The World Unclaimed

A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique ofHusserl

LILIAN ALWEISS

Ohio University Press A T H E N S

Series in Continental Thought

E D I T O R I A L B O A R D

Steven Gait Crowell, Chairman, Rice University Elizabeth A. Behnke David Carr, Emory University J o h n J. Drummond , Mount St. Mary's College Lester Embree , Florida Atlantic University Burt C. Hopkins, Seattle University Jose Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University Joseph J. Kockelmans, Pennsylvania State University William R. McKenna, Miami University Algis Mickunas, Ohio University J. N. Mohanty, Temple University Thomas Nenon, University of Memphis Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg Universitat, Mainz Gail Soffer, New School for Social Research Elizabeth Stroker, Universitat Koln f Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbil t University

I N T E R N A T I O N A L A D V I S O R Y B O A R D

Suzanne Bachelard, Universite de Paris Rudolf Boehm, Rijksuniversiteit Gent Albert Borgmann, University of Montana Amedeo Giorgi, Saybrook Institute Richard Grathoff, Universitat Bielefeld Samuel Ijsseling, Husserl-Archief te Leuven Alphonso Lingis, Pennsylvania State University Werne r Marx, Albert-Ludwigs Universitat, Freiburg f David Rasmussen, Boston College J o h n Sallis, Pennsylvania State University J o h n Scanlon, Duquesne University H u g h J. Silverman, State University of New York, Stony Brook Carlo Sini, Universita di Milano Jacques Taminiaux, Louvain-la-Neuve D. Lawrence Wieder Dallas Willard, University of Southern California

Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio 45701

© 2003 by Lilian Alweiss

Printed in the United States of America

All rights reserved

Ohio University Press books are printed on acid-free paper 0

12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 5 4 3 2 1

Aversion of chapter two was published as "The Enigma of Time" in PhanomenologischeForschungen 4/2 (1999): 159-202

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Alweiss, Lilian, 1966-The world unclaimed : a challenge to Heidegger's critique of Husserl / Lilian Alweiss.

p. cm. — (Series in Continental Thought; 30) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8214-1464-X 1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 2. Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938.1. Title. II. Series.

B3279.H49 A644 2002 193-dc21

2002066301

For my parents

"Hiersdn ist herrlich * — Rainer Maria Rilke, Duineser Elegien

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XI LIST OE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT AND ENDNOTES xi i i INTRODUCTION x ix PROLOGUE 1

C H A P T E R O N E . H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R : A R E A P P R A I S A L OF T H E I R R E L A T I O N S H I P

Introduction 3 Why Husserl Is Not an Internalist

§1. Husserl, a Methodological Solipsist? 4 §2. Object and Meaning Do Not Coincide 5 §3. The Structure of Consciousness 6 §4. The Problem of Reference 7 §5. "The Ontological Turn of the Concept of Evidence" 8

Heidegger's Indebtedness to Husserl §6. Intuitions zvithout Concepts Are Blind 10 §7. Categorial Intuition 11 §8. Being Is Not a Predicate 12

The Transcendental Turn §9. The Transcendental Turn 13 §10. Husserl and Hu me 15 §11. The Spectacle of the World 16 §12. Ontology versus Epistemology 19

Conclusion 20

C H A P T E R T W O . T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

Introduction 22 Heidegger's Critique

§13. HusserVs Cartesianism 23 §14. The Incompleteness of Space 24 §15. The Bracketing of the Unseen 25 §16. An Incompleteness That Is Not Based on Lack 26 §17. The Affirmation of an Enclosed Space 27

Toward an "Unworldly" Existence §18. The 'Annihilation of the World" 29 §19. The Description of Immanent Perception in Ideen I 30 §20. Limitations of Ideen I 32

C O N T E N T S

§84. Phenomenology as a Form of Archaeology 134 §85. To Practice Phenomenology Is to Practice Humility 136

Conclusion 138

C H A P T E R FIVE. T H E W O R L D R E C L A I M E D

Introduction 141 The Return to an Embodied Dasein

§86. The Need to Return to an Embodied Dasein 142 §87. Heidegger's Reservations 145 §88. "The Body as an Outer Brain of Man " 147 §89. The Prioritization of Theoretical Consciousness 149

The Body Moves before T Can'—The Break with Immanence § 90. The Body as the Hyletic Foundation of Consciousness 151 §91. The Body That Is Felt 152 §92. The Double Apprehension of the Body 153 § 93. The Primacy of the Sensing Body 155 §94. The Reduction of the 7 Can' 155 §95. The Latency of Consciousness 156 §96. The Spatium Sensibile as the Abiding Correlate

ofExperien ce 157 §97. Husserl as the True Heir of Kant 158

The Primacy of the World §98. The Absolute Hereness' of My Body 160 §99. The Refutation of Idealism 161 §100. The Objective World 162 §101. But the World Does Not Move 163

Conclusion 165

A P P E N D I X . T H E W O R L D T H A T SPEAKS

(a) A Linguistic Departure 167 (b) The Symbolic Structure of the World 168 (c) Resisting the Hybrid Called Language' 171 (d) The Return to Dasein 176 (e) The Fear of Fragmentation 177 (f) The Spatial Basis of Language 178

NOTES 181 WORKS CITED 2 2 7 SUBJECT INDEX 2 3 7 NAME INDEX 2 4 1

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

MY SPECIAL THANKS go to those who have guided me through this work. They are Jay Bernstein, Howard Caygill, Simon Critchley, Klaus Held, William Large, and David Smith. Many eyes and hands were involved to ensure the completion of this work, and I am indebted to them all: Yvonne Alweiss, Charles Barrow, Jeremy Dittmer, Ruth Goodwin, Brian Garvey, Richard Gray, Steven Kupfer, Jean Lechner, Ian Lyne, Alan Montefiore, Paul Naish, Joanna Oyediran, and Nicho­las Walker. I am extremely grateful to series editor Steven Crowell for his encouragement and advice, to the two anonymous readers for Ohio University Press for their detailed and constructive comments, and to Sharen Rose and Bevin McLaughlin for their editorial help. Finally, I should like to thank the many friends (too numerous to list) for their advice and encouragement at various stages of writing. It goes without saying that I am to be held responsible for any errors or misjudgments that remain.

This book is based on my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Essex and entitled "The Recovery of Time and the Loss of the World." I should like to thank the British Academy for its support at that time.

Abbreviations Used in the Text and Endnotes

Unless it is indicated otherwise, I have adhered to the most recent translations cited. Where the page number of the original text is not provided in the marginalia, I have provided the page number of the translated text. Anything in square brackets is my own addition.

A. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Note: The number after the Gesamtausgabe (GA) [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 19-] refers to the individual volume. I have cited the GA only where no other edition is available. When referring to an individual essay, I give two page numbers: the first refers to the page number in the original publication; the second, to the page number in subsequent editions in which the essay appears. Brief Letter Heidegger wrote to Husserl on 22 October 1927 in

Phdnomenologische Psychologie, Hua. IX, 601-2. [Translated by Thomas J. Sheehan: "The Idea of Phenomenology, with a Let­ter to Edmund Husserl." Listeningl2 (1977): 118-21.]

BW David Farrell Krell, ed. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings. Lon­don: Routledge Paul & Kegan, 1993.

GA 4 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Erlduterungen zu Holder-tins Dichtung. 1981.

GA 15 Curd Ochwadt, ed. Seminare (1951-1973). 1986. GA 20 Petra Jaeger, ed. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Mar-

burger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925). 1988. [Translated by Theodore Kisiel: History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena. Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.]

GA21 Walter Biemel, ed. Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Mar-burger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1925/26). 1976.

GA 24 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1927). 1975.

GA 26 Klaus Held, ed. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1928). 1978. [Translated by Michael Heim: The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.]

GA 29/30 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Die Grundbegriffe der

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Metaphysik, WeUFndUchkeit-Einsamkdt (Freiburger Vorlesung Win-tersemester 1929/30). 1983. [Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker: The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics— World, Finitude, Solitude. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.] Manfred S. Frings, ed. Parmenides (Freiburger Vorlesung Win-tersemester 1942/43). 1982. Claudius Strube, ed. Phdnomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks—Theorie der Philosophischen Begriffsbildung (Frei­burger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1920). 1993. Kate Brocker-Oltmanns, ed. Ontobgie (Hermeneutik der Faktizi-tat) (Friihe Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1923). 1988.

Holzwege Holzwege (1935-1946). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster-mann, 1950. Or GA 5, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. 1977.

Kantbuch Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), 5th extended edi­tion. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991. Or GA 3, 1991. [Translated by Richard Taft: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.]

Kunst und Raum "Die Kunst und der Raum" (1969). In GA 13, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, ed. Hermann Heidegger, 1983, 203-10. [Translated by Charles H. Seibert: "Art and Space." Man and Worldb (1973): 3-8.]

Letter to Richardson. In William J. Richardson, Heidegger through Phenome­nology to Thought, viii-xxi. The Hague: Martinus NijhofF, 1963.

OWL On the Way to Language. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. SuZ Sein und Zeit (1927), 15th revised and extended edition.

Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979. Or GA 2, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1977. [Translated—based on the seventh edition—by John Macquarrie and Edward Robin­son: Being and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.]

UzS Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Pfullingen: Gtinther Neske, 1959. Or GA 12, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1985.

WdG "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1929) in Wegmarken, 123-73. [Translated—based on the fourth German edition—by Ter-rence Malick: The Essence of Reasons. Evanston, 111.: Northwest­ern University Press, 1969.

Wegmarken Wegmarken (1919-1961), 2nd revised edition. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. Or GA9, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1976. [The citations refer to the 1978 edi­tion.] For translations of individual essays, see bibliography.

WhD Was heisst Denken? (1951-1952), 4th edition. Tubingen: Max

GA54

GA59

GA63

A B B R E V I A T I O N S XV

Niemeyer Verlag, 1984. Or GA 8. [Translated by Fred D. Wieck a n d j . Glenn Gray: What Is Called Thinking? New York: Harper & Row, 1968.]

Zdhringer Seminare Seminare zu Zdhringen. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973. Or "Seminar in Zahringen 1973" in GA 15,372-400.

ZSD Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-1964). Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969. Or GA 14. [Translated by Joan Stambaugh: On Time and Being. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.]

B. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR EDMUND HUSSERL

Note: All references give the page number of the HUSSERLIANA (Hua) (Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke [based on the unpublished work in the Husserl-Archive]. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950-) first.

The page numbers in the marginalia of the English translation of Hua X refer to the Hua, whereas the page numbers in the marginalia of the English translation of Idem / r e fe r to the 1913 (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag) edition.

Unless otherwise noted, I have made only the following two amend­ments to the published translations: 1) I have translated the term Erlebnis as "lived experience" and not as "mental process"; 2) I have translated the term Leib as "lived body" and not as "Body." BrWII HUSSERLIANA-DOKUMENTE Karl Schuhmann in conjunction

with E. Schuhmann, ed. Briefwechsel, vol. 2. 1994. BrWIII HUSSERLIANA-DOKUMENTE Karl Schuhmann in conjunction

with E. Schuhmann, ed. Briefwechsel, vol. 3, Die Gottinger Schule. 1994.

CM S. Strasser, ed. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrdge. 1950. The main text has been edited and individually pub­lished by Elisabeth Stroker: Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1987. [Translated by Dorion Cairns: Cartesian Meditations—An Intro­duction to Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I960.]

EU Ludwig Landgrebe, ed. Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie derLogik, 6th revised edition. With an afterword and index by Lothar Eley. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1985. [Translated byJ. S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks: Experience and

Judgement—Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973.]

Hua II Walter Biemel, ed. Idee der Phdnomenologie, Fiinf Vorlesungen (1907). 1973. [Translated by William P. Alston and George

XVI A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Nakhnikian: The Idea of Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.]

Hua VIII Rudolf Boehm, ed. Erste Philosophie (1923-1924). 1959. Hua IX Walter Biemel, ed. Phdnomenologische Psychologie (Vorlesungen

Sommersemester 1925). 1962. Hua X Rudolf Boehm, ed. Zur Phdnomenologie des Inneren Zeitbeiousst-

seins (1893-1917). 1966. Originally published as "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren ZeitbewuBtsein" (1905-1910), Martin Heidegger, ed., in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, vol. 9 (1928), 367-498; reprinted in Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1980. The additional texts of the critical edition of Zeitbewufitsein have been individ­ually published and edited by Rudolf Bernet: Texte zur Phdnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917). Ham­burg: Felix Mei-ner Verlag, 1985. [Translated by John Barnett Brough: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) Collected Works IV. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; Zeitbewufitsein was first translated by James S. Churchill as The Phenomenology of Inter­nal Time-Consciousness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964.]

Hua XI Margot Fleischer, ed. Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis (Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926). 1966.

Hua XVI Ulrich Claesges, ed. Ding und Raum (Vorlesungen 1907). 1973. Individual publication and edition of the main text and appendix I by Karl-Heinz Hahnengress and Smail Rapic. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991.

Hua XVII Paul Janssen, ed. Formale und transzendentale Logik— Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (1929). 1974. First published in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, vol. 10, and reprinted in Halle (Saale): Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929. [Translated by Dorion Cairns: Formal and Transcendental Logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.]

Ideen I Hua III. Walter Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Ein-fuhrung in die reine Phanomenologie (1913), revised and ex­tended edition based on Husserl's handwritten marginalia. 1950. Originally published under the same title in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung vol. 1, and reprinted by Max Niemeyer, Halle, 1913. [Translated by F. Kersten: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenobgical Philos­ophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology; Col­lected Works, vol. II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. Ideen I was first translated by W. R. Gibson under the auspices of Hus-

A B B R E V I A T I O N S XV11

serl in 1931 as Ideas— General Introduction to a Pure Phenome­nology. New York: First Collier Books Edition, 1962.]

Ideen II Hua IV. Marly Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenolo­gie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phdnomeno-bgische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, ([1912-] 1928). 1952. [Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Phi­losophy; Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.]

Ideen III Hua V. Marly Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch, Die Phdnome­nologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaf ten. 1971. [Translated by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl: Edmund Husserl Phenom­enology and the Foundations of the Sciences; Third Book, Ideas Per­taining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980.]

Krisis Hua VI. Walter Biemel, ed. Die Krisis der europdischen Wissen-schaften und die transzendentale Phdnomenlogie (1934-1937). 1954. [Translated by David Garr: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1970.]

LI J. N. Findlay, trans. Logical Investigations, vols. I and II. Lon­don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.

LU Hua XVIII-XIX/1-2; originally published as Logische Untersu­chungen. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2nd revised edi­tion. Vol. I: Hua XVIIL Elmar Holenstein, ed. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1913). 1975. Vol. I I / l : Hua XIX/1 . Ursula Pan­zer, ed. Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (1913). 1984. Vol. I I /2: Hua XIX/2. Ursula Panzer, ed. "Elemente einer phanomenologischen Aufklarung der Erkenntnis (1921)" in Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. 1984.

C. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR IMMANUEL KANT

KRV Wilhelm Weischedel, ed. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781 A ver­sion, 1787 B version), in Kant-Werke, vol. 3, part 1 and vol. 4, part 2, special edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-sellschaft, 1983. [Translated by Norman Kemp Smith: Imman-uel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: Macmillan Press, 1933.] All references are the standard first- and second-edition pagination.

AK Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences, ed.

XV111 A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Kants gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: Georg Reimer, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-.

D. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR EMMANUEL LEVINAS

AQE Autrement quetre on au-dela de ['essence (Phaenomenologica 54). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. [Translated by Alphonso Lingis: Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. The Hague: Mar­tinus Nijhoff, 1981.]

DEHH En decouvrant Vexistence avec Husserl et Heidegger, 2nd revised and extended edition. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1967.

DL Difficile liberte, Essais sur le judaisme, 3rd edition. Paris: Albin Michel, 1976. [Translated by Sean Hand: Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. London: Athlone Press, 1990.]

DQVI De Dieu qui vient a Videe, 2nd revised and extended edition. Paris: J. Vrin, 1986.

EE De Vexistence a Vexistant (1940-1945). Paris: J. Vrin, 1990. [Translated by Alfonso Lingis: Existence and Existents. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.]

INTRODUCTION

H o w D O I K N O W that the external world exists? Can it not be that the world is nothing but a figment of my imagination? How can I be cer­tain that the content of my thought is identical with its referent, namely, an object in the external world? How can I ever know whether you view the world exacdy as I do? Moreover, how can I be sure that you exist and are not a mere automaton? There is a strand in contemporary philosophy that believes it has brought these ques­tions to a final halt. Instead of direcdy responding to these questions, which have been troubling philosophy ever since Descartes, it has begun to analyze the questioner herself. At issue here is not so much whether it is possible to provide a cogent proof for the existence of things outside us, but what it is that leads philosophers to seek such proof again and again. Attention has been diverted from trying to solve the problem to analyzing its source, namely, the motivation that has led philosophy to raise these questions in the first place. It may be fair to say that there is a tendency in contemporary philosophy to problematize the problem.

In this manner , philosophy has become self-reflexive. It attempts to unders tand the source of the characteristic anxieties of mode rn philosophy—anxieties that center on the relation between mind and world. Adherents to the analytic tradition have tended to pathologize philosophical issues. From Wittgenstein we learn that philosophy ought to be nothing other than a form of therapy. Epistemological skepticism about the existence of the external world is treated as if it were an illness that needs to be cured (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, §255). Continental philosophers, in turn, claim that philosophical issues have been shaped by a t radi t ion. We n e e d to r ead the history of philosophy, no t in o r d e r to unde r s t and the past bet ter , bu t to un­derstand our own critical position in the present. We learn that dis­tinctions between mind and world, reason and the given, emerge

X X I N T R O D U C T I O N

within an extended historical process of rational self-examination. What­ever counts as a constraint or limit of thought 's self-determination is its very own product .

While skeptics would question whether it is possible to match u p our ideas with the way things are "in themselves," anti-Cartesians would argue that skeptics fail to reflect on their own standards of eval­uation. In the analytic tradition the a rgument would be that Descartes has distorted the requirements for knowledge. Skepticism is a mis­guided philosophical position and reveals nothing about our every­day or scientific knowledge and beliefs.1 The continental tradition, in turn, would argue that the standards of evaluation as to whether things are "thus and so" are historically determined or internal to consciousness (cf. Hegel 1977, 53). In other words, those standards are defined in terms of the kinds of reasons we have to regard them as authoritative. Representatives of both traditions hold that philoso­phy needs to examine whether these grounds are legitimate.

It would thus appear that contemporary philosophy is nothing other than a clearing u p after the storm. Its primary concern is to dis­close the manner in which Cartesianism, particularly in its method and criterion for determining truth, is flawed and misguided. We are told that epistemological skepticism arises only when "language goes on holiday" (Wittgenstein 1958, §38). Epistemology is nothing but a history of bad ideas. If this were so, then philosophy should not seek to reveal anything new; rather it should disentangle our philosophical confusions and disclose that which Cartesianism has distorted and covered up, namely, our original familiarity with the world.2

However, there is a curious paradox connected with such a cor­rective or therapeutic stance to philosophy. Not only is it parasitic on the Cartesian premise it seeks to overcome, but, more important , the anti-Cartesian concerns are not as divorced from the Cartesian enter­prise as they may first appear. We should not forget that philosophi­cal skepticism about the external world is spurred by the desire to prove its existence. Descartes believed that he was able to prove that it is impossible to doubt the existence of the physical world. Yet, that the external world cannot be doubted can be known only through the me thod of doubt itself. In other words: the proof provided by Des­cartes is that his initial doubts "should be dismissed as laughable."3

Doubt refutes skepticism. Hence Descartes, the father of m o d e r n skepticism, appears to be the first to agree with the claim that philos-

I N T R O D U C T I O N XXI

ophy should at tempt to disentangle our initial confusions. The aim is to overcome skepticism.

However, the parallel drawn here is not as straightforward as it might seem. It is true that there are many anti-Cartesians who remain loyal to the Cartesian project. They believe that Descartes has failed to overcome skepticism and seek to improve his method. Though their work is critical, it remains within the spirit of the Cartesian leg­acy. We may call such objections internal, insofar as they adhere to the terms that Descartes has set himself.4 Yet, what is distinctive about the ruling conception of philosophy today is that its anti-Cartesian stance is far bolder. Its objections are external to the Cartesian enterprise. It no longer seeks to overcome skepticism; rather it seeks to undermine the very project itself. The various anti-Cartesian positions could be presented in the following way. The first two refer to internal, and the last one refers to external, objections raised against the Cartesian enterprise:

1. There are those who accept Descartes's project, yet question whether Descartes has not been disingenuous about the limits of pos­sible doubt. They claim that Descartes was premature in taking the certainty that "I am a thinking thing" as an ultimate premise, and ar­gue that Descartes failed to overcome skepticism about the external world. Such objections are exemplified in Kant's "Refutation of Ide­alism." According to Kant, if self-knowledge is regarded as primary, the existence of things outside us can only be inferred but never known. Hence, according to Kant, it is "a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general" that there is still no cogent proof for "the existence of things outside of us."5 From Kant we learn that we can do away with skepticism about the external world only if we can prove that knowledge of ourselves presupposes knowledge of things outside us. In this manner , thinkers like Kant raise objections that are internal to the Cartesian enterprise. The aim is to overcome skepticism — a move which, they believe, Descartes has failed to accomplish.

2. There is another anti-Cartesian strand in philosophy that does not seek to correct the Cartesian project but endeavors to puncture its pretensions of reason by showing that skepticism is impossible. Such objections are still internal to the Cartesian enterprise insofar as they show that Descartes fails to adhere to the terms that he has set himself. They question the possibility of universal doubt . Hume , for example, contends that skeptical doubt is possible only if we believe

XX11 I N T R O D U C T I O N

we have knowledge of an external world in the first place.6 Whatever argument is provided, it presupposes a belief in the existence of the ex­ternal world which can never be undone.7 Another prime contender for such an anti-skeptical position is Hegel. We learn from Hegel that t rue skeptics would have to concede that all points of view are relative to our own contingent subjective point of view. However, in order to make such a claim the skeptic must assume a detached universal point of view—one, however, which she cannot justify. The pretensions of skepticism are thus rendered inefficacious by the impossibility of ar­riving at an Archimedian point that lies beyond the realm of doubt.8

Skepticism (Zweifel) is nothing other than a pathway of despair (Ver-zweiflung). Authoritative skepticism must be skeptical about itself; it must realize that it itself is only an "appearance" (cf. Hegel 1977, 49f).

3. These internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise have been replaced by external objections that define the ruling concep­tion of the philosophical enterprise today. Today many philosophers no longer seek to overcome or to refute the pretensions of skepti­cism; instead they question why we should desire to be skeptics in the first place. Contrary to Kant, they claim that the scandal of philosophy is not so much that a proof for the existence of things outside us is still outstanding but that philosophy is expecting such proof again and again (cf. SuZ, §43a, 205). We are mistaken in seeking an ultimate premise that renders our relation to the world intelligible. As Witt­genstein observes: "It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go further back" (Wittgenstein 1975, §471). Contemporary philosophy ques­tions whether there is an Archimedian point at all. We are encour­aged to accept that a "beginning" could have "no foundation upon which something could be built" (ZSD, 34 / 32E). The aim, then, is to collapse the traditional project of Cartesian rationalism. Contem­porary anti-Cartesianism is anti-foundationalist and thus departs radi­cally from the Cartesian enterprise. The objections it raises are external to the terms that Descartes has set. The aim here is no longer to overcome skepticism and to arrive at certainty. Such an enterprise itself is jeopardized.

Inevitably, the question arises whether such a radical and exter­nal objection to Descartes provides a new dimension to the under­standing of our relation to the world, a dimension the Cartesian system cannot acknowledge. To understand the significance of this

I N T R O D U C T I O N XX111

question it is important first to recall that although Descartes reached the conclusion that his initial doubts were laughable, he would not claim that his initial doubts were futile. Quite the contrary, Descartes contends that skepticism frees us "from an error that has gripped all of us since our childhood, when we came to believe that there are no bod­ies a round us except those capable of being perceived by the senses" (Descartes 1985, 17). In this manner Descartes wishes to show that physical science is possible once we realize that it should not be guided by the senses alone but also by the natural light of reason. Doubt leads to certainty; however, it is a certainty of a world which we would not have were we not skeptics initially.

If we follow the anti-Cartesian stance, we cannot accept Des-cartes's solutions since we no longer accept his premise. That is to say, if we can no longer accept the process of doubt by means of which the assurance of the external world is achieved, then we have to arrive at a different conception of a world. Indeed, those anti-Cartesians who refuse to endorse the method of doubt do not affirm the world of physical science that Descartes had in mind, but a world that discloses itself before any doubt is possible. The world they refer to is the world of the everyday, the world of meaning and belief, or the world of praxis. The claim is that this world can be disclosed only outside the Cartesian project and thus remains anterior to and radically different from any Cartesian conception of a world.

This book sets out to explore whether these external objections to Descartes do, in fact, reveal as fundamentally new a conception of our relation to the world as these thinkers would have us believe. We remain skeptical as to whether it is that easy to dispose of the Carte­sian problematic; for it would appear that external objections shy away from the problem of the external world, ra ther than proving why we should no longer be troubled by skepticism. Moreover, we be­lieve that the internal objections raised against Descartes's system al­low for a far more truthful depiction of our relation to the world than those external objections that refuse to face the problem in the first place.

This book contends that contemporary philosophy has been pre­mature in dismissing skepticism and illustrates this by focusing on the writings of two closely related thinkers who share the same historical descent: Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It is tempting to compare these two thinkers, since they were in constant dialogue with

XXIV I N T R O D U C T I O N

one another, debating whether to adopt an internal or an external critical stance to the Cartesian tradition. The philosophical dialogue between them is thus a very useful way of probing the issues that char­acterize Cartesian and anti-Cartesian responses to skepticism. Ed­m u n d Husserl sides with those thinkers who seek to rescue Descartes from his own pitfalls; namely, he develops internal objections to Des­cartes's skepticism and endeavors to replace it with what he calls a "cri­tique of cognition" (Hua II, 29). Heidegger, in contrast, belongs to the contemporary strand of philosophy that is powerfully anti-Cartesian. He regards Husserl as a representative of the (Cartesian) tradition and in his main work, SuZ, seeks to show why the Cartesian premise is flawed and misguided. In his view the problem of the external world arises only if we believe that there is a subject that is distinct from the phenomenon of the world. Heidegger contends that this "worldless" subject is a philosophical fiction, as is the problem of the external world. The main thrust of SuZ is to show why skepticism, and with it the central issue that has troubled philosophy ever since Des­cartes, has become redundant . Though sympathetic to Heidegger 's project, this book questions whether Heidegger manages to reclaim the world which the Cartesian tradition has puportedly overlooked. The book sets out to explore what it means to ignore or, indeed, "jump over" the phenomenon of the world. It asks what kind of world Heidegger has in mind when he articulates this critique. Rather than approaching this question sideways by postulating in advance our conception of the world, we will investigate what motivates Heidegger to reconsider the conception of the world and whether he fulfills his promise to salvage the phenomenon of the world which he believes the tradition of philosophy has ignored.

The book is divided into five chapters: Chapter 1 explores how we are to interpret Heidegger 's depar­

ture from Husserl. It argues that although Heidegger repeatedly ac­cuses Husserl of exemplifying the tradition of philosophy by returning to a 'worldless subject', we should not understand this accusation as a form of internalism, in the sense made familiar by contemporary ana­lytic philosophy. The chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 will demonstrate that Husserl is not an internalist. LU show that proposi-tional attitudes cannot be assessed without reference to external states of affairs. Part 2 argues that, as long as we depict Husserl as an inter­nalist, we fail to recognize the significant breakthrough of Husserl's

I N T R O D U C T I O N xxv

phenomenology—namely, that it lays out a new form of objectivity and thereby facilitates the question of Being. Part 3 argues that, even after Husserl's so-called transcendental turn, the accusation that Husserl is a methodological solipsist is misplaced. Rather than ignoring the world, the transcendental reduction brings into the foreground the phenomenon of the world.

Indeed, Heidegger praises Husserl not only for overcoming Car­tesian representationalism, but for raising, and even answering, the question of Being. Hence, Heidegger 's objections to Husserl 's work cannot be understood in terms of the recent internalism/externalism debate. What Heidegger objects to is Husserl 's transcendental turn. This is not because he believes that it advocates a methodological sol­ipsism, but because it is epistemologically motivated. The problem, for Heidegger, is that Husserl adheres to the tradition insofar as he raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise. He uses Carte­sian doubt as a methodological device without, however, taking any of its premises for granted. Husserl is thereby thoroughly anti-Cartesian in his Cartesianism. First, unlike Descartes, Husserl believes that doubt leads not to the certainty that "I am a thinking thing," but to the realization that we can never think without thinking of something. Essential to cognition is that thought is directed toward something, whether real or imaginary. Husserl calls this directedness intentional-ity. Second, Husserl believes Descartes was mistaken in equating doubt with a moment of negation. If we wish to be true skeptics, we need to abstain from making judgments . Husserl calls such a suspen­sion of j udgmen t ^TTO^T], or bracketing. Thus Husserl avoids the pit­falls of skepticism as described above: namely, that if doubt were a form of judgment , we would conflate our own personal point of view with a universal point of view, a move that would puncture the preten­sions of skepticism.

The issue for Heidegger is that because Husserl raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise, he fails to realize that the world is an existential structure of Dasein which can never be turned into an 'object' of reflection. This is why Husserl, in the final analysis, forgets the question of Being. Like other adherents to the tradition of philosophy, he affirms a philosophy of consciousness (Bewufttseins-philosophie) which ignores the phenomenon of the world.

Chapter 2 seeks to understand the nature of Husserl 's Cartesian­ism. It explores Husserl 's at tempt to justify the claim that the stream

XXVI I N T R O D U C T I O N

of the appearing world in its suspension, though constantiy changing, is fully present in its unity. We will show that Husserl 's project is doomed to failure: there is always a trail of life that escapes conscious­ness which can never be made fully present. Husserl fails to remain faithful to the aim he has set himself, namely, to re turn to an Archi-median beginning that lies beyond the realm of doubt. The enclosed space of consciousness is always already broken.

The chapter further shows that Husserl adheres to the tradition by prioritizing consciousness over and against the spatiotemporal world. It claims that Husserl's anti-Cartesianism is essentially Kantian in style. Just as Kant argues that the world needs to conform to our m o d e of representation, Husserl argues that objects need to conform to the "style" of consciousness. Also like Kant, Husserl realizes that any experience, even immanent experience, needs to be accompanied by an experiencing consciousness, which is that of the pure Ego in Hus­serl, and the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant. Though Husserl's phenomenology imitates a certain form of Kantianism, it ex­ceeds Kant insofar as it manifests that which critical philosophy posits.

According to Heidegger, Husserl's anti-Cartesianism has deep­ened philosophy's subjective turn, since the concern is no longer "How do I know that the world exists?" but "How does the world in its suspension appear to consciousness?" Husserl is concerned neither with the subject nor with the world, but merely with the directedness of thought itself. In this respect Husserl's revised and critical Carte-sianism epitomizes modern philosophy: it makes explicit philoso­phy's implicit disinterestedness in the existence of the external world. Philosophy is concerned only with the manner in which we are con­scious ofthe world; everything that lies beyond the realm of conscious­ness is r endered futile. This leads Heidegger to claim that Husserl affirms a claustrophobic immanence which excludes the possibility of a m o m e n t of exteriority.

Chapter 3 sets out to explore Heidegger 's response to the tradi­tion of philosophy. Heidegger seeks to disclose a world that does not require validation through doubt. That which determines the mean­ing and nature of the world is no longer doubt but the manner in which we are bonded to the world. What defines us living human be­ings is our compor tment to the world. Heidegger uses the term Da-sein to emphasize our openness to the world. Before we think, we find ourselves "over there" (Da) in a world. Dasein is always already "other"

I N T R O D U C T I O N XXV11

(transcendent) to consciousness ( immanence) . Heidegger thereby suggests a "revolution of the place of thinking" (Zdhringer Seminare, 385 / 123) by prioritizing transcendence over immanence. A topology of thinking stands in "lieu" of consciousness.

The chapter is concerned with the very dis-location, or Ortsver-legung (Zdhringer Seminare, 123 / 385), that the term Dasein suggests. It examines whether SuZ manages to retrieve the world that the tra­dition of philosophy has purportedly overlooked. Although SuZ sug­gests a radical break with Husserl, we show that SuZ consistently resists what its critique opens up , namely, the re turn to the material world and an embodied Dasein. In a manner analogous to Husserl, Heidegger refuses to acknowledge the anterior excess of a life that lies beyond the grasp of Dasein. Rather than returning to things them­selves as they show themselves, Heidegger turns away from what shows itself. Thus, Heidegger, like Husserl, discloses a self-enclosed constitu­tive site and fails to acknowledge that this site is always already b r o k e n .

Chapter 4 argues that SuZ fails to overcome philosophy's subjective turn. Heidegger remains concerned with the question of the "how"— namely, how Dasein comports itself to the world. The world is not at issue here; only the manner in which the world matters to Dasein counts. The world is understood purely adverbially. Like Husserl, Heidegger thereby defines the world as a temporal horizon of Dasein. Heidegger departs from Husserl only by calling this horizon finite, in contrast to Husserl's infinite stream of consciousness. In this manner Heidegger falls prey to the very critique that he himself directs against the tradition. His only concern is Dasein, and everything that exceeds Dasein's understanding is rendered otiose.

Moreover, by denying the possibility of bracketing the world, SuZ lets the world disappear without acknowledging its loss. Heidegger, even more than Husserl, epitomizes the tradition, insofar as he brings its disinterestedness in the phenomenon of the world to completion. Husserl at least lets the world appear in its suspension. To put it an­other way, Husserl acknowledges the bracketing of the world, while Heidegger wipes out the world without leaving any traces behind, since he denies the possibility of doubting its existence in the first place. This has devastating consequences, for it leads to the denial of any form of exteriority. Dasein's transcendence is even more claustropho­bic than Husserl's account of immanence.

xxviii I N T R O D U C T I O N

The final chapter explores whether Heidegger's project can be rescued—whether it is possible to pierce the field of immanence and retrieve the world that the tradition has overlooked. We shall claim that such a retrieval is possible if we return to those thinkers who raise internal objections to the Cartesian system, in particular Kant and Husserl. We can reclaim the world that the tradition has ignored only by returning to those thinkers whom Heidegger seeks to overcome.

PROLOGUE

T H E Y ARE T O O C L O S E to separate and too far away to see each other. They can neither u n d o their respect for one another nor bear the closeness. It is the father who sees his life continued in the son. The son, however, can only accept the heritage by turning against the father. This is how we could describe the relationship between Hus­serl and Heidegger.

Husserl considered Heidegger to be his heir. Heidegger was the only student who could explore "unknown depths" of Husserl's phenome-nological method.1 With prophetic irony Husserl wrote to Pfander that Heidegger would "not only inherit bu t even surpass."2 Husserl 's hopes and expectations were that Heidegger would not just continue the phenomenological project but exceed it by allowing for new open­ings and insights Husserl himself could not have envisaged. Inevitably, however, as soon as Heidegger articulated his depar ture in SuZ—a text Husserl accepted for publication in his Jahrbuchfur Phanomenolo-gischeForschungwithout even having read the manuscript in detail (cf. Breeur 1994, 3)—an irreconcilable rift emerged. Heidegger would proudly claim that he unders tood the project of phenomenology bet­ter than its founding father did: "To this day I still consider [SuZ] a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology" (Letter to Richardson, xv). Heidegger believed that he had both inherited and surpassed Husserl 's legacy. Husserl, for his part, felt betrayed and argued that Heidegger 's depar ture was made possible only by a distor­tion of his own phenomenological method. In a letter to Roman In-garden Husserl complained: "Heidegger has never unders tood the true meaning of the method of the transcendental reduction."3

Heidegger, the heir so greatly admired, would soon become the "en­emy" (Feind) .4 Accusations of betrayal would replace declarations of admiration.

This is the setting in which our writing takes place. Our aim is no t to reconstruct the awareness and (mis)understanding each thinker had of the other; it is ra ther to explore SuZ in terms of its adherence to and depar ture from Husserl. It will emerge that SuZ's adherence to

2 PROLOGUE

Husserl is far s t ronger than it tries to make us believe. T h e aim is not to vindicate Husserl, nor to blunt Heidegger's philosophical rigor. We are only too keenly aware that to philosophize means to do vio­lence and any at tempt to do justice, any academic exercise which is en­gaged merely in trying to minimize differences between thinkers, leads to the greater violence of a philosophical silencing.5 Rather than reducing the differences between the thinkers, the aim is to locate Heidegger 's true depar ture from Husserl. For SuZ's failure to depar t from Husserl will unwittingly reveal the avenue by which a true depar­ture is possible.

SuZ's success thus lies in its failure. By drawing on its failure we can both exceed Husserl and overcome the limitations of SuZ. We embark on a curious journey. By taking SuZ's critique of Husserl as our point of depar ture , we shall constantly be drawn back to Husserl. SuZ's critique of the tradition of idealism (the term tradition he re al­ways includes Husserl, who, according to Heidegger, still exemplifies the tradition)6 paves the way for the claim that nothing is more urgent today than the task of rethinking our relation to the world in terms of kinaesthesia and embodiment . Yet, as this work will show, it is Husserl and no t Heidegger who will allow us to unders tand our relation to the world in this manner . SuZ's critique of idealism thus inadvertently prepares the g round for a re turn to Husserl.

From the outset our reading is thematically restricted. We read SuZ in terms of its adherence to and depar ture from Husserl, and measure SuZ's success in relation to SuZ's own proclaimed trajectory. The Husserl in question is the Husserl preceding the publication of SuZ. For the aim is to investigate how Husserl unwittingly provides the way for an adequate response to SuZ before SuZ was even written.

CHAPTER O N E

Husserl and Heidegger A Reappraisal of Their Relationship

INTRODUCTION

E D M U N D H U S S E R L ' S phenomenological approach is often inter­pre ted as a form of internalism or "methodological solipsism."1 Hus­serl, it is claimed, describes our propositional attitudes in ways that do not require the existence of any particular objects or propert ies in the world. We know the content of our minds. However, we "lack the resources with which to explain how such subjective, intentional expe­riences can ever make contact with reality, or can ever be related to things which are not subjective or intentional in such a way as to con­stitute objective knowledge of them" (Bell 1990, 148). In view of this, Heidegger 's position may appear far more attractive. It advocates an externalist position and shows that experience should be unders tood no longer in terms of consciousness but "as the transcendence of the self to things in the world" (Keller 1999, 100) .2

The aim of this chapter is to show that such a reading is misleading: although Heidegger accuses Husserl of returning to a philosophy of con­sciousness {Bexvufitseinsphilosophie), it would be a mistake to interpret that accusation in terms of the internalism/externalism debate. Heidegger does not accuse Husserl of returning to "the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theater" (Keller 1999, 43); indeed, he praises him for overcoming Cartesian representationalism (cf. GA 20, §6b, a, 78). Husserl, so Heidegger believes, shows that our lived experiences (Er-lebnisse) are never of mental contents but "simple cognizance of what is found" (GA 20, §5c, a, 51). Nonetheless, Heidegger admonishes Husserl for his Cartesianism. Husserl still takes the Cartesian project seriously, insofar as he seeks to secure our knowledge of the external world by puncturing the pretensions of skepticism. For Heidegger the

4 H U S S E R L A N D H E I D E G G E R

problem is not that Husserl can describe only the contents of our mind, but that he adheres to the parameters set by the Cartesian enterprise. Thus, when we seek to explain Heidegger's departure from Husserl, we should not draw on the internalism/externalism debate, but should focus on the different ways in which the two thinkers respond to the Cartesian legacy.3

WHY HUSSERL IS NOT AN INTERNALIST

§1. Husserl, a Methodological Solipsist?

When we turn to LU, the claim that Husserl promotes an internalist position seems far-fetched. After all, the explicit aim of LU is to salvage logic from psychologism and thereby to affirm the existence of a non-mental reality. In line with his contemporary Gottlob Frege, Husserl argues that we should never conflate concrete (psychical or phenom-enological) processes of thinking with pure logic, nor temporally individuated acts of thinking with the ideal conditions of cognition. Were we to fail to draw such distinctions, we would no longer be able to distinguish between "being true" and "being taken as t rue" (Frege 1966, 30 ff.), and would be paving the way toward skepticism, subjec­tivism, and relativism (cf. LU I, Prol. §36 ff.).

Like Frege, Husserl is thus most anxious to ensure a level of mean­ing or sense which he regards to be the true object of logical inquiry. Moreover, like Frege, he believes that logical propositions expressed as a result of logical thinking refer to a sphere of sense which is not contained in the act of thinking. Nothing about the act of counting, for example, belongs to the sense or content of a pure number . Rather numbers , propositions, and logical proofs constitute a closed realm of objects that Husserl calls ideal. Logic refers to pure concepts or propo­sitions, just as mathematics speaks about mathematical truths whose meaning does not depend on the existence of a spatiotemporal world. Irrespective of whether there is such a world or, indeed, a subject that thinks, logical or mathematical truths such as 2 + 2 = 4 subsist. Pure truths, according to Husserl, are ideal. They are not conditioned by the factual world.4

So why is it that Husserl is nonetheless read as an internalist?5 The reason seems to be that Husserl fails to deliver what he promises. Hus­serl cannot reach a full-blooded objectivity because he argues not

Why Husserl Is Not an Internalist 5

only, in line with Frege, that logical truths are ideal, but also, unlike Frege, that it is only possible to overcome logical psychologism if one is also able to show how the truths of logic exhibit a necessary relation to psychological matters of fact (our actual thought processes).6 It is this latter move that may suggest the view that Husserl is an internalist, for, inevitably, his focus is on the subjective side of experience (Hus­serl calls it noetic), and he has no way of showing how it corresponds to an object as it is in itself.

Such a reading is, however, misleading. Husserl does not study in­tentional objects as intrinsic to acts; Husserl in fact seeks to account for an extra-mental reality. Yet, he believes he can do this only by ad­dressing the problem of constitution, namely, by showing how our thought processes relate to an objectivity, the existence of which Hus­serl takes for granted.7 The question is not "How do we impose sub­jective forms onto an objective reality?" or "How do objects appear within our mind?" but "How do subjective acts instantiate (cf. Smith 1989, 163), or constitute, objective ideal laws of logic or meanings which are true and exist in themselves, independent of our thinking about them?" By addressing the problem in this manner Husserl does not reduce objectivity to subjective experience; rather, the reverse is true: he describes our relation to objectivity.8

§2. Object and Meaning Do Not Coincide

We can best illustrate what is at issue through reflections on language. According to Husserl, in every objectivating act, meaning is consti­tuted. This meaning is never intrinsic to the act. As Husserl puts it: "Each expression not merely says something, but says it ^/something: it not only has a meaning, but refers to certain objects. . . . But the object never coincides with the meaning" (LU I, §12, 52; LI, 287). We need to differentiate between the acts that form words and that confer meanings and the object that is meant. Husserl illustrates this by pointing out (in line with Frege) that two acts of meaning can have the same object but different "contents."9 We can name the same histori­cal figure when we refer to "the victor at Jena" and "the vanquished at Waterloo." Although the expressed meanings are different, they intend or refer to the same object, namely, Napoleon (cf. LU I, §12, 53; LI, 287). In other words, apart from its meaning, an expression also has the function of "naming" something, the object we are thinking about. The object and the meaning of an expression do not coincide.

6 H U S S E R L A N D H E I D E G G E R

While the act of meaning changes over time —it can be ut tered in a number of different ways—its object remains identical.

To explain this difference Husserl distinguishes between the ob­jec t pure and simple that is intended and the object as it is intended (cf. LU V, §17, 414; LI, 578). While the object that is intended does no t change—it possesses an unchanging identity which is "ideal" — the object as it is intended can vary both qualitatively and materially. Not only can it be intended in different apprehensional modes—we can think, fantasize, desire, or perceive one and the same object; but the object can also be determined in a particular manner , i.e., we can re­fer to the knife as such, or the knife as lying on the table. Husserl thus distinguishes between the objectivity (Gegenstdndlichkeit) to which an act taken fully directs itself (the knife as such) and the objects (Gegen-stdnde) to which different partial acts direct themselves (cf. LU V, §17, 415; LI, 579). The object as such appears as the telos of various inten­tional processes. It stands to multiple acts of expressing as the species (or essence) "redness" stands to multiple instances of various shades of r ed (cf. LU I, §31,106; LI, 330) .10

In a word, the example of language illustrates that a certain content-species is instantiated or constituted in every act. This content is not re­ducible to individual acts or use. Rather it refers to an ideal unity (cf. LU I, §29) whose identity and objectivity persists over time and space.

§3. The Structure of Consciousness

Husserl now holds that every conscious act refers to an object; it is inten­tional. If this is so, then consciousness should not be understood as an inner theater, since it essentially involves reference to an object. Hus­serl, indeed, warns us not to confuse the term consciousnessvaXh the real being of the empirical ego, i.e., the psychic experiences in the stream of consciousness (cf. LU V, §4, 363; LI, 541), or with an inner aware­ness of one's psychic perception (cf. LU V, §5). Rather we should understand consciousness in the "pregnant" sense, as intentional expe­rience (Husserl calls it a mental act) which incorporates the distinction between psychic processes (the individual acts) and ideal being (mean­ing) . Husserl thereby breaks with the tradition, inaugurated by Des­cartes, that advocates a representational theory of knowledge.11 He redefines the way we should understand the term consciousness. As Heidegger observes, "When all epistemological assumptions are set aside, it becomes clear that comportment itself—as yet quite apart

Why Husserl Is Not an Internalist 7

from the question of its correctness or incorrectness—is in its very structure a directing-itself-toward" (GA 20, §5a, 40).

§4. The Problem of Reference

Consciousness not only expresses "a [direct] relation . . . to some ' t ranscendent ' matter" (LU V, appendix to §11 & §20, 437; LI, 595), but also directs itself toward something objective. It is important to unders tand what Husserl has in mind when he refers to "objectivity" or the "object." Like Frege, Husserl holds that even an expression that has no actual object, such as a round square, has signification. Unlike a mere collection of words that does not form a unified sense (or mean­ingful whole),12 the expression obeys the syntactic rules for forming complex meanings. While Frege believes that an expression that is correcdy constructed grammatically does not necessarily have a refer­ence, Husserl argues that the fact that an expression has no actual object does not mean that it has no reference to an object or that it is non-referential. "To use an expression significantly, and to refer expressively to an object . . . ," Husserl says, "are one and the same. It makes no difference whether the object exists or is fictitious or even impossible" (LU I, §15, 59; LI, 293). Distancing himself from Bren-tano, Husserl claims that the object that is intended is "not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand) of the experience, it is in t ruth not really immanent or m e n t a l But it also does not exist extramentally, it does not exist at all" (LU V, §11, 387; LI, 559). Every mental act that confers meaning necessarily refers to an object that is intended. To refer to something with an expression is to mean (meinen) something, and that which is meant (das Gemeinte) is never identical with the way it is meant. However, to refer to some­thing is not to make the ontological claim that the object that is intended exists. "Object" for Husserl in the first instance means some­thing about which meaningful statements can be made (cf. §5 below).

Yet this could suggest that Husserl is an internalist after all. Hus­serl can unders tand the notion of reference only as something intrin­sicto an expression's meaning (cf. Bell 1990,130). As David Bell states it, "Precisely because 'objectrdirectedness' is an intrinsic property of acts, and one which they can possess without there actually being an object to which they are directed" (Bell 1990, 143), Husserl can have nothing to say about "how such subjective, intentional experiences can ever make contact with reality, or can ever be related to things

8 H U S S E R L A N D H E I D E G G E R

which are not subjective or intentional in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge of them" (Bell 1990, 148).13

§5. "The Ontological Turn of the Concept of Evidence"14

Yet Husserl 's position could not be more opposed to such a reading. H e does not at tempt to elucidate the concept of meaning indepen­dently from the concept of truth. To the contrary, Husserl holds that "consciousness was not merely an empty . . . having conscioused [Bezoussthaben], but also a process of accomplishing which is . . . goal-directed and directed towards the idea of truth" (Hua IX, 36).15 Every mental act seeks to bring into coincidence what is in tended with actual states of affairs. Husserl calls the experience of such a coinci­dence meaning-fulfillment, or evidence.16 Evidence, according to Husserl, is "the experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given state of affairs" (LU, Prol. §51, 193-4; LI, 195). When we judge , we make a j udgmen t not about the meaning of an expression but about the state of affairs that is intended (cf. LU I, §34). Full understanding—so Husserl holds —is guaranteed only if we know how to verify a meaning-intention; that is to say, if we know how to rec­ognize its truth value. Husserl illustrates this in the following example:

We clarify the concept (53)4by having recourse to the dennatory presentation: Number which arises when one forms the product 53 • 53 • 53 • 5 \ If we wish to clarify this latter concept, we must go back to the sense of 53, i.e., to the formation 5 • 5 • 5. Going back further, we should have to clarify 5 through the dennatory chain 5 - 4 + 1 , 4 - 3 + 1 , 3 = 2 + 1 , 2 = 1 + 1. After each step we should have to make a substitution in the preceding complex expression or thought, and, were this proceeding indefinitely repeatable —it is certainly so in itself, just as it is certainly not so for us—we should at last come to the completely explicated sum of ones of which we should say: "This is the number (53)4 'itself'." It is plain that an act of fulfilment not only corresponded to this final result, but to each individual step leading from one expres­sion of this number, to the expression next in order, which clarified it and enriched its content. In this manner each ordi­nary decimal number points to a possible chain of fulfilments. (LU VI, §18, 601; LI, 723)

Why Husserl Is Not an Internalist 9

To grasp evidently the equation, it is necessary to unders tand the whole chain of possible fulfillments that confirm it. Full understand­ing of mathematical expressions requires the ability to show how one arrived at them. The state of affairs is not a construction of the mind or an intrinsic property of an act but is arrived at through rational clarification. It is the telos of every act.

Yet, if Husserl truly believes that we cannot elucidate the concept of meaning apart from the concept of truth, then how are we to make sense of the contention troubling so many readers of Husserl, namely, that it is possible to refer to a theory of intentionality that is based on acts of consciousness that need have no object at all (cf. Bell 1990, 130 ff.)? Husserl's position here is not as paradoxical as it may at first appear, once we realize that Husserl, like Kant, draws a distinction be­tween thinking and knowing. For Kant an object is an object of knowledge only if it is given to us in a manner conforming to our form of intuition, namely, time (and space) and the categories of the understanding. This leads Kant to differentiate between objects that can be known and objects that cannot be known or experienced. The former are objects that relate to something given, the latter refer to objects that can only be thought. Likewise for Husserl, it is possible to think of objects, i.e., have meaning-intentions (such as a round square) that can never find meaning-fulfillment, i.e., become objects of knowledge, since they are never given to us. Every statement has an intended reference, but not all intended references can be fulfilled. This means that the notion of objecthood does not necessarily imply the possibility of experience.

Let us look at this in more detail: Husserl says we can recognize an experience as fulfillment only by grasping or understanding the meaning-intention in the first place (cf. LU IV, §12). Hence, we can think of a "round square" even though it is never intuitively given, that is, it can­not be known or authenticated in thought. The absurdity cannot be detected by looking at the rules of grammar; the expression is not senseless (Unsinn), like a heap of words, rather it has a unified sense. Nonetheless, an expression can be absurd (Widersinn) when it, for ex­ample, defies "Laws such as that of Contradiction, Double Negation or the Modus Ponens" (LU IV, § 14,343; LI, 523). However, we can rec­ognize it as absurd only if we have unders tood it previously. We recog­nize that an empty intention remains a presumption if it does not find intuitive confirmation. For example, the expression "round square" can­not be rationally explicated. The two intentions, "circle" and "square,"

10 H U S S E R L A N D H E I D E G G E R

contradict each other. The identifying fulfillment (which is the telosof the act) is thus inevitably frustrated. The expression bears an expectation of meaning-fulfillment that is a priori impossible.17 This impossibility does not prove that Husserl seeks to provide a theory of intentionality based on acts of consciousness that need no object at all. The contrary is t rue: it shows that all intentional acts strive for intuitive fulfillment, but that intuitive fulfillment is not always possible. Some objects can only be thought and never be known.

To conclude: Husserl argues that our judging is always subject to a kind of assessment as to whether it is correct, namely, true (corre­sponding to something objective) and successful (corresponding to the intention). Bell's reservations are unfounded: Husserl bites the bullet. He asks, "Howdo we experience truth?" (cf. LU, prol., §51,193; LI, 194). He attempts precisely to show how subjective, "intentional expe­rience can be related to things which are not subjective in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge." This shows that whatever reserva­tions we may have about Husserl's theory, there is one charge of which Husserl is not guilty: Husserl does not believe that the propositional at­titudes can be assessed without reference to states of affairs. In a word, he does not advocate an internalist position.

HEIDEGGER'S INDEBTEDNESS TO HUSSERL

§6. Intuitions without Concepts Are Blind

It is time to address the question of how we are meant to unders tand Heidegger 's thought in relation to Husserl's. We have seen that the internalist/externalist distinction is irrelevant here. At first sight it would appear that rather than referring to a depar ture from Husserl we should speak of an indebtedness to Husserl. On studying SuZ's ref­erences to Husserl we sense that there is a positive engagement between the thinkers. Heidegger professes that he continues to work within the spirit of phenomenology by following the Husserlian maxim "Back to the things themselves" (zuriick zu den Sachen selbst) .18 Heideg­ger acknowledges, "The following investigation would [not] have been possible if the g round had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose LU phenomenology first emerged" (SuZ, §7, 38). In a footnote he expresses his gratitude to Husserl more explicitiy: "If the following investigation has taken any steps forward in disclosing the 'things themselves', the author must first of all thank E. Husserl"

Heidegger 's Indebtedness to Husserl 11

(SuZ, §7, p. 38, fn. 1). What is it, then, about LU that impresses Heidegger so much? Important to Heidegger is that the LU argues not only that all intentional acts strive for intuitive fulfillment, but also that t ruth value is determined by states of affairs and not by us. Heidegger believes that Husserl thereby "touches or brushes against . . . the question of Being" (Zdhringer Seminare, 111 / 373), since he shows that what is given in experience is far more than sensible data.

Let us look at this in detail. The phenomenological breakthrough lies in Husserl's claim that it is possible to experience truth. We can ex­perience states of affairs and not just their representations. It is exactiy this insight that leads Husserl to redefine the traditional conception of experience in the Sixth Investigation.

O n the one hand, Husserl repeats Kant's insight that intuitions without concepts are blind (cf. KRV, A51 / B75). We cannot make any epistemological claims, i.e., recognize something to be something, if the intuition has not been subsumed under a corresponding (catego-rial, i.e., synthetic) intention. What is merely sensory within experi­ence is insufficient to provide us with an object (Gegenstand) .19 On the other hand, unlike Kant, Husserl holds that what is given in experience is far more than sensible intuition. Whereas Kant regards intuitions as exclusively distinct from concepts,20 one representing a moment of receptivity (intuition) and the other a momen t of spontaneity (con­cepts) ,21 Husserl claims that fulfillment lies in an intuition that is cate-gorial in its form.22 There is an analogy here; Husserl says categories can be like intuitions. They can be intuited.

§ 7. Categorial Intuition

Although Husserl argues that categories are given as "an analogue of common sensuous intuition' (LU VI, §44, 670; LI, 784), we should not confuse the term intuition here with "the kind of intuition employed by Bergson" (GA 20, §6, 64). Husserl is not referring to an immediate pure seeing but to a cognitive fulfillment that is founded in the mate­rial of a perceptual act with which it is bound up.23 It is the disclosure of a state of affairs through the exercise of our understanding.

Categorial intuition involves acts of identification and discrimina­tion. It allows us to grasp relations such as "a is 'brighter than' &" or ag­gregates such as "a+ b+ c±d"24 Husserl says that these relational structures should not be confused with the addition of a series of acts; rather, like meanings, categorial objects are ideal. They are constituted

12 H U S S E R L A N D H E I D E G G E R

in the categorial act. Take the judgment "Sis P"as an example. Accord­ing to Husserl, the is is not a copula that connects S and Pin the judg­ment . Rather, the "is Pn is a nonindependent {unselbststdndiger) but unitary act. The categorial object "5 is P "comes into being when the act of judgment is performed. We do not have simple or first order objects u p o n which we impress a logical form. Rather the form is disclosed in the act.

Like Kant, Husserl thus argues that knowledge is judgment and j udgmen t is a form of synthesis. However, Husserl is unlike Kant in that synthesis is to him not the result of a spontaneous act—it is not the bringing together of various aspects, but it is understood intentionally; it 'gives the object' (cf. GA 20, §6c, 87). Husserl says: "But we do not en­act a mere sequence of presentations, but a judgement, a peculiar 'unity of consciousness,' that binds these together. In this binding together the consciousness of the state ofaffairsis constituted: to execute judgement, and to be conscious of a state of affairs, in this synthetic positing of something as referred to something, are one and the same" (LU V, §36, 491; LI, 632). Thought is a mode of disclosure. The state of affairs is not assembled but given in a fulfilled intention. "To execute judgement , and to be conscious of a state of affairs, are one and the same." In other words, the synthetic achievement is determined by the object itself. It is not a question of fabricating sense but of "letting the entity be seen in its objectiv­ity" (GA 20, §62, 97). It is through categorial intuition that we grasp that things are thus and so; we recognize something to ^ someth ing .

§8. Being Is Not a Predicate

H e r e Heidegger locates Husserl's significant breakthrough. For "by way of understanding what is present in categorical intuition, we can come to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its broad sense is much richer than the reality of the thing" (GA 20 §6c, 89).

Take the simple expression "the paper is white" as an example. The actual word "is" appears in this expression as a sign. However, the "is" to which the meaning intention points is not a real inherent mo­men t given. It does not appear in the same way as sensuous matter does. Husserl says: "I can see colour, but not ^rnig-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. . . . Being is nothing in the object, no par t of it, no moment tenanting it, no quality or intensity of i t . . . n o constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing

The Transcendental Tu rn 13

attaching to an object: as it is no real [reales] internal feature, so also it is no real external feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a 'fea­ture ' at all" (LU VI, §43, 666; LI, 780). "The form-giving flexion Being, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled . . . in any percept. Here we are reminded of Kant's dictum: Being is no real predicate" (LU VI, §43,665; LI, 780). It cannot be seen or touched. It never appears as such; it is never 'actual'; nonetheless "it" is assumed as given.

When we say "The paper is white," we thus need to differentiate between seeing and saying: "I see white paper," says Husserl, "and say 'white paper ' " (LU VI, §40,659; LI, 775). When we see white paper we are referring to purely sensory information. When we say "the paper is white," we are introducing a syntax into what we perceive and recog­nizing something to be something.25 The statement presents not just paper and whiteness but the fact or state of affairs that the paper is white. The copula where provides an objective reference. It does not merely link the two words but presents the paper as "being" white. Heidegger believes that "with those analyses of categorial intuition Husserl has liberated Being from its dependence upon judgement" (Zahringer Seminare, 115 / 377). 'Being-true' is a predicate that does not belong to the judgementa l act but to the state of affairs. To follow Husserl: "Being is not a judgement nor a constituent of a judgement . Being is as little a real consituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a judgement" (LU VI, §44, 668; LI, 782) .26

This insight provides the ground for Heidegger 's own analysis. "As a result of this there emered a new orientat ion of the whole sphere of investigation" (Zahringer Seminare, 115 / 377). "Husserl's achievement consisted precisely in this presentification of Being which is phenome­nally present in the category." Through this, achievement, Heidegger continues, "At last I found a ground: 'Being' is no mere concept, is no pure abstracation which has emerged along the path of derivation" (Zahringer Seminare, 116 / 378). We can now understand why Heideg­ger believes that LU has prepared the way for the question of the mean­ing of Being. It allowed him to assume that Being itself is given.27

THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN

§9. The Transcendental Turn

While we have shown that we should not understand the relation be­tween Husserl and Heidegger in terms of the internalism/externalism

14 HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

debate, it seems feasible that when turning to Husserl's later work Keller is not mistaken in interpreting their relation in this way. For it is with his transcendental turn that Husserl reduces all phenomena to the sense bestowal (Sinngebung) of consciousness. The accusation that Husserl's phenomenological approach affirms nothing other than a "methodolog­ical solipsism" thus does not seem unfounded. Indeed, this view appears to reflect Heidegger's reading of Husserl. While the LU touch upon the question of Being, Heidegger believes that with his Cartesian and tran­scendental turn Husserl betrays the very principle of phenomenology:

Even today it is very hard to imagine the scope of the difficul­ties which stood in the way of asking the question of Being. . . . Husserl himself who came close to the true question of Being in the Logical Investigations—above all in the VI— could not persevere in the philosophical atmosphere of that time. He came under the influence of Natorp and turned to transcendental phenomenology which reached its first culmi­nation in the Ideas. The principle of phenomenology was thus aban­doned. (ZSD, 47; 44E, emphasis added)

Yet a closer look at GA 20 suggests that even this reading requires reassessment. Although Heidegger constantly turns against Husserl 's transcendental idealism, he never accuses him of re turning to "the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theatre"; ra ther he concedes in passing that the aim of the transcendental reduction is "the determination of the very entity" (GA 20, §10b, 136) that has been bracketed. Moreover, he states that "the question of being is thus raised, it is even answered' (GA 20, §12,155). This leads Steven Crowell to observe that, "though difficult to interpret with confidence, this provocative statement suggests that Heidegger has no quarrel with Husserl 's transcendental approach to the question of the being of en­tities" (Crowell 1997, 32). Indeed, despite the fact that Heidegger tends to object to Husserl 's transcendental turn, there is no question that SuZ itself is transcendentally motivated. After all, Heidegger will be concerned with the "conditions for the possibility o f (SuZ, §18,85 & §41,199) all ontical or factual manifestations which he believes are disclosed when we study the fundamental constitution of the Being of Dasein. Heidegger 's approach, like Husserl's, is foundational: "The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori condi­tions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type . . . but also for the possibility of those

The Transcendental Tu rn 15

ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations" (SuZ, §3, 11). In keeping with Crowell, we can thus assume that "transcendental reflection and ontology are not incompatible" (Crowell 1997, 29). If this is the case, we need to ask why Heidegger nonetheless objects to H u s s e r l transcendental turn.

§10. Husserl and Hume

First let us consider why Husserl could be interpreted as defending an internalist position. It is assumed that Heidegger objects to Husserl's transcendental turn because it leads him to bracket the question of existence. After all, Husserl argues that it is necessary to bracket the general thesis of the natural attitude (rather than merely particular acts, as in LU). This attitude assumes that a world exists indepen­dently of consciousness. Though it remains unnoticed, this attitude informs our everyday life. Whether as scientist or layperson, we all operate with the belief that there is a world within which all experi­ence takes place. H u m e would call this our "natural disposition to belief," which we can neither choose nor undo .

Since the reduction encourages us do away with all our presupposi­tions, it forces us to bracket the belief that such a world and the things in it 'exist'. We are encouraged to look at the structure of appearing without assuming either its existence or nonexistence. It seems that by advocating such a suspension, Husserl is exemplifying the tradition of philosophy as depicted by Heidegger. He explicitly encourages us to ignore and, indeed, to "jump over" the phenomenon of the world.

However, such a reading misses the ingenuity of Husserl 's posi­tion. For Husserl argues not only that we have no means of affirming, but equally that we have no means of negating, our natural disposition to belief. He thereby radicalizes a H u m e a n position and shows why scepticism is impossible.28 H u m e has shown that all arguments in sup­por t of the skeptical position are totally inefficacious, and all argu­ments against it are totally idle.29 Although a skeptical position may sound convincing, we cannot help believing in the existence of the body, and cannot help forming beliefs and expectations in general, in accordance with the basic canons of induction. This leads H u m e to re­fer to two irreconcilable attitudes: the philosophical attitude (which leads us to be skeptics) and the natural disposition to belief. Husserl, however, contends that this should have led H u m e to realize that both these attitudes are part and parcel of one and the same attitude, which he calls the "natural attitude." For Husserl, H u m e has shown that it is

16 H U S S E R L A N D H E I D E G G E R

impossible either to affirm or to negate our belief in the existence of an external world. We can neither sustain a skeptical position nor can we justify our natural disposition to belief. If we take H u m e ' s argu­men t seriously, we realize that it should have led him to a position that makes skepticism impossible. Inadvertently, H u m e has shown that we lose the right either to affirm or to negate the existence of the exter­nal world. This is why Husserl argues that true skepticism does not doubt the world but our capacity to judge whether or not there is a world. It leads to the suspension of judgment—to what Husserl calls the epoche or bracketing or reduction.™

Rather than turning us away from the world and describing our mental events or "intuitions" (Bell 1990,197), as Bell contends, the re­duction leads us to turn our attention toward that which has been sus­pended , our natural disposition to belief in the existence of the world and of entities found within it. As Heidegger observes: "The term 'sus­pension' is thus always misunderstood when it is thought that in sus­pending the thesis of existence and by doing so, phenomenological reflection simply has nothing more to do with the entity. Quite the contrary: In an extreme and unique way, what really is at issue now is the determination of the being of the very entity" (GA 20, §10, 135). Rather than ignoring it, the reduction brings into the foreground our general disposition to belief that there is an external world. It allows us precisely to "look at what we normally look through" (Sbkolowski 2000, 50). The transcendental reduction does not lead Husserl to ad­vocate an internalist position. To the contrary, the epoche leads us to look at the world and phenomena within it without assuming an inner-outer distinction.

