AMITAI ETZIONI

On Ending Nationalism*

N ationalism must be ended. It is a creed that hascome to burden the expansion of globalism (as

evident for instance in the demonstrations againstwro); hobbles the growth of the European Com-munity (as seen in the votes against the Euro in Den-mark); stands in the way of resolving violent conflicts(for instance, over the fate of Jerusalem); complica-tes the resolution of differences within existing na-tion-states (for example, in Corsica); and turns refu-gees and immigrants into a threat to the receivingcountries. Its ill effects are evident from Kosovo toEast Timor, from Chechnya, to Cyprus, to Bolivia.

These are, of course, enormously distinct phe-nomena, involving very distinguishable issues.Other factors -economic for instance -also playasignificant role in their dynamics. My only thesisis that nationalism importantly hinders progresstoward solutions in all of these international anddomestic situations as it does in many other ones.

Nationalism is a creed that extols the nation,and regards it as an ultimate value. It deeply affectscitizens' sense of self, psychological well-being,and identity; it makes them treat their nation-stateas their primary community. The "ism« comes toindicate that reference here is not to moderatecommitments to one's nation as one source ofaffiliation and loyalty but to a highly intensiveand nearly exclusive investment of one's collectiveidentity in the national state. (In this sense natio-nalism differs from reasonable national commit-ments the way moralism differs from morality.)When in full bloom, people view the state as semi-sacred or even as directly in the service of theirGod. As it is written in Romans 13:1, "Let everyperson be subject to the governing authorities, forthere is no authority except from God, and thoseauthorities that exist have been instituted by God.«

People imbued with nationalism believe thattheir independence, ability to control their fate asa collective, and cultural distinctiveness and self-determination are all dependent on their nation.

(To save breath, such commitments will be refer-red to from here on as defining involvements.)Often at least some sense of superiority over othernations is involved as well as at least some measureof xenophobia. Nationalism tends to be most inevidence when a nation is at war.

While nationalism is often most intense in tota-litarian and authoritarian societies, some elementsof it, at least in a dormant form, can also be foundamong the citizens of free democratic countries.The nation, a seemingly remote and abstract socialentity, is one for which these citizens -manyotherwise quite moderate and self-restrained -arewilling to sacrifice their lives and kill others, notmerely to defend the nation's existence andintegrity but also to redeem its honor. Attacks byforeigners, even on minor and remote outposts,are framed as profound personal insults, followedby popular calls for revenge.

Major reactions to the increasingly distorting ef-fects of nationalism include: the suggestion that thenation-state itself is obsolete, to d~pict the very con-cept of national sovereignty as old fashioned,l tostrongly champion the free flow of trade andcapital ( and to somewhat lesser extent that ofpeople) across national borders, and to support thedevelopment of numerous supranational bodies.2

* The author is indebted to Jason Marsh for research as-sistance and to SWomo Avineri, Henry Nau, Joel Rosen-thal, and Simon Serrati 'for comments on a previous draft,I. Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift«, Foreign Affairs,January(February 1997: 50 ff. See also Saskia Sassen,Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).2. The term "supranational« is used here to refer tobodies that have the authority to directly act on corpora-tions or individuals in participant nations without havingto deal with their government. They differ from inter-national bodies whose legitimacy is derived from theconsent of the representative of the participating nationsfor each and every significant measure -the way, forinstance, the United Nations works.

144 Amitai El1iani, On Ending Nationalism

These include the European Commission and Par-liament, the international criminal court, commit-tees set up by NAFTA and the WTO among others,and the view that the UN Declaration of HumanRights justifies the intervention of foreign powersin the internal affairs of nations that violate theserights. Further expanding the sovereignty of thesesupranational bodies is viewed as one major ant-idote to nationalism. Others have called for theabsorption of national states in regional bodies,for instance in a United States of Europe. On thedomestic front, nations are chided for clinging tQnationalistic, old homogenous cultures and identi-ties, and are urged to embrace diversity and multi-culturalism.

weak.

Such countries already experienced or standthe danger of being torn apart by secessions orcivil wars, when member communities that com-mand strong involvements, such as ethnic andtribal ones, are not bound together by an over-arching national commitment. Such countriesinclude Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, NorthernIreland, Nigeria, and Somalia. In short, nationalinvolvement is what social scientists call a variable,that can be both too high and too low.

