ammeter 2003

Toward a political theory of leadership

Anthony P. Ammetera,*, Ceasar Douglasb, William L. Gardnera,Wayne A. Hochwarterb, Gerald R. Ferrisb

aSchool of Business Administration, University of Mississippi, University, MS 38677, USAbDepartment of Management, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA

Accepted 9 September 2002

Abstract

Leadership has been an active area of scientific investigation for over half a century, with scholars

developing different perspectives on antecedents, processes, and outcomes. Conspicuous in its absence

has been a conceptualization of leadership from a political perspective, despite appeals for such a

theory and the widely acknowledged view of political processes in organizations. In this article, we

develop a model of a political theory of leadership in an effort to address this need, and to demonstrate

the versatility of such a conceptualization for understanding both leadership and social influence

processes in organizations. Because we define politics in organizational leadership as the constructive

management of shared meaning, we demonstrate how a political perspective does not necessarily cast

leaders in a personally ambitious, manipulative role. We proceed to show how this political perspective

can contribute to effectiveness through both enhanced leader outcomes and the constituencies’

consequences to which leaders are directing their efforts. The implications for a political theory of

leadership are discussed, as are directions for future research.

D 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Inc.

1. Toward a political theory of leadership

A political perspective on organizations has become an increasingly accepted view in

recent years. Indeed, if we can accurately characterize organizations as ‘‘political arenas’’

(Mintzberg, 1983, 1985), then it seems quite reasonable that we should be interested in the

1048-9843/02/$ – see front matter D 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Inc.

PII: S1048 -9843 (02 )00157 -1

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-662-915-6748; fax: +1-662-915-7968.

E-mail address: [email protected] (A.P. Ammeter).

The Leadership Quarterly 13 (2002) 751–796

antecedents and consequences of the political behavior exhibited by the players inhabiting

organizational environments. Certainly, some work has focused on the development of a more

informed understanding of political behavior in organizations (e.g., Ferris & Judge, 1991;

Mintzberg, 1983, 1985; Pfeffer, 1992, 1981; Porter, Allen, & Angle, 1981). However,

noticeably absent in the literature are attempts to conceptualize leadership from a political

perspective, despite the recognized political implications of leadership positions and appeals

for such a theory (e.g., House & Aditya, 1997).

The purpose of the present article is to initiate decisive steps toward the development of a

political theory of leadership. We introduce a working model that specifies antecedents,

consequences, mediators, and moderators, and develop some important directions for future

research in testing this model. Furthermore, in establishing the nature of the political

perspective, we adopt a decidedly neutral, nonpejorative view of politics, characterizing

politics as neither inherently good nor bad, but rather a fact of life and a feature woven into

the very fabric of organizations. Also, we revive the concept of leader style and demonstrate

how it plays a pivotal role in this view of leadership. Finally, we discuss important outcomes

of leader political behaviors, including leader reputation as a key aspect of leader perform-

ance.

2. Background literature

2.1. Leadership theory and research

The study of leadership is one of the oldest areas of scientific inquiry in the behavioral

sciences and remains very active. One need only glance through the huge volume compiled

by Bass (1990) to appreciate the breadth, scope, and extensiveness of scholarly interest in

leadership. However, whereas such volume of scholarship has contributed to the development

of a substantial knowledge base, there are certainly gaps in our understanding of leadership

processes and outcomes. Our objective in this section is not to conduct a comprehensive

review of the leadership literature as a number of such thorough reviews are available in the

literature (e.g., Bass, 1990; House & Aditya, 1997; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). Instead, we

highlight some of the specific gaps in our knowledge of leadership that merit increased

attention.

One such area that warrants empirical attention which has been virtually untested

empirically to date, as argued by House and Aditya (1997), is the construct of leader

style—the manner in which leaders express particular behaviors (discussed further in later

sections). Also, they indicated that most approaches to leadership focus almost exclusively on

followers and ignore leader relations with superiors, peers, and other constituencies. House

and Aditya further emphasized that theories of leadership and empirical research have not

given adequate consideration to the context within which leadership is played out. Finally,

Yukl and Van Fleet (1992) contended that most leadership researchers have focused on only a

narrow aspect of leadership, with consideration given to merely a limited set of variables,

while they ignore other potentially relevant aspects. These deficiencies suggest that theories

A.P. Ammeter et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 13 (2002) 751–796752

of leadership have been too narrowly focused and that potentially important variables like

context, leader style, and alternative leadership constituencies have been neglected.

We believe that these perceived deficiencies in our leadership knowledge base indicate that

a new conceptual framework may be needed. Indeed, some of the noted deficiencies simply

involve omitted variables that could shed further light on leadership dynamics. However, it is

also quite possible that the fundamental assumptions of scholars examining leadership

phenomena serve to drive certain approaches, as well as limit consideration of other

approaches.

Along these lines, House (1995) contended that traditional theories of leadership have

labored under implicit assumptions of rationality and that research is needed on how political

processes resonate with leadership phenomena. Similarly, House and Aditya (1997, p. 455)

argued for the theoretical and empirical investigation of leader political behavior and suggest

‘‘It is rather amazing that there is no theory of political leadership in complex organizations,

given the fact that social psychologists have long studied power and influence processes in

organizations.’’

2.2. Leadership and organizational politics

As part of the development of our model of a political theory of leadership, we must define

what we mean by leadership and organizational politics. First, when we refer to leadership,

we utilize the definition proposed by House (1995, p. 413) of general leadership, that is,

behavior ‘‘. . .that gives purpose, meaning, and guidance to collectivities by articulating a

collective vision that appeals to ideological values, motives, and self-perceptions of

followers. . ..’’ House further states that the outcomes of such behavior are heightened

awareness of organizational values, unusual levels of effort, and the foregoing of self-interest

of followers for the good of the collective.

Although many of the political behaviors that are discussed in our model could be used for

self-serving purposes by leaders, we do not focus on these aspects because such self-serving

behavior is not a part of our definition of ‘‘leadership.’’ We acknowledge, however, that such

behavior likely exists, and encourage interested researchers to undertake studying this as a

complement to our work here. It is also likely that leadership behavior has important positive

impacts on the leader (e.g., enhanced reputation due to organizational unit performance

attributed to good leadership), but as these are entrained with the collective good, such

behavior is functional for the collective. Thus, our focus is on the behavior intended to be of

benefit to the greater collective or organization.

Second, it can be argued that politics has garnered an undesirable reputation over the

course of the last 20 years (Gandz & Murray, 1980; Porter et al., 1981). To the average

individual, the term organizational politics is likely to conjure a host of reprehensible images

that include (but are not limited to) backroom manipulation, behind-the-scenes maneuvering,

and self-serving posturing. A significant body of literature (e.g., Ferris, Adams, Kolodinsky,

Hochwarter, & Ammeter, 2002; Kacmar & Baron, 1999) examining politics in organizations

has adopted the view that workplace politicking is an inherently divisive phenomenon that

leads to a host of adverse outcomes for both individuals and organizations.

A.P. Ammeter et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 13 (2002) 751–796 753

According to Sederberg (1984), politics represents any purposeful attempt to generate,

maintain, alter or dispose of shared meaning. These ‘‘shared meanings’’ provide normative

guidelines for subsequent behavior and interpretations of incidents at work. With regard to

leader behavior, Smircich and Morgan (1982) suggested that one objective of leadership is to

manage meaning. More recently, Fairhurst and Sarr (1996, p. 11) suggested that ‘‘framing is

an art whereby leaders manage meaning and socially construct reality for themselves and

followers.’’

In this article, we take a decidedly different view of organizational politics. Instead of

adopting the view that politics represents the ‘‘dark side’’ of employee behavior, we see

politics as a neutral, and inherently necessary, component of organizational functioning

(Pfeffer, 1981). Further, we view political behavior as activities designed to minimize the vast

amount of ambiguity that occurs in organizations (Bolman & Deal, 1991), and to give

meaning to organizational phenomena where uncertainty exists (Ferris & Judge, 1991).

3. Toward a political model of leadership

A diagram of the model of our developing political theory of leadership is shown in Fig. 1,

and it is divided into three basic components: antecedents of leader political behavior, leader

Fig. 1. Political model of leadership.


political behavior, and consequences of political behavior. Before going into the model in

detail, we first introduce its components below.

Antecedents of political behavior explain the motivation for leaders to engage in political

behavior and the source of their ability (or lack of ability) to successfully engage in such

behavior. Note that we use the term ‘‘target’’ to refer to the constituency or constituencies

with whom the leader is attempting to ‘‘manage shared meaning.’’ We incorporate the

element of time into the model by recognizing that prior ‘‘episodes’’ of leader political

behavior contribute to the development of the leader’s reputation, which in turn serves as a

contextual input into the current episode.

Leader attributes are discussed as these have an impact on the likelihood that a leader will

engage in (and the extent to which he or she will successfully implement) political behaviors.

Similarly, leader cognitions are expected to affect the particular influence tactics that a leader

chooses. Leader social capital (resources available through social or interpersonal ties) is

included in this model because of the antecedent and outcome implications of possessing

social capital when engaging in key leader behaviors, such as networking and reputation

building. Finally, leader interpersonal style is discussed as a critical component because it is

often a deciding factor in the effective execution of influence attempts. The attributes of the

target, such as demographic characteristics, status and power differences with the leader, and

target personality attributes, are argued to play a key role in shaping the political behavior of

the leader, as well as the target’s reactions to leader political behavior.

The leader political behavior portion of the model discusses the behaviors in which leaders

engage when trying to enact shared meanings with constituencies. Intermediate consequences

in the model include target outcomes, that is, target affect and cognitions that result from

leader political behavior. Target attitudes and performance are discussed with respect to

conditions under which leader behavior will have a positive or negative impact on these

important outcomes. The model concludes with leader outcomes such as leader effectiveness,

performance evaluation, promotion, and, finally, reputation accrual for the leader. A final

outcome of the model is the impact that resultant reputation and related artifacts of the

‘‘political behavior episode’’ have on the next episode of leader political behavior.

4. Antecedents of political behavior

4.1. Incorporating time into a framework of leader political influence

As evidenced by the recent ‘‘Special Topic Forum on Time and Organizational Research’’

published in the Academy of Management Review, the importance of time to the study of

organizational phenomenon is gaining long overdue recognition from organizational

scholars (Goodman, Ancona, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001). Leadership scholars (e.g.,

Hunt, 1991; Hunt & Conger, 1999; Hunt & Peterson, 1997) have likewise called for greater

theoretical and empirical attention to the effects of temporal influences on leadership

processes. Toward this end, we adopt a temporally based framework of leader–target

interactions in the proposed political model of leadership. In doing so, we draw heavily upon


the temporally based framework of team processes advanced by Marks, Mathieu, and

Zaccaro (2001).

Team performance episodes occupy a central and critical role within theMarks et al.’s (2001)

framework. Episodes are defined as distinguishable periods of time over which performance

accrues and feedback is available (Marks et al., 2001, p. 361). Here, we apply the same

definition to our focus on episodes that encompass attempted political influence by the leader,

as well as subsequent performance outcomes and target feedback. That is, an episode of leader

political influence occurs when the leader directs political behavior towards a target audience,

the target responds, and assorted outcomes—including performance—accrue.

We depict the current and focal episode of leader political influence in Fig. 1 as Episode n

(En). Moreover, we include the history of prior political episodes between the leader and the

target where the historical context for the current episode En is the summation of past episodes

involving these actors and is an important contextual variable that impacts the forms of political

influence adopted by the leader in the current episode, as well as the target’s response. Finally,

as episodes of political behavior by the leader unfold over time and with assorted targets, the

leader develops a reputation (either favorable or unfavorable) with respect to such critical

elements of leadership as competence, decisiveness, trustworthiness, and/or effectiveness

(Ferris, Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, & Treadway, in press). This reputation, in turn, serves

as a contextual input for the next (En + 1) episode of leader influence.

4.2. Contextual influences on political processes

By definition, context represents the interrelated conditions within which something exists

or occurs. In the realm of political leadership, organizational context reveals the issues that

are integral to the creation of the political environment. Power is context-specific (Pfeffer,

1981), and organizations are political settings that facilitate the exchange of power (Fairholm,

1993). The importance of context is that it shapes performance standards and determines the

process by which leaders acquire their roles and authority (Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001). The

underlying logic here is that context is vital to any discussion of political activity within

organizations, and, therefore, is included in the model of political leadership. In this section,

we expand on the following contextual issues: organizational structure and culture, account-

ability, leader position, and prior political episodes as a temporal reference.

