american institutional penetration into greek military & political policymaking structures [june...

7/28/2019 American Institutional Penetration Into Greek Military & Political Policymaking Structures [June 1947-October 1949]

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A m erican Institut iona l Pen etrat ion intoG reek M ilitary & Po lit ical Pol icym akingStructures: Jun e 1947-October 1949

by MICHAEL MARK AMEN

(A) The Case Study Method In Foreign Policy AnalysisA vast amou nt of published interpretative material on European-Am erican relations in the early C old W ar years is available for anyonewho seeks a readymade explanation of A merican foreign relations im-mediately after W orld W ar II. This literature, supported by official un-published docum ents of governments, can be divided into categories ofhistorical I and theoretical approaches. 2 N either position, however, operateswithin an inductive framework w hich would provide a cumulative move-ment toward an objective understanding of Am erican foreign relationsduring the C old W ar. Consequen tly, w e find ourselves stalled insteadof progressing to a verifiable and definitive interpretation of Am ericanpolicies after the war. This immobility has produced a third body ofwritings, the purpose of which appears to be qu ibbling w ith accusationsthat government docum ents are being exploited to support preconceivedviews about U nited States world intentions in the 1940 's. 2 This kind ofwriting serves no purposes and deserves no consideration when it reaches

the level of questioning the personal competence of scholars.1 For literature from the various historical schools (orthodox, revisionist, anti-and neo-revisionists), see the comprehensive bibliographic note #1, p. 1-2 inSteinert, Marlis G. and Nolte, Earl C., "La Guerre Froide et l'Europe: Variationssur un theme," I.U.H.E.I., January 1976.

This approach encompasses the literature of those who make use of Cold Warhistorical data in order to develop models of world politics. Characteristic amongthese are the contributors to Rosenau, James (ed.), International Politics andForeign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1969 (rev. ed.). Note especially theselections by Stanley Hoffman, p. 30-41; Morton Kaplan, p. 291-303; and severalpieces in Part V, pp. 457-724. One receives the impression from reading manyof these works that a deductive process is in operation, with the data being conformedto various models of the world political order. This same impression may alsoapply to those who employ concepts of colonialism, imperialism, and their "neo"forms. The author could cite his own work as an example: Amen, Michael Mark,"American Foreign Policy in Greece-1944-1949: Economic, Military and In-stitutional Aspects," unpublished doctoral thesis at I.U.H.E.I.

The main example of this kind of writing is Maddox, Robert J., The NewLeft and the Origins of the Cold War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.Less offensive but in the same vein, are Holsti, O le R., "The Study of Internat ion al


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90ounNAL O1 THE HELLENIC DIASPORAAn inductive approach could constructively reroute analysis of the

beginning of the C old W ar and m ove research in a profitable direction.The case study method offers such a framework. 4 Though limited logicallyby the invalidity of generalizing on the basis of a particular case as wellas by the static nature of isolating a single point in history, the case studyhas many advantages. Primary among these is the ability to com pile a vastnum ber of interactions betw een the variables which con tribute to themaking of foreign relations. Compilation restricts the subjective elementwhich highlights intuitive approaches to foreign policy. A related limiton the researcher's interference with an accurate account of the policy isthat the required assem blying and organizing of extensive data allowsboth the researcher and reader to discover the subjective, unverifiableelements when all the collected data will not conform to preconceptionsheld by both. At this point, requisite eleme nts of the case study enterin to draw out this interference. T he researc her m ust explain: (1) theprevious history of the case in point, (2) which parameters were set andwhy, (3) how and why the data collected was selected, and (4) thesocialization process of the participants. Moreover, content and interactionanalysis, as quantifiable measurem ents, could be used in points 3 and 4to further objectify the case results.M ost of us, in reference to the historical context of Greek-Americanrelations, are generally familiar with events in Greece from the G ermanoccupation in M ay 1941 through Truman's speech before a joint specialsession of Congress on March 12, 1947. In that address he requested thatG reece and Turkey be helped "primarily through economic and financialaid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."But the meaning of these events as representative of American interestsin G reece escapes any general intrepretation when one considers theambiguous A merican activities there in the immediate postwar period:its actions through the O ffice of Strategic Services, the British led postwaroccupation program , the Joint Transportation Facilities M ission, theUnited N ations Re lief and R ehabilitation A gency program, the A lliedM ission for the G reek Elections, and the Export-Import B ank. Thus,the analysis of Am erican actions in G reece after June 1947 evolves froma period wh ich cannot be c onclusively used to explain the data whichfollows. Nonetheless, it is certainly dear that the United States was involvedPolitics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and RadicalLeft," American Political Science Review, vol. 68, no. 1, January 1974, pp. 217-242and Leigh, Michael, "Is there a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the ColdWar," Political Science Quarterly, March 1974, pp. 101-116.

4 The classic example of a consistent use of this method is Paige, Glenn, T heKorean Decision, New York: The Free Press, 1968. For a brief but critical evalua-tion of the shortcomings of the case study approach see Garson, G. David, Hand-book of Political Science Methods, Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1971, p. 69-72.Truman, Harry S., speech, March 12, 1947, Public Papers of the Presidentof the United States: Harry S. Truman, vol. 3, p. 178.


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A m erican Pene tration Into Gree k S tructures1economically, politically, and militarily in Greece w ell before 1947 . 6The involvem ent of other Allied powers in Greece, particularlyEngland and the S oviet Union, during the war and early postwar periodalso does not clear up the intent of Am erican actions during the G reekCivil War. M any explanations of American involvement during this periodcenter around either the B ritish inability to maintain its role of protectorin Greece after February 1947 or the Soviet Union's desire to bring G reecew ithin its sphere of influnece after W orld W ar II. B oth explanationsare unsatisfactory. There is evidence that the U nited States was alreadyactively involved an d interested in playing a m ajor role in G reece bylate 1945, and this contradicts finding the answer in the B ritish role. O nthe other han d, there is very little evidenc e to supp ort the contentionthat the Soviet Union ever had an interest in m aking G reece part of itsbloc.' C onsequ ently, w e are required to put aside preco nceived inter-pretations as much as possible and reconsider the acts of the United Statesthrough the major missions it established after Congressional endorsementof the Truman D octrine.In the context of European-American relations, the employm ent ofthe case study necessitates the setting of parameters within which certainvariables can be a rtifically isolated for examination. Therefore, this paperon A merican policies in G reece is only concerned w ith collecting dataon the actions of and interactions between Americans both officials whoheld positions in the Trum an A dm inistration either in W ashington orin foreign m issions w hich had program s in G reece as w ell as privateAm erican citizens employed by the G reek government. It is not the in-tention of this paper to collect or interpret data on the activities of otherforeign nationals or governments, though their activities are occasionallymentioned to provide a context for Am erican movem ents. The adoptionof this parameter was prompted by the desire of the researcher to spendall his time thoroughly examining Am erican sources and to surmou ntproblem s related to travel, access to documents, and language barriers.Eventually, of course, a full analysis of the topic will require research onat least the ac tivities of the go vernm ents and c itizens of E ngland, theSoviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece.The time frame in which Am erican activities are examined is fromthe establishment of the American M ission to Aid G reece (AM AG ) inJune 1947 to the end of the Greek Civil War in October 1949. 8 The

Amen, M.M. op. cit., pp. 89-90, 93-262 and 274-78.7 Ibid., pp. 264-275. There is no proof that the Soviet Union was either directlyor indirectly supporting the insurgent movement from the time of the declarationof revolt in December 1946 until the end of the Civil War. Until such proof surfaces,it is feasible to assume that Stalin abided by his informal agreement with Churchillin October 1944 over division of the Balkans. Consequently, the Truman Adminis-tration's contention that there was a Soviet threat in Greece appears to be basedeither on ignorance or deception.8 It must be noted here that American military involvement in Greece tookplace in an unbroken line at least from the operations of the Office of StrategicServices in early 1943. Amen, M. M., op . cit., pp. 131, 273-274.