The Role of the Public

Ending Nationalism, Not the Nation State

The approach outlined below draws on one addi-tional sociological observation and normativeposition: it presumes that ending nationalism andovercoming the various challenges it engendered,cannot and should not be carried out via secret orclosed negotiations among national representati-ves (the way the Oslo agreement was reached oreven the Maestricht treaty was hammered out)or by arrangements worked out by internationallawyers and select civil servants of supranationalbodies (such as the EU commission or WIO com-mittees). Nor can the needed changes be succes-sfully introduced if defining down national invol-vements is presented as merely relevant to tech-nical or economic matters (e. g. the way Blair hasframed the adoption of the euro by the UK). Whileit is true that foreign policy can often be advanceda great deal with little public involvement, endingnationalism is an important and powerful excep-tion. Because of the strong and widely held sup-port for nationalistic defining involvements, anyefforts to redirect and attenuate them must besimilarly popular. The public will have to be enga-ged because the change entails modifying, andhence a profound sense of what millions of peopleconsider right, believe in, and identify with. One

3. Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, »The Real New WorldOrder", Foreign Affairs (September/October 1997):183 fT.4.

For a discussion of Germany's attitudes towardnationalism in the post-war period, see Mary Fulbrook,German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cam-bridge: Polity Press, 1999); Michael Mertes, StevenMuller, and Heinrich August Winkler, eds., In Search ofGermany (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers,

1996).

The argument advanced here presumes that it isneither necessary nor prudent to attempt to endnationalism by head-on attacks on the legitimacyof the nation-state or by favoring its demise.3 Thevision of replacing the nation-state by regionalgovernments and ultimately by a world govern-ment (as UN enthusiasts dream), or envisioning astate that acts as a mere framework for the interac-tions of groups of people of different culturesbut commands no loyalty and involvement of itsown, is normatively dubious and unnecessarilythreatening. Nationalism can be and is best endedby a much more moderate approach.

To higWight the line between nationalism andmoderate, reasoned national involvement it mightbe useful to provide an example of a nation-statethat is fully intact but harbors little nationalism.Germany, which used to be an extremely nationa-listic country, stood out during the last twodecades of the 20th century as a country in whichnational involvement of most of its citizens wasmoderate. Indeed, one of its core shared values inthis period was a rejection of nationalism.4 Onecan also find low-key national involvement inCanada, Costa Rica, and the Netherlands amongother nations.

It should be further noted, very much in linewith the thesis that the desired development is notending involvement in the nation-state but merelyending an immoderate, nationalistic one, that insome states, commitments to the nation are too

IPG 2,/2,001 Amitoi Etzioni, On Ending Nationalism

of the reasons Yasser Arafat had great difficultiesin completing the 2000 Camp David negotiationswas that they entailed making concessions hispeople were not prepared to accept. The same mayhave been true for Ehud Barak. One key reasonwro expansion was followed by street demonstra-tions was that important and politically activesegments of the public were not convinced of thelegitimacy of the wro's authority over membernations. One major reason opposition to the eurosucceeded in Denmark -and threatened the parti-cipation of other countries -is that large segmentsof the public realized that much more than amonetary issue was at stake, and they had not beenwon over to the large-scale reduction of nationalautonomy was likely to follow.

limited Historitol Pretedents

A Communilarian Approach

The main approach outlined here favors shiftingmuch of the defining involvements of citizens inthose countries that are inflicted with nationalismfrom the nation-state to the body society, specifi-cally to communities (not to be confused withlocal governments), the community of these com-munities, and to a "thick" civic fabric. It entailsdeveloping and championing public policies, insti-tutions, symbols, and belief systems that helppeople realize that they can maintain their sense ofself, identity, social and cultural distinctiveness, aswell as a good part of their control over their indi-vidual and collective fate -all through involvementin a variety of communities. 5 Millions already draw

on such commitments, and these commitmentscan be extended and expanded to a point that willsignificantly reduce the involvement in the nation-state and thus enhance the ability of treating thevarious problems that must be faced -withoutabolishing the nation-state or eradicating commit-ments to it. To put it in different terms: referenceis to shifting a good part of the legitimacy nowassociated with particular states to societies andtheir component units. This approach is not with-out risks of its own, explored after the approachitself is spelled out.