4.2.1. Organizational structure

Structure provides the context that mediates the relationship between behavior and power

(Brass & Burkhardt, 1993), and power is the essence of leader behavior (Yukl, 2002). From

this perspective, the connection between organization structure and leadership is quite clear.

Whereas leaders exercise free will in making behavioral choices, structural norms determine

the appropriateness of their selection. For example, looking at just one method of describing

structure, Burns and Stalker (1966) established the ‘‘mechanistic’’ and ‘‘organic’’ categories

for organization structures, with each representing opposite positions on the issues of

formalization and hierarchy of authority. The importance of this distinction is that each form

contributes to a unique political arena that requires a different set of leader political behaviors.


In a summary of the differences between mechanistic and organic organizations, House

(1991) discussed two issues that are noteworthy: hierarchical differentiation (i.e., the degree

of status stratification) and the tightness of coupling (i.e., the degree of interdependence

between operating units). Mechanistic structures are more formalized than organic structures

and therefore have more hierarchical differentiation and are more tightly coupled, which

limits power-striving activities (House, 1991). Leaders operating in organic structures will

have greater power-striving opportunities because a reduction in structure creates uncertainty,

and uncertainty stimulates political activity (Porter et al., 1981). Thus, in organic structures,

securing work unit resources and recognition may require greater political activity. In this

vein, as a consequence of organizational structure, leader political activity will vary.

4.2.2. Organizational culture

An organization’s culture is the behavior in and of an organization (Ott, 1989), which

consists of the values, beliefs, and behavioral norms that are shared by its members (Detert,

Schroeder, & Mauriel, 2000), drives actions and relationships (Lucas, 1987), and creates a

broad set of organizational cues that form the bases for rules, procedures, and communica-

tions that constrain leadership (Waldman, 1993). Through its existence and influence on

behavior, organization culture frames and shapes the use of leader behaviors.

In a political approach to leadership, culture has an important role due to its complement-

ary relationship with organizational politics (Lucas, 1987). Organization members reify both

organizational politics and culture; however, both are difficult to quantify because of their

perceptual nature. This is problematic for leaders who must adopt political behaviors that

align with the established political norms, because their behaviors must match the situational

assessments of their followers.

The reality and presence of culture’s effect on the political influence process is apparent

from a recent study of the use of upward influence in promoting gender issues in

organizations. Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, and Dutton (1998) reported that female managers

considered salient norms, such as whether the organization showed support for gender-equity

issues, before proactively promoting gender-equity issues to upper management. In this study,

female managers made a cultural assessment before making an attempt to influence top

management. Understanding of top management values and openness to change provides

cues to a firm’s culture, which must factor into the development of political behavioral norms.

4.2.3. Accountability

Accountability is the need to justify decisions to some audience, and it is considered the

glue that binds social systems together (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). Accountability is important

to rule and norm enforcement, because it is a link between decision-makers and the

organizations to which they belong (Tetlock, 1985). In contrast to responsibility, which

strictly reflects an internal feeling, accountability takes on different forms and affects leader

behavior.

The overarching goal of accountability mechanisms is to control action and to improve

individual and organizational performance. In the context of political leadership, account-

ability mechanisms motivate leaders with the threat of being required to explain their actions


to others within the organization. The primary task of managers is to make organizational

activities sensible and meaningful with an acceptable social definition (Pfeffer, 1981).

Research suggests that knowledge of accountability compels people to devote more cognitive

effort to information processing (Tetlock, 1985). As a consequence of being held accountable,

individuals are more thoughtful in their decision-making activities, which may lead to better

decisions.

4.2.4. Leader position

Position within an organization’s hierarchy is a source of power and influence. According

to Mintzberg (1983), access to information and access to influential others contributes to

political influence, and a leader’s hierarchal rank and centrality are positional characteristics

that moderate political influence and leader behaviors.

Rank is the most obvious source of a leader’s power and influence. As Zaccaro and

Klimoski (2001, p. 12) argued, ‘‘the hierarchical context of leadership has profound effects on

the personal, interpersonal, and organizational choices that can be made.’’ Specifically, rank

influences the issues and people leaders engage, as well as the protocol of those encounters.

Research also indicates that organizational politics occurs more often at higher organizational

levels (Madison, Allen, Porter, Renwick, & Mayes, 1980), which is indicative of the

availability of resources and information.

Centrality, like rank, is a product of the organization’s structure. However, unlike rank, its

benefits are not entirely based on hierarchical level. Centrality is contingent upon one’s

position in the intra-organizational social network, and it is related to influence and power

(Brass, 2001). The power associated with centrality stems from an individual’s relationship

with multiple resource flows (Brass, 1984). In this vein, leaders in highly centralized

positions have greater access to resources, but more importantly, they have greater access

to well-connected others.

Today’s organizations often feature flexible structures that rely on project and cross-

functional teams to address specific organizational needs. Team leaders and members gain

connectivity when projects are critical to organizational success and provide the opportunity

for political activity. Individuals use either political behaviors focused on self-interest (i.e.,

personalized political behaviors) or political behaviors focused on organizational issues (i.e.,

socialized political behaviors) (House, 1991). Thus, the increased use of specialized teams

generates more opportunity for political activity by team leaders and members for personal

and organizational improvement.

4.2.5. History of prior leadership episodes

As previously described, the proposed model reflects a temporally based, episodic

framework for examining the political processes whereby leaders exert influence. The

premise here is that both the leader and the target enter each situation with knowledge of

prior leadership episodes; that is, they each possess [P(Past episodes up to and including

En � 1)], and that this serves as a reference point for placing the current episode in context.

Indeed, the leader–member exchange (LMX) literature suggests that the quality of prior

interactions between the leader and target members has a profound effect on the kinds of


influence tactics selected by the leader in the current episode, as well as the members’

reactions (Boyd & Taylor, 1998; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Liden & Mitchell, 1989;

Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999). The construct of leader reputation represents the

cumulative product of the leader’s actions and subsequent results within the organization.

Consequently, in the model, the leader’s reputation serves as a key input into the context and

the starting point for the next episode of leader political influence.

4.3. Leader attributes

4.3.1. General mental ability

One class of job performance predictors that has been actively researched for years is

intelligence, cognitive ability, or what Schmidt and Hunter (1998) referred to general mental

ability (GMA). Schmidt and Hunter’s review suggested that GMA tends to be the single most

valid predictor of future job performance and learning, which has been noted by others as

well (Ree & Earles, 1992). GMA is a well-researched construct, with impressive cumulative

evidence of its capacity to predict job performance.

However, the direct influence of GMA has been called into question when noncognitive

variables have been proposed to challenge its predictive effectiveness (McClelland, 1993;

Ree & Earles, 1992; Sternberg & Wagner, 1993). Indeed, instead of posing arguments

promoting a single predictor, contemporary thinking seems to favor consideration of

predictors that can supplement the contribution of GMA, which might include personality

measures and social skills (Guion, 1983; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Wagner, 1997). Because

skilled political behavior depends so heavily on interpreting social situations and then

enacting proper responses, it is likely that GMA will interact heavily with personality and

social skill to produce individuals with more or less capability to engage successfully in

political behaviors.

4.3.2. Personality measures

Examination of personality attributes that are most directly organizationally relevant

indicates that certain personality characteristics can be linked to political behaviors. These

attributes include self-esteem, self-verification, Machiavellianism, need for power, and locus

of control (Biberman, 1985; House, 1988; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989). Biberman (1985)

reported that individuals are more likely to engage in political behavior to the extent that they

are higher in self-esteem. It is not clear if simply desiring to become a successful or worthy

individual will trigger political behavior to achieve this end. In fact, as noted by Swann and

colleagues, some individuals strive for self-verification rather than enhanced self-liking or

self-competence and would rather engage in interactions with others whose outcomes tend to

support their preconceived views of themselves (Bosson & Swann, 1999). In such instances,

it would be expected that individuals high in need for self-verification would engage in

political behavior only if doing so was consistent with their self-view.

Machiavellianism may also be a characteristic that predicts propensity to engage in

political behavior. In Biberman’s (1985) study of MBA students and office politics,

Machiavellianism correlated so highly with the office politics scale that they appeared to


measure the same construct. One would not expect Machiavellianism to be correlated with a

desire to share meaning with constituents; rather, it would likely be consistent with a desire to

distort meaning to suit the designs of the Machiavellian individual. Thus, although

Machiavellianism might be correlated with some aspects of political behavior, we would

expect these to be predominantly self-serving rather than other-serving behaviors.

One personality characteristic that has been found to be especially relevant to leadership

and organizational politics is need for power (nPow). McClelland (1985) describes this

need as a nonconscious motive that varies across individuals, and in strength within a

particular person, depending on environmental cues. Persons high in nPow tend to assume

an activist role in their work environment, and act to shape outcomes arising from key

decisions. In his 1977 theory of charismatic leadership, House posited that extremely high

levels of nPow explain why charismatic leaders develop the requisite persuasive abilities to

influence others. In support of this argument, researchers have shown that an exceptionally

high nPow is a distinguishing attribute of charismatic leaders (House & Howell, 1992).

Overall, this literature suggests that a strong desire to influence others and change the status

quo is a core motive driving the behavior of leaders in general and charismatic leaders in

particular.

Finally, Biberman’s (1985) study also found that locus of control was predictive of

propensity to engage in political behaviors. His subjects reported that they tended to engage

in office politics more than others they viewed as less competitive than themselves. Leaders

high in internal locus of control would be expected to feel that they are in control of their

situations and to be active in influencing the outcomes of the interactions around them.

4.4. Political will

Mintzberg (1983) argued that to be effective in organizations, which he characterized as

political arenas, individuals needed to possess both the desire and interest in engaging in

politics (i.e., political will), and the intuitive savvy necessary to be good at it (i.e., political

skill). Ferris Fedor, and King (1994) believed this was important as well, and referred to it as

‘‘propensity to behave politically.’’ In addition, House and Baetz (1979, p. 461) noted that

effective leadership requires a disposition to be influential. They suggested that ‘‘(t)his

disposition may well result in some universal influence-oriented behaviors.’’ House (1977)

argued that outstanding leaders scored higher on the need for social influence scale. In

essence, we suggest that a necessary antecedent condition contributing to leader political

behavior is the desire or inclination to exercise influence and manage shared meaning in ways

that further leader and organizational objectives.

4.5. Leader cognitions: information processing by the leader

With the cognitive revolution in psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1990), ample evidence of the

fundamental importance of information processing to social relations, including leadership

(Lord & Maher, 1993; Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Green & Mitchell, 1979) and organizational

politics (Ferris et al., 1989), has been generated. Central to our discussion of leader


information processing are three basic forms of knowledge structures: leader identity, power

mental models (PMM), and political scripts.

4.5.1. Leader identity

To Schlenker (1985, p. 68), ‘‘identity’’ involves ‘‘a theory (schema) of an individual that

describes, interrelates, and explains his or her relevant features, characteristics, and

experiences.’’ This ‘‘theory of self’’ includes images that specify pertinent self-constructs

(e.g., leader, executive branch manager) and establish one’s standing on particular

dimensions (e.g., creative, powerful). To Schlenker (1985, p. 67), the self-concept is an

identity, which is invoked when one ‘‘attempts to answer a personal question about the self

posed by oneself.’’ Self-identification involves ‘‘fixing and expressing one’s own identity,

privately through reflection about oneself and publicly through self-disclosures, self-

presentations, and other activities that serve to project one’s identity to audiences’’

(Schlenker, 1985, p. 68).

As individuals interact with other persons in particular situations, selected components of

their self-schemata are instantiated to construct their situated identity. Schlenker (1985, p. 68)

defined one’s situated identity as ‘‘a theory of self that is wittingly or unwittingly constructed

in a particular social situation or relationship.’’ Thus, a situated identity is jointly constructed

by the actor (leader) and audience (e.g., followers, rivals, and third parties) in situ, and

includes factors that take into consideration the challenges being confronted by both.

Basically, our situated identity reflects who we are to others and ourselves in a given

situation, and serves as a guide for subsequent behaviors. For leaders, their situated identity

will shape, among other things, (1) the interaction goals they seek to achieve and (2) the types

of political tactics they consider to be appropriate and effective means for influencing the

target (Gardner & Avolio, 1998).