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92OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORAstarting date was selected because it suggested a new point in Americanactivities inside G reece and a significant change in the m ethod for con-ducting Am erican foreign relations during times of w orld peace. Thetermination date was accep ted due to limited access to docum ents ofthe Am erican government after 1948 and to the conclusion of the CivilW ar for which AMAG and other mission structures were created.A further limit on the data in this study is set in the kind of activitieswhich have been selected. W hile A merican governmen t officials andprivate citizens in the U nited States and G reece w ere politically andeconomically active in conducting A merican relations in G reece, datais presented only on A me rican decisions and their im plemen tation inregard to military matters affecting the outcome of the G reek C ivil W ar.Though a significant am ount of research has already been done on allAm erican activities during the tim e frame , the confines of this paperdo not allow for such an ex tensive presentation. The kinds of activities con-sidered here, howev er, provide a cross-section of data w hich appearsnot to misrepresent other American actions or falsify conclusions drawnonly from the major dec isions on m ilitary issues.The data was selected from available materials of the United Statesgovernment deposited in its National Archives, the Library of C ongress,the Truman L ibrary, the Army H istorical Library at Ft. M cN air, the AirHistory D ivision at Maxwell Air Force Base, as well as from correspond-ence and interviews with some of the participants.The m ost reliable me thod available to select data for a historicallydocumented topic is conten t analysis. This quantifiable method of cor-relating the frequency of words and positions contained in printedmaterials with the views of participants and policies adopted could resultin plausible conclusions w hich w ould attribute the authorship of andexplain the meaning behind actions taken. In the present case, however,several problems made content analysis unworkable: (1) lack of extensiveaccess to m aterial on military decisionmaking, (2) n-depth knowledgeof the socialization backg rounds of participants (see below), and (3) in-ability to attribute authorship to many gove rnme nt docum ents. Con-sequen tly, the present data was selected from the previously men tionedsources which w ere available as of April 1974 . In searching through thismaterial, data wa s extracted whe never: (a) it contained a reference toAmerican military, strategic or security interests, or expenditures in Greece,(b) its authorship could be clearly tied to a m em ber or agenc y of theUnited States Armed Forces, and (c) the content or authorship occurredbetween June 1947 and O ctober 1949. H aving completed the search,the data w as then filtered to classify only that part wh ich shed light onthe meaning of American decisions and their implementation to affect themilitary outcome of the Greek Civil War. The selection process employedhere, therefore, is necessarily only at a primitive stage w herein the im-mediate objective must be to bring into the public forum previouslyunpu blished docum ents on the topic. With the circulation and first in-


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A m erican Penetration Into Greek S tructures3terpretation of this data, leads should be provided for further researchon the subject.A complete analysis of this topic, furthermore, would require afamiliarity w ith the pa rticipants in the case. This information m ay bethe most difficult to obtain, especially when the research covers a periodbeyond the life span of the participants or is of such a sensitive naturethat participants wish no t to discuss their roles.' The m ajor task of thepresent research w as merely to ascertain who the participants were andto determine authorship of printed m atter. The n ext step would be todeterm ine the social and political culture influencing the participants,as well as their attitudes and behavior toward A merican relations withGreece." Then one might attempt to classify the actors in terms, forinstance, of Bales' types of behavior." Employing such types could resultin statem ents about the kind and /or degree of participation and , con-sequently, who was responsible for the decisions made in the present topic.This kind of assertion would certainly advance the explanation in a com-prehensive direction.In com piling the data there w as often difficulty in upholding thedistinction between a decision and an implementation. Sometimes it seemedthat an implementation of a decision was in fact an ac tion unrelated to oraltering a decision though the authority given under the previous decisionw as used to legitim ate the act. The " implem enting" act, howe ver, in-fluenced conditions inside Greece in such a way that a new decision followedit and w as at least who lly com patible with the act. In this case, "imple-menting" acts appeared to "bring about" certain major new decisions."How then should decisionmaking and implementing data be classed?Tw o areas of interaction were predom inant in the case: dec ision-making exc hanges (which w ere officially resolved in W ashington) andAm erican econom ic assistance and military advising a ctions (whichoccurred always in G reece). W hile the former w ere clearly decision-making situations, occasionally the latter also appeared to be of a decision-

Evidence of this reluctance w as attested to by L t. General James V an Fleet, theHead of the JUSM AP G , who refused either to meet the author or answer questionsin writing.I This may lead into a psyc ho-historical approach to the study of foreign re-lations. This direction is full of danger, especially whe n taken by historians andpolitical scientists who h ave no com petence in psychological analysis. The bestexam ple of a comp etent approach is Erikson's wo rk on Luther. The dangers canbe seen in Brodie's work on Jefferson.11 Bales, Robert F., Interaction Process A nalysis: A Method for the Study ofSmall Groups, Reading M ass.: Addison-Wesley, 1950.12 The m ingling of official roles which leads to a much m ore comp lex accountthan the chain-of-comm and system of w ho and how policies are made has given riseto a new body o f literature on bureaucratic politics which holds muc h promise forthose interested in understanding the policymaking process. In the area of Americanforeign policym aking two recent w orks are worth citing: Halperin, M orton, B u-reaucratic Politics And Foreign Policy, W ashington: Brookings Institution, 197 4and Arkes, Hadley, Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan and the National Interest,Princeton: Princeton University P ress, 1972. See also footnote 56.


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9 4 OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORAmaking character. This was most obvious when the latter deviated fromprevious officially made decisions. Should these actions to use Am ericaneconomic and m ilitary aid be classified as implementing acts or decisionacts? T he resolution of this problem in classifying the data maintains thetraditional distinction between formal policymaking and enactment, whilethe conclusions w ill not support this method of classification. Abidingby this discrepanc y guards aga inst the accusation of having biased theresults through organizational procedures.Traditionally, in the formal chain-of-com m and system officiallyfollowed by the United S tates government, decisionmakers are clusteredin the W ashington Federal bureaucracy and imp lementing agents aredispersed both within the W ashington bureaus and the various missionsin the field. In using this distinction, what follows is only the datacovering decisions related to military matters which were usually m adewithin the formal channels of authority. Presentation of the data on thoseactivities of the implementors in the field in their use of economic aid andmilitary advice for military ends would exceed the scope of this paper.Though this data w ould pose a definitive challenge to those w ho arguefor the official policymaking processes' validity, even the dec isionmakingdata calls into question the accuracy of this explanation for policymaking.The implementing data can be used as supportive evidence in arriving atpreliminary conc lusions about the American decisionmaking process andthe meaning of U nited S tates relations with G reece during the C ivil W arperiod.(B) The Data on American Military and Political Decisions in Greece