Those who wonder if the suggested shift of defi-ning involvements to some other body than thenation can be achieved, may wish to note that sucha condition was crudely approximated before theonset of nationalism. After all, both the mere exi-stence of the nation-state and its elevation to asemi-sacred status by nationalism are of a ratherrecent vintage.6 Neither existed before the 18thcentury and, for a good part of the 19th centurythe nation-state was the project of narrow elitesand later small classes.7

In earlier generations, people's involvementswere largely focused on their extended family, clan,and village. This is still the cases in some of theless developed countries, among the less educated,especially if they are not exposed to mass media.Further, for those in power and the educated, thedefining involvements were often divided betweenreligious and secular bodies, and not all contratedin one centrally controlled territorial entity. Theline, »Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and give toGod what is God's", captures this point. Peopledid not see themselves mainly as members of thisor that territorial group (say, a given fiefdom) butalso as members of a church, and their secularinvolvements were also split between their localcommitments and those to other social groups.For instance, many Russian aristocrats identifiedwith and shared a culture with their French coun-terpart~ more than with the Russian peasantry. Thewell-known conflicts between the Catholic Churchand the British monarchy -and those loyal to each-further illustrate strong involvement in a reli-gious and non-statist, social corpus.

In this limited sense, the pre-nationalistic worldprovides a precedent for the post-nationalisticone. The precedent is, of course, limited, because

5. On the importance of identity for the reconstitutionof the international order, see Alexander Wendt, "Collec-tive Identity Formation and the International State«,American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994-):384--96. See also Anthony D. Smith, National Identity(Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991).6. Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National Statesin Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1975).7.

Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New WorldOrder«.

146 Amitai Etziani, On Ending Nationalism

IPG

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defining involvements in earlier ages were largelya matter for a thin layer of the educated andactive, and not for the much larger numbers ofother people.

tions (comrnunitarian bodies for short) all canserve to dampen nationalism but only when theymeet the said conditions. Indeed, when thesegroups are coextensive with the nation or involve-ment in them entails extolling the nation, they canact to further strengthen nationalism.

Crisscrossing and Thick Communities

All major religions can provide for the neededinvolvements when they satisfy the said prerequi-sites: crisscross and are thick. Thus, the CatholicChurch provides many millions with a source ofinvolvement and community in the Americansociety and other societies with Protestant majori-ties and a secular state, in numerous Asian andAfrican

societies, in former communist countries,and in countries in which Catholics are themajority but the national government is largelysecular (e. g. Italy). The same holds for Protestantgroups in China and Russia.

Similarly, Islam has provided for defining invol-vement in communities in nations in which thegovernment has been largely secular (e. g. Turkey)or the established religion has been a different one(e. g. in the UK or in Israel). Judaism arguably pro-vides the strongest example of a people able tomaintain their culture and identity separate from anation-state over long periods of time (some 2000

years).Religious involvements are more effective as

antidotes to nationalism when they entail morethan mere attendance, when for instance childrenattend religious schools, members socialize mainlywith other members, act as members of voluntaryassociations that involve other church members(e. g. Catholic teacher associations), and otherwiseshare social bonds. Also religious groups may pro-vide their own dispute resolution institutions suchas Qadis and rabbinical courts. All these religiousbodies show that it is possible in principle to nur-

Most discussions on ending nationalism focus oninternational developments, such as the increasingrole of international NGOS,8 international law andcourts and regulatory bodies, and the UN andother international organizations. These are oftenvaluable but may not develop much further unlessaccompanied by domestic developments becausethe main roots of nationalism are domestic.Hence, the discussion here focuses on the neededintra-national changes, especially that of involvingdefinitions. My thesis is that only as such involve-ments are shifted away from the nation-state notmerely to supranational bodies but also to sub-national ones the difficulties posed by nationalismand efforts by nation-states to monopolize sover-eignty might be significantly rearranged. To reite-rate, reference is to a partial shift, resulting in splitinvolvements between the state and various socialbodies, rather than expunging all national involve-ments.

For enhanced involvement in communities tohelp end nationalism the social bonds and loyaltiesentailed must crisscross rather than parallel andthus enforce the nationalistic ones. That meansthat membership in these groups cannot be coex-tensive with citizenship (which would make thenation into the relevant community) and thegroups' loyalty itself cannot be centered aroundextolling the nation. Thus when Hitler champio-ned Germany as one» Volksgemeinschaft" he waspromoting a community that was coextensive withthe nation, precisely in order to absorb the com-munal defining involvement into the nation, as away to further fuel nationalism.