4.5.2. Power mental models

A second type of knowledge structure that plays a critical role in determining the leader’s

situated identity and the expected utility of various forms of influence vis-a-vis a target

audience involves his or her conceptions of personal, work unit, and target power. Fiol,

O’Conner, and Aguinis (2001, p. 225) recently introduced the construct of PMM to describe

‘‘organized mental representations of one’s own and others’ power that tend to lead to

relatively predictable behaviors within a particular context.’’ They made a fundamental

distinction between identity PMMs, which specify one’s beliefs about the amount and type of

power held by oneself or one’s group, and reputation PPMs, which represent one’s beliefs

about the power held by other persons or groups.

Although PMMs, by definition, exist in people’s minds, they are not formed in cognitive

isolation (Fiol et al., 2001). To the contrary, they reflect the power bases that accrue to

individuals, groups, and organizations through social interaction (Giddens, 1993). The

antecedents (e.g., functional organizational position, control of resources, and network

centrality) that instantiate PPMS serve as cues that generate attention and foster the initial

development of these mental models. Such cues do not operate directly to produce PPMs.

Instead, they are interpreted through various cognitive mechanisms (e.g., judgmental


heuristics, causal attributions, and self-verification processes) that filter and frequently distort

information (Fiske & Taylor, 1990). Once elicited, PPMs influence the political behavior of

leaders, group members, and outsiders, who in turn interpret these behaviors and subsequent

outcomes through cognitive mechanisms, potentially altering their identity and reputation

PPMs (Fiol et al., 2001).

For leaders, the identity PPMs they develop for themselves and/or their work group, and

the reputation PMMs the hold for the target they seek to influence, play important roles in

determining the political tactics they deem to be most appropriate and likely to secure desired

outcomes. Consider, for example, a newly appointed CEO of a software firm who seeks to

obtain the commitment of a talented group of programmers from an R&D unit that has a well-

deserved reputation for innovation. As a result of its successes, the R&D unit has been richly

rewarded with access to critical resources (e.g., capital, equipment, and state-of-the art

technology), and garnered considerable influence within the firm.

Based on her extensive administrative experience with a rival firm, personal achievements

in the industry, structural position, and a favorable self-assessment of her managerial abilities,

the CEO’s identity PMM is likely to reflect her perceptions that she possesses considerable

reserves of position and personal power. Her reputation PPM for the R&D unit is likely to

reflect the high levels power that have accrued to the group based on its centrality, visibility,

and the expertise of it members. Under these circumstances, the leader may conclude that the

best way to secure the support and enthusiasm of the R&D unit for the project is through

inspirational appeals that highlight the inherent intellectual challenge involved (Bass, 1985;

Conger & Kanungo, 1987), as opposed to hard tactics of influence that may alienate the

programmers (Yukl, 2002).

4.5.3. Political scripts and strategies

Cognitive scripts are conceptual memory structures of events, objects, roles, sentiments,

conditions, and outcomes that occur sequentially within familiar situations and tasks (Gioia &

Poole, 1984). By specifying the anticipated roles and sequence of events for each party

involved in a political interaction episode, a political script can serve as a guide for political

leader behavior and probable target reactions (Block, 1987). Depending on the particular

target and circumstances, specific lower-order scripts or ‘‘tracks’’ may be selected that are

most congruent with the target’s past experiences, perspective, and objectives (Gardner &

Avolio, 1998; Wofford & Goodwin, 1994). Leaders with superior social skills may be adept at

making subtle but effective changes in the political script that reflect an understanding of the

target’s goals and interests.

Strategies are constructed when preexisting scripts are either unavailable or unacceptable,

by interweaving general information about goal-directed behavior with specific information

about the situation (Wofford & Goodwin, 1994). Over time, a strategy of political influence

that is repeatedly and successfully executed may be encoded in memory as a script for

future reference (Gioia & Poole, 1984). Strategy formulation enables a leader to adapt to

novel situations that call for a change in behavior. Once again, we expect socially skilled

leaders to be adept at quickly formulating effective strategies for political influence in novel

situations.


4.6. Leader social capital

Social capital includes the resources available to an individual through that person’s social

or interpersonal ties, where these resources can be used to one’s benefit in an organizational

setting (e.g., Coleman, 1988). Individuals with good social and political skills build up

extensive stores of social capital through their adeptness at developing and using diverse

networks of people (e.g., Baron & Markman, 2000). For example, Luthans, Hodgetts, and

Rosenkrantz (1988), in their examination of successful managers, found networking to be, by

far, the most dominant activity on which these managers spent time. In their study,

networking activities included behaviors of interacting with outsiders and socializing/

politicking, or the use of social and political skills to get ahead. By the sheer force of their

social effectiveness skills, leaders tend to easily develop friendships and build strong,

beneficial alliances and coalitions.

Politically skilled individuals enjoy a favorable social identity and reputation PMMs (Fiol

et al., 2001) among those in their network, resulting in significant and tangible benefits, such

as gaining favorable reactions to one’s ideas, enhanced access to important information, and

increased cooperation and trust (e.g., Baron & Markman, 2000). They know when to call on

others for favors, and are perceived as willing to reciprocate in kind. In addition, they inspire

commitment and personal obligation from those around them, which can be leveraged as a

source of additional influence and power, and becomes a resource that maintains and even

increases in value.

4.7. Leader interpersonal style

Leader style has been discussed as a potentially important factor in leader effectiveness.

It is regarded as the manner in which leaders express particular behaviors, which likely

contributes to the target’s interpretation of and subsequent effectiveness of such behaviors.

House and Aditya (1997) suggested that whereas leader style appears to have relevance

and potential importance for leadership theory, with no empirical research to date, con-

clusions about its role and effectiveness are unknown. In related work, Bolman and Deal

(1991) argued that the effectiveness of leaders ultimately is judged on the basis of their

style, and Yukl and Van Fleet (1992) discussed the manner or style with which power and

influence is demonstrated by leaders as being critically important. In their examination of

charismatic leadership, Gardner and Avolio (1998, p. 43) suggested that ‘‘. . .how leaders

say what they say may sometimes be just as important, or even more important, than what

they say.’’

We suggest that leader interpersonal style essentially is captured in a set of social

effectiveness constructs that share some common domain space, but maintain sufficient

uniqueness to exist as independent constructs. We briefly review some of these measures

of leader interpersonal style, and the role that they would play in this theory. Then, we

focus specifically on political skill as one particular operationalization of leader inter-

personal style that might bear more serious examination in a political theory of leader-

ship.


4.7.1. Social effectiveness

The ability to effectively read, understand, and control social interactions has been of

interest to behavioral scientists for quite some time. Early work focused on a construct

introduced more than 80 years ago by Thorndike (1920, p. 228) referred to as social

intelligence, which he defined as ‘‘the ability to understand men and women, boys and girls—

to act wisely in human relations.’’ Argyle (1969) suggested that social skill is reflected in the

effective exercise of persuasion, explanation, and other influence mechanisms that reveal the

ability to control others. Also, Meichenbaum, Butler, and Gruson (1981) noted that social

skill reflects the capacity and knowledge of both what to do and when to display different

behaviors, as well as control and flexibility in exhibiting such behaviors. Similarly,

Hooijberg, Hunt, and Dodge (1997) illustrate the importance of the combination of cognitive,

social, and behavioral complexity in their comprehensive ‘‘Leaderplex’’ Model.

The social effectiveness construct can be construed as a somewhat broad category

including a number of specific operationalizations that carry different labels, including social

intelligence, emotional intelligence, practical and successful intelligence, sociopolitical

intelligence, social skill, political skill, interpersonal acumen, self-monitoring, social com-

petence, ego resiliency, and functional flexibility (Ferris, Perrewe, & Douglas, 2002).

Despite the realization that they might share some degree of domain space, Ferris et al.

(2002) regarded all of these constructs as reflections of the broad category of social

effectiveness, which is currently regarded as critically important to success in jobs and

careers, and for leaders. Argued (and empirically demonstrated, in many cases) to reflect a

separate set of abilities independent of GMA, social effectiveness has been found to be

essential for managerial effectiveness (Kilduff & Day, 1994; Luthans et al., 1988).

Furthermore, research has shown a lack of social effectiveness to be one of the leading

causes of ‘‘management derailment’’ (Van Velsor & Leslie, 1995).

4.7.2. Political skill

As we have seen, the focus on social effectiveness is particularly relevant in organizational

settings as we have tried to increase our understanding of phenomena such as leadership and

interpersonal influence. However, whereas research in these areas has increased dramatically

during the past several decades, much is still unknown, particularly in how interpersonal

effectiveness actually transpires (e.g., House & Aditya, 1997). Although the foregoing section

discussed the general social effectiveness concept as well as specific construct manifestations

that fall under that general concept, we argue that political skill is one of the few constructs

that has emerged which was developed to explicitly address social influence skills in work

settings (e.g., Ferris, Perrewe, Anthony, & Gilmore, 2000; Perrewe, Ferris, Frink, & Anthony,

2000).

By design, our initial conceptualization contends that the political skill construct is not

totally dissimilar from other previously outlined social effectiveness constructs. Thus, we

view political skill as an interpersonal style construct, which combines interpersonal

perceptiveness or social astuteness with the capacity to adjust one’s behavior to different

and changing situational demands in a manner that inspires trust, confidence, and genuine-

ness, and effectively influences and controls the responses of others. We suggest that people


high in political skill not only know precisely what to do in different social situations (e.g.,

selecting the most situationally appropriate political or influence behaviors), but exactly how

to do it with a sincere, engaging manner that disguises any ulterior motives and inspires

believability, trust, and confidence, and renders the influence attempt successful.

This does not simply involve the demonstration of particular behaviors that might be

regarded as contributing to effective interpersonal interactions. Instead, political skill allows

people to create synergy among discrete behaviors that transcends the simple sum of the

parts. Leaders can then realize a set of interpersonal dynamics that enables them to reach

higher levels of personal and career success through the appropriate selection and execution

of political behaviors (Ferris et al., 2000). In addition, political skill has been suggested to

build resistance and protection in individuals, and essentially serve as an antidote to the

dysfunctional consequences of stress, particularly for managers and executives (Perrewe et

al., 2000).

4.8. Target attributes

Attributes of the target audience play a key role in shaping the political behavior of the

leader, as well as the target’s reactions. Essentially, the attributes of the target, leader, and

context serve to define the situation and provide a backdrop within which the political

behavior of the leader and the target’s response take place (Gardner & Avolio, 1998;

Goffman, 1959; Liden & Mitchell, 1989). Key target attributes discussed here are status/

power and personality attributes.

4.8.1. Target status/power

Both the influence (Yukl, 2002) and the impression management (Rosenfeld, Giacalone, &

Riordan, 2002; Schlenker, 1980) literatures have consistently demonstrated that the relative

power and status of the audience are major determinants of the types of tactics the actor

chooses to direct toward the target. With respect to influence tactics, Yukl and Tracey (1992)

proposed a model that posits the type of tactic selected for a particular influence attempt. The

assumption underlying this model is that agents will favor tactics that are socially acceptable,

are at a minimum feasible given the power of the agent relative to the target, are not overly

costly in terms of resources (e.g., time, effort, opportunity costs, and lost resources) required

for their execution, and expected to be effective in securing the interaction objective given the

level of expected target resistance (Yukl, 2002). Based on this model, Yukl and Tracey

predicted that the influence tactics of pressure, exchange, ingratiation, and legitimation would

be directed more often in a downward and lateral direction, since these tactics are more

consistent with the power base of a superior in relation to a subordinate, rather than vice

versa.

The literature on impression management likewise demonstrates the fundamental role that

the status and power of the target exerts on actor presentations. In general, this research

suggests that actors are more self-aware and concerned about their images (Gardner &

Martinko, 1988a, 1988b; Leary & Kowalski, 1990) in the presence of audiences who possess

personal attributes (status) or resources (power) that the actor values (Jones & Wortman,


1973; Schlenker, 1980) and will use some tactics with higher status/power targets (e.g.,

ingratiation), and other tactics with lower status/power targets (e.g., intimidation). Based on

these literatures, it is clear that the status and power of the target constitute key factors that

determine the type of political behavior exhibited by the leader.

4.8.2. Personality

Target personality characteristics would also be expected to influence a leader’s propensity

to engage in certain types of political behavior and the success of this political behavior. Two

organizationally relevant examples, need for affiliation (nAff) and propensity to trust, are

discussed here.