Through Executive Order 9857 on M ay 22, 1947, President Trumanauthorized S ecretary of State M arshall to use the power C ongress hadgiven him under S enate Bill 938 (P ublic L aw 7 5), which appropriatedfunds for the Trum an D octrine implementation in G reece and Turkey,to administer and formulate policy related to the program. O n June 15,in a note signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Tsaldaris, the GreekG overnment stated that the assistance "w ould be used in conformancewith the purposes for which it may be made available." The note requestedAm erican personnel to assist in G reek recove ry and the creation of aM ission to "adm inister the extension of Am erican aid, observe its use bythe Greek G overnment, and advise the Greek G overnment." The M issionwas to participate in the development of revenue and expenditure policies,approve Government expenditures involving the use of PL 75 funds, takepart in the import program, approve the use of foreign exchange, as wellas assist in the execution of reconstruction projects, improvement of publicadm inistration, technical training of c ivil servants and other personnel,development of exports, promotion of agricultural and industrial recovery,and regulation of w ages and p rices. O n the basis of this note, the twogovernments entered into a formal agreement on June 20 which bound


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A m erican Pene tration into Greek S tructures5the Greek government to follow the economic program it had presentedin its June 15 note. Agreeing to send the Am erican M ission for Aid toG reece (AM AG ) to represent the United States government on mattersrelating to assistance, Article 4 of the Agreem ent gave the Chief of theM ission power to determine "the terms and conditions upon which spe-cified assistance shall from time to time be furnished under this Agree-ment." It further stated that the C hief would provide "advisory assist-ance . . . to make the most effective use" of American assistance and Greekresources."W ith the approval of the Departmen ts of State, Treasury, W ar, andN avy, Secretary of State M arshall sent an official letter of instruction toTruman's choice as Chief of AMAG , Dw ight Griswold, on July 10, 1947,prior to his departure for Greece, which outlined the interests underlyingthe United States program about to be set up in G reece." United Statespolitical and economic objectives and responsibilities were stated at thattime though ambiguity over political responsibilities later caused se riousproblems between G riswold and Lincoln M acV eagh, the American Am-bassador in Greece. The instructions, however, made no mention ofresponsibility for the military program in G reece. There apparently wasan understanding that, as Chief of a M ission which com bined both aneconom ic and military program, Griswold was responsible for the policiescarried out by both programs."Chart 1 represents the organization of AM AG as conceived by theSpecial Executive D epartmental Comm ittee in June 1947. The originaleconomic program included nine divisions suggested by the Interdepart-mental Com mittee on Greek-Turkish Aid. Chart 2 indicates the evolutionof AM AG between September and December 1947 , effected by changeswhich the M ission made . As originally proposed in June 1947 , the policyline for military program actions was from the Army an d N avy G roupsthrough the Chief of M ission to the State D epartment, which consultedthe Armed Forces D epartments and the N ational M ilitary Establishment

For Public Law 75 see U.S. Statutes at Large, 80th C ongress, 1st Session,1947 , vol. 61, Part 1, pp. 103-105. For the P resident 's M ay 22, 19 47, statement seePublic Papers, op. cit., pp. 254-255. For the June 15 note, see Department of State,Report to Congress, Report 1, Appendix K, pp. 49-52. For the formal agreement,see ibid., Appendix H, pp. 35-38. See also 868.00/9-3047, Howard to McGhee,draft, "Greek Budget Agreement," Record Group (RG) 59 (General Records ofthe Department of State), National Archives, Washington, D.C. (NA)."Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: DiplomaticPapers, 1932-(FR), 1947, vol. 5, p. 2191f. For the origins and meaning of theofficial instructions which rev eal that they did n ot include all instructions G riswoldwas given, see 868.00/4-847, Lunning to Peurifoy, memorandum; 868.00/6-347,Snyder to Acheson, memorandum and Acheson to Snyder, memorandum (19 June);868.00/6-2747, Marshall to Patterson and Forrestal, memorandum; indicating thatG riswold met Love tt and M arshall to discuss the "broader aspects of his assignmentwhich could not be covered in his Letter of Instructions ..." see 868.00/7-747,M cGhee to Lovett, memorandum, RG 59, NA . - ,

15 This understanding was expressed in 868.00/2747, RG 59, NA. McGhee,"The Impact of Foreign Com mitments upon the Coordinative Responsibilities of theDepartment of State," pamphlet, p. 51.


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TEMPORARY ADVIS-ORY GROUPS(civil corvine, tax,customs, gar% admin.,labor, agri., budget,health) 50 (4 months) $ 188,667

PROGRAM PLANNINGAND COORDINATION57,880 OFFICE OF TIIE CHEF.10 $ 08,010 LEGAL10 $ 54,840

MISSION ADMINISTRATIONAND FINANCE

a) office of chiefh) finance sectionc) reports section4) administrative serviceFOREIGN TRADE`AND SUPPLY

64. $ 217,820

military :Lprogrant, INFORMATION

19 $ 107,100PUBLIC FINANCE

17 $ 192,460PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-TION

6 $ 46,460REL. AND WELFARE(PI. 94)

1. 9

I PUBLIC 911CALTH 4 $ 80,280

RECONSTRUCTION 49 $ 90, 480

R INDUSTRY'8 . 252,480LABOR

5 $'45,240

personnel obisU.S. 178(excludingGreek ig 50 advioory)

1262,480Greek $S7.3 000$ 1,998,460

(s division

96 $ 209,840

_navy prof._i

AGRICULTURE.

17 . $ 118,640

96OURN AL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORACHART 1

ORGAN IZATION OF AM ERICAN MISSION TO AID GREECEJUNE 1947

SOURCE: 688.00/5-2247, "Assistance to Ciremos and Turkey: Budget Estimates," 160 59. NA.

on issues pertinent to them. Recommendations on important policydecisions related to the military program were obtained from the Secretaryof D efense, who could refer them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 16In August 1947 questions arose about the role of the Army G roup(USAG G) in waging the war against the Greek insurgents, and it resultedin changing the procedures initially adopted for official policym aking.The original purpose of the Arm y G roup, as envisioned in the spring of1947 , was to serve primarily as a supply procurement organization and totrain G reeks in the use of purely Am erican-type equipm ent. As earlyas July, prior to the arrival of Griswold in. Greece, M arshall sent a memoto and then met w ith Truman to advise him that the m ilitary situation inGreece was worsening " and could be compared to the Dardanelles situation(between the Soviet Union and Turkey) during the summer of 1946 whichprompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) military arms sale policydecision in August of that same year. The m eeting m ay have prom ptedboth Kennan in the State D epartment 's Policy P lanning S taff and the

"McGhee, Ibid. and Interview, George C. M cGhee, December 6, 1973, Wash-ington, D.C.17868.00/7-1547, Lovett to Marshall, memorandum; 868.00/74647, M arshallto Truman, memorandum; 868.00/7-1747 , M arshall to L ovett and Armour, mem o-randum (concerning sending a memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretariesof W ar and N avy on military developments in Greece), RG 59, N A.