Aside from crisscrossing memberships andloyalties, communities must also be »thick". Theirscope of activities must be extensive enoughto provide significant involvement of the kind,studies show, not found in thin groups such aschess clubs, bird-watching societies, and bowlingleagues. 9 Increasing people's involvement in reli-

gious or secular communities or voluntary associa-

8. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service:GOPernment-Nonproftt Relations in the Modern WelfareState (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995),24-3.9. See Nina Eliasoph, Alloiding Politics: How Ameri-cans Produce Apathy in Elleryday Life (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1998).

PG

Amitai Etziani, On Ending Nationalism 147

Separation of church and state -which, allother things being equal, helped dampen involve-ment in the nation-state -is a rather Americanidea. However, such separation may be embracedby more societies as they become more diversebecause their aging societies require large-scaleimmigration and these immigrants tend to be fromdifferent religious and cultural background. Thus,Germany is moving toward having Muslim as wellas Jewish schools and is considering stopping thecollection of dues via the state to pay for the clergy.In Israel there is a strong demand to turn whathas been conceived as Jewish state into a secularone. Sweden is making considerable progress inthis direction. II Other societies may have to

separate church and state if the distinct .socialfabric of religious communities is to develop intoone able to provide non-nationalist sources ofinvolvements.

The Civil (Secular) Society

ture a sense of self, identity, and independence notassociated with the state or any other specific terri-tory. Note also that members of religious commu-nities are often dispersed among members of othercommunities.

True, like all cures, shifting defining involve-ment can be excessive. Hence, such shifting is notsuitable for societies in which national involvementis low to begin with. And this is the reason I statedfrom the onset that nationalism should be endedby a partial rather than holistic shift of involvementfrom the nation to member communities.

An indication of the strength of the separateloyalty involvement religious groups provide, andits dampening effect on nationalism, can be seen inthat secular totalitarian regimes (such as the USSRand Nazi Germany) made strenuous efforts to sup-press religious groups. Further indication of thisstrength can be gleaned from the fact that whenCatholics or Jews ran for public office in the Uni-ted States their national loyalty was sometimes

questioned.In contrast, when membership in a religious

community and a nation-state are coextensive andthe values extolled by these communities are natio-nal ones, the opposite effect results: nationalism isintensified. This is evident in theocracies such asMghanistan and Iran; in those religious Jewishgroups that embrace the ideas of a Greater Israel aspart of their core values; and in those situationswhere the Church supported nationalism (forinstance, the generals in Argentina in order to era-dicate the »cancer of communism").

,>Charitable choice" in the us is a recent majorexample of how religious based involvement maybe enhanced (at least in the American context),while the role of the state is curtailed. Charitablechoice, enacted in the us in 1996 under the welfarereform act, encourages the state to provide fundsfor the provision of social services by religiousgroups rather than using the same funds for deli-very of the these services by government agencies.(References are mainly to welfare and health ser-vices.)lO While theoretically such provisions arenot supposed to entail any religious proselytizing,even if this regulation is well maintained, the veryfact that numerous people would regularly atrendand participate in the social activities of religiousgroups is likely to enhance their involvement inthese bodies.

The other main basis for non-nationalistic involve-ment is the civil society, including voluntary asso-ciations and secular communities. It is telling thattotalitarian states tend to ban voluntary associa-tions and work to absorb the functions of the civilsociety into the state, to ensure that people's invol-vement is focused on the state. The oppositedevelopment occurs when there is a rich fabric ofvoluntary associations, which can provide a majorsource of non-statist involvements which in turncan moderate nationalism. Thus, the fewer indivi-duals who see themselves merely or even primarilyas »good" Singaporeans> Frenchmen, and so on,and the more who consider themselves as dedica-ted environmentalists, feminists, or members ofprofessional communities, the less nationalisticthey will tend to be.

In a secular version of the grand exceptionwhich parallels the religious one: nationalism isintensive rather than demoted when the corevalues of a given voluntary association are nationa-

10. For more discussion see Amy Sherman, »ShouldWe Put Faith in Charitable Choice?«, The ResponsiveCommunity 10, no.4- (2000): 22-30.II. T. R. Reid, »Church of Sweden Is Thriving on ItsOwn«, Washington Post, December 29, 2000, A24-.