For nAff (need for affiliation; an individual’s desire to pursue and remain in positive and

supporting interpersonal relationships; McClelland, 1966), it is possible that targets high in

nAff will be more amenable to influence behaviors enacted by the leader in an attempt to

enter into or maintain close personal relationships with the leader. If the leader is aware of

this, he or she can utilize this need to place greater and greater demands on the individual. At

the same time, he or she can expend relatively fewer cognitive resources designing politically

‘‘correct’’ requests for this kind of target. This does not necessarily mean that the leader uses

the target, it simply recognizes that the target and the leader might be able to engage in

friendly interactions with fewer political overtones than a dyad where the target does not have

any need for friendly interactions. Targets low in nAff would likely require the leader to fully

utilize their political savvy and rely on cognitive and fact-based appeals rather than emotional

appeals.

Much of the success of leader political behavior (or almost any leader behaviors for that

matter) hinges on targets’ trust that the leader is acting in good faith. As a component of the

trustor’s disposition, ‘‘propensity to trust,’’ influences the development of trust and sub-

sequent trust evaluations of a target (Wrightsman, 1964). In a meta-analysis of research on

trust in leadership, Dirks and Ferrin (2002) summarize the many empirically supported effects

of trust in leaders on workplace outcomes such as satisfaction and organizational commitment

as well as the effect of trust in leaders as a moderator of the effect of workplace characteristics

and job/organizational outcomes. The importance of a ‘‘baseline’’ level of trust is made

apparent by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995), who proposed that the trust rating of a

target will incorporate the trustor’s propensity to trust. Similarly, measuring behavior directly

in the workplace, Currall and Judge (1995) found that willingness to engage in trusting

behavior with another was affected in part by the dispositional ‘‘trusting personality’’ of the

trustor. Thus, we should expect that a target with a high propensity to trust will, all other

things being equal, have a higher likelihood of responding favorably to the political behavior

of a leader than will a target with a lower propensity to trust.

5. Leader political behavior

Previous sections detailed skills, propensities, and motives for political behavior by leaders

in organizations. This section sharpens this discussion by focusing on various forms of


political behaviors that are used by leaders in pursuit of desired outcomes. From the outset, it

is important to recognize that the literature on social influence processes that may provide

insights into leader political behavior is extensive and fragmented. As Ferris, Hochwarter, et

al. (in press) pointed out, the literature on social influence processes encompasses a number

of interrelated topics that share considerable conceptual overlap, but are nevertheless often

treated as distinct in the literature.

These topics include influence tactics, impression management and self-presentation,

organizational politics, networking, and symbolic management. A comprehensive review of

these topics is beyond the scope of the current manuscript. Instead, we focus on behaviors from

across these diverse bodies of the literature that appear to be especially relevant to leadership.

To better understand the criteria we used to determine the relevance of social influence

tactics to leadership, it is useful to consider our perspective on the functionality of alternative

forms of influence. As noted at the outset, we have adopted a neutral perspective on politics,

arguing that they reflect a reality of organizational life, and that political behaviors may be

functional or dysfunctional, depending on how they are used, and whose interests are being

considered. Hence, many self-serving behaviors that are functional for an individual may be

dysfunctional for the group and/or organization. Although such behaviors may serve to

protect the individual’s reputation and interests, such outcomes are often achieved at the

expense of the organization’s best interests. To us, such instances of self-serving behavior do

not constitute leadership.

To the contrary, a prerequisite for leadership is that the actor’s behavior must be driven by

the interests of at least one key constituent, as opposed to purely self-serving objectives. That

is, the actor’s behavior must be functional for one or more of the constituencies he or she

represents to be considered leadership. Note that such behavior may or may not be considered

functional from the perspective of the organization as a whole. For instance, whereas the

efforts of a manager to hoard scare resources (e.g., capital, personnel, and equipment) for his

department may result in suboptimization from an organizational perspective, his work unit

clearly benefits.

Using this criterion, we examine a variety of social influence behaviors that appear to be

especially relevant to a political theory of leadership in the sections that follow. We begin by

considering three basic levels of political action (Cobb, 1986) at which leaders operate: (1)

the individual level, (2) the coalition level, and (3) the network level. Next, we examine three

general categories of political behavior that cut across these levels: (1) proactive political

behaviors, (2) reactive political behaviors, and (3) symbolic and nonverbal forms of in-

fluence. We also consider the ways in which combinations of tactics can be used by leaders to

increase their effectiveness. While not meant to be an exhaustive accounting of the relevant

behaviors, those examined provide a focal ‘‘anchor’’ for the antecedents and the outcomes of

political leader behavior.

5.1. Three levels of political action

Cobb (1986) identified three basic levels of political action within organizations as

appropriate levels for assessing alternative avenues for effective organizational development


interventions. We believe these three levels also provide insights regarding the types of

political behaviors leaders use to influence key constituencies. We discuss the distinguishing

characteristics of leader political behavior at each of these levels below.

5.1.1. The individual level

This level encompasses the political behaviors that leaders direct toward other individuals

through one-on-one relationships. Much of the theory and research on influence tactics

conducted by Kipnis and associates (Kipnis, Schmidt, and Willkinson, 1980), and subse-

quently by Yukl and his colleagues (Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl, Falbe, & Young, 1993; Yukl,

Kim, & Falbe, 1996), has focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the tactics individuals use

to influence one another. Moreover, LMX focuses on the unique, dyadic relationships that

formal leaders form with individual members of their work units (Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne,

1997; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997).

As the LMX literature makes clear, leaders often develop special, close relationships with

trusted followers. While the leader may rely predominantly on his or her position power to

influence low LMX members, alternative forms of influence become important for high LMX

members. Indeed, for high LMX relationships, leaders may use personal bases of power, such

as expert and referent power (French & Raven, 1959) more extensively as they become part

of the leader’s inner circle. Of course, it is important to recognize that the influence exchange

between leaders and members is a two-way process, as members act to impress and build a

favorable relationship with the leader (Liden & Mitchell, 1988, 1989).

Beyond direct reports, leaders represent their work units as they seek to influence a wide

variety of individuals representing various internal and external organizational constituents,

including superiors, peers, customers, regulators, and suppliers (Mintzberg, 1973, 1983; Tsui,

1984). Indeed, the desire to enhance their power and influence serves as a primary motivation

behind leaders’ efforts to build an extensive interpersonal network (Kotter, 1985; Luthans et

al., 1988). Importantly, a leader’s influence at the individual level, serves as the foundation

for the political behaviors applied at the coalition and network levels, as described below.

5.1.2. The coalition level

Beginning with the frame-breaking work of Cyert and March (1963), organizational

scholars have developed an increasing appreciation for the pervasiveness of coalitions as

mechanisms of political influence within organizations (e.g., Allen, Madison, Porter,

Renwick, & Mayes, 1979; Fairholm, 1993). Far earlier, however, politically savvy leaders

were aware of the utility of building coalitions by convincing peers, subordinates, superiors

and/or outsiders to join forces to pursue their common interests (e.g., Bolman & Deal, 1991;

Deluca, 1999).

As a benefit to the organization, in contrast to individual level tactics that are often driven

by hidden agendas, DeLuca (1999) argued that coalitions are more visible and hence more

likely to discourage unethical conduct because they require the cooperation and approval of

multiple organizational actors. Additional benefits of coalitions identified by DeLuca include:

(1) convergent validity, as agreement among coalition members with varied perspectives

lends credibility to the importance of the issue and the need for action; (2) task legitimization,


as individuals who would otherwise refrain from political action come to recognize the

legitimacy of their concerns and the importance of addressing them; and (3) increased

maneuverability arising from the combined resources and abilities of the coalition members.

As recognition of the importance of coalitions as forms of political influence has grown,

confusion regarding the construct has likewise increased. In an effort to remedy this situation,

Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter (1985, p. 261) defined a coalition as ‘‘an interacting group of

individuals, deliberately constructed, independent of the formal structure, lacking its own

internal formal structure, consisting of mutually perceived membership, issue oriented,

focused on a goal or goals external to the coalition, and requiring concerted member action.’’

They argued that all eight of these criteria must be present in order for a group to be a

coalition. This definition provides several important insights regarding coalitions that are

useful in understanding how leaders use them to achieve influence.

First, the members of the coalition must communicate about the coalition issue(s) and any

coordinated actions they contemplate. Although it is not necessary for all of the coalition

members to be present during issue-related communications, it does mean that two or more

individuals who share a common interest, but fail to discuss it and act independently, are

excluded (Stevenson et al., 1985). A second and related criterion is that the members exhibit

agreement on coalition membership; that is, they have similar perceptions of who is, and who

is not, a member. The implication for leaders seeking to build and guide a coalition is that

they must make coalition members aware of one another and their shared interests, and

coordinate their interactions and issue-related activities. These actions relate to the third

criterion: the coalition must be deliberately constructed. Leaders who build coalitions do so

consciously out of an explicit recognition of the members’ joint interests and the heightened

influence that an engineered alliance can potentially achieve.

Fourth, the coalition is independent of the organization’s formal structure. Thus, by

definition, a manager’s work unit (e.g., department, committee, task force, and division) is not

a coalition, since it is formally designated and sanctioned by the organization, and the

manager already possesses the legitimate authority to represent the group’s interests. To the

contrary, coalitions are formed when members’ common interests have not been explicitly

acknowledged, and no formal and sanctioned means for expressing their concerns and

exerting their combined influence is available. In practice, however, ‘‘it may sometimes be

difficult to separate formally mandated responsibilities from coalitional objectives’’ (Steven-

son et al., 1985, p. 261).

Fifth, coalitions lack a formal internal structure due to their transitory nature. Coalitions are

typically formed to address a specific issue or set of issues, and often disband once they

receive a response from the targeted decision maker(s) (Stevenson et al., 1985). As a

consequence, an informal role structure, rather than a formal hierarchy of authority, is likely

to develop. Although persons who are instrumental in constructing the coalition typically play

critical leadership roles within the coalition, it is important to recognize that these roles are

never formalized. As such, effective social skills and persuasive abilities are required for a

leader to guide a coalition in desired directions.

The final three criteria are that the coalition be issue-oriented, externally focused, and

demonstrate concerted member action. As suggested above, leaders who build coalitions do


so to unite persons who share similar views and interests regarding a particular issue or set of

issues to jointly influence an external party. In some cases, the leader may be proactive in

forming a coalition to originate a proposal or initiate action to take advantage of perceived

opportunities that would benefit the members. In other cases, the leader may seek to construct

a coalition in reaction to proposals or actions initiated by others (Stevenson et al., 1985).

5.1.3. The network level

‘‘A network is an association of individuals and groups tied together into an interconnected

system. The ties can be characterized as linkages (e.g., affiliation bonds, authority, and task

relationships) and/or ‘channels’ through which resources flow (e.g., information through the

‘grapevine’)’’ (Cobb, 1986, p. 490). As noted during the discussion of political action at the

individual level, politically savvy leaders devote considerable attention to the development of

relationships with a broad array of subordinates, peers, superiors, and outsiders. The net

product of these activities is the development of an extensive interpersonal network that the

leader can utilize to gather information and mobilize support (Kotter, 1985), often in the form

of coalitions, as described above.

Many studies have shown that networking strategies lead to positive outcomes such as the

building of social capital, acquisition of resources and opportunities, and reputational strength

(e.g., Baron & Markman, 2000; Burt, 1997; House, 1995). Luthans et al. (1988) maintained

that networking is the dominant activity of ‘‘real managers.’’ In discussing what one does

when networking, they described strategies that include socializing/politicking, interacting

with outsiders, and mentoring. Socializing and politicking refer to the informal conversations

and ‘‘chit-chat’’ that are used to communicate and share gossip, rumors, and engage in

passive or active leader impression management and influence behaviors, usually inside the

organization. Interacting with outsiders involves building ties to constituencies outside the

organization. These two strategies involve the two key environments for networking—within

the organization and the organization’s external environment. Each is important as both

environments contain constituencies that leaders need to disseminate information and

meaning to and that have resources the leader may need or want to control.

Mentoring is a more intensive form of networking where the leader creates a very strong

dyadic relationship that, if done properly, leads to a very strong tie with a potential ally to

extend a leader’s influence within the organization (Luthans et al., 1988; Noe, Greenberger, &

Wang, in press). Note that mentoring relationships across organizations are less common, but

can be very effective in extending outside influence. The mentored subordinate also stands to

gain from this relationship due to their ‘‘fast-track’’ inclusion into the mentor’s existing

network or set of networks.

As context is an important antecedent to political behavior, certain contextual character-

istics have an impact on the success of networking strategies. Centrality and rank or position

within an organization will affect the immediate paths of access that a leader has, both to gain

social capital and to reach targets of political behavior (Brass, 1984, 1985; Pfeffer, 1992).