§11. The Spectacle of the World

As in LU, with the introduction of the transcendental reduction the aim is to re turn to an absolute givenness.31 New at this stage is that this evidence is no longer restricted to what can find adequate intuitive fulfillment—it includes objects in the external world, and moreover our general disposition to belief, which can never find adequate fulfillment.32 In other words, evidence includes objects as they are given in their vagueness. Husserl thereby comes to show that what manifests itself is not only what is fully present but also what is absent.

Let us look at this in more detail: The world and its objects, looked at from a phenomenological attitude, Husserl calls noemata.

The Transcendental Tu rn 17

Noematarefer to objects as they are intended, or as looked at precisely as they are intended. Noemata work on two levels:

First, the noema refers to individual acts of perception. There is no noesiswithout a noema (cf. IdeenI, §93, 232 / 193). According to Hus-serl, any act of perception strives for fulfillment in the object as it is in­tended, which, however, can never be turned into a really inherent component of perception. When we perceive an object, for example a die, be it an imagined or a real die, we do not merely perceive one side of the die that is genuinely given. We cannot see a side of the die without instantaneously intending the unity and identity of the die as such, which is meant or intended, though never genuinely given. This fundamental form of synthesis—identification—is passive. We do not need to walk a round the die and add up all its sides in order to per­ceive the unity of the die; rather, we perceive the unity as soon as we perceive a particular side of the die. This is not to say that we know what the object looks like from the other side, but we can see an object (as three-dimensional) only if we already have some expectations of what the object may look like from the other side. This intending is of a pe­culiar kind. For we are not trying to make present the sides that are absent; rather, the sides that are absent are seen as absent™

We here re turn to the distinction between the object as it is intend­ed and the object that is intended. Perception involves layers of synthe­sis which are not only actual but also potential and thus absent. There is a multitude of perceptual acts (noeseis), which all strive to (intend) one and the same object as such, which is meant (noema). What is meant is not the essence of the different acts of perceptions but a correlate of all acts of perception.34 The noema is the ideal correlate of noesis. It guides and in this way makes possible the manifold of perceptual acts (noeseis).

Second, noemata now not only are limited to particular percep­tual acts, but refer to the absolute interpretative horizon, which is given in its vagueness and thus can never find adequate fulfillment. To follow Husserl: "Any actual experience points beyond itself to possible experiences, which in turn, point to new possible experiences and so ad infinitum. . . . Any hypothetical formulation in practical life or in empirical science relates to this changing but always co-posited horizon whereby the positing of the world receives its essential sense" (Ideen 7, § 4 7 , 1 1 2 - 1 3 / 9 0 ) .

Consciousness is dynamic. Every perceiving not only intends the unity of an individual object as such, but co-intends the possibility of

18 HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

other objects and, indeed, the unity of the world as such. "For indeed their particularity is particularity within a unitary universe, which, even when we are directed to and grasping the particular, goes on 'appear­ing' unitarily. . . . This consciousness is awareness of the world-whole in its own peculiar form, that of spatio temporal endlessness" (CM §15, 75). Every object we perceive is situated in one way or another. I never perceive an object, let us say a chair, in isolation. Though my at­tention may be on the chair, Husserl says, I can see the chair only if I also intend the chair as being in a room, and the room, in turn, as be­ing in a house, and the house as being in a city, and so forth. More­over, all actual and possible perceptions appear within the horizon of one and the same world. The world allows for the continuity of expe­rience and the iterative (the "and so forth" or "over and over again") fundamental forms of idealization. Again these intentions are of a pe­culiar kind. They are implicit, unthematized, or what Husserl calls pre-predicative. Nonetheless they are necessary for any object percep­tion to take place. In a word, all our perceptions are teleologically structured.35 They strive toward the unity of the world. What is evi-dendy given with every object perception is the implicit awareness of a world-whole in its spatiotemporal endlessness.

Phenomenology thereby brings to evidence what H u m e has called our natural disposition to belief that there is an external world. In bracketing the world nothing is lost, and world knowledge is won. Phenomenology describes how all our experiential life —all actual, potential, or habitual posi tings—takes place against a background of indeterminacy (cf Ideen I, §27,58 / 49). This background is the world as such. The reduction draws our attention to exactly that which has been previously ignored—an underlying, implicit world-belief cannot be outstripped.

Husserl here operates with a version of ontological difference. The horizon of all horizons—the world as such—has a similar func­tion to what Heidegger would call "the worldhood of the world" (SuZ, §14 ff.); it provides the condition for the possibility of any entity to be. It is transcendence pure and simple. The reduction brings to light what Heidegger would call the Being of the world, which can never be outstripped.^6 It facilitates the determination of the Being of entities. Hence , it should not surprise us that Heidegger comes to proclaim that the transcendental reduction thus not only facilitates, but even answers, the question of the meaning of Being (cf. GA 20 §12, 155).

The Transcendental T u r n 19

§12. Ontology versus Epistemology

This might suggest a complete overlap between Husserl and Heideg­ger: it was Husserl who raised the question of the meaning of Being in the first place. However, we should remain cautious in our assessment. The analogies we have drawn above merely make the discrepancies between the thinkers more visible with respect to their approach and method. We need to remember that, although Heidegger acknowl­edges the significance of the transcendental reduction, he nonetheless objects to Husserl's Cartesianism and insists that "the question of being itself is left undiscussedn (GA 20, §12, 157).

The problem, as seen by Heidegger, is not so much that Husserl fails to raise the question of Being, but that his method and analysis re­main epistemologically motivated. Rather than sidestepping skepti­cism, Husserl raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise. His aim is still to overcome skepticism in order to arrive at certainty. In view of this Heidegger believes that "the being of acts is in advance theoretically and dogmatically defined by the sense of being which is taken from the reality of nature" (GA20, §12, 157).

Heidegger acknowledges that the significance of Husserl 's think­ing, with respect to Descartes, is that he does not reduce the notion of person to a "thinking thing."37 What remains after the reduct ion is not an T think', but thought as an intentional act (cogitatio).38 However, Heidegger believes that Husserl 's analysis falls short, since it fails to question the "ontological meaning of 'performance [.]' How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to be ascertained ontologi-cally in a positive way?" (SuZ, §10, 48).

Husserl's primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possi­ble object of an absolute science? The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science. This idea, that con­sciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not simply in­vented; it is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes. The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomeno-logically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy. (GA 20, § l l d , 147)

20 HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

The problem facing Heidegger is that Husserl 's phenomenology focuses on the question of cognition, namely, "how can experience as consciousness give or contact an object?"39 Husserl thereby affirms a philosophy of consciousness (Beumpseinsphilosophie). Like Descartes, Husserl leaves the question "what is the sum of the cogito?" unexplored and fails to see that the world is an existential structure of Dasein.40

Heidegger objects to Husserl's Cartesianism. This is not because he believes Husserl's position to be that of an internalist or methodo­logical solipsist, but because he detects a philosophical "natural attitude" in Husserl's prioritization of consciousness and theory.41 In Heideg­ger 's view, Husserl's starting point is unphenomenological because he has failed to free himself from all theoretical presuppositions about the nature of our relation to the world. Husserl takes it for granted that "man" in the natural attitude "is given as a living being, as a zoological object" (GA 20, §12,155). Yet Heidegger believes that Husserl thereby fails to see that "[m]an's natural manner of experience . . . cannot be called an attitude" (GA 20, §12, 156). Husserl's natural attitude, ac­cording to Heidegger, is "totally unnatural. For it includes a well-defined theoretical position in which every entity is taken a priori as a lawfully regulated flow of occurrences in the spatio-temporal exterior­ity of the world" (GA20§12,156) .

Heidegger thereby raises external objections to the Cartesian enter­prise. For Heidegger, phenomenology as transcendental critique is ade­quate only if it reflects on the being that is able to raise the question of Being, namely, Dasein itself. Once this reflection takes place, we realize that we can never bracket the question of the world's existence, since any bracketing or questioning is possible only if we always already have — and, indeed, live with—an understanding of its existence. As Heidegger provocatively asserts: "The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised hyDasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?"42 Heidegger not only renders obsolete the problem of the external world, he questions the very possibility of questioning the existence of the world as such. He ques­tions whether its Being can ever be turned into an object of reflection.

CONCLUSION

It has become clear that we should not see the relation between Heidegger and Husserl in terms of the internalism/externalism oppo-

Conclusion 21

sition. The problem for Heidegger is not that Husserl returns to "a Cartesian conception of the mind as a kind of inner theater" (Keller 1999, 43), but that his approach remains epistemologically motivated. Husserl's fundamental concern is the question of cognition, namely, "How can experience as consciousness give or contact an object?"48

Husserl still tries to dissolve Cartesian skepticism in order to arrive at the assurance that there is an external world. According to Heidegger, Husserl thereby fails to realize that the being that can find such an assurance is a being that always already has a world.

While Husserl believes that phenomenology and epistemology go hand in hand, Heidegger argues that ontology precedes epistemology. To put it another way, Husserl 's fundamental question will be: "How do phenomena constitute themselves to consciousness?" The task is to show how cognitionis possible. Heidegger, in turn, rejects the problem of cognition outright. Rather than trying to solve it, he presents tradi­tional philosophy as being "out of tune with that with which [we are] most fundamentally attuned" (Mulhall 1996, 31). The problem of cog­nition is a pseudo-problem which disappears as soon as we realize that Dasein cannot be divorced from the phenomenon of the world.

Heidegger thereby raises external objections to skepticism. We need to reframe epistemology not by refuting it but by questioning its premise.44 It is only by sidestepping epistemological concerns that the question of Being can come into the foreground.4 5 For it is then that we realize that the Being of the world is an existential structure of Dasein which can never be turned into an object of reflection. Keller is thus not mistaken when he argues that Heidegger departs from Husserl in understanding experience no longer in terms of con­sciousness, but "as the transcendence of the self to things in the world" (Keller 1999,100). However, contrary to Keller's findings, we have seen that we cannot understand this departure in terms of the internalism/ externalism debate.

CHAPTER T W O

Toward an "Unworldly" Beginning

INTRODUCTION

T H E P R E V I O U S C H A P T E R has illustrated the proximity of Husserl's and Heidegger 's thought. We have shown that Heidegger 's depar ture from Husserl should not be understood in terms of the internalism/ externalism debate. The aim of the transcendental reduction is not to improve the method of analyzing consciousness, it is to bring the phe­nomenon of the world into the foreground. Heidegger recognizes both the significance of the transcendental reduction and its limita­tions. "There is no doubt that Husserl's fundamental position is an advance from neo-Kantianism. For the latter the object is nothing o the r than the manifold of sense-data s t ructured by the concepts of the understanding. With Husserl the object regains its permanence. Husserl rescues the object—but only by integrating it within the imma­nence of consciousness" (Zahringer Seminare, 382 / 120). Heidegger praises Husserl for having overcome neo-Kantianism by showing that the external world is not a problem that needs to be surmounted. There is no need for structuring a meaningless manifold of sense-data, because the world is always already meaningfully structured. In this manne r Husserl departs from the tradition of philosophy.

Nonetheless Heidegger criticizes Husserl for his Cartesianism, which in the final analysis leads him to re turn to a worldless subject. The problem for Heidegger is that Husserl manages to overcome neo-Kantianism (i.e., "rescue the object") only through the transcen­dental reduction. This permits Husserl to reduce the external world to the field of immanence.1 The world in question is the world of con­sciousness. Husserl thus fails to see that the world itself is an existential structure of Dasein and can never be turned into an object of reflec-

Heidegger 's Critique 23

tion. In a curious manner Husserl thus "rescues" the Being of the world, yet only by "ignoring," that is bracketing, the world. The para­dox is that Husserl departs from the tradition only insofar as he ad­heres to it.

Hence the fundamental problem for Heidegger is that Husserl re turns to a philosophy of consciousness (Bewufitseinsphibsophie). Hus­serl, so Heidegger claims, affirms a claustrophobic immanence which excludes the possibility of a moment of exteriority. Heidegger could not emphasize this point more forcefully: "Husserl neither questions nor pierces the realm of consciousness. . . . Indeed, it cannot be pierced as long as the starting point is the ego cogito. It is fundamental to the ego cogito (as it is for Leibniz's monad) that it has no windows through which something could enter or depart . Thus the ego cogito is an enclosed space. The idea of being able to 'get out o f this sealed space is self-contradictory. Hence the necessity of starting from some­thing other than the ego cogito' (Zahringer Seminare, 383 / 121). As long as philosophy takes consciousness, or the ego cogito, as its starting point, even if "the object is rescued," of necessity a momen t of exterior­ity is rendered impossible. Husserl hereby undermines the signifi­cance of his breakthrough. The transcendental reduction permits Husserl to reduce the Being of the world to immanence. He adheres to the tradition of mode rn philosophy by affirming a "worldless Ego" as "the beginning of all beginnings." The aim of this chapter is to ex­plore the nature of Husserl 's Cartesianism and to analyze the extent to which Husserl 's r e tu rn to immanence can be described as a re turn to an absolute and "enclosed" space.

HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE

§13. Husserl's Cartesianism

Heidegger believes that Husserl epitomizes the tradition of philoso­phy insofar as he makes philosophy's implicit disinterestedness in the phenomenon of the world explicit. By prioritizing consciousness Hus­serl slights the independence of the world and "abandons the project of phenomenology" (ZSD, 47; 44E). His starting point no longer dif­fers from an idealist one.2 Heidegger locates Husserl's "fatal" move in his re turn to Descartes. This finds its fullest expression in §49 of Ideen 7, in which Husserl affirms consciousness as the absolute g round for

24 T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

all appearances. The title of §49 alone implies a trajectory opposed to the one articulated in SuZ: "Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the World" (Ideen I, §49, 114 / 91). As Heidegger argues, §49 indicates that, for Husserl, "In principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is 'not affected in its own existence' by an 'annihilation of the world of things' — a consideration which, as is well-known, Descartes had already employed" (GA 20, § l l c , 144). While the Heidegger of SuZ maintains that "to Dasein, Being-in-a-world is something that belongs essentially" (SuZ, §4, 13), Husserl re­turns to a Being that can be defined independently of the phenomenon of the world. This is articulated in the following passage of Ideen I: "No real being, no being which is presented and legitimated in conscious­ness by appearances, is necessary to the being of consciousness itself (in the broadest sense, the stream of lived experiences). Immanental being is therefore indubitably absolute being in the sense that by essential necessity immanental being nulla 're'indiget ad existendum" (Ideen I, §49,115 / 92). Husserl adheres to the Cartesian postulation that we need only thought, and not extension, in order to exist. It is an affirmation of an existence that is not, and could never become, spatial.

§14. The Incompleteness of Space

Husserl adheres to Descartes, however, only insofar as he departs from him. The above citation itself is a partial quotation of Descartes' definition of substance in the Prinapia: "By substancewe can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence" (Descartes 1985, 210). As Jean-Luc Marion points out, it is important to note that "Husserl, however, modifies Descartes' formula: he omits aliain 'alia re, ' and only accepts resin in-verted commas."3 Husserl makes this modification because he wishes to differentiate consciousness from reality (cf. Ideen I, §42,96 / 77), and therefore has to prevent any association between conscious­ness and res in terms of realitas}

Nonetheless, structurally Husserl adheres to Descartes: not only does Husserl intimate a dualism by defining consciousness (i.e., im­manence) as essentially distinct from reality ( transcendence), but, like Descartes, he argues that transcendence is characterized by ex­tension. Space is the essence of transcendence5 and never pertains to immanence, which reminds us of Descartes' definition of extensio as the essence of res corporea, which can never be attributed to res cogitans.

Heidegger 's Critique 25

Indeed, this definition permits Husserl to argue that only the imma­nent field is absolutely given. The incompleteness of the transcendent field is due to the extended nature of the world. Since the transcen­dent world is spatial, that is, three-dimensional, it is never completely visible at one given time. Transcendent objects are given incom­pletely, for to be absolutely given is to be fully present and completely visible (i.e., clear and distinct). Being spatial and being incomplete are therefore virtually synonymous descriptions of the transcendent world.

§15. The Bracketing of the Unseen

This leads Husserl to maintain that it is possible to bracket the world, "a consideration which, as is well-known, Descartes had already em­ployed."6 Because transcendent being, or the world of things, is essen­tially incomplete and can neverbe exhaustively given to consciousness, it is in principle open to doubt. "The world is dubitable not in the sense that rational motives are present to be taken into consideration over against the tremendous force of harmonious experiences, . . . but dubi-tability exists in the sense that a becoming doubtful and a becoming null are conceivable; the possibility of non-being, as an essential possi­bility, is never excluded."7 We cannot exclude the possibility of doubt even if there is no rational motive for it, since our expectations might be disappointed and redirected.

The bracketing of the transcendent world is not the exclusion of objects from the field of the theory of knowledge, but it is an exclusion of the unseen. What defines the transcendent world is its indetermi-nateness in terms of visibility:

Of necessity a physical thing can be given only "one-sidedly"; and that signifies, not just incompletely or imperfecdy in some sense or other, but precisely what presentation by adumbra­tions prescribes. A physical thing is necessarily given in mere "modes of appearance" in which necessarily a core of "what is ac­tually presented"is apprehended as being surrounded by a hori­zon of "co-givenness, " which is not givenness proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness. . . . To be in infinitum imperfect in this manner is part of the unanullable essence of the correlation be­tween "physical thing" and perception of a physical thing. (Ideen I, §44, 100 / 80)

26 T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

This leads Husserl to his provocative claim that the possibility of the annihilation of the world (Weltvernichtung) can never be excluded. Any perception of a transcendent thing necessitates the co-give nness of empty intentionalities and horizons which are not fully given (i.e., in their totality as being present) and therefore do not provide us with the certainty needed for an adequate phenomenological starting point.8

We can now unders tand how Husserl, in a way analogous to Des­cartes, reaches the conclusion that "in principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is not affected by the annihilation of the world of things." The only area of study that can provide the absolute certainty needed is pure consciousness, and the transcendent world, in whose being doubt is conceivable, must be bracketed. Everything that is not actually given in the cogitationes and therefore not evidently seen remains only as suspended.

§16. An Incompleteness That Is Not Based on Lack

The transcendent world is essentially distinct from the immanent field. Indeed, it is impossible for a transcendent thing ever to turn into an immanent being, just as it is impossible for the stream of lived experiences ever to turn into a transcendent res. "A lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as something spatial. However, the adumbrated is of essential necessity possible only as some­thing spatial (it is spatial precisely in its essence), and not possible as a lived experience" (Ideen I, §41, 95 / 75-76, emphasis added) . This definition leads Husserl to give a positive account of incompleteness, in contrast to Descartes. The absolute distinction between imma­nence and transcendence defies a representative account of the world. If the distinction were not absolute, then we would be led to believe the transcendent domain to be incomplete; it would be an incomplete representat ion of an ideal world which, in principle, could be given absolutely, i.e., as immanent and fully present. If this were the case, then we would unders tand phenomena only privatively. "But this view is a countersense. It implies that there is no essential difference between something transcendent and something immanent , that, in the postu­lated divine intuition, a spatial physical thing is present as a really inherent constituent, that it is therefore itself a lived experience also belonging to the divine stream of consciousness and divine lived expe­riences generally."9

Heidegger 's Critique 27

Incompleteness, however, does not refer to a momen t of lack. It is not that the transcendent field is an incomplete representation of an ideal, adequately given world. We too easily interpret the unseen as pointing to a mysterious reality from which we are barred.10 The world ofrealitasis not an enigma that we, like paleontologists, have to recon­struct. The transcendent world can be perceived only incompletely, i.e., aspectivally. For to £e spatial means to be given incompletely.11

This definition holds even for divine or intellectual intuition: "Not even a Divine physics can make simply intuited determinations out of those categorial determinations of realities which are produced by thinking, any more than a Divine omnipotence can bring it to pass that someone paints elliptic functions or plays them on the violin" (Ideen I, §52, 129 / 102). We have reached the limits of any form of skepticism.12 Incompleteness is no longer measured against a thing-in-itself, or an absolute truth that lies beyond the field of phenomena; rather, it describes a mode of givenness that is essential to the percep­tion of the transcendent world. The diversity between consciousness and reality is so absolute that even an intellectual intuition cannot bridge it. " [A] veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and real­ity" (Ideen I, § 4 9 , 1 1 7 / 93). This gulf cannot be overcome—a transcen­dent thing can never be turned into an immanent being, since the gulf is founded in the different modes of givenness.

§17. The Affirmation of an Enclosed Space

Unlike Descartes, Husserl is a thinker of finitude.13 There is no world that lies behind the phenomenal world (Hinterwelt). As we have shown, Husserl can sustain this claim only if immanence and transcen­dence are regarded as essentially distinct: "The essentially necessary diversity among modes of being, the most cardinal of them all, becomes manifest: the diversity between consciousness and reality "u

Husserl, therefore, could never allow for a m o m e n t in which both domains become united. For Descartes, in contrast, both the substan-tia cogitans and the substantia corporea, though self-sufficient and dis­tinct, are substances of a second order, after God. This position, as Marion points out, leads to a weaker claim: "For Descartes, every finite substance, thought as well as extension, indicates a radical weak­ening of God's (usual) support. In this way, the ego has to share its substantiality with extension (first disagreement with Husserl) and has only relative validity (with respect to God) and, thus, is in no way

28 T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

absolute (second disagreement with Husserl)" (Marion 1989, 127). Unlike Descartes, Husserl argues that the distinction between imma­nence and transcendence is absolute and not relative to an absolute and ideal being.

This leads to Husserl's second modification of Descartes. Not only are there two separate and essentially distinct fields, but Husserl wishes to show that transcendence is dependent on immanence: ''The world of transcendent res' is entirely referred to consciousness and, more particularly, not to some logically conceived consciousness but to actual consciousness" (Idem 7, §49 ,115-16/ 92). Only immanence is self-sufficient, while tran­scendence is by virtue of immanence alone;15 this is what Husserl calls immanent transcendence. There is only one absolute field and that is the field of immanence; there is no substance of a higher order.16 Us­ing Descartes' terminology, immanence is a substance of the first and transcendence a substance of the second order . With this claim Hus­serl avoids the Cartesian subject-object dualism, for everything that is can come into being only through the field of immanence. The ques­tion "How do we get to know the outside world?" is therefore not a problem, for the outside is already inscribed by the inside.

These modifications allow Husserl to adhere to the Cartesian pa­rameters without affirming a dualism. Immanence remains the abso­lute field that lies beyond the realm of doubt. By turning immanence into a substance of first order , Husserl denies any momen t of exteri­ority, for everything that is, and could possibly be, is by virtue of con­sciousness alone. As Heidegger observes: "Consciousness is absolute in the sense that it is the presupposition of being on the basis of which reality can manifest itself at all" (GA 20, § l l c 144). In this manner Husserl affirms a momen t of closure. Without the presupposition of an enclosed and stable foundation, nothing can exist, be, or appear. "It is non-sensical to say that there is an object which could not princi­pally be an object of consciousness" (Hua XI, §4,19-20) . It is only with reference to a stable and enclosed terrain that any form of identifica­tion, signification, or j udgment can take place.

Thus, in accordance with Heidegger, we can conclude that there is in Husserl a definite re turn to Descartes, a re turn which, however, is "elaborated at a higher level" and with "another philosophical goal":

Already here, we can detect a kinship with Descartes. What is here elaborated at a higher level of phenomenological analysis

Toward an 'Unworldly' Existence 29

as pure consciousness is the field which Descartes glimpsed un­der the heading of res cogitans, the entire field of cogitationes. The transcendent world, whose exemplary index for Husserl as well is to be found in the basic stratum of the material world of things, is what Descartes characterizes as res extensa. This kinship is not merely factual. Husserl himself, at the point where he ob­serves that the reflection has come to a climax refers explicitly to Descartes. He says that what comes to a head is simply what Descartes really sought in the Meditations, to be sure with another method and another philosophical goal. (GA 20, §10, 139)

Husserl does not re turn to the ego cogitobut to the structure of thought itself. However, the correlate of thinking and that which is thought— i.e., the entire field of cogitationes—is, in a manner analogous to Des­cartes' res cogitans, devoid of space and indeed world. The world Husserl has in mind is the world of res extensa. This allows Husserl to perform the transcendental reduction and thus "leap over" (uberspringen) the world. Not only this, but Husserl's notion of immanent transcendence permits immanence to be an absolute and self-enclosed space, for everything that is and could be is by virtue of immanence alone.

TOWARD AN 'UNWORLDLY' EXISTENCE

§18. The "Annihilation of the World"

The gulf that separates immanence from transcendence permits Hus­serl to assert the possibility of the annihilation of the world. Transcen­dence is dependent on and relative to immanence, while the field of immanence is absolute. Consciousness is thus described as the abso­lute given, the phenomenological residuum (cf. Ideen 7, §33, 72 / 59). Heidegger 's concern is to show that such a self-enclosed realm does not exist, since there is no being that can exist independently of the world.17 Indeed Heidegger is perplexed about how we can move from a consciousness devoid of the world to the world (cf. GA 20, §10,139). We need to show how Husserl attempts to describe the nature of con­sciousness as essentially distinct from the world (cf. GA 20, §1 l c ) . We shall argue that Husserl manages to uphold that distinction by differ­entiating between temporalization and the spatiotemporal world. Husserl describes consciousness as an event. The immanent field is nothing static, but is the transcendental stream of consciousness,

30 T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

which shows itself in its mode of temporalization. The transcendental reduct ion reveals a dimension of being in its temporal upsurge that is distinct from the spatiotemporal world.

§19. The Description of Immanent Perception in Ideen I

The phenomenological reduction does not lead us back to a punctual ego cogito; indeed, it does not lead to anything solid whatsoever, but to the transcendental stream of lived experiences {Erlebnisse). It is an experiencing and appearing that is anterior to the act of perception. The daring nature of the claim is that, although the field of imma­nence is "a perpetual Heraclitean flux" (Hua X, no. 51, 349), and thus constantly changing, it wfully present in its unity. However, the follow­ing statement might lead us to assume the opposite:

It is the case also of lived experience that it is never perceived completely, that it cannot be adequately seized upon in its full unity. A lived experience is, with respect to its essence, in flux which we, directing the reflective regard to it, can swim along after it starting from the Now-point, while the stretches already covered are lost to our perception. Only in the form of reten­tion do we have a consciousness of the phase which has just flowed away, or else in the form of a retrospective recollection. And my whole stream of lived experiences is, finally, a unity of lived experiences, which, of essential necessity, cannot be seized upon completely in a perceiving which *'swims along with it." (Ideen I, §44, 103 / 82, emphasis added)

The phenomenological reduction permits the re turn to what Husserl calls "pure" consciousness (Ideen I, §33, 73 / 59). This "purity" of con­sciousness should not be understood in the Kantian way, that is, as free from empiricism (cf. KRV, A50-51 / B74-75). Rather, it is pure be­cause it is absolutely free from the incompleteness that defines tran­scendence; it is free from invisibility. From the beginning, though, it appears that phenomenology is faced with the impossible, for it wishes to present a field that constantly withdraws from any presentation. What is made present through phenomenological reflection inevitably fades away and withdraws. It thus seems impossible to seize what phenome­nology seeks to grasp.18

At first sight it might therefore appear that Husserl's architectonic has lost its foundation, for it seems that it is impossible to seize upon lived

Toward an l Unworldly' Existence 31

experiences, for they are appearing within a flow and therefore by ne­cessity "flowing away" or disappearing. Immanence as a self-enclosed space appears thus to be an ideal that is never obtained. Although Husserl admits to this imperfection pertaining to immanent perception, he argues that it is distinct from the incompleteness associated with tran­scendent perception: "But to incompleteness or 'imperfection,' per­taining to the essence of the perception of a lived experience, is radically different from the incompleteness or ' imperfection' pertain­ing to the essence of the perception of something ' t ranscendent '" (Ideen I, §44, 103 / 82, emphasis added) . Husserl hereby holds on to the radical distinction between immanent and transcendent percep­tion. For while the latter, because of its incompleteness, is not fully given, Husserl wishes to argue that immanent perception, in contrast, is absolutely given. Though incomplete, it will not be incomplete in the sense of being aspectival, in the form of profiles —this incomplete­ness is peculiar to immanent perception, for it is inevitably accompa­nied by a sense of completeness. Since immanent being is not spatial,19

there are no empty intentions that accompany my perceptions. Rather, 'perceiving and what is perceived form essentially an unmediated unity" {Ideen I, §38, 68, translation slightly al tered). Hence we are facing the peculiar scenario in which the self-presence of immanent being is de­scribed as complete in its self-presence, yet simultaneously as an im­perfection that should not be confused with the incompleteness of transcendent perception. To clarify this issue, Husserl draws the distinc­tion between the adumbration (Abschattung) and the adumbrated (Abge-schattetes): "The adumbrat ion, though called by the same name, of essential necessity is not of the same genus as the one to which the adumbrated belongs. The adumbrat ing is a lived experience. But a lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as some­thing spatial. However, the adumbra ted is of essential necessity pos­sible only as something spatial" (Ideen I, §41, 94-95 / 75).

Husserl 's distinction between two forms of incompleteness is ex­plained in terms of spatiality and temporality. The appearing of inner experience is not spatial and thus not aspectival. The field of imma­nence is procedural ; it is thus adumbrat ing and never given as 'adum­bration' , like the objective transcendent world:20 "Each actual lived experience . . . is necessarily an endur ing one; and with this durat ion it finds its place in an infinite continuum of duration—in a fulfilled con­tinuum. Of necessity it has an all-round, infinitely fulfilled temporal

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horizon. At the same time this says: it belongs to one endless 'stream of lived experiences'" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163). Though incomplete, the stream of lived experiences should not be unders tood in terms of occlusion or obstruction, for occlusion is possible only in a three-dimensional world. In immanent experience we are faced with an in­completeness that does not occlude the co-appearance of that which appears in its failure to appear, which in turn is fully present. In im­manen t experience the infinite fulfilled stream of intentions is fully present despite the incompleteness of the adumbrat ing nature of lived experiences.

§20. Limitations of Ideen I

Reading Ideen I in isolation, we fail to unders tand how these claims have come about. How can we simultaneously see incompleteness and completeness? Husserl admits that we can come to unders tand the stream of lived experiences only if we understand it in terms of tem­porality, which Ideen I leaves uninvestigated.

Moreover, as will emerge from investigations to follow later on, time is a name for a completely delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be shown that in order to avoid confusion our previous presentation has remained si­lent to a certain extent, and must of necessity remain silent about what first of all is alone visible in the phenomenological attitude and which, disregarding the new dimension, makes up a closed domain of investigation. (Ideen I, §81, 197-98 / 162)

Husserl here confesses to a certain inertia, as he refuses to delve deeper into the question of temporality. With a sense of relief he announces: "Fortunately we can leave out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in our preliminary analyses without endanger­ing their rigor."21 There is a provisional character to the idea of con­stitution in Ideen I. In order not to complicate phenomenological reflection, the reduction has been brought to a halt.

Ideen I can only naively presuppose the stream of lived experi­ences, since the Cartesian approach alone fails to show how we could possibly re turn to consciousness in its full temporalization. As Iso Kern righdy observes, Ideen /fails to acknowledge the incompleteness of the Cartesian method at this stage. "Is it not through the Cartesian approach of Hua II and Ideen I that Husserl after all reaches the

Toward an 'Unworldly' Existence 33

stream of consciousness in its full temporality? There is no doubt that Husserl claims that he has achieved this in those texts. But in critical remarks from the twenties, Husserl explains that in those texts he failed to show how he arrived at the stream of lived experience, but naively presupposed it" (Kern 1964, 207). Like Descartes, Husserl affirms the quest for certainty, evidence, and the re turn to subjec­tivity. However, this re turn cannot be Cartesian,22 for Descartes can­not explain how the phenomenological reduction leads us back to a stream of lived experiences.28

§21. Why Lived Experiences Defy an Atomistic Worldview

It is only by returning to Husserl's previous lectures on internal-time-consciousness,24 developed between 1905 and 1917,25 that we can explain how we can simultaneously perceive difference and unity, imperfection and incompleteness, presence and the non-absence of absence. It is in H u a X that Husserl describes the temporalization of time itself. We never intuit momentary instances but only their duration. Immanent objects are called Ablaufsphdnomene26 since they belongto the immanent sphere and are thus part of the flow. To emphasize this, Hua X starts off with a critique of Brentano, who, in the spirit of Descartes, is puz­zled by the phenomena of duration. According to Husserl, for Bren­tano, time, alteration, and succession are not perceived, but are comprehended only by means of association and fantasy.27 Although Brentano affirms the consciousness of succession, he denies that it can be perceived, since we only perceive pure nows, for intstance, a single note at one time.28 Husserl, in contrast, argues that we never intuit a punctual or a hyletic datum; rather, we experience a temporal event prior to any association or fantasy. In the immanent sphere we do not perceive static, self-identical now-points but the life of the lived experi­ences (Erlebnisse). The emphasis is on the vital, adverbial, and transi­tory nature of their being, l ived experiences are not punctual instants but are given in their mode of temporal orientation.

Only abstracdy can we isolate a single moment , for as soon as we experience this moment , as soon as it exists for us, we already experi­ence it as pointing beyond itself. The lived experiences have a certain structure which abstracdy can be divided into three separate compo­nents: 'primal impression or sensation', 'primary remembrance ' , and 'primary expectation'. Primary expectation and remembrance are al­ways already co-intuited with every impression; indeed they make its

34 T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

very existence possible. These three components constitute the con­crete living present, which forms an original temporal field.29 The ac­tual now which we apprehend is always already subject to the "law of modification."30 It is an appearing which is only because it is temporal .

We should not be led to believe that Husserl is here claiming, purely, that whatever we experience is in time, for it is not that lived experiences are in time but that they exist only as temporal events. Not the phenomenon of time is described but the coming into being of lived experiences. The emphasis is on the fact that phenomenological reflection never isolates an atomistic impression; it isolates the tempo­ral form of an impression.31 Phenomenological reflection cannot go beyond lived experiences, thus the beginning is always one of dura­tion. Even "the point 'now' is also a small field" (Hua X, §16, 40 / 399). The now is nothing but an "ideal limit" (ideale Grenze), an abstraction32 that is never experienced as such—for to be means to be temporal .

§22. Retention as a Primordial Intentionality

We d o not synthesize isolated moments; rather, the lived experiences are given in their temporal form. Here Husserl is following Kant, inso­far as the emphasis is on the moment of synthesis.33 However, unlike Kant, Husserl believes that not all synthesis is active.34 There is a syn­thesis "which is not to be thought of as an active and discrete synthesis" (Ideen I, §118, 292 / 246). Synthesis is given. To show how this is pos­sible, Husserl introduces the terms retention and protention, which should not be confused with remembrance and expectation.*5 Any lived experience, even the experience of a pure now, exceeds the momen­tary, "since it is a relative concept and refers to a ' pas t / jus t as 'past ' refers to the 'now'" (Hua X, §31, 68 / 423). This pointing beyond itself Husserl calls retention and protention.36 The peculiar nature of this pointing is that is has no object, no contents in the original (i.e., impressional) sense, neither, however, is it imagined. Rather, retention and protent ion allow for the appearing of the now and are "actually existing" (Hua X, §11, 29 / 390). Retention does not belong to the past, and protention to the future, rather both are moments of the actual now.37 Retention bears its object within itself intentionally:

The retentional "contents" are not at all contents in the origi­nal sense. When a tone dies away, it itself is sensed at first with

Toward an 'Unworldly' Existence 35

particular fullness (intensity); and then there follows a rapid weakening in intensity. The tone is still there, still sensed, but in mere reverberation. This genuine tone-sensation must be distinguished from the tonal moment in retention. The reten-tional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone "primarily remembered" in the now: it is not really on hand in the reten-tional consciousness. But neither can the tonal moment that belongs to this consciousness be a different tone that is really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak tone equivalent in qual­ity (such as an echo). A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a past tone, exemplify it; pictorialize it; but that already pre­supposes another representation of the past. The intuition of the past cannot itself be a pictorialization. It is an original consciousness. . . . The reverberation of a violin tone is pre­cisely a feeble present violin tone and is absolutely different from the retention of the loud tone that has just passed. (Hua X, §12, 3 1 - 3 2 / 3 9 2 - 9 3 )

Retention should not be confused with a moment of fading, for it is not an original impression; neither is it a replication of a moment which is no longer, nor is it pointing to the loss of the actual present. Unlike remembrance , retention is not a re-presentation of something that no longer is: "Retention is not image consciousness; it is something totally different" (Hua X, §13, 34 / 394). Retention differs from the past given in secondary remembering, insofar as remembrance refers not to the transitory moment of something slipping away, but to some­thing that has slipped out of sight. Retention is a retaining in its slipping away. It has no concrete object or content; "the retentional 'contents' are not at all contents in the original sense." It has a "unique Rind of In-tentionality" (Hua X, §12, 31 / 392), which can be neither reduced to an impression nor interpreted as an objectification or a re-presentation of an impression; rather, it is presentative. "For only in primary memory do we see what is past; only in it does the past become constituted, and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively" (Hua X, §17,41 / 401). Retention is given in person without re-presenting anything. It is a pre­sentative co-appearance.

Our immediate experience of an immanent object is our first and most fundamental experience of pastness pr ior to any sense of loss. It is the slipping away that accompanies the experience of the present, an

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aging that is retained as present. Husserl refers to it in terms of a trail or trace: "This now apprehension is as it were, the head attached to the comet's tail of retentions relating to the earlier now—points of the motion" (Hua X, §11, 30 / 391). The retentional tail is not an ad­ditional moment that has been attached to the present; rather, it is the trace (Hua X, §16, 39 / 398) that constantly accompanies and indeed makes possible any intuition of the now. Any intuition of a now is in this sense prolonged.3 8

§23. The Identity of the Impression and the Fiction of Atomistic Psychologism

Through his notions of retention and protention, Husserl questions an atomistic starting point.39 It is not that we intuit the now and that intuition is accompanied by empty intentions, but that retention and protent ion are fully present in our intuition of the now. Every actual now is modified and adumbrated:

Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed continuum of re­tention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum. The tone begins and "it" steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the impressionalconsciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new retentional consciousness. (Hua X, §11, 29 / 391, emphasis added)

Unlike transcendent perception, which is accompanied by empty intentions, the object of immanent perception is fully present in all its "profiles" (cf. Hua X §43,91-92 / 444). In the above quotation Husserl refers to "der Ton setzt an, und stetig setzt 'er ' sich fort." A direct trans­lation reads: "The sound begins and 'it' steadily continues." The inverted commas are crucial, for they signify that no tone actually appears as an isolated moment. No sound-impression, though neces­sary, ever appears as a punctual impression, since it is only if it is given in its temporalizingyorm, which exceeds the impression. The primal impres­sion is always already folded into the adumbrative horizon of retentions and protentions, which, in their modification, turn the now into an event. "The object becomes constituted as an object only in the appre­hension of time, in the consciousness of time—as an object that endures, that changes or remains unchanged" (Hua X, no. 49, 321). Be

Toward an 'Unworldly' Existence 37

it the immanent perceived, or a particular individual tone, it is never identical with the impression; rather, the very identity of the tone is constituted in the chain of retentions and protentions. "Immanent con­tents are what they are only as far as, during their 'actual' duration, they point ahead to the future and point back to the past" (Hua X, §40, 84 / 437). The punctual now is intuited only as temporally extended:

If one speaks of the evident givenness of an immanent content, then of course the evidence cannot signify indubitable certainty respecting the being of the tone at a single point in time; I would consider an evidence so conceived . . . to be fiction. If it belongs to the essence of a content given in perception that it is tempo­rally extended, then the indubitability that pertains to percep­tion can signify nothing other than indubitability with respect to temporally extended being. (Hua X, §41, 84 / 438)

What is completely grasped by immanent perception is never a now-point. "I would consider an evidence so conceived . . . to be a fiction." It is impossible to grasp completely a momentary point of experience, since it is ready to be perceived only if it is extended. The self-identical tone can appear only in inverted commas; though it is one and the same tone, it is not the impression that appears but only the impression in its modification.

§24. The Extension of the Present

It should not surprise us that Husserl frequently refers to presence as a temporal extension (das zeitlich Ausgedehnte)40 or as a temporal field (cf. Hua X, §11,32 / 391; no. 15,42). Although these are spatial metaphors, it is important to note that the field of immanence describes lived expe­riences which are a moment of life and not of space. The immanent field is prior to and distinct from the transcendent spatiotemporal world: "A lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as something spatial" (Ideen /, §41,95 / 75). Although we can divide the present of an immanent temporal object into impression and the adumbrative chain of retentions and protentions, we can do so only abstractly. For they are one and the same moment.41 It is now that we can understand Husserl's distinction between appearing and appearances, or the adumbrated (Abgeschattetem) and the adumbration (Abschattun-gen) in Ideen V2 In transcendent perception, things are apprehended only disjunctively, i.e., we perceive the object either horn the front, the

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side, or the back. In immanent perception, which is not spatial but purely temporal, there are no alternative points of view. "Here there is no actual perspective" (Hua IX, §30, 164). The difference or incom­pleteness is not disjunctive but assimilative.*3 To follow Sokolowski: "There are no alternative points of view for an inner temporal object. There is only the present. All looks are available here, and only here. Elapsed looks are assimilated and still at work in the present; there is no other way we can have them. . . . There are boxes inside boxes in tempo­ral constitution, and they melt into one another" (Sokolowski 1974, §62, 163-64). The change in a temporal object is therefore presented in its presence. The segment of conscious life involving impression, retention, and protention is a whole and a concretum.

It is by virtue of retention and protent ion that Husserl can de­scribe immanent experience, the appearing of appearances, as abso­lutely given. Immanent objects are completely given despite the fact that the appearing is not static but a dynamic flow. However, the ex­tent to which immanence is the absolute foundation remains question­able, since it appears that the dynamic structure of immanent experience is possible only by virtue of an impression.

THE PROBLEM OF "SENSUOUS HYLE"

§25. The Problem of Data-Sensualism

We have shown that our original experience is not sense-data, or a punctual now-point, but its temporal form. Phenomenology does not re turn us to a meaningless manifold but synthesis. In this manner Husserl overcomes the problems of corpuscularism. The original and most fundamental experience is not sense-data but the stream of modifications, which is fully present in its unity. The problem, how­ever, is that Husserl can reach this observation only by presupposing that there is a punctual now that initiates these modifications. Given this, Husserl still appears to operate with a matter-form dualism. This leads Sokolowski to argue that transcendental subjectivity is pure form, which is dependent on a reality that lies outside of its grasp (cf. Sokolowski 1964, 133-41, 210-11).

The problem becomes visible in §85 of Ideen I, where Husserl dis­tinguishes between two interrelated moments , that of sensuous hyle (impression and sensations), which he describes as formless stuffs, and

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyle" 39

intentional morphe, which he describes as stuffless forms.44 Husserl ini­tially argues that non-intentional sensations cannot be separated from their intentional structure: "This remarkable duality and unity of sensuous vXrj and intentive fiop(j)fj plays a dominant role in the whole phenomenological sphere" (Idem I §85, 208-9 / 172). As in Hua X, Husserl here purely affirms that consciousness should never be con­fused with an empirical or psychological moment: "Consciousness is precisely consciousness 'of something . . . . Consciousness is not a name for 'psychical complexes/ for 'contents ' fused together, for 'bundles ' or streams of'sensations' which, without sense in themselves, also can­not lend any 'sense' to whatever mixture; it is ra ther through and through 'consciousness.' . . . Consciousness is therefore toto coelo dif­ferent from what sensualism alone will see, from what in fact is irratio­nal stuff without sense—but which is, of course, accessible to rationalization" (Ideen I, §86, 212-13 / 176). Despite these affirma­tions, Husserl concedes that sensuous hyle&oes constitute an indepen­dent field that is open for an independent hyletic phenomenological discipline (cf Ideen I, §86, 215 / 178). For he believes that not all ex­perience is intentional, such as " 'sensuous' lived experiences, . . . sensation-contents'such as color-Data, touch-Data and tone-Data, and the like, which we shall no longer confuse with appearing moments of physical things—coloredness, roughness, etc.—which 'present themselves' to lived experiences [ertebnismaflig] by means of those 'contents ' . Like­wise the sensuous pleasure, pain and tickle sensations, and so forth, and no doubt also sensuous moments belonging to the sphere of 'drives'" (Ideen I, §85, 208 / 172).

There is a sensuous sphere, the sphere of pleasure and pain, which should never be confused with the intentional experience of touch. Ideen /differentiates between the immediate, pre-objective life of experiences and the structuring or objectification of these experi­ences. Thus, Husserl appears to equate the moment of objectification and representation with intentionality, whereas the pre-objective sphere refers to formless stuff, the "irrational stuff without sense —but which is, of course, accessible to rationalization" (Ideen I, §86, 213 / 176). Not only does Husserl refer to two separate fields, the sensuous and objective, but he points to the possibility of the existence of sensu­ous moments that exceed objectification and thus any form or inten­tional structure: "Whether everywhere and necessarily such sensuous lived experiences in the stream of lived experiences bear some

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' animating construing' or other . . . whether, as we also say, they al­ways have intentive functions, is not to be decided here" {Idem I, §85, 208 / 172). In this manner Husserl advocates a heterological model in which hyle appears as pure matter for intentional activity.45

Husserl does not wish to operate with a matter-form dualism, bu t he questions whether all experience is open to objectification. Hence the emphasis is not on a data-sensualism but on the possibility of experiencing feelings that are nonobjective. Indeed, the lectures on internal-time-consciousness have shown that all lived experiences, even pre-theoretical ones, are intentional. There are no non-intentional sensations; data is ready to be perceived only once 'it' obtains a cer­tain form.46 Even existence that precedes any form of objectification is already intentional. Indeed, intentionality is not necessarily a mo­m e n t of objectification, for what the immanent sphere reveals is the pr imordial nature of intentionality in its form of retent ion and pro-tention, which has no intentional object; it is an intentionality in which an explicitly thematized object is absent. Only abstractly can we differentiate between hyle and morphe, for the hyletic da tum as such does not exist, having no being independently of its form. In re turn­ing to Hua X, we realize that, even in the immanent field, the matter-form distinction is an abstraction and a misleading schema to use. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty observes: "Husser l . . . for a long time de­fined consciousness or the imposition of a significance in terms of the Auffassung-Inhalt framework, and as a beseelende Auffassung. He takes a decisive step forward in recognizing, from the time of his Lec­tures on Time, that his operat ion presupposes another deeper one whereby the content is itself made ready for this apprehension."4 7

The re turn to temporality renders this dualistic schema redundant . It is, however, not as if Husserl were completely oblivious to these problems; rather, he wishes to hold on to "the clearly provisional character of reference to the idea of constitution in the Ideas' (Fink 1966,136). Husserl acknowledges that as long as the question of tem­porality remains bracketed,48 he has failed to prevent the re tu rn to a matter-form dualism.49

§26. Inconsistencies in Hua X

At first sight, however, the re turn to temporality does not seem to solve the problem. Although Hua X emphasizes that we are never conscious of data, but only the form of the appearing, and thus argues

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyle" 41

that even hyle is intentional, Hua X upholds the claim that sense data provide the raw material for intentional formations. Husserl repeat­edly emphasizes that though atomistic psychologism is a fiction, there is no consciousness without impression.50 The impression is the unmodified source of all being: "The primal impression is something absolutely unmodified, the primal source of all further consciousness and being" (Hua X, §31, 67 / 423). Husserl here appears to refer to a moment of transcendence within the field of immanence that exceeds the intentional structure of consciousness, but makes consciousness possible.51

It thus appears that phenomenology is characterized by nothing but its failure. Rather than re turning to an absolute foundation, which is fully visible, phenomenology returns to that which fails to show itself—a pure 'now' that consciousness fails to grasp. It appears that we have to conclude, with Jacques Derrida, that the 'now' that we perceive is always already other to this pure momen t and therefore structured by non-presence. According to Derrida, Husserl's account of pure presence is always already infected insofar as non-perception, in the form of retention and protention, structures the actual now:

As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; non-presence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of the in­stant There is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus Vorstellung. . . . The fact that nonpresence and other­ness are internal to presence strikes at the very root of the ar­gument for the uselessness of signs in the self-relation.52

Against this view we have already argued that it is not that "non-presence and non-evidence are admitted into the blink of the instant"; rather, that retentions and protentions are fully present. The now is onfy a now if it is experienced <zs pointing beyond itself, that is, as extended.53

However, the question remains as to the status of this primal impres­sion. We believe that Husserl is here intimating a certain distinction which is already at work in Kant's KRV.54 The distinction between pri­mal impression and consciousness can be compared with Kant's differ­entiation between intuition and the transcendental object = X.55

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§27. On the Nature of the Vrimpression—Husserl and Kant

Husserl 's claim that "without impressions there is no consciousness" is consistent with Kant's doctrine: "Without material nothing whatso­ever can be thought" (KRV, A232 / B284). This "stuff or matter should not be confused with Kant's notion of intuition. O n the one hand, Kant argues that intuition precedes our understanding: "In order to exhibit the objective reality of the pure concept of unders tanding we must always have an intuition" (KRV, A235 / B288). The categories are therefore "merely forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions" (KRV, B288). O n the other hand, intuitions themselves are preceded by a moment of affectivity. Our intuition is called "sensible, for the very reason that it is not original, that is, is not such as can itself give us the existence of its object. . . . Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object, and is there­fore possible only if the subject's faculty of representation is affected by that object" (KRV, B72). What characterizes human intuition is that it is dependent on the existence of an object that it cannot create itself. Human intuition is an uintuitus derivativus" (KRV, B72).

Whatever announces itself should not be confused with the mo­men t of intuition. There is something that never appears but makes intuition possible. Because human intuition is sensible, we need to be­lieve that there is a cause that initiates these intuitions, and since this 'cause' never appears, it can only be thought, bu t not intuited. This merely intelligible cause Kant calls the transcendental object - X: "We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have some­thing corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity" (KRV, A494 / B 5 2 2 ) .

From this we can deduce that Kant, like Husserl, gives an account of experience that is nonempirical.5 6 Though we are affected, every­thing that we intuit already differs from that which announces itself. The transcendental object = X escapes any form of representation. It is "the completely indeterminate thought of something in general" (KRV, A253). However, it should not be confused with the noumenon . A n o u m e n o n is "even apart from the constitution of our sensibility . . . in itself, that is, an object independent of sensibility" (KRV, A252). "This [transcendental object = X] cannot be entitled the noumenon', for I know nothing of what it is in itself, and have no concept of it save as

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyle" 43

merely the object of a sensible intuition in general, and so as being one and the same for all appearances" (KRV, A253). In contrast to the noumenon , we can think of the transcendental object only through sensible intuition: "This transcendental think object cannot be sepa­rated from the sensible data, for nothing is then left through which it might be thought" (KRV, A250-51). It cannot be abstracted from sen­sible intuition, and therefore belongs to the field of appearances, though it does not appear. There must be something that announces itself; "otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears" (KRV, BXXVI-BXXVII). Thus we can posit it only as the intelligible correlate to sensible intuition. It can be described only in negative terms: it "is transcenden­tal, and is therefore necessarily unknown to me" (KRV, A496 / B524). The transcendental object = X is an essential correlate to receptivity, a correlate that can only be thought, never intuited.

Husserl, like Kant, holds on to the necessity and primacy of im­pressions. The generative act for consciousness is the impression. There are retentions and protentions only in relation to a primal im­pression or sensuous hyle. In addition, appearances are possible and there is intuition only if they are preceded by a genesis spontanea: "By virtue of the original spontaneity of internal consciousness, each pri­mal moment is the source-point for a continuity of productions" (Hua X, appendix VII, 1 1 5 / 468). Since any appearing is possible only as a temporal event, this primal momen t is a source point for both tempo­rality and the appearing. Thus Husserl, like Kant, argues that we need to posit an original source allowing for the appearing of appearances.

As in Kant, this genesis spontanea does not exist in itself. It is some­thing purely abstract, "which can be nothing by itself (Hua X, §16, 40 / 400), existing only as a correlate to the stream of consciousness. A pri­mal impression is ready to be perceived only once it obtains a certain form. Though posited as a creative source, it is something material only from the point of view of an already constituted flow.57

§28. A Kantian Phenomenology There are, however, important distinctions that need to be drawn. For Husserl follows Kant only by exceeding his description. We need to remember that the task of the phenomenological reduction is to make manifest that which usually remains hidden. Phenomenology is not a re turn to a logical beginning that needs to be thought, but a re turn to

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the things themselves as they show themselves. What Kant's critical inquiry posits, in our reading, Husserl's phenomenology manifests.

Unlike Kant, Husserl believes that the primal impression is not an intelligible correlate but appears as a correlate. The primal impression, like Kant's transcendental object, should never be confused with a noumenon , a reality to which we have no access. This is not because it is a correlate that needs to be thought, but because it is a correlate which appears in its modification. The primal impression manifests it­self as a correlate to consciousness; it is in the fold of consciousness. Although the primal impression is nothing but an 'ideal now, it is not an abstract moment that can be thought but not intuited; it is not other to intuition, but actually appears within the tension of retentions and protentions. "It remains to be said that even this ideal now is not some­thing toto coelo different from the not-now but is continuously medi­ated with it."58 What is visible is the mediation of an ideal momen t that exists only in its iteration. It appears in the fold of adumbrative modi­fications of retentions.

The comparison with Kant, however, helps us to unders tand how Husser l is able to argue that any m o m e n t is s t ruc tured by its chain of retentions and protentions. Although there is a primacy of the im­pression, it is retention that constitutes and thus makes possible the experience of a now. "Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now" (Hua X, §18, 43 / 402). Kant helps us to unders tand the corre­late between primal impression and consciousness insofar as the pri­mal impression or sensuous hyle exists only in relation to the flow. The primal impression is the necessary correlate of consciousness mediat­ing between retention and protention, yet without ever appearing as such. It is neither matter nor form, neither movement nor static; it is the 'in-between' which appears only as mediating.59 The primal impres­sion manifests itself in its latency. However, since retentionality itself is present in its slipping away, we are referring not to an absence but to an appearing that lies in the tension of retentions and protentions.

We should not interpret the "failure" to appear, as Derrida does, in terms of loss, or in terms of a reality that exceeds the grasp of con­sciousness. Unlike the transcendental object, the primal impression can be described positively. The primal impression 'is', and comes into being as, a temporal event. Retentions and protentions should not be unders tood as a non-present accompanying the primal impression; rather, the deferral itself is the present, it constitutes the present as

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyle^ 45

present. Protention and retention are not moments that infect the im­pression; rather, they turn the impression into a temporal event, into a now. As our analysis above has shown, protent ion is in its not-yet; re­tention and protention do not re-present a lost moment , for both are without a. content "in the original sense."60

In this manner Husserl no longer operates with the matter-form dualism. There is no pure now that exists outside the stream of modi­fications. There is no rup ture with the present. Nothing needs to be represented, for nothing has been lost. Husserl does not search for a time foregone. There is not, as Derrida believes, an infection of a pure present—rather, an enlarging of presence. We are therefore referring to a pointing in which nothing is lost but everything retained. Reten­tion and protent ion are not a moment of negation but of reiterated modifications ( H u a X , appendix VII, 116 / 469) that are present.

§29. The 'Function' of the Primal Impression

If the now exists only in its mediation between retention and proten­tion, why cannot we just follow Hegel 's account of "sense certainty" in the Phanomenlogie des Geistes?61 Hegel 's fundamental claim is that there is no immediacy, for the 'now' is identical only through mediation: "The 'Now,' and pointing out the 'Now,' are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is something immediate and simple, but a movement which contains various moments" (Hegel 1977, §107). Like Hegel, Husserl argues that the now that we experience is always a now that is folded into the movement (mediated) between reten­tions and protentions. However, although to be, and thus to appear, means to be temporal and perceived, Husserl, in contrast to Hegel, holds on to the necessity of positing an immediate and simple 'now'. For what needs to be sustained is its ideal function, even if it does not have an existence besides that of being a correlate to consciousness.

Husserl, like Kant before him, wishes to uphold a moment of het-eronomy by emphasizing a moment of givenness. A temporal event is not caused by our will or imagination but by a source that initiates the temporal form of lived experiences. The difference between objective time and immanent time lies in their modes of givenness. The fluid time of the immanent stream is structured a round the emergence of given now-points, while we are free to recollect objective time.62 Objec­tive time persists and can be recalled: I can repeatedly re turn to past events and br ing them to consciousness by way of reproduct ion. 6 3

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Immanent , or subjective, time, in contrast, cannot be repeated but is given to us in its flow.64 Husserl here is following Heraclitus's postu­late "Nothing gone can return": "Nothing can re turn and be given in identity a second time" (Hua X, no. 51, 349). Thus, the immanent sphere is (pre-) structured by the primal impression, which guaran­tees a manner of appearing.

Once again we can draw parallels to Kant's work. Kant reads the transcendental object = X as subsisting within a dynamic framework, thereby guaranteeing that our knowledge claims are subject to a cer­tain lawfulness, "which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion' (KRV, A105, emphasis added) . Similarly, Husserl ar­gues that the primal impression initiates and guarantees the man­ner, or form, of appearing: "The form consists in this, that a now becomes constituted by means of an impression and that a trail of re­tentions and a horizon of protentions are attached to the impres­sion" (Hua X, appendix VI, 114 / 467). The 'motor ' of the chains of retentions and protent ions is the constant emergence of new 'now-points ' . New impressions initiate the flow to move, pushing aside each preceding impression and its accompanying retentions and protentions, and thus ensuring an infinite series. The now-point, or pr imal impression, is, however, nothing but an 'ideal limit' toward which the stream converges.

T h e function of the transcendental object in Kant is analogous to that of Husserl 's primal impression; while Kant argues that the tran­scendental object allows for the unity of the manifold (cf. KRV, Al 05), Husserl emphasizes that the primal impression constitutes the unity of the stream, insofar as it is the centrifugal point that structures the manifold of retentions and protentions. In his lectures of 1925 Hus­serl even refers to it as an Uranstofl,65 an initiating force.

§30. The Lawful Nature of the Appearing

At first sight the analogies drawn between Kant and Husserl might appear surprising, for Husserl 's account of the primal impression has far stronger empirical overtones than Kant's transcendental object = X. Kant emphasizes that the transcendental object is " throughout all our knowledge . . . always one and the same" (KRV, Al09) , while Husserl constantiy refers to the emergence of new 'now-points' that continu­ously modify the previous 'now-points' and indeed push them into the

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyk" 47

background. At the beginning of his lectures Husserl presents us with the following account: If I listen to music I might retain the preceding sounds, however, not necessarily the first tone that was played. In the case of the melody, I hear the "nows" that have just elapsed; though they are retained in the present, they are already "older" than the new 'now points ' . The aging is retained as present as long as I actually con­tinue hearing the melody; that is, as long as my perception is still ani-matedby the "new" now (cf. Hua X, §8). However, the melody I hear might sink further and further into the past until it fades from con­sciousness altogether. That is to say, at some stage I will be conscious no longer of the melody but of something else. At that moment the melody is no longer structured or animated by the 'now point ' . Depending on the distance of the primal impression, the individual melody becomes increasingly unclear until it finally disappears com­pletely.66 Hence the extended field of the present, the concrete Prasensfeld, is limited.67

Phenomenological reflection is supposed to make intentional life available for investigation. "But," Husserl writes in 1909, "all experiences flow away. Consciousness is a perpetual Heraditean flux; what has just been given sinks into the abyss of the phenomenological past and then is gone forever" (Hua X, no. 51 , 349). We are here confronted with the same perplexity that initiated our investigation in Ideen I. We have shown how immanent objects are completely given; however, we have to accept that this completeness is not absolute insofar as it is not per­manent . As J o h n Brough observes: "What the flow of time takes away . . . the consciousness of time restores."68 Indeed, Husserl refers to a Heraditean stream.69 The claim therefore seems to repeat an ancient one, that everything at every time reunites all contraries in itself in the stream of becoming.70 What remains constant is the pattern of appearing — it has a certain lawfulness.

Although Husserl refers to the constant emergence of new 'now-points ' , the emphasis is not on the newness or difference of these 'now-points' , bu t on their identical form. As Husserl emphasizes: "And the continuity in which a new now becomes constituted again and again shows us that it is not a question of 'newness' as such but of a continu­ous momen t of individuation in which the temporal position has its origin" (Hua X, §31, 66 / 421). Later he explains what he means by this "individuation": "What 'individual' means here is the original temporal form of sensation, or, as I can also put it, the temporal form

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of original sensation" (Hua X, §31, 67 / 423). Thus Husserl 's primal impression and Kant's transcendental object have one and the same function, insofar as they animate and structure the appearing.

Immanent objects do not persist; however, the structure of their appearing does. "What abides, above all, is the formal structure of the flow, the form of the flow. That is to say, the flowing is not only flowing throughout , b u t . . . it is determined through the form of regularity [lawfulness would be a better translation he re ] " (Hua X, Beilage VI, 1 1 4 / 467). The primal impression guarantees that the form of appearing is constant. It allows for the constancy of the flow and ensures the law­fulness and unity of the stream.71 The constant emergence of newnows ensures the continuity of one and the same structure of consciousness.

Husserl's account mainly focuses on the nature of retention and mentions "protention" only in passing. However, in o rder to under­stand the infinite nature of the stream, we need to unders tand the function of protention. For Husserl's wondrous claim is that not only the past is retained, but also the future. The infinite future is retained in a continuum of iterations.

§31. The Nature of Protention

At first Husserl merely wishes to argue that the phenomenon of pro­tention has a structure analogous to that of retention, insofar as it is a pointing towards a future prior to any anticipating or presuming. It is a presentative pointing towards that which is in its not-yet. "What is coming to be perceived in the expectation of the further phases of percept ion proper is also posited as now; it exists now and it endures and fills the same time" (Hua X, appendix X, 123 / 477). However, retent ion and protent ion move in opposite directions.72 Retention moves further and further away from the impressional momen t whilst protent ion converges towards the impression. That is to say, every future impression will come to fulfill the protention.

At first sight this might sound impossible. Are we not constantiy disappointed and, indeed, are we not often taken by surprise? If in the immanent field everything is completely given, there seems to be no room for coincidence or disappointment, as all intentions are full. Hus­serl, however, does not point to a deterministic vision of experience — we should r emember that protention is different from expecting or presuming. Like retention, protention is presentative. It does not point to an object in the future. Protention is not an expectation of a

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyle" 49

particular event, but is "primary expectation" insofar as it points to an always already implied future without contents in the original sense — a future that is, in its suspension of any objective event, happening.

If we listen to music, for example, we do not merely hear the sin­gle tone, or a number of individual tones; we hear the whole melody. Not only are all the past sounds present, but so are the future ones, in­sofar as they are implied. This is not to say that we expect an object— for example, a particular tone C being followed by a particular tone D —rather, we expect the continuity of the melody. Protention points to a moment that is structured by a certain type of familiarity. Nothing completely unexpected can happen. The next tone might be deficient in that it contradicts our expectations, bu t this contradiction confirms that the tone did not quite fit into our type of expectation, yet is still accom­modated within it. The "not having expected a particular tone" is not a negative momen t but a positive characteristic, for it affirms a vague expectation that is either confirmed or disappointed. Husserl de­scribes this moment in Hua XI as a "crossing out": it is a "retroactive crossing out of earlier predelineations which are still consciously re­tained" (Hua XI, §7, 30). We might expect a certain vague continuity of the melody; however, a dissonant tone is perceived that "disrupts" the flow. Although the unexpected tone appears, it appears only in re­lation to the type of continuity we expected the music would have, i.e., we experience it as not fulfilling our intentions. However — and this is of importance — the previous expectations are retained, for it is only in relation to these expectations that we can come to judge a tone as disappointing or unexpected. We can experience difference only in relation to a certain familiarity, i.e., as the crossing out of that which we expected.73 That which has been crossed out, however, is retained and hence continues to exist.