148 Amitai Etziani, On Ending Nationalism IPG 2/2001

listic, as in the case of many veteran organizations.The same holds for many secular right-wing

groups.I cannot stress enough that the thesis presented

here about the transition away from a nationalisticstate to a communitarian society is not retracingoft-made arguments in favor of a strong civilsociety, although there are some parallels. Thestandard arguments about the merit of civil societycenter around its primary aims of sustainingliberty, respect for individual rights, and for the de-mocratic regime. The main thesis advanced here isthat a civil society can also provide a major sourcefor communitarian defining involvements and thusmoderate nationalism. Moreover, while almost anycivil society can advance liberty (indeed, somehold that a >,thin" society can best so serve), onlyrather »thick" civil societies can provide for satis-factory opportunities for defininginvolvements. Thickness in this context entailsproviding a substantive (as distinct from merelyprocedural) and considerable set of values, as wellas social bonds that encompass significant relationsrather than trivial ones. Voting, for instance, isthin; serving in the Peace Corps is thick. Serving asan observer at a polling station is thin; serving asadeacon at one's church is thick.

The crucial significance of thickness for thepurpose at hand leads to the important observa-tion that from this viewpoint not all voluntaryassociations are created equal. The defining invol-vement these associations are able to provide rangefrom socially and normatively trivial to ratherpowerful. Those voluntary associations that areoften mentioned and studied and hence jump tomind -especially following the important work ofRobert Putnam 12 -such as bowling leagues, pro-

vide a rather thin scope of social activities andvalues and hence rather meager involvement. Withthe exception of a few, such as activists or diehards,people do not define themselves as bowlers, birdwatchers or derive their norms from such activities.Moreover, the much celebrated NGOs tend to pro-vide involvement for their cadres but not for mostof their members, who often feel rather detached ifnot excluded and alienated. Consider for instancethe typical members of the league of women votersor the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA).

Much more consequential for the building upof non-nationalistic, communitarian involvements~

are thicker voluntary associations that have moreof a normative content and/or are socially moreencompassing. Among the first kind are ideologi-cal associations such as the Sierra Club. Among thesecond kind are those labor unions in which themembers share a social life, hang around a hiringhall, frequent the same bars antfso on. These asso-ciations make almost communities.

Communities (which are often excluded fromdiscussion of civil society, among other reasonsbecause they are in part ascribed, not voluntarilychosen or constructed; they are, for instance,excluded from Putnam's calculations) are multi-faceted and hence socially thick. They tend toencompass numerous different activities of theirmembers rather than merely one (e. g. the PTA'sfocus on schooling of children). Indeed, com-munities often'contain several voluntary associa-tions. Numerous policies to strengthen communi-ties that are advanced for other reasons can alsohelp build up non-nationalistic involvements. Inthe us these include community policing, crimewatch, mutual saving societies, self-help groups,block parties, safer public spaces, and muchmore.

More generally, the thicker the civil society(beyond the mere existence of a rich and variedbody of thick voluntary associations and commu-nities), the more opportunities there are for non-nationalistic involvements to evolve and to be nur-tured. The more civil society is extolled in cultureand mores, the stronger the social norms that limitconflict among citizens and among political partiesand public leaders and the stronger opportunitiesand encouragements for community service inschools and otherwise.

Note that the thickness of the civil society thatis relevant to the issue at hand is not measuredby the extent of participation in politics or publicaffairs (e. g. the proportion of the public conver-sant with public affairs) but by the richness ofinformal social norms and controls, the trustpeople

put into one another, the extent to whichthey are tolerant and civil to one another.

12. Robert PutIIam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse andRevival of American Community (New York: Simon andSchuster, 2000); see also Francis Fukuyama, The GreatDisruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution ofSocial Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999).

Amitoi Etzioni, On Ending Notionolism 14-9

While one should readily acknowledge that ifthe various communitarian bodies make extollingthe nation their core value, they will tend to rein-force nationalism, one should also note that thesebodies provide a grand potential: communitarianbodies can -and often do -form bonds and buildloyalties and social norms that cut across nationalborders and thus dampen nationalism. At the least,they are capable of so doing, which is not the caseif the involvement is the nation itself. Among thethinner examples are public policy networks andgroups of civil servants committed to the samecause e. g. the stewardship of the environment.Thicker examples include the feminist movement,anti-war movements, and Amnesty International.

being violent, materialistic, and excessively indivi-dualistic (all criticism that contain some merit) -provides an important sociological design thatallows for less national involvement but still provi-des for maintaining the integrity of the nation. TheAmerican society is basically organized as a com-munity of communities in which the membercommunities are free to follow their own subcultu-res in numerous matters ranging from religiouspractices to second languages, from involvementin their countries of origin to tastes in music andcuisine. These particularistic involvements are notviewed as threatening the nation at large.