Individual difference variables will likewise impact the extent and nature of networking

activities pursued by the leader. For example, a recent study by Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass

(2001) demonstrated that high as opposed to low self-monitors were more likely to occupy


central positions in social networks within organizations. Moreover, for high (but not low)

self-monitors, longer service within the organization was associated with occupancy of

strategically beneficial network positions. When coupled with Luthans et al.’s (1988)

findings, these results lend support for the notion that politically sophisticated leaders will

develop extensive networks, while simultaneously moving themselves into central and

strategically advantageous positions.

5.2. Proactive leader political behaviors

Having examined the three levels of political action within organizations, we now turn our

attention to specific forms of political behavior that leaders use to achieve social influence. To

do so, we follow the lead of Valle and Perrewe (2000) who, building on the work of prior

authors (Arkin, 1981; Tedeschi & Melberg, 1984), make a distinction between proactive and

reactive political behaviors. Proactive leader political behaviors consist of those actions the

leader assertively undertakes in response to a perceived opportunity to influence a target and

secure desired outcomes for one or more collective bodies he/she represents. In contrast,

reactive leader political behaviors are initiated in response to a perceived threat to the

collective(s) in order to minimize or forestall the adverse consequences; such behaviors are

examined in the next section. We consider the insights regarding proactive political behaviors

provided by the impression management, influence tactic, and organizational politics

literatures below.

5.2.1. Impression management

One of the most commonly used taxonomies for classifying impression management

behaviors is provided by Jones and Pittman (1982). A common attribute of the tactics they

identify is that they are proactive. Specifically, the self-presentation strategies of exempli-

fication, self-promotion, ingratiation, intimidation, and supplication are each used proactively

to solicit attributions that they are morally worthy, likable, competent, dangerous and

helpless, respectively. Moreover, the first four attributions correspond to the identity images

of trustworthy, moral, attractive, esteemed, and powerful, each of which are likely to be

viewed as desirable to a leader (House & Aditya, 1997). Partial support for this assertion is

provided by Schutz (1995), who found that political leaders appearing on television talk

shows relied heavily on self-presentations that portrayed them as worthy, successful, and

innovative.

In this section, we consider how the exemplification, self-promotion, intimidation, and

ingratiation tactics can be used to achieve a leader’s political objectives. We also consider two

additional promotional tactics identified by Gardner and Avolio (1998) as being of particular

value to leaders: vision promotion and organizational promotion. In our opinion, the

supplication tactic, which involves efforts to solicit an attribution of helplessness from an

audience in order to secure their aid, will be of relatively little value to leaders. Hence, it is

not discussed further.

The impression management tactic that has been most commonly associated with effective

leadership is exemplification. Indeed, the concept of ‘‘leading by example’’ is often presented


as a highly desirable and noble form of leadership by both academics and practitioners. For

example, nonvocal sports figures who illustrate their dedication to the team through their

reliability, work ethic, and citizenship behaviors are typically admired and described as ‘‘role

models.’’ Tedeschi and Norman (1985, p. 301) define exemplification as ‘‘behavior which

presents the actor as morally worthy and may also have the goal of eliciting imitation by

others.’’ Because the attributes of integrity, honesty, and moral worthiness represent ideals

that are almost universally valued, exemplifiers present themselves as exceptionally trust-

worthy and morally responsible persons. Importantly, Jones and Pittman (1982) identify

Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Ghandi as prototypical exemplifiers—two individuals

who have come to be revered and admired as particularly effective and noble world leaders.

Ample recognition of the importance of exemplification to transformational and charis-

matic leaders is also provided in the academic literature (Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Gardner

& Avolio, 1998; House, 1977; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993). Indeed, by modeling

exemplary behaviors that often involve personal sacrifices, leaders can effectively illustrate

the type of dedication, commitment, and self-sacrificing behavior that is expected of

followers. Moreover, to the extent that a leader’s behavior is consonant with followers’

values and objectives, followers may experience elevated levels of admiration, respect, and

positive affect for the leader. For example, the followers of our prototypical exemplifiers,

Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Ghandi, exhibited extraordinary levels of trust in their

leaders and commitment to the cause. Many were also inspired to emulate the leader’s

behavior by making great personal sacrifices for the collective good. Empirical support for

the relationship between exemplification and perceptions of transformational leadership is

provided by Gardner and Cleavenger (1998) in a psycho-historic study of world-class leaders.

As expected, world class leaders who were perceived by raters as using the exemplification

tactic more extensively were judged to be more transformational, effective, and capable of

satisfying follower needs.

We expect leader interpersonal style to moderate the effectiveness with which leaders use

exemplification to elicit desired behaviors from followers. Support for this assertion is

provided by Turnley and Bolino’s (2001) investigation of the moderating role that self-

monitoring plays in the impression management process. Specifically, they found that high as

opposed to low self-monitors who reported using exemplification were more effective at

securing the desired image of ‘‘dedicated’’ from a target audience, while avoiding the

undesired image of ‘‘feels superior.’’ The implication of this finding is that socially skilled

leaders are more likely to be effective at securing the favorable images (e.g., dedicated,

morally worthy, committed, trustworthy, and honest) that can accrue from exemplification,

while avoiding the less favorable images (e.g., aloof, hypocritical, condescending, and self-

deluding).

In addition to being the most ubiquitous impression management tactic (Jones & Pittman,

1982), ingratiation has received the most extensive attention from scholars. Its utility is also

well-recognized within the influence tactic (Yukl & Falbe, 1990) and organizational politics

literatures (Allen et al., 1979; Zanzi, Arthur, & Shamir, 1991). The goal for ingratiators is to

make the target like them and attribute desirable qualities to them, such as warmth,

attractiveness, charm, and humor (Schlenker, 1980). Jones (1964), an early scholar of


ingratiation, specified four basic tactics: self-characterization (self-descriptions that highlight

personal qualities of the actor that are expected to appeal to the target), opinion conformity,

other enhancement (e.g., flattery and discounting negative attributes of the target) and

rendering favors.

As discussed earlier, motives to ingratiate are typically greatest among low status/power

actors who depend on the target (Gardner & Martinko, 1988a; Jones, 1964; Jones &

Wortman, 1973; Schlenker, 1980). Hence, we expect leaders to use ingratiation tactics such

as flattery or opinion conformity predominantly during interactions with superiors as opposed

to subordinates. Indeed, Liden and Mitchell (1989) suggest that ingratiation is an important

means whereby followers can make themselves more attractive to leaders, and thereby

enhance the quality of the LMX. Still, there are likely to be occasions when leaders find

ingratiation to be an appropriate and effective means for influencing followers. For example,

emerging leaders who have yet to establish a reputation, may find utility in a well-timed favor

or compliment that elicits positive follower affect and support (Leary, 1989). We expect

leaders who rely more heavily on follower support, such as in volunteer movements, will be

especially likely to flatter followers when their support is a crucial determinant of success, or

when their support base appears to be waning.

In their psycho-historical study of world class leaders, Gardner and Cleavenger (1998)

found that leaders who were judged as using ingratiation more extensively were rated as more

transformational, effective, and capable of satisfying follower needs. In contrast with the

negative connotation that is often linked to ingratiation, the behaviors Gardner and

Cleavenger included under the ingratiation category (e.g., making nonwork related compli-

ments, inquiring about one’s nonwork life, presenting oneself as warm and charming, praising

others’ ideas, and helping others with their work) were viewed quite positively by the

respondents. The transformational factor most closely linked to ingratiation was individu-

alized consideration, presumably because ingratiatory behaviors communicate the leader’s

personal concern for and interest in followers. Importantly, these findings are consistent with

Leary’s (1989) assertion that—when skillfully applied—ingratiatory behaviors, such as being

friendly, warm and accepting, can serve to enhance a leader’s appeal to followers. Moreover,

Turnley and Bolino’s (2001) findings that high as opposed to low self-monitors who use

ingratiation more frequently achieve the desired image of ‘‘likeable’’ while avoiding the

undesired image of ‘‘sycophant,’’ lend additional support to this argument.

As described by Jones and Pittman (1982), the purpose of self-promotion is to secure an

attribution of competence. To acquire such an attribution, the actor may highlight some

general ability level (e.g., athletic prowess and intelligence) or a specific skill (e.g., portfolio

analysis). The affective reaction desired is one of respect, which may include feelings of

deference or even awe. Because leader competence is obviously an important attribute for

prospective followers, leaders have strong incentives to use self-promotion tactics to bolster

their reputation as a person with great abilities. Once again, however, real dangers await

leaders who overuse this tactic. Indeed, a ‘‘self-promoter’s paradox’’ is apparent, since

persons with high abilities typically are reluctant to boast, preferring to let their achievements

speak for themselves. As a consequence, audiences tend to discount performance claims

made directly by the actor (Schlenker, 1980).


Given the shortcomings associated with blatant self-promotion, socially skilled leaders

might prefer more subtle forms of self-promotion, such as pursuing challenges they are sure

they can overcome, fostering and perpetuating myths about their accomplishments, and

failing to disclose information on factors that may have contributed to their success (Bass,

1985; Conger, 1989; Gardner & Avolio, 1998; House, 1977). Consistent with the notion that

socially skilled leaders are more effective in using self-promotion to secure favorable images,

Turnley and Bolino (2001) found that high as opposed to low performing actors achieved the

desired image of ‘‘competent’’ when using self-promotion more often, while simultaneously

avoiding the undesired image of ‘‘conceited.’’

Gardner and Avolio (1998) assert that two additional forms of promotional behaviors are

especially relevant to leaders, and charismatic leaders in particular: vision promotion and

organizational promotion. Vision promotion involves the leader’s efforts to ‘‘sell’’ the target

on the merits and feasibility of the vision. Consistent with the marketer’s concept of

promotion, leaders using this tactic seek to differentiate their vision from a less desirable

alternative, such as the status quo. To do so, they highlight and expound upon the desirable

features of the vision, while simultaneously portraying the alternative in an undesirable light

(Block, 1987). In effect, the leaders’ efforts to promote the vision will produce disenchant-

ment among followers with the current state of affairs, along with a strong commitment to

pursue the vision.

In their role as organizational spokespersons (Mintzberg, 1973), leaders commonly use

organizational promotions to highlight the favorable features and stress the achievements of

their organizations (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996). Once again, such promotional efforts are

typically used to ‘‘sell’’ the target (e.g., prospective or current employees, investors, and

customers) on the organization and solicit their support. One manifestation of such

promotions is the tendency for many leaders, and charismatic leaders in particular, to use

inclusive terms such as ‘‘we,’’ ‘‘our,’’ and ‘‘us,’’ when describing organizational objectives

and achievements (Shamir, Arthur, & House, 1994; Shamir et al., 1993). Such terms serve to

emphasize and build the collective identity of organizational members, while encouraging

nonmembers to join the team.

The purpose of intimidation is to present the actor as a dangerous person who is able and

willing to harm others (Jones & Pittman, 1982). The attribution sought by the intimidator is to

be feared. Overt threats and incipient anger represent the most common manifestations of this

strategy. Evidence of the potential pitfalls for leaders who overuse intimidation is provided by

Gardner and Cleavenger’s (1998) study of world class leaders. Intimidation was found to be

negatively related to perceptions of transformational leadership, leader effectiveness, and

follower satisfaction.

Because of the inconsistencies between the transformational leader’s quest to empower and

develop followers, and the intimidator’s use of coercion and manipulation, it is not surprising

to find a negative association between these behaviors. Moreover, the negative relationships

of intimidation with perceived leader effectiveness and follower satisfaction echo the findings

from the influence literature. Specifically, research on hard pressure tactics (e.g., threats,

warnings, and demands) indicates that while they are sometimes successful in securing

follower compliance, they are unlikely to result in commitment, and often lead to resentment


that can undermine the leader–follower relationship (e.g., Thacker & Wayne, 1995; Yukl,

Kim, & Chavez, 1999).

5.2.2. Influence tactics

Building on Kipnis et al.’s (1980) groundbreaking research into organizational influence

tactics, Yukl and his colleagues (Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl et al., 1996) developed a more

extensive and refined influence taxonomy. The following proactive tactics are included: (1)

rational persuasion, (2) apprising, (3) inspirational appeals, (4) consultation, (5) exchange, (6)

collaboration, (7) personal appeals, (8) ingratiation, (9) legitimating tactics, (10) pressure, and

(11) coalition tactics.

