American Public Opinion Toward Israel

Dr. Amnon CavariIDC Herzliya

American Special Relationship with Israel

• Mutual Strategic Interest• Dominant Jewish population (politically and economically)• Strong Israeli Lobby• Shared values and beliefs – democracy, Judeo-Christian values• Guilt (Holocaust)

• Gilboa (1987) Special relationship would be untenable were it not for highly favorable American public opinion

• Strong public support• Support transcends conventional social and political cleavages

Israel Palestiniansmean of SYMPATHY_2way

EgyptKuwaitJordan

PakistanTurkey

IndonesiaBangladesh

MoroccoLebanonMalaysiaSenegal

MaliChinaSpain

BulgariaItaly

Great BritainNigeria

SwedenPolandFranceRussia

ArgentinaTanzania

MexicoChile

South KoreaCanada

PeruVenezuelaGermany

UkraineKenya

IndiaSouth Africa

EthiopiaGhanaJapan

SlovakiaUganda

BrazilBolivia

Czech RepublicIvory Coast

United States

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, May 2007

Figure: Global Views about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Sympathies in the Middle East Conflict

American are Uniquely Favorable of Israel(Cavari 2012)

Israel an Ally

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

AllyAllyAlly AllyAllyAlly AllyAllyAllyAllyAlly AllyAlly

Ally

AllyAllyAlly

AllyAlly Ally AllyAllyAlly

AllyAllyAlly

AllyAllyAllyAllyAllyAllyAlly Ally

FriendlyFriendlyFriendly

Friendly

FriendlyFriendly

FriendlyFriendly

FriendlyFriendlyFriendly

Friendly

Friendly

Friendly

FriendlyFriendly

Friendly

FriendlyFriendlyFriendly Friendly

Friendly

Friendly

FriendlyFriendly

FriendlyFriendly

FriendlyFriendlyFriendlyFriendlyFriendly

FriendlyFriendly

Figure 5.4: Percent Americans Seeing Israel as an Ally or Friendly Country

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II

19971998

19992000

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20130

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Military Grants 1997-2013 (in $ Millions)

FY2000: Wye. FY2003: IraqIn 2012: Israel’s Defense Budget was about $15 Billion. More than 20% comes from the US

… And Americans have been supportive of military aid for Israel

02

04

06

08

01

00

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010Source: Roper iPoll Archive, 1975-2011

Figure 5.5: Percent of Americans Supporting Military Aid to Israel(at existing level or more)

05

01

00p

erce

nt

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010YEAR

Israel Arab Nations/Palestinians

Both/Neither

In the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more?

Source: ABC, ADL, CBS, Gallup, La Times, NY Times, Pew, Roper, Time

1967-2009Sympathy toward Sides in the Middle East Dispute

Understanding Support and Change

• Three major points:1. Party polarization2. Polarization lead by elite polarization3. Cohort change (with Shlomo Egoz)

-10

0

10

20

30D

iffe

ren

ce (

perc

enta

ges)

Rep

ublic

ans

min

us

Dem

ocr

ats

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Source: ABC, CBS, Gallup, NY Times, Pew, Roper, Time

Figure 2: Emerging Gap in Partisan Sympathies with Israel, 1967-2009

Modeling the Relative Effect of Partisanship(Cavari 2013)

• Dependent variable: – Sympathies with Israel

(binary; 1 Israel, 0 otherwise, DK dropped)

• Independent variables:– Party (Republican, Democrat)– Religion (Protestants, Catholics)– Education (4 categorical groups)– Age (4 categorical groups)– Gender (male)– Race (white)

– Controlling for time

01

23

4D

ensi

ty

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Probability of Sympathy with Israel

Republicans Democrats

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0119

1967-2009Probability Distribution of Sympathizing with Israel

02

46

Den

sity

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Probability of Sympathy with Israel

Republicans Democrats

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0106

A. 1967-1985

02

46

8D

ensi

ty

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Probability of Sympathy with Israel

Republicans Democrats

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0094

B. 1985-2009

Probability Distribution of Sympathizing with Israel

-10

12

para

met

er e

stim

ates

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Democrats

-10

12

para

met

er e

stim

ates

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Republicans

Multivariate analysis. Gray lines represent 95% confidence intervels.

Source: ABC, ADL, CBS, Gallup, LA Times, NY Times, Pew, Roper, Time

Sympathize more with Israel, by partyOver-time Effect of Party Identification

Polarization initiated by Republican Support

02

46

0 .25 .5 .75 1

1967-1988

02

46

0 .25 .5 .75 1

1989-2000

02

46

Den

sity

0 .25 .5 .75 1

Democrats Republicans

2001-2009

Source: Probabilities generated from the base model, Table 2 model 1

Figure 3: Three Periods of Partisan Attitudes toward Israel

Three periods: Cold War, Post Cold War, Post 9/11

50

60

70

80

90

100

Po

lariza

tion

in C

ong

ress

-10

01

02

03

0

Isra

el S

ym

pa

thie

sR

elig

ious

Cle

ava

ges

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Partisan Gap: Sympathies with IsraelPartisan Gap: Percent of Evangelical Christians