At the same time a set of values exists to whichall are expected to adhere, shared values that serveas a sort of framework and glue that keep the richand colorful mosaic from falling apart. Theseinclude commitment to the Constitution and itsBill of Rights, the democratic form of govern-ment, command of the English language, mutualtolerance, and what Sandy Levinson called theconstitutional faith. IS Moreover, to sustain unity,

the loyalty to the community of communities isexpected to take precedence over that to membercommunities, if and when these two loyalties comeinto conflict.

Seeking neither assimilation (in which membercommunities would be stripped from their parti-cularistic values and involving powers) nor sepa-ratism, the American society as a community ofcommunities draws on a concept that is missing inmany others: hyphenation. Much more is at stakehere than referring to people on the basis of theirethnic origins, not simply as Polish or Irish orMexican, but as Polish-Americans, Irish-Ameri-cans or Mexican-Americans. Hyphenation is anexpression of the legitimization of their distinctsubcultural status, of their non state driven parti-cularism -but also of their being contained by ashared American creed and a set of related institu-tions. It speaks of pluralism within unity, not sheerpluralism as American diversity is often mistakenly

When the strengthening of communities is advo-cated -especially when reference is made notmerely to their social fabric, but also to loyalties tothem and to their particularistic values -a legiti-mate concern arises: that communities will engagein cultural wars with each other and that these mayturn into civil wars. 13 Furthermore, there is a fear

that a nation may lose its identity, shared cultureand history, if ever more social diversity and multi-culturalism is allowed. This fear is evoked by largescale immigrations, especially if the immigrant'scultural traditions are substantially differentfrom those of the host country. Such fears are rein-forced when communities seek exceptions fromnationwide laws (e. g. to use narcotics during reli-gious services) or practices in public schools (Mus-lim girls wearing scarves in French schools or notwearing swimsuits in Germany). To put it in moregeneral terms, particularism, diversity, and multi-culturalism, or more generally community separa-tion, can undermine the integrity of the nation andlead to its destruction. 14

It should, though, be noted that such develop-ments mainly threaten a nation that has rathermeager involvements in its state to begin with,rather than one that is infected with nationalism.For this reason, as already indicated, such shiftingof involvement from the state to communities isnot recommended under these circumstances.

In this matter, American society -which isoften criticized by members of other societies as

13. For a discussion of culture wars in America, seeJames Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle toDefine America (New York: Basic Books, 1991).14-. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of Ame-rica (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992).IS. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Prince-ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Amitai Etziani, On Ending Nationalism

the possibility of adding supranational layers ofloyalty and state power -without threatening par-ticularistic involvements. One may come to thinkabout regional communities, such as the EU as se-cond order communities; as communities whosemembers are natiol16 (which already contain com-munities ).16 Regional communities could applythe ideas behind the model of community of com-munities, of pluralism within unity, allowing forconsiderable continued national variations. Themore this model is embraced and legitimated, theless resistance there will be to the development ofsupranational institutions and an additional layerof loyalty (as compared to the simple concept ofcommunity, which evokes an image of a muchgreater measure of blending). The model can serveto reassure people that if Germany, France or theUK were integrated into a United States of Europe,such action would not lead to loss of identity, cul-ture, and state rights by these nations.

To put it differently, the community of com-munities provides a sociological model and lendslegitimacy for divided and layered sovereignty. Itindicates that sovereignty, as legal scholars andhistorians have long established, never an absoluteconcept, can be shared and redefined without lossof control and self-determination for those whoagree to delegate some of their decision-makingpower and judiciary rights to a more encompas-sing level. I?