Note that the pressure tactic is basically equivalent to the self-presentational strategy of

intimidation (Jones & Pittman, 1982) discussed above. Because these tactics have been

extensively researched and discussed elsewhere (Ferris, Hochwarter, et al., in press; Yukl,

2002), we focus our attention on those that theory and research suggest are most important to

effective leadership.

Insights into the frequency of use and relative utility of alternative influence tactics for

leaders are provided by Yukl (2002). Based on findings from an extensive research program

(Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl et al., 1993; Yukl & Tracy, 1992), he concluded that rational

persuasion, inspirational appeals, consultation, and collaboration tend to be highly effective

forms of influence, followed by apprising, ingratiation, exchange and personal appeals, which

have a moderate chance of being effective; coalition tactics, legitimating tactics, and pressure

were least likely to be effective. Similarly, Ferris, Hochwarter, et al. (in press) concluded from

a more extensive review of the social influence literature that supervisor-focused ingratiation,

rational appeals, inspirational appeals, and consultation appear to yield the most positive

effects, whereas pressure (i.e., assertiveness) tends to backfire; findings for the remaining

tactics were inconsistent.

Yukl (2002) provides additional insights about the directional use of the tactics. Rational

persuasion is widely used in upward, downward, and lateral directions, whereas inspirational

appeals and pressure are typically used to achieve downward influence. Consultation,

collaboration, apprising, ingratiation, exchange, and legitimating tactics are predominantly

used for downward and lateral influence. Interestingly, the findings that ingratiation is directed

most often subordinates and peers contradicts the previous discussion which suggested that

motives to ingratiate are greatest for subordinates seeking to influence superiors (Jones &

Wortman, 1973; Liden &Mitchell, 1988, 1989; Ralston, 1985). Perhaps, ingratiation was used

more often in downward and lateral directions for precisely this reason—it is less obvious and

less likely to arouse suspicion when directed at subordinates and peers. Finally, personal

appeals and coalition tactics appear to be used at the lateral level most extensively.

The preceding discussion implies that effective leaders will make extensive use of rational

persuasion to influence targets across organizational levels, while utilizing inspirational

appeals, consultation, and collaboration to influence subordinates, as well as the latter two

tactics with peers. It is interesting to note that these tactics are the only ones likely to be

sanctioned by the organization as appropriate means of influence, which undoubtedly

contributes to their effectiveness. It is also noteworthy that these tactics resemble well-


documented forms of leadership. Specifically, inspirational appeals correspond to the

inspirational motivation dimension of transformational leadership (Bass, 1985), whereas

consultation and collaboration are consistent with a participative style of leadership (Vroom

& Jago, 1988; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Nonetheless, we believe that apprising, ingratiation,

exchange, and personal appeals may also be effective when used by a politically skilled

leader, especially when directed at subordinates and peers. Finally, we expect only the most

politically savvy leader to achieve consistent success with pressure and legitimating tactics.

5.2.3. Tactics suggested by organizational politics literature

As was the case for impression management behaviors and influence tactics, several

taxonomies of organizational political tactics have been advanced (Allen et al., 1979;

Fairholm, 1993; Vredenburgh & Maurer, 1984; Zanzi et al., 1991). Although these taxono-

mies encompass many of the impression management and influence tactics described above,

they also delineate other types of political behaviors that are available to organizational

leaders. In this section, we examine these behaviors. Moreover, we draw on the research of

Fairholm (1993), Vredenburgh and Maurer (1984), and Zanzi and O’Neill (2001) to make an

important distinction between political behaviors that are likely to be sanctioned by the

organization and nonsanctioned behaviors.

Consistent with our initial definition of leadership based on House (1995) and these

authors’ arguments, we define sanctioned political tactics as ones that are deemed to be

acceptable because they are consistent with the organization’s norms; that is, they ‘‘are

typically tolerated, expected, or even encouraged’’ (Zanzi & O’Neill, 2001). In contrast, when

political behavior deviates from organizational norms, it is considered to be nonsanctioned.

Not surprisingly, people typically do not want others to know that they are using non-

sanctioned political tactics, since these are viewed as undesirable, unacceptable, and negative.

The sanctioned political tactics identified by Zanzi and O’Neill (2001) include four

discussed above: networking, coalition-building, persuasion (rational), and image building.

Two additional political tactics were also identified as likely to be sanctioned: use of expertise

and super-ordinate goals. The former tactic refers to ‘‘providing particular skills, unique

knowledge, or solutions to enhance one’s position’’ (Zanzi & O’Neill, 2001, p. 249). The

utility of expertise as a power base for effective leadership is well recognized (French &

Raven, 1959; Yukl, 2002). A related tactic involves the use of an outside expert such as an

external consultant to legitimize a position favored by the leader (Dubrin, 1998; Fairholm,

1993; Zanzi et al., 1991).

Interestingly, there is some disagreement among scholars regarding the ethicality of this

tactic. Whereas Dubrin (1998) recommended the use of experts as an ethical political tactic

that can be employed to gain support for one’s position, and hence power, the respondents to

Fairholm’s (1993) survey identified it as an ethically negative tactic when used to influence

superiors. Further evidence of the ambiguity regarding the perceived appropriateness of this

tactic arises from the fact that it failed to load on either the sanctioned or the nonsanctioned

factor in Zanzi and O’Neill’s (2001) study. Thus, it appears that the use of experts may be

seen as both a sanctioned and a nonsanctioned form of influence, depending on the manner

and circumstances in which it is used.


Appealing to a super-ordinate goal involves efforts to gain support for one’s argument by

linking it to the greater good of the organization (Zanzi et al., 1991). This tactic is especially

significant from a political perspective of effective leadership. Indeed, one of the challenges

for leaders is to convince constituents that the actions they advocate will facilitate the

attainment of organizational goals. We have already discussed one specific manifestation of

this tactic: vision promotion. In this case, the leader’s vision serves as the super-ordinate goal.

By promoting their vision, leaders seek to convince target audiences that the idealized future

they foresee can be attained through the cooperative efforts of the collective (Block, 1987;

Gardner & Avolio, 1998).

Nonsanctioned political behaviors identified by Zanzi and O’Neill (2001) include just one

tactic that has been previously discussed: intimidation and innuendoes. Other nonsanctioned

political tactics they identified include manipulation, co-optation, control of information,

using surrogates, organizational placements, and blaming or attacking others. For example,

manipulation involves efforts to convince another party to accept your point of view by

distorting reality or misrepresenting one’s intentions such as through selective disclosure or

‘‘objective’’ speculation about other persons or situations (Zanzi et al., 1991).

Other nonsanctioned political tactics identified by Fairholm (1993) include controlling the

agenda, controlling decision criteria, using ambiguity, brinkmanship, and incurring obliga-

tions. A leader may control the agenda by determining in advance the subjects or concerns to

be considered by a decision-making body; he or she may also act to keep unwanted issues or

proposals off the agenda. Similarly, a leader may choose the criteria for making decisions so

that desirable results will be obtained regardless of who decides. Using ambiguity involves

purposefully generating unclear communications that are subject to multiple interpretations.

Brinkmanship or planned disorganization (Vredenburgh & Maurer, 1984) involves

intentionally disturbing the organization’s equilibrium to gain control over choice options.

An example would be a computer systems manager who favors the introduction of a fully

automated production system, but anticipates resistance from program managers due to initial

costs and concerns about automation. The systems manager may allow excessive backlogs in

the existing semi-automatic system to develop until the program managers have no option but

to purchase the recommend information system (Fairholm, 1993). Note that this is a highly

risky tactic, since the leader risks being seen as incompetent in light of the performance

difficulties he or she creates or allows to develop. Finally, leaders may incur obligations from

others to insure that they will do what they desire (Allen et al., 1979). This tactic is most often

used with peers by generating an unbalanced exchange of capital, information, materials,

friendship or psychological support.

Given the inherently self-serving nature of many of the nonsanctioned tactics, we expect

that they will often be used for purposes that have little or nothing to do with leadership.

Nevertheless, there are also circumstances where such tactics may be used by the leader to

secure desired outcomes for one or more key constituencies. For example, controlling the

agenda can be an effective means whereby the leader can ensure that top priority issues

receive adequate consideration without attention being diverted to less pressing concerns.

Similarly, using ambiguity may be the only means whereby the leader can prevent an

unpopular but nonetheless promising alternative from being prematurely eliminated. Thus,


we believe that there are a wide array of situations for which a leader’s use of nonsanctioned

political tactics may prove to be advantageous for selected constituents, and often, the

organization as a whole.

5.3. Reactive leader political behaviors

In contrast to the proactive tactics described above which are employed to assertively

pursue desired outcomes, reactive tactics are used to protect the actor’s interests (Valle &

Perrewe, 2000). These tactics encompass a wide array of defensive impression management

tactics including accounts, disclaimers, self-handicapping, restitution, prosocial behaviors,

excuses, and apologies (Gardner & Martinko, 1988a, 1988b; Schlenker, 1980; Scott &

Lyman, 1968; Snyder, Higgins, and Stuckey, 1983).

Although a complete discussion of the similarities and differences among these tactics is

beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that all fall within a more general category that

Goffman (1967) labeled ‘‘facework.’’ Here, the term ‘‘face’’ refers to ‘‘the conception of the

self that each person displays in particular interactions with others’’ (Cupach & Metts, 1994,

p. 3). Facework is required whenever an actor encounters a ‘‘predicament,’’ i.e., a situation

‘‘in which events have undesirable implications for the identity-relevant images actors have

claimed or desire to claim in front of real or imagined audiences’’ (Schlenker, 1980, p. 125).

Note that defensive impression management tactics cannot be used by a leader to acquire a

desired image; they can only be used to protect their established identity by warding off or

discounting unfavorable images.

Ashforth and Lee (1990) have also identified a number of reactive political behaviors that

organizational actors use to avoid action (e.g., overconforming, buck passing, playing dumb,

depersonalizing, stretching and smoothing, and stalling) or avoid blame (e.g., buffing, playing

safe, justifying, scapegoating, and misrepresenting). From their description of these tactics,

however, it appears that they are most often used for purely self-serving purposes, and hence

have little to do with leadership. Indeed, to constitute leadership, these reactive tactics must

be used to protect, at least indirectly, the interests of a collective body the leader represents.

As is the case with the proactive tactics described above, the effectiveness of reactive tactics

is likely to depend on the leader’s style or social effectiveness. Indeed, leaders who make

excessive use of reactive tactics or employ them in an obvious fashion, may find that such

tactics do more harm to their image, and in the process, the interests of the collective, than they

do good (Cupach &Metts, 1994). Not only are the leader’s efforts at image protection likely to

fail, but both the leader and the collective may be perceived as being unwilling to assume

responsibility for their transgressions. It is equally clear that reactive tactics, when skillfully

used, can go a long ways toward preserving a leader’s favorable image in the face of highly

threatening and embarrassing incidents, and hence preserving his or her capacity to lead.

5.4. Symbolic and nonverbal forms of influence

House and Podsakoff (1994) argued that outstanding leaders are very concerned about

their own image, particularly with respect to the need to be perceived by followers as


credible, competent, and trustworthy. House (1977) suggested that outstanding leaders need

to possess the ability to be verbally articulate as well as nonverbally expressive, recognizing

that the effective use of facial and bodily expressions and gestures can be useful in altering

the affective/emotional reactions of followers.

This indicates that symbolic and nonverbal behaviors by leaders can be potentially

powerful forms of influence. Strong evidence of the role that symbolism exerts on perceived

leadership is provided by Emrich, Brower, Feldman, and Garland (2001). In this study, US

presidents who used image-based as opposed to concept-based rhetoric (e.g., ‘‘heart’’ vs.

‘‘commitment,’’ ‘‘dream’’ vs. ‘‘idea,’’ ‘‘sweat’’ vs. ‘‘toil’’) more extensively in their speeches

received higher ratings of charisma and greatness from historians. Furthermore, Peters (1978)

argued that one way managers and leaders focus attention on, and symbolize the importance

of, an activity or issue is to spend time on it, which then serves as a surrogate measure of

importance.

Other research documents the importance of nonverbal and expressive behaviors to

leadership, demonstrating the impact of eye contact, facial expression, gestures, and so forth,

on reactions of others (e.g., DePaulo, 1992). Direct empirical evidence of the importance of

such behaviors to leadership is provided by Awamleh and Gardner (1999) and Holladay and

Combs (1994). These experiments confirmed that the nonverbal and expressive behaviors have

a potent impact on perceived leadership. Awamleh and Gardner interpret these findings as

reinforcing the previously noted assertion of Gardner and Avolio (1998) that what a leader says

may, at times, be less important than how he or she says it, in determining follower impressions.