§32. The Prioritization of Protention

There are no innocent perceptions. Every perception is always already embedded in the very pat tern of protention and retention, which is itself folded together. Husserl now argues that there is a cer­tain prioritization of protention over retention insofar as the move­ment always points toward the future. Held records that Husserl refers, in his unpublished manuscripts, to curiosity as a primordial drive: "Since . . . all intentional perceptual life is fulfilled in original presentincations, the T instinctively tends towards transforming the

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unknown future into an established familiarity. This curiosity inherent in protentionality is a primordial drive of world experiencing life. If this structure of enpresenting turns out to be the primordial way of all life, then it is ^ p r i m o r d i a l drive" (Held 1966, 43). The stream of lived experiences is teleological insofar as it always points into the future. It is a pointing toward a future that is in its non-yet and there­fore can never end with an impression—for with every impression another pointing is established.74 The stream is therefore infinite and can never come to a standstill; it is an infinite continuity of one and the same stream. The stream has to continue. The lawfulness of the stream thus lies in its continuity of form: "But this abiding form s u p por ts the consciousness of constant change, which is a primal fact: the consciousness of the change of impression into retention while a fresh impression continuously makes its appearance: or, with respect to the 'what' of the impression, the consciousness of the change of this what as it is modified from being something still intended as 'now' into something that has the character of 'just having been '" (Hua X, appendix VI, 114 / 467). As Held and Yvonne Picard observe (cf. Held 1966, 44-45), Husserl does not prioritize the future over the past and present, as Heidegger will do; rather, he prioritizes a future toward which the present tends.75 Absolute consciousness lives in its longitu­dinal intentionality insofar as it lives in the unity of the stream. It is nothing but the type or style of appearing that accompanies and makes possible all appearances. Everything that appears is always already par t of one and the same consciousness—to appear means to be ready to be perceived, and to be ready to be perceived means to fit into and appear within the structure of consciousness.

§33. Limitations of Our Account

To conclude, Husserl, similarly to Kant, attributes a structuring func­tion to the primal impression. Whereas phenomenology is concerned with the manifestation of this structuration, Kant refers to that which needs to be thought, yet cannot be manifested. Their accounts reveal significant parallels. If we re turn to the A version of Kant's Transcen­dental Deduction we can summarize the following steps. Firstiy, all representations have their objects; however, they are only given as appearances: "Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately" (KRV, A108-9). Secondly, intuitions immediately relate to objects: "That in them which relates immediately to the

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyle" 51

object is called intuition" (KRV, A108-9). Thirdly, that which is intu­ited immediately is not a thing in itself but purely a modification of an object in general which needs to be thought: "But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object— an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, tran­scendental object = x" (KRV, A108-9). Fourthly, although this tran­scendental object = X is no-thing, it still performs a certain function. It functions as a correlate of the manifold of appearances—it opens up, indeed structures, the horizon of the appearing. Indeed, as we will show below, this leads Kant to claim that the transcendental object = X can be thought of only "as a correlate of the unity of apperception" (KRV,A250).

As we have shown, Husserl analogously argues that, firstly, we do not encounter sense data; phenomena are given to us. Secondly, we intuit an impression only in its temporal form. Thirdly, whatever we intuit, and hence whatever appears, always exceeds the primal impres­sion, yet the primal impression still appears in its modification. Fourthly, the primal impression is responsible for the manner in which the stream of consciousness unfolds. For all retentions and pro-tentions converge toward the ideal limit of the primal impression.

This fourth step has been merely posited; we have yet to show how the stream as such manifests itself as a correlate of the primal impres­sion. We have argued for a constancy of the appearing, but have ex­clusively referred to its formal structure and not to the manifestation of this lawfulness. If we wish not merely to posit a function, but to ad­here to the phenomenological project of revealing that which is abso­lutely given, we need to show how this manner or form of appearing manifests itself. We have reached the most difficult and obscure mo­ment of our analysis, and we can conclude this section only with Hus-seiTs voice, pointing to the problems that lie ahead:

I do not intend to offer this analysis as a final one; it cannot be our task here to solve the most difficult of all phenomenologi­cal problems, the problem of the analysis of time. What mat­ters to me here is only to lift the veil a little from this world of time-consciousness, so rich in mystery, that up until now has been hidden from us. And I want to emphasize particularly the new sense of unity as opposed to multiplicity, with which a number

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of senses of the perception of something immanent, of ade­quate perception, and even of representation as opposed to the absolute presentation of something itself, are connected. (Hua X, no.39, 276)

THE ENIGMA OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME

§34. The Shuddering Depths of Intemal-Time-Consciousness

O u r phenomenological description remains incomplete. We have shown how immanent objects as Ablaufsphdnomene are given com­pletely, but we have failed to question how the flow itself is consti­tuted. From 1907 onward, Husserl refines his account and questions the nature of the absolute flow.76 For what becomes apparent in the analysis is that every temporal object appears within a stream, which in turn structures the appearing of temporal events. Thus the immanent sphere has two dimensions: the absolute stream and immanent tem­poral objects, which are constituted within that stream. The division between immanence and transcendence needs to be refined, for we need to differentiate not only between immanent and transcendent objects, but between immanent objects and the absolute stream of consciousness. We need to differentiate among three levels: " (1) the things of empirical experience in objective time . . . ; (2) . . . the imma­nen t unities in pre-empirical time; (3) the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness" (Hua X, §34, 73 / 428). There are two levels of immanence; one is constituted, the other constituting. Just as objec­tive reality is dependen t on and relative to the field of immanence, it now appears that the field of immanence itself is relative to and de­penden t on another field that allows for the appearing of immanent objects.

We need to go beyond describing immanent temporal events that are constituted by a stream, and turn to what Heraclitus calls the "ever living fire," a conscious life that allows for the appearing of the stream itself.77 Idem I confesses that it has never succeeded in even getting close to this transcendental, absolute ground: "The transcendentally 'absolute ' which we have brought about by the reduction is, in truth, not what is ultimate; it is something which constitutes itself in a certain profound and completely peculiar sense of its own and which has its pr imal source in what is ultimately and truly absolute" (Idem I, §81,

The Enigma of the Consciousness of Time 53

198 / 163). Husserl shies away from this primal source that lies in un­known depths. Held provides us with a telling citation from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, revealing this anxiety about what phenome­nology might reveal: "Do we not shudder at these depths? Who has se­riously taken them up as a systematic theme in past millennia? Who has risked his life on the way to the 'Mothers ' since the first Augustin-ian reflections?"78

Phenomenology intends to make manifest the absolute and final g round of all being—it is guided by this quest for certainty; yet this de­sire for transparency is accompanied by an even stronger sense of un­certainty and even fear of what it might come to reveal. Nonetheless, phenomenology needs to re turn to the things themselves. However unsettling it may be, that which lies covered u p in the depths of all be­ing is not only the final given, but a fundamental given that grounds all phenomena . Thus Husserl has to appeal to a vigilant subject who has the courage to under take this daunting task. In the final analysis Husserl cannot compromise and settle for an incomplete phenome­nology. The endeavor, though provisionally bracketed in Ideen I, should never come to a halt:

That which is called "merely subjective" (although already transcendentally subjective) as opposed to the worldly real is constituted yet again, though it is no longer constituted as real (actual). And the constituting in turn is constituted. . . . It is necessary to have the courage to say what one sees and to give it the force of evidence, even if we are "threatened" by regress. The medusa is dangerous only to him who already believes in her and fears her. Riddles may be left over but they are indeed riddles. Riddles without solution are non-sense.79

The fear of infinite regress should not bring the analysis to a halt. We need to have the courage to show what can be seen, even if this points to an even deeper and unknown riddle. We should not shy away from discovery that the field of immanence is not the final ground, rather, we should seek to unravel this absolute field that accounts for the appearing of immanent objects. The transcendental absolute — the riddle beyond riddle—is neither the immanent sphere of lived ex­periences, nor appears within it; it is the primal source of the stream within which immanent objects appear. Husserl is here pointing to­ward a transcendence within immanence (cf. Ideen I, §57, 138 / 110),

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for immanent reflection itself is enveloped within a spontaneous flow of temporality, which is the source and life of any possible reflection.

§35. Absolute Consciousness We are here touching on one of the most ambiguous and obscure moments of Husserl 's phenomenology, and that is the sphere of abso­lute consciousness which Husserl also calls inner or internal con­sciousness (cf. Hua X, appendix XII, 127 / 481-82). In Hua X, Husserl recognizes that the phenomenological account has come to a halt too early.80 In appendix XII, he reproaches himself for having remained purely within the inner sphere of Erlebnisse (in LU), and thus having failed to ask back into the ground of the act of reflection.81

From 1908 onward, Husserl realizes that he was mistaken to equate the sensing with what is sensed, for there is never a complete congruence between the experiencing self—consciousness — and that which is experienced: "Every experience is 'consciousness,' and con­sciousness is consciousness of. . . . But every experience is itself experi­enced [erlebt], and to that extent also ' intended' [beivusst]" (Hua X, no. 41, 291). There are two forms of consciousness. One refers to the con­scious act, a consciousness of immanent objects. The other refers to a consciousness which has to be written in inverted commas, for it is an accompanying consciousness that exceeds the consciousness of ob­jects and thus does not appear within the immanent field.

Immanent objects, though completely given, never coincide with the subject who perceives them. While appearances go into and out of existence, what remains permanent , what endures, is the T that per­ceives the manifold of appearances. There is an infinite Heraclitean flux of lived experiences—yet there is an experiencing self or con­sciousness that accompanies the flux without flowing in it. The self that remains constant can thus not be defined in terms of the flux, for the ex­periencing self lives prior to the manifestation of immanent objects. In o rde r to perceive a flow as changing, there must be an T that remains constant, for difference can be perceived only in relation to unity.82

Husserl here once again intimates a Kantian move.83 Kant like­wise argues that, for there to be intuitions, there needs to be a subject that can perceive them. This subject cannot be identical with its rep­resentations; it is thus a pure apperception, an T think' that accompa­nies all my representations (cf. KRV, B132). There is a preceding synthesis that allows for the appearing of diversity. "Now all unifica-

The Enigma of the Consciousness of Time 55

tion of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthe­sis of them" (KRV, B137). The unity of the horizon is guaranteed by a self that remains constant and precedes the manifold of appearances. Kant thus observes that we need to differentiate between conscious­ness in time (empirical), and absolute consciousness (transcendental), which is a numerically identical T think'. Any synthesizing presupposes a consciousness of our synthesizing activity, a consciousness that is dis­tinct from my empirical self that changes through time. There must be an T think' that can accompany all my representations, even the representation of myself. Hence that which remains constant is out­side space and time, for the 'I think' cannot be an intuition in me.84

Likewise, Husserl argues that there is a distance between the T that experiences and what is experienced. The T that experiences precedes even the subjective time of immanent perception. The ulti­mate consciousness is therefore timeless and cannot be an object or representation appearing in time: "Subjective time becomes consti­tuted in the absolute timeless consciousness, which is not an object" (Hua X, appendix VI, 112 / 464). The experiencmg of immanent ob­

jects exceeds the durat ion of immanent time. It endures while my per­ceptions change. The Ego, or pure T , does not appear as an object; it is not a representation but an activity that allows for presentation. The experiencmg-of lived experiences is itself not an inner object but manifests the distance between me and my perceptions. Consciousness cannot be defined as something appearing within the sphere of imma­nence. Husserl, like Kant, concludes that consciousness is "nontempo-ral; that is to say, nothing in immanent time' (Hua X, no. 50, 334).

§36. A Phenomenological "Transcendental Unity of Apperception "

The analogies drawn so far are not coincidental. From 1907 onward Husserl realizes the significance of Kant's KRV.85 In Ideen I the influence of Kant is most visible:

This much is clear from the very beginning: After carrying out this reduction we shall not encounter the pure Ego anywhere in the flux of manifold lived experience which remains as a tran­scendental residuum —neither as one lived experience among others, nor as strictly a part of a lived experience, arising and then disappearing with the lived experience of which it is a part. The Ego seems to be there continually, indeed, necessarily, and

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this continualness is obviously not that of a stupidly persistent lived experience, a "fixed idea." Instead, the Ego belongs to each coming and going lived experience; its "regard" is directed "through" each actional cogito to the objective something. This ray of regard changes from one cogito to the next, shooting forth anew with each new cogito and vanishing with it. The Ego, however, is something identical. . . . In contradistinction the pure Ego would, however, seem to be something essentially nec­essary; and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in lived experiences, it cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or moment of the lived experiences themselves. (Idem I, §57, 137-38 / 109)

In this passage Husserl emphasizes—as does Kant— that the pu re Ego is the permanent and self-identical correlate to all experience. The pu re Ego stands apart, indeed never appears within the flux of the manifold of experiences. The self is never identical with what is expe­rienced; yet the Ego is permanent and necessarily there (though ante­rior) in the experiencing of lived experiences. This Ego is not an empty vessel that exists in itself. It exists only in its synthesizing activity, it "belongs to each coming and going lived experience." However, its being is not reducible to the lived experiences, and hence it is not a "real part or phase of these experiences." It should not surprise us that Husserl concludes this passage by acknowledging the significance of Kant's postulate: "In Kant's words, 'The '7 think" must be capable of accompanying all my presentations'" (IdeenI, §57,138 / 109). The acknowl­edgement , however, remains hesitant. In the edition of the Husserli-ana the following addition is made: "Whether [this is] also [Kant's] sense I leave undecided."86 Indeed, Husserl's phenomenological ap­proach is Kantian only insofar as it exceeds Kant.

Phenomenology manifests that which critical philosophy posits. Although structurally Husserl 's account appears Kantian, phenomeno-logically it goes beyond Kant Phenomenology does not search for an intelligible starting point of analysis, but wishes to reveal that which is absolutely given. To follow Levinas: "Consciousness is a constituting event and not a constituting thought, as in idealism."87 Husserl be­lieves that he can describe the event oiconsciousness—which is, and al­ready was before, the reflective gaze (cf. Levinas 1973, 30).

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§37. The Riddle Conscious life is not an intelligible correlate but is an event which is a life prior to reflection and thought. It is a being prior to being perceived. The aim is thus to describe this absolute given, the unity of conscious­ness, without falling prey to the dangers of what Kant calls the "Paralo­gism of Reason" (cf. KRV, A341 / B399) — that is, without inferring from the formal conditions of thought that there is a substance of thought, for we are referring only to a constituting event.

In order to avoid an infinite regress, Husserl, like Kant, maintains that consciousness cannot be an intratemporal event, for if it were, then consciousness would appear in time and would be not the abso­lute ground, but constituted once again. Transcendental consciousness is, however, the absolute final ground to which phenomenology re­turns. Hence, consciousness is both outside of time and self-constituting.

The absolute stream of time-constituting consciousness is "this fundamental form of 'active' [aktuellen] living" (IdeenI, §28, 60 / 51). As a constituting force it allows for the immanent sphere to appear, with­out, however, being an appearance of the stream. Absolute conscious­ness is pre-phenomenal and pre-immanent.88 Not only this, but since it is the absolute ground it cannot in turn be constituted. The tran­scendental time-constituting consciousness, if it truly is the beginning of all beginnings, needs to provide for its own ground of being. Tran­scendental consciousness is responsible for its own being. Here we are reaching one of the most complex and "mysterious" levels of phenome­nology,89 for Husserl needs to account for an absolute time-constituting consciousness that not only constitutes, or allows for the appearing of immanent objects, but, simultaneously, allows for the manifestation of its own flow. "The self-appearance of the flow does not require a sec­ond flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in it­self (Hua X, §39,83 / 436). The flow needs to be aware of its own self; otherwise further levels of investigation would be necessary. Thus, however strange the claim might sound, transcendental consciousness not only constitutes immanent being but is responsible for its own ap­pearing: "There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of con­sciousness itself become constituted at once. As shocking (when not initially even absurd ) as it may seem to say that the flow of conscious­ness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does"

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(Hua X, §39, 80 / 434). We are referring to a givenness that in turn is the source of its own donation. This account is "shocking (when not initially even absurd)" because this consciousness which lies outside the immanent and phenomenal field is neither a logical correlate to my appearances, nor is it atemporal. The obscure argument Husserl attempts to articulate is that transcendental consciousness is pre-immanent , though it still has its own mode of appearing. The absolute constituting subject is not an empty vessel, nor a logical point of refer­ence, but it appears as a stream in its constituting activity.

§38. The "Dogma of the Momentariness of a Whole of Consciousness"90

Husserl 's crucial depar ture from Kant is his at tempt to make manifest transcendental consciousness. For Kant the transcendental unity of appercept ion is the "highest po in t" (hochstePunkt) (KRV, B134) — it is an analytic unity which exists only as a correlate to synthetic unity (cf. KRV, B134). Husserl likewise believes that consciousness exists only as a correlate to experience. However, this consciousness is never a 'point ' , but discloses itself as this living correlate. That is to say, Hus­serl believes that phenomenology can disclose this transcendental correlate, for it is in the fold of temporalization.

As in his account of immanent experience, Husserl argues against an atomistic description of consciousness by breathing life into pres­ence: "The aim is to find life in the present again. "91 The pure Ego, though pre- immanent and pre-temporal, should never be confused with a unitary now-point. It is never a rigid, frozen unity bu t is a living self-presence which is alert and vigilant in its being.

Although Husserl, like Kant, argues that change can be perceived only in relation to unity, from the very beginning of his lectures on internal-time-consciousness, Husserl emphasizes that we are mistaken in believing that change or time can be perceived only in relation to a timeless, non-changing consciousness:

It appears to be an evident and quite inescapable assumption of this conception that the intuition of an extent of time occurs in a now, in one time-point. It simply appears as a truism that every consciousness aimed at some whole, at some plurality of distin­guishable moments (hence every consciousness of relation and combination), encompasses its object in an indivisible time-point. Wherever a consciousness is directed towards a whole

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whose parts are successive, there can be an intuitive conscious­ness of this whole only if the parts, in the form of representants, come together in the unity of the momentary intuition. (Hua X, §7, 20 / 383)

Against this common-sense view, Husserl argues that there never is a punctual self-identical now-point. Just as any primal impression only is in relation to its protentions and retentions, so is the experiencing self. As early as 1905 Husserl maintains that it is possible that appre­hension "is extended over a stretch of time (the so-called 'presence-t ime ' ) " (Hua X, §7, 20 / 383). Indeed, consciousness of time itself requires time. It has its own form of temporalization: "I see with evi­dence that that final state is possible only as a final state, that any state or condition that intuits time is possible only as extended, . . . that the con­sciousness of time itself [requires] time; the consciousness of dura­tion, duration; and the consciousness of succession, succession."92 Just as the now appears only as extended, so does the experiencing self. Retention and protent ion are thus not unique to immanent experi­ence, but are inherent also in the experiencing of that experience.

§39. The Double Nature of Retention The peculiarity of transcendental consciousness is that it always is alive; the sense of myself never ceases nor begins, but accompanies and is prior to reflection. This latent anterior existence is, however, experienced as present. It is simultaneously latent and present, for it is retained prior to being perceived. The wondrous moment that Hus­serl attempts to articulate is the existence of a consciousness that is present, yet anterior, to the phenomenal immanent field.

Transcendental consciousness is made out of the same cloth as immanent objects, namely retention. In §39 Husserl points to a double-intentionality of the flow: transverse intentionality (Querintentionalitat) where reflection intuits the temporal event of lived experiences, and longitudinal intentionality (Ldngsintentionalitaf) ,93 which points to the absolute flow itself, "the self-appearance of the flow" (Hua X, §39, 83 / 436). This double intentionality constitutes at once the unity and appearing of the flow and the unity and manifestation of immanent ob­jects. Immanent objects are structured around the primal impression — their life depends on how long they are animated by the primal im­pression. These temporal objects never appear in isolation, but within a chain of preceding temporal objects.

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Not only is the primal impression folded into protent ion and re­tention, but every retention in turn is retained again. A tone is given in an impression (I) and in a retention (R). When a new impression of the same tone appears (F), it is accompanied by another retention (R') , and the retention that was originally retained (R) is tu rned into a retent ion of retention (R") . This account can be continued ad infini-tum. "Going along the flow or with it, we have a continuous series of re­tentions pertaining to the beginning point. Beyond that, however, each earlier point of this series is adumbra ted in its turn as a now in the sense of retention. Thus a continuity of retentional modifications at­taches itself to each of these retentions, and this continuity itself is again an actually present point that is retentionally adumbrated" (Hua X, §11, 29 / 391). Each retention again merges and implicates o ther retentions. This, however, does not lead to an infinite regress, since the infinite horizon of previous modifications is implicated in retention. Retention implicates the "whole heritage" of all the preced­ing developments and thus intends the flow of consciousness itself. "This does not lead to an infinite regress, since each memory is in it­self a continuous modification that carries within itself, so to speak, the heritage of the whole preceding development in the form of a se­ries of adumbrations" (Hua X, no. 50, 327). As Merleau-Ponty ob­serves: "Each moment of time calls all the others to witness" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 69). We therefore have a whole history of series of reten­tions that are intentionally implicating each other: there is a "continu­ity of retentions which, however, are not on an equal footing; they are instead to be related to one another continuously—intentively—a continu­ous complexity of retentions of retentions" {Ideen I, §81, 199 / 164).

Not only do we perceive the identity of a sound as temporal , but we live the identity or unity of the flow, and both forms of intentional-ity are correlates to each other. The sound as a temporal event is fold­ed into the consciousness of the absolute flow of lived experiences, which is also fully present (cf. Ideen I, §§81 -83) . Only abstractly can we isolate these intentionalities, for the unity of the tone and the unity of the flow become constituted at once.94 Although the two intentionali­ties point in two different directions, it is impossible to separate one from the other. Like Kant, Husserl maintains that consciousness exists only as an abiding correlate to experience, that is, the T accompanies my acts of perception. Absolute consciousness appears as this transcen­dental correlatebetween experiencing and experience. Transcendental

The Enigma of the Consciousness of Time 61

consciousness is in this fissure — it expresses the synoptic relation be­tween these two dimensions of immanence.9 5

The flow is thus at once conscious of itself as a succession of phases through its longitudinal intentionality. Consciousness is two-dimensional: the unity of a temporal object is constituted by an abso­lute consciousness. "It belongs to the essence of this unity as a temporal unity that it 'becomes constituted in the absolute consciousness. Speci­fically, with respect to absolute given unities such as the sound-unity we have been discussing, we recognize the marvelous fact that the ex­istence of such a unity is not conceivable without its being a consti­tuted unity of a certain kind; namely, one that points back to a certain uniquely formed and i n t e r connec t ed^ !^ of consciousness' (Hua X, no. 39, 284). The whole of conscious life is unified synthetically through longitudinal intentionality. Immanent experience is possible only within that unity.

We can now finally unders tand the quotat ion that initiated our investigation: "Each actual lived experience . . . is necessarily an en­during one; and with this durat ion it finds its place in an infinite con­t inuum of dura t ion —in a. fulfilled cont inuum. Of necessity it has an all-round, infinitely fulfilled temporal horizon. At the same time this says: it belongs to one endless 'stream of lived experiences'" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163). Each lived experience is an enduring one and, as such, finds its place in an infinite duration, a. fulfilled continuum. It thus be­longs and points to the unity of an infinite open horizon.

We can summarize the following steps: firstly, the awareness that consciousness has of itself— of its acts of perceiving, judging, or un­derstanding—is different from the awareness that I have of immanent experience. Consciousness is an experiencmg that accompanies all my experience. This awareness of my being is neither posited nor meant and can be described purely as an adverbial non-positing, non-objectivating awareness of myself as existing. Secondly, this conscious­ness experiences itself as a unity—it remains constant, in contrast to the manifold of immanent experiences that are constandy 'flowing away'. "Every single lived experience, e.g., a lived experience of joy, can begin as well as end and hence delimit its duration. But the stream of lived experiences cannot begin and end" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163). Thirdly, this self-identical and infinite consciousness is a stream and not static. It manifests, however, a movement, a flowing, that is differ­ent from the flowing of Ablaufsphanomene, insofar as it precedes and

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makes possible immanent experience. The main difference between immanent experience and consciousness lies in the nature of their givenness: while the former is finite, the stream of consciousness is infinite and absolute.

§40. The Sublime Moment of Phenomenology

Transcendental consciousness, which accompanies all my (acts of) perception, is latently retained. It is prior to any perception and older than any conscious act. It does not appear in the temporal flow and is thus anterior to time and space, yet it has its own form of appearing, and that is in the form of an infinite stream of retentions. It is through the not ion of retention that Husserl can show that absolute conscious­ness is active and changing in its unity. Absolute consciousness is no 'punctual now' but is infinitely extended. Pre-reflexive awareness or self-relation involves a longitudinal intentionality that is characterized by the presentative absence of a content. It is a pre-objective, pre-temporal , and non-thetic being that exists in its suspension of being no-thing—for it is purely in its not-yet and no-longer. In his unpub­lished works Husserl describes it as the " 'primordial ' in which every­thing which might be called a phenomenon in whatever sense is rooted. It is the standing-streaming self-presence, that is to say, that absolute T (!) which is present to itself as streaming in its standing-streaming life."96 Although absolute, the Ego refers to a strange hy­brid that exists as a standing-streaming self-presence.

But to what kind of flow are we referring? This consciousness that precedes all acts of reflection is transitive. Indeed, Husserl constantly refers to the "stream of consciousness." This stream, however, cannot be unders tood in terms of temporality, for it is pre-temporal, pre-objective, and indeed pre-immanent. We are referring to a flow that changes while retaining all its moments. Although the stream flows, and thus constantly changes, nothing is lost, for everything is retained in its no-longer. Consciousness is thus both streaming and standing. We cannot describe the stream of consciousness in terms of duration, succession of now-points, or temporality:

Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an objective movement? Certainly! On the other hand, memory is surely some­thing that itself has its now, and the same now as a tone, for ex­ample. No. There lurks the fundamental mistake. The flow of the

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modes of consciousness is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now. The retention97 that exists ' together' with the con­sciousness of the now is not 'now', it is not simultaneous with the now, and it would make no sense to say that it is. (Hua X, no. 50, 333, 1908/9)

We can describe the stream only negatively: "It is not a process," "It is not itself as now," "It is not a simultaneity of now-points," it is present to itself prior to being perceived as present. We face die absurdity of de­scribing that which cannot be described. While an immanent object has its own velocity—that is to say it can rest or be accelerated—the tran­scendental stream, although constandy changing, has "the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither 'faster' nor 'slower'" (Hua X, no. 54,370). Absolute time<:onstituting conscious­ness is a stream that flows. However, the flow itself is not initiated by an external force, but has its own regularity. In addition to this, Husserl continues: "The change is not a change. And therefore it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures, and it is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of a duration" (Hua X, no. 54,370). Even calling the constant retentional iteration of inner time a 'flow' is resorting to an inadequate metaphor, for there is no time within which it appears.

We can describe the stream only as a change that has no duration, as a flux that, though it flows, cannot be described as passing through time. Through the double intentionality of retention the flow appears to itself as a " quasirtemporal a r rangement of the phases of the flow" (Hua X, §39, 83 / 437). The flow lies between movement and non-movement and is streaming and standing. "We can say nothing other than the following: This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not 'something in objective time.' It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as 'flow'; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in a primal source-point, ' the now/ and so on. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all of this, we lack names" (Hua X, §36, 75 / 429). The flow is so structured that it manifests itself without, however, appearing within time. Although we refer to an infinite chain of retentions and pro tendons, we cannot even refer to a duration or simultaneity of different moments , for this would lead us to assume

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that they share one and the same time. The flow is neither temporal nor static; it is a movement that is reiterated in its unity. There is no linearity of internal time.

We have reached the moment at which language defies us in ar­ticulating the most fundamental moment—when unity and diversity, and presence and the non-absence of absence, are simultaneously ap­prehended . Even the "stream" is nothing but a metaphor , for we are not referring to a movement, nor to a stand-still, but to a "thickness" that is "foreign to natural language."98 This is the most Nietzschean momen t in Husserl 's phenomenology. We are pointing to a pre-thetic life that resists any rational account. We are dealing with the simul­taneity of difference and non-change—which is not open to rational investigation. It is an immediacy that escapes reason, as Nietzsche ob­serves: "Timelessness and succession get on well together as soon as the intellect is absent."99

§41. The "Annihilation of the World" That Does Not Lead to a Loss

The phenomenological reduction leads us beyond the objective world and the immanent field and points to the most subjective expe­rience. It reveals consciousness in its anteriority to perception, as it is implicated in the infinite movement of the stream of retentions and protentions. The most fundamental given is not static, but an adver­bial transitive life that is permanent in its endless iteration. This move­m e n t cannot be described in terms of before and after, for everything is retained and implicated in the present. The most fundamental given to which phenomenology thus returns is an infinitely extended presence that is pre-temporal and pre-spatial, though allowing for the appear ing of immanent and transcendent objects. We can now under­stand more fully the claim, made in chapter one, that the reduction re tu rns us to the spectacle of the world (§11) - With the annihilation of the world we have not lost the world but re ta ined it in its pre-immanen t appearing.

However, as we have shown, this creates a problem in that it leads Husserl to re turn to an idealistic inquiry. The nature of this idealism needs to be explained, for it leads Husserl to re turn to a subjectivity of a peculiar kind. As Husserl argues in CM:

Carried out with this systematic concreteness, phenomenology is eo ipso 'transcendental idealism', though in a fundamentally

The Enigma of the Consciousness of Time 65

and essentially new sense. It is not a psychological idealism, and most certainly not such an idealism as sensualistic psycholo-gism proposes, an idealism that would derive a senseful world from senseless sensuous data. Nor is it a Kantian idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things in themselves. On the con­trary, we have here a transcendental idealism that is nothing more than a consequentially executed self-explication in the form of a systematic egological science, an explication of my ego as subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with re­spect to every sense of what exists, wherewith the latter might be able to have a. sense for me, the ego. . . . It is sense-explication achieved by actual work, an explication carried out as regards every type of existent ever conceivable by me, the ego, and spe­cifically as regards the transcendency actually given to me be­forehand through experience: Nature, culture, the world as a whole. (CM, §41, 118-19 / 88, emphasis added)

What is retained is the type or style of experiencing. Absolute con­sciousness does not create the objective world of objects; rather, as Sokolowski observes: "It allows them to emerge as real, but does not make them" (Sokolowski 1964, 138). It is the source of all life and being. The world is retained in its appearing without any appearances or thetic objects. The form of the perceiving, not its content, is com­pletely given. Jan Patocka draws on the vocabulary of SuZ, and describes this event as a projection {Entwurj): "It is a projection of every possible encounter with it. As projection of a possible encounter it, of course, has a relation to beings, which lives in possibilities, and is as the possible; and 'sum' means precisely this" (Patocka 1970, 3 3 1 -32). Everything is retained and nothing lost. Everything "is nested inside the living present, while it is not nested inside anything else. . . . The living present is the theater in which the whole spectacle of conscious life is available for phenomenological viewing" (So­kolowski 1974, §61, 159).

What is retained is not an objective world bu t the style of the world, the unitary style of appearing that is constant. To follow Merleau-Ponty: "There is a temporal style of the world, and time remains the same because the past is a former future and a recent present, the present an impending past and a recent future, the future a present

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and even a past to come; because, that is, each dimension of time is t reated or aimed at as something other than itself (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 422). The world appears in its suspension. The 'annihilation of the world' is the contraction of existence into the present—an exist­ence in which no (thing) has duration but everything is. To follow Kern: "The existence of consciousness is not destroyed after the anni­hilation of the world, however its remaining existence has no durat ion after the annihilation of the world. In other words, it has no longer a past and a future but fuses together into the present" (Kern 1964, 209). Retentions refer to the form of retaining without an object. The infinite flux is nothing but a stream of retentions which sustain an infinitely large presence. The annihilation of the transcendent world does not lead to the negation or loss of the world; rather, it shows that reality is retained in subjectivity. As Husserl argues in Ideen I: "Strictly speaking, we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, 'constitutes' within itself, all worldly transcendencies 'as an inten­tional correlate. . . .'"10° It allows for the leeway (Spielraum) of all ap­pearing. The enigma of life lies beyond space and time; thus, it can be solved only after the reduction. As Wittgenstein argues in the Tracta-tus, "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time" (Wittgenstein 1963, 6.4312, 148 / 149).

THE VIGILANCE OF THE SUBJECT

§42. The Seeing of 'Seeing', or I Can 'See' the 'Seeing' Itself

Husserl points to a non-thetic consciousness which exists as synthesiz­ing prior to the act of reflection.101 This passive synthesis,102 as Husserl calls it later, precedes and makes possible the act of understanding. The absolute given is not an objective moment . The beginning is thus a life that precedes reflection: "Its beginning is the pure —and, so to speak, still d u m b . . . experience" (CM, §16, 77 / 40). This is, how­ever, not the last momen t of phenomenology, for the aim is to reflect u p o n this final g round so that it becomes visible to phenomenological reflection. This d u m b experience needs to be perceived if it is to serve as an absolute starting point.

This leads Husserl to a radical depar ture from Kant. Kant says of the awareness of my self that! am, "this representation is a thought, not an intuition' (KRV, B157). While Kant argues that the unity of appercep-

The Vigilance of the Subject 67

tion never appears but can be thought only, phenomenology believes it can be seen. "I surely do know of the flow of consciousness as flow. I can look at it" (Hua X, no. 54, 378). Husserl believes that "I can 'see' the 'seeing' itself (Hua II, 24 / 31). Through a particular phenome-nological reflection, which is no longer concerned with immanent ob­jects, bu t is concerned with the nature of experiencing as such (reflection on lived experiences, Erlebnisreflexion), Husserl believes that it is possible to manifest that which precedes any possible perception — even the intuition of our own self.

In Ideen /Husser l provides us with the following argument: "Each Ego is livingits lived experiences, and in the latter a great variety is in­cluded really—inherently and intentively. It lives them: that is not to say that it has them and [has] its 'eye on ' what they include and is seiz­ing upon them in the manner characteristic of an experiencing of something immanent or of any other intuiting and objectivating of something immanent" (Ideen I, §77, 177-78 / 145, emphasis added) . The T that experiences lived experiences and subsists in these experi­ences lives this experiencing prior to any reflection. That it is, and per­sists, ensures that we can become conscious of this life through reflection: "Any lived experience which is not an object of regard can, with respect to ideal possibility, become ' regarded ' ; a reflection on the par t of the Ego is directed to it, it now becomes an object for the Ego" (Ideen I, §77, 178 / 145). The re is thus an Erlebnisreflexion that is different from the reflection on the immanent object, since it purely makes manifest an awareness that already is.103 "This occurs in the form of 'reflection', which has the remarkable property that what is seized upon perceptually in reflection is characterized fundamentally not only as something which exists and endures while it is being re­garded perceptually but also as something which already existed before this regard was turned to it. 'All lived experiences are intended to' : . . . they are there already as a 'background' when they are not reflected on and thus of essential necessity are 'ready to be perceived?" (Ideen I, §45,104 / 83-84). Conscious life is latent and anterior to any perception, but it is always ready to be perceived.

§43. An Unconscious Given

Husserl, however, comes to realize that this absolute ground can never be completely grasped. "The constituting and the constituted coin­cide, and yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect. The

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phases of the flow of consciousness in which phases of the same flow of consciousness become constituted phenomenally cannot be identical with these constituted phases, nor are they" (Hua X, §39,83 / 437). We can grasp parts of the flow, but we can never grasp the unity of the flow as such.104 The fungierende self that precedes any reflective act can never be completely seen. Husserl therefore concedes that it is given only in the sense of a Kantian idea: "In the continuous progression from seiz-ing-upon to seizing-upon, in a certain way, I said, we now seize upon the stream of lived experiences as a unity. We do not seize upon it as we do a single lived experience but rather in the manner of an idea in the Kan­tian sense" (Ideen I, §83, 202 / 166). While immanent objects are abso­lutely given, the absolute stream is given only in the manner of a Kantian idea. It is the absolute totality of all experience, which is itself, however, not grasped. The true beginning of phenomenology turns out to be an ideal moment that cannot be seen. The annihilation of the world thus leads to a pure consciousness in which any reality or realiza­tion is disregarded. The living presence that remains is a standing and streaming, a nunc stans and nuncfluens, which, however, is nothing but an ideal (idealiter) infinite continuum.

To follow Merleau-Ponty: "Reflection does not itself grasp its full significance unless it refers to the unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and which constitutes for it a kind of original past, a past which has never been a present" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 242). The experiencing- that accompanies all my experiences can never be perceived as such. Consciousness thus precedes experience, and is not only anterior to it, but remains latent. As Levinas observes: "Consciousness is an ageing and on the search for a t ime foregone."105 Consciousness in its temporalization precedes and is always already older \hzn experience—our experience is accom­panied by a trail of life that lies beyond our perceptual grasp. The d u m b experience can never be fully turned into speech. It is always anterior to appearances; does not this last consciousness finally lead to an unconscious field that lives without being perceived?

But now we ask whether we must not say that there is, in addi­tion, an ultimate consciousness that controls all consciousness in the flow. In that case, the phase of internal consciousness that is actual at any particular moment would be something in­tended through the ultimate consciousness; and it would be

The Vigilance of the Subject 69

this ultimate consciousness that passes over into the reproduc­tive (retentional) modification, which itself would then be something again intended in the ultimate consciousness. This ultimate intentionality can take up into itself the style of paying attention, and in this way we can become conscious of its con­tent in the manner of the object of attention. We find, more­over, that when we do pay attention to something, something is always already "appearing"—the style of attention always runs through and across an intentionality. But if I direct my re­gard towards an actual momentary phase of the flow? But we should seriously consider whether we must assume such an ul­timate consciousness, which would necessarily be an 'uncon­scious' consciousness; that is to say, as ultimate intentionality it cannot be an object of attention (if paying attention always pre­supposes intentionality already given in advance), and there­fore it can never become conscious in this particular sense. (HuaX, no. 54, 382)

This is the last entry in Hua X, written between 1909 and 1911. Hus­serl here raises the most unsettling question for phenomenology: If the ult imate consciousness is unconscious, it could never be open for phenomenological reflection. Hence, phenomenology faces the strange task of searching for a beginning that always recedes, and thus is never present for investigation. The beginning of all beginnings is nothing that we can grasp completely. Husserl here , without admit­ting to it, proves the impossibility of ever grasping this absolute stream of life.

Husserl concedes , in this last entry in H u a X, that it should be seriously cons idered whether one must assume such an ul t imate consciousness —a consciousness that would be, necessarily, an 'un­conscious' consciousness. But Husserl resists this move. The final and absolute g round needs to be present. Husserl refuses to recognize the necessary latency of absolute consciousness:

It is just nonsense to talk about an "unconscious" content that would only subsequently become conscious. Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of its phases. Just as the reten­tional phase is conscious of the preceding phase without mak­ing it into an object, so too the primal datum is already intended—specifically, in the original form of the 'now' —

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without its being something objective. It is precisely this primal consciousness that passes over into retentional modification— which is then retention of the primal consciousness itself and of the datum originally intended in it, since the two are insep­arably united. If the primal consciousness were not on hand, no retention would even be conceivable: retention of an un­conscious content is impossible. (Hua X, appendix IX, 119 / 472-73)

What comes to light here is the struggle between accepting that there is an awareness of life that lies beyond our grasp and the refusal to give u p the idea of an absolute beginning. In this struggle Husserl 's idea of "philosophy as a rigorous science" surrenders to life.106 This surren­der , however, is "played out behind Husserl 's back," for it is acknowl­edged only in the Krisis.m

CONCLUSION

In H u a X, Husserl cannot accept that there is an unconscious latency, for whatever is latent is the retention of an originary actual moment . Longitudinal intentionality is a correlate to a primal impression, for there are no retentions without a preceding impression. Husserl is he re pointing to an insoluble tension between acknowledging the ide­ality of the stream and refusing to recognize the impossibility of turn­ing this ideal into a perceived moment . As Rudolf Bernet observes: "Husserl's texts unfold thoroughly within the field of tension which pervades the opposition between the ideal of an absolute, perceptual presence of the flow to itself, and the impossibility, evinced in the phe-nomenological analysis of the flow, of ever realizing this ideal" (Ber­net 1983,110-11). Bernet relates this tension to the fact that Husserl still holds on to a primacy of presence, and therefore is imprisoned in what Derrida calls the metaphysics of presence. Indeed, the problem for Heidegger will be exactly this moment , namely, that Husserl believes that the event of consciousness can be seen. Husserl herewith gives a primacy to intuition and presence, and thus, according to Heidegger, still holds on to a vulgar notion of time.108 The quest for presence goes hand in hand with the desire to turn immanence into an absolute, self-enclosed space. To follow Held: "Husserl's aberra­tion away from the primacy of the dimension of appearance can be

Conclusion 71

unders tood in terms of a Cartesian ascription of appearance to sub­jective immanence. The aberration can be explained as resulting from the fact that he allowed himself to be misled by 'reflection' which undoubtedly is required if one is to thematise the appearing of the appearing" (Held 1981, 191). Since phenomenology takes presence as its ideal, it fails to reveal the fundamental disclosure that is always already anterior to presence. This permits Husserl to re turn to sub­jectivity and to reverse the manifestation of the absolute ground into the sphere of immanence. Yet inadvertendy, the phenomenological description leads Husserl to disclose a transcendence that not only exceeds immanence but lies beyond the grasp of consciousness. Con­sciousness is thus always already fissured. The enclosed space of immanence is broken. Phenomenology as a rigorous science idealizes presence and thus fails to acknowledge that it has sur rendered to a life that lies beyond its grasp, a surrendering that is played out behind Husserl 's back.

CHAPTER THREE

Heidegger's Recovery of the World

INTRODUCTION

So FAR WE HAVE focused on Heidegger 's critique of Husserl. We have shown that Husserl seeks to re turn to an absolute and, indeed, "worldless" beginning by treating transcendental consciousness as an "ideal, that is, not real being" (GA 20, § l l d , 146). l The problem for Heidegger is that Husserl thereby ignores the fact that acts of percep­tion essentially belong to a concrete individual human being that finds itself in a real world.2 This leads him to complain that Husserl aban­dons the principle of phenomenology. Rather than re turning to the things themselves, Husserl returns to a pure abstraction and renders the facticity of our existence meaningless. Heidegger 's exasperation with Husserl's phenomenological project is well expressed in his bewil­de red comment in the marginalia of Husserl 's Encyclopaedia Britan-nica article: "Does not a world necessarily pertain to the essence of the p u r e ego?"3 Surely the gulf between consciousness and the world can­not be sustained. The question of Being cannot be separated from the question of the world. "Dasein's understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a 'world,' and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world" (SuZ, §4, 13).

Herewith, Heidegger suggests a radical depar ture from Husserl. The 'beginning of all beginnings' is not a worldless subject, but Dasein as Being-in-the-world.4 Dasein pierces {durchbricht) the field of con­sciousness. Contrary to Husserl 's pure Ego, it is not an "enclosed space" but is defined in terms of its openness to the world: "The Being in Da-sein must retain its 'exteriority'" (Zahringer Seminare, 121 / 383). The problem is no longer "how to get out of the enclosed space of

Dasein's Distinctiveness 73

consciousness"; rather, Dasein is always already 'other ' to conscious­ness. It defines the place that makes thinking and acting possible. Heidegger thus suggests a "revolution of the place of thinking" (Zdh-ringer Seminare, 385 / 123). SuZ's breakthrough lies in the fact that Dasein replaces an immanent transcendence with a momen t of tran­scendence allowing for immanence.5 A topology of thinking is going to stand in "lieu" of consciousness.

This chapter is concerned with the dis-location, or Ortsverlegung, that the very term Dasein suggests.6 It explores whether SuZ manages to retrieve the phenomenon of the world that the tradition of phi­losophy has overlooked.

DASEIN'S DISTINCTIVENESS

§44. Nihil Sine Esse Ratione

SuZ's critique of subjectivity is tied u p with its critique of the search for a singular and absolute foundation of all being.7 The prioritization of subjectivity is problematic insofar as it is regarded as a sole source of all being, i.e., as a self-enclosed constitutive site. This function is implicit in the very term subject Subjectum derives from the Greek V7T0KElflEVOV? which literally means to "lie under" or "lie below" as the "substratum" of all being. This is exemplified in both Husserl's prioritization of immanence and Kant's "I think." The role of both— the unity of the stream of consciousness and the transcendental unity of apperception —is a constitutive one, and the world of appearances can be unders tood only by virtue of this ultimate subjectum. The sub­ject posits the world. To follow Husserl: "It is exclusively as positingthat I am subject for this world."9 In this manner , the world is my repre­sentation,10 a secondary phenomenon dependent on the subject who legitimizes these representations.11 "Nihil sine ratione, "there is nothing without reason — that is to say, without a ground.1 2

Although Heidegger turns against this prioritization of subjectiv­ity, he does not discard the idea of constitution per se. As he wrote to Husserl in October 1927: "It has to be shown that Dasein's mode of Being . . . precisely contains in itself the possibility of transcendental constitution. . . . Therefore the problem of Being is universally related to that which constitutes and to that which is constituted" {Brief, 601-2 / 119-20). SuZ is not simply concerned with the question of existence

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but, like Husserl's work, essentially addresses the question of constitu­tion: "The question about that [ontological] structure [of existence] aims at the analysis (Auseinanderlegung) of what constitutes existence. The context (Zusammenhang) of such structures we call 'existentiality.'"13

In the marginalia of his copy of SuZ Heidegger adds: the term constitu­tion indicates that SuZ is "thus, no philosophy of existence."14 This em­phasis on the question of constitution leads Heidegger to a qualified defence of idealism: "As compared with realism, idealism, no matter how contrary and untenable it may be in its results, has an advantage point in p r i n c i p l e . . . . If idealism emphasizes that Being and Reality are only 'in the consciousness,' this expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained through entities" (SuZ, §43a, 207). Implicitly, Heidegger thereby acknowledges the significance of the gulf that separates immanence from transcendence in Husserl's phe­nomenology.15 For at least Husserl points to a Being that is radically dis­tinct from the transcendent world.16

§45. Dasein's Distinctiveness

At first sight it appears the term Dasein does not permi t a dis-location of subjectivity. Heidegger merely transfers the subject's constitutive role to Dasein; like the rest of the tradition, he privileges h u m a n Dasein. He repeats Kant's so-called "Copernican Turn" by locating the starting "point" of philosophizing in Dasein: "Dasein itself has a special distinctiveness as compared with other entities . . . by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issueior it. . . . Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological" (SuZ, §4, 11-12). What distin­guishes Dasein from beings of a character other than its own is that it has an understanding of Being (and in SuZ Being is defined always as the Being of beings) which cannot be divorced from its relation to itself. This understanding is not a matter of theoretical reflection. It is pa r t of Dasein's essential constitution that it comports itself to its Being; this compor tment itself belongs to the Being of Dasein. The comport­m e n t to Being is called understanding, which has to be interpreted existentially, insofar as it characterizes Dasein's way of Being. Dasein has an ontic-ontological priority with regard to the question of Being. Its priority is 'ontic' insofar as "to be" means that its very Being is an issue for it, even when the question of Being is not raised explicitly. It is 'ontological' insofar as the ontic relation, our pre-understanding of Being, makes the disclosure of Being possible. It is 'ontic-ontological'

Dasein's Distinctiveness 75

insofar as what is at stake is not only Dasein's Being, but the Being of all other beings.

What remains relatively undeveloped in SuZ is that Dasein's dis­tinctiveness, i.e., its ontic-ontological priority with respect to the ques­tion of Being, is based on the fact that Dasein can speak: "Dasein has language. . . . Man shows himself as the entity which talks. This does not signify that the possibility of the vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself (SuZ, §34, 165). Heidegger thereby appears to be mak­ing a classical move, arguing that Dasein is privileged17 over and against animals and entities insofar as it can use language.18 (We investigate SuZ's failure to acknowledge fully the significance of language in the appendix, "The World That Speaks.") Only Dasein can speak and un­derstand ?cnd thus can raise the question of the meaning of Being.19

With this an unquestionable priority is given to Dasein. "But in­deed something like a priority of Dasein has announced itself (SuZ, §2, 8) . The starting point of all philosophizing lies in Dasein's ques­tioning compor tment to Being: "Fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the ex­istential analytic of Dasein } (SuZ, §4,13). The question of Being is noth­ing but a radicalization of Dasein's tendency toward Being.20 Thus, by questioning the meaning of Being, Dasein asks about its very self. Dasein is at the center of the investigation. The primary question is who we are, "the 'Who' of Dasein" (SuZ, §25, 114 & §54, 267), for on­tology is closely entwined with the constitutive structures of Dasein's ex­istence, what Heidegger calls existentiality.21

At this stage we have difficulties in locating a depar ture from Hus-serl, since for Husserl, too, questioning is the fundamental starting-point of phenomenology. Although Dasein's questioning is not an issue of theoretical reflection or Cartesian doubt, but of comport­ment , structurally Heidegger seems to repeat Husserl 's moves: while Husserl 's phenomenology finds the principle of all principles in the intentional structure of consciousness, SuZ's starting-point is the exis­tential structure of Dasein's compor tment to Being. The transcen­dental constitutive site is no longer the pure Ego but Dasein.22

Fur thermore , both Husserl and Heidegger work with a dualistic schema. For Husserl, radical doubt reveals the "dualism" between im­manence and transcendence, and for Heidegger, Dasein's questioning compor tment toward Being reveals the "dualism" between Being and

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beings. The distinction between Being and beings is so closely entwined with the dichotomy between Dasein and beings of another character than its own that the whole analysis seems to repeat structurally Hus­serl' s differentiation between immanence and transcendence.23 Da­sein's distinctiveness over and against beings of a character other than its own, which lies in its ontic-ontological priority with regard to the question of Being, ensures that for Dasein not only its Being, but also the Being of all other beings, is an issue.24 Dasein opens u p the horizon (cf. SuZ, §5,17) within which beings can appear. Not only is Dasein at the center of the investigation, but it is by virtue of Dasein that there is Being.25 These claims remind us of Husserl 's definition of con­sciousness as nulla re indiget ad existendum, which Heidegger so ada­mantly criticizes.26

§46. Toward a Constitution without Subjectivity

The priority and centrality given to Dasein, however, is radically dif­ferent from that given to subjectivity: "This priority [of Dasein over all o ther entities] has obviously nothing to do with a spurious subjectiviz-ing of the totality of entities" (SuZ, §4,14, translation slightly al tered). While for Husserl the priority given to consciousness leads to a radical division between immanence and transcendence, Heidegger empha­sizes that the world cannot be bracketed since it is an essential constit­uen t of Dasein:27 "But to Dasein, Being in a world is something that belongs essentially" (SuZ, §4, 13). Thus, Heidegger repeats Husserl 's phenomenological approach only structurally, by prioritizing Dasein.

Heidegger concurs with Husserl insofar as he upholds the ques­tion of constitution. However, he thereby also departs from Husserl, as the constitutive momen t is no longer sought in an ens creatum. Rather, it is sought in a constitutive transcendental site that is neither sub­jective nor objective, and that is inherent in the term Dasein (being-there). To put it another way, the aim is to separate the question of constitution from subjectivity and thus from an ultimate and firm foundation.28 Hence, Heidegger both adheres to the principle of phe­nomenology by addressing the question of constitution and departs from Husserl by ascribing the constitutive moment to Dasein. Dasein does not purely replace the term subject, but "revolutionizes the whole concept of the human-being."29 The prefix Da-of Dasein does not desig­nate the occurrence of something present but the opening of presence, that is to say, Dasein's openness toward Being, its transcendence.

Dasein's Distinctiveness 77

Dasein opens u p a constitutive beginning that dis-locates and pierces the unitary source of subjectivity.30

As Heidegger elucidates in 1946: "That is why the sentence cited from Being and Time (p. 42) is careful to enclose the word 'essence'in quotation marks. This indicates that 'essence' is now being defined f rom ne i the r esse essentiae no r esse existentiae bu t r a the r from the ek-static character of Dasein."31 Dasein is not a unitary, fundamental, stable beginning but is essentially dis-locating. As the lecture "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (which deepens SuZ's analysis of the world) em­phasizes, "the essence of Dasein (which then stands 'in the center ') is ecstatic or 'excentric.'"*2 The priority given to Dasein is, from the out­set, a priority that is de-centering.

§4 7. Dasein as Being-in-the-World

Heidegger not only pierces the field of immanence but maintains Dasein's distinctiveness. Dasein is distinct from entities not insofar as there is a gulf that separates Dasein from the world, but because Dasein 'is' in-the-world.

As an existentiale, 'Being alongside' the world never means any­thing like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that oc­cur. There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world.' Of course when two things are present-at-hand together alongside one another, we are accustomed to express this occasionally by something like 'The table stands "by" ["bei"] the door' or 'The chair "touches" ["beruhrt"] the wall.' Taken strictly, 'touching' is never what we are talk­ing about in such cases, not because accurate re-examination will al­ways eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero. If the chair could touch the wall, this would presuppose that the wall is the sort of thing 'for5 which a chair would be encounterable. (SuZ, §12,55, emphasis added)

Dasein's distinctiveness is due to the fact that it is {daft es ist) in-the-world. Being-in and Being-alongside the world is an existential character­istic that is unique to Dasein.33 A table might be found next to a chair but the table has no sense of beingn&a to the chair; indeed, it has no under­standing of Being whatsoever. Dasein alone has an onticontological

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priority with regard to the question of Being. The emphasis in this pas­sage, however, is not on Dasein's understanding of the world, nor on the fact that only Dasein exists and therefore is, but on Dasein's sensibility. Only Dasein can touch and be touched. Objectively speaking, an object might push or "touch" another object; however, "taken stricdy, touch­ing is never what we are talking about," for entities have no sense or un­derstanding of other beings, no sense of being nearby or far away. They never encounter anything; they cannot touch and have no sense of be­ing touched. The passage therefore intimates that Heidegger places the distinctiveness of Dasein in sensibility, which needs to be a specifically human sensibility (should Dasein's distinctiveness be maintained) .M

Although this passage suggests that only Dasein has a skin, and is touched by the world, and despite Heidegger's apparent emphasis on Dasein's embodiment and corporeality, SuZ does not locate Dasein's distinctiveness in its sensibility. To the contrary—SuZ treats touch as a momen t secondary to understanding. The passage cited alludes to §29, in which Heidegger emphasizes that what characterizes Dasein is its fac-ticity and state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), which has nothing in common with a moment of feeling, vulnerability, sensibility, or touch: "Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the at tunement of a state-of-mind. And only because the 'senses' [die Sinne] belong ontolog-ically to an entity whose kind of Being is Being-in-the-world with a state-of-mind, can they be ' touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' [Sinne habenfur] something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect" (SuZ, §29, 137). Touching and sensibility are made pos­sible through an a priori understanding of Being-in-the-world. Dasein's openness to the world precedes the moment of sensibility. I must always already be capable of being touched and affected before touching is pos­sible. Touch is therefore a secondary moment of Being-in-the-world.

A curious constellation has come to light. Although Heidegger maintains that Husserl 's transcendental reduction is "unphenomeno-logical and indeed purportedly phenomenological" (cf. GA 20, §13f., 178) because it turns away from the real world, we now find that Heidegger 's affirmation of the world is not derivable from its materi­ality either. Touch and sensibility are possible only by virtue of a Dasein that is Being-in-the-world. In Husserlian terminology, Being-in-the-world is constituting, while touch and sensibility are consti­tuted. Thus, Dasein's dis-location of subjectivity does not lead us back to a momen t of materiality or an embodied Dasein. Here is a radically

The Distinctiveness of the World 79

new definition of the world. Indeed, Heidegger must define the world as "something" that is not some thing or entity in order to maintain Dasein's distinctive and constitutive role.

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE WORLD

§48. A World without Spectators

The world that is an existential of Dasein should never be confused with the categorial understanding of the world to which the tradition of philosophy adheres—the world written in inverted commas.35 The world is thus never separate from Dasein, is never an 'in itself that needs to be "discovered," but only is in relation to Dasein, in the same manner as Dasein only is as Being-in-the-world. In contrast to Husserl 's doctrine of immanent transcendence, the dependency between Dasein and its world is not one-sided but mutual The hyphens between the words Being-in-the-world are crucial, for they emphasize Dasein's dis-location, that is, this essential interdependency or interrelat-edness between Dasein and the world.36

'Dasein-as-Being-in-the-world' should not be confused with 'immanence-Being-in-transcendence'. For the claim that Dasein always already "finds itself in" a world is still based on the belief that there is a world that exists independendy of Dasein. This would suggest a dual­ism between Dasein and the world that Heidegger wishes to avoid.

© Daseln^'oN.

uasein yftffiF1

Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

All we would argue is that Dasein occupies a certain place or space (fig. 2) rather than being, like Husserl's pure Ego, an outside spectator (fig. 1). It is, however, not a matter of placing the pu re Ego back into the world, for Dasein cannot be found in anything. Dasein is not in the world in the same manner "as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is ' in' the cupboard" (SuZ, §12, 54). For Heidegger 's is a categorial

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understanding (cf. SuZ, §12, 54) of being-in, referring to the relation­ship between two entities occupying the same space (fig. 2).37

"Being-in, on the o ther hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale" (SuZ, §12, 54) . This existentiale should not be un­de r s tood spatially. Drawing on Grimm's etymology of the word in, Heidegger observes: "Nor does the term 'Being-in' mean a spatial 'in-one-another-ness' of things present-at-hand, any more than the word ' in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind" (SuZ, §12, 54). 'Being-in' is not "a spatial relationship of this kind," but refers to the way Dasein understands itself. Dasein is its world insofar as Dasein is always already in a certain manner in the world. "Dasein is its world existingly" (SuZ, §69c, 364) ,38 The world is an existential ontological con­cept which cannot be described in terms of a what, as an in-itself, but only in terms of a how, how it is interlaced with us (fig. 3) . We are no longer referring to two separate entities that need to be linked, but to the essential interwovenness between Dasein and its world that cannot be undone .

The term Dasein does not "revolutionize the whole concept of the human-being" (cf. GA 26, §9, 167) because the move is from the tran­scendental world-less spectator (fig. 1) to a spectator in the world (fig. 2), bu t because the spectator to some extent disappears. Dasein can­not be differentiated from its world (fig. 3). To follow Fink: "We are never a subject for whom the world as a whole is as 'object' [Gegen-stand]. We can by no means 'set it aside' [beseitigen means both 'set aside' and ' remove ' ] , cannot set it on one side and us before it as if we were the otherworldly spectators of the world. The 'world stage' has no audience that is distinct from the actors; here everyone partici­pates in the play. . . . Only in the encompassing region of the world do we encounter objects, do we stand as subjects over against objects" (Fink 1972,102). The world is not a spectacle that takes place in front of us (it is not a Gegenstand, i.e., it does not stand opposed [gegen] to us), bu t the world is in and through our engagement with 'it', and Dasein, in turn, is defined through this engagement. Heidegger calls this the facticity that expresses Dasein's dependency and essential inter-wovenness with the world: "The concept of 'facticity' implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can unders tand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world" (SuZ, §12, 56, emphasis added) . Dasein's destiny, as 'Being-in-the-world', is essen-

The Distinctiveness of the World 81

tially interwovenvAth the Being of those entities it encounters in its own world. It cannot be unders tood independently from its world.

We now see why Heidegger argues that the 'Being-in' of 'Being-in-the-world' should not be unders tood as a spatial relationship. For Dasein is not an entity that is fully present, and the world is not 'out there ' , but is defined through Dasein's comportment . "If no Dasein exists, no world is ' there ' either" (SuZ, §69c, 365). Thus, Dasein does not find itself in a geometrical fixed space in which it moves around, as figure two suggests.39 Nor is the world a three-dimensional geometri­cal space or empty void: "A three-dimensional multiplicity of possible positions which get filled up with Things present-at-hand is never proximally given" (SuZ, §22, 103). Rather, the world is and has to be "relative to human Dasein (WdG, 3 9 / 1 4 1 ; 5 IE) . Being-in does not em­phasize a spatial relationship, but draws our attention to the fact that the world is always already familiar to Dasein.

The expression 'bin'is, connected with 'bei/ and so 'ich bin' ('I am') means in its turn T reside' or 'dwell alongside' the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. 'Being' (Sein), as the infinitive of 'ich bin' (that is to say, when it is under­stood as an existentiale), signifies 'to reside alongside . . . ,' 'to be familiar with . . . ' (SuZ, §12, 54, emphasis added)

And as Heidegger adds in GA 20:

Tn' primarily does not signify anything spatial at all but means primarily being familiar with (GA 20, §19, 213)

These passages suggest that there is a familiarity with the world that is essentially pre-spatial and indeed "primarily does not signify anything spatial at all." However, this is not the line of a rgument that Heideg­ger pursues. Rather, his aim is to retrieve a spatiality that the tradition of philosophy has ignored.

§49. Dasein fs Spatiality

Although the primacy of the geometrical description of the world is rejected, SuZ claims: "Then in the end a 'salvaging' of the Cartesian analysis of the 'world' is possible."40 Descartes is not mistaken in defining the physical world in terms of its extension (res extensa). The problem is that he overlooks the existentialontological significance of spatiality. "There is some phenomenal justification for regarding

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the extensio as a basic characteristic of the 'world/ even if by recourse to this neither the spatiality of the world nor that of the entities we encounter in our environment (a spatiality which is proximally discov­ered) nor even that of Dasein itself, can be conceived ontologically" (SuZ, §21,101). What SuZ seeks to rescue from the Cartesian analysis of the world is not the world of nature defined in terms of its exten­sion, but a world and spatiality that is specific to Dasein.

Hence, when Heidegger emphasizes that Being-in should not be un­derstood as a spatial relationship, not all spatiality is bracketed from Dasein: "By thus delimiting Being-in, we are not denying every kind of 'spatiality' to Dasein" (SuZ, §12,56). There is a spatiality that is peculiar to Dasein alone: "But its spatiality shows the characters of de-serverance and directionality" (SuZ, §23, 105). This spatiality should never be con­fused with the traditional descriptions of space, for "space is not in the sub­ject" as a form of intuition, nor, as Descartes believes, "is the world in space" (SuZ, §24, 111). This spatiality is neither in, nor external to Dasein.

Dasein's spatiality needs to be unders tood adverbially. It is char­acterized as rapprochement or deseverance (Entfernung): "We use the ex­pression 'deseverance' in a signification which is both active and transitive" (SuZ, §23, 105). Entfernung means distancing and remov­ing, and literally, de-severance (Ent-fernung) means reducing dis­tance. "'De-severing' amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is" (SuZ, §23, 105). What characterizes Dasein as Being-in-the-world is its tendency to make farness vanish and to br ing things closer, "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards close­ness."*1 Geometrico-mathematical models fail to describe this ten­dency toward closeness, for closeness is not explicable in terms of objective mathematical laws but only in terms of familiarity and of what is environmentally in reach. First and foremost we estimate our surroundings in terms of a definite vagueness: "Though these esti­mates may be imprecise and variable if we try to compute them, in the everydayness of Dasein they have their own definiteness which is thor­oughly intelligible. We say that to go over yonder is 'a good walk,' 'a stone's throw,' or 'as long as it takes to smoke a pipe '" (SuZ, §23,105). Not only are our everyday estimations physically inaccurate and vague, they often even contradict the physical definition of distance and objective measurement . For what is closest to Dasein environ-

The Distinctiveness of the World 83

mentally often is, physically speaking, farthest away.42 In terms of phys­ical criteria the glasses I am wearing are closest to me, however, in terms of my environment, the book that I am reading is closer to me than the glasses. Environmentally speaking, I am more aware of the picture on the wall than the glasses, although objectively speaking the picture is further away. Spatiality is thus defined in accordance with Dasein's engagement within its environment.

§50. Space Is in the World

Heidegger thereby intimates a fundamental depar ture from Husserl. While Husserl attempts to describe the stream of consciousness as devoid of spatiality, it appears now that the term Dasein "revolutionizes the whole concept of the pure Ego." For Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact not only that Dasein has a world, but that it is spatial. The concept Dasein dislocates subjectivity by allowing spatiality to pierce the enclosed field of immanence. However, Heidegger is not as radi­cal as he appears.

Firstly, Heidegger 's emphasis on Dasein's spatiality should not lead us to believe he is arguing that the subject is always embodied. In­deed, Dasein's spatiality is not a result of its bodily nature. As we have shown above, Being-in should not be understood as a spatial relation­ship. Being-in " . . . in the form of an occurrence . . . does not refer to a corporeal thing called ' human body' being on hand in a spatial con­tainer (room, building) called 'world.' This cannot be the intention from the start, if we keep to what the fundamental character of Dasein itself implies. Dasein is not to be taken as an entity with a view to its out­ward appearance, as it looks to others in one or another state. Instead, it is to be taken only in its way to be" (GA 20, §19, 212).

We should never confuse Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world with the way in which a body is in space. Similarly, we should never understand Dasein's spatiality in terms of its corporeal­ity or bodily presence, for this would lead us to misinterpret Dasein's existential structure ontically: "Hence Being-in is not to be explained ontologically by some ontical characterization, as if one were to say, for instance, that Being-in in a world is a spiritual property, and that man 's 'spatiality' is a result of his bodily nature (which, at the same time, always gets ' founded' upon corporeality)" (SuZ, §12, 56). The spatiality of Dasein does not lead us back to Dasein's corporeality but to Dasein' s familiarity with the world, its manner of Being-in-the-world.

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This leads us to the second modification: although Dasein has a spatiality (and thus subjectivity can no longer be defined as devoid of spatial characteristics), Heidegger is careful not to turn spatiality into a primordial existential structure of Dasein. Being-in should never be defined in terms of its spatiality; rather, Dasein's spatiality is possible only by virtue of its existential structure of Being-in-the-world. "So if spatiality belongs to it in any way, that is possible only because of this Being-in" (SuZ, §23,104-5, emphasis added) . If we recall, Heidegger wishes to break with the tradition in two ways, by arguing that "space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space" (SuZ, §24, 111). The world is neither a form of intuition, nor in space; rather, space is 'in the world.