16. For discussion of the development of the EuropeanUnion, see Simon Serfaty, Europe 2007: From NRtion-StRtes to Member StRtes (Washington, D.C.: Center forStrategic and International Studies, 2000); WilliamJames Adams, ed., SinguiRr Europe: Economy Rnd Polityof the EuropeRn Community Rfter 1992 (Ann Arbor: Uni-

versity of Michigan Press, 1992); Robert Keohane andStanley Hoffman, eds., The New EuropeRn Community:DecisionmRking Rnd InstitutionRI ChRnge (Boulder,Colorado.: Westview Press, 1991); Alberta Sbragia, ed.,Euro-Politics: Institutions Rnd PolicymRking in the NewEuropeRn Community (Washington, D,C.: BrookingsInstitution, 1992); Dennis Swann, ed., The Single Euro-feRn MRrket Rnd Beyond: A Study of the Wider ImplicR-tions of the Single EuropeRn Act (New York: Routledge,1992).17. For discussions of sovereignty and the contem-porary world, see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: OrgRn-ized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N,]: Princeton UniversityPress, 1999); David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Terri-tory Rnd PoliticRI Economy in the Twenty-First Century

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Maryann

depicted. This model allows for much more soci-ally based defining involvements than one in whichthe only sanctioned sets of values and involve-ments are nationally shared ones.

All this is not to suggest that the state plays norole in a society that is based on the community ofcommunities model. Ending nationalism does notentail shutting down the nation- state. The statehelps to sustain the shared part, the frame, thatkeeps communities as members of one overarchingcommunity. For instance, the nation-state upholdsrights defined in the Constitution that might clashwith the particularistic values of some membercommunities, and helps ensure that differencesamong communities will not turn violent.

While all states can help to ensure that theincrease in community involvement will not un-dermine the society of which they are members,some formats serve this purpose better thanothers. All other things being equal, as has beenoften noted, unitary states (France) are less accom-modating than federations (Germany). Higherlevels of devolution (and subsidiarity) tend to bemore favorable to the community of communitiesthan to lower levels. It should, though, be reco-gnized that devolution does not automatically pro-vide the preferred context. If devolution merelyshifts functions and control from the national levelto large subentities (e. g. of the size ofScodand), itis much more likely to feed separatist nationalismthan if devolution reaches into much smaller localunits. Nationalism is not needed for a nation to beable to modify the balance between the centralgovernment and local ones to work out modifi-cations in the relationship that provide more auto-nomy to the member communities without break-ing the frame. The us's increased recognition ofstates' rights in recent years and shifting fundsand missions and controls from Washington to thestates reflects such an accommodation. EvenChina's incorporation of Hong Kong, under the"one nation, two systems« model has this format.In contrast, the clashes between Spain and the Bas-ques, France and Corsica, Turkey and Iraq and theKurds in their respective countries, Sri Lanka andthe Tamil all reflect clashes of strong nationalismof both the country and those who seek full-fled-ged self-determination.

Most importandy for the purposes at hand, themodel of a community of communities points to~

IPG 2/2001 Amitoi Etzioni, On Ending Notionolism ISI

words. Language is a major center of a cultureand people are correctly concerned about protec-ting it from excessive absorption of foreign terms(although this has occurred throughout history).However, to the extent that these efforts attack therapid development of English as a second language-a language that more and more people of theworld use for instrumental purposes such as tradeand coordination -they are not justified by thecriteria applied here. English is on its way to be-come the language of the third-layer community,the lingua franca. To nurture one's nationallangu-age should not be combined with attacks onEnglish as long as a second (or third) language.

Once can combine protecting national culturewith openness to the world. This is evident whenone witnesses the significant cultural differencesthat exist between communities within the samenation -for instance, between Bavaria and Nort-hern Germany, Sicily and Milan, Manhattan andLouisiana.

A Cultural Exception

Must Supranational Bodies Be Democratic?

A major objection to shifting more involvementto communitarian bodies (whether domestic orcross-national) and to supranational bodies isthat the latter are not democratically governed.19Indeed, we have known since Robert Michel's"Political Parties" that these associations tend tobecome oligarchic, and that in effect they aregoverned by small elites, whether or not they haveelections (as is evident in many labor unions). Dis-cussions of the increased supranational role ofNGOs has led some to fear the rise of a world

A policy issue that by itself is not of the highestimportance illustrates the approach that combinesbuilding up additional layers of communities ofcommunities (or, say, communities of the thirdorder) while respecting the member communities'particular values. The issue concerns culturalexceptions to various international agreements. IS

The question is whether cultural products (such asmagazines and movies) should be treated in thesame manner as other goods and services or accor-ded an exception for trade freed from nationalborders within whatever supra-community is beingconstructed. It is a complex subject, as some mightwish to be extended such an approach to the Inter-net, where it might well be overridden by techno-logical devices.