Also, there has been some research done on how individuals can employ both verbal and

nonverbal behaviors to influence the affect and emotional states of others. Some of this work

has examined the effective regulation and demonstration of emotion as an influence tactic,

designed to inspire emotional expression and affectivity in others (e.g., Arvey, Renz, &

Watson, 1998; Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989). So, as a mechanism of influence

designed to manage shared meaning, symbolic and nonverbal behaviors need to be

investigated more specifically in the repertoire of leader political behaviors employed alone

and in combinations with other forms political behavior.

5.5. Combinations of tactics

Various authors have suggested that organizational influencers tend to use combinations of

influence tactics rather than just single tactics. For example, Kipnis and Schmidt (1988)

suggested that influence attempts are not always confined to the use of a single influence tactic.

Rather, they found that influence attempts often consist of clusters of tactics, and developed

labels for such clusters or ‘‘influence styles.’’ The ‘‘shotgun’’ influence style is characteristic of

‘‘people who refuse to take ‘no’ for an answer’’ (Vecchio, 1997, p. 89), and who use varying

combinations of many (e.g., assertiveness, appeals to higher authority, and coalition influence)

if not all of the influence and IM tactics discussed above. ‘‘Tacticians’’ are those who primarily

use rational persuasion, reason, and logic to influence others. ‘‘Ingratiators’’ focus their

influence attempts on flattery and ingratiation. Lastly, ‘‘bystanders’’ are those who fail to make

influence attempts, instead opting to watch rather than influence others.


Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) found that tacticians received the highest performance ratings,

ingratiators received moderate ratings, and shotgun managers received the lowest ratings.

Interestingly, bystanders, who ostensibly wielded the least influence, received moderate to

high performance ratings by their supervisors. Farmer and Maslyn (1999), with two diverse

samples, found strong support for the existence of the shotgun, tactician, and bystander styles,

and only partial support for the ingratiator style.

Falbe and Yukl (1992) found that certain combinations of influence tactics were more

effective than others, and that effectiveness was determined by the potency of the individual

tactics. Whether a combination was better than a single tactic depended on what tactics were

combined. For example, combinations of ‘soft’ tactics such as consultation, ingratiation, and

inspirational appeals were usually more effective than use of a soft tactic alone. [Fur-

ther]. . .the use of a soft tactic was usually enhanced when it was combined with rational

persuasion’’ (Yukl, 1998, p. 217). Interestingly, they also found that combining soft with

hard tactics (e.g., pressure and coalitions) was not as effective as a soft tactic used alone.

Yukl (1998, p. 218) suggested that ‘‘effectiveness of a tactic combination probably de-

pends. . .on the extent to which the component tactics are compatible with each other. . .Rational persuasion is a very flexible tactic that is usually compatible with any of the other

tactics.’’ Developed in a later section of this article, we also suggest that factors such as the

reputation of both the influencer and the target(s) of influence help to facilitate such

effects.

5.6. Moderator role of leader interpersonal style

5.6.1. Leader Interpersonal Style�GMA interaction

Leadership theory and research generally has recognized the roles of GMA and social or

interpersonal style in leader effectiveness for many years (e.g., Bass, 1990). We have

discussed the importance of each of these constructs in earlier sections of this article as

demonstrating main effects on leader political behavior. Additionally, we believe that leader

interpersonal style interacts with GMA to affect target reactions. As noted by Ferris, Witt, and

Hochwarter (2001), social skill and GMA represent largely independent but complementary

constructs, essentially providing individuals with behavioral and cognitive flexibility, both of

which can enhance effectiveness. This would imply that the constructs have merely additive

effects on outcomes, but they argued (and found evidence to support) that performance

ratings and salary would be maximized when individuals are high on both social skill and

GMA.

Similarly, we argue here that leader interpersonal style and GMA interact to affect target

reactions such that the highest levels of these reactions are found when both interpersonal

style and GMA are high. Under conditions of high interpersonal style and low GMA, leaders

may be socially impressive but lack the cognitive resources to generate a sufficiently large

repertoire of effective solutions to issues and problems, thus generating lower target reactions.

Also, when leaders are high on GMA but low on interpersonal style, targets may be

unimpressed by the decisions and actions the leaders take if they are unable to frame and

present such actions in an accessible and convincing way.


5.6.2. Leader Interpersonal Style�Personality interaction

Hogan (1991) and Hogan and Shelton (1998) argued that personality is an essentially

inactive component but needs to be brought to life by social skill (we would say, political

skill). In addition, Hogan defined personality as possessing an internal identity component

and an external reputation component, and he argued that social skill is what translates

identity into successful goal accomplishment or reputation. We argue that leader interpersonal

style is the energizing component that activates personality, and thus helps to unleash its

potential effects on outcomes. Therefore, we would expect to see little impact of personality

traits on outcomes when leader interpersonal style (e.g., political or social skill) is low.

However, we should observe stronger positive effects of personality traits on outcomes when

leader interpersonal style is high.

5.6.3. Leader Interpersonal Style�Influence Behavior interaction

As Jones (1990) argued over a decade ago, we have studied influence tactics quite

extensively, but we know very little about the social style component that likely explains the

effective or successful execution of influence attempts. Leader interpersonal style (i.e.,

measures of social effectiveness like political or social skill) should facilitate the success of

leader political behaviors by ensuring that the particular political behavior selected for

demonstration is executed in an effective way that disguises any ulterior motives and/or

allows the behavior to be interpreted in a convincing, sincere, and genuine manner.

6. Consequences of political behavior

6.1. Target outcomes

Based on the target’s assessment of the leader’s political behavior, a variety of target

outcomes may arise. These outcomes can be classified into five basic categories: target

affective reactions, cognitions, behavior, attitudes, and performance. We explore each of these

categories of outcomes below.

6.1.1. Target affective reactions as intermediate linkages

Affective reactions to leader political behavior depend on the target’s reputation PMMs

and the inferences they make regarding the appropriateness of the behaviors given the

organizational context. For example, to illustrate possible affective consequences as an

intermediate linkage, we focus on the affective component of trust. Research on trust has

found support for an affect-based component of trust; that is, sometimes trust appears to be

the result of the gradual development of shared values and mutual understanding between

individuals.

If the leader’s political behaviors are viewed by the target as inappropriate or similarly

involve breaches of trust, affect-based trust will likely suffer. Outcomes of such breaches of

trust include withholding or distorting information given to the supervisor (Roberts &

O’Reilly, 1974), a weakening of the relationship between having power and being influential


(Frost & Moussavi, 1992), and a lessening of the incidence of organizational citizenship

behaviors of employees (Atwater, 1988; Deluga, 1994). If the leader’s political behaviors

align with the normative behaviors expected by the target, it is likely that the target’s affect-

based trust level will not suffer and may even be raised by the positive information gained

from the episode.

6.1.2. Target cognitions as intermediate linkages

Just as leaders’ cognitive processes shape their definition of the situation and subsequent

behavior, the cognitive processes of followers influence their interpretation of the situation

and their reactions to leader behaviors (Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Lord & Maher, 1993). In

this section, we consider the influence of three particular types of cognitive structures and/or

processes on target perceptions and responses to leaders’ political behaviors: target identity,

implicit leadership theories, and target attributions.

Recall that one’s identity (Schlenker, 1985) involves a ‘‘theory of self’’ that specifies

relevant self-constructs (e.g., branch manager, Canadian) and one’s standing on particular

dimensions (e.g., loyal and assertive). For targets of leader political behavior, their identity

PMMs may interact with the reputation PMMs of a focal leader to shape their situated

identity, as well as their assessment of the leader’s actions. A sizeable gap between the

leader’s identity and reputation PMMs (Fiol et al., 2001) may cause him or her to select

political tactics that are deemed to be inappropriate by the target, and thereby elicit target

resistance. Indeed, greater congruence between the leader’s reputation PMM and the

target’s identity PMM may explain why targets occupying higher-level hierarchical

positions tend to consider rational persuasion and coalition tactics to be more appropriate

forms of upward influence than pressure, legitimating tactics, exchange, and inspirational

appeals (Yukl, 2002; Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl, Falbe, & Young, 1993; Yukl & Tracey,

1992).

The beliefs and assumptions that individuals hold about the characteristics of effective

leaders constitute their implicit leadership theories (e.g., Eden & Leviatan, 1975; Lord, 1985).

Typically, such implicit theories involve prototypes and stereotypes about pertinent traits,

skills and behaviors associated with effective leaders (Yukl, 2002). According to leader

categorization theory (Lord, 1985; Lord & Maher, 1993), individuals employ a prototype

matching process to identify people they encounter as either leaders or nonleaders. For

persons categorized as leaders, they may be further classified as effective versus ineffective

and assigned to a particular leader type (e.g., political leader and religious leader). The

category to which a leader is assigned is important because it impacts target expectations

regarding appropriate leader behavior.

The attributions targets make regarding the leader’s underlying motives for political

behavior have important implications in predicting a probable response (Ferris, Bhawuk,

Fedor, & Judge, 1995). For example, if the target attributes ingratiatory leader behaviors such

as flattery and favors to a desire to secure valued resources (e.g., a promotion), as opposed to

genuine attraction to the target, the leader is likely to be seen as manipulative and encounter

an unfavorable target response (e.g., rejection) (Jones, 1964; Jones & Wortman, 1973;

Schlenker, 1980; Wortman and Linsenmeier, 1977).


6.1.3. Target attitudes

The literature on perceptions of organizational politics (POPs) has studied the impact of

political behavior on work-related attitudes of the targets of such political behavior.

Specifically, this area of research examines the impact of the perceptions that targets hold

of the level and form of political behavior in their work environment.

The POPS literature indicates that the POP, including supervisory political behavior, has

important negative relationships with job satisfaction (e.g., Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Harrell-

Cook, Ferris, & Dulebohn, 1999). Several of these studies also found that these relationships

were moderated by level of understanding (Ferris et al., 1996; Kacmar et al., 1999); that is,

targets who have a better understanding of ‘‘how things work’’ in their organization will have

less of a lowering of job satisfaction due to political behaviors than will targets without this

level of understanding.

Similarly, Ferris et al. (1996) found that perceived control moderated the politics–

satisfaction relationship. Thus, we see that leader political behavior can be detrimental to

target satisfaction. It is possible, however, that a skilled leader might be able to mitigate this

effect by educating subordinates as to the necessity of such behavior (increasing organiza-

tional understanding) and by making them feel that they are active and valued participants in

their workplace (increasing perceived control).

With respect to other target attitudes, Abraham (2000, p. 269) defined organizational

cynicism as ‘‘a negative attitude toward one’s employing organization, composed of a belief

that the organization lacks integrity; it includes negative affect toward the organization and a

tendency to disparaging and critical behavior toward the organization consistent with this

belief and affect.’’ Thus, leader political behavior that is deemed to be insincere, deceptive,

and manipulative is likely to contribute to organizational cynicism among targets, which in

turn can lead to a number of adverse work outcomes including heightened levels of job

dissatisfaction, alienation, and withdrawal behaviors. Furthermore, as targets develop cynical

attitudes about leaders they are likely to become highly skeptical of future leader behaviors,

and thereby undermine the potential effectiveness of such behaviors. Thus, leaders who

engage in political behavior might be more successful (at least in terms of target attitudes) if

they take into account the expectations and understanding of the targets of this behavior.

6.1.4. Target performance

Performance outcomes that have been informed by the POPS literature include target

ratings of supervisor effectiveness, target self-reports of individual performance, and

supervisor ratings of target performance. Kacmar et al. (1999) found a negative relationship

between perceptions of political behavior and target ratings of supervisor effectiveness and

target self-reports of individual performance. Interestingly, while she and her colleagues

found that understanding moderated the impact of POPS on self-reported individual

performance, understanding was not found to moderate the impact of POPS on supervisor

effectiveness.

Parker, Dipboye, and Jackson (1995) found that self-reports of perceived organizational

innovativeness were also impacted by POPS. Finally, Witt (1998) found that the relationship

between target perceptions of political behavior and supervisor ratings of performance was


partially moderated by goal congruence. That is, POPS had a detrimental effect on

organizational outcomes only when goal congruence between supervisors and subordinates

was low. Thus, political behavior can have a negative impact on target performance

outcomes. However, it is possible that this impact can be lessened to the extent that the

target and work environment characteristics for such as understanding and goal congruence

are taken into account by the leader engaged in such political behavior.