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98OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORAN ational Security Council to consider whether and under what conditionsUnited States forces should be sent to G reece. But by mid-October 194 7no recom mend ation had been m ade by either body."' By A ugust, "theU SA G G becam e quite naturally involved in the problem of developingthe G reek N ational Arm y into a m ore effective fiighting force." 19 Itsday-to-day operations widened its de facto responsibility a s it beganassuming a role, on its own initiative, beyond procurem ent and training inthe use of equipment.As the de facto role of USA GG expanded in August and September,Griswold cabled the O ffice of the Coordinator, headed by G eorge McGhee,at the State Department that the military situation had worsened in G reece.He recommended that AM AG give "operational advice" to the G reekG eneral Staff and Army and that Am erican troops replace British troopsif the latter should w ithdraw from G reece ." Griswold's cable arrivedshortly after Cromie of the State Department recommended to Hendersonthat the United States take "operational control of the Greek Arm y" andG endarmerie, that the Air Force role in w aging the war be expanded,and that the Adm inistration be w illing to send a "token force to G reeceplus remobilization at hom e" to force the S oviets to pause and considertheir involvement in G reece." G riswold's telegram apparently promptedthe State Department to request from the Army D epartment that they sendLt. G eneral Stephen Cham berlin to Athens to survey the "broad strategicand ope rational factors of the present m ilitary situation" and m ake arecomm endation to the Army on Griswold's proposal. 22Cham berlin arrived in Athens in late September, and on O ctober 8cabled the Army D epartment, supporting Griswold's recommendation onoperational advice." Lovett, an Undersecretary in the State Department,then told W ilds in the same D epartment to request the Army Departmentto formulate their position on offering ope rational advice and sendingAmerican troops so that it could be given to the N ational Security Council.Acc ording to Love tt, no action should have been taken until the P res-ident made a decision and a final vote w as taken in the U nited N ationsGeneral Assembly on the Greek border question. Furthermore, Wiles statedthat no decision should be m ade until the P olicy P lanning S taff and theN ational Security Council made recommendations on sending American

18 868.00/10-1147, Wilds to Lovett, memorandum, RG 59, NA. See 868.00/7-1747, RG 59, NA, for the Policy Planning Staff's consideration of the question inJuly .USAGG: Brief History, p. 14ff. See also USAGG: History, vol. 2, FY 1948,RG 334 (Records of Interservice Agencies), Modern Military Branch (MMB), NA.

80 868.00/9-1547, Griswold to Wilds, AMAG 222, 4p. and 868.00/9-647,Griswold to McGhee, AMAG 191, RG 59, NA.91 711.68/9-247, Cromie to Henderson, memorandum, "Comments on Amer-ican Policy with Respect to Greece," pp. 3 and 5, RG 59, NA.22 868.00/9-1647, Lovett to Keeley and Griswold, tel. 1565, RG 59, NA." For Griswold's recommendations after AMAG 196 and 222, see 868.00/10-947, Griswold to State Department, AMAG 334, 4p. For Chamberlin's position,see FR 1947, vol. 5, p. 370 (8 October),


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American Penetration Into Greek Structures9forces since this would affect the operational advice question."

O n O ctober 20, Cham berlin submitted his report to Eisenhower, theArmy Chief of Staff, recommending that there be established aU.S. Advisory and P lanning G roup under nominal control ofthe Ambassador, but reporting directly to the JCS, with missionof planning and furnishing advice to the U.S. Ambassador, theCh ief of the Aid M ission and the U .S. Armed Forces on thedeveloping situation and in the coordination of the U .S. militaryeffort, and additionally furnishing high level military advice,coordinated with British, to the Greek Government and its

armed forces...5The report further recomm ended the establishment of Am erican ArmyO bservers in the field to take "operational action, restoring the offensivespirit and advising on planning and operations." O n O ctober 27, theN ational Security Council informally considered Cham berlin's report, andthree days later, Admiral Sidney Souers, its Execu tive Secretary, sent adraft statement to the Council members for their approval. Souer's draft,which w as approved by the Counc il, endorsed Cham berlin's proposal foran Advisory and Planning Group to "provide high staff advice to the Greekforces, and to place observers w ith Greek military units down to and in-cluding divisions." "The C ouncil statement established the Group, know n as the JointUnited States M ilitary Advisory and Planning G roup (JUSM AP G ), aspart of AM AG . But JUSM AP G was to have direct communication withthe Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters conce rning military operations. Thehead of JUS M AP G was given responsibility for all military decisions inthe field of operational advice that did not affect overall AM AG policiesor activities. On November 3, the President approved the NSC recommen-dation."Prior to the N SC statement and the President's approval, a small plansand policies group joined the USA G G staff in Athens to work out theextension of the authority of the U.S. Arm y, Navy, and Air Force Groupsthere. According to the Army Group, this action was intended "to includethe full advisory func tions provided for in P L 75." 28 American officersbegan arriving in Greece in December, and, on December 31, JUSM AP G" 868.00/10-1147, RG 59, NA; 868.00/10-1547, Wilds, memorandum (of

15 October conversation with Lovett), RG 59, NA.22 FR 1947, vol. 5, p. 376." 868.20 Missions/11-447, Souers to National Security Council, memorandum(30 October), RG 59, NA.27 868.00/10-1347, Lovett to Souers, memorandum (28 November); 868.00/10-2447, Lovett to Forrestal, memorandum; 868.00/10-2747, Jernegan to Hender-son, memorandum; 868.00/11-1347, Arnold (War Department) to Lovett, memo-randum (on Secretary of War Royal's and Lovett's approaching Congressmen toinform them of the decision), RG 59, NA.USAGG Brief History, p. 14ff, RG 334, MMB, NA.


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100OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORAwas officially established." Its origins had been in the de facto expansionof U SA G G 's role in August and possibly the July considerations of theN SC and State Policy Planning G roup to send American forces to G reece.The dec ision w as prompted by the recom mendations of G riswold, latersupported by C hamberlin, with approval of the Army D epartment, theN SC, and, finally, the P resident.As disagreement sharpened between G riswold and M acV eagh overthe power of each in internal G reek political affairs, in conjunction withplans to expand the military role of AM AG , the State Department workedout new instructions for relations between the Ambassador and the C hiefon high policy issues. Sauer of the State Department requested the approvalof N SC for its O ctober 23 position on the organization of A mericanactivities in Greece. This statement apparently originated in the O fficeof the U ndersecretary of S tate, and was meant to supplement the July 11instructions to Griswold. This statement recom mended that the Ambas-sador be recognized as the American representative in G reece "chargedwith dealing w ith the G reek governm ent on m atters of high policy."A high policy dec ision was defined as

one w hich involves major political factors or repercu ssionsapart from the techn ical desirability or undesirability of theaction proposed."In high policy decisions affecting A M AG , when disagreement existedbetween the Ambassador and the C hief or his principal military or navalsubordinates, the statement recom mended that the views be presented tothe Department before any action was taken.In AM AG matters not involving high policy, the Chief of AM AGhad sole responsibility for decisions. If any decision involved a new ex-penditure or a reallocation of AM AG funds, it could be made only withthe Ch ief's approval or on the basis of decisions taken in W ashington.All decisions involving military and naval assistance in the form ofsupplies, advice on logistics, training, or operations were to be handled bythe military and naval units of AM AG . High policy decisions in theseareas were subject to the Ambassador's approval. All other decisions wereto be taken by the Chief in consultation w ith his principal military andnaval subordinates. It was expected, however, that in the area of operationaladvice, the Chief w ould let military and naval subordinates make dec isionswhich did not affect overall AMAG policies or activities. Military decisionsinvolving high policy were to be brough t to the Am bassador's attentionby the Chief. The proposal was approved by the N SC and then the P resi-dent on N ovember 3.