For the purpose at hand it suffices to note thatto the extent that some of these cultural productsare of special import for sustaining the membercommunities' involving powers, they should beexempt from some parts of free trade agreements(which of course would involve renegotiatingthem). The underlying reason is that defininginvolvements are nourished by cultural products.If these are undermined, nationalism is likely togrow more rampant. This will not necessarilyoccur if widgets, cranes, and ball bearings are im-ported. While any product from airlines to sportscars can be turned into a matter of national pride,cultural products are much more likely to carrya richer and more authentic symbolic content.Numerous images and word choices indicate theculture of origin, which can hardly be said aboutthe pieces used to make a plane or car, whoseorigin is likely to be mixed and multinational tobegin with and often not visible to begin with.

Providing cultural exceptions need not be allencompassing. For instance, they may toleratesubsidies for local film makers and the productionsof plays of the kind banned for non-cultural pro-ducts (as a way to support the local culture) butnot encompass import controls on importingmagazines and films (e. g. excluding other cultu-

res).Similarly, there seems to be no reason to

oppose academies of languages trying to comeup with national terms for new objects from com-puters to satellites, rather than relying on English

K Cusimano, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for ~ Glob~lAgend~ (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000); Gene M.Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond West-ph~li~? St~te Sovereignty ~nd Intern~tion~l Intervention(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).18. See Harvey B. Feigenbaum, Glob~l Culture vs. Pro-tectionism: The French ~nd Kore~n C~ses in Comp~r~tivePerspective, prepared for the panel »Hollywood and theWorld: Site of Power, Sites of Resistance?« AmericanPolitical Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta,September 2-5, 1999.19. See Mark Imber, »Geo-Governance WithoutDemocracy?" Reforming the UN System, in AnthonyMcGrew, ed., The Tr~nsform~tion of Democr~cy (Cam-bridge: Polity Press, 1997).

IPG 2/W01152 Amitai Etziani, On Ending Nationalism

Crime and pollution know no borders, and areincreasingly internationalized.

The gap between that which needs to be gui-ded and those who seek to guide cannot be closed,as some hope, by restoring national controls. Withfew exceptions, in the longer run, in order formankind to gain control, to direct these processesto its benefit and curb excesses or anti-humandevelopments, it will require social, political, andmoral institutions whose reach is as global as thechallenges are. Nationalism stands in the way ofthe development of these institutions. ~

government of a syndicalist or corporate nature, inwhich various interests gain ever more decision-making power. The same fear of lack of accounta-bility to elected bodies has been raised against theNAFTA and wro committees and the EuropeanCommission.

Several considerations come into play. Domes-tically, the shift of involvement from the state tocommunitarian bodies does not mean that citizensgive up their rights to vote for local and nationalgovernments. These in turn set limits on theaction of these social bodies, can serve to ensurethat individual rights will not be violated, that thelaws of the land will be abided by. Also, many ofthese bodies do adhere to democratic proceduresand if these are not honored steps can be taken toensure that they are, as was in the case of theTeamsters Union. And people who are disaffectedby the way one voluntary association is conducted.

Internationally, at issue is the scope of thefunction and power of the new supranationalbodies. NGOS, with very few exceptions, haverather limited scope and power. Hence the waysthey are controlled matters relatively little. Thesame is true so far about the NAFTA and wro com-mittees. However, the European Commission hasachieved reached a scope and power which oughtto be, and is becoming, more accountable to theEuropean Parliament. In short, there seems hereto be no principled objection to the developmentof social involvements and supranational ones.

In Conclusion

Our generation is challenged by the fact thatglobalization so far has been largely economicand technological, and not social, political, andmoral.2O As a result, the ability of the people of theworld to control their fate has been diminished. Anational government may enact laws banning thedistribution of designs to make bombs or of " MeinKampf«, create legislation to protect children frompedophiles, or to safeguard the privacy of medicalrecords but these will be of little viability in the ageof the Internet. A bioethics commission may curbcertain experiments conducted in one nation,however, in the absence of supranational bodies toagree and enforce such bans, these experimentsmay easily be conducted in some other country.

20. For discussion on the changing political landscapeof a globalized world, see James N. Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government:Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1992).

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