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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Eldon Glick,
V.
Appellant,
Case Number:
Appellant's Motion for Inunediate Stayof the Court of Appeals Judgment;Exhibit "A" - "C"; Certificate of Service.
STATE OF OHIO, Court of Appeals, Ninth DistrictCase No. 06 CA 0058
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE STAY OF THECOURT OF APPEALS JUDGMENT
Eldon Glick, in pro. per.17600 E. Lincoln WayDalton, Ohio, 44618(330) 828-2333
Appellant.
Martin Frantz (0002625)Wayne County Prosecutorc/o Latecia Wiles (0077353)115 W. Liberty StreetWooster, Ohio, 44691(330) 262-3030Fax No. (330) 287-5412
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STATE OF OHIO.
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE STAY OF THECOURT OF APPEALS JUDGMENT
Appellant Eldon Glick files his Motion for Immediate Stay of the Appellate
Court's Judgment and Journal Entry dated August 14, 2007. This Motion for Stay of
Appellate Judgment is brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rules of Practice, Rule II, Sec.
2(A)(3)(a)(i).
Appellant's Motion for Stay of Judgment is based on the attached memorandum
in support, attached appellate decision as Exhibit "A", Execution Order as attached
Exhibit "B" and the trial court's first notice of costs due as Exhibit "C". Additionally,
Appellant is requesting a stay of the execution order and the trial court's first notice of
costs herein attached.
Done at Wayne County this 26`h day of September A.D. 2007,
Eldon Glick, Appellant
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATESTAY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGMENT
Appellant, Eldon Glick, files and requests this court to grant the stay from the
appellate court's judgment pending appeal as part of his substantive due process guarantee.
A. Introduction
1. Appellant is Eldon Glick; appellee is STATE OF OHIO.
2. Appellee charged appellant for obstruction of official business.
3. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of appellee, STATE OF OHIO.
4. Appellant appealed to the Ninth DCA on seven errors.
5. The Ninth DCA denied the appeal declaring no substantial error.
6. Appellant now files his Notice of Appeal as a companion document to this
motion for stay.
B. Argument
7. This court should grant this motion for immediate stay of judgment since this
court will consider taking jurisdiction of this matter. During the time this court considers
whether it will on discretion hear the case, it should grant the stay since if this court
exercises its discretion, it will assume jurisdiction over the matter. The short time for this
court to decide in hearing this appeal cannot be an inconvenience on the appellee. Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 62(A) and (B) allows for a stay of judgment pending a
motion for stay. Appellant has property that would cover any bond needed to secure the
appellee. Since no bond would be required of the appellee, appellant has the right to the
equal protection of the laws clause.
8. Appellant was unfairly surprised in the trial level and these facts were brought
to the Ninth DCA. The DCA felt that the surprise was not harmful. This will be one of the
errors that this court will be reviewing in this appeal should this court decide to hear the
appeal. The surprise occurred when the trial judge misapplied the court discovery rule to
procure unlawfully gained information of appellant's evidence in chief. The trial judge,
thereafter, immediately ordered appellant and barred him from using that entire defense at
trial only a day before the trial.
It is the duty of this Court to ensure that all involved receive a fair trial. News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 1991.C11.40608 <http://www.versuslaw.com> ¶ 32; 939F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1991).
It would seem that this court's duty of fairness would extend to every stage of the
proceeding leading up to trial and through the review process.
The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court's havingjurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S.165, 171-172 (1938); Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 465 (1874).
This up for review since denying due process to appellant is one where the trial
court looses jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of this Court cannot be conferred by waiver or non-assertion bycounsel, and neither waiver nor non-assertion would affect the duty of this court tosearch the record for jurisdiction. Dobard v. Johnson, 1985.C11.41935<http://www.versuslaw.com> ¶ 28; 749 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1985).
9. The stay of judgment will not prejudice the adverse party. The delay in the
execution of the judgment will not adversely impact these proceedings, and appellant has
at all times acted in good faith. The adverse party will not suffer from the stay in
pursuance of justice. There is the distinct possibility that this court will find for appellant
and reverse the appellate judgment. Adverse party can always enforce its tmjust judgment
at any time in the near future. The real issues to be considered is not effected by the stay
however will impede this appellant from performing properly in these proceedings.
Appellant's Motion for Stay of Judgment - Page 2 of 6
Appellant acted to preserve his fundamental rights in the face of controversy. Appellant
attempted to resolve and mediate any differences at all times.
10. A party may seek a stay of judgment if it is discovered that his substantive due
process was denied. The Ninth DCA determined that the trial judge did violate appellant's
right not to disclose his evidence. That court would concede that all subsequent actions
based on the illegal transfer would flow from this breach of right.