§51. Dasein s Directionality

Heidegger resorts to the phenomenon of directionality—which is the o ther definition of Dasein's spatiality43-to explain why spatiality is a derivative phenomenon of the world. Dasein is always already oriented in the world; it has a directionality: "Every bringing-close has already taken in advance a direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself close" (SuZ, §23, 108). By removing distance, Dasein is moving toward a region within which things are brought closer. Directionality discloses the primordiality of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger illustrates this by drawing on Kant's text "Was heiBt: Sich im Denken orientieren."44 Heidegger cites Kant's example of entering a dark but familiar room in which everything has been moved around: "Suppose I step into a room which is familiar to me but dark, and which has been rearranged [umgerdumt] dur ing my absence so that everything which used to be at my right is now at my left. If I am to orient myself the 'mere feeling of the difference' between my two sides will be of no help at all as long as I fail to appre­h e n d some definite object 'whose position,' as Kant remarks casually, T have in mind '" (SuZ, §23, 109).

Dasein has a directionality out of which the fixed directions of left and right arise. Dasein does not just make farness vanish, but desever-ance is linked with the moment of orientation; it is relative to the man­ner in which Dasein orients itself in the world. While Kant explains this directionality and orientation psychologically in terms of remem­bering, Heidegger claims that this directionality is grounded in Being-in-the-world. Dasein's directionality, its orientation in the world, is not due to the fact that Dasein remembershcw the world—or the particular room—was furnished initially, but due to Dasein's a priori under-

The Distinctiveness of the World 85

standing of the world. Spatiality is based on the aroundness (Um-hafte) of Dasein's environment (Um-welt). "One must notice, however, that the directionality which belongs to de-severance is founded upon Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §23, 109). Because Dasein comports itself to the world, it can orient itself within it and move toward objects. Being-in-the-world thus makes possible the encounterability of objects and with it the phenomenon of spatiality (in the form of deseverance and directionality).

It is peculiar to see that Heidegger thereby concurs with Husserl. While for Husserl space is possible by virtue of the pure Ego, for Hei­degger it is Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world that makes possible the phenomenon of spatiality. Although Heidegger breaks with Husserl insofar as he states that there is no existence inde­penden t of the phenomenon of the world, this should not lead us to the conclusion that Heidegger returns to the phenomenon of spatial­ity. Thus, despite Heidegger 's promise that "in the end a 'salvaging' of the Cartesian analysis of the 'world' is possible" (SuZ, §21, 101), Des-cartes's definition of the world is not "salvaged."45 Spatiality is and re­mains secondary to Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world. Our temptation to locate the distinctiveness of Dasein in its spatiality is erroneous, just as touch is never the existential characteristic of Dasein. For in both cases Heidegger ensures that Being-in-the-world main­tains its primordial status. Being-in-the-world allows for the encounter-ability of entities, and thus allows for the moment of touch, just as it allows for this relational lived and transitive notion of spatiality.

§52. The A Priori Perfect

We find that SuZ throughout ensures that Being-in-the-world is ante­rior to the phenomena of both touch and spatiality. Indeed, to emphasize this, Heidegger refers to the world as the a priori perfect structure of Dasein. This a priori perfect should not be confused with Dasein's personal past, or the storage of past events; rather, it describes a fundamental dependency that precedes any disclosure of entities within the world and is thus anterior to spatiality and sensibil­ity. As Heidegger notes in the marginalia:

'Anterior' in this ontological sense in Latin means a priori, in Greek npoxepov rfj (frvcrei, Aristot, Physics, A 1 more explicitly rd zi r)v eivai, Metaphysics, E 1025 b 29, 'that which already was-being,' 'that which in each case always already was being-before

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(Wesende),' the having-been, the perfect. The Greek verb eivai has no perfect form. This is referred to here by the r]v eivai. Not an ontic past, but an always preceding to which we are directed backby the question about beings as such. Instead of referring to an a priori perfect we could also call it ontological, or transcen­dental perfect, (cf. Kant's Schematism)46

The a priori perfect is not that which once was present and was pushed into the past; rather, it has been a past to which we are always referred back without it ever being present in front of us. Dasein therefore can only return: the world is "something 'wherein' Dasein as an entity already was, and if in any manner it explicitly comes away from any­thing, it can never do more than come back to the world" (SuZ, §16, 76). This is what the term always already (immer schon) indicates. There is n o beginning at which Dasein becomes immersed in the world; rather , Dasein is always already interwoven with the world. "Dasein, in so far as it is, has always referred itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this dependency belongs essentially to its Being."47

Dasein is given over to a world; this is a transcendental, ontological, a priori perfect structure of Dasein that cannot be bracketed.

In stark contrast to Husserl, Heidegger herewith proposes a worldly model of thought. To exist and to think is to be-in-the-world. The re is a commitment that Dasein does not make in terms of propo­sitions but that Dasein has, insofar as it is, since to be means "to be given over to the world." This a priori perfect refers to what Heidegger calls "state-of-mind" {Befindlichkeit). State-of-mind does not signify that Dasein always already finds (finden) itself within a world, nor does it refer to a psychological state, a momen t of a mere feeling, or what Kant called "I have in mind." Instead, the term Befindlichkeit under­lines Dasein's forestructure of understanding,4 8 insofar as Dasein un­derstands itself through its dependency upon the world. "[I] t is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders it­self to the world' and lets the 'world' 'matter ' to it" (SuZ, §29, 139). Tha t Dasein is, is an a priori perfect Dasein cannot overcome. "This ' that it is' . . . we call it the 'thrownness' of this entity into its ' there ' " (SuZ, §29, 135). It is an existential of Dasein to be always already thrown into a ' there ' ; thus it is impossible for Dasein ever to get be­hind its thrownness. This worldly character of Dasein cannot be an­nulled, for what makes us human is our rootedness in the world.

The Reluctance to Think Resistance 87

§53. The World without Dirt

We have seen that, although this suggests a fundamental depar ture from Husserl insofar as there is no existence independent of the phe­nomenon of the world, this constitutive worldly site is not so radically different from Husserl 's worldless beginning. For, like Husserl, Hei­degger is at pains to stress that embodiment and spatiality are consti­tuted and never constituting. Although Heidegger points out that "It gets the name 'homo' not in consideration of its Being but in relation to that of which it consists (humus)" (SuZ, §42, 198), the transcenden­tal constitutive site remains devoid ofmaterialitf9 and indeed devoid of earthiness. It is a world that consists of no soil or dirt.

The interdependency between Dasein and the world should not be confused with the collapse of the mind-body dualism. Dasein's dis­location of subjectivity is not derivable from its extension, bodily presence, or touch, rather the emphasis throughout is that Being-in-the-world is anterior to those phenomena. Indeed what is emphazised is the a priori perfect structure of a disembodied Dasein and an immaterial world. The world does not touch Dasein, it does not resist or soil Dasein, but is in­terwoven with a being that is neither subject nor body. This weaving structure of Dasein and its world has no texture; the threads never touch but are always already entwined before any crossing and touch­ing is possible. The real world that Heidegger seeks to retrieve is, like Husserl 's pu re Ego, a site devoid of spatiality and materiality.50 We are thus faced with the curious paradox that Dasein's interwovenness with the world dis-locates Husserl's 'worldless' subject without re turning to the material world.

THE RELUCTANCE TO THINK RESISTANCE

§54. Heidegger's Double Refusal

Our analysis points to a double refusal. SuZ refuses to perform the transcendental reduction and additionally refuses to return to a primor­dial spatiality or sensibility. We are encouraged to think of a radical beginning that should re turn us to Dasein's essential interwovenness with the world. However, the re turn is to a world that has no opacity, heaviness, or materiality in the same way that Dasein is neutral; it has no flesh and blood—it cannot be wounded—but is always already en­twined with this neutral world before any feeling or bodily sensation

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is possible. We therefore find that SuZ 's critique resists that which it seems to be opening up . There is a constant tension at work: the mutual dependency between Dasein and its world allows the possibil­ity of attributing a primordial materiality and sensibility to Dasein, which, however, are denied.

§55. The Ignoring of Sensibility

This tension becomes particularly apparent when we turn to Heideg­ger 's critique of Descartes, which is an indirect critique of Husserl.51

Heidegger criticizes Descartes for drawing a distinction between two independent substances—res corporea and res cogitans, "Nature" and "spirit" (SuZ, §19, 89)—and for treating the world as something present-at-hand which is open to mathematical analysis.52 As long as the world is seen as something that is present-at-hand and that remains constant, "remanens capax mutationum" (SuZ, §21, 96), the world is accessible to intuition and thus thought alone.53

This has fatal consequences. The division between res cogitans and res corporea leads to the adoption of a theoretical attitude toward the world which renders sensation as a genuine access to knowing onto-logically insignificant: "What is 'proximally' given is this waxen Thing which is coloured, flavoured, hard, and cold in definite ways, and which gives off its own special sound when struck. But this is not of any importance ontologically, nor, in general, is anything which is given through the senses. . . . These senses do not enable us to cognize any entity in its Being" (SuZ, §21, 96).

Although our first encounter with the world might be a sensuous one, it remains insignificant for any ontological claim. Descartes re­duces sensuous experience to thought and intuition.54 The substance of res corporea is extension, and properties such as mobility, weight, or resistance are "modes of extensio" (SuZ, §19, 91). Thus, sensation or non-theoretical experience is reduced to mathematical-physical laws which are disclosed to intuition and thought alone:

Hardness gets taken as resistance. . . . For Descartes, resistance amounts to no more than not yielding place — that is, not under­going any change of location. So if a Thing resists, this means that it stays in a definite location relatively to some other Thing which is changing its location. . . . But when the experience of hard­ness is Interpreted this way, the kind of Being which belongs to sensory

The Reluctance to Think Resistance 89

perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities en­countered in such perception should be grasped in their Being. Descartes takes the kind of Being which belongs to the percep­tion of something and translates it into the only kind he knows: the perception of something becomes a definite way of Being-present-at-hand-side-by-side of two resextensae. . . . Of course no be­haviour in which one feels one's way by touch can be 'completed' unless what can thus be felt has 'closeness'of a very special kind. But this does not mean that touching and the hardness which makes itself known in touching consist ontologically in different velocities of two corporeal Things. Hardness and resistance do not show themselves at all unless an entity has the kind of Being which Dasein— or at least something living —possesses. (SuZ, §21, 97, emphasis added)

This critique opens u p the possibility of locating the problem of Des-cartes's thinking in his reduction of sensibility, touch, resistance, and hardness to extension and hence to intuition and thought. Indeed, we might assume that SuZ wishes to safeguard a momen t of resistance and sensibility. Yet it is curious that Heidegger is adamant and indeed eager in resisting that which his critique has opened up . For Heideg­ger tenaciously claims that resistance and sensibility are derivative phe­nomena. Indeed, in a way similar to Descartes, SuZ resists thinking resistance. Heidegger intimates a reductive reading by claiming that resistance and sensibility are modi of Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world.

§56. The Resistance to Thinking Resistance

The main critique Heidegger launches against Descartes in the pas­sage cited above is that he "obliterates the kind of Being which belongs to sensory perception." Descartes fails to see that touching and hard­ness, and indeed the phenomenon of resistance, exist only in relation to Dasein—or at least something living. Resistance needs to be experi-encedby a living being in order to 'be ' . We might assume that Heideg­ger herewith wishes to point to the primordiality of affectivity, since his claim that Descartes obliterates "the kind of Being which belongs to sensory perception" appears to criticize Descartes's failure to acknowledge that perceptions are embodied. However, the focus of the critique is not on the question of sensibility or Dasein's embodiment; rather, the aim is to show that by bracketing the question "for whom

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there is resistance," Descartes has barred and covered u p the phe­n o m e n o n of Being-in-the-world. "But thus the road is completely blocked to seeing the founded character of all sensory and intellective awareness, and to understanding these as possibilities of Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §21, 98). Heidegger criticizes Descartes's prioritization of ' thought ' (Stavoeiv) over sensatio (aiaOrjcng) as the "genuine access to knowing" only because Descartes fails to disclose Dasein's essential compor tment to the world.

And only because the 'senses' [die "Sinne"] belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of Being is Being-in-the-world with a state-of-mind, can they be 'touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' [ "Sinn habenfur"] something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect. Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the re­sistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself [sick schon angewiesen] to having entities within-the-world 'mat­ter' to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance. (SuZ, §29, 137)

T h e r e is resistance, touch, or hardness only for a Dasein that always already comports itself to the world. It is the existential structure of Being-in-the-world which makes the encounterability of beings pos­sible. Thus, sensatio, resistance, and thought are g rounded by Being-in-the-world. There is no touch, affectivity, or resistance—indeed there is no bodily sensation— if there is no world.

Hence, although the text allows for the possibility of a re turn to sensibility and the body, Heidegger does not wish to reverse Des­cartes's order of prioritization. The phenomena of resistance and sen­sibility are not the primary concern of this critique, for the aim is to r e tu rn to one ' thing' only, and that is Dasein's a priori perfect struc­ture of Being-in-the-world. Thus SuZ not only refuses to perform the transcendental reduction by affirming the essential interwovenness between Dasein and its world, but simultaneously resists what this cri­t ique appears to open up, namely the re turn to an embodied Dasein.

§57. The Excess of Life

A double form of resistance is displayed: Heidegger repeatedly invokes a re turn to the phenomenon of resistance, yet he resists

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acknowledging its significance. This becomes apparent in his critical appraisal of Dilthey. Heidegger praises Dilthey for returning to the phenomenon of resistance by showing that "Reality is resistance, or, more exactly, the character of resisting" (SuZ, §43b, 209). But he accuses Dilthey of failing to provide "an ontological Interpretat ion of the Being of consciousness" (SuZ, §43b, 209). The problem for Hei­degger is that Dilthey has left the nature of the Being that experiences resistance ontologically uninvestigated. Thus, Dilthey, like Descartes, fails to question back into the existential structure of Dasein, for it is only Dasein who can experience resistance. This time, however, Heideg­ger pushes the critique even further, for not only does the kind of Being that experiences resistance remain ontologically indetermi­nate, but ultimately the phenomenon of life remains so too. "That this has not been done, depends ultimately on the fact that Dilthey has left 'life' standing in such a manner that it is ontologically undifferenti-ated; and of course 'life' is something which one cannot go back 'behind '" (SuZ, §43b, 209). The Being of consciousness remains onto­logically indeterminate because Dilthey has failed to question back into the phenomenon of life. SuZ, however, also refuses to re turn to the phenomenon of life.

SuZ resists what its critique has opened up . It states, "Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein" (SuZ, §10, 50). However, life is resisted because it exceeds Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world: "Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else" (SuZ, §10, 50). Life is neither present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein; it is not a modus of Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world.

Rather than acknowledging the significance of this excess which es­capes Dasein,55 the investigation brackets the phenomenon of life (cf. Franck 1986, 63). Having criticized Dilthey for leaving ontologically indeterminate the kind of Being that experiences resistance—and thus the phenomenon of life —Heidegger himself resists the re turn to the phenomenon of life by asserting that the phenomenon of resis­tance does not disclose life, but Dasein as Being-in-the-world: "The ex­periencing of resistance—that is, the discovery of what is resistant to one's endeavours—is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world' (SuZ, §43b, 210). To come up against resistance presupposes

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that Dasein has always already disclosed a world wherein resistance can be experienced. Heidegger herewith resists the return to the phenome­non of life, which goes hand in hand with the refusal to re turn to the phenomenon of resistance. Yet, as we shall show, the peculiarity of the analysis is that SuZ fails to resist the phenomenon of resistance, and thus always already avoids its own resistance despite itself.

FROM RESISTANCE TO AVOIDANCE

§58. The Forestructure of Understanding

SuZ resists not only what its critique of the tradition of philosophy makes possible, i.e., the re turn to Dasein's materiality, but addition­ally that which it cannot avoid—which is the materiality of the world. Thus, SuZ can resist only what it has previously avoided. This anterior avoidance is strikingly exemplified in SuZ's analysis of the everyday.

The everyday discloses a genuine access (Zugangsweise) to know­ing which is anterior to both thought and sensation. The paradigm of Dasein's everyday is the world of work (Werkwelt). The world '"wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'" (SuZ, §14, 65) is not the world of puissance or tiredness, as Levinas has pointed out (cf. EE), nor, as Lowith has shown, the world of sleep (cf. Lowith 1969, 43). Rather, it is reduced to a world that is defined through modals of work.56 For even the moment when Dasein does not work is a deficient m o d e of work, such as "leaving undone , neglecting, renouncing, tak­ing a rest" (SuZ, §12, 57). By means of this practical description of Dasein's everyday, a non-prepositional disclosure of the world, which coincides with the disclosure of Dasein, is revealed.57 "It is precisely non-theoretical compor tment which uncovers not only the world but also Dasein itself' (GA 20, §21, 227).

Dasein's "everyday . . . 'dealings' in the world" (SuZ, §15, 66) ex­hibit the essential entanglement of Dasein and its world. The world is not external to Dasein; it is not an object that needs to be represented. It is Dasein's surrounding (Umwelt), which is disclosed through Dasein's preoccupation with tools, which are ready-to-hand, immedi­ately is given within a meaningful context. The everyday reveals a rad­ically new form of 'knowing' that is based on Dasein's "pre-predicative 'prepositions' of praxis" (Kisiel 1985, 204), for "the kind of dealing which is closest to us is . . . not a bare perceptual cognition, but ra ther that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use;

From Resistance to Avoidance 93

and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'" (SuZ, §15, 67). The signifi­cance of this knowing is not that it is based on praxis,™ but that it discloses Being-in-the-world, which is anterior to both thought and practice.59 The everyday discloses a genuine access to knowing that is not thought or practice, nor sensation or intuition, but the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world.

There is an understanding that is not based on intuition or Aus-sage, but on Dasein's anterior closeness to the world.60 In contrast to Descartes, Heidegger therefore argues that knowing (Erkennen) does not have "the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way" (SuZ, §14, 65), but Dasein's knowing and 'look' (which Heidegger calls circumspection) are structured by its worldliness. "In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it as a table, a door , a carriage, or a bridge; but what we have thus interpreted need not necessarily be also taken apart by making an assertion which definitely characterizes it. Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, some­thing which already understands and interprets" (SuZ, §32, 149). 'Knowing' is not primordially founded on the model of perception (Wahrnehmung) —we do not grasp beings that are posited in front of us, rather, we have an interpretative understanding (auslegendes Verste-hen) that precedes intuition and predication.61 "An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us" (SuZ, §32, 150), as Husserl contends, for any judgment , predica­tion, or assertion maintains itself on the basis of a prior understanding of Being-in-the-world.62

To emphasize this, Heidegger distinguishes between the 'apo-phantic as', which is the 'as' of predication (Aussage), and the 'herme-neutic as', which is based on a "circumspective interpretation" (SuZ, §33, 158). The latter is pre-predicative, insofar as it refers to a 'sight' that moves a round and evades rather than pointing to an object. It de­scribes Dasein's m-explicit awareness of its environment. This 'herme-neutic as' both precedes and exceeds any explicit appropriat ion. It does not refer to a pre-linguistic moment,6 3 rather, to an inexplicit, yet still interpretative, awareness that accompanies every predication.64

§59. A Circumventive Anteriority of Knowing

The problem with this anterior excess of 'knowing' is that it is a form of circumvention. Something needs to be circumvented (um-gangen) so

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that our everyday circumspective (um-sichtigen) dealing (Um-gang) with tools is possible. Yet, it has to precede the moment of circumven­tion, for there is nothing to circumvent if the 'hermeneut ic as' is always already anterior to that which it is meant to avoid. That is to say, if the 'hermeneut ic as' is anterior to any explicit appropriat ion (i.e., the 'apophantic as ') , then it cannot avoidexplicitness, since this is pos­sible only if explicitness precedes the 'hermeneut ic as'. Avoidance is possible only on the basis of the assumption that there is something that can be avoided. To put it into Husserlian language: if the 'herme­neutic as' is a form of circumvention, then it is not constituting but constituted and thus derived. What needs to be questioned is whether these clear distinctions can be drawn, for from the outset the line of demarcat ion between the constituting and the constituted appears to be blurred.65

This problem comes to light if we look more closely at the key terms Heidegger employs to describe this 'knowing': Most of them have the prefix Urn, such as Um-gang, Um-welt (environment) , Um-zu ( inorder- to) , Um-willen (for-the-sake-of), and um-sichtig. As Magda King observes: "It is not by accident that each of these key words be­gins with Um. . . . It indicates the . . . round-aboutness, nearness, in the sense of immediate surroundings."66 Um additionally can denote a "vagueness" and "evasiveness." This is particularly visible in the am­biguity of the term Umgang. Umgang means both "dealing" and "han­dling," but it also means "avoidance," "circumvention," "bypassing," and "evasion" (the literal translation of Umgang is "to go around") . These are the characteristics of pre-predicative 'knowledge' (i.e., its m-explicitness and m-conspiciousness), which is rooted in a kind of oversight of that which is transparent in its familiar m^visibility.67 The prefix in- intimates the moment of avoidance, for it describes the cir­cumvention of the actual visibility of objects. The 'hermeneutic as' thus points to a 'knowing' that inhibits visibility in order to disclose Being-in-the-world as such.

§60. The World of Work as a Form of Circumvention

The first instance in which this comes to light is the description of Dasein's everyday dealings with tools. These tools are not objects in the traditional sense of the word Gegen-stande; objects that stand opposed to Dasein which are what Heidegger calls present-at-hand (vor-handeri) .68 Rather, these tools are utensils and equipment that are ready-to-hand (zu-handen). The paradigm in SuZ is the hammer . I

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might be using a hammer in-order-to hammer a nail into the wall; how­ever, my attention is not with the hammer , but with the picture I wish to hang up. Our attention is thus not primordially with the tools but with the product ion of a work.69 Dasein does not grasp or have any the­oretical awareness of the tools. Rather it 'knows' them by no£ primor­dially dwelling with them.

Thus, our circumspective dealing (Umgang) with equipment re­veals an understanding that is inexplicit and can be characterized only in terms of its concernful circumvention.70 It belongs to the very na­ture of a piece of equipment that it points beyond itself to other equipment. Hence, a piece of equipment is never disclosed in isola­tion.71 It is always already in relation to other equipment; the relation of the inorder - to structure is thus one of assignment.72 The hammer , for example, is not grasped thematically; rather, the more we are en­gaged in and busy with our projects, the less the equipment is "no­ticed."73 As Zeug the equipment is not theoretically grasped, but is disclosed through its Bewandtnis. Bewandtnis means both "relevance"74

and "letting be" (bewenden lassen).75

The more the tools are relevant for our projects, the more we are busy in the world and the less we pay explicit attention to the utensils, the more primordially we relate to them, insofar as we "let them be."76

The relevance (Bewandtnis) of utensils is thus grasped in their inex-plicitness and withdrawal, as they point beyond themselves and remain in the background: "The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in or­der to be ready-to-hand quite authentically" (SuZ, §15, 69, emphasis added) . What characterizes the ready-to-hand is that it, "as it were, withdrazvs." Rather than dwelling with the tools, Dasein is oriented to­ward its projects. "That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work— that which is to be produced at the time" (SuZ, § 15, 69-70). Knowing is thus based on a form of cir­cumvention, render ing the visibility of objects invisible.77

§61. A 'Circumvention'Devoid of Teleology

We might be tempted to equate this kind of knowing with the Aristo­telian conception of T£XVT|, which describes a dispositional knowing which that is revealed through work (epyov).78 For Aristotle, this dis­position and skill has no significance independently of work. le^vr) and epyov—which is nothing but eiSog— need to be thought of

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together. Figal writes that, for Aristotle, "knowing is Teftvrj as knowing the eiSog of a work which is to be produced and thus Aristotle is able to identify T£XVr| with EiSog' (Figal 1988, 80). In contrast to Aristotle, Heidegger posits that "T£XVT| [is] a form of knowing" (ibid.), which has its significance independendy of any zeXoq and thus dSog.79

The everyday reveals that Dasein's attention and fundamental ori­entation is not toward projects, rather, that the world is disclosed as possibility. For even the final project should not be unders tood as a telos, but is itself a form of Zeug that is to say, it is circumvented yet again. While utensils are characterized in terms of their in-order-to structure, the work or product has no finality either, since it is a towards-which (Wozu): "The work to be produced, as the 'towards which 'of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Be­ing that belongs to equipment. The shoe which is to be produced is for wearing (footgear)" (SuZ, §15, 70). Work not only refers to the mate­rials that are used, but it is "also . . . an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it.80 The work is cut to his figure; he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges" (SuZ, §15, 70-71). As Figal observes, these three moments , i.e., form, material, and user, "are easily recognised in Aristode's analysis of 'causes ' (aixia), that is eiSog, vXr], and xeXoq (Met . -1013a24ff)" (Figal 1988, 82). The work, however, is not the te­los of the assignment (Verwiesenheit). Rather, the aim is to grasp the as­signment as assignment. Figal claims that, while "according to Aristode's conception product ion has its aim in its actuality, . . . for Heidegger it is a matter of dissolving the actuality of the work back into the equip-mental possibility."81 Equipment should no t be unders tood in terms of its telos— the knowing that the everyday reveals is not g rounded in the final work but in the structure of possibility. Thus, the structure of circumvention and assignment should not be unders tood teleologi-cally. That is, the 'knowing' is not focused on the final work or user; ra ther , the significance of the 'knowing' is that it remains circumven­tive, for any possible telos is circumvented again.82 Meaning and significance are thus not reducible to a telos, nor to the relation of as­sertions or predicative judgments , but have their ontological origin in assignments.83

§62. A Referring without an Indicating

The peculiarity of the argument is thus that circumventive knowing is mean t to precede any form of actuality, be it the explicitness of a tool

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or the final goal. Before a tool is a ' thing,' before it is sensed, intuited, or thematized, it is withdrawing.

Whenever we see with this kind of sight, we already do so under-standingly and interpretatively. In the mere encountering of some­thing, it is understood in terms of a totality of involvements; and such seeing hides in itself the explicitness of the assignment-relations (of the 'in-order-to') which belong to that totality. That which is understood gets Articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the 'something as something'; and this Articulation lies be­fore our making any thematic assertion about it. In such an asser­tion the 'as' does not turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible. (SuZ, §32, 149)

The possibility of isolating an object from its environment and identi­fying it as an object is based on a forestructure of our understanding that allows us to make this as' explicit. Thus, we become aware of the particular tool, and its materiality, only after the assignment structure has been disclosed. Indeed, materiality is and can be only by virtue of this assignment structure.

This leads Heidegger to the paradoxical claim that the structure of assignment precedes the moment of actuality, materiality, and explic­itness. This paradox is expressed in the following enigmatic sentences: "Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Ev­ery 'indication' is a reference, but not every referring is an indicating. This implies at the same time that every 'indication' is a relation, but not every relation is an indicating" (SuZ, §17, 77). While an assertion explicitly indicates the relation between two moments , in everyday concernful circumspection with tools the relational moment is inex­plicit. For the assignment is based on the inexpressive and inconspicu­ous nature of equipment . Thus, the assignment is not necessarily an indication; i.e., not every indicating is a reference. "This implies at the same time that every 'indication' is a relation, but not every relation is an indicating," for the significance of equipment lies in the fact that it does not draw our attention to it. It does not indicate; rather, it, "as it were, withdraws."84 In its withdrawal it refers, however, to the totality of assignments. It does not refer to something new but to something that is constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection: "The context of

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equipment is lit up , not as something never seen before, but as a total­ity constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this total­ity, however, the world announces itself (SuZ, §16, 75). The whole of the world, the structure of #//possibilities, is anterior to and exceeds any particular encounter of tools. This is what Heidegger calls the "hermeneutical as", which refers to the pre-predicative interpretative understanding of factical Dasein as Being-in-the-world. "Higher than actuality stands possibility' (SuZ, §7, 38). What is anterior to the partic­ularity of an object (the 'apophantic as') is the structure of assign­ment (the 'hermeneut ic as').

We seem to have encountered a fundamental problem. It is by vir­tue of invisibility or withdrawal that the structure of assignment is dis­closed. However, the aim is to show that the structure of assignment is pr ior to the actuality of tools. If this is the case, then no tools need to withdraw, for the assignment structure is prior to any withdrawal. Indeed, it appears that we should not mistakenly construe the circum-ventive structure of assignment in terms of a temporal order that pos­its a tool y b ^ initiating the structure of assignment. That is to say, it is not as if we first encounter a tool which then assigns Dasein to other tools and projects. Rather, and this is the peculiarity of the argument , Dasein is always already oriented toward other projects and hence possibilities, before any such encounter is possible. There is a referring that precedes any indicating (i.e., sign or signals). The paradox, how­ever, is that this a priori perfect structure of assignment is disclosed only through a sign, despite itself.

§63. The Impossibility of Avoiding the Moment of Avoidance

The anterior structure of possibilities is disclosed through the assign­ment structure of signs. On the ontological level a sign should not be confused with a Zeug.H5 While tools point to their use-ability, the assign­ment of signals or signs points to something that is use-able. That is to say, the assignment structure of tools is rooted in the assignment structure of signals. As Heidegger argues in the Prolegomena: "The sign-relation is not, say, the specific reference which constituted the serviceability of a sign; rather, the serviceability is itself determined by the indicating" (GA 20, §23, 283). A sign does not purely refer to other equipment , but "establishing a sign can, above all, reveal" (SuZ, §17, 80). A sign allows the in-order-to structure of equipment to appear: "The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, but in its readiness-to-

From Resistance to Avoidance 99

hand the environment becomes in each case explicitiy accessible for circumspection. A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand, which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [ was. . . anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and ofworldhood' (SuZ, §17, 82). In moving away from the assignment structure of tools to the assignment structure of signs, the worldhood of the world (i.e., the ontological structure of assignments) is dis­closed. The assignment structure of signs discloses that possibility, or the structure of assignments, "stands higher than actuality."

In this manner , however, Heidegger appears to affirm, after all, that "every relation is an indicating." Although this assignment struc­ture is no longer rooted in the circumvention of tools, it is still based on the model of circumvention. What is circumvented is the materiality of the sign. Fur thermore , the significance of the sign is attributable to the phenomenon of oversight As with tools, the significance of the sign lies in its invisibility:

The sign is not authentically 'grasped' if we just stare at it and iden­tify it as an indicator-Thing which occurs. Even if we turn our glance in the direction which the arrow indicates, and look at something present-at-hand in the region indicated, even then the sign is not authentically encountered. Such a sign addresses itself to the circumspection of our concernful dealings, and it does so in such a way that the circumspection which goes along with it, fol­lowing where it points, brings into an explicit 'survey' whatever aroundness the environment may have at the time. This circum­spective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment. (SuZ, §17, 79)

Thus, even on the ontological level we are dealing with the phenome­non of circumvention. This time, however, it is not described in terms of the p h e n o m e n o n of Umsicht, but of oversight (Ubersicht). Ubersicht means "bringing into view," "survey," "overall view," and literally "oversight." Ontologically, what is overseen is the everyday world of tools, which brings into overall view the ontological structure of Being-in-the-world: "Circumspection . . . is subordinate to the guid­ance of a more or less explicit survey of the equipmental totality of the current equipment-world and of the public environment which belongs to it. . . . What is essential to it [this survey] is that one should have a primary understanding of the totality of involvements within

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which factical concern always takes its start" (SuZ, §69b, 359). The ontic Umsicht is thus preceded by and founded upon an ontological Ubersicht, which discloses the referential totality of the whole of the world by letting the world of tools be. The sign "is not authentically encountered," but it brings into an explicit survey (Ubersicht) the 'aroundness ' of the environment, which alfowsforDasems factical con­cern. What Dasein renders invisible this time is not the tool but the materiality of the sign, and with it the ontic world as such.

§64. The Return, to Spatiality

This presentation is analogous to the description of Dasein's spatial­ity, which we have described above.86 We have shown that the re tu rn to spatiality is resisted by referring to the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world. We now see that this a rgument is repeated, if we recall that Dasein's spatiality was defined in terms of its de-severance and directionality. De-severance is here analogous to the Zeug struc­ture . For the assignment structure of tools reveals that that which is closest to Dasein is, physically speaking, often furthest away. What is closest to us is first and foremost circumvented—indeed, it "as it were withdraws." The phenomenon of directionality, in turn, is analogous to the assignment structure of signs. For "this circumspective survey [oversight is a better translation in this context] does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our en­vironment."87 The ontological significance of assignment (which is nothing but the worldhood of the world) is disclosed through the p h e n o m e n o n of orientation. Just as Dasein's directionality discloses the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world, the assignment structure of signs discloses the worldhood of the world.

Fur thermore , Heidegger resists the re turn to spatiality. Heideg­ger admits that "the sign addresses itself to a Being-in-the-world which is specifically 'spatial.'"S8 But by avoiding the materiality of the sign, Heidegger simultaneously resists the re turn to the phenomenon of spatiality. This time, however, the disclosure of this a priori perfect structure is based on the model not of resistance but of avoidance, for it is made possible only by an anterior 'freeing' from spatiality.

§65. The Avoidance of Spatiality

We here touch upon the ontological significance of the term Bewandt-nis, for ontologically there is a letting be (bewenden lassen) that allows

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for the use-ability (or its deficient mode) of equipment (to be) : "If let­ting something be involved is unders tood ontologically, what is then per t inent is the freeing of everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, no matter whether, taken ontically, it is involved thereby, or whether it is rather an entity of precisely such a sort that ontically it is not involved thereby" (SuZ, §18, 85). This "previous freeing' refers to the ontological structure of assignment.89 Once again something needs to be freed. The ontological structure of assignment frees us from any par­ticular assertion and assignment structure of tools, and from the materiality of the physical world. Bewandtnis turns our attention away from the particular project or a sensible visibility and assigns Dasein to the worldhood of the world as such.90

Dasein 'frees' (freigeben) the 'leeway' (Spielraum; cf. SuZ, §23, 107) and indeed spatiality and region (Gegend) within which beings can appear:

Freeing something and letting it be involved, is accomplished by way of referring or assigning oneself circumspectively, and this in turn is based upon one's previously understanding signifi­cance. We have now shown that circumspective Being-in-the-world is spatial. And only because Dasein is spatial in the way of de-severance and directionality can what is ready-to-hand within-the-world be encountered in its spatiality. To free a totality of in­volvements is, equiprimordially, to let something be involved at a region, and to do so by de-severing and giving directionality; this amounts to freeing the spatial belonging-somewhere of the ready-to-hand. In that significance with which Dasein (as con-cernful Being-in) is familiar, lies the essential co-disclosedness of space. (SuZ, §24, 110, emphasis added)

What is disclosed is a certain leeway that makes possible the encounter of entities within the world. This leeway, however, is grasped only inso­far as it is circumvented: "But neither the region previously discov­ered nor in general the current spatiality is explicitly in view. In itself it is present for circumspection in the inconspicuousness of those ready-to-hand things in which that circumspection is concernfully absorbed" (SuZ, §24, 111). The spatiality is overseen.91 "[I]t is not explicitly in view," so that the a priori structure of the world is dis­closed, for "spatiality is not discoverable at all except on the basis of the world" (SuZ, §24, 113). Heidegger wishes to make two moves

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simultaneously. Firstly, his aim is to show, contrary to Descartes, that "space itself cannot be conceived as the kind of Being which belongs to a res extensa (SuZ, §24, 112), for spatiality is transitive and rela­tional to Dasein. Secondly, Heidegger wishes to deny that this leads him to subjectivize space. "[N]or does the Being of space have the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein" (SuZ, §24,112), for space can be found not in the subject but 'in' the world alone. This account can be sustained, however, only by avoiding the significance of spatiality and turning it to a modus of the phenomenon of the world.

What precedes any disclosure of equipment is the pre-disclosed totality of involvements. However, Dasein first needs to let things be'm order to disclose this ontological structure of assignment. While ontically, Da­sein lets tools be—by letting them, as it were, withdraw— ontologically, the assignment structure of signs lets the whole ontic world be —also by letting it, as it were, withdraw.92 Ontologically, 'letting-be' refers to everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, that is, the ontic world as such. It makes the encounterability of all beings possible.

Even on the ontological level, Heidegger fails to avoid the struc­ture of circumvention and, thus, does not seem to succeed in articu­lating a structure of possibility that is anterior to actuality. For this structure is disclosed by virtue of circumventing the materiality of the sign, which allows for the circumvention of the 'world'. We can thus con­clude that, even on the ontological level, the hierarchical descrip­tion—"higher than actuality stands possibility" (SuZ, §7, 38)—cannot be upheld, for the invisibility of the actuality of the sign is always al­ready presupposed.

§66. A Descriptive Apology

Our analysis so far has shed a peculiar light on Heidegger 's descrip­tion. We have shown that on both the ontic and ontological level Heidegger not only resists a re turn to the actual world, but avoids that to which he has always already returned. Through a method of cir­cumvention and oversight, Heidegger passes over the actual material world. It might be tempting to argue that this structure of circumven­tion reflects the structure of the book. It is because Dasein is always already fallen that Dasein by definition needs to return. The disclo­sure of the ontological structure is possible only by turning away from (i.e., circumventing) Dasein's fallenness and allowing for the return to Dasein's authentic compor tment to the world.

From Resistance to Avoidance 103

Dasein's everyday is described in terms of its fallenness: Dasein is absorbed (Aufgehen in der Welt),93 fascinated and enthralled {benom-meri)94 by the world, or busy in the world.95 This turning toward and being absorbed by the world is, however, based on the fact that Dasein has always already turned axoay from authenticity. This structure of circumvention Heidegger calls fleeing.96 It is because Dasein is first and foremost fleeing and lost in the everyday that a re tu rn to authen­ticity is necessary. On the descriptive level we can thus unders tand why it appears that it is necessary to first let the world of the everyday with­draw, as it were, so that the structure of assignments can be disclosed.

However, even this reading does not help us to overcome the problem of avoidance. For this authentic moment is described only in terms of a not: authentic Dasein is not-yet (c£ SuZ, §48), is the possibil­ity of impossibility,97 is not-at-home, no-thing, and no-where.98 Authen­ticity is nothing but a modification of inauthenticity. As Tugendhat rightly points out, Heidegger discloses the worldhood of the world only dialectically." Thus we cannot uphold the claim that authenticity or the structure of possibility is anteriorto inauthenticity, for it is only by virtue of being in contradistinction to in-authenticity.

The problem is that this dialectical structure remains unacknowl­edged. The analysis has shown how SuZ falls victim to its facticity. In­deed, in §63 Heidegger concedes that the essential interpretation has been governed by and has received its guidance from an idea of exist­ence that has been presupposed (cf. SuZ, §63, 313). The aim is to keep the ontic and ontological, the apophantic as and the herme-neutic as, inauthenticity and authenticity, the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand separate and distinct. It has emerged, however, that the interpretation needs to keep them in close touch with one another (cf. SuZ, §59,295). There is no strict division or gulf that separates dif­ferent spheres, but each moment implicates the other.

Heidegger asserts that he discloses a "genuine access to knowing" without acknowledging that it is preceded by a general facticity that it cannot avoid. Heidegger thus fails to acknowledge that which he avoids. This should not surprise us, for what is avoided is a moment that SuZ always wishes to resist: the re turn to a sensible visibility and materiality. Indeed, it appears that the avoidance of the materiality of the world goes hand in hand with the resistance to re turning to an embod­ied Dasein. For the aim is to re turn to one theme only: the ontologico-existential structure of the world.

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§67. The Refusal to Return to Dasein 's Hands

Not only does Dasein as Being-in-the-world "leap over" the phenome­non of the world, which is characterized in terms of its spatiality, mate­riality, and sensibility, but it even evades the return to an embodied Dasein itself. As we have shown at the beginning of the chapter, disclo­sure is possible only because Dasein has an understanding of 'some­thing called' the world. Tools, work, users, and signs are disclosed as assignment and thus have no telos. There is, however, a finality or desti­nation to the structure of relevance (Bewandtnis) that is Dasein itself. Dasein has no access to the world of utensils unless something like a world has already announced itself. Every significance leads us back to Dasein. The ready-to-handedness of tools, the meaning of signs —all these relationships of 'in-order-to', 'toward-which', and 'for-the-sake-of-which' — are bound up with one another as a primordial meaningful™ totality that signifies Dasein as Being-in-the-world.101 Disclosure is always already linked to a toward-which: "This primary 'toward-which' is not just another 'toward-this' as something in which an involvement is possible. The primary 'toward-which' is a 'for-the-sake-of-which'. But the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue" (SuZ, §18, 84). The world is for the sake of Dasein. This world we are referring to is the ontologico-existential concept of the world, which is not the totality of things. Indeed, it cannot be described in terms of a whatbut only adverbially in terms of a how, or the manner in which Dasein discloses the world.

Although Dasein is the final relevance of destination (Bewandtnis), it seems curiously nonmaterial insofar as its essential constitution is concerned. Heidegger contends that the world of tools is ready-to-hand only if it is in some sense accessible to Dasein.102 That is to say, Dasein can encounter tools circumspectively only if they are already meaningful to Dasein, i.e., if they are disclose-able in Dasein's world. "In a symptom or a warning-signal, what is coming' 'indicates itself,' but not in the sense of something merely occurring, which comes as an ad­dition to what is already present-at-hand; 'what is coming' is the sort of thing which we are ready for, or which we 'weren't ready for' if we have been attending to something else. . . . Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involve­ment there is with something" (SuZ, § 17, 80). What Heidegger is refer­ring to is a certain preparedness of Dasein. A sign indicates wherein one

From Resistance to Avoidance 105

lives and thus points to the referential totality within which things can be. It is only because Dasein is open toward beings that the disclosure of beings is possible. Dasein discloses the possibility and Frei-gabe of the lee­way (Spielraum) within which beings can appear.

It is tempting to read this preparedness of Dasein as relying on the fact that Dasein has two hands. For it seems that the structure of the ready-to-hand is made possible by a hand that can manipulate the world. And the world is manipulatable, 'to hand ' (zurHand; SuZ, §22, 102) only for a Dasein that has hands. Indeed, the world is ready not only to-a-hand, bu t often specifically to two hands, a left and right one.103 As Heidegger briefly argues in SuZ: "Thus things which are ready-to-hand and used for the body—like gloves, for example, which are to move with the hands—must be given directionality towards right and left" (SuZ, §23, 108). Although other tools do not need to refer to a specific hand, they still refer to a hand: "A craftsman's tools, however, which are held in the hand and are moved with it, do not share the hand 's specifically 'manual ' movements. So although ham­mers are handled just as much with the hand as gloves are, there are no right- or left-handed hammers" (SuZ, §23,108). The world is rele­vant (hat Bewandtnis) only for a being that can choose to use and ma­nipulate tools. Thus, without a hand, the world has no relevance; it is neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand, for this very distinction is possible only by virtue of (at least) a hand.

Didier Franck suggests this reading by drawing on Heidegger 's later text, Was heisst Denken P104 In this text Heidegger posits that only human Dasein has a world and can speak. He also claims that human Dasein is distinct from beings of another character than its own, insofar as it has hands and, thus, has a world that it can form and manipulate.105

"The hand has its own relevance. Normally, the hand is regarded as be­longing to our bodily organism. However, the hand's essence can never be defined or explained as a prehensile bodily organ. For example, the ape has a prehensile organ but not a hand. The hand is infinitely dif­ferent, that is, separated by an essential abyss, from all prehensile or­gans: paws, claws, tentacles. Only a being who speaks, i.e., thinks, can have a hand and through manipulation produce works by hand" (WhD, 51, my translation). Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact that it can speak and use its hands. The hands, in turn, are distinct from tools in that they are never present-at-hand, nor ready-to-hand, but they make that very distinction possible.

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However, SuZ refuses to refer the relevance {Bewandtnis) back to Dasein's hands. In a subclause Heidegger briefly admits that he has bracketed Dasein's corporeality: "This 'bodily nature ' hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here"W6 As with the phe­n o m e n o n of touch and spatiality, Heidegger contends that the Be­wandtnis discloses Dasein's Being-in-the-world as such, which precedes any corporeal presence, even that of a hand. Thus the primordial ex­istential significance of the hand is refused, although it is presupposed.

CONCLUSION

SuZ pretends to take Husserl 's maxim "Back to the things themselves" seriously. The aim is "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself 'phenomenol­ogy'. But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim . . . : 'To the things themselves!"' (SuZ, §7C, 34). That "which shows itself from itself," however, does not lead us back to the material world, nor an embodied Dasein, but, instead, to a world and Dasein which is no-^ m g r o n c r e t e ; ra ther it is the referential totality which makes possible the structure of the assignment of tools.

Fundamental ontology should re turn us to the fundamental be­ginning that is Dasein's existential analytic; a beginning that is not only more radical than but anterior to Husserl 's 'beginning of all be­ginnings'. Yet, as we have shown throughout , Heidegger avoids and resists revealing the true beginning, which is an unacknowledged ma­teriality and life. That which shows itself from itself is always already a m o m e n t of circumvention and oversight of that which actually shows itself. At both the ontic and the ontological levels, the " 'genuine ' ac­cess of knowing" can be guaranteed only by an oversight of that which always already shows itself.107 Heidegger safeguards Husserl's motto — "Back to the things themselves" — only by circumventing its actual re­turn. Heidegger fails to acknowledge that fundamental ontology falls victim to its facticity.108 Heidegger 's work is analogous to Husserl 's in that it surrenders to a life that lies beyond Dasein's existential analytic. This surrender ing is, however, played out behind Heidegger 's back.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Final Loss of the World

INTRODUCTION

T H E P R E V I O U S C H A P T E R has shown that Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world entails a constant struggle to resist that which it cannot avoid. We have, however, failed to consider why there is this tension of avoidance-resistance at work in SuZ. Indeed, Dasein's dis-location of subjectivity has remained curiously invisible. Being-in-the-world, like Hus­serl's pure Ego, is a site that is devoid of space and materiality. Al­though a dislocation does take place, the phenomenon of the world is not rescued. This chapter explores how Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world dislocates subjectivity and why, for SuZ, this dis­location is possible only in preventing a re turn to an embodied Dasein.

FROM 'IMMANENT TRANSCENDENCE' TO 'TRANSCENDENT IMMANENCE'

§68. An Ambiguous Inversion

SuZ appears to reverse Husserl 's doctrine of immanent transcen­dence. Husserl 's transcendental reduction leads us back to a topology of self-sufficiency ( immanence) — a site where the subject is no longer defined in terms of its "abandonment to the world [Welthingabe]" or transcendence.1 SuZ, meanwhile, suggests a topology of dependence (Angetoiesenheit)2 — Dasein as Being-in-the-world. It is important , first of all, to unde r s t and the s t ructure of this inversion. After all, one of Heidegger 's premises is that, like Husserl, he wishes to uphold Dasein's distinctiveness from the world of things (Dingwelt): "We agree that beings in the sense of what you [i.e., Husserl] call 'world' can not be explained in their transcendental constitution by a re turn

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to a being of the same mode of Being. . . . It has to be shown that Dasein's mode of Being is totally different from that of all other beings and that, as the mode of Being it is, it precisely contains in itself the possibility of transcendental constitution" {Brief, 601 / 119E). Here , Dasein has a transcendental constitutive role which is analo­gous to that of the pure Ego; Dasein discloses a transcendental topol­ogy which constitutes the 'world of things'. In this sense, we should argue that the emphasis on Dasein's dependence on the world not only reverses Husserl 's doctrine, but at the same time radicalizes Hus­serl's reduction. It shows that his reduction has come to a halt too early and has missed a beginning that is anterior to both what Husserl calls immanence and transcendence. If we restructure the image developed in the previous chapter, we thus appear to end u p with the following construction:

W E D

Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Here , Dasein's transcendence to the world precedes any form of dualism and, indeed, makes possible the encounter (ability) of beings in the world. Transcendence is prior to, and distinct from, intention-ality; it is not a result of intentionality.3 Thus, Dasein's interlaced struc­ture of Being-in-the-world (fig. 1) is anterior to immanence (fig. 2) and the empirical ontic Dasein that finds itself in the world, be it what Heidegger calls the world of the everyday or Husserl 's general thesis of the natural attitude (fig. 3).4 With this, Heidegger manages to up­hold Dasein's constitutive function and dislocates immanence.

The possibility of performing the reduction has not been an­nulled. Rather, SuZ discloses that Husserl's bracketing has come to a halt too early. Just as Husserl questions Descartes's starting-point of an ego cogito, Heidegger questions back into the ground of the pure Ego

From ' Immanent Transcendence' to 'Transcendent Immanence ' 109

by disclosing that immanence is made possible by Dasein's transcen­dence. There is a "primary datum" (SuZ, §12, 53), "a still more primor­dial phenomenon" 5 which is the "unitary phenomenon" 6 of Being-in-the-world.

At first sight this model of "hierarchization" does not seem quite justified. For Dasein's transcendence is, on one fundamental level, analogous with Husserl's account of the natural attitude. What charac­terizes the natural attitude is the subject's "involvement" (Verflechtung), its interlaced structure of being in the world.7 Indeed, Husserl describes the natural attitude as universal belief (Universalglaube), the moment when the subject is abandoned to the world (Welthingabe) .8 Literally, Welthingabemeans "given" (geben) "over" (hin) to the world. The subject is "donated," "sacrificed," and "offered" (Gabe) to the world. However, whereas the aim for Husserl is to free the subject from this "blind" "sur­render" (Hingabe) and disclose an absolute — that is, self-sufficient-field,9 Heidegger maintains that it is impossible to undo this primordial bonding. Bonding is a positive and essential characteristic of Dasein: "This bonding belongs essentially to its Being."10 In this way, we cannot ar­gue that Heidegger radicalizes the phenomenological reduction, for the fundamental characteristic of the natural attitude, i.e., the belief in the world, can never be undone.1 1 The world is an existential of Dasein and the possibility of bracketing the world is denied from the outset.

§69. The Structure of Reciprocal Dependence

These reservations, however, are misplaced. Dasein's dependence should never be confused with Husserl 's notion of Welthingabe, since surrender not only describes the natural attitude or Dasein's every­day, bu t is an existential of Dasein—it has an ontological significance. In the everyday, Dasein's surrender to the world comes to light only inauthentically, as Dasein's avoidance of its dependence . In truth (i.e., [un]concealment) , however, Dasein has always already been deliv­ered over (ausgeliefert), and cannot be indifferent to its world.

That Dasein is given over is expressed in terms of the modes of responsibility and freedom. "As free, Dasein projects itself on the for-the-sake-of-itself, as the whole of the essential possibilities in its capacity-to-be . . . only because Dasein as such, as free, applies itself for itself, is Dasein essentially such that in each case it factically stands before the choice of how it should, in a particular case, in the ontic-existentiell sense, apply itself for others and for itself (GA26, §12, 252-53). To be

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means to be possible.12 Hence, Dasein is always already responsiblefor its Being. Dasein has to be (hat-zu-sein) ,13 and thus has always made a deci­sion as to how its Being is in each case mine (Jemeinigkeit), i.e., authenti­cally or inauthentically.14 Dasein, in its compor tment to Being, has always already surrendered to, and chosen, how it relates to its Being. As Heidegger notes in the marginalia of his copy of SuZ: To be means "that it has to be; Determination."15 So long as there 'is' Dasein, it has decided its way of Being, for the questionableness of Being is continu­ously being lived through, regardless of whether we flee from, or face, the question of Being.

In the everyday, Dasein's surrender and responsibility come to light only inauthentically. Dasein is disowned16 (inauthentic) because it has handed over its primordial responsibility for its world to the 'They'.17

The everyday thus describes Dasein's recoiltrovci authentic existence.

§70. An Authentic Surrender

Heidegger, like Husserl, believes in the necessity of withdrawing from the everyday world. In Heidegger, this withdrawal is made possible not through reflection, as Husserl believes, but through a fundamen­tal mood, be it anxiety or boredom.1 8 When Dasein is anxious the world of the everyday slips away; there is no grounding or hold. Dasein finds itself destitute of everything that was previously meaning­ful. The world is no longer defined and fixed but is disclosed through its no-thingness-as-possibility. Through anxiety Dasein is "freed" from the world of things and comes to experience the "oppressiveness" of the world qua possibility. " [W] hat oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the pos­sibility of the ready-to-hand in general, that is to say, it is the world itself."19 The withdrawal from the 'world' should not be confused with a r e tu rn to immanence:

"Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of under­standing itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about—its authentic potenti-ality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that under­stands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. . . . [A]nxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible." (SuZ, §40, 187-88)

From ' Immanent Transcendence' to 'Transcendent Immanence ' 111

In the moment of anxiety, the world of the everyday ebbs away and what remains in that withdrawal is not a worldless Dasein; rather, anxi­ety "makes manifest 'how one is.' In anxiety one feels 'uncanny.'"20 What is important here is that Heidegger does not say "/feel uncanny" but "one feels uncanny"; the Dasein that feels uncanny is destitute not only of the everyday but of its own "dis-owned self." It is no longer a Dasein denned in terms of its environment, but is a Dasein that is expressed only as Being-possible. The uncanny {unheimlich) describes a moment when Dasein is no longer at home (heim) with itself: "Being-in enters into the existential 'mode ' of the 'not-at-home. 'Nothing else is meant by our talk about 'uncanniness'" (SuZ, §39,189). The authentic mode of Being-in discloses that Dasein is primordially no-where, not even at home with itself, and is dis-located of any secure anchorage.

This is why the neutral term Dasein has been chosen. It should in­dicate that Dasein is never some-thing fully present to itself. Dasein's surrender to the world is not expressed in terms of Dasein's embodi­ment but in terms of Being-possible. "This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two sexes. But here sexlessness is not the indif­ference of an empty void, the weak negativity of an indifferent ontic nothing. In its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and ev­erybody, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence"21 Dasein's neutrality is not a privative or negative moment—Dasein is not no one and everyone — rather, it is the original positivity of being able to choose its Being. Dasein's openness to possibilities precedes the mo­ment of identity, even that of sexual difference.22 To emphasize this, in a later essay Heidegger will argue that Dasein is a "lieu-tenant" of this no-thingness.23

Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its own nullity, and thus with its ownmost potentiality for Being-in-the-world (cf. SuZ, §50, 251). It confronts Dasein with the uncanniness of the ' there ' —i.e., the no­thingness of the place —and thus discloses Dasein's ownmost responsi­bility for Being-in-the-world, a responsibility no one can take over. The fact that Dasein is always already being-possible, and is ahead of itself, toward its ownmost potentiality for Being-in-the-world, shows Dasein's ownmost responsibility. Dasein can flee from this responsibility, but it can never undo it.24 Thus, Being-in-the world expresses Dasein's dislo­cation of subjectivity. Before Dasein is a subject (fig. 2), before it has a body and encounters beings in the 'world' (fig. 3), it has surrendered to the nullity of the world, and thus to Being-possible (fig. 1).

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THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD

§71. The Indestructible Unity of Being-in4he-World

In the first instance it is difficult to understand Dasein's dependence; the world qua possibility cannot precede Dasein, since the world and Dasein exist only by virtue of each other. Throughout SuZ, Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world has to be thought of as a whole. The hyphens linking the compound ex­pression are of importance here: "The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole" (SuZ, §12, 53). Analytically we might isolate the constitutive moments, by analyzing separately Being-in and the world, yet in doing so we should never ignore its necessary indestructible equiprimordial totality.25

Here , Heidegger seems to be oscillating between two claims. O n the one hand, he wishes to argue that the world and Dasein are equiprimordial . Any possible dualism is denied by claiming that the world 'is' only by virtue of Dasein, just as Dasein 'is' only by virtue of the world. This is exemplified in the following two statements: "Dasein, then, is not Being-in-the-world because and only because it exists factically; on the contrary, it a m only foas existing, i.e., as Dasein, because its essential constitution lies in Being-in-the-world" (WdG, 139 / 3; 45E). "If no Dasein exists, no world is ' there ' either" (SuZ, §69c, 365) . O n the o ther hand, Heidegger does no t wish to art iculate a dialectical model but to affirm the primacy of the world. A dialectical relationship would fail to disclose the superlative structure of Being-in-the-world because it would lead to the collapse of the essential differ­ence between Dasein and its world. The structural interdependency between Dasein and its world cannot be completely mutual if it is to prevent a re turn to subjectivity ( immanence). For the primordial dif­ference between Dasein and its world cannot be described in terms of the world's dependency on Dasein—since this would repeat Husserl 's description of immanent transcendence — but purely in terms of Da­sein's surrender to the world. With this a unilateral t ranscendence and dependence comes to light; we start with Dasein's transcendence to­ward its world and only then re turn from the world to Dasein.

Dasein must be orientated toward the world qua possibilities first, before the world's dependence in turn is possible. If the world were equiprimordially dependen t on Dasein, immanence would coincide

The Primacy of the World 113

with transcendence, a movement SuZ wishes to disprove. Thus, the structure of bonding needs to define Dasein before the world's depen­dency on Dasein comes to light.

1

Dasein World

§72. The Problem of Space

Though the primacy of the world seems to be emphasized here, it should not be forgotten that the world is only by virtue of Dasein (cf. SuZ, §69c, 365). The world cannot exist outside of, or independently of, Dasein, for this would suggest another form of dualism. To avoid any misunderstanding, Heidegger therefore insists that Dasein's tran­scendence should not be unders tood spatially. As Heidegger eluci­dates in this 1929 lecture:

A preliminary remark on terminology will fix the use of the word "transcendence" and prepare the way for a definition of the phenomenon it signifies. Transcendence means surpassing. What executes the action of surpassing, and remains in the con­dition of surpassing, is transcendent (transcending). As a hap­pening, surpassing is proper to a being. As a condition, it can be formally construed as a "relationship" that stretches "from" something "to" something. To surpassing, then, belongs that to­ward which the surpassing occurs, and which is usually but im­properly called the "transcendent." And finally, something is always surpassed in surpassing. If we take the above to be the main features of surpassing, it is because we conceive surpassing as a kind of "spatial" happening—which is, after all, what the expression ordinarily means.26

Heidegger fears that this spatial, everyday understanding of tran­scendence conceals the ontological significance of transcendence be­cause it describes transcendence as a form of surpassing. Indeed, as soon as we wish to visualize transcendence we end u p with the following diagram:

114 T H E F I N A L L O S S O F T H E W O R L D

1

/ Msein wo ffdofthings World

V r v - y ^ \ - - - . . _ _ - -

This diagram suggests that there is the world of things, and a Dasein which "leaps over" this world. It is exactly such an image that Heidegger wishes to avoid, for it implies that beings in the world make transcendence possible. His aim, conversely, is to show that transcendence is anterior to beings in the world; transcendence should not be under­stood as a "leap" or "stepping over."

We came across the same problem when we described Dasein's dealings in the world.27 Dasein's circumspection (Umsicht) and deal­ings (Umgang) presuppose that there is something that has been cir­cumvented (umgangen). Yet, circumvention is meant to make possible and precede that which is circumvented. In the same way, transcen­dence does not surpass beings. Rather, transcendence is anterior to the possibility of surpassing something, insofar as its surpassing makes pos­sible anything that can 'be ' (surpassed). Heidegger therefore insists that we should never understand transcendence literally as a spatial movement of stepping over. Rather it makes possible this spatial and on-tic understanding of transcendence:

Transcendence can be understood in a second sense, still to be clarified and explained, namely, as signifying what is unique to hu­man Dasein—unique not as one among other possible, and occa­sionally actualized, types of behavior but as a basic constitutive feature of Dasein that happens prior to all behavior. Of course, since human Da­sein exists "spatially," it can, among other things, spatially "surpass" a spatial boundary or gap. Transcendence, however, is the surpass­ing that makes anything like existence and thereby movement in space possible in the first place. (WdG, 135-36 / 33-34; 35 & 37E)

A spatial understanding of transcendence produces a dualism. We would visualize Dasein's transcendence as a "linkage" between two poles—Dasein and the world. However, Dasein does not move to the world; rather Dasein is as being-toward the world. Transcendence characterizes a surpassing that precedes anything that can be surpassed.

We can now unders tand why Heidegger constantly refuses and re­sists the re turn to spatiality, for the aim is to demonstrate the unitary

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structure of Being-in-the-world. "We had to assure ourselves in the be­ginning that the structural unity of this phenomenon cannot be torn apart" (SuZ, §69, 351). The phenomenon of space or spatiality threat­ens this unitary structure, for it suggests a momen t of dispersal. SuZ can thus be characterized as seeking to prevent the possible dissolution of this fundamental unity.28 To protect Dasein from its dispersal, Heidegger needs to show that spatiality is secondary to temporality.

§ 73. The Return to Temporality

Heidegger 's depar ture from Husserl thereby becomes questionable. As with Husserl, it is the fear of dispersal (which is a momen t of incom­pleteness for Husserl) that leads Heidegger to affirm a primordial temporality (Zeitlichkeit). Indeed, to avoid the danger of infinite re­gress, Heidegger, like Husserl, needs to ensure that this temporality is constituting and not constituted in turn. While Husserl affirms a self temporalizing stream of consciousness that does not appear in time, Heidegger claims that Dasein is not a thing ' in ' time but that time tem-poralizes itself in and through Dasein. "Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself (SuZ, §65, 328). Dasein is not an inter-temporal event but 'is' the unfolding of time itself.

Furthermore, we find that both Husserl's and Heidegger's descrip­tions of temporality are haunted by spatial metaphors, yet both deny tem­porality's spatial basis.29 Whereas Husserl describes an infinite extended living presence, Heidegger emphasizses Dasein's ek -static temporal­ity, which should not be understood spatially, though the prefix £K signifies "out," "off," "away from the middle," and, indeed, "outside." As does Husserl, Heidegger distinguishes between a vulgar conception of time (Husserl calls it objective time) and Dasein's temporality. A vulgar conception of time is based on an image of the unrolling of an infinite se­ries of now-points, which is analogous to the spatial unfolding of the infinite points of a line. In order to avoid a moment of dispersal, Dasein's temporality must be protected from such vulgarity; originary temporality must never be interpreted in spatial terms (cf. SuZ, §69, c), 369).

Though Heidegger seems to repeat Husserl's presentation structur­ally, he believes that it is through these essentially non-spatial characteris­tics of Being-in-the-world that the phenomenon world can be salvaged. Originary temporality expresses Dasein's bond with the world, and thus the primacy of the world: "Only through the fact that Being-there is rooted in temporality can we get an insight into the existential possibility of that phenomenon which [. . . ] we have designated as its basic state:

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Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §69,351). We thus encounter the peculiar sce­nario: that Heidegger can uphold the primacy of the world only by ensur­ing that the world is devoid of space.30 Only by returning to a primordial temporality can Heidegger affirm the paradox that the world has pri­macy, though it 'is' only in relation to Dasein. Originary temporality makes manifest a primordial exteriority that is not extrinsic to Dasein. To understand this argument we need to show how primordial temporality differs from Husserl's account of internal-time-consciousness.

§74. The Primacy of the World Devoid of Space

In contrast to Husserl 's internal-time-consciousness, originary tempo­rality does not arise from intuition, presence, or sensual hyle, but from Dasein's understanding and surrender to the world. This explains why touch is secondary to Being-in-the-world. Anterior to intuition, sensa­tion, and presence is an interpretative 'sight' that is always already ori­entated towards the future (world). Contrary to Husserl 's claim, "The 'now' is not pregnant with the 'not-yet-now', but the Present arises from the future" (SuZ, §81, 427). In this manner , temporality de­scribes Dasein's transcendence. The present ( immanence) is second­ary to what will be (transcendence). "The primary phenomenon ofprimordial and authentic temporality is the future" (SuZ, §65, 329). Temporality per­mits Heidegger to provide a credible description of Dasein's unilat­eral movement into the world, for it articulates the manner in which Dasein is "the primordial 'out-side-ofitself in and for itself" (SuZ, §65, 329) without having to surrender to a dualism.

The primacy given to the world is demonstrated through the pri­macy given to the future in Dasein's ecstatic temporality. Though it has primacy, the future is not extrinsic to Dasein; it is not the unexpected.31

Rather, Dasein 'is' futural insofar it exists finitely. Heidegger calls this finite authentic future Being-toward-death. Death does not refer to Dasein's actual death (for if Dasein were no longer, the existential struc­ture of Being-in-the-world would also perish). Rather, death points to the extreme possibility of the impossibility of existence. It is the ultimate unsurpassable horizon. Being-toward-death brings Dasein face to face with the absolute impossibility of existence, face to face with its own no­thingness and thus with the all-embracing potentiality of Being-in-the-world. Being-toward-death is the limit situation which lets beings 'be' . It allows for the encounterability of beings in the world. Being-toward-death is the foundation of finite existence, the starting-point of all being.

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Unlike in Husserl 's work, possibilities are never simply open-ended, but 'a re ' only in view of an end. Possibilities in a human sense are constitutively determined by finitude. For God there is no (desir­able) possibility that is not always already actual, if God wills it. The open-endedness of ontic possibilities is thus made dependen t on the radically closed and certain "possibility" of death as the horizon of finite existence.