Partisan Gap: Polarization in Congress

All gaps are measured by subtracting annual means of Democrats from Republicans

Figure 4: Three partisan gaps: Religious, Elite Polarization and Israel

Elite Driven Process

Table 3: The Effect of Party Polarization and Religious Cleavages on the Israel Gap, 1980-2009 (1) Israel Gap Polarization (t-1) 0.144^ (0.0789) Religious Cleavages (t-1) 0.211^ (0.122) Democratic Administration -0.0202 (0.0177) Post 2001 0.107** (0.0331) Constant -0.0382 (0.0494) N 29 R2

0.894

Standard errors in parentheses ^ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Note: Series are aggregated annually. Missing data are linearly extrapolated on time.

101

89’

102

91’

103

93’

104

95’

105

97’

106

99’

107

01’

108

03’

109

05’

110

07’

111

09’

Polarization in Congress?(Cavari & Nyer)

101

89’

102

91’

103

93’

104

95’

105

97’

106

99’

107

01’

108

03’

109

05’

110

07’

111

09’

Polarization in Congress?

Oldmixon, Rosenson and Wald (2005)

Trice 1977 Fereurergeson 1979

Data

• Examine all Congressional resolutions referring to Israel

• Criteria for inclusion1. Resolutions specifically referring to the state of Israel 2. Israel is a dominant issue in the resolution. 3. Expressed support—declaratory, monetary or military—

for Israel or condemned its foes

Israel Related Resolutions

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 1110

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

101

89’

102

91’

103

93’

104

95’

105

97’

106

99’

107

01’

108

03’

109

05’

110

07’

111

09’

Focus on 109th Congress

Dependent Variable: Israel Score

1. Level of Support (Oldmixon et. al)• No, No Vote, Present, Yes = 0• Cosponsor & Sponsor = 1

2. Intensity Measure• No = -1• No Vote & Present = 0• Yes = 1• Cosponsor & Sponsor = 2

Level of Support0

50

100

150

Num

ber

of R

epre

sent

ativ

es

0 5 10 15 20Israel Score

Score measured by number of resolutions sponsored or co-sponsoredNumber of Resolutions: 36

Figure 2: Support for Israel, Members of the 109th Congress

Intensity Measure0

2040

6080

100

Num

ber

of R

epre

sent

ativ

es

0 10 20 30 40Israel Score

Nay=-1; NV,Present=0; Yea=1; CS,S=1Number of Resolutions: 36

Figure 3: Intensity of Support for Israel, Members of the 109th Congress

Determinants of Support for Israel

Personal

District

Israel Score

Independent Variables Personal Level

• Religion – Jewish, Catholic, and Evangelical or Christian

fundamentalist• Partisanship • Ideology

– DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal)• Race

Independent VariablesDistrict Level

• Religion • Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), 2000 Census

• Race • Percentage of Black population in district based on 2000 Census

• Partisanship• Measured as percent vote given to Republican presidential

candidate in 2004 presidential election

Determinants of Support, 109th Congress

Variables Level of Support Intensity Measure

Jewish + +

Evangelical + +

Catholic +

Republican +

Black -

Ideology + +

% Evangelical -

% Jewish + +

% Catholic -

% Republican

Is support for Israel affected by Events, Life Cycle Attitudes or Cohort Change?

(with Shlomo Egoz)

• Support for Israel is influenced by systematic secular transformations of public support which are based on the experiences each person is exposed to while she is establishing her long-term views of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict

Cohort Analysis

• Birth cohort – An aggregate of the individuals born in a certain years-

span, 17-25 (Evan 1959; Ryder 1965)– Share similar events and environmental effects that shape

how they view the world. • Europeans coming of age during WWI (Fussell 1975)• Algerians, who came of age during Boumedienne's regime

between 1965 and 1978 (Tessler, Konold & Reiff 2004)

• Cohort analysis used for assessment of age, cohort and period effects.

Cohort Analysis: three hypothetical patterns

Age group

+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-

Year of Survey

1969

1979

1989

1998

2009

Cohort Analysis: Age

Age group

+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-

Year of Survey

1969

1979

1989

1998

2009

Cohort Analysis: Period

Age group

+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-

Year of Survey

1969

1979

1989

1998

2009

Cohort Analysis: Cohort

Age group

+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-

Year of Survey

1969

1979

1989

1998

2009

Data

• Survey data from 1967 to 2009 (45 surveys)“In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with Arab nations / Palestinians?”(ABC, CBS, Gallup, LA-Times, NY-Times, Pew, Roper)

– Total of 69,771 respondents• 91% response rate

Sympathies for Israel and Arab Nations / Palestinians by Age and Year of Survey

(note: Percentage difference, Israel – Arab Nations/ Palestinians)