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, butfrom the Due Process Clause. Insurance Corporation Ireland v. Compagnie DesBauxites De Guinee, 1982 S.Ct. 42242 <http://www.versuslaw.com> ¶ 32; 456U.S. 694 (1982). The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects anindividual liberty interest. Id. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as amatter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty. Id. Thus, the test forpersonal jurisdiction requires that "the maintenance of the suit . . . not offend'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' International Shoe Co. v.Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940).
A court cannot conclude all persons interested by a mere assertion of its ownpower. Insurance Corporation Ireland, supra, at ¶ 35.
Every court has the prerogative and duty to see that its processes are not abused.Marine Transport Lines v. Green, 1959.FL.40992 <http://www.versuslaw.com> ¶14; 114 So.2d 710 (Fla.App. 1959). The federal judiciary has a strong interest inensuring that its processes function efficiently and are not abused. Reshard v. Britt,1988.C11.41499 <http://www.versuslaw.com> ¶ 40; 839 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.1988).
It has been said that Due process requires that "wherever one is assailed in hisperson or property, there he may defend." Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. (3 Otto)274, 277 (1876).
When I assert federal rights governed by federal law, it is this Court's duty to makecertain that they are fully protected. Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Railway Co.,1957.SCT.40703 <http://www.versuslaw.com> ¶ 11; 353 U.S. 360 (1957). ThisCourt cannot make interpretations that nullify their effectiveness, for ". .. theassertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeatedunder the name of local practice." Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24.
In Barber v. Ameriquest Capital Corp., 2006.MFL.0000069<http://www.versuslaw.com> ¶ 51; No. 3:04-cv-1296-J-32TEM (M.D.Fla. 2006) the
Appellant's Motion for Stay of Judgment - Page 3 of 6
Court noted the plaintiffs failure to comply with Local Rule 3.01(g) but with awarning rendered its' opinion anyway.
To be sure the Ninth DCA chastised the appellee for failure to follow the Supreme
Court's promulgated court rules but ruled in their favor anyway.
Since the citation stated not in confomrity with the Local Rules to the prejudice of
the constitutionally protected Due Process right to defend, this goes to the court in
misapplying the rules of procedure promulgated by this court.
11. A party is entitled to a stay of judgment if (1) the adverse party engaged in
fraud, nusrepresentation, or other misconduct and (2) the judgment was unfairly obtained.
See Government Fin. Servs. One L.P. v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 1995).
Appellant is entitled to stay of judgment because clear and convincing evidence
exists that appellee engaged in misconduct. Id. at 773. Appellee fully participated and
condoned the trial judge's action to deprive appellant of this substantive due process.
Appellee's ntisconduct prevented appellant from fully and fairly presenting his case on the
merits. See Walsh v. McCain Foods Ltd, 81 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1996). Specifically,
appellant was unable to present his evidence proving his intend, essential element of the
crime, and reliance on certain petitions filed in the appellate court.
12. A party is entitled to stay of judgment if the judgment is void. When a court
deprives one of his substantive due process it looses its jurisdiction. Therefore a court that
looses jurisdiction over a case and continues to issue orders, joumal entries and or
judgments does so by issuing void utterances.
Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 871 (411, Cir. 1999);New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5' Cir. 1996).
Appellant's Motion for Stay of Judginent - Page 4 of 6
The court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. See Marshall v.Board of Educ., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3'd Cir. 1978); Eberhardt, supra; New YorkLife, supra.
13. A party is entitled to stay of judgment if intervening acts justify vacating the
judgment. Appellant is entitled to stay because it is inequitable for this judgment to have
prospective application. The underlying order, upon this trial was based, was flawed. The
so-called official actor lacked official capacity. Further, the facts did not support the
official conclusions.
14. A party is entitled to stay of judgment if it is not otherwise entitled to relief
under the rules and exceptional circumstances exist that demonstrates the judgment is
manifestly unjust. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863-64,
108 S.Ct. 2194, 2204 (1988); Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 84 F.3d 874, 877 (7tl` Cir.
1996). This judgment is manifestly unjust because the outcome of the trial would have
been decidedly different were appellant allowed to properly defend himself to the
accusation. See Windsor, supra.
C. Conclusion
15. Without the stay, Appellant will be irreparably harmed, and his due process
extends through the appeal process. Although the rule states that the appeal is
discretionary, nevertheless the right extends through this right to appeal and the decision
time for this court is make its determination. Appellant outlined numerous substantial
causes to stay the appellate's judgment pending this appeal. For these reasons and in the
interest of justice and fairness appellant requests this court to stay the appellate's
judgment, trial court's first notice of costs due and the trial court's execution ofjudgment.