6.2. Leader outcomes

Leader effectiveness is gauged largely through work-related outcomes that are typically

used to measure success in organizations, and such indicators contribute to the development

and re-calibration over time of leader reputation. Specifically, salary progression, promotions,

and performance evaluation ratings are all indices that can be used to determine the level of

effectiveness and reputation in organizations. Despite this acknowledgement, there are other

measures that can be used to determine one’s effectiveness at work. For example, effective-

ness can be enhanced if an employee achieves a certain level of power within the

organization, or if the individual receives indicators of external recognition such as awards,

honors, or professional certifications.

6.2.1. Performance evaluation

In some situations, it is clear who the best performers are. For example, automobile

dealerships and real estate companies often list their top salespeople in public outlets such

as newspapers or on a website. In other cases, however, the determination of success is not as

freely available or objectively measured. Many organizations rely on subjective ratings

provided by an employee’s immediate supervisor as to evaluate job performance. Although

subjective evaluations are often used to determine important individual and organizational

outcomes (i.e., promotions, salary increases, and group rewards), they are prone to influence,

bias, and distortion. Previous research (Ferris & Judge, 1991) has shown that the use of in-

fluence tactics can affect performance ratings even when objective indices of work effective-

ness suggest no actual difference. Further, it has been suggested that individuals are often rated

on the basis of beliefs, values, or effort instead of actual performance (Pfeffer, 1981).

Because goals often represent a surrogate measure of effort, and a substitute index of

performance, evaluations of performance may take into consideration the success of

accomplishing self-set goals. As evidence, Dossett and Greenberg (1981) found that super-

visors gave the highest evaluations to individuals who set the highest goals, regardless of

actual objective performance. It can be argued that goals become inexplicably relevant in the

context of evaluation and that they dictate the level of focus as well as the manner in which

impressions are formed. Given their importance in determining performance ratings, actual

performance, exclusive of impression management tactics, may take on a secondary role. If,

in fact, the employee’s performance is consistent with a high level of self-set goals, the initial

impressions of the subordinate are largely validated. Conversely, if performance is not up to

standard with previously self-set goals, it is likely that the failure to be successful will be

attributed to nonpersonal causes.


Previous research has shown that job incumbents are apt to manage their effectiveness by

ensuring that they are evaluated on process measures (i.e., effort) rather than actual objective

measures of job performance (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1994; March, 1984). In

an effort to shift the focus of job performance criteria, some individuals may incorporate

intentional vagueness or strategic ambiguity to improve or protect their reputation (Eisenberg,

1984; Williams & Goss, 1975).

6.2.2. Promotions and mobility

The number of promotions that an individual receives can also be viewed as a measure of

one’s effectiveness. In actuality, the absolute number of promotions received is often viewed

as secondary relative to the number received within a specific period of time. For example,

receiving two promotions over the course of one’s career does not capture the same tone as

receiving two promotions in the span of 6 months. Consistent with the nature of the

performance evaluation process, the decision to promote an employee can be influenced

dramatically by subjective evaluations that often do not reflect objective reality. It is with this

in mind that research has indicated that promotions represent the most political decision made

in organizations (Ferris & Judge, 1991). Whether an individual is considered for promotion is

also heavily biased by the early impressions formed by the evaluator. Research suggests that

the impressions formed early by decision-makers have a strong influence on subsequent

promotions (Cooper, Graham, & Dyke, 1993; Rosenbaum, 1989).

6.2.3. Compensation

Salary represents one of the most salient indices of worth, and subsequent effectiveness at

work. Not only is salary indicative of one’s ability to afford material possessions, society

holds those who amass an admirable salary in higher esteem than those whose salary is more

modest. Research suggests that an individual’s effectiveness is associated with salary

increases. For example, Bartol and Martin (1990) found that managers rewarded subordinates

whose expertise they relied upon with high pay raises, suggesting that a subordinate’s level of

reputation may directly result in organizational rewards.

6.2.4. Power

Society holds powerful individuals with higher regard than those viewed as weak. Pfeffer

(1992) suggests that individuals seek to build records of effectiveness and reputations that

allow them to be seen as powerful. Once this level of effectiveness is attained, the individual

is likely to seek out other opportunities that bring more power. In this regard, the relationship

between effectiveness and power may be recursive. Specifically, powerful individuals are

more likely to use their influence to accomplish goals with less effort. Hence, more tasks can

be completed, which serves to build one’s effectiveness and reputation (Pfeffer, 1992).

As evidence of a relationship between reputation and power, Gioia and Sims (1983) found

that managerial reputation predicted subordinate perceptions of expert, referent, and legit-

imate power. Further, research suggests that people form attitudes regarding the influence of

others (Fiol et al., 2001), implying that some individuals have a greater influence reputation

than others. In addition, Matthews (1988) maintained that power and reputation are


intrinsically linked, and that one’s power is more often a function of what is perceived than

what in actuality exists.

Referent power reflects the influence one person has on another based on attraction and

identification (French & Raven, 1959). Given this definition, it is not surprising that

individuals are attracted to and would like to be identified with reputable coworkers. Because

social power bases are formed largely by the accumulation of information and resources,

having access to powerful individuals would likely augment the reputation of those seeking

power (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994; Tsui, 1984).

6.2.5. Leader reputation

The foregoing discussion of leader outcomes made implicit and explicit reference to leader

reputation as both affecting and being affected by such outcomes or indicators of effective-

ness. In many respects, this is the culmination of the political behaviors and substantive

contributions made by leaders that contributes to an overall indication of reputational

effectiveness, which feeds back to contextual factors like accountability, and also the

selection, use, and target interpretation of political behaviors in future episodes.

For example, there is some evidence to indicate that leader reputation is related to trust, and

previous work has demonstrated a reciprocal relationship between trust and reputation. In some

cases, trust is allocated based on one’s perceived reputation whereas reputation is enhanced

with the augmentation of trust in others. Dirks and Ferrin (2002) report strong support for

certain behaviors such as transformational leadership activities (e.g., demonstrating individ-

ualized concern and respect for others) that result in enhanced trust in leaders and resultant

positive impact in follower job outcomes and attitudes. Politically skilled leaders would likely

be savvy to these tactics and thus could be expected to benefit from their use to the extent that,

for example, increased follower performance yielded increased leader reputation.

Similarly, Wernerfelt (1988), examining principal–agent relationships, found that princi-

pals were less likely to scrutinize the efforts of agents who had better reputations. This finding

suggests that the relationship between managers and subordinates may be quite different

across dyads with those possessing a greater reputation being treated more favorably than

those without. From a theoretical perspective (Greenberg, 1990; Hollander, 1958), the

‘‘idiosyncrasy credit’’ view may help explain this phenomenon. For example, it has been

suggested that those with greater reputations are often treated with more autonomy and given

more ‘‘margin for error’’ than those with lesser reputations (Greenberg, 1990).

Further, the belief that higher reputations tend to be associated with higher trust results in

people with higher reputations being monitored less and generally held less accountable than

those with lesser reputations (Ferris, Blass, et al., in press; Ferris, Hochwarter, et al., in press).

This appears to have some quite interesting implications as we look at the incredibly low

accountability mechanisms placed on high-visibility corporate executives (e.g., Enron).

Indeed, we might even argue that leaders work hard at developing and maintaining their

reputations, and one way to do that is to use the media as a vehicle (e.g., Deephouse, 2000;

Fine, 1996) for enhancing reputation—as seen by President Reagan who was a master at

communication, impression management, and playing to the media (who then convey the

image you want them to; e.g., Leary, 1989).


It is also quite important to note the reciprocal relationship between leader reputation and

leader social capital. The accumulation of social capital (networks, allegiances, contacts, etc.),

which can be leveraged in the future as an influence force or mechanism, has an important

influence on the selection of political behaviors to utilize, and it contributes to the formation

of reputation. Additionally, as leaders develop reputations, this often results in the further

development of social capital resource stores, which cycle back through the model. Boyatzis

(1982), Luthans et al. (1988), and others have demonstrated that networking, coalition

building, and social capital building are some of the main ways we have been able to

distinguish effective from ineffective managers. There seems to be little doubt that this is also

a distinguishing characteristic of people with high reputations.

In communication research, the effectiveness of influence attempts is a function of the

individual possessing appropriate resources, and the prestige or reputation of the influencer is

one of the most important resources (Klapper, 1960). Thus, the integration of influence tactics

and reputation is such that one’s reputation can serve as a contextual backdrop for influence in

a number of ways. This backdrop may serve as both an enabler and constrainer of the

effectiveness of influence attempts. Further, both the reputation of the individual making the

influence attempt and that of the target(s) may affect the influence outcome. Indeed, some

research to date has examined the nature of influence attempts as they play out and are

interpreted against a reputational context. As Schlenker (1980, p. 193) pointed out, ‘‘success-

ful people can afford to be modest and thus acquire images of success and humility.’’

Presumably, such behavior demonstrated against a positive and successful reputational context

would be interpreted much more favorably than highly self-promoting behavior, which might

raise questions in perceiver interpretation as a function of the reputational backdrop.

Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) argued that reputation affects the way we interpret certain

behaviors. Furthermore, Klapper (1960) noted that, as a resource of influence, reputation

must be carefully considered when other forms of influence are added to one’s situational

behavioral repertoire. Reputation can serve to indirectly affect outcomes by causing the

influencer to consider their own reputation, as well as the reputation of the parties of

influence, prior to the choosing of influence behaviors. From this perspective, we suggest that

the influence tactics chosen must be consistent with the reputation or the reputation will be

redefined, however incrementally.

Finally, the impression management implications of reputation and influence/power have

been suggested by others as well. Pfeffer (1992) argued that people engage in efforts to build

reputations that reflect power, which then result in those persons wielding even more power (or

at least being viewed as such). Reflecting on such processes, Matthews (1988), in character-

izing Washington-type politics, contended that people become powerful by doing things that

make them appear powerful, which has subsequent effects on their power-broker reputations.

7. Summary and conclusions

The study of leadership has witnessed significant and distinctive streams of intellectual

thought. Historically, trait, behavior, and contingency theories gave way to relationship-


oriented, charismatic, and renewed trait approaches. Unfortunately, most theories of lead-

ership have embraced an implicit rational model assumption of the organizational sciences

field. However, recent acknowledgments of this implicit assumption, as well as consideration

of alternative perspectives, have resulted in strong appeals for the development of a political

theory of leadership (e.g., House & Aditya, 1997).

In this article, we attempted to address these appeals and propose decisive steps toward the

development of a political theory of leadership that would deal with deficiencies raised in past

reviews of the literature (e.g., House & Aditya, 1997; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). Specifically,

our theory emphasizes leadership traits, but it does so in a manner that delineates the

behavioral manifestations of such traits and thereby elaborates a process model with

intermediate linkages that can be tested in future research.

Also, the proposed model highlights leader interpersonal style, a variable that has been

acknowledged but sadly neglected in the past. Here, we developed the leader interpersonal

style construct more fully, and suggested the critical role this construct plays in leadership

processes and effectiveness. House and Aditya (1997) proclaimed this area essentially

unknown because of lack of empirical work. We hoped to demonstrate how leader style

could be expanded and elaborated upon to incorporate social and political effectiveness

constructs which can function as both direct influences on the choice of political behaviors to

exhibit in particular situations, as well as facilitators of the effective execution of those

behaviors.

Finally, we introduced the notion of leader reputation as an outcome variable that captures

the essence of the process dynamics of the political model proposed here. The leader

reputation construct emphasizes the importance of multiple constituencies, and the need to

demonstrate effectiveness to each of the leader’s various critical target groups. This certainly

positions leadership research in this area as taking account of targets beyond the traditional

and nearly exclusive focus on followers, and expands consideration to include superiors,

peers, and other relevant constituencies. Overall, we believe the political theory of leadership

effectively addresses some of the deficiencies of leadership theory and research discussed by

House and his colleagues (e.g., House, 1995; House & Aditya, 1997).

We proposed ideas contributing to a political theory of leadership in an effort to

characterize the behavior of leaders in a wide variety of contexts. In so doing, we hope

this characterization of leaders demonstrates that a political perspective need not reflect a

destructive, manipulative, and inherently negative view of organizational phenomena.

Instead, we hoped to depict that politics are simply a fact of life in organizations, and

demonstrate how leaders need to work on and through others to accomplish personal and

organizational goals.

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