§ 75. Death as the Unmasterable Work That Can Never Be Performed

That Dasein is futural should not be understood as an anticipation of actuality. The future is not a stream of empty intentions (accompanying our perceptions) that anticipate fulfillment; rather, it is a future that can never be actual. This repeats the structure of argumentation we pro­vided in the previous chapter, when we described Dasein's dealings with tools. The significance of the everyday is that it discloses a circum-ventive form of knowing. Dasein understands tools not as something present-at-hand, but in terms of their structure of assignment. Thus, primordial understanding is not based on intuition or sight; rather, understanding is based on a sight that circumvents the material, indeed hyletic, presence of equipment. The significance of this circumventive knowing (understanding) is that it, in turn, is not orientated toward any specific xeXog and thus eldog. The work (epyov) is not the tehs of the assignment (Verwiesenheit); rather, the aim is to grasp the assignment as assignment, the structure of possibility as such. Similarly, Being-toward-death, should not be understood as Being-toward-perfection; the future is not a moment of fulfillment (or completeness) toward which Dasein aspires (as Husserl believes). Dasein does not lack anything for which it seeks fulfillment in the future; death is not the final work. Rather it is the unmasterable 'work' that can neither be performed nor avoided. It grounds the possibility of all Dasein's possible 'works', i.e., ontic actualities. The 'end' allows Dasein to grasp the unity (Ein-heit) of Being-in-the-world.

He re a clear depar ture from Husserl surfaces. For Heidegger shows not only that understanding and surrender precede imma­nence (presence) and intuition, but also that the future itself is finite.32 This contradicts Husserl 's transcendental stream of con­sciousness that is an infinite, open stream of possibilities. Husserl, in Heidegger 's eyes, fails to grasp finitude and thus falls prey to an inau-thentic (everyday) understanding of possibilities.33 In the everyday,

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we push the possibility of dying into an infinite future: "it will happen in the future," "it has nothing to do with us right now." We find our­selves saying, "on^dies at some time."34 The everyday conceals the cer­tainty of death; or better, in the everyday the 'They' transports this certainty of death into the infinite. "Thus the 'they' covers u p what is peculiar in death's certainty— that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its 'when'" (SuZ, §52, 258). Authentic Dasein cultivates the possibility that death can happen at any moment . The aim in affirming Dasein's finitude would not be to hasten our demise, or brood, or sink into a kind of self-pity. Rather, Being-toward-death should be understood as the fore-running and anticipation of the ultimate possibility of the impossibility of ex­istence. In fact it makes manifest a moment of the greatest freedom — the ut termost possibility for beings in the world.

Heidegger criticizes Husserl for failing to recognize that it is im­possible to perform the transcendental reduction, since the pure Ego is always already in the world, and thus takes up a specific site from which it can "look onto the world."35 The problem is that Husserl fails to recognize Dasein's fundamental responsibility for its Being. He criti­cizes Husserl not for failing to grasp that Dasein is primordially spatial, or embodied, or culturally and linguistically defined, but for failing to show that the transcendental subject has to be loyal to its ownmost ex­istence: "Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self' (SuZ, §75, 391). Rather than seeking redemption in the infinite, Dasein needs to be loyal to its finitude. The term world thereby gains a peculiar significance; it is neither material, nor external to Dasein, but defines Dasein's finitude and hence Dasein's absolute freedom.

§76. An Ambiguous Dis-location of the Unitary Ego Pole

In the first instance this emphasis on Dasein's temporality and free­dom suggests a subjectification of the world. Indeed, it intimates a r e tu rn to subjectivity, or what Kant calls "inner sense."36 Heidegger seems to realize the precariousness of his approach: "If the 'subject' gets conceived ontologically as an existing Dasein whose Being is g rounded in temporality, then one must say that the world is 'subjec­tive.' But in that case, this 'subjective' world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is 'more Objective' than any possible 'Object '" (SuZ, §69c, 366). Being-in-the-world, when unders tood as temporality, does imply subjectivity, but it is a subjectivity that exceeds both subjectivity

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and objectivity. It is always already more subjective than any subjectiv­ity and more objective than objectivity, insofar as the 'objective world' manifests itself within Dasein's transcendence. Thus, temporality should never be confused with "conceptions of a ' t ime' which is 'sub­jective' or 'Objective,' ' immanent ' or ' t ranscendent '" (SuZ, §65, 326). However, Heidegger implicitly acknowledges that the re turn to tem­porality inevitably permits a re turn to a subjectivity: "In Kant , . . . while time is indeed 'subjective,' it stands 'beside' the 'I think' and is not bound u p with it" (SuZ, §81, 427). Though Heidegger concedes that he does re turn to a form of subjectivity, it is a subjectivity that is dis-located from an 'I think'.37 Temporality defines not the structure of subjectivity, but the condition of the possibility of such a structure.38

Unlike Kant and Husserl, Heidegger posits that Dasein's tempo­rality does not have a unitary starting point (Kant), an Ego-pole, or what Husserl calls the standing-streaming presence, but a unity that is no longer bound up with presence (a unitary pole) . The aim is not to find a primal ground, or originary source, but to seek origin in the moment of diversity: "The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodo­logically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple 'primal ground '" (SuZ, §28,131). Although Heideg­ger affirms the unity (Einheit) of temporality, he argues not for a tran­scendental unum, bu t for a unity that sustains ra ther than subsumes the manifold. Hence , pr imordial temporality cannot be r educed to a pr imal source (i.e., p resence) , bu t is a temporal manifold that makes possible the structural unity in the first place. That is to say, the existentials— 'Being-in', 'thrown-projection', 'Being-with-Others', the 'world', the 'call of conscience', and 'Being-toward-death' —all consti­tute, equiprimordially, Being-in-the-world. This should not be under­stood dialectically; these moments do not implicate each other, nor do they presuppose a common source, but there is a unity that is co-instantaneous with all these 'moments ' . The originary unity of tempo­rality is based on an equiprimordial manifold. There is no subject which unites these moments, nor is there a primal source (presence) which provides the center for this manifold. Unity is sustained by diver­sity, of which there is no center.

Heidegger does argue, therefore, with Kant that "time stands be­sides the 'I think' and is not bound u p with it," for the T think' is just one mode of this temporality and not its primal source. Heidegger

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elucidates this in his Logic lectures: "The T think' is not in time (Kant is completely right about this refusal), but it is time itself. More pre­cisely: it is a mode of time, and indeed it is the mode of pure pre-sentifkation" (GA 21, §36, 405). The T think' is purely a mode of temporality:

If we take the 'I think' as a mode of pure presentification and presentification as Dasein's mode of Being, as Being-in-the-world, then the Kantian beginning is fundamentally altered. In other words, Cartesianism's dogmatic beginning is avoided from the start. It is not as if first the 'I think' is given as a simple a priori and then time is given which in turn mediates a move­ment out into the world. Rather the Being of the subject qua Da-sein is Being-in-the-world and Dasein's Being-in-the-world is possible only because the fundamental structure of its Being is time itself and, what is more, in this case, is a mode of presenti­fication. (GA 21, §36, 406)

Originary temporality prevents a dogmatic Cartesian beginning; the T think' is not an antecedent of temporality allowing the subject to reach out to the world. Rather Dasein is possible only by virtue of the structure of temporality.

§ 77. The Horizonal Schema

Once again Heidegger draws on Kantian terminology to define this structure. Heidegger calls the unity of Dasein's ek-static temporality a horizonal schema. Although Heidegger here alludes to the Kantian concept of schema which he will develop in the Kantbuch, he departs from Kant on one fundamental level: the schema expresses Dasein's dislocation of subjectivity.

For Kant the permanent , self-identical T that accompanies my representat ion is not something in time and thus cannot be repre­sented. It is nothing real and can never be perceived.39 If it could be represented we would fall into an infinite regress, assuming another self that could perceive this self in time. Thus, the T can perceive only what is given in intuition but never what is necessary (notwendig) .40 An a priori necessity does not appear in space and time, but defines the very subjectivity of the subject, which, however, is only as a correlate of ex­perience (cf. KRV, B277). The permanence of the 'I think' is not a cate­gory but describes what Kant calls the schema of the category of

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substance.41 Schemata are "nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules" (KRV, A145 / B184); they make pos­sible appearances in time. This allows Kant to claim —in the first anal­ogy of the transcendental analytic —that all appearances are in time, bu t that time never appears. Time is only as a substratum by analogy; it accompanies durat ion and alteration. The substance of appearance (the empirical self) is that which "as the substrate of all change re­mains ever the same" (KRV, A182 / B225). Its permanence has as a correlate the permanence of the T think', which is an abiding correlate not only of alteration but of the permanence of appearances. The schema, for Kant, is a pure concept of reason.

Heidegger also states that originary temporality should be under­stood as a horizonal schema. However, this schema is not orientated a round an Ego-pole, an T think' or presence, but expresses the equiprimordialstructure of Being-in-the-world, comprising but not sub­suming the three equiprimordial ek-stases of the past (thrownness), present (being-alongside-entities), and the future (projection). Tem­porality has to be unders tood as a horizonal schema that does not de­scribe an Ego-pole, but expresses Dasein's pr imordial rap ture and dis-location of any now-point. "Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a whither ' to which one is carried away. This 'whither' of the ecstasis we call the 'horizonal schema'" (SuZ, §69c, 365). In contrast to the Kan­tian schema, a horizonal schema affirms not the permanence of an T think',42 but the unity of temporality in its diversity—Dasein's thrown pro­jection,43 which precedes the T think'. Where Kant (and Husserl) goes wrong is in seeking unity in the presence of the Ego-pole.44 The diversity of Dasein's temporal ecstasis discloses the ' there ' of Dasein and, with it, the horizonal unity of the world: "Having its g round [grilndend] in the horizonal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent" (SuZ, §69c, 366). With this Heidegger determines the transcendental sitethat precedes subjectivity. This site does not have a "primal source," for it 'is' through Dasein's primordial dis-location.

However, this primordial diversity or dis-location has its limita­tions. Diversity can be affirmed only so long as it does not threaten Dasein's primordial unity (Einheit). We have shown that, to protect Dasein from the vulgarity of diversity, which would produce a dualism, Heidegger has to insist that this originary unity is devoid of space.45

Diversity is limited to temporal determinations alone. An inevitable

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consequence of this is a re turn to subjectivity, for "time is indeed 'sub­jective' even if it stands beside the 'I think' and is not bound u p with it." It should not therefore surprise us that Heidegger concedes in 1929—without causing any inconsistency with his argument—that the world is more subjective than objective. "Ultimately the concept of world must be construed in such a way that the world is indeed subjective but for that very reason does not (as would a being) fall within the in­ner sphere of a 'subjective' subject" (WdG, 156 / 54; 89E). It is subjec­tive insofar as it points to an anterior moment of subjectivity, i.e., to the manner in which Dasein is its ownmost transcendence. Indeed, since the fundamental aim is to break with immanence and thus to point to an anterior moment of subjectivity, the place that is disclosed is no t the world but Dasein in its transcendence. Thus, it should not surprise us that Heidegger later refers to the "subjectivity of the sub­ject"46 to describe Dasein's transcendence to the world. Heidegger has n o problem calling the world "subjective," so long as this descrip­tion is not confused with "immanence." This concession is already im­plicit in SuZ, in which he acknowledges the re turn to a Kantianism devoid of a transcendental subject.47 The sole aim is to break with the immanent starting point. As long as the world is subjective, insofar as it always already precedes and makes possible immanence, the sub-jectification of the world causes no further irritation. To break with immanence is more important than to "salvage the world."48

§ 78. The Return to an Originary Spatiality

Yet in the first instance Heidegger seems to be aware of the dangers of such an interpretation; he rejects such a reductionist reading in §70: "The demonstration that this spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality, cannot aim either at deducing space from time or at dissolving it into pure time. If Dasein's spatiality is 'embraced ' by temporality in the sense of being existentially founded upon it, then this connection between them (which is to be clarified in what follows) is also different from the priority of time over space in Kant's sense" (SuZ, §70, 367). Here , Heidegger intimates that the affirmation of originary temporality goes hand in hand with a re turn to an originary spatiality. Though "temporality is already the advance condition of the possibility of Being-the-world in which Being alongside entities within-the-world is grounded,"49 we should not be lead to believe spatiality is secondary to temporality. Indeed, primordially Dasein 'is' ' there ' (Da) before it 'is' present to itself ( 'here ') ; not only is it temporally ek-static,

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but it defines the space, i.e., the 'in-between' (das Zwischeri) within which beings can appear. There is a spatiality that is antecedent to both immanence (inner sense) and beings in the world (outer sense): "And because Dasein is s p a t i a l . . . in the way we have described, space shows itself as a priori. This term does not mean anything like previously belonging to a subject which is proximally worldless and which emits a space out of itself. Here apriority means the previousness with which space has been encountered (as a region) whenever the ready-to-hand is encountered environmentally" (SuZ, §24, 111). Since any form of dualism is inconceivable from the outset, spatiality cannot be exterior, i.e., 'other ' to Dasein, but defines Dasein's structure of comportment . Dasein as Being~in-the-world is spatial and thus always already defines the region (Gegend) in which beings in the world can be: "To encoun­ter the ready-to-hand in its environmental space remains ontically pos­sible only because Dasein itself is 'spatial' with regard to its Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §22,104), Dasein's spatiality allows for the encounter-ability of entities in the world.

This spatiality is distinct from physical space that can be mea­sured. As we have shown in chapter three, Heidegger defines this spa­tiality in terms of Dasein's de-severance and distantiality (§49). Dasein has a tendency to bring things closer (cf. SuZ, §22 & §23). 'Nearness' cannot be measured or calculated, but is defined in relation to what is environmentally closest to Dasein (i.e., the book on the desk rather than the glasses I am wearing). Equally, equipment is not merely present-at-hand, occurring at r andom in some spatial position (cf. SuZ, §22,102), but all equipment has its place (Platz) in a specific re­gion (Gegend): "In each case the place is the definite ' there ' or 'yon­der ' [ Dort'und 'Da'] of an item of equipment which belongs somewhere' (SuZ, §22,102). Equipment does not appear at a geometrical point in space but belongs to a region relative to Dasein. The significance of the claim is that this region needs to be disclosed in advancefor such a "be­longing" to be possible.50 To be over there, Dasein must have an un­derstanding of being-here,51 an understanding defined in terms of Dasein's compor tment to the world. Dasein is open to the world inso­far as it lets beings be.52

Negatively this means that Dasein is never present-at-hand in space, not even proximally. Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of equipment would, so that the boundaries di­viding it from the surrounding space would themselves just define

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that space spatially. Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally. It is by no means just present-at-hand in a bit of space which its body fills up. In existing, it has already made room for its own leeway. It determines its own location in such a manner that it comes back from the space it has made room for to the 'place' which it has reserved. (SuZ, §70, 367-68, emphasis added)

Dasein's spatiality should not be confused with Dasein's bodily space. As we have shown in chapter three, SuZ throughout refuses to r e tu rn to the body, sensibility, or any corporeality and instead empha­sizes the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world. Here , analo­gously, Dasein's spatiality does not refer to its physicality, but to a spatiality that makes possible its embodiment. "Dasein does not fill u p a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of equipment would"; indeed, such a "filling" would presuppose that there is a space independent of Dasein. But there is nothing that is exterior to Dasein. Rather, Dasein is always already more exterior than any possible exteriority.

In this manner spatiality exceeds (always already) objective space. "Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally"—it defines the re­gion within which beings, and indeed its own bodily presence, are pos­sible. "In existing, it has already made room for its own leeway." Dasein determines its own location in such a manner that "it comes back from the space it has made room for to the place' which it has reserved. "In exceed­ing immanence it has always already made room for its own specifi­city, its own appearance in space. Primordially, Dasein is spatial; it is always already ' there ' (toward the world) before it is here , an embod­ied self in space: "Dasein, in accordance with its spatiality, is proxi-mally never here but yonder; from this 'yonder ' it comes back to its ' he re ' " (SuZ, §23, 107). Before Dasein has any dimensions, before it has a sex or any other specific characteristics, it is neutral in its exten­sion, making possible its ownmost manifestation in both time and space. "In surpassing, Dasein first attains to the being that it is; what it attains to is its 'self" (WdG, 136 / 34; 39E). There is thus a spatiality that is no longer defined in accordance with a space-time duality. Dasein's spa­tiality provides the leeway for both inner and outer sense.

§ 79. The Struggle between Time and Space

In this manner the structure of presentation appears to mimic that of originary temporality. There is a spatiality that is anterior to inner and outer sense. Yet to what kind of spatiality are we referring? It should

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not be understood in terms of extension or three-dimensional space, for this would re turn us to an ontic understanding of transcendence as a "passing over" or transition. But if it is not extensive, then what kind of spatiality is here at issue?

Heidegger seems to be facing a dilemma in wishing to affirm a spati­ality that, from the outset, is devoid of space. Only a nonspatial spatiality re­sists the "fatal 'linkage of the spirit to a body'" (SuZ, §70,368). This leads Heidegger to the peculiar claim that Dasein is spatial only insofar as it is "spiritual."53 "Because Dasein is 'spiritual,' and only because of this, it can be spatial in a way which remains essentially impossible for any extended corporeal Thing" (SuZ, §70,368). So, the significance of Dasein's spatial­ity lies in the fact that it is devoid of space, indeed devoid of matter. Dasein's spatiality does not define outer things in terms of their material extension but purely in terms of their "spiritual extension":

Because Dasein as temporality is ecstatico-horizonal in its Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made room, and it can do so factically and constantly. With regard to that space which it has ecstatically taken in, the 'here' of its current factical situation [Lage bzw. Situation] never signifies a position in space, but signifies rather the leeway of the range of that equipmental totality with which it is most closely concerned—a leeway which has been opened up for it in directionality and de-severance. (SuZ, §70, 369)

Heidegger thereby returns to his original claim that transcen­dence is devoid of space. "Spiritual extension" turns out to be nothing but Dasein's temporality. So, in the final analysis, spatiality remains secondary to Dasein's ek-static temporality and is not an existential of Dasein. This is confirmed in the following sentence: "Only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space" (SuZ, §70, 369). Spatiality can be broken into only by time and cannot exist independent ly of time. However, though Dasein's ecstatic tem­porality allows it to "break into space," Heidegger believes he has also proven that space can be unders tood independent ly of time. "The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is independen t of time; bu t on the o ther hand, this same temporality also makes intelligible Dasein's 'dependence ' on space" (SuZ, §70, 369). Yet nowhere in SuZ is this possible independence of space from time proven.54 Indeed sec­tion §70 —"The Temporality of the Spatiality that is Characterist ic of

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Dasein" (SuZ, §70, 367) —is not followed by a section entitled "The Spatiality of Temporality that is Characteristic of Dasein."55

§80. Dasein Needs No Windows: 'Solus Ipsel

Finite temporality breaks with immanence insofar as it discloses a pri­mordial transcendence; however, this thesis does not necessarily imply a re turn to the world. For what is at issue throughout is that Dasein's dependence on the world reveals Dasein' s freedom.56 SuZ suc­ceeds in retrieving the world that Husserl has ignored only by reduc­ing it to a modality of temporality, which, in turn, is a modality of Dasein's freedom.57 Everything that could possibly be exterior to Dasein is reduced to an adverbial function of Dasein's ecstatic tempo­rality. This prevents SuZ from engaging in any form of dualism. The world is not subjective, for it merely makes subjectivity possible; nor is it objective, 'out there ' , since it is defined in terms of Dasein's tran­scendence. The world has an ambivalent function: it is neither tran­scendent nor immanent to Dasein. The problem, however, is that this ambivalence is not evenly weighted, for its existence is accounted for only insofar as it defines Dasein. It thus appears that the world is more subjective than objective, insofar as the aim is to describe Dasein and never the world. Our presentation seems to be reversed; ra ther than giving primacy to the world, SuZ in the end gives primacy to Dasein.

The significance of the world lies in the fact that it discloses Dasein's nullity, and thus, potentiality, for Being-in-the-world. The phe­nomenon of the world is purely a vehicle to describe Dasein's respon­sibility to be free. As Heidegger states in his 1929 lecture, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," "Surpassing to the world is freedom itself (WdG, 161 / 59; 103E). The world is no-thing, but is Dasein's ownmost possibility. What is disclosed is Dasein's primordial transcendence, that is, that Dasein 'is' only for the sake of its world. "World belongs to selfhood; it is essentially related to Dasein" (WdG, 155 / 53; 85E). With this SuZ describes the manner in which Dasein is in the world, the manner in which the world is Dasein's world, and the manner of Dasein's free­dom. The world discloses how Dasein is, its transcendence: "World means a How of the Beingof"being rather than being itself. . . . This pri­mary How in its totality is itself relative to human Dasein" (WdG, 141 / 39; 5 IE) . Thus, first and foremost, SuZ is concerned not with the world as such, but with Dasein's transcendence, which the world makes possible. The world can be unders tood only adverbially:

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"World never 'is'; it 'worlds'" (WdG, 162 / 60; 103E). The world never 'is' but becomes possible in and through Dasein's dependence . In its procedural worldmg, the world describes only Dasein's freedom. The gravity and heaviness of the world have thereby been dissolved.

All Heidegger is concerned with is Dasein; the significance of the world lies solely in the fact that it describes Dasein's primordial comport­ment. Through this it becomes questionable why it is at all necessary to hold on to the term world, for transcendence is already expressed in the term Dasein (being-there) itself. Indeed, it is tautologous to refer to a transcendent Dasein (cf. WdG, 136; 45E). Dasein is always already there (Da) before it is itself. We can thus revise the image we developed above without omitting any essential characteristics of the world:

Transcendence. Da Sein

Being There

Being-in-the-world

The ' there ' of Dasein already describes what the world initially was meant to define —Dasein's dis-location. According to Heidegger, the ' there ' reveals the world: "In the disclosedness of the ' there ' the world is disclosed along with it" (SuZ, §69c, 365). The world is embedded in the term Dasein itself. It thus seems possible to describe Dasein's tran­scendence without resorting to the phenomenon of the world. For everything is always already made possible, even the world itself, by the fact that Dasein is ' there ' .

We seem to be returning to a Leibnizian monad without windows, for everything is always already within Dasein's transcendent structure. Dasein as Being-in-the-world defines the horizon wherein beings in the 'world' can be. But such a definition returns to the very criticism launched against Husserl.5 8 After all, Heidegger criticized Husserl for his "immanentism" and closure: "For Husserl the sphere of conscious­ness is not at all questioned still less pierced. . . . Indeed it cannot be pierced as long as one's starting-point is the ego cogito. For the funda­mental conception of the ego cogito (as also in the case of Leibniz's monads) is such that it has no windows through which anything could enter or depart. Therefore the ego cogitois an enclosed space. The idea

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of being able to get out of this sealed space is self-contradictory. Hence, the necessity for a starting-point other than the ego cogito." (Zdhringer Seminare, 383 / 121). Yet in SuZ, Dasein has no windows either, since ev­erything that is disclosed is within the horizon of Dasein's transcen­dence. Indeed, Heidegger acknowledges the analogy with Leibniz, but only to highlight the discrepancies:

Now you see a distinct correspondence between this and Leib­niz's monadology, but also that wherein they differ. . . . Leibniz can . . . say, Monads need no windows, because they already have everything in the interior. We would say, conversely, they have no windows, not because they have everything within, but because there is neither inside nor outside . . . insofar as transcend­ence is already in itself the possible leap over possible beings that can enter into a world. (GA 26, §12, 270-71)

Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world is analogous to Leib­niz's claim that monads need no windows insofar as there is no exteri­ority to Dasein. In contrast to Leibniz, however, Heidegger does not hold that this is because everything is interior to the monad; rather, it is because there is no outside or inside. Dasein is always already outside before any inside or outside is possible.

We are here on slippery ground, for the distinctions are not as straightforward as Heidegger would have us believe. We concede that Dasein, like Leibnizian monads (and in this respect the Husserlian transcendental stream of consciousness), has no windows, but that this lack of exteriority is defined in terms of Dasein's dis-location or excen-tric structure. Moreover, though Dasein is monadic in its structure it should not be defined in terms of immanence, but in terms of transcen­dence. The problem is that, though Dasein pierces the field of imma­nence, its dis-location defines the "walls" of "region" or "leeway" within which beings can appear.

This reading puts us at risk of falling into an ontic understanding of transcendence, since it suggests that Dasein is in a circular monad. However, there are no walls outside of Dasein. Rather, Dasein is always already Being-toward-its-end. Everything that can be and can be known is always already made possible in and through Dasein's forestructure of understanding. Heidegger calls this the hermeneutic circle of under­standing. It is a circle that does not engulf Dasein, but describe Dasein in terms of its possibilities: "This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression

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of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. . . . In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing" (SuZ, §32, 153). Whatever can be known is never anything new but always already made possible by Dasein's forestructure of understanding. Although there are no "walls" in the obvious sense, we cannot avoid the critical conclusion that Dasein engulfs ?M possibilities of appearance and that in this sense everything is "interior" to the monad (Dasein).

Although Dasein pierces immanence, the structure of presentation seems to be analogous to Husserl's. Just as, for Husserl, everything that is can be experienced only by the transcendental stream of consciousness, so, for Heidegger, every being can be disclosed only by virtue of Dasein. Thus, as with Leibniz's monadology, SuZ seems to affirm that "monads need no windows, because they have everything in the interior," even if this interiority describes nothing but Dasein in terms of its possibilities, i.e., its transcendence. Everything that is possible manifests itself xmthin Dasein's transcendence and is thus immanent to its ownmost transcendence. It allows us to focus on Dasein and forget about anything else.

A DEFENSE OF INFINITY

§81. The Denial of a Loss

In a peculiar manner Heidegger succeeds in showing why "the exter­nal world" is no longer a philosophical problem. Since the world is "constitutive for Dasein,"59 it does not make sense to raise the episte-mological question that has occupied modern philosophy: "How do we get to know the outside world?" "The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised by Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?"60

As we have shown, Heidegger thereby raises external objections to the Cartesian project. Not only does he render obsolete the problem of the external world, but he questions the very possibility of questioning the existence of the world as such: "To have faith in the Reality of the 'external world,' whether rightly or wrongly; to 'prove'this Reality for it, whether adequately or inadequately; to presuppose it, whether explicitly or not—attempts such as these which have not mastered their own basis with full transparency, presuppose a subject which is proxi-mally worldless or unsure of its world, and which must, at bottom, first assure itself of a world" (SuZ, §43a, 206). The need and desire to prove the existence of the world presupposes the ability to see ourselves, in

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principle, as separate from the world. While for thinkers like Kant it is '"a scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general ' that there is still no cogent proof for the 'Dasein of Things outside of us' which will do away with any scepticism" (SuZ, §43a, 203), the scandal for Heidegger is not that proof of the existence of the external world is still outstanding, but that philosophy still seeks such a proof: "The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again (SuZ, §43a, 205). The expectation, demand, and desire to prove an existence of the external world arises only if philosophy operates with a subject-object dualism and therefore "misses" a more fundamental beginning, which is Being-in-the-world. The world is always already an issue forDasein, and it is because this world primordially matters to Dasein that the existence of the world cannot be questioned. Surrender to the world thus quenches any desire or need to prove the existence of the world, for Dasein lives the proof insofar as it understands itself through its compor tment to the world.

Heidegger is really arguing that a positive account of finitude should no longer be measured against the infinite. The need and desire to prove the existence of an external world arises from the belief that there is something that transcends our understanding. The necessity to prove the external world in this sense is linked to an onto-theological understanding of transcendence. Though we are finite we wish to ob­tain an absolute standpoint that lies beyond finite understanding. Yet the significance of originary temporality is that it is not in contradis­tinction with eternity, or a God-like world, for the origin of all being lies in the finite structure of Dasein's transcendence. The problem of the world is a problem only as long as we believe in a transcendence that exceeds Dasein's finitude.

Husserl adopts the onto-theological conception of transcen­dence in that his account of temporality maintains the idea of the infinite. Although Husserl does away with a two-world image, he still holds fast to the idea that there is an absolute self-sufficient stream toward which any knowing strives. The finitude of our knowledge is under­stood negatively—in contrast to the infinite. Husserl's onto-theological understanding of transcendence becomes apparent if we take a closer look at his account of immanence. Immanence is described as the self-temporalizing stream of consciousness. The significance of this stream is that it is an infinitely extended presence. It is an eternal presence in

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which change and non-change coincide. Husserl, in line with the tra­dition of philosophy, contrasts the absolute present with imperfection or incompleteness (finitude), thereby ensuring the constriction of an onto-theological model.61

Because Dasein's finitude is absolute, there is no need to search for a beyond, since everything that 'is' is possible through Dasein's bonding with the world. Dasein is always already there and understands itself through its compor tment to the world. The world is not an enigma, or resistant, but is always already grasped in its unity. A positive understanding of finitude thus wipes out once and for all the problem of the world and with it the desire and need to search for a transcen­dence that lies beyond our finitude. In a perverse sense there is no perfection that lies beyond Dasein's grasp. This leads to dangerous consequences, insofar as Heidegger will come to deny ' reason' in the Kantian sense.62 At this stage the strengths of Husserl 's phenomenol­ogy, in contrast to SuZ, become apparent .

§82. The World as a Regulative Idea

At first sight it appears that Heidegger 's critique is justified, for though Husserl 's doctrine of immanent transcendence affirms that nothing can be outside transcendental subjectivity, Husserl still u p holds a notion of infinity. For Husserl, the possibility of grasping the transcendental stream of consciousness as a whole can be only "in the manner of an idea in the Kantian sense" (Ideen I, §83, 202 / 166). The quest for apodicticity is thus a regulative idea that can never find fulfillment.

As we have shown, transcendent perception is incomplete (cf. §15). Yet the a priori incompleteness of object-consciousness is teleo-logically striving toward completeness.63 That is to say, although the ' thing as such' (Gegenstand selbst)—is never a really inherent (reell) component of experience, it is nonetheless a teleologically antici­pated idea that guides perception. Object perception, though incom­plete, strives for a continuous synthesis of appearing—a continuity that is structured by internal-time-consciousness.64

To follow Husserl:

There are objects —and included here are all transcendent ob­jects, all "'realities" comprised by the name Nature or World—which cannot be given in complete determinedness and, likewise, in complete intuitiveness in a closed consciousness.

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But perfect givenness is nevertheless predesignated as 'Idea " (in the Kantian sense) —as a system which, in its eidetic type, is an abso­lutely determined system of endless processes of continuous ap-pearings, or as a field of these processes, an a priori determined continuum ofappearances with different, but determined, dimen­sions, and governed throughout by a fixed set of eidetic laws. (Idem I, §143, 350-51 / 297)

Since we have no actual complete givenness of the object, a principle of reason is invoked to make up for the deficiency. Reason prescribes the Idea of a completely given object and thereby ensures the progress of knowledge. It ensures that the phenomenologist is able to grasp the visibility of an object more richly and, at the same time, grasp the visibility of the rules that make this infinite progress of knowledge pos­sible. The continuum of appearances is guided by the Idea of a com­pletely given world, which, in turn, remains an Idea in the Kantian sense, that is to say, an Idea that can never find fulfillment.65 Thus, though transcendent objects are incomplete, this does not deter Hus-serl from arguing that it is the idea of completeness which guides our perceptions and is anticipated in any appearance. Husserl thereby comes up against the following paradox: while the goal of knowledge is unattainable, it guides us toward infinite progress (cf. Idem I, §142, 3 4 9 / 2 9 6 ) .

Implicitly, Husserl draws on the Kantian distinction between 'rea­son' and 'understanding'. Appearances are always finite (incomplete); bu t perception aspires to the infinite (completeness). This leads Bernet to conclude that there is a third ideological significance, for "[w]hat was true of the perception of a thing also holds for phenomenological science as such. In both cases, the teleological aspiration for absolute cognition of objective being becomes a pursuit of the infinite advance­m e n t of the process of cognition" (Bernet 1979, 130). Just as object cognition is orientated toward fulfillment, and the object as consti­tuted within cognition strives for fulfillment through the object X, the phenomenologist reflects this teleological structure insofar as s /he strives for an apodictic science that never finds fulfillment. The ideal of absolute knowledge is accompanied by the awareness of the fini-tude of human cognition. Heidegger 's concern appears proven: Hus­serl 's thought epitomizes the way in which epistemological concerns about the external world are essentially onto-theological. "So, inquiry

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into the possible constitution of the transcendent in the epistemolog-ical sense is bound up with inquiry into the possibility of knowing the transcendent object in the theological sense. The latter inquiry, in fact, is, in a certain sense, the impulse for the former. Therefore, the problem of the existence of the external world and whether it can be known is implicated in the problem of the knowledge of God and the possibility of proving God's existence" (GA 26, §11, 207).

However, such a reading would lead to a misunderstanding of Husserl 's definition of transcendence. Finitude does not lie in contra­distinction to an infinite God-like intuition, because the infinite is im­manent to human knowledge. It is not beyond because it resists the transcendental subject, but because adequate thought exceeds that which can be thought. That which lies beyond our grasp points to an "exteriority" of knowledge, which is itself immanent to thought. It is an infinity immanent to the monad.

§83. The Fictional Basis of the World

Like Heidegger, Husserl believes that the aim should not be to prove the existence of the world. Phenomenology is not concerned with the question of whether the world exists or not, but how the world appears. "We do not say: things are outside. How can we know them? We do not say as Kant did in 1772: what is the basis for the relationship of that in us, which we call representation to an object, which is in itself' (Hua XVI, §40,139). While this leads Heidegger to argue that it is impossible to bracket the world, Husserl argues that it is exactly this questioning that justifies the phenomenological reduction, since it shows that the world is nothing 'out there ' but 'is' only as constituted. The question about the existence of the external world is thus the wrong starting point, as it takes its existence for granted. "We have no interest in such putative questions however justified and urgent. They are not only dif­ferent questions from ours, but as we know questions which are wrongly posed' (Hua XVI §40, 140, emphasis added) . Having bracketed the question of whether the world exists or not, we are no longer con­cerned with the problem of a world that we suppose exists indepen­dently of us. Rather we have turned our attention to the question of how our belief in the world has become possible in the first place. In a very Nietzschean manner , the transcendental reduction reveals a fun­damental finitude: the world is no longer measured against an ideal world of truth, or intellectual intuition, but is described through the

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manner in which it is constituted.66 Thus, phenomenology appears to embrace the Nietzschean question: "Why could the world which is of any concern to us—not be a fiction?" (1990b, 66). O u r belief in the world could in principle be nothing but fiction; i.e., transcendent perception is in principle open to doubt.

It is this principle of doubt, however, that allows Husserl to proble-matize the phenomenon of the world again. Husserl does not r ender obsolete the problem of the world—he does not "wipe out" the ques­tion once and for all. Rather, he shows that the problem of the world comes to light only after \he reduction. "Strictly speaking, we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which rightly unders tood contains within itself, 'constitutes' within itself, all worldly transcendencies" (Ideen /, §50,119 / 94, emphasis added) . We have not lost the world but gained it, for the reduction makes visible that the transcendent world 'is' only as constituted. While SuZ ren­ders the problem of the external world otiose, and concentrates on Dasein, Husserl ensures that the problem of the world, and not con­sciousness, remains the fundamental concern of any philosophical in­vestigation.67 So long as we remain within the natural attitude, we presuppose anonymously the constitution of the world.68 We need to question back into the ground of any acquiescing belief in the world by showing how this belief has come about in the first place.

Unlike with Nietzsche, it is the fictional basis of the world that leads Husserl to turn the "fiction" of the world into an absolute eidetic science. "Thus if one is fond of paradoxical phrases, one can actually say, and say with strict truth, providing one understands well this am­biguous sense, that fiction'is the vital element of phenomenology as of all eidetic science. Fiction is the source from which knowledge of 'eternal t ruths ' draws its sustenance."69 It allows Husserl to move from natural­ism to idealism, where certainty can be sought.70 It is through the re­duction alone that we are able to raise the question of how adequate knowledge of the world is possible —it allows us to re turn to and strive for a world that lies beyond doubt. The reduction brings us face to face with the problem of the world, while Dasein's surrender to the world stifles and suffocates the problem of the world.

§84. Phenomenology as a Form of Archaeology

Husserl does not "wipe out" the world, but turns the problem of the world into an infinite task. With this a peculiar constellation comes to light: Heidegger is not mistaken in criticizing Husserl for his "immanent-

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ism" when he states, "The ego cogito is an enclosed space and the idea of being able to get out of this enclosed space is self-contradictory" (cf. Zdhringer Seminare, 383 / 121). Yet the paradox is that within this closure Husserl demonstrates a moment of exteriority, since tran­scendental subjectivity is an infinite open horizon. The infinite is not a moment that is exterior to the monad—there are no possible win­dows that allow us to catch a glimpse of the beyond; the infinite lies within the finite itself.

The aspiration is never to get beyond consciousness but to re tu rn to the origins of thought itself. The original, absolute givenness to­ward which percept ion strives is transcendental subjectivity. The tran­scendental stream of consciousness as absolute describes nothing but this ideal of all knowledge, and is thus a structure that is defined by reason.71 Husserl refers to it as an originary reason. "Since the rational positing should be a positing originaliter, it must have its rational g round in the originary givenness in the full sense of what is deter­mined: The X is not only meant in full determinedness, but is given originarily precisely in this determinedness" {Ideen I, §142, 349 / 296). Perception does not aspire to an outside world, it does not strive toward an idea that is posited outside subjectivity; it intends an originary given that is immanent to transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental consciousness is an "absolute telos" of all knowing.72

Unlike Kant, Husserl not only posits, but manifests, the idea of the infinite. Once again we can argue that Husserl manifests that which Kant posits.73 The Kantian idea in Husserl 's version is not pos­ited as an idea but is an originary given and can, in principle, be ade­quately perceived: the object itself is "seized u p o n originarily and therefore in a perfectly adequate way" (Ideen /, §142, 349 / 296). It is given, though it remains as an ideal. It is the infinite process of approxi­mation that "includes in itself a rule for the ideal possibility of its being per­fected" (Ideen I, §148, 366 / 311). Although the process of perception is infinite, the rule that governs these perceptions is not: "The idea of an infinity motivated in conformity with its essence is not itself an infinity; seeing intellectually that this infinity of necessity cannot be given does not exclude, but rather requires, the intellectually seen givenness of the idea of this infinity" (Ideen 7, §143, 351 / 298). The infinite process can be unders tood only by knowing the rule that structures this process. The rule itself cannot be infinite since it is structured by the constitutive a priori of internal-time-consciousness. Thinking aspires toward thought itself, and the telos of percept ion and

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thinking is that which is always already originarily given, the transcen­dental stream of lived experiences.

The ideal of completeness thus does not point to a moment that is exterior to the self, but forces us to delve deeper into consciousness. The teleological structure of knowing points to absolute immanence. "Philosophy [is] a function of the humanisation of the human being, in the sense of the humanisation o f 'human in general, ' indeed of human­kind."74 What is at work here is a kind of archaeology, re turn ing to the origins of thought itself, i.e., transcendental consciousness—which, nevertheless, cannot ever be grasped completely.75 This "return" should not be understood temporally. It is not as if we first had the tran­scendental stream of consciousness and then appearances and acts of perception; rather, the transcendental stream of consciousness 4s' only as a correlate to experience. Thus, although we aspire to re turn to that which makes experience possible, this aspiration expresses itself only in and through experience. For in experience, the transcendental stream of consciousness always already structures our experience.

Everything that is possible originates in me: "All thinking and knowledge about the world . . . derives from my own experience."76

Levinas therefore observes: "Husserl's phenomenology is not con­cerned with reason: there is no principle that allows Husserl to liber­ate himself from and get outside of concrete existence. . . . The act of reason' does not lead to its 'release' from the origin but coincides

with it; to reconstruct the world and not to get beyond oneself and be­hind the world is an act that resembles Platonic dying."77 There is no possibility of escaping immanence, and all we can do is return. How­ever, against Levinas's observation, we have shown that this re turn re­mains an infinite task. The emphasis is thus still on infinity. The inadequacy of thinking within thought remains the central concern.

§85. To Practice Phenomenology Is to Practice Humility

The structure is thus still defined by the desire to reach perfection, to reach beyond imperfection to fulfillment. To strive for perfection is an ethical responsibility; indeed, it is the ethical teleological motivation behind Husserl's thought. "For all genuine scientific knowledge is in practice simultaneously normative" (Hua VIII, 201). In this manner the theoretical project cannot be separated from the practical one.78

It is our absolute responsibility to strive for apodicticity: "For me philoso­phy is in accordance with its idea of the universal and in the radical

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sense ' r igorous' science. Thus it is a science g rounded on an ultimate foundation and as such also a science of ultimate responsibility to our­selves."79 I should not merely passively experience the world, but real­ize my responsibility by performing the transcendental reduction, since any knowledge originates in 'me ' , i.e., thought as such. It is my respon­sibility to delve deeper into 'myself\ This 'myness' does not refer to my particular empirical self but the transcendental self, a conscious­ness that is nothing but the representative of possible consciousness: "The individual's responsibility toward himself, who regards himself as a member and functionary of the community, also includes the responsibility for this kind of practical life and, accordingly, includes responsibility for the community."80 Bernet is therefore right to con­clude that this "(endless) theoretical investigation interests him [Hus-serl] not only as an at tempt to escape death, but because he believes his activity to be the best and worthiest form of human life. The high­est form of human life is according to Husserl, a search for absolute self-responsibility."81 The ideal is to achieve apodicticity, an ideal that remains, however, as a regulative idea in the Kantian sense insofar as apodicticity is infinitely deferred.

The significance of Husserl 's phenomenological approach, therefore, lies in the fact that he attempts to provide an account of the infinite and to uphold the problem of the external world without conflating epistemological concerns with an onto-theological under­standing of t ranscendence. Husserl thereby shows that so long as the problem of the world is maintained, human knowledge has to ac­knowledge its inadequacy, for while it strives for perfection it never obtains it. "Thus, omniscience is a goal which is infinitely deferred."82 It is my responsibility to strive for perfection, a responsibility that is always accompanied by risk: "Essentially, areas of leeway always remain for the unknown, the danger of er ror , sin and so forth. The endless progress of knowledge is a progress of reducing limits and dangers but it is an endless progress, and danger, sin and so on, remain to infinity."83 We strive for perfection, while remaining aware of our finitude. We are aware that we can make mistakes —our desire for perfection goes hand in hand with the recognition that we are not perfect, that our life is nothing but a constant self-examination. We need to question ourselves constantly and face our imperfection. If perfection remains a possibility, so do imperfection and mistakes. Rather than celebrating our finitude, we need to remain aware that

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the future is not something we dispose of, but remains an infinite ap­proximation. In contrast to Heidegger, we do not grasp Being-in-the-world in its entirety {Einheit), for we have always already failed— the telos remains infinitely deferred. There is a desire for perfection that is no t based on a model of lack. For everything is always already within transcendental subjectivity. The origin of thought cannot be distin­guished from the act of thinking, since whatever we think of is imma­nent to thought.84

CONCLUSION

At this stage the advantages of Husserl's phenomenological approach come to light. While Heidegger 's critique of Husserl's immanentism is no t unjustified, Dasein's finitude suggests a far more stifling imma­nence. The world no longer lies beyond our grasp, for the world is always already "reached." By denying the possibility of bracketing the world, SuZ lets the world disappear without acknowledging the loss. Husserl at least lets the world appear in its suspension. To put it oth­erwise, Husserl acknowledges the bracketing of the world, while Heidegger wipes out the world without leaving any traces behind, for he denies the possibility of the "annihilation of the world" in the first place. In his denial of "the problem of the external world," Heidegger leaves no leeway for the desire for perfection. SuZ thereby affirms what Levinas once called an idealism without reason.85

The strength of SuZ lies in the fact that it articulates a transcen­dence that precedes immanence. In this manner it points to an origi-nary dis-location that cannot be reduced to a primal source. SuZ does not seek perfection, certainty, or adequacy—rather, authentic Dasein makes manifest a momen t in which one feels uncanny and is not-at-h o m e (i.e., not-certain) .86 Philosophy returns Dasein to its finitude and nullity. However, the problem is that the concrete ideal of unity is still upheld . Rather than acknowledging our finitude and pointing to an overproduction of sense, Heidegger can affirm finitude only by up­holding the absolute claim that it is possible to grasp the possibility of all possibilities. For death is the final perspective that makes life intel­ligible and possible.

Dasein's finitude should not be regarded as a momen t of restric­tion, weakness, or limitation. There is no perfection that lies beyond Dasein, there is no external world to which Dasein should aspire, for

Conclusion 139

everything is an adverbial modality of Dasein. With this the problem of the external world has been rendered otiose. Heidegger is thus able to advocate a nihilistic heroism. Dasein's Eros is orientated to­ward Dasein's finitude —its ownmost possibilities out of which all life and being springs. This leads Heidegger to suggest a "rival metaphys­ics" by disclosing our creatureliness (Hinfalligkeit) without the infinite instance that gives meaning to the "ens creatum. "A violent reversal is at play, for the belief is that the nihilistic moment can be overcome for the sake of a deeper self-possession. Indeed, whereas for Kant and Husserl the tehs is orientated towards the infinite, in SuZ the teleologi-cal structure is bounded and limited. Authentic Dasein can grasp the possibility of all possibilities through its fundamental finitude. Hence, although Heidegger undoes the desire for certainty and perfection, Dasein internalizes the teleological model , insofar as authentic Dasein takes over responsibility for its creatureliness. The aim is to overcome nihilism within nihilism by positively affirming Dasein's finitude.

With this Heidegger affirms an "immanentism" that is far more stifling than Husserl 's. The primordial projection (the structure of possibilities) is immanent to Dasein, insofar as Dasein is always already coming toward itself—-its ownmost possibility of choosing how it is in the world. This coming toward itself is necessarily accompanied by a momen t of Being-guilty (for first and foremost Dasein is inauthen-tic).87 Dasein has to take over its thrownness as it already was, i.e., its primordial not-being-at-home. In this manner Dasein's primordial ek-static structure leads Dasein back to its past: "The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibili­ties of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over7' (SuZ, §72, 383). Dasein as being-toward-death grasps the possibility of all possibilities that re­turns Dasein to what it always already was—thrown into the world.

The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly— that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. The authentic repetition of a possibility of exist­ence that has been —the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero —is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which

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makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the foot­steps of that which can be repeated. (SuZ, §74, 385)

Dasein has to constantly re turn to that which it has always already been, its ownmost possibilities. The return is thus to the fact that Dasein has to be. Dasein in this sense faces the infinite responsibility to repeat its ownmost possibilities and thus to grasp the "the 'monumenta l ' pos­sibilities of human existence"—which define its very existence.88

Dasein has to choose a hero; the hero is not another being (neither transcendent nor even another Dasein), but Dasein's authentic facti-calideal. Anticipating my death is not an empty idealhut a concrete ideal that Dasein has to grasp resolutely.89 To chose a hero is to chose one 's ownmost self as Being-in-the-world.90 For Heidegger, as for Husserl, this most individualizing moment (Dasein as Being-possible) is a mo­m e n t of utter responsibility.91 Yet, unlike Husserl, Heidegger believes which Dasein can grasp heroically its thr own-projection—that is, the structure of all possibilities. There is nothing that lies beyond Dasein. The re is no need for humility, for Dasein is finite in its full positivity, insofar as it itself is the model for perfection. Dasein can choose heroi­cally only ^ a u t h e n t i c self—which is the model of all being and exist­ence. Husserl's humility is taken over by Dasein's heroism.

CHAPTER FIVE

The World Reclaimed

INTRODUCTION

O U R J O U R N E Y HAS come to an end. In the first instance we believed in SuZ's claim that it "salvages the phenomenon of the world that the tradition has ignored." However, we have come to realize that Heideg­ger not only "leaps over" the phenomenon of the world, but renders it otiose. It is time to explore what we understand by the phenomenon of the world. We have shown how SuZ refuses and resists a re turn to an embodied Dasein and the material sensuous world, but have failed to show why such a re turn is necessary at all.

After the Turning (Kehre), Heidegger admits that it was a mistake to reduce spatiality to a modality of temporality: "The attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable" (ZSD, 24; 23E). Rather than reducing the world to an ad­verbial function of Dasein, Heidegger acknowledges that the signifi­cance of the world lies in its concealment. There is a world that is and remains re t rocedent to Dasein. "The denial of world about which 'The T u r n ' speaks is related to the denial and withholding of the present in 'Time and Being'" (ZSD, 58; 54E), In Heidegger 's later writings Dasein's finitude articulates neither the structure of possibil­ities, nor the unity of time that can be grasped, but a unity that is given only in its withdrawal. Unlike in SuZ, finitude now expresses a limit that is no longer defined purely temporally but also spatially: "Time is four-dimensional; nearness being the first collecting dimension."1 The first dimension expresses a closeness that both gathers the unity of time and ensures that it remains retrocedent . For closeness conceals that which is closest. In this manner Heidegger acknowledges that the world of SuZ, i.e., the referential totality of signification, is always al­ready in a struggle with the earth which refuses to be disclosed.2

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T h e problem, however, even in Heidegger 's later writings, is that space and the body are understood only in terms of appropriat ion (Er-eignis) and withdrawal (Entzug). Physis emphasizes not the materiality of the world, but the coming into presence out of withdrawal, i.e., t ruth (aletheia) (cf. Kunst und Raum, 190-91). Fur thermore , though space (and, with it, language) will gain increasing significance, Heidegger will no t re turn to an embodied Dasein. Rather the aim is to think of re­sistance independently of embodiment: "Truth, as unconcealment of Being, is not necessarily dependent on embodiment . Goethe said: 'It is not always necessary that what is true embody itself.'"3 We will there­fore no t be able to retrieve the material world that SuZ has resisted by following Heidegger 's turning from philosophy to thinking.4 Rather, we shall claim that the retrieval can be made possible by 'Turning ' from Heidegger to Husserl.

A reversal of roles is taking place. While SuZ sets itself the task of salvaging the world that Husserl has ignored, now we re turn to Hus­serl in an attempt to salvage the world SuZ has "leapt over." The 'Turning ' to Husserl is, however, informed by its depar ture . In other words, we do not leave SuZ behind; rather, we seek to overcome SuZ's limitations by re turning to the writings of Husserl. The aim remains to affirm the primacy of the world without producing dualisms.

Not only do we believe that it is possible to find the seeds for the re­trieval of the phenomenon of the world in Husserl's phenomenology, we maintain that they can be traced back to Idem II. It is a text, though published only posthumously, in 1952, with which Heidegger was well acquainted.5 Husserl shows how it is possible to inherit and exceed his own phenomenological approach. This chapter thus faces the daunt­ing tasks of both dislocating subjectivity and salvaging the sensuous world.

THE RETURN TO AN EMBODIED DASEIN

§86. The Need to Return to an Embodied Dasein

Chapter 4 has shown how SuZ opens up and prevents a re turn to origi-nary spatiality. However, we have failed to explore Heidegger's reasons for avoiding this unitary spatiality. Surely it cannot be the problem of dispersal alone. Dispersal is unique to an everyday ontic under­standing of space. The problem at this stage is not the "vulgarity" of space but the fact that a unitary spatiality presupposes an embodied Dasein.

The Return to an Embodied Dasein 143

This is well illustrated in Kant's essay of 1768 entitled "Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume" (AKII, 375-83). Kant's description of spatiality here bears a strong resem­blance to that found in SuZ. In his essay, Kant, like Heidegger, posits a pre-theoretical notion of spatiality. He distinguishes between spatial "positions" (Lageri) —the relation of things to one another in space — and spatial "directions" (Gegenden) such as nearness, farness, left, and right—which refer to the space outside of the thing. Like Heidegger, Kant gives priority to the latter. To Heidegger directionality points to the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world, which he conceives tem­porally, whereas Kant argues that direction "does not consist in the reference of one thing in space to another . . .but in the relation of the system of these positions to the absolute space of the universe" (AKII, 377). Direction discloses that "absolute space, independently of the exist­ence of all matter and as itself the ultimate foundation of the possibility of the compound character of matter, has a reality of its own (AK II, 378). Kant sees directionality as disclosing a unitary spatiality that precedes the world of things and has its own reality.

Kant believes he is able to demonstrate this through his account of incongruent counterparts (inkongruente Gegenstucke), such as a left and a right hand. A left and a right hand are formally identicalwih re­spect to their internal relations. They can have the same shape, exten­sion, and texture. However, there remains an inner difference, which cannot be measured in terms of positions and the relation of their parts to each other.6 Despite their similarity they cannot be superim­posed on and made identical to one another (i.e., they are not con­gruent ) . This leads Kant to argue that we can unders tand their difference only in relation to "absolute and original space" (AK II, 383). "The ground of the complete determination of a corporeal form does not depend simply on the relation and position of its parts to each other; it also depends on the reference of that physical form to uni­versal absolute space, as it is conceived by geometers" (AKII, 381).

Kant arrives at this observation by taking the idea of a solitary hand as an example. If we carry out a thought exper iment by imagin­ing a solitary hand in the universe, it would still be either a right or left hand. A solitary hand, so Kant claims, is not "completely indetermi­nate" (cf. AKII, 383). If this thought experiment is correct then Kant has proven that space is not relational; left and right is intelligible at least partly in virtue of its relation to absolute space.

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O n the one hand, Kant thereby seeks to vindicate Newton against Leibniz. Space is not relational; it does not consist of the external re­lation of parts; it is absolute. On the other hand, Kant leaves it open as to whether this space, though absolute, has an autonomous reality.7

Indeed, Kant emphasizes that "the ultimate ground, on the basis of which we form our concept of directions in space, derives from the re­lation of these intersecting planes to our bodies" (AK II, 379). Left and right, above and below, nor th and south are meaningful only in relation to a body that is divided into left and right counterparts, and thus, in relation to my bodily standpoint. This suggests that for us left-ness o r Tightness has to be related to our bodily standpoint. Nonethe­less Kant insists that the essential property of leftness or rightness that pertains to a hand is not due to, or relative to, my bodily standpoint. That a hand is left does not depend on how it is related to other ma­terial objects, in particular to asymmetrical bodies like our human bodies, but "these differences relate exclusively to absolute and original space" (AK II, 283). It thus seems that what Kant has in mind is not necessarily an absolute empty Newtonian space, but an absolute space that is defined in accordance with my "bodily figuration" (korperliche Ge-stalt) (AKII ,382) .

While in this early essay Kant emphasizes that space is not an ob­ject of outer sensation, but "a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all such outer sensations" (AK II, 383), two years later, in his Inaugural Dissertation (1770), Kant clearly states that space is an intuition and not a concep t 8 Concepts are general representations that can be divided hierarchically into part-whole relations, contain­ing all things under themselves (e.g., species—genus; animal—cow). In­tuitions, such as space and time, in turn, says Kant, refer to singular representations where the par t is contained in the whole. "The concept space is a singular representation embracing all things within itself.... For what you speak of as several places are only parts of the same boundless space related to one another by a fixed position" (AK II, 402). More­over, "the concept of space is . . . a pure intuition, for it is a singular con­cept, not one which has been compounded from sensations, although it is the fundamental form of all outer sensations" (AKII, 402). This leads Kant to conclude that space has an absolute reality no t as a self-subsistent independent object but as a form of sensible intuition.

Once again it is by virtue of the phenomenon of incongruent counterparts that Kant justifies his position: "Which things in a given

The Return to an Embodied Dasein 145

space lie in one direction and which things incline in the opposite di­rection cannot be described discursively nor reduced to characteris­tic marks of the understanding" (AK II, 403). Phenomena such as a left and right hand cannot be explained "conceptually"; their incon­gruity "can only be apprehended by a certain pure intuition" (AK II, 403). As we have shown above, the ultimate g round upon which we form our concept of directions in space derives "from the relation of these intersecting planes to our bodies." It could thus be argued that we ought to refer to an embodied intuition of absolute space.9 Indeed, we shall try to show how absolute and unitary space or spatiality can be affirmed by re turning to an embodied Dasein.

§87. Heidegger's Reservations

It is important to note that Heidegger explicitly resists such a re turn. This emerges in his critique of a later essay by Kant, "Was heiBt: sich im Denken zu orientieren" (1786), which equally claims that I know my way a round "by the mere feeling of a difference between my two sides" (SuZ, §23, 109). Here Heidegger could have seized on the op­portunity of re turning to an inner spatiality; yet he immediately criti­cizes Kant for reducing the phenomenon of orientation to a mere feel­ing, and thereby failing to recognize that it is because Dasein is in a world that it can orientate itself.10 Despite this criticism, Heidegger acknowledges the significance of Kant's essay: "Suppose I step into a room which is familiar to me but dark, and which has been rear­ranged [ umgerdumt] dur ing my absence so that everything which used to be at my right is now at my left. If I am to orient myself the 'mere feeling of the difference' between my two sides will be of no help at all as long as I fail to apprehend some definite object 'whose position,' as Kant remarks casually, 'I have in mind '" (SuZ, §23, 109).

He re an ambiguous appraisal emerges. Heidegger criticizes Kant for providing a psychologistic explanation of orientation, yet he praises Kant for intimating the right conclusion: "The psychological Interpretat ion according to which the T has something 'in the mem­ory' is at bot tom a way of alluding to the existentially constitutive state of Being-in-the-world."11 What Dasein remembers is the whole of the world within which beings are disclosed. The problem with Kant's presentation is that he resorts to psychologistic metaphors and thereby fails to realize that this "memory" and "feeling" refer to Being-in-the-world. This permits Heidegger to argue that transcendental

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imagination (i.e., temporality) is the unknown root of intuition and understanding (cf. Kantbuch, §6).

In this manner Heidegger refuses to acknowledge that there might be a primordial spatium sensibile that exceeds inner and outer sense. His refusal occurs not only because he fears a momen t of dis­persal, but because a re turn to an embodied Dasein undermines Dasein's primordial freedom.12 If Dasein were primordially embod­ied, then it would be first ' here ' (in its thrownness) before it would be 'over there ' {Da, in its projection). Dasein would always already be b o n d e d to its body before it was ' there ' in its possibilities. The finitude would no longer lie in the possibility of the impossibility of existence (death) , but in the impossibility of dissolving Dasein's bond to its body. It is because SuZ wishes to maintain Dasein's primordial (exis­tential) freedom that it refuses and resists the re turn to an embodied Dasein.

Friedrich Kaulbach illustrates this dilemma in relation to Kant's theoretical development. In his critical period, Kant replaces the no­tion of an embodied intuition of spatiality with an intellectualized con­ception of space. Kaulbach observes that Kant intellectualizes space in order to guarantee the primacy of the spontaneity of the T think', that is, the freedom and subjectivity which are the central themes of his critical writings. So to uphold the primacy of freedom, Kant needs to minimize the significance of space and show that it is secondary to temporality (inner sense).13

Kaulbach illustrates this by drawing on Heidegger 's definition of thrown-projection. What characterizes human intuition is that it is de­pendent on the existence of an object that it cannot create itself. In­tuition expresses the subject's thrownness. Kant now shifts the emphasis from dependence (intuition) to the spontaneity of the 'I think': "There is a displacement from the standpoint of intuition. In­tuition previously dominated thought (in the sense of conceptual thought) . The receptive openness to the given which corresponded to the attitude of intuition is overtaken by the projection of the rules of understanding" (Kaulbach 1960, 115). It is the schema that has prior­ity as a conceptual rule (begriffliche Regel) over intuition. "In the same brea th that we refer to the thrownness which inheres in sensation we need to refer to something else which is connected with freedom, spontaneity, a predecessor of any possible spatial encounters: Indeed, here Kant refers to projection (Entzuurfi" (Kaulbach 1960, 114). Ac-

The Return to an Embodied Dasein 147

cording to Kaulbach, to ensure self-determination and freedom, the role of intuition, and with it an embodied intuition, loses its signifi­cance. As soon as we affirm the primacy of the material world, we can no longer uphold a categorial understanding of freedom. Before I could say "I am" or "I am possible," I would be bound to a body that has a world.

§88. 'The Body as an Outer Brain of Man"14

At first sight, however, Heidegger 's problem does not seem to be that Dasein's embodiment undermines its primordial freedom — rather, that it suggests a re turn to subjectivity. The fact that I am bound to the body does not dislocate subjectivity, but broadens consciousness. This emerges in Husserl 's Ideen II. In a curious manner Husserl here unknowingly repeats and refines Kant's 1768 text by emphasizing the primacy of an embodied intuition.15

In the first instance Husserl argues that the world of things has primacy over the lived pre-theoretical world.16 T h i n g s ' are essentially spatial.17 Be they real things or phantoms, they are given only aspectiv-ally, as "the sensuous schema of the thing [that] undergoes continuous altera­tion " (Ideen II, §15b, 37) .18 The real thing cannot be distinguished from a phantom so long as I perceive it in isolation. We can be assured that it is not a phan tom only if it is causally related to other objects. Husserl hereby is following Kant's a rgument as presented in the second anal­ogy of the KRV. Every event has a cause; that is to say, every event takes place in a temporal order insofar as alterations are governed by the "law of the connection of cause and effect" (KRV, B232). The reality of the thing, its materiality, is guaranteed only as a substratum of its changing qualities in relation to other objects. Husserl therefore con­cludes that to know a thing is to know how it reacts, for instance to pressure or heat. "[R]eal substance (concretely understood as a thing in a very broad sense), real property, real state (real behavior) and real causality are concepts which belong together essentially" (Ideen II, §31, 126). However, Husserl realizes that this causal relation alone is not sufficient to show how an objective thing is constituted. For an objec­tive ' thing' is perceived only when it is opposed to us.

Spatial objects presuppose not only an observer, but a subject that possesses a spatial location, i.e., that is embodied.

All spatial being necessarily appears in such a way that it appears either nearer or farther, above or below, right or left. This holds

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with regard to all points of the appearing corporeality, which then have their differences in relation to one another as regards this nearness, this above and below, etc., among which there are hereby peculiar qualities of appearance, stratified like dimen­sions. The lived body then has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all these orienta­tions. One of its spatial points, even if not an actually seen one, is always characterized in the mode of the ultimate central here: that is, a here which has no other here outside of itself, in rela­tion to which it would be a "there." (Ideen II, §41b, 158)

Objects (Gegenstande) stand over and against my bodily standpoint; they can be only ' there ' , as opposed to my lived body, which is 'here ' : "I have all things over and against me; they are all ' there ' -—with the ex­ception of one and only one, namely the lived body, which is always ' he re ' " {Ideen II, §41b, 159). Since all experience is orientated a round my lived body, it is the absolute zero point of all experience. Farness, nearness, left, and right make sense only in relation to my lived body.

Like Kant, Husserl argues that we have pre-theoretical experi­ence of the world. It is defined in terms of nearness and farness, ra ther than objective measurement. Unlike in Heidegger 's work, the emphasis is on Dasein's 'hereness' , the very fact that it is (thrown). Fur­thermore , like Kant, Husserl says that I cannot be anywhere else but here—\ can never be ' there ' , for ' thereness' is possible only in relation to my absolute standpoint. My lived body defines the insubstitutable 'he re ' ; everything that 'is' or 'can be ' can be only as opposed to me, i.e., over ' there ' . In this manner Husserl shows that, for object percep­tion, it is not an T think' that accompanies all my representations but an embodied psyche (psychophysical unity).

The manifold of appearances is thus united by the unitary stand­point of my body. As Husserl argues in the 1930s: "The entire physical perceptual field as a constituted manifold of things that appear in per­spectives is a harmonious unity of perspectivity; one perspectival style governs and continues to govern throughout the changing percep­tual field."191 experience the unity and continuity of the world as ori­ented around my body: "Thus each thing that appears has eo ipso an orienting relation to the lived body, and this refers not only to what ac­tually appears but to each thing that is supposed to be able to appear. If I am imagining a centaur I cannot help but imagine it as in a certain

The Return to an Embodied Dasein 149

orientation and in a particular relation to my sense organs: it is 'to the right' of me; it is 'approaching ' me or 'moving away'; it is 'revolving,' turning toward or away from 'me ' " {Ideen II, §18a, 56). The world is only in relation to my living and moving body. As I move a round the world all real and possible appearances by necessity accommodate themselves to, and are positioned in relation to, me. Thus, even if I imagine an object, my lived body is presupposed.2 0

This claim alone, however, is not particularly radical. For we seem to be merely enveloping, indeed broadening, consciousness to the realm of the lived body. The body remains the constitutive pole of all experience. Thus, in the same way as the 'I think' accompanies all my experiences, so does my body. Knowing is a function not only of con­sciousness; there is also a gnosis of the body. Like consciousness it is the centrifugal "point" of possible perceptions. The body is the "center of orientation" (Orientierungszentrum) (Ideen II, §41 a, 158). My absolute standpoint ( 'hereness') discloses that the world is for me. Once again the "world is my representation." My lived body expresses nothing but an T can'; I a m / r ^ to move my body. The body is the only organ that is immediately moveable by my will. Just as the pure Ego is the "terminus a quo" (Ideen II, §25, 105), the center pole of all conscious life, the 'I can' is the transcendental unity of all cogitationes: "The structure of the acts which radiate out from the Ego-center, or, the Ego itself, is a form which has an analogon in the centralizing of all sense-phenomena in reference to the lived body" (Ideen II, §25, 105). If the T can' is analo­gous to the 'Ego pole ' then we have not escaped the sphere of imma­nence. Rather than dislocating subjectivity, the lived body merely emphasizes that everything that 'is' needs to be in relation to an 'I can'. We can thus unders tand why Heidegger refuses and resists the re turn to an embodied Dasein. For as soon as we re turn to an embod­ied Dasein we re turn to the field of immanence.