29 For relations between JUSMAPG and the British Military Mission (13MM),see 868.00/12-347, Griswold to State Department, AMAG 581; 868.00/12-947,Marshall to Lovett, tel. 2086; 868.20/12-1247, Anschuetz to Henderson, memo-randum, RG 59, NA.3 FR 1947, vol. 5, pp. 393-94.


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A m erican Pene tration Into Gree k S tructures01Griswold immediately protested the new instructions, which he felt

militated against AM AG 's coordination of economic activities with politi-cal and military decisions. He not only opposed the new instructions, butstated that he needed wider powers and that it was "impossible if a goodjob is to be d one here to refer everything back to W ashington or take itup through an Ambassador." He recomm ended that no changes be madeand that the relations between the Chief and the Ambassador be kept asthey were set up in July." The Chief's protest led to Truman's withdrawalof the proposal; only paragraph 6 of the statement was kept. This sectiongave the heads of the army a nd naval units decisionmak ing powe r inadvice on logistics, training, and operations to the G reek force if theseareas did not affect overall AM AG policies and activities."By the end of N ovember 19 47, therefore, the President had givenapproval to G riswold's recomm endation that the Chief of AM AG beallowed to intervence in high political issues as they affected AM AGactivities. M ilitary decisions were left for the head of JUSM AP G unlessthey affected AM AG activities, in w hich case the Chief had to give hisapproval." O n econom ic activities, the Chief of AM AG retained auton-omous decisionmaking control.Chart 3 represents the organizational relationship and lines ofdecisionmaking between AMAG and JUSM AP G w hich were establishedby the spring of 1948 pursuant to the decision to offer operational adviceto the Greek Armed Forces. The chart indicates that the Executive Sectionof AM AG was directly responsible for logistic (procurement of militarysupplies and training in their use) and ad m inistrative functions givento USAG G. Apparently, these areas were considered as directly affectingAM AG activities according to the N ovember 1947 arrangement. Determi-nation of military aid uses as well as additional fund recommendationswere initiated in the Budget and Fiscal D ivision of USA G G 's Logisticsgroup but subject to the approval of the Chief of AM AG prior to sub-mission to the S tate Departm ent." The same relations existed between

31 868.00/11-447, Griswold to State Department, AMAG 471 and 868.00/11-1447, Griswold to State Department, AMAG 421, RG 59, NA. Further backgrounddocuments for the new instructions can be found in FR 1947, vol. 5, pp. 395-416.For the positions of the Executive Branch and Griswold, see Griswold to Patterson,letter, 20 November 1947, and Patterson to Griswold, letter, 28 November 1947,Patterson Papers, "General Correspondence: 1947-1952," Library of Congress,Washington, D.C.32 FR 1947, vol. 5, p. 416. See also 868.00/11-1447, Lovett to Griswold, GAMA484 (personally approved by Truman and Marshall); 868.00/10-1347, Lovett toSouers, RG 59, NA and 868.20/12-1247, Anschuetz to Henderson, p. 1, RG 59, NA." 868.20/12-2447, Lovett to Griswold, GAMA 718 (30 December) and 868.00/12-2447, Griswold to State Department, AMAG 722, RG 59, NA."The request for further military program funds came through the BudgetDivision of USAGG. See USAGG: Brief History, RG 334, MMB, NA, pp. 19-23.For AMAG and State Department determination of ECA economic aid to Greecefor fiscal year 1948, see 868.00/10-1047CS/ERP, Griswold to McGhee, letter;868.00/11-647, McGhee to Dort, memorandum; 868.00/11-1347, Herter to Taber,letter, RG 59, NA.


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102OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORAthe Executive Section and the N avy G roup. Operational advice given tothe Armed Forces was ultimately subject to the approval of the Directorand Executive Com mittee of JUSM AP G who, in turn, were under theJoint Chiefs of Staff in W ashington.' Recomm endations for advice givento the Armed Forces w ere initiated by teams in the field, passed throughthe adviser on operations and the Assistant Director of JUS M AP G , andultimately approved by the m ilitary group's Director and Executive Com -mittee. AMAG's Executive Section had no authoritative role in the approvalof advice except insofar as it affected economic operations of the M ission.This arrangement continued until the ECA G reek M ission took over theeconom ic responsibilities of AM AG on July 1, 1948.The establishment of EC A and the appointment of Hen ry G radyas Am bassador in July 194 8 led to a new decisionmak ing relationshipbetween Am erican personnel involved in the p olitical, economic, andmilitary programs of the United States. This change can be seen in Chart 4,which represents the relationship in operation after the fall of 194 8. InM arshall's letter of instruction to G rady, the State D epartment attemptedto join wha t it referred to as the traditional responsibilities of the A m-bassador in the diplomatic realm and the executive authority given to theSecretary of State by the President under Executive Orders 9857 ofM ay 22, 1947 and 99 44 of April 9, 1948." The Am bassador was thusmade Ch ief of AM AG , and was directly responsible to the Secretary"for conc urrence on dec ision questions of high policy." But the role ofAM AG was redefined. Wh ile it had originally encompassed both theeconom ic and m ilitary programs, w ith the establishment of E CA onlyAM AG 's military functions were continued through the JUS M AP G ,US AG G , and USN G , whose commanding officers were still responsibleto the Chief of AM AG . "O n purely military matters they will continue toreport also to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and their respective D epart-ments." These new arrangements highlighted the autonomy of Americanmilitary means to achieve, United States goals.B y late O ctober 1948, both government personnel in W ashingtonand A thens w ere dissatisfied w ith the appa rent ineffectiveness of themilitary program. T he situation prompted the S tate Departm ent's N earEastern Affairs D ivision and Policy P lanning G roup, as well as the JointChiefs of Staff, to consider increasing the amount of aid for the militaryprogram and/or evolving tactics to make the program m ore effective."Concurren t with the dissatisfaction and ensuing considerations, tensionsbetween Ambassador Grady and EC A C hief John N uveen increased over

"Lt. General James A. Van Fleet assumed command of USAGG and director-ship of JUSM APG on February 24, 1948." Marshall to Grady, letter (undated), 2 p., Grady Papers, Truman Library,Independence, Missouri (TL); Pace (Acting Director of Bureau of the Budget)to Truman, memorandum, April 7, 1948, OF 42, Truman Papers, TL.37 Baxter to Grady, letter, October 28, 1948, Grady Papers, TL. Baxter statedthat "... the Greek situation is causing us (the State Department) concern at themoment."