Done at Wayne County this 26b day of September A.D. 2007,
Appellant's Motion for Stay of Jodgmcnt - Page 5 of 6
Eldon Glick, Appellant17600 E. Lincoln WayDalton, Ohio, 44618
Appellant's Motion for Stay of Judginent - Page 6 of 6
Affidavit of Eldon Glick
Wayne County
Ohio StateSS.
I, Eldon Glick, Affiant, being deposed do solemnly affirm that thefollowing statements are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge andbelief:
l. Affiant is of legal age and competent to make the foregoing and followingstatements.
2. Afflant states in no uncertain terms this appeal stay of Judgment andexecution of judgment cannot be an inconvenience on the appellee. Anydelay will not prejudice appellee for there can be no loss to appellee.
3. Affiant has property that would cover any bond needed to secure theappellee.
4. Affiant claims any right held by appellee that it is exempt from posting anybond.
5. Affiant asserts that the trial judge by her own admission wrongfully appliedthe discovery rule to gain the defenses intended to be used at trial.Thereafter, trial judge immediately ordered affiant and barred him fromusing his entire defense at trial in the morning of the very day just beforethe trial.
6. Affiant asserts that the Ninth DCA confirmed this error at item 5.7. Aff ant asserts that this error will be at issue for review by this courk8. Affiant at all times acted in good faith and did and still endeavors to resolve
this conflict in an equitable and just manner.9. Afflant was severely injured by the court's denial of his due process rights.10. Affiant asserts that since the jury did ask for the documents proffered as
evidence and denied would upon seeing them the results of the outcome andthe jury decision would have been different.
11. Affiant 4sserts that the appellate tribunal did harangue appellee for the trialjudge setting a wrongful precedent for other courts to follow.
12. Affiant attests that appellee did engage in misconduct by fixlly exploiting itsadvantage over appellant by the trial judge's prejudicial actions. Appelleesuppressed its duty to insure appellant's rights, among them due processrights.
13. Affiant did rely upon specific documents to disprove mens rea whichappellee ignored this entire element of proof. Affiant was prejudiciallybarred from entering on the record this proof.
14. Vacation of the prior order in which this trial court relied was in order. Theunderlying order was flawed due to the incapacity of a certain official.
15. Affiant will be irreparably harmed should the appellate judgment andexecution order be allowed to continue.
16. Affiant's due process extends through the appeal process.
Further, Affiant Sayeth Naught,
Eldon Glick
itness 5ee v.^c ^acUd^s
Witness Cy/i+htw Tlt:ov"S
Acknowled e^
9/P- &/0Date
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Subscribed d a ffirmed to, before me this 26th day of September, A.D. 2007in and for County, Ohio.
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F. Glick Affidavit - Page 2 of 2
STATE OF OHIO
COUNTY OF WAYNE
STATE OF OHIO
Appellee
V.
ELDON GLICK
Appellant
1:flFl.^ IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
'Q7i 0!" i JUDICIAL DISTRICT^g THU 'i C. ; :1: .
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L C. A. No. 06CA0058
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTENTERED IN THEWAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPALCOURTCOUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIOCASE No. CRB-06-01-0048
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 13, 2007
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned
has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Eldon Glick, appeals from his conviction in the Wayne
County Municipal Court. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On January 13, 2006, Appellant was indicted on one count of
obstructing official business, in violation of R.C. 2921.31, a misdemeanor of the
second degree. The case proceeded to trial before a jury. On May 4, 2006, the
jury found Appellant guilty. Appellant was sentenced to one day incarceration
and a$500.0'0 fine. In addition, Appellant was placed on probation fbr three
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Judicial District
2
months. Appellant's sentence was stayed pending appeal. Appellant timely
appealed from his conviction, raising eight assignments of error for our review.
We have colnbined several of Appellant's assignments of error to facilitate our
review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
"DID MILLHOAN ERR BY ORDERING [APPELLANT] TOSUBMIT ALL HIS DEFENSES KNOWING [APPELLANT] HADNOT REQUESTED DISCOVERY, AND HAD OBJECTED, BUTSTILL CONTINUED TO DEMAND ALL OF [APPELLANT'S]DEFENSES TO BE SUBMITTED PRIOR TO TRIAL?"
{1[3} In his fr-st assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
court erred in ordering him to submit all his defenses knowing he had not
requested discovery.
{$4} "This court reviews the trial court's application of the law de novo."
Akron v: Holland Oil Co. (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 298, 303, citing Medina v.