§89. The Prioritization of Theoretical Consciousness So long as the lived body is analogous to the Ego pole, consciousness is merely b roadened . Husserl also maintains his position, developed in Ideen I, by giving primacy to theoretical consciousness. Indeed, in the first instance it seems impossible to affirm the primacy of the material world via Husserl. For Husserl 's entire phenomenologica l project remains concerned with no th ing bu t the idealization of the world. While the second section of Ideen II, "The Constitution of

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Animal Nature ," affirms the necessary r e tu rn to an embod ied Dasein, the thi rd and last section of Ideen / / seeks to ensure the r e tu rn to an absolute consciousness that guarantees the constitution of an ideal­ized, objective world. Although Ideen / /discloses that an embod ied Dasein is an essential correlate for the naturalistic attitude (not to be confused with the "natural" at t i tude) , which is concerned with the reality of material things and the reality of mental life,21 Husserl will upho ld the claim, developed in Ideen I, that "this naturalistically considered world is of course not the world" {Ideen II, §53, 208). The world, indeed, the only world which concerns the phenomenolo -gist, will remain the objective apodictic world that is consti tuted by an absolute spirit (Geist) or subject. In this m a n n e r Ideen / / r e p e a t s the conclusions drawn in Ideen I. Consciousness can be thought of as i ndependen t of the world, while the world, in turn , is d e p e n d e n t on consciousness: "It [the spirit is] absolute, irrelative. That is to say, if we could eliminate all spirits from the world, then that is the end of na tu re . But if we eliminate nature , ' t rue , ' Objective-intersubjective existence, there always still remains something: the spirit as individ­ual spirit" (Ideen II, §64, 297). The aim remains to r e t u r n to an abso­lute positing consciousness.22 This reflects Heidegger ' s reading of Ideen / / . As he claims in the GA 20: "We are refer red once again to what is already familiar to us. The personalistic at t i tude and experi­ence is characterized as inspectio sui, as an inner inspection of itself as the ego of intentionality, that is, the ego taken as subject of cogita-tiones" (GA20, §13, 169).

Yet the paradox is that, in the same breath, Ideen / /shows that this Ego cannot be thought of as independent of the world. Contrary to Heidegger, Husserl says that ' to be ' means no t to be-in-the-worldbut to have-a~world and to have-a-body: "I am not my lived body, but I have my lived body" (Ideen II, §21, 94). The body and its correlate, the world, are no t the objective body (Korper) and the world of the natural sci­ences, but a pre-theoretical lived body and lived world. Any material object is constituted only as a correlate of a lived body. "It depends on the lived body and on what is proper to the psyche, what it is that, as world, stands over and against the subject."23 Though the aim of Ideen / / i s to show how an objective perception of the world, and hence of objects, is possible, Husserl realizes that the possibility of such an investigation presupposes that the world 'is' for a lived body. To grasp the objective

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world, we need to be able to communicate, and the ability to commu­nicate presupposes embodiment .

But in principle subjects cannot be blind as regards all the senses and consequently at once blind to space, to motion, to energy. Otherwise there would be no world of things there for them; in any case it would not be the same as ours, precisely the spatial world, the world of na tu r e . . . . There is always the possibility that new spirits enter into this nexus; but they must do so by means of their lived bodies, which are represented through possible ap­pearances in our consciousness and through corresponding ones in theirs. (Ideenll, §18g, 86)

In this manner Husserl intimates a retrieval of the world that Heidegger has rendered otiose. The problem, however, is that this re­trieval remains inexplicit and, indeed, rudimentary, and Husserl him­self will seek to undo the possibility of such a retrieval. We do not wish to disclose the tensions within Ideen II;24 rather the aim is to explore how Idem / / could help us in both dislocating subjectivity and retrieving the world. This can be achieved only by bracketing Husserl's aim to affirm the primacy of theoretical consciousness. It is with the help of Husserl that we wish to reach the limits of transcendental phenomenology itself.

THE BODY MOVES BEFORE T CAN' — THE BREAK WITH IMMANENCE

§90. The Body as the Hyletic Foundation of Consciousness

We have posited that the lived body accompanies object-perception, yet we have failed to show how the essential "link" between subjectivity and the body has come about; rather, we have merely claimed that originary spatiality presupposes an embodied subject. The signifi­cance of Husserl's presentation, however, is not that he shows that sub­jectivity is essentially embodied (as the analysis above made us believe), but that an unthematized body-consciousness always already exceeds subjectivity. In this manner Husserl dislocates subjectivity; the lived body stands apart from and dislocates the T can'.

Subjectivity comes about only through a lived body. Husserl shows this by returning to the phenomenon of sensual hyle, which we dis­cussed in relation to internal-time-consciousness.25 We recall Husserl's

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claim that sensual hyle provides the raw material for intentional forma­tions. It is because we are affected, because there is an Uranstofi, that there is the intentional stream of life. This claim is upheld in Ideen II; but this time it refers us back to a lived body.

The re turn to the lived body is guaranteed by this belief in a neces­sary originary affectivity. The lived body is thus the hyle tic foundation for consciousness (i.e., immanence) : "Hence, in this way a human be-ing's total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its hyletic substrate, bound to the lived body' (Ideen II, §39, 153). Since affectivity is possible only through the body, subjectivity is inextricably linked with the body. With this it appears that the body and subjectivity originate instanta­neously out of sensual hyle. The center where conscious life receives rays (lived body) and emits them (i.e., the noetic side) is identical. This, however, merely repeats the claim that the lived body is analogous to the Ego pole. Yet this cannot be the case, because the lived body is al­ready presupposed.

T o be affected there needs to be a body that is ready to be affected. There is only a sensuous moment if there is a lived body that can be af­fected. To put it another way, for there to be affectivity (Empfindung) there needs to be a sensing body (ein empfindender Leib). This leads to a radical new understanding of sensual hyk, for hyle is possible only if a body is already 'here ' (cf. Franck 1981,43). With this a curious constel­lation emerges: not only is consciousness embodied, but there is a living and sensing body before there is a subject. The lived body is not an exten­sion of subjectivity. It accompanies and stands apart from subjectivity.

§91. The Body That Is Felt

In o rder to avoid any confusion we shall unravel these steps slowly. Husserl distinguishes between two bodies, the objective body that moves around in three dimensional space and the body that is sensed. Husserl calls the latter the lived body (Leib) and the former the body (Korper). The body now has this double reality of being both experi­enced as a body in terms of res extensa and as a body that is felt. I can never perceive my own body completely, not only because as a tran­scendent ' thing' it is aspectival, but because my body, as it were, stands in the way. My vision of myself and, indeed, of the environment is always occluded by my body: "The same lived body which serves me as means for all my perception obstructs me in the perception of it itself and is a remarkably imperfectly constituted thing" (Ideen II, §41, 159).

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I can perceive my body only partially. I can see my hand or my foot, but not my eyes or my mouth. Additionally, this very same body is also a sensing body that I can never perceive. "A subject whose only sense was the sense of vision could not at all have an appearing lived body" (Ideen II, §37, 150). This lived body is nothing but this absolute perspective, the center of orientation which we described above. It can never be per­ceived, but is only felt. Even when I look into the mir ror I fail to see myself as the one looking—but see myself as being looked at from my perspective.26 As Wittgenstein once said: "But really you do not sec the eye."27 It cannot be seen, but, as Kant argued above, it can only be felt. The lived body is thus not an object of nature , nor a thing in space, but it has space insofar as it feels itself as the center of orientation. This is what we have called an embodied intuition. Consciousness and the body are linked to a psychophysical unity which is never an object of nature;28 it cannot be seen, but only felt.

We recall that Heidegger criticized Kant for reducing the phe­nomenon of orientation to a "psychologistic phenomenon ." A subject with the "mere feeling" for left and right is a construction that does not get at a being of Dasein. Conversely, Husserl shows that feeling need not necessarily refer to an inadequate concept of Dasein, that of the isolated subject (cf. GA 20, §25, 321), but can disclose a sensing that exceeds the subjective Ego pole.

§92. The Double Apprehension of the Body

In the first instance it seems that sensual hyle brings about the sense of our body. We need to be affected in order to have a lived body. I feel my body when I touch hot water, when it is caressed or pushed. Thus, like consciousness, a lived body 'is' only if it is affected by sensual hyle; there is a hyletic substratum that makes possible both thought and feel­ing. This suggests that 'the beginning of all beginnings' lies in a mo­ment of passivity and affectivity. We thereby encounter a problem analogous to the one that we discussed in chapter 2: Husserl still seems to operate with a matter-form dualism. Not only transcendental subjectivity but even embodied subjectivity is pure form that is depen­dent on a reality that lies outside of its grasp.29

However, the significance of Husserl 's account is that he undoes the problem of affectivity once and for all by showing that the lived body is characterized in terms of its self-affectation. It is simulta­neously constituting and constituted. The lived body does not need to

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be affected in o rde r to come into existence, bu t it exists th rough its kinaesthesia (bodily movement) . Here , Husserl distinguishes be­tween two modes of feeling; one is active and the other passive. Not only do I experience my body when it is touched, but I also sense my lived body as mowing, touching, walking, and acting. T h e peculiarity of the lived body is that it is not only sensed (passive) but also sensing (active) .30 Two hands that touch each other illustrate this double sen­sation:

Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, which are Objectified as features of the thing, 'left hand,' belong in fact to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch sensations, which are 'localized'in it, though these are not constitutive of properties (such as rough­ness or smoothness of the hand, of this physical thing). (Idem II, §36,144-45)

My right hand has tactile sensations through which my left hand is experienced as a physical thing—i.e., as a res that has a certain exten­sion, shape, and texture. Instantaneously my left hand has certain sensa­tions that are not qualities of its body but are in principle different from all material determinations of a res. The body hereby is a "physical-aesthesiological unity" (Ideen II, §40, 155), a carrier (Trdger) of sense organs and a body of sensations. I feel my hand moving and feel the o ther hand. Merleau-Ponty calls this an "ambiguous mode of exist­ence."31 It is ambiguous since it is completely neither one nor the other . The moment my hand touches another hand, the distinction between touching and being touched becomes ambiguous. Not only is the hand active (constituting), but, in the very instant that it is touch­ing it is being touched (passive and constituted) and experienced as a bodily thing.32 The touching hand touches and is instantaneously touched by the other hand. We can refer only to a double touching. It is impossible to say which hand touches the other. The division between constituting and being constituted is blurred. Indeed, I never perceive my own body completely as a thing, nor completely as a lived body, but only in its double and ambiguous reality.

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§93. The Primacy of the Sensing Body

Only the body felt is dependent on being affected.33 The sensing body, in turn, is no longer dependen t on an Uranstofi. To exist, it does not need to be affected by a reality that lies beyond its grasp, since it affects itself in and through its movements. It is self-constituting through kin-aesthesia. So, kinaesthesia makes sensual hyle possible. I can experi­ence my body as touched or felt only if I have kinaesthetic sensations. It is for this reason that feeling can only be kinaesthetic; sensual hyle — the momen t of affectivity, passivity, and touch—thus presupposes the active sensing and moving body.34 In other words, kinaesthesia is the necessary correlate of sensuous hyle and affectivity. This leads Husserl to claim that it is possible to bracket the body that is sensed, but not the sensing body, for only a sensing lived body is apprehended fully:

The touch-sensings, however, the sensations which, constantly varying, lie on the surface of the touching finger, are, such as they are lying there spread out over the surface, nothing given through adumbration and schematization. . . . The touch-sensing is not a state of the material thing, hand, but is precisely the hand itself which for us is more than a material thing, and the way in which it is mine entails that I, the 'subject of the lived body,' can say that what belongs to the material thing is its, not mine. All sensings pertain to my soul; everything extended to the material thing. (Idem II, §37, 150, emphasis added)

The touch-sensing is completely given, that is, "not given through adumbration." This touch-sensing is not the material body— it is not the body sensed as having a certain dimension, shape, and texture—but the lived and sensing body that exceeds a material thing insofar as it is mine. "All sensings pertain to my soul." And what pertains to my soul, i.e., the sensing body, cannot be doubted: "If I convince myself that a perceived thing does not exist, that I am subject to an illusion, then, along with the thing, everything extended in its extension is stricken out too. But the sensings do not disappear. Only what is real vanishes from being" (Idem II, §37, 150). What is sensed is open to doubt but not the sensing.35

§94. The Reduction of the T Can'

The body is the turning-point (Umschlagspunkt) where the causal rela­tion between me and the world is transformed into conditional relations between the external world and my body.36 My body is both subjective

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and objective. It is "medium of all perception', it is the organ of perception and is necessarily involved in all perception" (Ideen II, §18, 56) and it is the other organ of my will. This body as the organ of my will is only as a cor­relate to the lived body:

The distinctive feature of the lived body as a field of localization is the presupposition for its further distinctive features setting it off from all material things. In particular, it is the precondition for the fact that it, already taken as lived body (namely, as the thing that has a stratum of localized sensations) is an organ of the xvill, the one and only Object which, for the will of my pure Ego, is moveable immediately and spontaneously. {Ideen II, §38, 151-52)

The body as the organ of my will is an object of my will. It is the body that can touch and be touched. It is the body of the 'I can', that is: T can' move my body freely and T can' perceive the world by means of these movements. Yet in order to have this free access to the body the existence of the lived body is presupposed. "The distinctive feature of the lived body as a field of localization is the precondition for the fact that it can be an organ of the will." We are immediately conscious of our kinaesthetic system as a system of making possible (Ermoglichung); on the other hand the kinaesthetic system is always already 'here ' before I can manipulate it. The double apprehension of the lived body thus reveals that there is a body, analogous to consciousness (it has an Ego-like — ichlichen—characteristic), that is immediately subor­dinate to my will, and a lived body that is other to my will, the sensing body. The T can' has immediate access only over the body sensed, not over the sensing body. The sensing body will be the absolute center of orientation that precedes the 'I can'. We are here not referring merely to an incarnate Ego-pole which accompanies all my represen­tations, but to a sensing body that stands apart from the T can' (Ego).

§95. The Latency of Consciousness

It is striking that we are now repeating an argumentat ion that we developed in chapter 2. We recall Husserl's belief that it is possible to disclose an absolute consciousness that is the abiding correlate to all experience. It accompanies and always exceeds any perceptual act.37

Analogously, we can argue that there is an absolute sensing that is always already older than any ' thing' that is sensed; it can never be tu rned into an object of perception. Sensing accompanies and ex­ceeds the T can' (the body that is immediately subject to my will). This

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absolute sensing does not appear in time and space but is pre-spatial and pre-temporal. As Husserl elucidates in his manuscripts, "My ani­mate organism has extension, etc., but no change and non-change of place in the sense of the way whereby an outer body is presented as in motion receding or approaching, or not in motion as near, far away" (Husserl 1981c, 315; 226E). Here is an absolute life that lies outside of space and time.38 It is a sensing that therefore remains latent. It is al­ways already older than any act.

In chapter 2 we showed that Husserl could not accept this primor­dial aging, for if consciousness were latent then it would be necessary to affirm an unconscious consciousness, a claim that Husserl wishes to resist39 Absolute consciousness needs a correlate of a primal impres­sion. The claim throughout was linked with the belief that sensual hyle, or living presence, is the fundamental substratum of experience.

This led Heidegger to claim that so long as presence is seen as the principle of all principles, a re turn to immanence is inevitable. Yet in Ideen / / a n inverse reading emerges. Presence and hyle are no longer the substratum of all experience; rather, they are possible only by vir­tue of a sensing body. What precedes presence is an absolute immedi­acy of sensing that exceeds anything that can be sensed (presence). It is a trail of life that remains anterior to objectivity.

The beginning of all beginnings is not a momen t of passivity, but the activity of the living body, which makes the receiving of any given possible. The sensing body is not constituted through being affected by an external source (a reality that lies beyond its grasp); rather, it is self-constituting. Sensing is always kinaesthetic; that is to say, it is self-moving. Before I can say "I am," "I can," or "I am possible," I move. "Originally, the T move,' 'I d o / precedes the T can d o ' " {Ideen II, §60, 261). My lived body is in and through its own movement. If the term affectivity here makes sense we should argue that the 'I move' is the self-affectivity of my body. Thus we can conclude with Landgrebe: "Without impressions there are no time-constituting accomplishments and without kinaesthesia there are no impressions' (Landgrebe 1981b, 59). With this Husserl brings into question the primacy of the presence. What exceeds and is older than any experience and presence is the sensing body.

§96. The Spatium Sensibile as the Abiding Correlate of Experience

Sensuous hyle is possible only because a sensing body is ready and pre­pared to be affected. The ^ t o m o m e n t is possible on the basis of the

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prior openness of the lived body to the world. The lived body, the absolute center of orientation, thus defines the horizon within which beings can be disclosed. A peculiar analogy to Kant comes to light here , for Kant has also argued for an absolute spatiality that is not dependen t on outer sensation: "Absolute space is not an object of outer sensation, it is rather a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all such outer sensation" (AKII, 383). Husserl now has shown how this sense of space that precedes any material given is possible. Fu r the rmore , he has shown that there is a feeling that is no t reducible to a psychological m o m e n t bu t that is t ranscenden­tal. There is an absolute "inner" sense of spatiality that precedes any form of dualism. We have thereby r e tu rned to a " t ranscendental sensualism."40

Movement is self-affection and sensing. He re Husserl describes a primordial spontaneity that precedes any activity or passivity. This spontaneity is not the spontaneity of the T think', nor of my will, bu t of a moving that is before I can seize or act. Kinaesthesia does not ex­press a psychological moment , nor is it a bodily movement perceived by an immobile subject (the transcendental unity of appercept ion) . Rather, it is the originary mobility and motility of the subject. Move­m e n t belongs essentially to subjectivity. Without my lived body—this moving, self-affecting sensing— there is no world. Before T act' I have always already been, without having ever been present. For presence and, indeed, the self-presence of an T , is possible only in view of a sensing body: "The discovery of 'mineness' precedes the discovery of the 'I. '"41 To translate this observation into Heideggerian language; Dasein's mineness precedes immanence. Dasein is always already open to the world before it is a subject. We are here describing an embod­ied facticity that is free from any empiricism or idealism. For the lived body is anterior to a pure Ego that organizes the world and the empir­ical self. We have re turned to a materialism that exceeds the idealist-realist debate. Sensing is not conditioned, but a m o m e n t of absolute spontaneity, a spontaneity that is, however, always already older than any 'I can'.

§97. Husserl as the True Heir of Kant

In a peculiar manner we find a similar presentation in Kant's later writings. In the Kritik der Urteilskraft and the Opus Postumum he devel­ops the claim, which he articulated in 1768, that there is an inner

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sense of spatiality (spatium sensibile) that is not dependen t on outer sensation.42 Like Husserl, he argues that there is an active life prin­ciple that precedes the moment of affectivity. Kant refers to the self-affection of the Gemut, which needs to be unders tood as "dynami­cal."43 It is an "aroused movement."44 Should I be able to represent anything to myself it must occupy my Gemut.Ah Gemut refers to the pre­paredness and readiness to be affected.

We can find passages in the Opus Postumum in which Kant, like Husserl, argues that this self-affection is made possible through the transcendental deduction of the body. Moving forces of matter can­not be passively received; only a subject that is moving can anticipate counteracting moving forces of matter. It is only because I am moving that I can appear to myself as sensuous and corporeal.46 Indeed, Kant refers to a material force in the subject that discloses this originary spatium sensibile:

But space as something capable of being sensed {spatium sensibile), whose manifold content presents itself in the form of coexist­ence as an object of possible experience {spatium cogitabile), is nonetheless an actual (existing) object of possible perceptions, of those material forces that modify the sense of the subject, it­self which affects itself Without the subject's apprehension of the manifold of the phenomena (given to it) no object of empir­ical representations would ever be given.47

Here, the question of space is defined in terms of a sensing. There is the self-affection of the subject that is not reducible to the spontaneity of an T think'. There is an essentially dynamic sensing that is anterior to physical (static) space. Further, an inner extension (self-affection) is the transcendental condition for the possibility of outer experience.

This permits us to conclude that Husserl is more truthfully an heir of Kant than Heidegger. When Kant emphasizes the inner sense of spatium sensibile, like Husserl, he returns not to a psychologism, nor to an originary temporality (as Heidegger claims), but to an originary movement48 The essential correlate between the noesis znd noema and the fundamental ground of intuition and understanding is not the tran­scendental unity of apperception, nor an originary temporality, but a living and moving body. The lived body expresses the in-between {das Zwischen) that is Dasein's surrender to, and bonding with, the world. I do not know the world merely through sight and intuition, but every

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seeing is accompanied by kinaesthesia. The ground of intuition and understanding is a radical immediacy of the T move'.49

THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD

§98. The Absolute 'Hereness' of My Body

By emphasizing that the subject always has a body, Husserl does not, as we originally believed, merely broaden consciousness. Rather, there is a sensing that exceeds any conscious act. This sensing is nothing other than what Kant has called the inner sense of absolute, original space (spatium sensibile). We can therefore conclude that though the living body is the center of orientation, it is not analogous to an Ego pole. Rather there is a 'hereness ' that exceeds subjectivity. This 'hereness ' does not refer to my empirical body that moves, but to a sensing that is anterior both to inner sense—i.e., the experience of myself in time —and to outer sense —i.e., the experience of objects that stand over and against 'me ' . The 'hereness' thus refers to a mineness that exceeds any possible location in both space and time. It precedes and makes possible any particular spatial position in objective space.

Whereas Heidegger argues that Dasein is always already "there" (Da), Dasein's embodiment discloses that Dasein is always already "here"; it is the zero-point of orientation that makes any particular "here" or "there" possible. I can never undo this 'hereness ' ; my lived body can never be ' there ' : "I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my lived body, or my lived body from me" (Ideen II, §41 b, 159). My 'hereness ' is the absolute standpoint that cannot be an­nulled.

Consciousness is inextricably bound to a sensing, moving body over which it never has control. It is always already presupposed as ' he re ' before I can move, i.e., before the body is subjected to my will. This is emphasized in the following passage of CM: "I, as the primor­dial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself and tu rn toward myself with some activity or other. In particular, my lived body is always there and sensuously prominent; but, in addition to that and likewise with primordial originariness, it is equipped with the specific sense of an animate organism" (CM, §51,143 / 113). The lived

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body is always 'here ' , whether I draw my attention to it or not. It is, so to speak, differentiated, abgehoben—it stands apart—though it is the abiding correlate to my will. In the same manner , as Heidegger ar­gues with Kant that "time . . . stands beside the T think' and is not bound up with it" (SuZ, §81, 427), we can now claim that "the lived body accompanies all my representation; however, it stands apart from the 'I can'." Husserl thereby affirms a primordial transcendence (cf. CM, § 4 8 , 1 3 6 / 1 0 8 ) .

§99. The Refutation of Idealism

At first sight it appears that, unwittingly, Husserl is following Kant's "Refutation of Idealism": According to Kant, permanence is a substra­tum of all change, even the change of myself in time.50 "This perma­nent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this pe rmanen t that my existence in time can itself be determined."5 1

That is to say, whatever is pe rmanent cannot have originated in me, for it makes me possible. Since time itself (inner sense) has no manifold,52

the representation of my self in time is guaranteed only by outer sense, which precedes —and thus does not originate from—inner sense.53 This leads Kant to conclude he can provide a cogent proof of the existence of things outside of me: "Thus perception of this perma­nent is possible only through a thing outside of me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me" (KRV, B275). Before I know that I exist in time, there is a world. Knowledge of the world makes possible the representation of myself in time.

Husserl now adheres to and exceeds Kant's position by arguing that, though the permanent is outside me, it should never be con­fused with things outside me. In KRV we have an experience of objects outside us only through our a priori intuition of space. Space is the condition of sensibility for outer experience. It ensures that we can ex­perience objects as opposed—or, indeed, as external —to us. This leads Kant to argue that, since the permanence of things outside me makes knowledge of myself in time intelligible, outer sense precedes inner sense. Kant thereby inherits the Cartesian premise that there are two distinct realms —the inner and the outer. Indeed, Kant em­phasizes that "time cannot be outwardly intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us" (KRV, A23 / B38). This is why he can refute Cartesian or problematic idealism only by reversing it,

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namely, by showing that "our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience" (KRV, B275). When Husserl argues that the mode in which we can ex­perience things as outside us presupposes not only outer sense, bu t a subject that possesses a spatial location, he questions Kant's dualism. Permanency is guaranteed no longer by objects outside us, but by a position that exceeds the distinction between subjective and objective, inner and outer.

§100. The Objective World

Like Kant, Husserl argues that the sense of myself as moving in space (the body as the 'I can') is made possible because there is an absolute position, in accordance with which I can move. This permanency, how­ever, refers neither to outer sense nor to inner sense. The lived body exceeds knowledge of myself in time and space and knowledge of objects in the world. It is an absolute position that is given before there is an T that can act. Although I can change my position in relation to objects, what remains stable is the unity of my lived body, that is, its abso­lute position: "But it [the lived body] in its unity does not 'move', al though every individual organ can be moved" (Husserl 1940, 27). The paradox is that the unity of my lived body cannot move. I can move my body in space, but this movement is guaranteed only through its stable standpoint. I can never choose to be ' there ' , for any particular "here" or "there" is intelligible only in relation to an absolute stand-point. This absolute position is the horizon of all horizons—the objec-tive world—within which change and non-change can take place.

In the first instance, it appears that the lived body affirms merely my personal center of orientation. Namely, I have no choice in the mat­ter; / a m always 'here ' . This hereness refers to the fact that no matter where I am, I will see the world as orientated a round my lived body. However, in the same instance, I have a sense that my lived center it­self shifts. I am aware that I have changed my position in space. When I move, objects are positioned differently a round my lived body: some objects might appear closer, others might disappear out of my visual field. However, they will always remain 'other ' to me; namely, 'over there ' as opposed to me, who is always 'here ' . Though my perspectives change, I am aware that the objects do not change. As Kant observes in the "Second Analogy," my subjective apprehension of the world is

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necessarily accompanied by an objective apprehension. Namely, I am aware that the world does not exist only in relation to myself, but that it has an objective order .

That I have a sense that I am moving, and, indeed, that I can com­pare my different perspectives, suggests that there is a common shared ground, an objective world that makes these different perspectives in­telligible. The permanency that is thereby affirmed is no longer my in­dividual position in space, but the horizon of all horizons, within which all beings can be—even my particular bodily position in space.54

§101. But the World Does Not Move

This leads Husserl to the claim that it is the stability of the 'hereness ' of the earth that stands apart and makes possible the experience of myself and others. It is "the ark which makes possible in the first place the sense of all motion and all rest as mode of motion. But its rest is not a mode of motion" (Husserl 1981 c, 324; 230E). Its constancy is not a mode of change. Rather, constancy is more constant than change or non-change in the world. The absolute 'here ' is a standpoint that pre­cedes any possible standpoint. It is a constancy that is pr ior to activity and passivity, change and rest, myself and the other; it is the absolute 'hereness ' , the primordial transcendence within which beings can be.

This claim seems to contradict our original finding that the moving and, indeed, lived body precedes both intuition and understanding. However, this confusion arises only if we mistake Dasein's spatium sen-sibilewtfh outer sense. For the crucial claim is that kinaesthetic move­ment describes an inner movement that is not determined in terms of res extensa. "My animate organism has extension, etc., but no change and non-change of place in the sense of the way whereby an outer body is presented as in motion receding or approaching, or not in motion as near, far away" (Husserl 1981c, 315; 226E). Kinaesthetic movement refers to an inner spontaneity that precedes the distinction between in­ner and outer, objective space and spatial positions. The body is not a thing in space; it has space. It is the immediacy of having the world be­fore we find ourselves as moving bodies in a world. The world that we have is constituted through the infinite movement, but as inner move­ment it is at the same time the absolute 'here' . We are referring here to what Husserl has called the "standing-streaming life" in Hua X.55 Yet, this time, this life is not consciousness, but the living body, that is the

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correlate of the world that is standing-moving. The living body is the pre-phenomenal immediacy that precedes and makes possible time and space. It is an anterior, moving, sensuous richness, though it is sta­ble. For this richness is the center of all orientation.

This 'here ' is not in space; it is the absolute stability of the world. "But the basis on which my animate organism goes or does not go is also not experienced as a body, as wholly to be moving away or not moving away" (Husserl, 1981c, 315; 226E). It is a sensing of the having-of-the-world-as-stable. The world is the immediate sensuous experi­ence. It is not the perspective of the 'I can' but of the sensing body that precedes the 'I can'. With this a curious claim comes about: there is a perspective that is not mine but belongs to the sensing body toward which even this T can' is oriented. As soon as I move my body (Korper) I experience this movement, because it is in contrast to something that remains stable. This 'something' is not a thing—it is not other to me— but a mineness that is other to the T think' and T move' .

The world is experienced as unchanging and stable even though I move around in the world. It is not that I am in a world but that I have a world that is defined in terms of absolute 'hereness ' . This 'hereness ' cannot be moved, bracketed, or undone . The stable earth is the pri­mary basis of all experience. Both objects in the world and my body in space 'are ' only in relation to this absolute standpoint. With respect to the earth there is movement in space. According to my immediate ex­perience this earth is immobile; that it nevertheless really moves cannot be phenomenologically shown. Thus the transcendental immediacy of the 'hereness ' of the world reverses the "Copernican Turn." The ul­timate basis, our earth, remains stable. "But if this is the case, need we say with Galileo: pur si muove? And not the contrary: it does not move?" (Husserl, 1981c, 324; 230E). The human perspective has been di­verted to a perspective that is always already other to the T can' and T think', but it is mine so far as it is immediately felt—it is a sensing that originates in me before I am thinking and acting.

The 'beginning of all beginnings' is a Dasein that has a world be­fore it is a subject. This world, however, is not the world of extension, nor is it a world that is completely other to us, which we need to reach; it is a world to which we have already surrendered. We have always al­ready reached this world insofar as the sensing of this world precedes my sensed body, my consciousness and any object in the world. We are he re affirming not a momen t of dualism, but a primordial transcen-

Conclusion 165

dence that lies not in Dasein's finite future, but in the immediacy of the 'hereness ' of the world that cannot be annulled. With this, Husserl affirms the primacy of what we have called Kant's spatium sensibile. I unders tand myself and the world only in relation to this lived 'here­ness', the absolute originary space.

CONCLUSION

Husserl has enabled us to see how Dasein's embodiment dislocates subjectivity. Contrary to SuZ, we have shown that Dasein's transcen­dence articulates not that Dasein is always already "there" (Da), but that Dasein has surrendered to its 'hereness' before it can move and act. Before Dasein 'is' Being-irc-the-world, it has-a-wor\d. Dasein's pri­mordial transcendence points not to a finite future, but to a past, and, indeed, primordial, aging that cannot be annulled. Being-possible is thus always already preceded by Dasein's "rootedness" in the world. Finally, Heidegger 's observation (which remained unaccounted for in SuZ) is vindicated: "It gets the name 'homo'not in consideration of its Being but in relation to that of which it consists (humus)" (SuZ, §42, 198). What defines us as human beings is in relation to that of which we consist: our earthiness, flesh, blood, and sensuousness.56 Our creature-liness and surrender to the world is understood in terms of a sensing body. There is a transcendental sensualism that cannot be annulled.

The Heidegger of SuZ could not have succeeded in retrieving this sensualism. So long as its fundamental concern is Dasein's freedom and bringing into presence the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world, SuZ has to ignore Dasein's embodiment and primordial spatiality. Only by letting loose SuZ's fundamental project— that is, to heroically grasp Being-in-the-world in its entirety—can we salvage the material and sensuous world. For Dasein's embodiment expresses a facticity that always already lies beyond Dasein's grasp. SuZ thus could have succeeded in its critique of Husserl only by questioning its own heroic project of grasping the possibility of all possibilities, which is the im­possibility of existence. Husserl has pointed us in the right direction. Rather than proclaiming a rival metaphysics, he has helped us by showing how we can dislocate immanence and salvage the world with­out surrendering to a dualism. Husserl thereby has led us to the limits of phenomenology and, indeed, of SuZ itself. We re turn to a facticity and sensuous richness that refutes both idealism and realism.

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Hence , we have reached a curious solution: it is Husseri who un­wittingly shows us how to bring SuZ's project to completion. He finally permits us to salvage the world that SuZ sets out to retrieve. SuZ could have succeeded in its depar ture from Husseri only by re turning to Husseri and by acknowledging its indebtedness. In a rare momen t of humility, Heidegger admits: "It almost goes without saying that even today I still regard myself as a learner in relation to Husseri."57 The "son" has to re turn to the "father/' for the father, Husseri, has un­knowingly sown the seeds for his own overthrow.

APPENDIX

The World That Speaks

(a) A Linguistic Depa r tu r e

From an analytic-linguistic (sprachanalytischen) standpoint, the imma­teriality of the world and Dasein's a priori dis-embodiment do not pose a problem, for the radicality of Heidegger 's thinking can be sustained, insofar as the world is read as another term for language. Thus, Heideg­ger's departure from Husserl is located in the fact that the constitutive site is no longer the subjective act of a pure Ego, but the intersubjec-tive, constitutive structure of language. The symbolic structure of the 'world'—which is nothing but a "linguistic a priori" (Apel 1976a, 39 [Sprachapriori]) —discloses the possibility of a new starting point. This is a reading suggested by Karl-Otto Apel, who believes that Heideg­ger 's pre-predicative understanding can be translated into what lin­guistic theory calls language (Sprache).

Unlike Tugendhat , Apel does not wish to interpret SuZ as a specu­lative book. Tugendhat believes that the pre-predicative disclosure of the world points to a pre-linguistic, and indeed speculative, moment , for the "derivative mode [of disclosure]" is not articulated in asser-toric sentences (Tugendhat 1986,166). Rather, it leads "beyond the do­main of language/' and thus lacks an adequate criterion for truth.1

"The thesis that asserts such derivativeness is speculative in the sense that one cannot specify which criteria are to be relevant in evaluating its correctness."2 For Tugendhat it is without doubt that Heidegger follows Husserl by arguing for a necessary link between "disclosure" and "truth." He believes this link to be identical to the link Husserl draws between "assertion" and "truth." However, as Apel shows, Tu­gendhat thereby misses the radicality of Heidegger 's thinking, since the pre-predicative disclosure points to the leeway (Spielraum), which, in turn, allows for the articulation of truth claims, ra ther than being

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identical with truth claims themselves. "Heidegger's discovery which significantly deepened or widened the phenomenological problematic of constitution which had been opened up by Husserl was not a new con­cept of truth but the exposure of a 'forestructure' of the problematic of t ru th which is essentially identical with the . . . forestructure of the 'understanding"' (Apel 1976a, 43). Heidegger's discovery is this pre-predicative forestructure of understanding, which should not be mistaken for a speculative moment, because "what precedes is not pre-linguistic but language itself."3 The pre-predicative disclosure points not to a pre-linguistic moment , nor to a new notion of truth, but to a forestructure that allows for the articulation of truth claims. Linguistic theory calls this forestructure "language" (Apel here mainly thinks of the later Wittgenstein). It is identical to what Heidegger calls the "perfect tense a priori which characterizes the kind of Being belong­ing to Dasein itself" (SuZ, §18, 85). The claim is that what Heidegger calls ontology can be easily replaced with the term onto-semantics (Apel 1976a, 329).

(b) T h e Symbolic St ructure of the World

At first sight the GA 20 appears to confirm such a reading: "Since Dasein is moreover essentially determined by the fact that it speaks, expresses itself, discourses, and as speaker discloses, discovers, and lets things be seen, it is thereby understandable that there are such things as words which have meanings" (GA 20, §23, 287). What distinguishes Dasein from other beings is that it can speak and thus can disclose. Dasein is disclosing and always already stands in the possibility of truth and untruth, i.e., (un)concealment (fj(d)^rjOeia).4 Indeed, Heidegger em­phasizes that disclosure should not be mistaken for a new conception of truth. Disclosure and discourse refer back to the Greek term Xdyoq— translated by Heidegger as "letting things be seen" (Sehenlassen) —which can be both true and false. "Because the Xoyoq is a letting-something-be-seen, it can thereforebe true or false" (SuZ, §7B, 33). It is the possi­bility of both truth and untruth (d)An6tefa), (un-)forgetting, or (un-) concealment, and thus is not the locus of truth, as Tugendhat main­tains. "But because ' t ruth ' has this meaning, and because the Xoyog is a definite mode of letting something be seen, the Xojoq is just not the kind of thing that can be considered as the primary iocus ' of truth" (SuZ, §7B, 33). Here , Apel's critique of Tugendhat seems confirmed;

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there is no necessary link between disclosure and truth, for discourse as disclosing is the possibility of both truth and untruth .

Additionally, the analogy drawn between language and what Heidegger calls "world" seems to be confirmed in the very same pas­sage: "It is not as if there were first verbal sounds which in time were furnished with meanings. On the contrary, what is primary is being in the world, that is, concerned understanding and being in the context of meanings. Only then do sounds, pronunciation, and phonetic com­munication accrue to such meanings from Dasein itself. Sounds do not acquire meaning; rather, it is the other way around: meanings are expressed in sounds" (GA 20, §23, 287). Like the later Wittgenstein, Heidegger says that meaning precedes predication. It is not as if Da­sein creates its own language, but prior to any speech, sounds, signs, or phonetic communication, Dasein has a pre-understanding of a "con­text of meaning" (Bedeutungsztisammenhang) within which articulation is possible. What precedes any speech and the act of predication or disclosure is the possibility of disclosure, a general meaningfulness within which articulation occurs. Thus, the claim "Sounds do not ac­quire meaning; rather, meanings are expressed in sounds"3 is close to Wittgenstein's assertion: "The meaning of a word is its use in the lan­guage."0 The meaning of a sound depends on its use in a language in the same way that predication is g rounded in a pre-predicative struc­ture that makes the meaning of a particular predication possible.7

What Heidegger calls pre-predicative understanding is virtually anal­ogous with what Wittgenstein calls language.

Returning to the analysis of the previous section, we might be tempted to argue that, in the same way that tools are meaningful only through their use and non-use within the equipmental totality, the meaning of a word (sign) is preceded by that of a sentence.8 Just as the significance of tools is made possible by Dasein's primordial disclo­sure of the world, "To unders tand a sentence means to understand a language" (Wittgenstein 1958, §199). As we have shown above, the as­signment of tools refers back to the assignment of signs, and signs, in turn, disclose the world/ language as such. "Because world is present, that is, because it is disclosed and in some sense encountered for the Dasein which is in it, there is in general something like sign-things, they are handy" (GA 20, §23, 5, 285). It is because there is a wor ld / language that predication is possible. Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, emphasizes that the question of predication becomes a problem only

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when "the world/ language goes on holiday."9 As Heidegger says, ob­jects in the world are seen purely as something present-at-hand when the particularity of the place to which the tools and objects belong is overlooked: "Its place becomes a matter of indifference. This does not mean that what is present-at-hand loses its 'location' altogether. But its place becomes a spatio-temporal position, a 'world-point,' which is in no way distinguished from any o t h e r . . . . [T]he releasing from such environmental confinementbelongs to the way one's understanding of Being has been modified."10

The loss of the significance of the place or environment in which tools and objects are encountered produces what Heidegger calls the philosophical turning (Umschlag); the primordial significance of the world "goes on holiday."11 It is important to note that for Heidegger this ' turning' does not lie in the loss of the practical significance of the tool, but in the loss of the particularity of the place of Being-in-the-world as such. Here Heidegger is not concerned with the division between theory and praxis: "In characterizing the change-over from the manipulating and us­ing and so forth which are circumspective in a 'practical' way, to 'theoreti­cal' exploration, it would be easy to suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern holds back from any kind of manipulation. What is decisive in the 'emergence' of the theoretical atti­tude would then lie in the disappearance of praxis." (SuZ, §69b, 357)

What is at issue is not that we no longer use tools. For even in the mo­men t of 'nonuse' the significance of the environment can be sustained: "But the discontinuance of a specific manipulation in our concernful dealings does not simply leave the guiding circumspection behind as a remainder. Rather, our concern then diverts itself specifically into a just-looking-around [ein Nur-sich-umsehen]. But this is by no means the way in which the 'theoretical' attitude of science is reached" (SuZ, §69b, 357-58). Our pre-theoretical attitude is thus not essentially the field of praxis: "On the contrary, the tarrying which is discontinued when one manipulates, can take on the character of a more precise kind of cir­cumspection, such as 'inspecting,' checking up on what has been at­tained, or looking over the 'operations' [Betrieb] which are now 'at a standstill.' Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer 'theory' that the kind of circumspection which tarries and 'considers,' remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned" (SuZ, §69b, 358). The pre-theoretical site is over­looked purely "when the world, and not praxis," "goes on holiday."12

Resisting the Hybrid Called 'Language ' 171

It is not surprising, therefore, that Apel suggests that the term world can be easily replaced with the term language. For the world is nothing material; rather, it is the symbolic, intersubjective structure that allows for beings in the world. Instead of searching for a material affirmation of the world, we might be tempted to conclude, with Apel, that "the impossibility of transcending the everyday language"13—which is nothing but the impossibility of getting beyond the Um-welt—permits Heidegger to depart from Husserl. The moment of constitution is no longer located in a subject or in a consciousness: "This viewpoint no longer permits us to explicate the Husserlian problem of transcenden­tal 'constitution' as a problem of subjective 'performance' on the part of a 'pure consciousness/ It is, in fact, a mistake from a transcendental phenomenological viewpoint, to refer to 'constitution' as a subjective act: phenomena constitute themselves and have always already constituted themselves for us" (Apel 1976a, 39). It thus appears that Being-in-the-world dislocates Husserl's pure Ego, though it does not embrace the material world. SuZ departs from Husserl's work insofar as it locates the constitutive a priori in the intersubjective sphere rather than in a constitutive Ego.14

(c) Resisting the Hybrid Called 'Language '

The equation between world and language is not as clear-cut as it might appear at first. SuZ itself quite explicitly refuses to draw this analogy. Throughout the text we find the desperate attempt to show that lan­guage is not an existential characteristic of Dasein, that it has no onto-logical significance and thus cannot and, indeed, should never be equated with the not ion of the world.15

This claim might come as a surprise because the analogy Apel draws between onto-/ogy and onto-semanticsis implicit in Heidegger's defini­tion of the term hoyoq. Aoyog means disclosure, letting things be seen as they show themselves, concealed or unconcealed (d)Xr}6£id). However— and this might sound peculiar at first—Heidegger says throughout that we should never confuse this emphasis on Xoyoq with a re turn to lan­guage. He justifies this claim by arguing that "The Greeks had no word for 'language'; they understood this phenomenon 'in the first instance' as discourse" (SuZ, §34, 165). The aim is not only to "return" to the phe­nomenon Aoyoq, but to draw a distinction between Xoyoq, which he translates as Rede (discourse), and Sprache (language).16

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In this way Heidegger attempts to resist the re turn to language. This resistance is necessary because Heidegger believes that the affir­mation of language could suggest a return to a philosophy of conscious­ness. As Lafont points out, in SuZ Heidegger 's concerns are: first, that the prioritization of language might embrace a philosophy of con­sciousness. Meaning would then be founded in the speaking subject, and thus reduced to intentional acts of consciousness.17 Second, Heidegger is concerned that language could be seen merely as a prag­matic tool, which misses the overarching significance of Being-in-the-world; and finally, that language could be interpreted as a mirror ing device that represents the world. Thus the world would be nothing but "my representation" again.18 To ensure a non-subjective starting point, Heidegger believes that he needs to resist the re turn to language. Hence , Apel is right to claim that Heidegger 's aim is to sustain a non-subjective, constitutive a priori.™ However, he misses the fact that Heidegger believes he can uphold this aim only by reducing language to a secondary phenomenon .

The aim is to show that language only is ontically, "an entity within the w o r l d . . . which we may come across as ready-to-hand."20 It is a tool or medium, something that is ready-to-hand in the world, while dis­course should reveal the transcendental, ontological site within which language is possible. As we shall show, this reductive reading of lan­guage fails, for once again we find that Heidegger cannot avoid that which he wishes to resist—this time, the significance of language (Sprache)P

Heidegger insists that there is a categorial distinction between language and discourse that is at the same time a hierarchical one: " The existential-ontologicalfoundation of language is discourse or talk" (SuZ, §34, 160). Being an ontic phenomenon, language is constituted and never constitutive, while discourse, being ontological, is constituting. The significance of discourse lies in the fact that it discloses the pre-predicative forestructure of understanding: "Discourse is the Articu­lation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion" (SuZ, §34, 161). That is to say, "In discourse the intelligibil­ity of Being-in-the-world (an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind) is articulated" (SuZ, §34, 162). It is an existential of Dasein in­sofar as it discloses the Da within which thinking, acting, and indeed languageare possible. "Discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibil­ity of the ' there, ' is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness" (SuZ,

Resisting the Hybrid Called 'Language' 173

§34, 161). Dasein is distinguished from other beings in that it can speak. What is important here is not that it can make sounds, but that it discloses, and what it discloses is not language but Being-in-the-world as a whole.

Discourse thus discloses the constitutive whole of the referential total­ity that makes possible different languages: "That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the 'fofa/z^K)f-significations.'"22

This constitutive a priori can be maintained, however, only if the mani­fold of languages and worldviews is seen, in contrast, as a medium or tool, as an ontic phenomenon that is constituted rather than constitu­tive. The problem is that, as soon as Heidegger describes the function of discourse, the demarcat ion line between discourse and language is blurred. Indeed, it is impossible to maintain that language is purely an inner-worldly ontic phenomenon . This emerges in the following passage:

For the most part, discourse is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language. But in that case understanding and interpretation already lie in what has thus been expressed. In language, as a way things have been ex­pressed or spoken out [Ausgesprochenheit], there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted. This way of interpreting it is no more just present-at-hand than language is; on the contrary, its Being is itself of the character of Dasein. (SuZ, §35, 167, emphasis added)

In this passage the distinction between discourse and language, which should reflect the ontic-ontological divide, collapses. As soon as dis­course is expressed, it is language. Fur thermore , it is always already language. Here Heidegger admits that language is not purely present-at-hand but "on the contrary, its Being is itself of the character of Dasein." Yet if discourse is always already language, and language is an existential of Dasein, then the categorial and hierarchical distinction between language and discourse can no longer be maintained. Indeed, in the following passage the complete collapse of the distinc­tion is suggested:

Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it un­derlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Ar­ticulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in

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discourse, is what we have called 'meaning'. That which gets artic­ulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the 'totality-of-significations' [Bedeutungsganze].... If discourse, as the Articu­lation of the intelligibility of the 'there', is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically ivorldly. . . . The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. Language is a totality of words—a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. (SuZ, §34,161)

O n the one hand Heidegger says that discourse discloses the pre-predicative forestructure of understanding. It discloses the totality of significations, the place of the ' there ' (Da) of Dasein, which makes thinking and acting possible. On the other hand, he admits that if dis­course is a "primordial existential of disclosedness," then it is itself con­stituted by Being-in-the-world, which makes possible this disclosing activity. Thus, discourse, although primordial, is itself constituted. Not only this, but discourse is dependent on language itself. The prob­lem for Heidegger is that if this ' there ' is "constituted in Being-in-the-world," then discourse must be "worldly. " "Discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly." However, this worldliness of discourse is made possible by language (which was meant to be purely an ontic and, indeed, constituted, phenomenon) . For "the way in which discourse gets expressed is language" and "language is a totality of words—a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own." The worldliness of discourse is thus guaranteed by language, or, to put it another way, language transgresses the categorial distinc­tion between the ontic and ontological. However, if this is the nature of language then language can be neither purely ontic nor ontologi­cal, but hovers between the two. Indeed, it has a hybrid status similar to that of the sign. We recall that the sign can be ready-to-hand and at the same time have an ontological significance, insofar as it points to the referential totality of Being-in-the-world. This is Lafont's reading of the passage cited above:

[T]he ontological dimension of discourse (the "articulation of intelligibility") is precisely a consequence of the ontic character of language as ready-to-hand (because language just like Dasein

Resisting the Hybrid Called 'Language' 175

"does not just occur amongst other entities"). Thus, the "articu­lation of intelligibility" can "have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly' only in language. In this way, lan­guage here acquires the same 'function mediating' between the 'ontic' and 'ontological' (which corresponds to what Heidegger calls "worldly") which the sign already performs in the analysis of the world. (Lafont 1994, 102)

Language articulates the 'in-between' (das Zwischeri); it allows for the transgression between the ontic and the ontological. Discourse is only by virtue of language, in the same way as it is by virtue of the sign that the referential totality of the world is disclosed.

Heidegger seems to acknowledge this hybrid nature of language in the following question: "In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to ask what kind of Being goes with language in general. Is it a kind of equipment ready-to-hand within-the-world, or has it Dasein's kind of Being, or is it neither of these T (SuZ, §34,166, emphasis added) . Yet rather than advocating the third option, or even attempt­ing to suggest a solution to the question "What is the Being of lan­guage?" Heidegger is swift in bracketing the whole issue in order to re tu rn to the claim that discourse is "a fundamental kind of Being" (SuZ, §34, 166). The aim is thus to re turn to the initial claim that lan­guage is constituted: "But in significance itself, with which Dasein is al­ways familiar, there lurks the ontological condition which makes it possible for Dasein, as something which unders tands and inter­prets , to disclose such things as 'significations'; upon these, in turn, is founded the Being of words and of language" (SuZ, §18, 87). Yet we know from his marginalia that Heidegger was aware that such a reduc­tive reading of language is unjustifiable. He adds to the citation above: "False. Language is not a compilation, but woriginary essence of t ruth as 'There \" 2 3 Once again we can conclude that Heidegger attempts to resist something he cannot avoid. This time around it is the phenome­non of language itself. We have shown that it is impossible for Heideg­ger to sustain the claim that language is purely an inner-worldly phenomenon , yet SuZ refuses to acknowledge its constitutive function, in the same way it avoids the materiality of the sign in the previous sec­tion. For the aim is to uphold the initial claim that "Language . . . has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness" (SuZ, §34, 160). In this manner SuZ refuses to acknowledge and constantly avoids the significance of language.

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(d) The Return to Dasein

What are the possible reasons for such a reductive reading? Apart from Heidegger's fears that an emphasis on language could suggest a re turn to a philosophy of consciousness, Lafont shows that Heidegger also fears that a re turn to language could threaten the unitary struc­ture of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. It is striking not only that Heideg­ger avoids language, because it suggests the re turn to a philosophy of consciousness, but also that he refuses to acknowledge that it was W. von Humbold t who attempted to give a non-instrumental, and thus non-subjectivized, account of language. On the one hand, Heidegger praises Humbold t for showing that language is no longer based on predication. On the other, he claims that Humboldt "requires before­hand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existential (SuZ, §34, 165). Although Humboldt points to the pre-predicative nature of language, his account falls short because he fails to realize that discourse is an existential of language, which ensures a nonsubjective starting point. Disregarding the consti­tutive significance of discourse is a shortcoming only if we acknowl­edge Heidegger 's claim that language is purely a medium, and thus an ontic phenomenon. However, once we acknowledge that the radicality of Humboldt 's thinking lies in the attempt to account for the phenome­non of language that is not purely a medium or tool (which Heidegger refuses to do), the significance of Heidegger's critique no longer holds.24

According to Lafont, Heidegger cannot acknowledge the significance of language if he wishes to ensure the re turn to Dasein: " . . . the way in which Heidegger manages to get round Humboldt ' s insistent critique and refusal of every attempt to understand language instrumentally can only be understood by remembering Heidegger 's remark which immediately follows [the previous quote] which explicitly appeals to Husserl: 'The doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein'" (SuZ, §34, 166) .25 According to Lafont the problem is that Heidegger wishes to ensure that all phenomena remain modi of the uni­tary existential structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Unlike Hum­boldt, who opens up the possibility of a manifold of worldviews, Heidegger wishes to ensure that they are all reducible or are modi of a transcendental ontological a priori structure that allows for the mani­fold of appearances—indeed, for different languages. The third option — to see language neither as something present-at-hand nor as an exis-

The Fear of Fragmentation 177

tential of Dasein—would lead to an affirmation of languages that could no longer be categorized within the ontic-ontological frame­work. It would affirm a pluralism irreducible to the existential struc­ture of Dasein.

It is such a moment , however, that Heidegger refuses to consider. Indeed, the only time such a moment is affirmed is in SuZ's description of the everyday, which is immediately seized on in favor of the project of fundamental ontology.26 Unlike Humboldt , Heidegger wishes to uphold the claim that: "A doctrine of signification will not emerge au­tomatically even if we make a comprehensive comparison of as many languages as possible, and those which are most exotic. To accept, let us say, the philosophical horizon within which W. von Humbold t made language a problem, would be no less inadequate" (SuZ, §34, 166). The aim is to reduce the manifold of worldviews to: "The unity of significance —that is, the ontological constitution of the world" (SuZ, §69c, 365). Heidegger 's resistance to a re turn to the phenome­non of language is inspired not purely by the fear of a re turn to a phi­losophy of consciousness, but also by the attempt to ensure the re turn to the unitary structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world.

(e) The Fear of Fragmenta t ion

In a different context Levinas makes a claim similar to Lafont's. Levi-nas praises Heidegger 's account of the everyday because it risks "drowning ontology into existence": "And yet the philosophy of exist­ence is immediately effaced by ontology" in affirming a momen t that remains ambiguous and opaque for Dasein.27 At the same time, Levi­nas shows that Heidegger 's problem is that he is at pains to reduce the whole of humanity to ontology:28 "In fine, it turns out that the analysis of existence and of what is called its thisness (Da) is nothing but the description of the essence of truth, the condition of the very under­standing of being" (Levinas 1989, 123). Lafont similarly argues that it is through Heidegger 's "disparaging treatment of the 'Public' that he inconsistently avoids this path and decides to follow another path that once more privileges Dasein. A path upon which he is determined programmatically through the apodictic insistence upon the claim that ' the doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein'" ( SuZ, §34, 166) (Lafont 1994, 111). Against the plurality, the oneness of the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world should be sustained.

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Heidegger never loses sight of his aim of re turning to the existential structure of Dasein and grasping this structure of Being-in-the-world in its totality. "If, however, the ontological Interpretat ion is to be a pri­mordial one, this not only demands that in general the hermeneutical Situation shall be one which has been made secure in conformity with the phenomena; it also requires explicit assurance that the whole of the entity which it has taken as its theme has been brought into the fore-having" (SuZ, §45, 232). The return to the referential totality, which goes hand in hand with a re turn to Dasein, needs to be assured. To ensure such a return, SuZ has to remain essentially hierarchical in its structure. We differentiate between Sprache and Rede. Rede is founded in Being-in-the-world, which is well illustrated in the following passage from the GA 20: "Here it is only a matter of seeing the connection between the levels of verbal sound and meaning; meanings are to be unders tood on the basis of meaningfulness, and this in turn means only on the basis of being-in-the-world. . . . In order to make meaningfulness as such understandable in a provisional way, we must re turn to a more original phenomenon of being-in-the-world" (GA 20, §23, 28, emphasis added) . Meaningfulness is preceded and made possible by the phe­n o m e n o n of Being-in-the-world; language has to be a modus of Rede, and Rede in turn a modus of Being-in-the-world.29

With the help of Lafont we have shown that, though SuZ wishes to ensure the re turn to the unitary structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, Heidegger fails to accomplish that goal through his distinction between Rede and Sprache, for the hierarchical and clear-cut divide is always already transgressed. What Lafont does not show—what is, however, implicit in her argument—is that the refusal to re turn to language is not based purely on the fear of affirming a multiplicity of worldviews, but is based also on the fear that the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world can be undermined. Thereby spatiality could gain a significance independent of temporality.

(f) T h e Spatial Basis of Language

T h e refusal to attribute a constitutive, existential function to language is also—and more importantly for our investigation—caused by the fact that language is essentially spatial: "The whole stock of significa­tions which belong to language in general . . . [is] dominated through and through by 'spatial representations'" (SuZ, §70, 369). This insight

The Spatial Basis of Language 179

is most likely based on Ernst Cassirer's analysis. Cassirer has shown the predominance of spatial images in linguistic expressions.30 With the emphasis on language, then, a significance would be attributed to the phenomenon of spatiality, which SuZ refuses to acknowledge.31 In­deed, it is Dasein's dispersalin the ontic world that is reflected in lan­guage: "The phenomenon of Dasein's dissemination in space is seen, for example, in the fact that all languages are shaped primarily by spa­tial meanings" (GA 26, §10, 174). Fundamental ontology wishes, how­ever, to grasp this dispersal as a whole.32 To follow Franck: "If language is determined by its spatial meaning, then the worldliness, as a mode of presence, can no longer ensure the foundation from the momen t that spatiality exceeds temporality" (Franck 1986, 52). When a greater significance is attributed to language, spatiality gains a significance that has to be unders tood independendy of temporality. As we shall show, this is what Heidegger refuses to acknowledge.

Thus it should not surprise us that the next step in SuZ is to un­derstand discourse in terms of temporality. To avoid any misinterpre­tation Heidegger will come to rid himself of the distinction between Rede And Spracheby showing that all existentials of Dasein—that is, its thrownness, understanding, and discourse — are derived from the unitary care structure, which has to be unders tood temporally. For it is only temporality that can ensure the unitary character of Being-in-the-world. This is emphasized by Lafont:

In view of this fundamental constellation of unavoidable incon­sistencies it is no longer surprising that Heidegger's next stage in SuZ is an attempt to prove that all existentials which he has dis­closed phenomenologically can be referred back to the care structure of (individual) Dasein. Discourse—which is one of the three equiprimordial existentials of Dasein—'disappears' with­out further explanation . . . and when finally the context of the analysis of temporality should explicate "those fundamental structures of Dasein which we have hitherto exhibited, these structures are all to be conceived as at bottom 'temporal' and as modes of the temporalizing of temporality" (SuZ, §61, 304). However due to their incompatibility with any of those three "ec­stasies of temporality" the insoluble problem is rather pushed aside than investigated. (Lafont 1994, 114-15)

The significance of discourse virtually disappears in SuZ; indeed, the

180 A P P E N D I X : T H E W O R L D T H A T S P E A K S

whole analysis is reduced to Dasein's care-structure, which will indi­cate the primordial significance of temporality.

This becomes apparent in Heidegger 's later writings, which can be described as a turning (Kehre) from fundamental ontology to "ap­propriat ion" (Ereignis). It is in discarding the existential analytic of Dasein, and turning to the appropriation of the ' there is' (esgibt), that language as the "house of Being" (Haus des Seins) gains significance, and with it, the question of spatiality. For after the Kehre the disclosure of the world is possible only by virtue of language: "Only where there is language there is a world. . . . Language is not a tool over which we have control, rather it is appropriation which has the highest possibil­ity of mankind at its disposal."33 Being is no longer unders tood in terms of Dasein's comportment , but it is an event of appropriat ion, and, "since time as well as Being can only be thought from Appropria­tion as the gifts of Appropriation, the relation of space to Appropria­tion must also be considered in an analogous way. . . . The at tempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporal­ity is untenable."34 Thus, in attributing a greater significance to lan­guage, as Heidegger does after the Kehre, the question of space is automatically reconsidered.35 The Kehre from fundamental ontology to Ereignis is accompanied by a re turn to language and spatiality.

SuZ ensures that language remains a secondary and inner-worldly phenomenon . The Offenbarkeitshorizont is not language, but Dasein's existential of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger explicitly fol­lows Husserl when he says that "the doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein. Whether it prospers or decays depends on the fate of this ontology" (SuZ, §34A, 166). For the overarching aim of SuZ is to uphold a constitutive a priorifunction of Dasein.

Yet, if we refuse to interpret the worldhood of the world as another term for language— indeed if we return to Dasein's constitutive functions — then have we not undermined all possible departures from Husserl once again? We recall Apel's claim that Heidegger departs from Hus­serl insofar as the constitutive function is transferred from a transcen­dental subjective act to the intersubjective, constitutive structure of language. Yet our analysis has shown that even language threatens the project of fundamental ontology.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Cf.J. L. Austin 1962, 4-5 and M. Williams 1996. 2. Cf. SuZ, §5, 19 or Wittgenstein 1958, §109. 3. Descartes 1986, 89. 4. J o h n Cott ingham draws the distinction between internal and external

objections to the Cartesian enterprise. Cf. Cottingham 1992, 10. 5. Cf. KRV, Bxl and SuZ, §43a, 203. 6. The professed skeptic "must assent to the principle concerning the

existence of body, . . . he cannot p re t end by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity" ( H u m e 1978, 187).

7. "Nature has not left this to his [the skeptic's] choice, and has doubt­less es teem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncer­tain reasonings and speculations" (Hume 1978, 187).

8. This objection has already been raised by Mersenne and Arnauld, namely, that reason cannot perform the task of justifying itself (Cartesian circle).

PROLOGUE

1. Letter to Pfander, 1931, BrWII , 181. Cited by Roland Breeur (1994, 4) .

% Letter to Pfander, 1931, in BrW II, 181. Cited by Breeur (1994, 4) . 3. Letter to Roman Ingarden, 26 December 1927, in Husserl 1968, 43

and BrW III, 236. 4. Letter to Mahnke, 1933, in BrW III, 505. Cited by Breeur (1994, 5). 5. To echo Nietzsche: "His mir ror ing soul, for ever polishing itself, no

longer knows how to affirm or how to deny; he does not command, nei ther does he destroy" (Nietzsche 1990b, §207, 136).

6. As Michael Theunissen notes, al though SuZ needs to be read as an ex­plicit dialogue with Husserl, Husserl himself is hardly ment ioned. This is no t only because Heidegger did not wish to confront Husserl directiy, bu t also be­cause he regarded him as a representative of the tradition: "Heidegger deals with Husserl anonymously not only because respect for his teacher forbids any direct attack but also because he regards Husserl simply as a representa­tive of the m o d e r n tradition (i.e., post-Cartesian) in general" (Theunissen 1984, 167-68, translation slightly al tered) .

C H A P T E R 1

1. David Bell 1990, 133; cf. Keller 1999, 8.

182 N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 - 6

2. Pierre Keller actually goes further than this by arguing that "it is not quite correct to describe his position as externalism. Externalism presup­poses the traditional inner-outer distinction, and argues for the dependence of the inner on the outer, whereas Heidegger thinks that the traditional inner-ou te r distinction is based on a mistaken ontology of h u m a n existence" (Keller 1999,112).

3. It is important not to confuse the internal and external objections that can be raised against the Cartesian enterprise with an internalist or exter­nalist position.

4. "What is t rue is absolutely, intrinsically true: t ruth is one and the same, whether m e n or non-men, angels or gods app rehend and j u d g e it" (LU, Prol., §36, 125; LI, 140).

5. David Bell, for example, holds that Husserl can describe only the contents of our thoughts . However, he is not able to show whether our thoughts are related to any part icular objects or proper t ies in the environ­m e n t (cf. Bell 1990, 148). Husserl can thus under s t and the intent ional ob­j ec t only as intrinsic to the act, and never, like Frege, as a "genuine, full-b looded , relational reference" (Bell 1990, 130). According to Bell, Husserl is therefore commit ted to a "methodological solipsism according to which the workings of the mind can be investigated and unders tood in comple te isolation from any facts concerning the na tu re , or even the existence, of non-menta l reality" (Bell 1990, 148).

6. While for Frege meanings are meanings of signs, they are intentional correlates o£ acts for Husserl. Indeed, Husserl draws a distinction between signs and expression. Not all signs convey meaning. The concept of the sign is wider than that of expression, insofar as expressions also signify. However, we should not conflate the function of meaning with the function of signifying; the two are totally different. Cf. LU I, chapter 1.

7. To constitute here means to disclose, to br ing forth, to make manifest, or to reveal — not to create or construct. As Robert Sokolowski observes: "To 'constitute ' a state of affairs is to exercise our unders tanding and to let a thing manifest itself to us" (Sokolowski 2000, 93).

8. As Dermot Moran notes: "What Husserl wants to explore are the a pri­ori, necessary conditions which psychic acts require in o rder to achieve grasp of identical meanings necessary for knowledge. This in short, for Husserl, is the problem of constitution (Moran 2000b, 47).

9. Husserl moreover holds that "two expressions can have the same meaning but a different objective reference" (LU I, §12,53; LI, 287). In other words, two uses of one expression can refer to different objects al though the signification of the expression remains the same. Indexical expressions illus­trate this claim. Husserl confusingly uses the expression "a horse" as an ex­ample . In the statements "Bucephalus is a horse" and "This old nag is a horse," the expression "a horse," says Husserl, has the same signification, but a differ­ent reference. "A horse," however, is not a referring expression. If anything, it refers to the universal 'horseness' , or what Husserl calls a "species" or "es­sence" (cf. Atwell 1977, 92).