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1 04OURNAL OP THE HELLENIC DIASPORAquestions of ECA's economic and political roles in Greece. These two areasof instability influence d even ts of a decisionm aking cha racter whichoccurred in late D ecember.Between December 1948 and January 1949 three important decisionswere mad e co ncerning: (1) m ilitary, econom ic, and high p olitical pri-orities in G reece, (2) relations between the Am bassador and the C hiefof the ECA G reek M ission on econom ic issues, and (3) the role of ECAand m ilitary personnel in high political matters. These decisions, of whichonly the first and third w ill be considered, were taken at meetings heldin Washington in December in which the overall direction and effectivenessof the American missions in Greece were discussed. These meetings wereattended by Am bassador Grady, Paul H offman (the head of ECA inWashington), and State Department respresentatives Bruce, Bissel,Dyckinson, Henderson, and W ood.O ne major concern during the talks was the establishment of militaryand econom ic priorities in coordinating the w ork of both AM AG andECA. In stating his position on priorities, Hoffman felt the issue inG reece w as com parable to that in C hina: the question of the peop le'sbelief in the government. Indigenous comm unism could not be eradicatedby m ilitary m eans-

. . . the only way to w in in such a fight is to remedy econom icconditions causing unrest."For Hoffman, the morale of the people and their belief in the governmentdepended on economic conditions, not on military victory over the in-surgents. Grady agreed, stating that "he disapproved substantial increasein military program for this very reason."All participants at the meeting, however,

recognized inevitable competition between m ilitary and refugeerelief problems on one han d and reconstruction program o nother,"as well as the need to expand consum er imports to offset the drachm adrain on the Greek government budget, which w as due to military andrefugee expenditures. Apparently, the practice had been to buy everythingfor the Greek forces w hich could be produced in G reece. This policycaused a drain on the local economy an d required increased imports ofconsum er goods first under the AM AG program and later under ECAto meet G reek needs, which had increased because of the military pro-gram." It was agreed that if the military and refugee program s were givenpriority, the reconstruction program wou ld have to be reduc ed. G rady

38 Hoffman (ECA Director in Washington) to Harriman and Nuveen, tels.531 (to Athens) and 2534 (To Paris), December 25, 1948, p. 1, Grady Papers, TL"Ibid.4 Rountree to McGhee, letter, January 14, 1949, Grady Papers, TL, p. 2.


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106OURNAL Or THE HELLENIC DIASPORAstated that the proposed ECA reconstruction program for G reece couldbe cut "without creating crisis." According to him, the ". . . reconstructionprogram m ust be such as to give Greek G overnment and G reek peoplefaith in future of G reece. . ."

Hoffman summarized the consensus of the group by statingSense of discussion was that military and refugee problem wouldbe given priority; that it would be necessary therefore to em -phasize . . . consumer goods and that proposed reconstructionprogram would have to be cut.

The practical arrangement pursuant to this official priority policy w as thatprior to final approval of the size and nature of the reconstruction program,as well as the final ECA country report on G reece, these would be sub-mitted to Grady for comment 4 1 It was further agreed that Harriman, G rady,and N uveen would work out a program for complete cooperation betweenEC A and G rady. W hile no clear-cut plans were e stablished to createeconom ic conditions which would create a stable government and depressunrest, the military program's priority over economic reconstruction wasaccepted as an operating principle. Thus, by the end of D ecember, theacceptance of priorities, cabled to Harriman and N uveen in Athens, hadbeen made in favor of the military program by the consensus of theAmbassador, the State Department, and the head of ECA in W ashington.The official acceptance of a m ilitary priority in the American program w asan acknowledgment of a fait accompli, the emphasis by personnel in thefield on military means, which had already been expanded to accom plishAmerican objectives, rather than a consensus by those meeting in Washing-ton that this was the best approach. Resolving the military situation hadbecome the primary, immediate objective of American activities in Greece.The third decision, concerning the high political role of EC A andmilitary personnel in G reece, which N uveen had exercised according toGrady, was also made during the Washington meetings in December andinvolved, indirectly, the que stion of the military's role in G reek affairs.Almost simultaneously with these meetings, at N uveen's request, AverellH arriman (Special Envoy to the EC A in P aris for President Truman)went to Greece at the end of December. While it is unclear precisely whyECA 's roving Ambassador went, Harriman becam e involved in a politicalcrisis revolving around attempts to change the composition of the Greekgovernment. W ith support from JUS M AP G D irector James V an Fleetand possibly Harriman, N uveen was promoting the overthrow of a govern-

41 Grady and Nuveen disagreed on the size of the ECA program and staff inGreece. Hoffman felt that the size should be large enough to make optium use offunds. The State Department felt conditions in Greece might have warranted a largerECA mission there than in other countries.42 Interview, Averell Harriman, February 7, 1974, Washington, D.C. He claimedhe went to Greece to examine the ECA program and evaluate Van Fleet's JUSMAPGprogram. For deterioration in the Harriman/Nuveen relationship after the trip, seeHarriman to Nuveen, tel. REPTO 245, January 14, 1949, Grady Papers, TL.


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A m erican Penetration Into Greek S tructures07ment form ed acc ording to parliamentary procedure and supporting, in-stead, the establishment of a military government under General Papagos."Acc ording to G rady, Nu veen had convinced H arriman that the militarygovernment w as a good idea, and both men p roposed the possibility ofsuch a takeover to the King when H arriman w as in G reece. Grady w asin W ashington at the time. This affair may reveal the extent to w hichAmerican military methods had permeated other non-military dimensionsof the American program in G reece, but such a point should be discussedin the conclusion.At the Washington meetings, however, Hoffman agreed with Gradythat the United States could not becom e involved in initiating the over-throw of parliamentary governments and taking responsibility for dictator-ships and authoritarian regimes. The ag reement of the m eeting was that

EC A w ill not agitate for powe rful pressure by U .S. M issionto reconstitute present government by drastic steps. Hoffmanm ade clear EC A not com petent to or intending take officialposition on political situation though obv iously would makeopinions this subject known to S tate Department and G rady fromtime to time since PO LITICAL AN D ECO NO M IC PROB LEM SCANN OT BE WHO LLY SEPARATED."W hile Hoffman was stating the ECA position in W ashington, Harri-man and N uveen were operating on an opposing assumption." On hisreturn to Athens in early January, G rady w as given the impression thatH arriman had supported N uveen and V an Fleet in their efforts to bringabout a military government under Papagos and M arkezinis. The Am-bassador believed that, in conversations w ith K ing P aul, Harriman hadenco uraged the King's thinking to favor such an idea. G rady thoughtthat Harriman and N uveen had given the K ing the impression that theywere expressing ECA's position on governmental changes. M ountbatten,the head of the B ritish M ilitary M ission and a c lose friend of the King,informed G rady that the King was about to follow the two men's wishesover G rady's. W hen c onfronted, N uveen d enied ever raising politicalquestions with the King." Grady cabled Harriman, requesting verificationof his talks with the King and Queen as well as with Markezinis. 41Apparently, Harriman's replies were unsatisfactory, and G rady remained43 Grady, unpublished manuscript, Chapter 12, Grady Papers, TL." Hoffman to Harriman and Nuveen, tels. 531 and 2534, Grady Papers, TL,p. 2-3.

Interview, Harriman; Grady, unpublished manuscript, Grady Papers, TL;Grady saw Harriman's trip to Greece as an attempt to encourage the King to dis-solve parliament as indicated in this manuscript.46 Grady to McGhee, tel. 149, Grady Papers, TL; there he states that Nuveen"has what amounts to an obsession on the Greek political question and has gottenthe ECA staff all worked up on the subject."47 Grady to Harriman, January 12, 1949, telegram (unnumbered), GradyPapers, TL.