Age group

+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-

Year of Survey

44.9 35.1 31.9 39.6 46.1 45.7 1969

16.9 16.3 19.1 32.6 24.9 33.0 1979

31.8 38.5 41.8 39.7 39.2 34.3 1989

65.8 51.6 69.1 52.2 47.2 41.2 1998

44.3 46.8 40.3 36.2 35.3 30.3 2009

Sympathies for Israel and Arab Nations / Palestinians by Age and Year of Survey

(note: Percentage difference, Israel – Arab Nations/ Palestinians)

Age group

+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-

Year of Survey

44.9 35.1 31.9 39.6 46.1 45.7 1969

16.9 16.3 19.1 32.6 24.9 33.0 1979

31.8 38.5 41.8 39.7 39.2 34.3 1989

65.8 51.6 69.1 52.2 47.2 41.2 1998

44.3 46.8 40.3 36.2 35.3 30.3 2009

Hypothesis

• We expect that two perspectives of Israel have affected people’s attitudes toward the country:

Strategic Partnership

1960-1990; 2001+

Underdog Image1945-1982

Birth cohorts and their environmental experiences at maturation

Underdog image (1945-1982)

Strategic Partnership (1960-1990;

2001+)

Years of Political

Maturation (age 17-25)

Year of birth

Cohort

- - 1917-1934 1900-1909 1

- - 1927-1944 1910-1919 2

-/+ - 1937-1954 1920-1929 3

+ -/+ 1947-1964 1930-1939 4

+ + 1957-1974 1940-1949 5

+ + 1967-1984 1950-1959 6

- +- / 1977-1994 1960-1969 7

- -/+ 1987-2004 1970-1979 8

Cohort groups and their environmental experiences at maturation

Underdog image (1945-1982)

Strategic Partnership (1960-1990;

2001+)

Years of Political

Maturation (age 17-25)

Year of birth

Cohort

- - 1917-1934 1900-1909 1

- - 1927-1944 1910-1919 2

-/+ - 1937-1954 1920-1929 3

+ -/+ 1947-1964 1930-1939 4

+ + 1957-1974 1940-1949 5

+ + 1967-1984 1950-1959 6

- +- / 1977-1994 1960-1969 7

- -/+ 1987-2004 1970-1979 8

Cohort groups and their environmental experiences at maturation

Underdog image (1945-1982)

Strategic Partnership (1960-1990;

2001+)

Years of Political

Maturation (age 17-25)

Year of birth

Cohort

- - 1917-1934 1900-1909 1

- - 1927-1944 1910-1919 2

-/+ - 1937-1954 1920-1929 3

+ -/+ 1947-1964 1930-1939 4

+ + 1957-1974 1940-1949 5

+ + 1967-1984 1950-1959 6

- +- / 1977-1994 1960-1969 7

- -/+ 1987-2004 1970-1979 8

50%

75%

100%

Per

cent

Sym

path

izin

g w

ith Is

rae

l

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990Date of Survey

1910-1919 1920-19291930-1939 1940-1949

Attitudes of Cohorts, 1967-1990

50%

75%

100%

Per

cent

Sym

path

izin

g w

ith Is

rae

l

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005Date of Survey

1930-1939 1940-19491950-1959 1960-1969

Attitudes of Cohorts, 1980-2009

Estimating the Cohort Effect

• Dependent Variable– Sympathies with Israel (1 – Israel; 0 - Arab

Nations/Palestinians, DK)

• Independent Variable– Cohort indicators

(cohorts 1-8. Two models: 1-6, 3-8. 3 is reference)– Demographic variables: religion, education, party

identification, gender, race– Controlling for survey differences

The effect of cohorts on Israel Sympathies 1967-1990 1980-2009

Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds RatioCohort 1: 1900-1909

0.0712

)0.0881(

Cohort 2: 1910-1919

-0.115^ .89

)0.0689(

Cohort 4: 1930-1939

0.331*** 1.39 0.176* 1.19

)0.0687( )0.0757(

Cohort 5: 1940-1949

0.465*** 1.59 0.323*** 1.38

)0.0655( )0.0709(

Cohort 6: 1950-1959

0.267*** 1.31 0.176** 1.19

)0.0636( )0.0672(

Cohort 7: 1960-1969

0.0726

)0.0715(

Cohort 8: 1970-1979

0.0817

)0.0915(

The effect of cohorts on Israel Sympathies 1967-1990 1980-2009

Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds RatioCohort 1: 1900-1909

0.0712

)0.0881(

Cohort 2: 1910-1919

-0.115^ .89

)0.0689(

Cohort 4: 1930-1939

0.331*** 1.39 0.176* 1.19

)0.0687( )0.0757(

Cohort 5: 1940-1949

0.465*** 1.59 0.323*** 1.38

)0.0655( )0.0709(

Cohort 6: 1950-1959

0.267*** 1.31 0.176** 1.19

)0.0636( )0.0672(

Cohort 7: 1960-1969

0.0726

)0.0715(

Cohort 8: 1970-1979

0.0817

)0.0915(

Summary

• American attitudes toward Israel have polarized in the last decade– Mostly due to change in views of Republicans– Lead by elite change

• Attitudes toward Israel are cohort-based– As older cohorts are exiting the electorate,

support for Israel will drop