10. The meaning of an expression or statement is ideal, no matter

N O T E S T O P A G E S 6—11 183

whether the expression's object exists or is impossible and no matter what kind of expression is ut tered. Husserl believes that every empirical language conforms to an a priori structure: "The foundations of speech are no t only to be found in physiology, psychology and the history of culture, bu t also in the a priori' (LUIV, §14, 346-7; LI, 525). Indeed, no language, so Husserl claims, is thinkable that is not "determined by this a priori' (ibid.).

11. Even when we describe perceptual experience, there are no mental images 'in' the mind. Perceptual experience does not refer to sensations, sensa, or representations, but to the object that is intended. "I do not see colour sen­sations bu t coloured things," says Husserl. "I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song etc. etc." (LU V, § l l a , 387; LI, 559). The being of what we sense (empfinden) is different from the being that is perceived (wahrgenommen).

12. Husserl refers to a "pile of words" ^(LIJIV, §14; LI, 522). 13. O r at least we would have to concur with Keller that Husserl opts for

a theory of intentionality "based on acts of consciousness that need have no object at all" (Keller 1999,17).

14. Cf. Tugendha t 1967,105. 15. Husserl 1977, 209E. As Michael Dummet t in his critique of Bell

rightiy observes, for Husserl sense itself is the route and nothing but the route to reference. Cf. Dummet t 1993, 227.

16. An empty intention finds fulfillment when it intends something that is bodily present.

17. According to Husserl there are certain meaning-intentions that can a priori never find fulfillment, such as a r o u n d square, and others that have not yet or, indeed, can never, find fulfillment—as a matter of fact. For example, I can sit in my study and think about the br idge that I crossed yesterday. The br idge is no t actually given or present; nonetheless, I intend the bridge itself and no t an image of it. At that m o m e n t the intention does no t yet find fulfill­ment , since I am in my office and not on the bridge. When we think of an ex­pression such as "the bald king of France," the meaning-intention can never find fulfillment as a mat ter of fact because it remains at present, as Husserl would pu t it, "empty." According to Husserl, our acts can be more or less in­tuitively fulfilled. In LU, for example, Husserl holds that it is impossible to gain adequate evidence from the percept ion of objects in the external world. Since such objects are three-dimensional, they are never adequately given—fully present or visible. They are always accompanied by unfulfilled intentions. Fur­ther, there are different grades of evidence. Husserl refers to provisional, ade­quate, and final fulfillments. The last refers to an ideal of knowledge (cf. LU VI, introduction, 540; LI, 670).

18. In his translation of GA 20, Theodore Kisiel translates this dictum as: "Back to the matters themselves."

19. Husserl says: "A state of affairs, even one concerning what is sensibly perceived, is not, however, an object that could be sensibly perceived" (LU V, §28, 461; LI, 611). States of affairs (Sachverhalte) are never directly perceivable; rather , the identity of a state of affairs depends on a synthetic constitutive con­sciousness.

20. "These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions.

184 N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 1 - 1 3

T h e unders tanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing" (KRV, A 5 1 / B 7 5 ) .

21. "If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representat ions in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind ' s power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding. Our na ture is so constituted that ou r in­tuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the m o d e in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, o n the other hand, which en­ables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the unders tanding" (KRV, A51 / B75). However, at this stage it is important to point out that Kant is m o r e ambiguous. Heidegger has drawn our attention to the fact that in the A version the difference between sensibility and spontaneity is br idged th rough the 'gemeinsame WurzeF of the transcendental imagination — it is only in the B version that the function of the unders tanding comes to dominate . Cf. Heidegger 1990, §33.

22. As J. N. Mohanty observes, "In Husserl, the Kantian concept-intuition distinction takes the form of the distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment" (Mohanty 1982, 110-11).

23. "[T]he outcome of a categorial act, . . . consists in an objective 'view' (Fassung) of what is primarily intuited, a 'view' that can only be given in such a founded act, so that the thought of a straightforward percept of the founded object, or of its presentat ion through some other straightforward intuition, is a piece of non-sense" (LU VI, §61, 714-15; LI, 820).

24. Categorial objects that Husserl discusses are conjunctions, disjunc­tions, universals, identity relationships, numbers , classes, and states of affairs.

25. This is why Husserl calls "the whole perceptual assertion an expres­sion of perception" (LU VI, §45, 142; LI, 784).

26. Husserl differentiates between analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions abstract from the question of truths and can be formal­ized. That is to say, all material terms can be reqlaced by an empty formula such as the principle of noncontradiction. "In such proposit ion what is mate­rial is boundlessly variable" (LU VI, §63, 724; LI, 827).

27. However, this reading has its limitations. First, the 'Being' that is at is­sue is never the Being of all Beings that Heidegger envisages. It is limited to object perception. For Husserl the problem of Being is in no way fundamen­tal; 'being ' is just one of many logical forms that exceed sensible percept ion. "The 'a' and the ' the, ' the 'and ' and the 'or, ' the ' if and the ' then, ' the 'all' and the 'none , ' the 'something' and the 'nothing, ' the forms of quantity and the determinations of number , etc. —all these are meaningful propositional elements, but we should look in vain for their objective correlates . . . in the sphere of real objects, which is in fact no other than the sphere of objects of pos­sible sense-perception (LU VI, §43, 667; LI, 782). Second, in LU Husserl has not succeeded in r idding himself fully of the "ancestral household effects of phi­losophy" (GA 20, §6, a, 97). Although Husserl argues that "everything catego­rial ultimately rests u p o n sense intuition" (GA 20, §6, a , 94), the distinction between sensible and categorial intuition in many ways resembles that be-

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 - 1 7 185

tween form and matter. Indeed, this leads Husserl to reconsider his position. In the foreword to the second edition of LU (1920), he writes: "After twenty years of further work . . . I do not approve of . . . the doctr ine of categorial rep­resentation" (LU VI; LI, 663). Husserl concedes that he was mistaken to define categorial representat ion as a form of intuitive representat ion, i.e., as the categorial synthesis of sensuous content. It should no t surprise us that Husserl, in his later writings, hardly uses the expression "categorial intuition." It does not appear at all in the Idem Tor in the CM. In EU Husserl again draws on the term "categorial intuition," which will, however, refer only to the man­ner in which ideal objects (Gegenstdnde) are given (cf. EU, §§57-59).

28. O n the relation between Husserl and H u m e , see Moran (2000a, 139-42) a n d B e r g e r (1939, 342-53).

29. "Thus the skeptic still cont inues to reason and believe, even though he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the pr inciple concerning the existence of body, though he cannot p r e t e n d by any a rguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Na­ture has no t left this to his choice, and has doubtless es teemed it an affair of too great impor tance to be trusted to ou r uncer ta in reasonings and specu­lations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point , which we must take for g ran ted in all our reasonings" ( H u m e 1978, 187).

30. This leads Klaus Held to compare Husserl 's epoche with pyrrhonic skepticism. Cf. Held 2000, 43 ff. According to Husserl, had H u m e not held on to his sensualism, he could have become the founding father of phenomenol­ogy. "Had his [Hume's] sensualism not blinded him to the whole sphere of in-tentionality, of 'consciousness-of,' had he grasped it in an investigation of essence, he would not have become the great skeptic, but instead the founder of a truly 'positive' theory of reason. All the problems that move him so pas­sionately in the Treatise and drive him from confusion to confusion, . . . all these problems belong entirely to the area dominated by phenomenology" ("Philos­ophy as Rigorous Science," in Husserl 1981a, 182). The problem is that H u m e believes that only sensory information is immanent or immediately given.

31 . According to Ullrich Melle, Husserl introduces the idea of the phe-nomenological reduct ion for the first t ime explicitly in his lectures of 1906 to 1907. See Ullrich Melle's introduction to E d m u n d Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie Vorlesungen 1906/07 (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), xxii.

32. LU limited its investigation to the "noetic side" of experience, without, however, investigating the manner in which the object, as it is intended, consti­tutes itself. In view of this, in the second edition of LU Husserl argues that it is necessary to differentiate between the real contents of an act And its intentional con­tent (LU 1,411). Husserl later comes to distinguish between the noesis (the real act) and the noema (the object that is meant or intended, precisely as it is in­tended) . The differentiation between noesisrax\d noemais in t roduced in Idem L

33. Chapter 2 will explain how such a seeing is possible.

186 NOTES TO PAGES 17-22

34. "One must not confuse noema (correlate) and essence" (Hua V, §16, 85).

35. To follow Husserl, "the series of appearances is ru led by a certain te­leology" (Hua XVI, §39, 103).

36. This leads Held to describe the world "as this unovertakeable, the world is unsurpassable and in this way it is 'in itself" (Held 1980, 49). Cf. Michael Theunissen 1963, 352-53.

37. "I am, then in the strict sense only a thing that thinks" (Descartes 1986, 27; cf. 86).

38. "Essentially the person exists only in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object" (SuZ, §10, 48). It is impor tant to note that the reduct ion does not re turn to an individual or personal con­sciousness, as Keller assumes (Keller 1999, 39). Indeed, Husserl criticizes Des­cartes for confusing the ego with the animus, which still belongs to nature , which needs to be bracketed.

39. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Husserl 1981a. 40. "Descartes" Heidegger argues, " . . . is credited with providing the point

of depa r tu re for m o d e r n philosophical inquiry by his discovery of the 'cogito sum.' He investigates the 'cogitare'of the 'ego,' at least within certain limits. O n the other hand, he leaves the 'sum'completely undiscussed, even though it is r egarded as no less pr imordial than the cogito" (SuZ, §10, 45-46) .

41 . Heidegger 's recourse to Husserl is thereby similar to Husserl 's re­course to Descartes. Husserl uses Cartesian doubt "as a methodological device" (IdeenI, §31,64 / 54; translation my own) to facilitate the Cartesian overthrow (Umsturz; cf. CM §3, 48 / 8) . Heidegger, meanwhile, uses Husserl 's phenome­nology "as a methodological device" that, this time, leads to Husserl 's "over­throw." To follow von Her rmann : "Thus, Heidegger too seeks to achieve a phenomenological seeing that is independent of phenomenological directions" (von H e r r m a n n 1981, 14). Cf. Walter Biemel 1976, 204-5. Heidegger takes Husserl 's method seriously insofar as his philosophical bracketing includes the bracketing of what he regards to be Husserl 's preconceptions.

42. SuZ, §43a, 202. Cf. SuZ, §43, 206. 43. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Husserl 1981a, 172. 44. As Simon Glendinning states it, "A response by refraining does not

aim to refute skepticism but to undermine the whole fabric of thinking which sustains it as a threat" (Glendinning 1998, 23).

45. Although Heidegger insists that his analysis of the world is "always of subordinate significance" (Zdhringer Seminare, 1 1 0 / 372), it is without d o u b t that he can raise the quest ion of Being only if he succeeds in reframing epis-temology.

C H A P T E R 2

1. This is exemplified in Husserl 's claim that "the world of t ranscendent "res" is entirely referred to consciousness and, more particularly, not to some logically conceived consciousness but to actual consciousness" (Ideen I, §49, 1 1 5 - 1 6 / 9 2 ) .

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 3 - 2 7 187

2. "Consciousness in this sense of the absolute means the priority of sub­jectivity over every objectivity. . . . This determinat ion and conception of con­sciousness is likewise the place where idealism and idealistic inquiry, m o r e precisely idealism in the form of neo-Kantianism, enter into phenomenology" (GA20, § l l c , 145).

3. Marion 1989, 127. Rudolf Boehm makes the same observation and notes that, though no Latin edition of Descartes's Principia can be found in Husserl 's library, the relevant passages are under l ined in Husserl 's copy of J. H. von Kirchmann's translation of Rene Descartes's Phihsophische Werke, Part Three: 'DiePrinzipien derPhilosophie,' Berlin, 1870. Cf. Boehm 1959, 223 n. 41.

4. As Marion explains Husserl 's slight rephrasing of Descartes, "Why? Evidendy, because alia (res) would imply that consciousness was first and fore­most a res. However, Husserl he re precisely under takes to oppose conscious­ness to realitas. Thus, in o rde r to only keep the application of substantiality to the ego, Husserl, in defiance of all philological probity, has to modify that which in Descartes's citation implicitly extends the realitas to the res cogitans" (Marion 1989,127). Cf. GA 20, §10,139.

5. " [T]he adumbra ted is of essential necessity possible only as some­thing spatial (it is spatial precisely in its essence)" (Ideen I, §41,95 / 75-76) . As we shall show later, the adumbra ted (das Abgeschattete) is the characteristic of t ranscendent percept ion (cf. §§16 & 19 below).

6. GA 20, § l l c , 144. Cf. CM, §8, 60 / 22. 7. Ideen I, §46, 109 / 87, emphasis added (originally emphasized in the

1913 edition and in Kersten's translation, note 232). 8. "According to eidetic law it is the case that physical existence is never re­

quired as necessary by the givenness of something physical, but is always in a cer­tain manner contingent. This means: It can always be that the further course of experience necessitates giving u p what has already been posited with a legiti­macy derived from experience. Afterwards one says it was a mere illusion, a hal­lucination, merely a coherent dream, or the like" (Ideen I, §46,108 / 86).

9. Ideen I, §43, 98-99 / 78-79. Indeed, Husserl argues that we should never interpret transcendent perception as a sign or inadequate representa­tion: "The holders of this view are misled by thinking that the transcendence belonging to the spatial physical thing is the transcendence belonging to some­thing depicted or represented by a sign. Frequently the picture-theory is at­tacked with zeal and a sign theory substituted for it. Both theories, however, are not only incorrect bu t countersensical. The spatial physical thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something perceived, given 'in person ' in the manne r peculiar to consciousness. It is not the case that, in its stead, a pic­ture or a sign is given. A picture-consciousness or a sign-consciousness must not be substituted for perception" (ibid.).

10. "A not insignificant influence is exercised in these misinterpretations by the circumstance that one misinterprets the lack of sensuous intuitability. . . . [T]hat which is not intuitable sensuously is unders tood to be a symbolic representative of something hidden, which could become an object of simple sensuous intuition if there were a better intellectual organization; and the models are unders tood to serve as intuited schematic pictures in place of this

188 NOTES TO PAGES 27-30

h idden reality having, accordingly, a function similar to the belonging to the hypothetical drawings of extinct living beings which the paleontologist makes on the basis of meagre Data" (Idem I, §52,129 / 102).

11. "If we are dealing, as here , with the percept ion of a physical thing then it is inherent in its essence to be an adumbrative perception; and, correla-tively, it is inherent in the sense of its intentional object, the physical thing as given in it, to be essentially perceivable only by perceptions of that kind, thus by adumbrative perceptions" (Idem I, §43,100 / 80, emphasis added) .

12. Husserl he re intimates Nietzsche's observation: "We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparen t world p e r h a p s ? . . . But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparen t world!" (1990a, 51). Boehm illustrates this analogy in his excellent article (1962, 171).

13. In LU, we cannot yet find such a strong affirmation of finitude. "What is t rue is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same, whether m e n or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it" (LU, Prol., §36,125; LI, 140). However, even in the Ideen I, Husserl 's account in this respect remains ambiguous. While in general he stresses the impossibility of an existence that is no t constituted by consciousness, we can still find phrases like the following: "Obviously there are physical things and worlds of physical things which do not admit of being definitely demonstrated in any h u m a n experience; but that has purely factual grounds which lie within the factual limits of such ex­per ience" (Ideen I, § 4 8 , 1 1 4 / 9 1 ) .

14. Ideen I, §42,96 / 77. Indeed, the question will be whether Heidegger imitates this radical distinction with his articulation of the ontic-ontological difference between Dasein and entities.

15. "Reality, the reality of the physical thing taken singly and the reality of the whole world, lacks self-sufficiency in virtue of its essence (in our strict sense of the word)" (Ideen I §50, 118 / 93-94) .

16. "Reality is not in itself something absolute which becomes tied sec­ondarily to something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has n o 'absolute essence' whatever; it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only intentional, only an object of consciousness, something presented (Vorstelliges) in the manner peculiar to consciousness, something appa ren t [as appa ren t ] " (Ideen I, §50, 118 / 94).

17. The main criticism of the GA 20 is that Husserl has not asked back into the being of intentionality (cf. GA 20, 178) and has thus forgotten the quest ion of Being. We have dealt with these issues in chapter 1. Heidegger ' s crit ique is curious in view of the fact that before his publication of SuZ, he hardly refers to Husserl 's H u a X. It is, however, in these very lectures that the na tu re of intentionality is clarified. Heidegger observes in the preface to Hus­serl's publication that the significance of these lectures is "the growing, fun­damenta l clarification of intentionality" (Hua X, 367). O n this question see Dahlstrom (1994).

18. As Held puts it: "Intellectual percept ion of phenomenological reflec­tion thus immediately . . . encounters a momen t of experience which with­draws from the desire to grasp it which must be apprehended as an 'original fact'" (Held 1966,23-24) .

N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 1 - 3 3 189

19. "A lived experience is not adumbra ted" (Idem I, §42, 97 / 77). 20. Unfortunately, Husserl is not consistent here . Frequently he refers to

adumbrat ions when describing the na ture of the immanent sphere. 21 . Ideen /, §81,198 / 163. In H u a XVI Husserl repeats this claim, but this

time referring to the "dark abysses of time-consciousness" (Hua XVI, §19,64). 22. As George Heffernan observes, according to Husserl, Descartes's doubt

is not sufficiently radical even to address the problem of transcendence — namely, how can consciousness qua immanence reach the transcendent world? This question becomes meaningful only with the "discovery" of transcendental subjectivity. Indeed, according to Husserl, Descartes cannot even show how a subjective and immanent character of consciousness can have objective and transcendent meaning. To pu t it another way, "the human being existing nat­urally in the world cannot inquire transcendentally" (Heffernan 1997, 119). Moreover, Descartes falls prey to a circular argument. H e needs to show "how any subjective perception can achieve objective validity' (ibid., 123), and this is why he will resort to the idea of God. Husserl thereby takes Descartes to task, "ques­tioning, not only what guarantees that clear and distinct perceptions in partic­ular are true, but also what assures that evidence and truth in general 'correspond'?" (ibid., 130). Descartes cannot answer this question, since he can legitimate evidence only by validating it in terms of evidence again.

23. The question for Descartes is how the continuity of my existence as substance is guaranteed through time: "For a life-span can be divided into countless parts, each completely independen t of the others, so that it does not follow from the fact that I existed a little while ago that I must exist now, unless there is some cause which as it were creates me afresh at this moment—that is, which preserves me" (Descartes 1986, 33).

24. These were published, however, only in 1928, fifteen years after the publication of Ideen I.

25. "The efforts of the author concerning this enigma, and which were in vain for a long time, were brought to a conclusion in 1905 with respect to what is essential; the results were communicated in lectures at the University of G6t-tingen" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163 n. 1 [n. 26 in trans.]) . Boehm notes that, al­though Husserl argues in Ideen / t ha t the lectures were brought to a conclusion in 1905, "There is a shift of perspective in Husserl 's recollection. . . . In t ruth 'The efforts of the author concerning this enigma, and which were in vain for a long t ime' were 'b rought to a conclusion' only a round 1909" (Boehm 1962, xxxi). The actual Vorlesungen zur Phdnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, which were collated by Edith Stein and formally edited by Martin Heidegger, refer to a large extent to later writings dating u p to 1917. Even the first par t of these lectures, dated 1905 —"Die Vorlesungen iiber das innere Zeitbe-wusstsein aus dem Jahre 1905" (see contents page) —are actually of a later or­igin. As Boehm observes: "Only a few sections of the 'First Part ' of the 1928 publication date back to 1905. The majority date back to the years 1907 to 1911 and even to 1917" (Boehm's introduction to H u a X, xxiii). Although Heidegger is the formal editor of the "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins" (Hua X) (published in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung 9 [1928]: 367-499) , it needs to be no ted that

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Heidegger did no t encourage Husserl to publish these lectures (as it is often maintained); ra ther , Husserl himself asked Heidegger to edit his lectures af­ter Heidegger told him that he intended to dedicate SuZ to Husserl (cf. Boehm's introduct ion to H u a X, xxiii-xxiv). Fur the rmore , to Husserl 's dis­may, Heidegger merely under took some stylistic alterations, while the collat­ing and editing was per formed by Husserl 's assistant, Edith Stein. Boehm cites a letter from Husserl to Roman Ingarden dated 13 July 1928 in which he ex­presses his disappointment with regard to Heidegger ' s effort: "Jahrbuchs-band , Volume IX, 500 pages is nearing completion. It contains my Vorlesungen iiber inneres ZeitbewuBtsein von 1905, including appendices unal tered, apar t from a few stylistic changes in t roduced by Heidegger who edi ted this volume. I was not even sent the proofs" (cited ibid., xxiv n. 2).

26. John Barnett Brough awkwardly translates Ablaufsphanomene as "running-off phenomena" (Hua X, §10, 27 / 388); "flowing phenomena" would be a m o r e suitable translation in this context.

27. "Brentano speaks of a law of original association according to which representations of a momentary memory attach themselves to the percep­tions of the moment . . . . When Brentano speaks of the acquisition of the fu­ture , he distinguishes between the original intuition of time, which according to h im is the creation of original association, and the extended intuition of time, which also derives from phantasy but not from original association" ( H u a X , §6, 1 5 - 1 6 / 3 7 9 ) .

28. Brentano, according to Husserl, thus opposes memory or memorial presentat ion to perception. It follows that when I hear a melody I actually per­ceive only a single note at any one time. What Brentano calls memoria l pre­sentation Husserl will call ' retent ion ' (see below).

29. "Das originare Zeitfeld" (Hua X, §11, 31 / 391). 30. "Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to

the law of modification" (Hua X, §11, 29 / 390). 31 . "What 'individual' means here is the original temporal form of sensa­

tion, or, as I can also pu t it, the temporal form of original sensation, here of the sensation belonging to the current now-point and only to this" (Hua X, § 3 1 , 6 7 / 4 2 3 ) .

32. The momentary act "is not the percept ion of the temporal object; on the contrary it is an abstractum" (Hua X, no. 29, 227).

33. Indeed, as Kern points out: "The most significant of Kant's discoveries according to Husserl was his doctrine of synthesis" (Kern 1964, 247).

34. The problem for Husserl was that Kant accounted only for an active synthesis: "Husserl always unders tood Kant's 'synthesis' as creative or produc­tive" (Kern 1964, 257). It should therefore not surprise us that Husserl em­phasizes the A version of Kant's transcendental deduction. In the Idem I, Husserl pays the following tribute to Kant: "Thus, for example, the transcen­dental deduct ion in the first edition of the KRV, was actually operat ing inside the realm of phenomenology" (Idem I, §62, 148 / 119). The A version of the transcendental deduct ion is also emphasized in his later writings (cf. Krisis, §28, 106). We can assume that Husserl, like Heidegger later, focuses on the A version of the transcendental deduction because in it the gulf between intui-

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tion and unders tanding is reduced through the function of the transcenden­tal imagination (cf. Heidegger ' s Kantbuch, especially §31).

35. From 1909 onward Husserl increasingly uses the terms retention and protention ra ther than primary remembrance and primary expectation. He also em­ploys the term primal impression or primal sensation ra ther than novyperception. O u r analysis focuses mostly on these later versions of the text.

36. Although Husserl refers to protent ion frequently in the text, the core analysis centers a round retention. We shall turn specifically to the nature of protent ion later in the analysis.

37. William James referred to the extension of the presence long before Husserl: "The practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle back" (William James, The Principles of Psychology,\o\. 1 [New York: Dover Pub­lications, 1890], 609, cited by Brough in the introduction to his translation of H u a X [xxviii] and by Rudolf Bernet in his introduction to Husserl 's Texte zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), ed. Rudolf Bernet [Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1985], xxii n. 1). According to Bernet, Husserl read William James as early as 1891 or 1892, and especially in 1894; that is, at the time when he worked on H u a X. It is therefore most likely that his inter­pretat ion of the ' ex tended ' presence has its source in James (cf. Bernet, ibid.). Indeed, Husserl himself refers to William James 's concept of ' fr inges ' in H u a X (appendix I, 151).

38. Levinas's notion of trace finds its origin in this analysis. The funda­mental difference is that Husserl argues that re tent ion is possible only if it is p receded by an impression, while Levinas believes that the trace is always al­ready in the past and has never been present. Both, however, point to an ap­pearing without a content, an intention without an intentum (cf. the last three essays in D E H H ) .

39. And therefore atomistic psychologism. 40. Cf. H u a X, §11, 45 / 405; §19, 32 / 391, no. 12, 34. O n the nature of

the temporal extendedness of experience, see also Miller 1982. 41 . "Retentional consciousness really contains consciousness of the past

of the tone, primary memory of the tone, and must not be divided into sensed tone and apprehension as memory" (Hua X, §12, 32 / 393).

42- "It must be bo rne clearly in mind that the Data of sensation which ex­ercise the function of adumbrat ions of color, of smoothness, of shape, etc. (the function of 'presentation') are, of essential necessity, entirely different from color simpliciter, smoothness simpliciter, shape simpliciter, and, in short, from all kinds of moments belonging to physical things. The adumbra­tion, though called by the same name, of essential necessity is not of the same genus as the one to which the adumbra ted belongs. The adumbra t ing is a lived experience. But a lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as something spatial. However, the adumbra ted is of essential neces­sity possible only as something spatial" (Ideen I, §41, 94-95 / 75).

43. "Both the inner temporal object and the experiencing of an inner temporal object are thus assimilative wholes, not disjunctive and exclusive as spatial objects are" (Sokolowski 1974, chapter 6, §62,164). Within all Husserl's systematic!ty, a peculiar Nietzschean m o m e n t suddenly seems to erupt .

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44. "Formlose Stoffe und stofflose Formen" {Ideen I, §85, 209 / 173). 45. A dualism exists between feeling and thought that maps the distinc­

tion between non-intentional and intentional lived experiences. Thus, we need to differentiate between hyle, the formless stuff, and noesis, the intentional mo­ment , In LU Husserl already refers to them as non-intentional Erlebnisse: "That not all experiences are intentional is proved by sensations and sensa­tional complexes. Any piece of a sensed visual field, full as it is of visual con­tents, is an experience containing many part-contents, which are nei ther referred to, nor intentionally objective, in the whole" (LU V, §10, 382 / 83; LI, 5 5 6 ) . C f . L U V , § 1 5 b .

46. "Primary contents are at all times bearers of rays of apprehension, and they do not occur without such rays, however indeterminate the latter may be" (Hua X, appendix III, 105 / 456).

47. Merleau-Ponty 1962,152. Eugen Fink makes an analogous claim: "In truth, however, there is no dualism of heterological moments in the phenomenological idea of constitution bu t only relative strata within the unified constitutive dis­closure of the world's origin from within the depths of the transcendental subject's life. Both the hyle, which is first exhibited as the act's nonintentional moment , and the totality-form of the act itself are constituted within the depths of the intentional self-constitution of phenomenological time, a con­stitution which, however, does not proceed by means of acts" (Fink 1966,136-37).

48. "We already suggested above, when we characterized the stream of lived experiences as a unity of consciousness, that intentionality, disregarding its enigmatic forms and levels, is also like a universal med ium which ultimately bears in itself all lived experiences, even those which are not themselves char­acterized as intentive. At the level of consideration to which we are confined until further notice, a level which abstains from descending into the obscure depths of the ultimate consciousness which constitutes all such temporality as belongs to lived experiences, and instead takes lived experiences as they offer themselves as unitary temporal processes in reflection on what is immanent , we must, however, essentially distinguish two things: 1. all the lived experi­ences designated in the Logische Untersuchungen as 'pr imary contents ' ; 2. the lived experiences or their moments which bear in themselves a specific trait of intentionality" {Ideen 7, §85, 207-8 / 171-2, emphasis added) .

49. Shortly before 1928 Husserl notes in his "critical remarks" (Text-kritische Anmerkungen) to §88 of Ideen I: "It is not until p . 199 [of the English translation] that it is said in passing that 'noesis' signifies the same thing as 'concrete-complete intentive lived experience, ' with 'emphasis on its noetic components . ' Thus the hyletic moments belong to the noesis in so far as they bear the functions of intentionality, undergo sense-bestowal, help constitute a concrete noematic sense. But this must be stated earlier with corresponding seriousness. I myself have vacillated before in distinguishing noetic and hy­letic moments" {Ideen /, §88, 218 / 181 n. 2) . This passage is cited also by Sokolowski (1964, 180).

50. "Consciousness is nothing without impression" (Hua X, appendix I, 1 0 0 / 4 5 1 ) .

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51 . Indeed the following passage added to the 1928 edition appears to confirm our suspicions: " 'Sensed' would then be the indication of a relational concept that in itself would signify nothing about whether what is sensed is sensual — indeed, about whether it is immanent at all in the sense of what is sen­sual. In o ther words, it would remain open whether what is sensed is itself al­ready constituted and perhaps entirely different from the sensual. — But this whole distinction is best left aside; not every constitution has the schema: apprehension-content-apprehension" (Hua X, §1, 7, n. 7, emphasis added) .

52. Derr ida 1973, 65-66. Cf. pp . 83-85. 53. I am adhering to Marion's critique of Derrida. Marion argues that

Derr ida 's reading of Husserl 's phenomenology as a "metaphysics of pres­ence" is too narrow. Derr ida is concerned only with the Urimpression, which never appears and therefore fails to acknowledge that Husserl enlarges the present: "Paradoxially, Derr ida 's interpretat ion is not radical enough (by as­suming that the significance lies in the rup tu re with the presence and thus is outside of metaphysics), since this reading relies upon a too limited under­standing of the presence which lacks the depth of a truly Husserlian dona­tion" (Marion 1989, 56; see especially chapter 1, 11-63).

54. Since we are reading the H u a X in relation to Ideen I, it is impor tant to no te that Husserl acknowledges the importance of Kant to phenomenology in Ideen I: "Thus, for example, the transcendental deduct ion in the first edi­tion of the KRV was actually operat ing inside the realm of phenomenology" (Ideen I, §62, 148 / 119). Husserl, however, at this stage still reads the deduc­tion in psychologist!c terms, for he continues: "But Kant misinterpreted that realm as psychological and therefore he himself abandoned it" (ibid.). As Kern observes, we have to r e m e m b e r to read Husserl 's interpretat ion "in the context of Natorp 's interpretat ion of Kant and his conception of philosophi­cal psychology" (Kern 1964, 194). Although H u a X needs to be read as a re­sponse to Meinong and Brentano, we believe that the sections written after 1907 indicate Kantian influences, as the next section on the na ture of the tran­scendental consciousness will explain. However, the aim of this analysis is not to follow Husserl 's reading of Kant—which has been already investigated by Kern (ibid.)—but to clarify Husserl 's thought by drawing on Kant. Kockel-mans gives a short overview of the gradual shift in Husserl 's thinking from an empiricist conception derived from Brentano to the Kantian conception of the pure ego and Natorp 's interpretat ion of Kant (Kockelmans 1977).

55. This is against the observation of Aron Gurwitsch, who sides with Husserl 's critique of Kant. For Gurwitsch, Kant, together with the empiricist tradition in m o d e r n philosophy, confuses sense data or psychic facts {Emp-findungen) with sensible qualities in the object as presented (Gurwitsch 1966, 158). According to Kern, Husserl read mainly the first edition of Kant's KRV between 1907 and 1909: "Almost th roughout Husserl uses the Kahrbach edi­tion which is based on the A version" (Kern 1964, 30). Whether this is due to the fact that he had only the first edition at hand or whether we need to at­tribute a greater significance to it, we leave uninvestigated. O u r account of the transcendental object = X is, however, strongly based on the A version. The A version deals with what Allison calls the "'weighty' sense of object"

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(Allison 1983,147), which is concerned with the conditions of representat ion of an object, in contrast to the B version, which is concerned with the objective validity of the unity of apperception. When we turn to the 'status' of the tran­scendental subject, below, we shall draw on the B version.

56. To follow Henry Allison's reading of the status of the transcendental object = x: "The transcendental question therefore concerns the conscious­ness of this necessity, i.e., how its 'sense' arises in consciousness. This immedi­ately shifts the discussion from the empirical-realistic to the transcendentally idealistic standpoint" (Allison 1975, 151). Allison in this text continues to show the extent to which Kant can be read as a phenomenologist .

57. Brough makes a similar point when he argues: "The now is not a thing in any sense. It is ra ther a m o d e of appearance" (Brough 1989, 257).

58. H u a X, §16,40 / 400. The not-now here refers to the na ture of reten­tion. Husserl continues: "And to this corresponds the continuous transition of percept ion into primary memory" (ibid.). This passage was composed in 1905, which explains why Husserl still refers to the not-now and primary re­membrance ra ther than retention. Husserl started employing the term reten­tion only from 1909 onward. We are keeping to the later terminology and will use the term retention throughout , since the term not-now still suggests a rup­ture with the present.

59. Cf. Levinas's essay, "Intentionalite et Sensation," in DEHH, esp. 155-56. 60. Retention does not make present something that is not; neither is it a

re-presentation or a signification. As Husserl emphasizes in his lectures on H u a XI: "It is dangerous to refer to a representing or represented, to an inter­pretat ion of sense-data or even on the basis of such an ' interpretat ion' to refer to an outward directedness. To be adumbrated, or manifested as sensory-data is completely different to the interpretation of signs" (Hua XI, §4,17) .

61 . It is Yvonne Picard who reads Husserl 's account of time in terms of a Hegelian dialectic (cf. Picard 1946, 99 or 111-12). This extremely sensitive and thought-provoking reading of Heidegger and Husserl on the question of t ime was published in 1947, after her death. Picard was engaged in the French resistance movement and died dur ing deportat ion. Levinas pays her the fol­lowing tribute: "Cf. on the whole problem of t ime and intentionality—see the detailed study published in Deucalion in 1947. Yvonne Picard's thesis for the Diplome d 'e tudes superieures must have been written dur ing the first years of occupation. This text notably shows the significance of appendix V of H u a X. By following the path opened up byJean-Wahl it is one of the first at tempts that vigorously rethinks Husserl 's detailed analysis. Picard thus prefigures the thinking of Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Derrida. It compares Husserl and Heidegger , and Heidegger does not always have the final word. Yvonne Pi­card died during deporta t ion because of her involvement with the French re­sistance movement; her descent cannot be the cause of her martyrdom. We wish to pay her our reverent homage—eternally—by evoking he r thought and thus allowing her dead lips to move" (DEHH, 156). Picard is also paid homage by Held (1966, 45 n. 2) .

62. For Husserl, recollection (Erinnerung) is the pr imordial form of ob-jectification (ursprunglicheForm der Vergegenwdrtigung).

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63. "The time in recollection, of course, is also given as oriented in each moment of the memory; but each point presents an objective time-point that can be identified again and again. . . . I have an original schema: a flow with its content. But I have in addition an original multiplicity of the 'I can': I can shift back to any position in the flow and produce it 'once again'" (Hua X, ap­pendix IV, 108-9 / 460-61).

64. It is not that recollection simply draws on an even more distant past; rather, remembrance has no concrete immediate impression. There is a structural difference, for while retention is constantly modified and turned into a retention of second order, in recollection the whole perception is given. Objective time does not sink back; is not a temporal event but a static object remembered.

65. As Held observes: "Thereby he has dropped the sensuous construc­tion of a pure stream of consciousness which is based on pre-given, quantified hyletic data, but not the idea that the unity that maintains the stream at stand­still is something like an 'originary impulse' as a pre-figuration of any deter­minant content whatsoever. (Husserl himself alludes to Fichte's notion of an 'incomprehensible impulse' in Hua IX, p. 287)"( Held 1981, 199 & n. 25).

66. The 'width' or 'extent' of the temporal field varies depending on the intensity of our reflective regard. Husserl tellingly uses terms such as the aging and fading of a tone and the wakening of the new tone. Factually and psycho­logically Husserl admits that retentions do not extend very far (cf. Hua X, ap­pendix II, 153). However, Husserl does not exclude the possibility that we could, in principle, have an infinitely large retentive field "and idealiter a con­sciousness is probably even possible in which everything remains preserved retentionally" (Hua X, §11, 31 / 391 n. 1). Cf. Held 1966, 27, and 1981, 205.

67. "We say of the elapsed extent that it is intended in retentions;... And the situation is the same after the whole duration has elapsed: what lies near­est to the actually present now, depending on its distance from it, perhaps has a little clarity; the whole [then] disappears into obscurity, into an empty re-tentional consciousness, and finally disappears altogether (if one is permitted to assert that) as soon as retention ceases" (Hua X, §9, 26 / 387).

68. Barnett Brough, introduction to his translation of Hua X, xxiii. 69. "Consciousness is a perpetual Heraclitean flux" (Hua X, No. 51, 349). 70. "In itself every lived experience is a flux of becoming" (Ideen I, §78,

182/149) . 71. As Held points out, "the 'now' is a transitional continuum and thus

not originally border, but number. This is already how Aristode has defined time" (Held 1981, 200).

72. Husserl points to this reversal of direction in relation to remem­brance and expectation: "To that extent, the intuition belonging to expecta­tion is memorial intuition turned upside down, for in memory's case the intentions aimed at the now do not 'precede' the event but follow after it" (Hua X, §26, 55-56/413) .

73. A similar argument is developed by Donald Davidson in his 1974 arti­cle "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (Davidson 1984,183-99).

74. It is exactly this claim that "there can be no experience of a first (last)

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temporal event" that leads Heidegger to affirm that time is essentially finite. Cf. chapter 4 and Merlan (1947).

75. Yvonne Picard argues that, while Husserl 's not ion of t ime and there­fore future is dialectical in relation to the present, Heidegger prioritizes the future non-dialectically (Picard 1946, 95-124). Cf. chapter 4, §74.

76. Indeed, the most crucial passages to which we refer date from 1911. As Boehm notes in the critical edition H u a X, this third section of analysis, which is concerned with the question of constitution—the Time-Constituting Flow ( § § 3 5 - 3 9 ) - d a t e s from 1911 or after. "The text of §§ 35-39 from this point on is based on the text of a sketch that probably did not originate before the end of 1911. The sketch is completely r ep roduced in its original form (to the extent that it has been preserved) as No. 54 in the supplementary texts" (Hua X, §35, 73 n. 4) .

77. Fink interprets Heraclitus's Fragment 30 in the following way: "The nvp dei^coov is nei ther like a process within time, nor is it comparable with the way in which Kant describes the world matter, namely, as the substrate of an always subsisting time. What Heraclitus he re calls 'fire' is no t in time but time as 'letting time be" ' (Eugen Fink in "Martin Heidegger—Eugen Fink: Heraklit" in GA 15, 95 / 97).

78. MSB 1,14, XIII, 27 (1933), cited by Held (1966, 87 n. 2). ["Schaudert uns nicht vor diesen Tiefen? Wer hat sie j e ernstlich zum systematischen T h e m a gemacht in den Jahr tausenden der Vergangenheit , wer hat an die er-sten Reflexionen eines Augustin anknupfend an den Weg zu den, Mut tern ' sein Leben gewagt?"]

79. H u a VIII, appendix XXI, 442. ["Das 'gegeniiber ' d e m Weltlich-Re-alen als 'bloB subjektiv' —obschon schon transzendental —subjektiv—zu Bezeichnende ist selbst wieder Konstituiertes, obschon n u n nicht m e h r als real, das Konstituierende seinerseits wieder . . . Man muB den Mut haben, selbst wo Regresse 'd rohen , ' zu sagen, was man sieht, und es in seiner Evidenz gelten lassen. Die Medusen sind nur dem gefahrlich, der an sie im voraus glaubt und sie furchtet. Es mogen hier zunachst Ratsel iibrig bleiben, aber es sind eben Ratsel, unlosbare Ratsel sind Widersinn."]

80. These passages were written in 1910. As the translator Brough notes, "Rudolf Bernet has . . . located the original manuscripts for §§42-45; they bear the date: '21.2.1910'" (Hua X, §42, 88 n. 1).

81 . "The entire phenomenology I had in view in the Logical Investiga­tions was the phenomenology of experience in the sense of data of internal consciousness; and this, in any event, is a closed f ie ld . . . . Thus it is unders tood why I could identify sensing and the content of sensation in the Logical Inves­tigations. If I moved within the boundaries of internal consciousness, then naturally there was no sensing there but only something sensed" (Hua X, ap­pendix XVII, 127-28 / 482) /

82. "But in every case—and not only in the case of continuous change—the consciousness of otherness, of differentness, presupposes a unity. Something endur ing must be there in the variation and in the change as well, something that makes u p the identity of that which changes or that which undergoes a variation" (Hua X, §41, 87 / 440).

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83. However, we have to remember that Hua X has to be read as a response to Meinong and Brentano, and does not deal with Kant directly. Indeed, Husserl refers to Kant only in a handwritten marginalia (cf. Hua X, No. 35 n. 16). How­ever, the significance of Kant is acknowledged in Idem I (cf. §36 below).

84. "But this p e r m a n e n t cannot be an intuition in me. For all g rounds of determinat ion of my existence which are to be met within m e are representa­tions; and as representat ions themselves require a pe rmanen t distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so my existence in the time wherein they change, may be determined" (KRV, Bxxxix and B276).

85. This coincides with the time when he developed the idea of phenome­nology as a transcendental philosophy. The transcendental reduct ion was first in t roduced in 1907 in H u a II. Biemel, however, in his introduct ion to H u a II (p. viii), notes that the initial idea of the reduct ion can already be found in the Seefeld papers, dated summer 1905: "We can already find a first attempt at the idea of the reduction in the so called Seefeld papers of the summer 1905, (Sig­nature : A VII 25)." Kern believes that Kant played a much more significant role after H u a II. "In fact there is a great deal of evidence that after his decisive lectures in the summer semester of 1907 that Husserl worked intensively on Kant" (Kern 1964, 29-30) .

86. Idem I, §57, 138 / 109 n 7. Cf. Kern 1964, 41 . 87. Emmanue l Levinas, "Intentionalite et Sensation," in DEHH, 154. 88. "This p rephenomena l , p r e immanen t temporality becomes consti­

tuted intentionally as the form of the time-constituting consciousness and in it itself' (Hua X, §39, 83 / 436).

89. As Husserl says, "What matters to m e here is only to lift the veil a little from this world of time-consciousness, so rich in mystery, that u p until now has been h idden from us" (Hua X, No. 39, 276).

90. "Dogma von der Momentanei tat eines BewuBtseinsganzen" (Hua X, §7, 20 / 383 ). This is a phrase Husserl adopts from "William Stern: Psychische Prasenzzeit" (psychic presence-time), in Zeitschrifi fir Psychologie und Physiolo-gie der SinnesorganeXIII (1897): 325-49 (ibid., n. 2; n. 3 in the translation). Boehm provides the full citation: " 'Dogma of the momentar iness of a whole of consciousness or, in other words, of the necessary isochronism of its mem­bers ' is found on p . 330 f. of this article. — Cf. also William Stern: Psychologie der Veranderungsauffassung [Psychology of the apprehension of change] (Breslau, 1898)" (ibid., n. 2) .

91 . Emmanuel Levinas, "Rupture de 1'immanence" in DQVT, 1982, 53. 92. H u a X, no. 20, 192. Brough (1989) emphasizes the same issue. The

particular passage is cited on pp . 283-84. 93. Barnett Brough translates Ldngsintentionalitdt as horizontal intentional-

ity. Here , however, James S. Churchill 's chosen translation, longitudinal inten-tionality, seems m o r e appropria te . Cf. James S. Churchill 's translation of H u a X , 1 0 7 - 8 .

94. "The unity of a tone-duration, for example, becomes constituted in the flow, but the flow itself becomes constituted in turn as the unity of the con­sciousness of the tone-duration" (Hua X, §39, 80 / 434).

95. As Brough observes, "There is a kind of fissure between my acts, my

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sensory experiences and the marginal awareness of them that I continually possess. This is the abiding character of the life of consciousness itself over against the implicitly recognized transitory character of any one act of con­sciousness or state of mind" (Brough 1977, 94).

96. MS C7 II, 12 (1932), cited by Held (1966, 70). ["'Urphanomen,' in dem alles, was sonst Phanomen heiBen mag, in welchem Sinne immer, seine Quelle hat. Es ist die stehende-stromende Selbstgegenwart bzw. das sich selbst stromend gegenwartige absolute Ich <!> in seinem stehend-stromenden Leben."]

97. Boehm (the editor of Hua X) notes that the word retention was added later.

98. MS C21,5 (1931), cited by Sokolowski (1974, §60,158 n. 19). The full citation reads: "All these expressions, which involve the words temporaliza-tion [Zeitigung], time, world, and also object, when they are not mundanely used, have a sense that first comes out when the transcendental-reductive method is systematically exercised; and so their sense is completely foreign to the natural language" (ibid.). Cf. Hua X, no. 54, 371.

99. Nietzsche 1978, §1341,476. ["Zeitiosigkeitund Sukzession vertragen sich miteinander, sobald der Intellekt weg ist!"]

100. Idem 7, §50, 119 / 94; the translator Kersten adds this in note 28. 101. What Sartre will come to call the pre-reflexive consciousness. 102. "Perception has its own form of intentionality which has nothing in it

of the active attitude of the T or its constitutive activity" (Hua XI, §14, 54). 103. Reflection on lived experiences. 104. Heidegger will show that there is another form of disclosure that

neither is based on the perceptual model, nor has its starting point in a punc­tual now. Being in the world as a whole is disclosed through Stimmungen (cf. chapter 4, §71 &.).

105. "La trace de Vautre" in DEHH, 156. 106. Husserl in this text does not refer to the phenomenon of life as such

but to the fact that history is a necessary precondition for radical philosophi­cal reflection. Yet this is founded on the fact that Husserl realizes that it is im­possible to return to this absolute beginning. Landgrebe makes a similar observation. However he does not refer to Hua X, but to Husserl's later lec­tures in Hua VIII (1923-1924). The Krisis is not a break with Husserl's earlier beginnings but is rather the consequence of a program dedicated to an ulti­mate establishing of philosophical truth upon "absolute experience" (Land-grebe 1981b, 98).

107. Landgrebe uses this expression to describe this unconscious surren­der (Landgrebe 1981b, 98).

108. Cf. chapter 4, §74ff.

CHAPTER 3

1. From Denise Souche-Dagues, who compiled Husserl's marginalia in his copy of SuZ, we know that Husserl always felt misunderstood when Heidegger referred to a "worldless I": "Every time Husserl read terms such as

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"worldless T " in Heidegger 's writings he is correct in believing it refers to himself (he notes objection [Einwand]). But he considers it to be based upon a distortion of his thinking, which is the result of a linguistic deviation. This in his eyes is unjustified and unjustifiable. In o the r words, the deliberate use of a Heideggerian text in any other register than that of transcendental phe­nomenology is challenged by Husserl, because he considers the results of the existential analytic to be identical with those of phenomenology, bu t deprived of the r igour which the me thod of constitution ensures" (Souche-Dagues 1993, 125), Cf. Husserl 1994.

2. "It [the reduct ion] disregards not only reality bu t also any particular individuation of lived experiences. It disregards the fact that the acts are mine or those of any other individual h u m a n being and regards them only in their what. It regards the what, the structure of the acts" (GA20, §12, 151).

3. "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel," second version, in H u a IX, 274 n. 1. Cf. Biemel 1977. As Sheehan reports , this critique originated eight years before the publication of SuZ: "In a recently discovered letter of J u n e 20,1919, from one H e r r Walter of Freiburg to Professor Pfander, we find that . . . Heidegger was openly criticizing the transcendental ego in Husserl. Walter repor ts that at one of the Saturday-morning discussions which Husserl was accustomed to have at his home , the young Doctors Ebbinghaus and Heidegger launched a 'campaign against the pure ego '" (Sheehan 1979, 199).

4. In this manner , David R. Cerbone claims, Heidegger affirms not only a h u m a n standpoint, but "one might say, a worlded one" (Cerbone 1994, 419).

5. Henr i Birault makes a similar point: "Heidegger . . . replaces an in­tentional conception of t ranscendence with a transcendental conception of intentionality" (Birault 1978, 492). Cf. chapter 4, "From ' Immanen t Tran­scendence ' to 'Transcendent Immanence , ' " §68 ff.

6. Zdhringer Seminare, 123 / 385. A literal translation would be "displace­men t of location."

7. As we know from his recendy published lectures, Phdnomenologie der Anschauung (1920): "The 'Ego' is a source of problems only for a problematic governed th roughout by the idea of constitution. Therefore the starting-point has its sense only in the idea of constitution. The 'Ego' as source of problems, as the g round of all givenness is the 'I think' which must be capable of accom­panying all consciousness. In this way, the 'Ego' maintains the quite determi­nate role it has been assigned, which is decisive and original, namely, that of basis for all constitution within consciousness of every manifold" (GA 59,15b, 131-32).

8. Cf. SuZ, §10, 46. 9. 'Nachwort ' in Ideen III, 146 / 556, emphasis added.

10. Indeed, in 1954 Heidegger believes that Schopenhauer ' s famous dic­tum epitomizes m o d e r n philosophy: " 'The world is my representat ion. ' In this sentence Schopenhauer has summed u p the thought of recent philoso­phy" (WhD, 15 / 39, translation slightly a l tered) .

11. The subject is "£G)OV Xoyov £#ov and this is In terpre ted to mean an animal rationale, something living which has reason" (SuZ, §10, 48).

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12. As Leibniz has already argued: "The fundamental principle of reason­ing is that there is nothing without a reason; or, to explain the matter m o r e dis­tinctly, that there is no truth for which a reason does not subsist" (Leibniz 1973,172).

13. SuZ, §4,12, emphasis added. 14. SuZ (Randbemerkungen) , 12d,440. 15. "Implicitly" insofar as Husserl is not ment ioned by name in this

section. 16. This citation continues, emphasizing that it is only because of its fail­

u re to raise the question of Being that "idealism is no less naive in its me thod than the most grossly militant realism" (SuZ, §43a, 208). Idealism thus has the potential to express an unders tanding of the differentiation between Being and beings by positing that consciousness cannot be explained th rough a re­course to reality, a potential which is denied to realism. "If what the term 'ide­alism' says, amounts to the understanding that Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is ' t ranscendental ' for every entity, then ide­alism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic" (SuZ, §43a, 208, emphasis added) .

17. It is in his lecture course, Die Grundbegriffe derMetaphysik (GA 29 / 30), that Heidegger develops the distinctions between man, animals, and things. While SuZ brackets the question of animals and is interested only in the dis­tinction between Dasein and beings of another character than its own (what Husserl calls the world of things [Dingwelt]), in these lectures Heidegger ad­dresses the status of animals directly and distinguishes between three kinds of beings: 1) h u m a n Dasein, which is world-forming (tueltbildend), 2) animal Dasein, which is ' poor in world' (weltarm), and 3) things, which are worldless (weltlos). In these sections it is without question that Heidegger does not wish to give way to a biological determinism, nor to a vague experience of life, bu t wishes to uphold a distinctiveness of human Dasein. The significance of this analysis is that the difference between poverty and wealth is not one of degree . Heidegger argues for a deprivation of world (Entbehrung) that is peculiar to animals and not to things, and that should not be read as a m o m e n t of inferi­ority. The aim is to avoid an anthropocentr ism (that is still implicit in SuZ), yet at the same time to maintain a structure of differentiation. This complex s t ructure of differentiation without hierarchization has been well illustrated by Derr ida (1987, chapter 6). Despite this differentiation Michel Haar be­lieves that Heidegger remains within the humanist tradition, for the aim is not to become a creature (cf. GA 54, 229, cited by Haar 1993, 31). O u r analysis he re will remain within the framework of SuZ, and thus will bracket the ques­tion of the Being of animals.

18. In his later writings Heidegger addresses the significance of language directly, admitting: "The capacity to speak distinguishes the h u m a n being as a h u m a n being. . . . Man would not be man if it were denied him to speak— ceaselessly, ubiquitously, with respect to all things, in manifold variations, yet for the most par t tacitly—by way of an 'It is.' Inasmuch as language grants this very thing, the essence of man consists in language" ("Der Weg zur Sprache," 1959, in UzS, 241; GA 12, 229; BW, 397-98). The h idden agenda of SuZ is the

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relation between Being and language, which, however, remains in the back­ground. "I only know one thing: because reflection on language, and on Be­ing, has de te rmined my path of thinking from early on, therefore their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background. The fundamental flaw of the book Being and Time is perhaps that it ventured forth far too early" ("Aus einem Gesprach von der Sprache; Zwischen einem Japane r u n d einem Fragenden," 1953/54, in UzS, 93; GA 12, 88-89; OWL, 7). For more on lan­guage and SuZ, please see the appendix.

19. Many of the terms that are used to characterize the distinctiveness of Dasein are indeed related to language use: Reference (Verweisung), sign (Zei-cheri), significance (Bedeutsamkeit), unders tanding (Verstehen), Interpretat ion (Austegung), discourse (Rede), Language (Sprache), or assertion (Aussage).

20. "If to In terpre t the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question. But in that case the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendencyof-Being which belongs to Dasein itself — the preontological unders tanding of Being" (SuZ, §4, 14-15).

21 . This is well illustrated by Sallis (1986). 22. As Heidegger writes to Husserl: "It has to be shown that Dasein's

m o d e of Being is totally different from that of all other beings and that, as the m o d e of Being it is, it precisely contains in itself the possibility of transcenden­tal constitution" (Brief, 601 / 119E).

23. This leads Cristina Lafont to argue: "With this 'distinctiveness' which guarantees the basis for the equation of the difference between Being/beings and the dichotomy Dase in /and beings of another character than Dasein, the subject-object schema is already structurally adopted" (Lafont 1994, 44). However, the distinctiveness of Dasein lies in its diversity, which cannot be compared with the unitary starting point of the transcendental subject. Cf. chapter 4, §77ff. Moreover, Heidegger believes that Dasein's distinctiveness exceed the subject-object dualism insofar as the language of 'essence ' or 'sub­stance' does no t pertain to Dasein. Dasein has to be described in terms of its 'existential analytic'. In other words, we should not refer to two distinct sub­stances since Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is no t a thing (res) or substance.

24. "Dasein also possesses—as constitutive for its understanding of existence — an unders tanding of the Being of all entities of a character o ther than its own" (SuZ, §4, 13).

25. "Only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an unders tanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there ' Being" (SuZ, §43c, 212). This sentence should not be unders tood as a 'subjectification of Being'. Cf. §77ff.

26. Heidegger later realizes that SuZ's starting point remains too much en­twined with the tradition (which seeks its starting point in the reflective sub­ject) . Questioning cannot be the beginning of thinking: "The authentic attitude of thinking is not a putting of questions—rather, it is a listening to the address, the promise of what is to be pu t in question. But in the history of our thinking, asking questions has since the early days been regarded as the characteristic

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procedure of thinking, and not without good cause. Thinking is m o r e thoughtful in p ropor t ion as it takes a more radical stance, as it goes to the ra­dix, the root of all that is." ("Das Wesen der Sprache," 1957-58, in UzS, 175; OWL, 71). Questioning itself is the "'piety of thinking"' (ibid., UzS, 175; OWL, 72). For what precedes any questioning is that we are "addressed by the voice of Being" ("Nachwort zu: »Was ist Metaphysik?«" 1943, in Wegmarken, 103 / 305; Heidegger 1975b, 261). This thought, al though intimated in Heidegger ' s t rea tment of the call of conscience, remains relatively undevel­o p e d in SuZ. Jean-Luc Marion has convincingly shown how Dasein's existen­tial analytic still intimates a self-constituting ego and thus represents the last heir to the tradition (cf. Marion 1996).

27. However, it is important to keep in mind that the world Heidegger has in mind has nothing in common with Husserl 's definition of the transcen­den t world. Indeed, Heidegger will also bracket the t ranscendent world. H e will write it in quotat ion marks. As we shall show below and in chapter 4, the existential structure of the world should never be confused with the catego-rial unders tanding of the world. It refers nei ther to the totality of entities which are present-at-hand nor to the Being of those entities, be it the world of mathematics or biology. Rather these ontic and ontologico categorial defini­tions of the 'world' 'pass over' the existential unders tanding of the world, which refers to the world wherein Dasein lives (the ontic-existentiell structure) and the worldhood of the world (the ontologico-existential s t ructure) . Cf. SuZ, §14, 65.

28. As Heidegger explains in his self-appraisal: "The foundation of funda­menta l ontology is no foundation upon which something could be built, n o fundamentum inconcussum, bu t rather a fundamentum concussum" (ZSD, 34; 32E). This leads Heidegger to d rop the term fundamental ontology al together in his later writings.

29. "The essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole con­cept of the h u m a n being" (GA 26, §9b, 167).

30. As Heidegger states in 1949: "To characterize with a single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness ( ' there ') of Being as such, the name of 'be ing there [Dasein]' was chosen for that sphere of being in which m a n stands as m a n The te rm 'being there ' nei ther takes the place of the term 'consciousness' nor does the 'object ' designated as 'being there ' take the place of what we think of when we speak of 'consciousness.' 'Being there ' names that which should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place—namely, the location of the t ru th of Being" ("Einleitung zu Was ist Metaphysik?" 1949, in Wegmarken, 202 / 368; Heidegger 1975b, 270-71, emphasis added) .

31 . "Brief iiber den Humanismus" 1946, in Wegmarken, 158 / 32; BW, 231. 32. WdG, 58 / 160 n. 59; 99E. 33. As he emphasizes in his lectures on Leibniz, an animal "existiert nicht,

sondern lebt, ein Stein existiert nicht und lebt nicht, sondern ist vorhanden" (GA 26, §9a, 159). Cf. note 17 of this chapter.

34. Indeed, in GA 29 / 30 Heidegger differentiates between three essen­tially different forms of'sensibilities', that is to say, forms of touching: "We can

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say that the stone is exerting a certain pressure upon the surface of the earth. It is ' touching ' the ear th. But what we call ' touching' here is not a form of touching at all in the stronger sense of the word. It is not at all like that rela­tionship which the lizard has to the stone on which it lies basking in the sun. And the touching implied in both these cases is above all not the same as that touch which we experience when we rest our hand u p o n the head of another h u m a n being. The lying u p o n . . . , the touching involved in our three examples is fundamentally different in each case" (GA 29 / 30, §47, 290, emphasis added) . The question that needs to be raised, however, is whether this differentiation does not need to be b roken down in turn. For example, we need to differen­tiate between touching and being touched by others and touching ourselves. Cf. chapter 5, esp. §92ff.

35. Heidegger is no t consistent in his use of quotat ion marks. Quite often the 'world' refers to the existential unders tanding of the world, for example in SuZ, §18, 87.

36. Being-in-the-world is a unitary p h e n o m e n o n which should never be b roken up into separate parts: "The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary p h e n o m e n o n . This primary da tum must be seen as a whole" (SuZ, §12, 53).

37. "By this 'in' we mean the relationship of Being which two entities ex­tended ' in ' space have to each other with regard to their location in that space" (SuZ, §12, 54).

38. Heidegger thereby does not argue that no spatiality pertains to Being-in; rather , the emphasis is on the fact that "Being-in is not a spatial relation­ship of this kind" (i.e., a spatiality defined in terms of its extensio).

39. As Heidegger tellingly argues: "As Dasein goes along its ways, it does not measure off a stretch of space as a corporeal Thing which is present-at-hand; it does not 'devour the kilometres '" (SuZ, §23, 106).

40. SuZ, §21, 101, my translation ["Dann wird am Ende doch eine »Ret-tung« de r cartesischen Analyse der »Welt« moglich."]

41 . SuZ, §23, 105. Indeed, according to Heidegger, in our m o d e r n tech­nological age this tendency becomes increasingly visible: "All the ways in which we speed things up , as we are more or less compelled to do today, push us on towards the conquest of remoteness. With the ' radio, ' for example, Dasein has so expanded and destroyed its everyday environment that it has ac­complished a de-severance of the 'world' — a de-severance which, in its mean­ing for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized" (SuZ, §23, 105, translation slightly al tered) .

42. "That which is presumably 'closest' is by no means that which is at the smallest distance 'from us. ' It lies in that which is desevered to an average ex­tent when we reach for it, grasp it, or look at i t . . . . When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantially that they are 'sit­ting on his nose, ' they are environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall. Such equipment has so little closeness that often it is proximally quite impossible to find. Equipment for seeing—and likewise for hearing, such as the telephone receiver — has what we have designated as the inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand" (SuZ, §23, 106 / 7).

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43. "But its spatiality shows the characters of de-seruerance and directional­ity" (SuZ, §23, 105).

44. This is a ra ther reductive reading of Kant. We shall evaluate Heideg­ger ' s reading of this passage in chapter 5, §87ff.

45. Indeed, Heidegger will ensure that spatiality will be t reated as a phe­n o m e n o n secondary to temporality (cf. §74, below).

46. SuZ, Marginalia to §85b, 441-42. 47. SuZ, §18, 87, translation slightly altered. 48. This is a te rm that H.-G. Gadamer introduces in o rder to explain what

Heidegger calls the circle of understanding. Cf. Gadamer 1989, II, l a , 265-71.

49. As we shall show, it is a world that is nonmater ial by definition, insofar as it is defined in terms of its temporality. Indeed, it will be demonst ra ted that Heidegger needs to affirm the primacy of a nonmater ial world, so that the in­version of Husserl 's doctr ine of immanent-transcendence can be maintained. Cf. chapter 4, "From ' Immanen t Transcendence ' to 'Transcendent Imma­nence, '"§68ff.

50. Indeed, in his later writings Heidegger appears to address this appar­ent idealism with the introduction of notions such as the earth (Erde) and space-time cont inuum. These moments of resistance, opacity, and with­drawal, however, will be raised in his writings only following SuZ—in particu­lar, in "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege. Cf. introduct ion to chapter 5.

51 . This is confirmed by a note in the marginalia of Heidegger 's own copy of SuZ, which indicates that Heidegger always had Husserl in mind when he re­ferred to Descartes or the Cartesian tradition. Heidegger argues: "Descartes has still laid the basis for characterizing ontologically that entity within-the-world upon which, in its very Being, every other entity is founded — material Nature ." H e adds in the marginalia: "[This is] a criticism of Husserl 's construc­tion of 'ontologies '! [one which] is implicit here in the overall critique of Des­cartes" (SuZ, §21,98 & marginalia, a, p . 442). Marion also refers to this note in the marginalia: "A note in the marginalia of Heidegger 's personal copy of SuZ confirms the permanence of his judgment concerning this 'affinity'" (Marion 1989,129 n. 16).

52. The world that is accessible (zugdngig) only through knowing, intellec­ts o r cognition—i.e., th rough mathematics or physics this kind of "ontology of the 'world'"—does not seek the "phenomenon of the world" (SuZ, §21, 95) .

53. "A genuine grasp of what really is . . . lies in voeiv— 'beholding ' in the widest sense . . . ; Siavoeiv or ' thinking' is just a m o r e fully achieved form of VO£?vand is founded u p o n it. Sensatio (aiGOrjoiq), as opposed to intellect™, still remains possible as a way of access to entities by a beholding which is percep­tual in character; but Descartes presents his 'cri t ique' of it because he is ori­en ted ontologically by these principles" (SuZ, §21, 96).

54. "And though substance may indeed be known by some attribute; yet each substance has one principal property which constitutes its na ture and es­sence, and to which all its o ther propert ies are referred" (Descartes 1985, 25; and SuZ, §19, 90).

55. "But the basic ontological state of'living' is a problem in its own right

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and can be tackled only reductively and privatively in terms of the ontology of Dasein"(SuZ, §41,194).

56. T h e world of work in mind is, however, no t the world of the indus­trial worker. Heidegger is motivated m o r e by an artisanal romanticism re­ferring to non-mechanized labor. Indeed , it is this emphasis on the world of work which leads us back to Ernst Junge r *s heroic descriptions of Der Arbeiter, Herrschaft und Gestalt (cf. J u n g e r 1982). Heidegger ' s account of the everyday is thus limited. It has to be said, however, that SuZ does not p re t end to present a complete analysis of all the modes of Being-in and Being-with. Not only is the quest ion of life bracketed, bu t also the being of artworks and the quest ion of na ture , which will become increasingly impor tan t in his later writings. Heidegger acknowledges in passing that not all beings can be re­duced to the s t ructure of Dasein's Bewandtnis: "The Na tu re which 'stirs and strives,' which assails us and enthralls us as landscape, remains h idden . The botanist 's plants a re no t the flowers of the hedgerow; the ' source ' which the geographe r establishes for a river is no t the ' spr inghead in the dale '" (SuZ, §15, 70). Cf. SuZ, §43 and Villela-Petit 1992, 126. However, the p rob lem is that this bracket ing is necessary for SuZ if it wishes to mainta in the unitary s t ructure of Being-in-the-world. Cf. appendix to chapter 3, section (e) , and chapter 4, §73 ff.

57. However, against this reading Heidegger warns us that the term besor-gen is chosen not to emphasize the practical and economic engagement in the world but to make manifest care as the existential overall structure of Dasein-as-Being-in-the-world: "This term has been chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent 'practical ' and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care" (SuZ, §12, 57).