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108OURNAL OP THE HELLENIC DIASPORAconvinced of H arriman's support for Nuveen's political interventions andobjectives.As the governmental crisis continued in January, G rady and BritishAm bassador N orton lobbied for a reshuffling of cabinet positions. So-phoulis resigned as Prime M inister on January 15, but at the request ofthe King, who was under the instructions of both Grady and N orton, heformed a new coalition on January 20 . The coalition, which remained untilSophoulis's death in June, was, according to Grady,

the best we hav e had since the elections three years ago .. .wh ich has justified our action. . . . W e kept officially in thebackground but our force was fully felt."The government changes were accom panied by Papagos's appointmentas Com mander-in-Ch ief of the Armed Forces. M arkezinis was m adeM inister without Portfolio. The resolution of the government mak e-upand the manner in which it was to be changed thus favored, for the timebeing, the continued intervention by the Ambassador to bring abou t thekind of government the political sector of the United States governm entwanted. EC A and the military personnel in G reece were denied a directrole in these changes, but, in accordance w ith the D ecember meeting inW ashington, ECA was to m ake its position known to the Am bassador.Apparently, this arrangem ent was uph eld throughout 19 49. W hile theefforts of the American military personnel to intervene in and m ilitarizethe political system w ere also thwarted, this may have been only a tempo-rary setback as events bore out w hen the G reek Rally P arty (EllinikosSynagermos) was created and Papagos became Premier in 1952.The decisions made in December 1948 by the State D epartment, theD irector of the Econom ic Cooperation Adm inistration in W ashington,and Am bassador Grady acknow ledged the factual use of aid in 1948 andreaffirmed its continuation in 1949. The dec isions, furthermore, abidedby the development of A merican military methods and objectives begunin August 1947 by American personnel inside Greece. As embodied notonly in the decisions but in the use of aid as w ell, the goal of the Am ericanM issions in G reece during 1949 was to destroy the insurgent movementwhile attempting to sustain the impression of economic reconstruction andmonetary stabilization. This effort was carried out, however, only to per-petuate a Greek economic subsistence sufficient to create confidence in thegovernment while mobilizing all internal forces for the attainment of am ilitary victory. The A m erican objective during this period appea redto be dearly military.The affirmation of the M issions' military priorities, which deterredreconstruction of the Greek economic and monetary systems, was upheld

48 G rady to Secretary of State and H arriman, telegram (unnum bered), Feb-ruary 21, 194 9, 3 p., G rady Papers, TL . Grady claimed he had full British backing,through British Ambassador N orton, in reshuffling the governm ent and supportingthe continuation of parliament.


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A m erican Pene tration Into Greek S tructures09through 1949. In testimony during C ongressional hearings in August onthe M utual D efense Assistance Act of 194 9, both Am bassador Gradyand Secretary of Defense L ouis Johnson confirmed that the United States'operations in Greece were based on the premise that financial stability andecon om ic developmen t could not occu r until the "guerrilla w ar" wasended." The A mbassador had reversed the position he took at the W ash-ington meetings in 1948.The Executive B ranch's expression of priorities correlated w ith in-creased military activities w hich required increased military expendituresin 1949. A detailed military strategy to destroy insurgent strongho ldsthoughout Greece w as developed from the plans and advice of JUSM AP Gand implemented in three coordinated operations in 1949. Movingfrom the P eloponnese in the south to the G ramm os/Vitsi ranges on thenorthern A lbanian/ G reek border, Ope rations P igeon (January 19 toM arch 31), Rocket (May 1 to June 30), and Torch (Aug ust 2 to 31)systematically uprooted the insurgents from their bases of operation." Theoperational strategy included increasing the size of U nited States militarypersonnel in Greece,' the number of armed villages, as well as the sizeand/or operating capacity of the G reek N ational Army and the Roy alHellenic Air Force. By the beginning of the final major operationin August 1949, the Greek Armed Forces had been enlarged from 176,000in the summer of 1947 to between 250,000 and 260,000. The role of theRH AF in 194 9, m easured in terms of available aircraft, frequency ofmissions flown in counterinsurgency operations, and amount of napalmused," markedly increased in the course of the three operations in 1949.Even after the defeat of the insurgents was considered accomplishedin O ctober, the United States military operations and procurement pro-gram continued at least until the end of the year. From O ctober throughD ecember the mission dealt with problems beyond the internal securitylimits-of-operation defined in P ublic L aw 75. In preparing G reece for

" House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on the Mutual DefenseAssistance Act of 1949, pp. 134-160 (G rady's August 2, 1949 testimony) and 60,103, 111 (Johnson's testimony).5 JUSMAGGHistoryMaps-25 March 1949 to 30 June 1956, p. 135ffand JUSMAPG: Brief History, 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949, p. 22, RG 334,M M B , NA; USA GG: Brief History, RG 334, M M B, N A. These documents containdetailed accounts of the military campaigns, plans, and strategies. They suggestthat the initiative cam e from the Am erican military m issions.51 State D epartment, Reports to Congress. A com parison of Report 1 (June

1947) and Report 8 (June 194 9) indicates the expansion of the Am erican militaryprogram's personnel.52 For the strategy of arming the villagers, a tactic suggested by Van Fleetaccording to Harrim an in my interview w ith him, see Gardne r, unpublished manu-script, Draft Study, Ft. McN air, Army H istory D ivision, and USAGG: Brief History,RG 334, MM B, NA.as Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, M axwell Air Force B ase, M ont-gomery, Alabama, Air Power in the Greek Guerrilla War 1947-1949, prepared byM . A. Campbell , E. W . Dow ns and L. V. Schuetta, 1964 , 74 p. They had accessto government docum ents which were not m ade available to the author.


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1 10OURN AL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORAa possible foreign invasion threat, the mission worked on demobilizationpolicy, the establishment of a demobilization center, and reorganizationof the Greek Armed Forces, as well as continuing to provide. Greece w ithcapital equipment for the Greek National Army and spare parts andgeneral supplies for maintenance of the Greek Armed Forces. 54 Expandedm ilitary operations in 19 49 pre supposed the increase o f military ex-penditures which did, in fact, occur during the period.(C) An Interpretation Of American Military-Related Decisions

The da ta on decisions of United States officials concerning militarymatters in Greece between 1947 and 1949 allows some concluding com-ments first on the A me rican policymaking process. (1) The m aterialindicates a shift in the location of decisionmaking away from the form alcenter of policysetting authority in W ashington to the im plementingcenter in Greece. The majority of the data suggests that American personnelassigned to M issions in G reece or acting on the spot w ere able to havedecisions which they recom mended officially adopted. This conclusion issupported by the following data which appeared in the previous section:(1) USA G G actions in August-September 194 7; (2) G riswold's rec-omm endation on the m ilitary program in September 19 47; (3) the visitand recommendations of Lt. General Chamberlin in October 1947;(4) resolution of the Griswold/M acV eagh dispute in N ovem ber 1947to favor Griswold's position; (5) the increasing autonomy of the militaryprogram in Greece as seen both in actions and mission organization firstof US AG G and then JUSM AP G ; (6) the setting of military prioritiesin December 1948 despite the stated reluctance of those at the Washingtonmeeting to m ake m ilitary objectives the most important; (7) the actionsof Harriman, Nuveen, V an Fleet, and Grady to change the Greek govern-ment in early 19 49; and (8) the military cam paign to destroy the insur-gents in 1949 . (9) The conclusion is also supported by the data, not pre-sented, on the use in the field of Congressional funds appropriated to im-plement the Truman D octrine and the M arshall Plan.(a) W hen the recom mend ations from the field m et no oppositionfrom the formal chain-of-comm and in W ashington, the Mission positionsactually were the starting point for decisionmaking (supported by#1, 2, 3, 5 , 7). (b) W hen opposition existed it was overcome in favorof the recommendations of those in the field (supported by #4, 6).(c) At times, decisions resulted from M ission actions rather than recom -menda tions (supported by #1, 5, 7 and possibly 6, 8). (d) These actions,some of which contradicted official policies (in connection with #1, 2, 5 ,