58. Jacques Taminiaux has shown convincingly that SuZ, despite its em­phasis on praxis, sides with Platonism, as its distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity expresses a disdain for doxa. In fundamental ontology there is no r o o m for doxa (cf. Taminiaux 1991). O n the relation between Heidegger and Aristotle see Kisiel (1993), especially par t two, and Felix O Murchadha (1999), chapter two.

59. It refers us back to the care-structure, which is nothing but the existen­tial structure of Being-in-the-world: "this phenomenon [that is 'care'] by no means expresses a priority of the 'practical' atti tude over the theoretical. . . . 'Theory ' and 'practice ' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as 'care '" (SuZ, §41,193). The aim is therefore to reclaim the unity of theory and practice which is guaranteed by the care-structure. In the Kantbuch Heidegger warns us no t to mistake the analysis of the everyday as a form of pragmatism: "The existential analytic of everydayness does not want to describe how we use a knife and fork. It should show that and how all asso­ciation with beings, even where it appears as if there were just beings, already presupposes the t ranscendence of Dasein —namely, Being-in-the-world" {Kantbuch, §43, 235 / 160E.

60. Emil Kettering explores the significance of the term Ndhe in Heideg­ger ' s work (cf. Kettering 1987). In his later writings Heidegger relates the not ion of closeness to withdrawal (Entzug) to stress a positive not ion of con­cealment. Cf. introduct ion to chapter 5.

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61. "Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical state­ment" (SuZ, §33, 157).

62. "Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behaviour which, in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §32, 156).

63. This contradicts the reading of Ernst Tugendhat , who interprets the pre-predicative m o m e n t as pointing "beyond the domain of language" (Tu­gendha t 1986,166, emphasis added) . O n Tugendhat ' s critique, see appendix to chapter 3, section (a).

64. "From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that in­terpretat ion is absent" (SuZ, §33,157).

65. We do no t wish to reverse the presentat ion by arguing that the present-at-hand precedes the ready-to-hand; ra ther , we wish to question the very dichotomy. For this radical disjunction suggests an avoidance of sensible visibility. However, it is not apparent to us that seeing and sensing, interpreta­t ion and theory are necessarily radically distinct.

66. King 1964, 95. This is an excellent introductory text to SuZ. It p ro­vides a sensitive reading at a time when Heidegger was just being in t roduced to the English-speaking world (J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson's translation was first published in 1962).

67. It has no t "the modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obsti­nacy" (SuZ, §16, 74); the modes of the world of objects which are present-at-hand .

68. Herbe r t Dreyfus suggests the translation "occurrentness" for Vorhan-denheit: "This te rm [ Vorhandenheit] is usually translated 'presence-at-hand,' bu t since there is no ment ion of presence in the German, and since Heidegger rarely makes use of the embedded word for hand, I shall use the translation 'occur­rentness '" (Dreyfus 1991,40, emphasis added) . Dreyfus, however, thereby oc­cludes the significance of the differentiation between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, for it is the 'handiness ' of the equipment which is crucial. Vorhandenheit is nothing but a deficient m o d e of this handiness. To follow Heidegger: the term Zuhandenheit expresses that entities are "zurHand" ("to hand"; SuZ, §22, 102), and ^ Vorhandenheit suggests that is it before our hands and not to hand (cf. §70 below).

69. "That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. O n the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time" (SuZ, §15, 69-70).

70. "Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer , for example) ; but in such dealings an en­tity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammer ing does not simply have knowledge about the hammer ' s character as equipment , but it has appropri­ated this equipment in a way that could not possibly be more suitable. In deal­ings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ' in-order-to' which is constitutive for the equipment we are em­ploying at the t ime" (SuZ, §14, 69, emphasis added) .

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71. "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment . To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment , in which it can be this equ ipment that it is" (SuZ, §15, 68).

72. "Equipment is essentially 'something in order to . . . ' A totality of equ ipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to, ' such as service­ability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the ' in-order-to' as a struc­ture there lies an assignment or reference of something to something (SuZ, §15, 68, emphasis added) .

73. "Thematical percept ion of Things is precisely not the way equipment ready-to-hand is encountered in its ' t rue ' 'in-itself,' it is encountered rather in the inconspicuousness of what we can come across 'obviously' and 'Objec­tively'" (SuZ, §69a, 354).

74. Macquarr ie and Robinson translate Bewandtnis as "involvement." 75. "To say that the Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assign­

ment or reference means that it has in itself the character of having been as­signed or referred. An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and referred as that entity which it is. With any such entity there is an involvement which it has in something. The character of Being which be­longs to the ready-to-hand is jus t such an involvement. If something has an in­volvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. The relationship of the 'with . . . in . , . ' shall be indicated by the term 'assignment' or ' reference '" (SuZ, §18, 83-84) .

76. "The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the m o r e we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment" (SuZ, §15, 69).

77. Indeed Heidegger later acknowledges that there is a 'thingliness' about tools which withdraws from Dasein. The thing is not reducible to the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand structure. There is something obtrusive about the thing that cannot be reduced to use or utility. "It is mere things, ex­cluding even utensils, that count as things in the p rope r sense" ("Der Urs-p rung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege, 6; BW, 147-48). Similarly to the p h e n o m e n o n of life, things are nei ther mere objects nor tools. While the world of SuZ is described in terms of its structure of assignment and thus sug­gests a subjectincation of the world, in his later writings Heidegger moves away from the question of use and emphasizes m o r e the structure of 'letting be ' , which is already implicit in SuZ. In "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" Heideg­ger, for example, writes against the m o m e n t of aesthetics, which both di­vorces art from truth and turns art into a subjective experience (Erlebnis).

78. For example, in medical knowledge Te%VT1 refers to the manner whereby a goal is achieved. The doctor 's skills and 'tools' , or choice of method, are assessed in accordance with the aim or deed, i.e., curing those who are ill.

79. Similarly William Blattner observes: "For Aristotelian energeiais com­plete in an instant; to be in act is to realize its end. But for Heidegger quite the opposite seems to be true: the goal is always 'outstanding'" (Blattner 1992, 126).

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80. "In the work there is also a reference or assignment to 'materials ' : the work is dependen t on leather, thread, needles, and the like, Leather, more­over is p roduced from hides. These are taken from animals. . . . " (SuZ, §15, 70-71) .

81 . Figal 1988, 84. This leads J. M. Bernstein to argue: "The 'as' s tructure of equipmentality approximates the image of ethical life presupposed by the logic of the lost sensus communis" (Bernstein 1992, 76).

82. However, Heidegger adopts the Aristotelian conception of a final end (telos) in the form of a 'good life' by rearticulating it in terms of an end (Ende) of Dasein as Being-towards-death. As we shall show, there is a finality or desti­nat ion (Bewandtnis) to the assignment structure that is Dasein itself (cf. chap­ter 4, esp. §76 and conclusion).

83. "If we are to investigate such phenomena as references, signs, or even significations, nothing is to be gained by characterizing them as relations. In­deed we shall eventually have to show that ' relations' themselves, because of their formally general character, have their ontological source in a reference [assignment]" (SuZ, §17, 77).

84. "The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand authentically" (SuZ, §15, 69).

85. "But here we must notice that this ' referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as e q u i p m e n t Instead, ' referring' as indicat­ing is g rounded in the Being-structure of equipment , in serviceability for. . . . " (SuZ, §17, 78).

86. Cf. §52ff., above. 87. SuZ, §17, 79, emphasis added. 88. SuZ, §17, 79, emphasis added. 89. SuZ, §18, 83, emphasis added. 90. "As the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself dis­

covered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements" (SuZ, §18, 85).

9 1 . As Robert Bernasconi observes: "The constant necessity to suspend a specific sense of spatiality, suggests that in all of these p h e n o m e n a a certain sense of something like spatiality is still in play" (Bernasconi 1988, 48).

92. This withdrawal is made possible by fundamental moods such as anxi­ety or profound bo redom. Cf. chapter 4, §71.

93. Cf. SuZ, §12, 54 and SuZ, §13, 61. 94. Cf. SuZ, 76, 113, 176, 271, 344. 95. The expressions used for the analysis of the everyday in SuZ illustrate

a fundamental dislocation and lostness: fallenness (175), curiosity (175), lost (168), not tarrying alongside (Unverweilen) (172), distraction (172), entangled (178), being everywhere and nowhere (173).

96. "Dasein's absorption in the 'they' and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like afleeingof Dasein in the face of itself— of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self' (SuZ, §40, 184).

97. "We have prescribed in a prohibitive way how it is possible for au­thentic Being-towards-death not to be" (SuZ, §53, 260, translation slightly

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changed) . "The more unveiledly this possibility gets unders tood, the m o r e purely does the unders tanding penetra te into it as the possibility of the impossi­bility of any existence at aT (ibid. 262).

98. "In anxiety one feels 'uncanny.'' H e r e the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to ex­pression: the 'nothing and nowhere. ' But here 'uncanniness ' also means 'not-being-at-home'" (SuZ, §40, 188).

99. In SuZ the moment of negation is used dialectically. In his later writings —from "Was ist Metaphysik," (1929, Wegmarken; BW) onward—the adverb nothing (nichts) is substituted with the noun nothingness {das Nichts). Tu-gendhat maintains that this move—from the adverb to the noun—is nonsen­sical and unjustifiable, since it leads Heidegger to combine the infinitive of the verb to be (Sein) with the substantive nothingness (das Nichts) ra ther than referring to being-nothing (dasNichtsein). To follow Tugendhat : "Having noth­ing to hold on to is a genuine experiential possibility whereas to hold on to nothingness, is not" (Tugendhat 1992, 59). However, Tugendhat ' s intent to eliminate ' the question about nothingness ' (dieFrage nach dem Nichts) is ques­tionable. As Jacob Taubes observes, we need to contextualize Heidegger 's motives. The substantive 'nothingness ' (das Nichts) needs to be in terpre ted in relation to Heidegger ' s (destructive) reading of Parmenides. Parmenides needs to draw on 'nothingness ' in order to negate the possibility of the exist­ence of nothing: "Heidegger 's discursive transition from nothing to nothing­ness is a kind of an amnesis of the Parmenidean transition from nothingness to nothing" (Taubes 1975, 147).

100. We adhere to Kisiel's translation of Bedeutsamkeit as meaningfulness ra ther than significance, which Macquarr ie and Robinson have chosen. Cf. Kisiel's translation of the GA 20, §23.

101. "These relationships are b o u n d u p with one another as a pr imordial totality; they are what they are as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be unders tood. The relational totality of this signifying we call 'significance' This is what makes u p the structure of the world — the structure of that wherein Dasein as such al­ready is" (SuZ, §18, 87).

102. "This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets u p with it. Such an entity can 'meet u p with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world' (SuZ, §12, 57).

103. Indeed Kant has shown that orientation is possible only by virtue of in­congruous counterpar ts such as a right and a left hand (cf. chapter 5, §87).

104. Cf. "La main et le monde" in Franck 1986, esp. p . 53, and Court ine 1987-88.

105. This reminds us of Aristotle's observation that "The soul, as it were, acts like a hand" (Aristotle 1957, 432a, translation slightly a l tered) .

106. SuZ, §23, 108, emphasis added. 107. Heidegger later admits in a footnote to his essay "Vom Wesen des

Grundes": "If we somehow equate the ontical system of useful things (of tools) with the world and explain Being-in-the-world as traffic with useful things, we

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t h e n abandon any unde r s t and ing of t r anscendence as Being-in-the-world in the sense of a 'basic constitutive feature of Dasein'" (WdG, 51 / 153 n. 55; 81E).

108. Implicitly, the Heidegger of SuZ questions the relationship between philosophy and life. Not only does philosophy arise out of our concrete exist­ence, but it needs to re turn to life. Heidegger is he re similar to Plato, who ar­gues that the philosopher king needs to r e tu rn from the world of Ideas: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its depar ture from the hermeneut ic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns" (SuZ, §7, 38 & §83,436). This issue of return or folding back be­comes more explicit in GA 26: "But the temporal analysis is at the same time the turning-around [Kehre], where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains" (GA 26, appendix to §10, 201). An investigation concerning this turning back \lETafioXf[ (Umschlag) Heidegger calls metontology (Metontologie) (cf. GA 26, §10 & appendix, 199). A r e tu rn to the ontic world, however, questions the radical distinction between the ontic and ontological that SuZ suggests. Indeed, Heidegger concedes that there is a proximity between the ontic and ontological: "Nevertheless, the Inter­pretat ion which is more primordial existentially, also discloses possibilities for a m o r e primordial existentiell understanding, as long as our ontological con­ceptualization does not let itself get cut offfrom our ontical experience" (SuZ, §59, 295, emphasis added) . Fur thermore , the re tu rn to ontical experience thereby reveals that a. factical ideal informs the ontological investigation: "Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological Interpretation of Dasein's existence? That is so indeed. But not only is this Fact one which must not be denied and which we are forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of the object which we have taken as the theme of our investigation" (SuZ, §62, 310). A factical ideal guides philosophical investigation, which, however, phi­losophy needs to unfold: "Philosophy will never seek to deny its 'presupposi­tions' but neither may it simply admit them" (ibid.). A bridge between philosophy and life is affirmed. Hereby the question of authenticity and the ne­cessity of 'choosing one 's he ro ' (SuZ, §74, 385) become intelligible. Although this ideal needs to remain an illusion, Heidegger believes that it is necessary to adhere to it if we wish to have an art of existence: "Not only do we need analyse in general , but we must produce the illusion, as it were, that the given task at hand is the one and only necessary task. Only the person who understands this art of existing, only the person who, in the course of action, can treat what is in each case seized upon as wholly singular, who at the same time nonetheless re­alizes the finitude of this activity, only such a one understands finite existence and can hope to accomplish something in it. This art of existing is not the self-reflection that hunts a round uninvolved, rummaging about for motives and complexes by which to obtain reassurance and a dispensation from action. It is ra ther only the clarity of action itself, a hunting for real possibilities" (GA 26, §10, 201, emphasis added) . For a discussion of metontology and the possibility of a n ethics, see Bernasconi (1988), Cullen (1991), and Hodge (1995). Steven

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Gait Crowell (2000) convincingly shows why Heidegger 's aim to replace tran­scendental philosophy (phenomenology) with metontology (metaphysics) re­mains an illusory idea. For a good overview of Heidegger 's use of the term metontology, see McNeill (1993/1994) and Krell (1986), who initiated the dis­cussion.

CHAPTER 4

1. H u a VIII, 45. Lecture, 121. 2. Theodore Kisiel has shown convincingly that Heidegger adopts the

term Hingabe—which he translates as "devotion," "dedication," "submission," and "immersion"—from Emil Lask, who already differentiated between Hingabe and Hinsehen (cf. Kisiel 1993, chapter 1). John Macquarrie and Edward Robin­son translate Angewiesenheit as "submission." However, "referential dependency upon," "being ascribed," or "subjected to" is more appropriate here.

3. Cf. SuZ, §69b, 363 n. 1; 498 n. xxiii(E). It is there that Heidegger ar­gues that what Husserl calls "intentionality" is grounded in the ecstatical unity of Dasein. Heidegger explains in his 1929 lecture: "If one characterizes every way of behaving toward being as intentional, then intentionality is possible only on the basis of transcendence. It is nei ther identical with t ranscendence nor that which makes t ranscendence possible" (WdG, 133 / 31 / 29E). This text was originally published in a collection dedicated to Husserl in h o n o r of his sev­entieth birthday.

4. Although Heidegger refers no t to the natural attitude, which he calls the world of things, bu t to the everyday, which is Dasein's environment—the world of work— the claim remains identical insofar as Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is nei ther ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand, bu t defined in terms of its s tructure of compor tment . We have neglected Dasein's existen­tial structure of Being-with since it does not structurally change the main ar­gument . Heidegger wishes to argue that Dasein is no t only Being-in-the-world bu t equiprimordially Being-with. In the everyday this Being-with is character­ized in terms of a lack of 'self. Dasein is no t free (i.e., responsible), but defines itself in terms of the 'They' (be it norms or conventions). Indeed, Heidegger uses the Husserlian terminology of the natural atti tude when he argues that in the everyday Dasein is fascinated by or unde r the spell of the world (benommen) (cf. SuZ, §13, 61; §16, 76; chapter 3, §66), and is thus lost in the world.

5. SuZ, §41, 196. "Ein . . . noch ursprunglichere [s] Phanomen." This quotat ion is taken out of context, for it does not refer to Husserl but to the pri­mordial structure of care.

6. SuZ, §12, 53. llEinheitliches Phanomen." 7. Ideen I, §39, 87 / 70. Gibson's translations—"interwovenness," "en-

twinement," and "entanglement" —are more appropr ia te here . 8. Cf. H u a VIII, Lecture 45, 121. 9. "The Ego . . . is abandoned to what is objective. . . . To this state of af­

fairs, however, there belongs apriori the 'possibility' of an alteration in the subject's at t i tude" (Ideen II, §4, 10-11).

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10. SuZ, §18, 87, emphasis added. 11. It is in this context that we can unders tand why Levinas criticizes

Heidegger for his paganism (cf. "Heidegger, Gagarine et nous" in DL, 300-301).

12. "In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility, which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow under­stands" (SuZ, §9, 43).

13. "The 'essence' of this entity lies in its "to be"' (SuZ, §9, 42, emphasis a d d e d ) .

14. "Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself (SuZ, §4, 12). The aim of SuZ is to make this questionableness of Being visible again, thus to re turn to this possi­bility ofchoosing and sustaining possibility as possibility,

15. SuZ, p. 440, "Randbemerkungen zu," p. 42b. Although Heidegger in­sists that we should not unders tand the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in moralistic terms, this is disingenuous in some sense. For au­thenticity still constitutes the exemplary possibility for Dasein: to assume its true na ture or Be-stimmung. This is a normative concept; what one essentially 'is' one should authentically become.

16. This is a translation King (1964) suggests on page 56. 17. SuZ therefore describes Dasein's everyday in the following manner :

Dasein is floating, dispersed, lost, never dwelling anywhere, not-tarrying alongside of what is closest (i.e., its ownmost possibilities); it is dragging, groundless, unattached, and uprooted.

18. This presentat ion is not quite accurate because one of Husserl 's prob­lems is to account for the possibility of an adequate philosophical beginning. Heidegger believes that such a beginning can be motivated only by a funda­menta l mood, such as anxiety, which is unmotivated—i.e., there is nothing in the ontic world in the face of which one has anxiety. Husserl, meanwhile, ar­gues that the transcendental reduct ion also cannot be motivated by the gen­eral thesis of the natural attitude: "No one can simply tumble into philosophy" (Hua VIII, Lecture 30 ,19) . "Indeed, here we are dealing with an entirely 'un­natura l ' attitude and an entirely unnatural way of viewing ourselves and the world" (Hua VIII, Lecture 45, 121). The transcendental reduct ion is unmoti-vated. Writing u n d e r the auspices of Husserl, Fink observes: "The unmoti-vated character of the phenomenological reduct ion (the absence of any worldly problem which could serve as its real motive) expresses the reduc­tion's unfamiliar na ture in a similar way. Because it is the suspension of the "natural att i tude" it cannot appear within this attitude and it therefore must be unfamiliar. The reduct ion becomes knowable in its 'transcendentalmotiva­t ion ' only with the transcending of the world" (Fink 1970, 105). Indeed Hus­serl will later relate this transcendental motivation to Plato's and Aristode's not ion of Oav^etv (cf. Krisis, 331£). Cf. Held 1991, 89, and Held 1992a, 142.

19. SuZ, §40, 187. Indeed, there is an etymological connection; Angst de­rives from the Latin angustus, which means "tight" (engin German) .

N O T E S T O P A G E S 111—115 213

20. SuZ, §40, 188, emphasis added: "Macht offenbar, ' swe inem ist\ In der Angst ist einem 'unheimlichY'

21. GA26, §10,172, emphasis added. This passage is also cited by Derr ida (1983, 70-71) . Derr ida points out that "the Geschlechtslosigkeit would not be more negative than aletheia" (ibid., 72). Geschlechtslosigkeit is the original 'po­tency' of the articulation of t ruth and untruth .

22. Heidegger repeats this a rgument in "Vom Wesen des Grunde." "Only because Dasein is defined by selfhood can an I-se If relate 'itself to a Thou-self. Selfhood is the presupposit ion of the possibility of being an 'I, ' which itself is revealed only in the 'Thou. ' Selfhood is never related to a Thou; it is neutral toward 'being an I': and 'being a Thou, ' and even more toward 'sexuality,' since it is what makes them all possible in the first place. All essential proposi­tions of an ontological Analytic of Dasein in man treat Dasein in its neutrality" ( W d G , 5 4 / 1 5 6 ; 8 7 E ) .

23. "[A] l ieutenant of the nothing" ("Was ist Metaphysik," 1929, in Weg-marken, 15 / 117; BW, 106). O n the question of the differentiation between dasNichts andnichts, see chapter 3, §66, n. 99.

24. The fact that Dasein always already is inauthentic (fallenness is an ex­istential of Dasein) means that Dasein has always already avoided its responsi­bility. Hence Being-guilty is another existential of Dasein.

25. "The world as this 'How in its totality' underl ies every possible way of segmenting being; segmenting being does no t destroy the world but requires it" (WdG, 140-141 / 38-39; 49E).

26. WdG, 135 / 33; 35E, emphasis added. 27. Cf. chapter 3, §§62-67. 28. Indeed, the whole structure of the book reflects the fear of affirming

a m o m e n t of dispersal ra ther than the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world. After the analysis of the everyday we are in t roduced to a manifold of structures: "Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world and in its Being-with Others" (SuZ, §39, 181). Although these moments are investigated separately, the aim is to show that Being-in, Being-alongside, and Being-ahead-of-itself equiprimordially constitute the structure of Being-in-the-world. They are not separate moments that can be glued together but al­ways already implicate each other. Being-in-the-world needs to be thought of in its indestructible totality (Ganzheit), which encapsulates all these structures. This totalizing structure Heidegger calls care: "Being-in-the-world, in turn, is bound u p ontologically in the structural totality of Dasein's Being, and we have characterized care as such a totality" (SuZ, §43b, 209). The term totality, however, still implies that there are diverse structures that form this structural whole. SuZ proceeds to show that care articulates not only Dasein's thrown projection bu t also Dasein's Being-toward-death, the call of conscience and anticipatory resoluteness. This diversified articulation of the structural whole thus persuades us to lose sight of the unitary s tructure of care. "The totality of the structural whole has become even more richly articulated; and because of this, the ex­istential question of the unity of this totality has become still more urgenf (SuZ, §64,

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317). The totalizing structure of care is not sufficient. What needs to be proven additionally is the unity of care. The ontological questioning needs to persist "until we can exhibit a still moreprimordialphenomenon which provides the ontological support for the unity and the totality of the structural mani-foldness of care" (SuZ, §41, 196). This unity is guaranteed by temporality alone: "The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality" (SuZ, §65, 327). The movement is thus from dispersal to totality (Ganzheit), and from the totality of care to the unity (Einheit) of temporality.

29. This is well illustrated by Protevi (1994, 117), and Derr ida 's "Ousia and Grammar" (1982).

30. That is, if the primordial unitary s tructure of Being-in-the-world is to be maintained.

31 . This would suggest another form of dualism, for now there would be something lying beyond the grasp of Dasein.

32. As Sallis observes: "In Being and Time presence means predominantly, though not exclusively, Vorhandenheit (present-at-hand . . . ) . This is to be un­ders tood in its correlation with pure seeing, with voeiv, with intuition (An-schauungY (Sallis 1986a, 142).

33. This is not quite correct, for Heidegger describes the everyday as an infinity without a telos, while for Husserl the infinite is teleologically structured (cf. §83, below). Indeed, it is interesting to note that the original Greek meaning of rsteiogis close to Heidegger's description of Being-toward-death: it signifies "a whole" or "something complete." It really means something "rounded off as a whole." For Aristode and Plato the infinite in the sense of an indefinite and un­ending multiplicity was precisely axekfiq (i.e., non-bounded and therefore im­perfect: it did not have its 'limit' within itself; it was amipov [boundless]). I should like to thank Nicholas Walker, who drew my attention to this analogy.

34. Indeed the significance of the 'They' is that it cannot die (cf. SuZ, §81, 424-25) .

35. uFreedomfrom any standpoint if the phrase should m e a n anything at all is precisely noth ing o ther than the adoption of a viewpoint This is something historical, that is, something per ta ining to Dasein (and hence a mat ter of responsibility—Dasein's m o d e of relating to this viewpoint) — not an extra-t empora l chimerical in i tself (GA 63, §17b, 83).

36. Ever since Kant, time and temporality have been defined in terms of subjectivity (inner sense). This claim is not quite true, for in terms of the his­tory of philosophy the "subjectification of t ime" was in t roduced with August­ine. With this the path was set to characterize the subject in terms of its temporality, which found its full articulation only with Kant. However, we n e e d to note that Heidegger here attempts to retrieve Aristode's claim that "time in a sense belongs to a psyche" when he argues that, when no Dasein 'is', there 'is' no truth or pr imordial temporality.

37. The problem with this kind of claim is that in o rde r to affirm a pri­mordia l t ranscendence the 'I think' needs to be presupposed. Dasein's dis­location in this sense presupposes a 'location' from which it can depart .

38. Indeed, in the Kantbuch, Heidegger calls transcendental imagination (which is analogous to Dasein's temporality) "the original g round for the pos-

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sibility of h u m a n subjectivity" (Kantbuch, §31, 172; 118E). Transcendental imagination as the "sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring forth from a common, but to us unknown, root (KRV, A15 / B29)" (Kantbuch, §6, 37;24E) .

39. A schema should therefore no t be confused with a pictorial represen­tation (cf. KRV, A140-41 / B179-80).

40. Cf. KRV, A227-28 / B279-81. 41 . "The consciousness of myself in the representat ion T is not an intui­

tion, bu t a merely intellectual representat ion of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This T has not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition, which, as permanent , might serve as correlate for the determinat ion of time in inner sense" (KRV, B278).

42. Indeed the aim is to avoid any form of dualism: "We need to avoid the schema: There are subjects and objects, that is to say, there is consciousness and ex­istence [Sein]; existence is the object of knowledge; existence is really the ex­istence of nature; consciousness is T think,' hence a self, an Ego-pole, the centre of acts, person" (GA63, §17a, 81).

43. T h e whither of the ecstasis expresses the for the sake of which, that Dasein has to be (futural), that in the face of which Dasein is anxious—i.e., its thrownness (past)— and that Dasein is as Being along-side entities of the world, making present the world of tools through its projects (gegenwartigen).

44. Cf. Kantbuch, §22 ,106-7 8c §35, 200-201. 45. Cf. appendix to chapter 3, section (f). 46. "Transcendence is ra ther the pr imordial constitution of the subjectiv­

ity of a subject. The subject transcends qua subject; it would no t be a subject if it did not transcend" (GA 26, §11, 210-11) . It might be a rgued that Heideg­ger he re is purely in want of an adequate term. Indeed, we do not deny that Heidegger wishes to reconfigure and destruct what the tradition aimed at in its talk of 'subjectivity'. However, this is possible only as a qualified defense of idealism: unlike materialism, idealism at least opens u p the question of a con­stitutive a priori, i.e., a transcendental dimension within which our encounter with beings always already transpires. That is why the world is 'more ' subjec­tive than objective (cf. chapter 3, §49ff.). The problem remains, however, that for Heidegger this reconfiguration is possible only in render ing the significance of the world meaningless.

47. This is an expression Paul Ricoeur employs to describe Levi-Strauss's structuralist approach. Levi-Strauss 1963, 633.

48. H e r e we are alluding to the phrase Heidegger coins in relation to Husserl when he praises Husserl for "rescuing the object." Cf. Zdhringer Sem-inare, 382 / 120, and the introduction to chapter 2 in this volume.

49. SuZ, §69, 351, emphasis added, translation slightly altered. 50. "But in general the 'whither ' to which the totality of places for a con­

text of equ ipment gets allotted, is the underlying condition which makes pos­sible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as something that can be placed. This 'whither, ' which makes it possible for equ ipment to be­long somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us in our concernful dealings, we call the 'region" (SuZ, §22, 103).

216 N O T E S T O P A G E S 123 -131

51 . The significance of Dasein's locality is discussed in chapter 5, espe­cially under "The Primacy of the World."

52. "Dasein's openness to the world" (SuZ, §29, 137); "This discovery of regions beforehand is co-determined [mitbestimmt] by the totality of involve­ments for which the ready-to-hand, as something encountered , is freed" (SuZ, §22,104) .

53 . It is important to note the inverted commas, for the aim is not to privi­lege the 'soul', 'subject', 'mind ' , 'ego, or 'person ' .

54. It is only once, namely in §24 of SuZ, that Heidegger comes close to considering the anter ior structure of space.

55. To follow Poggeler: "Although Heidegger goes beyond Becker's phe-nomenological investigation on geometry by affirming a primordial experi­enced and 'lived' spatiality, he still wishes to refer spatiality back to temporality, even though differently from Kant" (Poggeler 1983,179). This leads Edward Ca­sey to claim: "Not only does Dasein not break into space from temporality, but the very terms of Heidegger's argument suggest that spatiality is prior to the fallen temporality with which every Dasein is beleaguered" (Casey 1990, 72).

56. We recall: that in the face of which Dasein has anxiety is Being-possible. Cf. §70, above.

57. For Held there is no question about it: "Just as in Husserl 's object-or iented intentional consciousness the will to evidence is operative, so Dasein, in the freedom of its existence, gives vent to a militant will which, as its 'for-the-sake-of-which,' gives the world in advance as the field of play for this freedom. With this idea Heidegger forces the sovereignty of the will and the m o d e r n voluntaristic world-relation to its extreme and outbids even Husserl 's imma-nental theory of world constitution. The world is now fully integrated u n d e r the sway of the will" (Held 1992b, 313). For Held it is only after the iKehre\ when concealment becomes a constitutive positive a priori of the world, that Heidegger manages to overcome this subjectivism. For it is then that the world in its constant concealment is no longer available (verfilgbar) to Dasein.

58. Cf. introduct ion to chapter 2. 59. SuZ, §11, 52: "Ein Konstitutivum des Daseins." 60. SuZ, §43a, 202. Cf. SuZ, §43, 206. 61 . Heidegger thereby does not reject outr ight theological concerns.

Rather, he believes that the question of the "divine" can 'in principle ' be raised on the basis of the clarification of issues in fundamental ontology. Thus , there is a m o r e appropr ia te way of grasping 'eternity' from the stand­poin t of the finite.

62. We here adhere to Ernst Cassirer's observations. Reviewing Heideg­ger ' s Kantbuch he shows that Heidegger constantly brackets the significance of reason in his reading of the KRV by reducing everything to the unifying function of the transcendental imagination (i.e., temporality). Against this Cassirer argues: "Nowhere does Kant present such a 'monism' of the imagi­nation, ra ther he insists on a deliberate and radical dualism, the dualism be­tween the sensible and the intelligible world. Kant's p roblem is not that of 'Being' and 'Time' but the problem of 'Being ' and 'Ought , ' o f 'Exper ience ' and ' Idea '" (Cassirer 1931, 16).

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 3 1 - 1 3 8 217

63. Cf. H u a XVI, §38, 134. Indeed it is an inauthentic (uneigentliche) ap­pearance (cf. ibid., §22, 74).

64. Cf. H u a XVI, §19, 26 8c 28-30. 65. Cf. Idem I, §143 and chapter 1, §12ff. 66. Cf. Idem I, §52,129 / 102. 67. "The life which effects world-validity in natural world-life does not

permi t of being studied from within the attitude of natural world-life" (Krisis, §39, 151;148E).

68. "In the first place transcendental subjectivity is for itself absolutely anonymous' (Hua VIII, appendix XVIII, 417).

69. Idem I, §70,163 / 132, translation slightly altered. This drawn analogy is, however, not quite accurate, for Husserl refers to the notion of 'fiction' only when he introduces the eidetic reduct ion—not the transcendental re­duction.

70. As Husserl adds in a footnote to the passage above: "A sentence which should be as a quotat ion perfectly suited to ridiculing eidetic knowledge from a naturalistic perspective" (Ideen I, §70, 163 / 132 n. 1, translation slightly al­tered) .

71 . As Franck observes, Husserl discloses " that reason is an essential and universal structure of transcendental subjectivity" (Franck 1981, 56).

72. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 197. 73. Cf. chapter 2, especially §28 and "The Enigma of the Consciousness of

Time" and "The Vigilance of the Subject." 74. Krisis, appendix X to §21 ff., 429. Cf. Broekman 1963, 136-87. 75. Indeed Fink notes that: "Husserl always deplored the fact that the ex­

pression 'archaeology' so appropr ia te to the essence of philosophy should al­ready have been taken up by a positive science" (Fink 1966, 246).

76. H u a VIII, appendix XVIII, 416. 77. "De la description a l 'existence" in DEHH, 97. 78. As Derr ida observes: "Theoretical consciousness is nothing other, in

itself and thoroughly unders tood, than a practical consciousness, the con­sciousness of an infinite task and the site of absolute value for itself and for hu­manity as rational subjectivity. . . . The unity of Reason in all its usages would manifest itself fuWy for Husserl in the theoretical project (rather than in the practical function, as would be the case for Kant)" (Derrida 1978,136 n. 162).

79. "Nachwort" in Ideen III, 139 / 550. 80. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 197-98. 81 . Cf .Bernet 1979, 131. 82. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 196. 83. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 202. 84. Indeed it is at this stage that parallels between Husserl and structural­

ist and post-structuralist thinkers come to l ight For once we bracket Husserl 's ideal of philosophy as a r igorous science, we can rephrase this by arguing there is always already an overproduct ion of meaning/sense—what Deleuze calls a virtual reality—that can never be made actual (cf. Deleuze 1973, 325 -26 and Levi-Strauss 1950, floating signifiers).

85. Cf. "De la description a l 'existence" in DEHH, 96.

218 NOTES TO PAGES 138-142

86. As he states in his 1929/30 lectures: "For God does not philosophise, if indeed (as the name already says) philosophy, this love of. . . as homesick­ness for . . . , must maintain itself in nothingness, in finitude" (GA 29 / 30, §6, 28).

87. Cf. SuZ, §§59 & 60. 88. SuZ, §76, 396: "'Monumentalen' Moglichkeiten menschlicher Exis-

tenz." 89. Cf. SuZ, §62, 310. 90. This is in contrast to Gunther Figal's reading, which argues that the

claim that Dasein needs to chose one's hero "is nonetheless not very convinc­ing. The choice of a hero after all betokens the wish to be like an other Dasein and with this one remains caught up in the structure of the 'They'" (Figal 1988, 322). Indeed, Bernasconi (1990) has beautifully illustrated how the call of conscience is linked to Being-towards-death through his reading of Tol­stoy's The Death of Ivan Ilyich. Bernasconi convincingly shows that Heidegger cannot avoid existential commitments, though his analysis serves to protect the reduction of the formal existential analysis to the existentiell level. Cf. con­clusion to chapter 3, n. 108.

91. Like Husserl, Heidegger emphasizes that this primordial possibility to which Dasein returns is representative of the community as a whole: "Its his-torizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [ Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people" (SuZ, §74, 384). For destiny is to struggle for authenticity; it is a factical ideal that is not only Dasein's ideal but the ideal of the people (Volk). It is the repetition of fac­ing the destiny by which Dasein understands itself as Being-with-others, a re­turn to the fate of resolutely grasping Being-in-the-world as Being-possible. It is a destiny of the people, insofar as the forgetting of Being, and thus the for­getting and fleeing from our ownmost potentiality of Being, is our philosoph­ical heritage. This heritage cannot be undone but only destructed—by undoing the forgetting without 'forgetting' the path that has led to this undo­ing. It is our fate that we are always already guilty and thus need to 'return' to authenticity, which is nothing other than Dasein's thrown-projection. Cf. SuZ, §58.

CHAPTER 5

1. "Einleitung zu Was ist MetaphysikV in Wegmarken, 206 / 377 (in GA 9 only), footnote added to the fifth 1949 edition; Heidegger 1975a. Cf. ZSD, 15-16; 14-15E.

2. Cf. "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege; BW, 139-212. 3. Kunst und Raum, 210; 8E. In this manner Heidegger fails to realize

that the lived body is the common root of thought and intuition. And it is to that analysis that we wish to return through Husserl. The aim is thus to remain at the limits of SuZ, rather than turning to Heidegger's later accounts of the world—to put it another way, we wish to retrieve the world within the phe-nomenological project.

4. Cf. "Brief iiber den Humanismus," 1946, in Wegmarken; BW, 213-65.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 142 -150 219

5. From the GA 20 we know that Heidegger had the manuscript of Ideen lion his desk in 1925. Cf. GA 20, §13,167.

6. "[NJamely, that the surface which encloses the one cannot possibly enclose the other" (AKII, 384).

7. As Michael Fr iedman (1992) observes, "he is not endorsing a Newto­nian conception of the autonomous reality of 'absolute space.' This is clear from the passage (cf. AKII, 378) where Kant deliberately refrains from endors­ing the Newtonian conception—adopted by Euler—of absolute motion' (p. 29).

8. Cf. AKII , 385-419. 9. S. Glockner has coined this expression leibhaflige Anschauung. Cited by

Kaulbach (1960), 134. 10. For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world makes possible the p h e n o m e n o n

of orientation. Cf. chapter 3, §51ff., and GA20, §25b, 320-22. 11. SuZ, §23, 109. Cf. GA 20, §25b, 320-23 and chapter 3, §51. 12. Cf. appendix to chapter 3, §5ff., and chapter 4, §70ff. 13. However, Kant 's posi t ion is n o t as clear-cut as Kaulbach makes it

appear . While Kant treats time in the Transcendental Aesthetic as the formal a priori condi t ion of all appearances whatsoever — that is, appearances in t ime and space —and space as the a priori condit ion only of ou ter appearances (cf. KRV, A34 / B50), this relat ion is reversed in the Refutation of Idealism, in which he claims that self-knowledge (of my existence in time) presupposes knowledge of the existence of objects outside us (outer sense). Cf. KRV, B275ff.

14. This phrase alludes to Kant, who, according to Merleau-Ponty, calls the hand an "outer brain of man" (un "cerveau exterieur de rhomme"; Merleau-Ponty 1962, 316). As we have shown above, the true source of this insight, how­ever, is not Kant but Aristotle, who says: "The soul, as it were, acts like a hand" (Aristotle 1957, 432a, translation slightly al tered) . Cf. chapter 3, §67 n. 105.

15. Husserl does not refer to this text in Ideen II. 16. This is analogous to Kant's presentat ion in the KRV. Kant distin­

guishes between the dynamic principles of substance (intensive magnitudes) and causality. Cf. 'Axioms of Intuition. '

17. Cf. chapter 2, §14ff. 18. Husserl introduces the term phantom for visual and spatial forms in

§10 of Ideen II 19. Husserl 1981b, 324; 239E. 20. I move my eye (occulatory kinaesthetic), I position the imagined ob­

ject in relation to my reallived body. "In phantasy, I do look at the centaur; i.e., my eye, freely moved, goes back and forth, accommodat ing itself in this or that way, and the visual 'appearances, ' the schemata, succeed one another in motivated ' appropr ia te ' order , whereby they p roduce the consciousness of an experience of an existing centaur-object viewed in various ways" (Ideen II, §18a, 56-57) .

21 . Cf. Ideen II, §49e, 181-85. 22. "The pure Ego must be able to accompany all my representations" (Ideen II,

§26,108) . 23. Ideen II, §18c, 75: "Es hangt von dem Leib u n d von dem Eigenen der

Psyche ab, was das Subjekt als Welt sich gegeniiber hat."

220 N O T E S T O P A G E S 151 -155

24. Ludwig Landgrebe has shown that Husserl fails to develop the essen­tial insight he developed in the second section of Ideen / /because he wishes to upho ld the primacy of a theoretical constituting consciousness. Cf. Land-grebe 1981c. Cf. Claesges (1964), who develops Landgrebe 's claims.

25. Cf. chapter 2 unde r "The Problem of 'Sensuous HyleT 26. "Obviously, it cannot be said that I see my eye in the mirror , for my

eye, that which sees qua seeing, I do not perceive" (Ideen II, §37, 148 n. 1). 27. Wittgenstein 1963,116-17, 5.633. 28. "But neither lived body nor soul thereby acquire 'nature-propert ies ' : in

the sense of logico-mathematical na ture" (Ideen II, §32, 132). 29. Cf. chapter 2 unde r "The Problem of 'Sensuous Hyle,'" §25ff. 30. When I touch an object, I feel not only the object bu t also the move­

men t of my hand touching the object. That is to say I have a kinaesthetic tactile sensation. Cf. Ideen II, §36.

3 1 . Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962, 93. Merleau-Ponty therefore calls the lived body "a third genus of being" (ibid., 350) and argues that "1 know myself only in ambiguity" (ibid., 345).

32. In a beautifully written article on Ideen II, Merleau-Ponty illustrates how this ambiguous m o d e of existence, for example, shaking hands, makes intersubjectivity possible. "My right hand was present at the advent of my left hand ' s active sense of touch. It is in no different fashion that the other ' s body comes to life before m e when I shake another man 's hand or when I jus t look at it" (Merleau-Ponty 1964,168, translation slightly al tered) . Prior to analogi­cal reasoning, the otherhody arises out of inter-corporeity. The copresence of the two hands, which are both felt (sentir) and feeling (sentanf),is ex tended to the other person. The re is an aesthesiological community which founds inter­subjectivity and no t reason, analogy, or indeed communicat ion.

33 . To follow Claesges (1964): "It is only by reflecting u p o n embodied consciousness that we realize that hyle as such is possible only as sensation" (p. 134).

34. Cf. H u a XVI, §46,161. 35. This insight p reempts the Fifth Meditation in CM, in which Husserl

realizes that a second reduct ion is necessary. It is possible that Ideen II re­mained unpublished because Husserl had not yet gained this insight. As Al­fred Schiitz notes: "In 1934 Husserl told the present writer (i.e., Schiitz) that he left the second volume of the / ^ ^ u n p u b l i s h e d , because he had not at that time found a satisfactory solution for the problem of intersubjectivity which he believed to have been achieved in the V. Cartesian Meditation" (Schutz 1952 /3 , 395-96). It is necessary to bracket not only the world of things, but also the idea that there is an intersubjective world, i.e., a world that can be per­ceived from a viewpoint that is different from mine. For it is only in this man­ner that the question can be raised of how an intersubjective world can come about. The question requires that I bracket the animal na ture and thus re­gard spiritual or living beings purely as things, objective bodies (Kbrper) that no longer play a constitutive role (cf. Fifth Meditation in CM). The Fifth Medi­tation is often misunderstood as introducing the 'o ther ' into philosophy. However, the fundamental question is not 'how do we know that o ther h u m a n

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 5 5 - 1 6 1 221

beings exist?' nor the question of empathy or appresentation. Rather the question is "How is an objective world possible?"—i.e., a world that is identical for all of us and not dependen t on my viewpoint. For if something is inter sub­jective, it is objective. Cf. Schutz 1975, 51-91 and Fink 1970, 368.

36. Cf. Ideenll, §42c, 161. 37. Cf. chapter 2 u n d e r "The Enigma of the Consciousness of T ime" and

"The Vigilance of the Subject." 38. As Aristotle has already shown, what defines life ((pvaiq) is that all

things move or change or come and go. 39. Cf. §42 and §43 above. 40. Claesges has coined the term transzendentaler Sensualismus (Claesges

1964,131). 41 . Cited by Landgrebe (1974), 478G; 61E, translation slighdy altered:

"Die Entdeckung des mein geht der Entdeckung des Ich voran." 42. Cf. §86 above. 43. A K 5 , 269; Kant (1987). 44. Ibid., A116 / B117, our translation: "Erregte Bewegung." 45. "[A] 11 representations, whether they have for their objects outer

things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our in­ner state" (KRV A34 / B50).

46. OpusPostumum, AK22, 364. 47. Opus Postumum, AK 22, "Zehntes Convolut," 332. Cited by Kaulbach

(1960), 136. 48. Kaulbach pursues this line of thought in Kant in the most intriguing

manner . He shows that Kant ' re turns ' to the idea of an embodied intuition in the Kntik der Urteilskrafi and the Opus Postumum. This leads Kaulbach to the con­clusion: "Fruitful though Heidegger 's insight might have been in grounding transcendental philosophy on temporality, it was also one-sided: Movement is more originary and makes possible both time and space" (Kaulbach 1960, 152). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Book IV. It is impor tant to note that in the KRV Kant refuses to provide a transcendental deduct ion of movement . There he states: "Transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than these two ele­ments , space and time. This is evident from the fact that all other concepts be­longing to sensibility, even that of motion, in which both elements are united, presuppose something empirical" (KRV, A42 / B58, emphasis added) .

49. To follow Casey, the lived body "is the ' common, bu t to us unknown root ' of all that comes to be classified in rigidly stratified ways in m o d e r n West­e rn thought" (1993, 50). Ludwig Landgrebe also alludes to this analogy (1954,202-3) .

50. Cf. KRV, "First Analogy," A184 / B227. 51 . KRV, B275. Cf. B XXXIX. 52. This has been shown well by Kriiger (1950, 884ff.) and Allison (1983,

258-59) . It is Vogel who does no t accept this line of interpretat ion, arguing that inner sense has its own pure manifold (1993, 878-81) . The a rgument that Vogel provides, however, indicates a conflation of what Kant calls ' inner sense' and 'Time' and 'subjectivity'. For Vogel it is deeply problematic "to see why the self, unlike outer things, has to be represented (if we can talk that

222 N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 6 1 - 1 7 0

way) as a bare substratum rather than a fully-fledged object" (ibid., 881). H e r e Vogel conflates the substratum of the self with the self that can be known in t ime. We need to distinguish between time that determines my empirical be ing {ich bin in der Zeit [I am in time]), and the temporal relation to myself (die Zeit in mir [the time in m e ] ) , which has its own sense of pe rmanence . The latter refers to a pe rmanence "as substratum (as pe rmanen t form of inner in­tuition) " (KRV, B224). This is well illustrated by Miiller-Lauter (1964, 74-78) .

53 . We are referring to inner sense in the narrower sense, i.e., to con­sciousness of ourselves in time.

54. Curiously we are here repeating Kant's second analogy: alterations are governed by the law of the connection of cause and effect. Every event has a cause; that is to say, every event takes place in a temporal order . Every event is measured over against a common ground, which is an absolute temporal horizon. As Husserl observes: "The constitution of myself in time and the o ther in time is tied u p essentially with the constitution of a world and a world time."

55. Chapter 2, §40, and Husserl, MS C7 II, 12 (1932), cited by Held (1966,70) .

56. We do no t wish thereby to undermine Dasein's distinctiveness over and against beings of other character than its own. Cf. chapter 3, §45, esp. n. 17.

57. GA 20, §13, 168. Simon Critchley, drawing on the same citations, ob­serves: "The point at issue here is that Heidegger 's critique of the Cartesian Husserl is necessarily based u p o n a partial reading of the Husserlian text and premised upon an oversimplification of the extremely rich and complex his­tory of subjectivity between Descartes and Husserl" (Critchley 1996, 17).

APPENDIX

1. Tugendhat 1986, 166, emphasis added. 2. Tugendhat 1986, 166, emphasis added. 3. Lafont, 1994, 99. She here refers explicitly to Apel. 4. Indeed, Lafont cites a passage from Heidegger ' s earlier work in

which this link between discourse, disclosure, and t ruth is clearly expressed: "The achievement of discourse is to render something accessible, as openly there As such Xoyoq has the privileged potentiality for aXr\6evew... making available, openly there as unconcealed that which was formerly concealed, covered over" (Lafont 1994, 96; cf. GA63 , 11).

5. This claim is repeated in SuZ: "To significations, words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied with significations" (SuZ, §34, 161).

6. Wittgenstein 1958, §43. Or: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? —In use it is alive'' (ibid., §432).

7. Cf. chapter 3, §58 and §62. 8. Ibid. 9. "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday'

(Wittgenstein 1958, §38). 10. SuZ, §69b, 361-62, emphasis added.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 223

11. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "change-over." 12- " [T]he p h e n o m e n o n of worldhood . . . gets passed over''' (SuZ, §14,

65). 13. Apel 1976a, 39 n. 56. 14. It is doubtful, however, whether this reading helps us to disclose a radi­

cal depar tu re from Husserl. For as we have shown in chapter 1, the transcen­dental reduct ion does not lead to a 'loss' of the world, nor is the existence of the world negated; ra ther , the world remains as an intentional interpretative horizon. After the reduction, the world remains qua cogitatum, which is given pr ior to anyjudgment or positing. This horizon is, however, nothing bu t a ho­rizon of meaning, indeed, Husserl himself refers to it as a "pre-predicative ex­perience of the world" (EU, §9, 37), a general intuition that accompanies any particular constitution of an object. Thus, it appears that the re tu rn to lan­guage is equally implicit in Husserl 's texts.

15. This is, however, specific to SuZ. Heidegger will soon consider lan­guage and Being as co-original. Cf. Lafont 1994, second part .

16. As Lafont points out, Rede can be compared with Humboldt 's concept of process or energeia, or Saussure's parole, whereas Sprache is synonymous with what Humboldt calls system (ergon) and Saussure (langue) (cf Lafont 1994,95).

17. The aim is to avoid Burner's (and implicidy Husserl's) view of lan­guage. Buhler views language as having merely a representative function (Darstellungsfunktion); Husserl claims that meaning is intentional.

18. For a summary of these three issues see Lafont (1994, 135). Not only is Heidegger ' s conception of language still strongly unde r the influence of Husserl, but, because of a misreading of Humbold t , Heidegger believes that language is always read as a med ium and tool. This leads him to differentiate between Rede (discourse or address) and Sprache ( language), a differentiation that Lafont believes to fall short, since in SuZ there is a kind of indecision about the function of language. O n the one hand, Heidegger argues that Rede is the existential of language: "The existential-ontologicalfoundation of language is discourse or talk " (SuZ, §34,160). Indeed, in GA 20 Heidegger emphasizes that Rede allows for the pre-predicative disclosure of the world. Heidegger illus­trates this by employing Husserl 's term Apprasentation: "Making manifest th rough discourse first and foremost has the sense of interpretive appresen-tation of the environment unde r concern; to begin with, it is not at all tailored to knowledge, research, theoretical propositions, and propositional context" (GA 20, §28d, 361). (On Heidegger 's adopt ion of Husserl 's te rm Apprasenta­tion, see Kisiel 1983, esp. 199-206). O n the other hand, Heidegger gives an ontological interpretat ion of language. Suddenly it is not only an inner-worldly phenomenon , but: "Our Interpretat ion of language has been de­signed merely to point out the ontological ' locus' of this p h e n o m e n o n in Dasein's state of Being" (SuZ, §34, 166; cited by Lafont 1994,107).

19. To avoid any misinterpretations Heidegger later argues: "We speak and speak about language. What we speak of, language, is always ahead of us" ("Das Wesen der Sprache," 1957-58, in UzS, 179; OWL, 75E).

20. SuZ, §34, 161: "Als innerweldich Seiendes wie ein Zuhandenes vorfindlich."

224 N O T E S T O P A G E S 172 -179

2 1 . This is well illustrated by Lafont, on whose analysis we shall draw. See especially Lafont 1994, §1.4.3, "Sprache und Rede," 94-116.

22. SuZ, §34,161, emphasis added. Cf. GA 20, §28, 364. 23. SuZ, "Randbemerkungen," 442, 87c. 24. Indeed, as Cassirer has shown, Humbold t ' s account of language is es­

sentially Kantian. Language, like the categories of the unders tanding in KRV, does no t represent an outside world. Rather it forms the objective world. Not only this, but language discloses our original unity with the world (and people) . Language discloses objectivity in its subjective acts. Language is thus not the tool of an individual bu t re turns us to an original unity that has made possible unders tanding in the first place: "We must free ourselves completely from the idea that it can be separated from what it designates, as for example the n a m e of a m a n from his person, and that like a conventional cipher it is a p roduc t of reflection and agreement or in any sense the work of m a n . . . no t to say the work of the individual For striving deep within him after that unity and to­tality, man seeks to surpass the barriers of his individuality The individual, wherever, whenever and however he lives, is a fragment b roken off from his whole race, and language demonstrates and sustains this eternal bond which governs the destinies of the individual and the history of the world" (Wilhelm Fre iherr von Humboldt , "Uber die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues," cited by Cassirer [1953, 156-57]) .

25. Lafont (1994), 107. In a footnote Heidegger refers explicitly to Hus-serl (ibid.).

26. The everyday, which our analysis has hardly ment ioned, is indeed characterized in terms of a breathlessness and fluidity, where Dasein is never itself, bu t is always already defined by the 'They' (das Man). Terms such as av-erageness (Durchschnittlichkeit; SuZ, §27, 127), publicness (Offentlichkeit; ibid.), not tarrying along (Unvenveilen; SuZ, §36, 172), distraction (Zerstreuung; ibid.), idle talk (Gerede; SuZ, §35, 167), and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit; SuZ, §37, 173) are chosen to describe this m o m e n t of lack of selfhood. O n the notions of 'selfhood' and 'authenticity', see chapter 4, §70 and §75.

27. Levinas 1989, 123. 28. Levinas praises SuZ for its anti-intellectualistic stance, which comes to

light in its account of the everyday, in which Heidegger argues that our re­sponsibility exceeds the realm of intentionality. We commit ourselves to life and this committal easily turns into comedy, and this comedy can turn easily into tragedy. "The comedy begins with the simplest of our movements, carry­ing with them every inevitable awkwardness. In putt ing out my hand to ap­p roach a chair, I have creased the sleeve of my jacket, I have scratched the floor, I have d r o p p e d ash from my cigarette. In doing that which I wanted to do, I have done so many things that I did not want to do. The act has not been p u r e for I have left traces, in wiping out these traces, I have left o t h e r s . . . . When the awkwardness of the act turns against the goal pursued, we are at the height of tragedy" (Levinas 1989, 122-23).

29. It is curious to see that Apel makes a similar move. H e too wishes to safeguard this constitutive m o m e n t by drawing analogies to what Wittgenstein calls 'dep th grammar ' . Apel advocates a symbolic a priori that could form the

N O T E S T O P A G E 1 7 9 225

basis for a regulative principle in the Kantian sense, which makes possible any form of communicat ion: "The factical existing multifarious and inconsistent language-games which are 'interwoven' with equally multifarious, inconsis­tent forms of life cannot be assigned to the criterial context for the follow­ing of a rule as postulated by Wittgenstein. It is ra ther the ' t ranscendental ' language-game which is presupposed in all of them as the condition of the possibility and validity for communicat ion" (Apel 1976b, 162-3). The signi­ficant m o m e n t for Apel is that Wittgenstein still holds on to a notion of a depth-grammar, "lTiefengrammatik" (Wittgenstein 1958, §664), which, like Heidegger 's notion of the worldhood of the world, allows for different lan­guage-games, namely, the encounter of beings in the world and indeed differ­ent 'worlds'. It is impor tant to note that Wittgenstein does not purely affirm the multiplicity of language-games bu t searches for what he calls a primitive form of language-game that could explain more complicated forms. "If we want to study the problems of t ruth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagree­men t of propositions with reality, of the na ture of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear . . . . We see that we can build u p the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms" (Wittgenstein 1969,17). Furthermore, Wittgenstein believes that these primitive forms of language are based on certainty: "The primitive form of the language-game is certainty, not uncertainty. For uncertainty could never lead to action" (Wittgenstein 1976,404 / 420E). That is to say, "Somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is par t of judging" (Wittgenstein 1975, §150). What is of impor tance for Apel is that this depth-grammar points to a quasi-transcendental apriorim the Kantian sense: "It is noteworthy that we are dealing he re with the linguistic analytical, that is the hermeneut ic transformation of the problematic of Kant's transcendental philosophy." (Apel 1976a, 327). For Apel, He idegge r a n d Wittgenstein are vehicles for the articulation of a quasi-transcendental regulative principle that allows not only for "providing in principle for the possibility of universal communicat ion . . . it [i.e., universal communicat ion] first acquires its sig­nificance unde r the condition that this possibility be progressively realized. This, however, means that [linguistic analysts, hermeneuticists, and interpret­ers] must be able to presuppose the idea of universal communicat ion as a reg­ulative principle in the Kantian sense" (Apel 1976b, 162). This move appears justified insofar as Heidegger 's search for a fundamental ontology leads him to "inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything unders tandable" (SuZ, §34,166). Cf. GA 20, §28. Thus, the worldhood of the world could be read as the regulative principle that allows for and makes pos­sible, to use the Kantian expression, ' the condition of possibility' of any form of communicat ion.

30. Cf. Cassirer 1953, chapter 3, 149-69. 31. As we shall show later, SuZ's spatiality is a secondary p h e n o m e n o n to

its temporality, as the tide of §70 indicates: "The Temporali ty of the Spatiality That Is Characteristic of Dasein." Cf. chapter 4, §79.

32. In the lectures on Leibniz he calls this "transcendental dissemination"

226 N O T E S T O P A G E 180

(transzendentale Zerstreuung); it is nothing but Dasein's thrownness (GA 26, §10,173-74).

33. GA 4, "Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," 35; 38. Also cited by Franck (1986, 52), and Lafont (1994, 122f.).

34. "Zeit und Sein" in ZSD, 24; 23E. 35. The essence of language will indeed be a moment of pointing: "What

unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing. Its showing does not culmi­nate in a system of signs. Rather, all signs arise from a showing in whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs" ("Der Weg zur Sprache," 1959, in UzS, 254; OWL 410).

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SUBJECT INDEX

absolute consciousness, 54-5 affectivity, 42, 89-90, 152, 153,155,

157, 159 animals, 75, 200 n. 17 anxiety, 110-1 'apophantic as', 93, 98, 103 atomism, 33-4, 36-7 authenticity, 103, 110, 139-40

Being versus beings, 75-6, 200 n. 16, 201

n.23 question of, xxv, 14, 15, 19-21, 72,

75-6, 77, 110, 186 n. 44, 188 n . l 7 , 2 0 0 n . l 6 , 201 n.20

Bewandtnis, 100-1, 104-6 body, 83, 87, 90, 111, 124, 142, 144,

146,147-9, 163-5, 220 n.32 lived body [Leib], 148-61, 163, 218

n.3,219n.20, 220nn.28,31,221 n.49

objective body [Korper], 150, 152, 164, 220 n. 35

see also embodiment bracketing, xxv, xxvii, 15, 16, 18, 25-6,

138, 155

Cartesianism, 3-4, 19, 22, 23-4, 32-3, 120

see also Descartes categorial object, 11, 184 n. 24

see also categorial intuition circumspection, 93, 97-8, 99, 101, 114,

170 circumvention, 93-6, 99, 101-2 consciousness, xxvi, xxvii, 3, 6-7, 16-7,

23-4, 27-30, 47-8, 54-5, 56-62, 67-70, 72-3, 134-6, 149, 151-2, 156-7, 160, 163-4

constitution, 5-6, 67-8, 74, 76-7, 94, 107-8,115,153-4,182n.8

corpuscularism, 38

Dasein, xxv, xxvi-xxvii, 14, 20, 22-3, 72-131 passim, 138-40, 141-51 passim, 158, 160, 163-5,169, 171, 172-80 passim, 200-18 passim, 223 n. 18

denned 73-9

Ego (pure T ) , xxvii, 55, 56, 58, 62, 67, 73,75,79,83,85,87,107-9,118, 149,150, 156,167,171,187 n. 4, 199nn.3, 7,202 n.26, 211 n.9, 216n.53, 219n.22

empirical ego, 6 Ego-pole, 118-21, 149, 152, 153, 156,

158, 160, 219 n. 42 embodiment, 78, 87, 89, 111, 124,142,

147, 151, 160, 165 see also body

everyday, xxiii, 92-3, 96, 103, 108-10, 117, 177, 205 nn. 56, 59, 208 n . 9 5 , 2 H n . 4 , 213n.28,214 n .33,224nn.26,28

evidence, 8-10, 16, 18, 33, 37, 53, 183 n.17, 189n.22, 216n.57

external ism, xxv, 3

fallenness, 102-3, 208 n.95, 213 n.24 flowing phenomena [Ablaufsphdno-

mene], 33, 52, 62, 190 n.26

Gemiit, 159

'hermeneutic as', 93-4, 98, 103

idealism, 2, 74, 161-2, 200 n. 16

238 S U B J E C T I N D E X

immanence, 24-5, 52, 68,123,124,139 and transcendence, 26, 28, 29-32,

36-8, 53-4, 64, 79,108-10, 112, 122,126-7,129, 131, 138,149

see also transcendence intention, 10,11,12,18, 32, 48-9,191

n.38, 195 n. 72 empty intention, 9, 31, 36, 117, 183

n.16 fulfilled intention, 12, 32 meaning-intention, 8-9, 12, 183

n. 17, 184 n. 22 unfulfilled intention, 49,183 n. 17

intentionality, xxv, 9-10, 35, 108 longitudinal [Langsintentionalitdt],

50,59, 61,62, 70,179 n.93 intentional morphe, 38

see also matter versus form intentional object, 5, 40, 182 n.5, 188

n . l l internalism, xxiv-xxv, 3, 5 intuition, 11-2, 16, 50-1 , 116, 133-4

categorial intuition, 11-2, 184-5 n.27

sensible intuition, 11, 42-3, 144, 184n.21

Kehre (Turning), 141, 180, 210 kinaesthesia, 2, 154-5, 158, 159-60,

163

language [Sprache], xx, 5-6,64,75,142, 167-80,183 n. 10, 200-1 n. 18, 201 n. 19, 206 n.63, 222 n.9, 223 nn.14, 15,17, 18,19,224n.24, 226 n. 35

language-games, 224-5 n.29 leaps or jumps over [uberspnngen],

xxiv, 15,29, 114, 141,142 lived experiences [Erlebnisse], 3, 24, 27,

30-5, 37, 39, 40, 50, 53, 55-56, 59-62,67, 68, 189 n. 19, 191 n.42,192 nn.45,48, 49,195 n.70

material, 42, 43, 96, 118, 155 material extension (versus spiritual

extension), 125

material nature, 204 n.51 material world, xxvii, 29, 87, 102,

106,141,142,147,149,165,171 materialism, 158, 215 n.46 materiality, 78, 87-8, 92, 97, 99-104,

106,107,142,147,175 matter, 7, 12, 42, 125, 143, 159, 196

n.77 versus form, 38-40, 43, 44, 153,

184-5 n.27 see also sensuous hyle

methodological solipsism, xxv, 3, 4-5

natural attitude, 15-6, 20, 108, 150 neo-Kantianism, 22 noema, 16-7

object that is intended and object as it is intended, 6, 7, 17

objectivity, 5-7, 12-3, 118-9, 157, 187 n. 2, 224 n. 24

ontology versus epistemology, 19-20, 21

passive synthesis, 66 passivity, 153, 155, 157 praxis, 92, 93, 170, 205 n.58 protention, 48-50

receptivity, 11,42-3, 184 n. 21 reference, 7-8 retention, 34-6

sensuous hyle, 38-52, 155, 157 see also matter versus form

sign, 12, 41, 102,104, 169, 174-5, 187 n.9, 194n.60, 201 n. 19, 208 n.83, 222 n.6, 226n.35

versus equipment, 98-100, 208 n. 85 versus expression, 182 n.6

skepticism, xx-xxiv, xxv, 15-6, 19, 21 space, 6, 9, 24-5, 29, 37, 55, 62, 66, 79-

85,101,107,113-7,120,121, 123-6, 142,143-5,146,151-3, 157-65 passim, 178-80, 203 n.39, 216 nn.54, 55, 219 nn.7, 13,221 n.48

SUBJECT INDEX 239

spatiality, 31, 81-7, 100-2, 114,122-6, 141, 142-6, 151, 158, 165, 178-80, 203 n.38, 204 nn.43, 45, 208 n.91,216n.55, 225n.31

spontaneity, 11, 43, 146, 158,159, 163, 184n.21,215n.41

state of affairs, 8-9, 12-3, 183-4 n. 19 synthesis, 12, 17, 34, 38, 54-5, 66, 131,

184-5 n. 27, 190 nn. 33, 34

transcendence, 108-10, 113-4, 125, 130

see also immanence transcendental object, 42-4, 46-7, 64 transcendental reduction, xxv, 14-6,

18,22, 23,29, 30,78,87,90,107, 118, 133, 137, 197 n.85, 212 n . l 8 , 2 1 7 n . 6 9 , 2 2 3 n . l 4

transcendental subject, 118, 122, 133, 192 n.47, 193-4 n.55, 201 n.23

transcendental subjectivity, 38, 131, 135-6,153,189 n.22,217 nn.68, 71

transcendental turn, xxv, 13-5 transverse intentionality [ Quenntention-

alitdt], 59

vorhanden [present-at-hand], 45, 104, 105,117,1234

worldless (subject, ego, or beginning), xxiv, 23, 72, 87,188-9, 111, 123, 129

zuhanden [ready-to-hand], 94-5, 98-9, 101,102, 105, 123,174, 207 n. 75