54 USA GG: Brief History, RG 334, MMB, NA, pp. 60, 109ff and 163-172(arguing that USAGG's role had been automatically expanded because of theM utual Defense P rogram to include considerations beyond Greece's internal security).See also President, Report to Congress on the M utual Defense Assistance Program,Report 1, pp. 34-45.


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American Penetration Into Greek Structures1 16, 7, 9), created situations inside G reece w hich "nec essitated" the kindof decisions taken later. O ne consequence of the supporting data for thefirst conc lusion was the exclusion of Congress from any effective role inoverseeing the appropriations it had mad e for the programs in G reece(supported by #9).Three pieces of data appear to c ontradict the above stateme nts:(1) the regular adoption of a formal authority system w hich gave theimpression that policies continued to be m ade in W ashington. (This isillustrated in the charts as well as in the letters of instruction to Griswoldand Grady) ; (2) the decision to set up JUS M AP G in Novem ber 1947;and (3) the priority setting decisions in D ecem ber 19 48. H ow ever, allthree processes would seem to have existed or taken place to give the im-pression that the formal system w as functioning rather than as accuratereferents to account for who and how dec isions were made.The shift of the decisionmaking center in the G reek case, therefore,calls into question the source of foreign policymaking power in the U nitedStates government. If this development was atypical, then the Greek casemust stand as a deviation from the traditional, officially-explained w ayin which foreign relations develop. Arkes implies that this was the casein the ECA G reek program, especially in its deviation from the policy ofnot intervening in internal affairs." But the rapid expansion of Am ericanfield operations after World War II had automatically increased theforeign relations bureaucracy of the U nited States government. The natureof this bureaucracy, as Halperin adequately demonstrates, encouragesdiffusing dec isionm aking pow er to those in the field." M oreover, thedisaggregation process in the chain-of-comm and system supports thescattering of power in policymaking and could ultimately be a mechanismof the authority system which actually leads to its destruction. Dec ision-making in the G reek case, then, may have been the first of several casesrather than an exc eption. W hen one no tes the num ber of military per-sonnel involved at the field level in an expanded bureaucracy and themilitary quality in priority setting, the G reek ca se further suggests that.the increase in American Missions after World War H led to a permanentmilitary input into foreign policymak ing This input resulted in Am ericanforeign relations which charac teristically had a military orientation astheir basis.

Arkes, op. cit., pp. 244-45 and 316.66 Halperin, op . cit., argues this point very effectively in his work . For other

indications of this, see the following works of those writing on the question ofbureaucratic politics and its consequences for policymaking: H untington, Samuel,Political Order; Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership,N ew Y ork, 1960; Allison, Graham, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the CubaMissile Crisis, Bo ston, 1971; Allison and H alperin, "Bureaucratic P olitics: A P a-radigm and S ome Policy Implications," World Politics, XX IV (Supplement, 1972),pp. 40-79; D avis, David, How the Bureaucracy Makes Foreign Policy: An ExchangeAnalysis, Lexington, Mass: D.C . Heath and Com pany, 1972, 164 p.; Perlmutter,Am os, "The P residential Political Center and Foreign P olicy: A Critique of theRevisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations," World Polities, October 1974,pp. 87-106.


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112OURN AL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORAThe shift to decisionmaking in the field had immediate consequences

for the nature of Greek-A merican relations during the time frame underconsideration. (II) Utilizing their decisionmaking pow er, Am erican per-sonnel, as members of M issions formally established by the government,penetrated the Greek military and political policymaking process todetermine the kinds of actions that would be followed by the Greekgovernment in the counterinsurgency w ar. This conclusion is supported bythe following, previously considered data: (1) the Greek government'sacceptance of AMAG authority in the June 1947 note; (2) the increasingmilitary operations inside Greece after August 1947; (3) priority settingby American officials in December 1948 which was then used as the basisfor G reek policies; (4) the Am erican determination of the com positionof the Greek government in January 1949; and (5) the JUSM AP G develop-ment of the m ilitary cam paign strategy in 1949. This conc lusion is evenmore convincingly supported by the unpresented data on the use of Amer-ican aid after June 1947 and the economic control AMAG , ECA, and pri-vate American citizens hired by the Greek government exercised in creatingG reek policies. This control permeated several areas of G reek econom icpolicy: trade, shipping, taxation, currency, and b udget ado ption. Theevidence overw helmingly indicates that in all major G reek policy areasrelated to ending the Civil W ar, prior approval for the policy by Americanpersonnel was required. Often the policy was adopted on the initiative ofAmerican field personnel.Rosenau has described a penetrated political system as one in which

nonm embers of a rational society participate directly and au-thoritatively, through actions taken jointly w ith the society'smembers, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilizationof support on behalf of its goals."This description nearly fits the role of Am erican personnel in Greece inthe above decisionm aking situations, with the only concept of dubiousvalidity being that of "joint" action. O ne does no t gain the impressionthat members of G reek authoritative society participated on an equal orsignificant footing with Americans in creating policies. On the contrary,the data suggest that A mericans m ade dec isions, set priorities, and thenrequested of the G reeks that they adopt certain actions. This impressionm ay result from hav ing considered only data from the Un ited States.But certain data imply that a G reek role in some decision areas was ofsecondary or no consequence (# 3 , 4, 5).The penetration concept has profound consequences for inter-state relations and the legitimacy of the nation-state as an authori-tative, autonomous actor in world politics. The Greek case sug-gests the dem ise of the nation-state in this sense. P enetration a pplied

57 liosenau, James, Pre-Theories and Theories of International Politics, p. 65.See also Herz , John, "The T erritorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future ofthe Nation-State," pp. 84-86 in Rosenau (ed.) op cit.


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A m erican Pene tration Into Gree k S tructures13to this case further suggests the incorporation of Greece into the Americanpolitical process so that one could look on G reek policies between June1947 and the end of 1949 as appendages of American policies. Thevalidity of the penetration concept (which itself requires further develop-ment) as an exp lanation of the present case cannot be ac cepted withoutfurther analysis and more detailed application to the data. N onetheless,the American military-related decisions on Greece leave a lingering ques-tion: should one regard American actions in Greece after W orld War IIas relations between two nation-states or as extra-continental activities ofa nation in a penetrated area of southeastern Europe?

american institutional penetration into greek military & political policymaking structures [june...

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