Talmage (July 11, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 3160-M, at *2. Pursuant to Crun.R. 16(A),
"[u]pon written request each party shall forthwith provide the discovery herein
allowed. Motions for discovery shall certify that demand for discovery has been
made and the discovery has not been provided."
{¶5} The record reflects that on April 7, 2006, the trial court issued an
order requiring both parties to appear for a status conference on April 28, 2006. In
this saine order, the trial court ordered both parties to bring with them statements
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Judicial District
3
of the issues they planned to present at trial, statements of the defenses they
planned to present at trial, names of witnesses they planned to present at trial, and
any exhibits that they would use at trial. The parties agree that Appellant had not
made a request for discovery. On April 11, 2006, Appellant objected to the trial
court's order that the parties exchange discovery because he had not requested
discovery pursuant to C.rim.R. 16. On April 13, 2006, the State filed a request for
discovery. On this same day, the trial court denied Appellant's April 11 "inotion
to answer with objections." Appellant filed a iuotion for findings of fact and a
motion to dismiss on April 21, 2006. In his motion , Appellant asserted that the
State could not "[attempt] to request discovery, per Crim R 16, when she KNOWS
that the Defendant *** did not make any request or motions demanding
discovery?" The trial court denied Appellant's motion on April 25, 2006. On
April 28, 2006, Appellant filed "Objections and Requested Pre-Trial Statements"
and a "Motion to Strike." In his motion, Appellant again objected to "any
information forced to be given to the prosecution that would be exchanged as
Discovery under Criin. Rule 16, as this information may only be requested and
given after Defendant requests Discovery under Ohio law[.]" Appellant disclosed
his witness and exhibit lists and set forth liis version of the issues involved.
{¶6} In a May 3, 2006 order, the trial court retracted its April 7, 2006
order and ordered that Appellant.was not requu•ed to provide this inforination as
discovery unless he requested discovery. We fmd, as the trial court later
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Judicial District
4
recognized, that it erred in isSuing the April 7, 2006 judganent ordering the parties
to provide discovery because Appellant had not requested or obtained discovery.
Crim.R. 16(C) governs "closure of evidence by the defendant. Section one
provides that information is only subject to disclosure "[i]f on request or motion
the defendant obtains discovery under subsection" (B)(1)(c), (d) or (e). The record
reflects that Appellaattina.e.np such request for discovery under ($)(1)(c), (d), or
(e).
{T7} However, Appellant has not asserted that he suffered prejudice as a
result of the trial court's order. Notch v. Evans, 9th Dist. No. 22629, 2005-Ohio-
5500, at ¶9, citing App.R. 12(D). Appellant failed to even make a fleeting
allegation as to any prejudice that he may have suffered as a result of the trial
court's n.uling. App.R. 12(D) provides that a judg>_nent or final order of a trial
courtmjy l?e reversed upon a finding that Appellant suffered prejudice as a result
of the assigned error. Here, Appellant has not argued that he was prejudiced by
the trial,pourt's error, Accordingly, pursuant to App.R. 12(D), we will not reverse
the judgment of the trial court. Appellant's first assigwnent of error is ovemiled.
ASSIC'YNMENT OF MROR 1I
"DID MILLHOAN ERR BY TAKING AWAY [APPELLANT'S]CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR THE JURY T9 DETERMINEALL THE FACTS, FQRCING A BENCH TRIAL ON CERTAINFACTUAL ISSUES, EVEN THOUGH [THE STATE] AND[APPELLANT] NEVER AGREED FOR MILLHOAN TO DECIDETHESE FACTS?"
Court:of Appeals of Oliio, Ninth Judicial Distiict
5
{¶8} In Appellant's seoond assignment of error, he contends that: the trial
court erred by taking away Appellant's constitutional rights for the- jury to
determin.e the facts, forcing a bench trial on certain factual issues. We disagree.
{1[9} Although Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously
determined certain facts, he fails to set forth which factual issues were err6neously
decided by the trial court. App.R. 16 provides in pertinent part:
"(A) Brief of the appellant. The appellant shall include in its brief ** * all of the following:
"(7) An argunrnent containing the contentions of the appellant wi[hrespect to each assignment of error presented for review and thereasons in support of the contentions, with citations to theauthorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellantrelies."
{¶10} An appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the
error on appeal, and substantiating his or her arguments in support. Angle v.
Western Reserve Mut. Ins. Co. (Sept. 16, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 2729-M, at * 1;
Frecslca v. Frecska (Oct. 1, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 96CA008b, at *2. See, also,
App.R. 16(A)(7) and Loc.R. 7(A)(6). "It is not the function of this court to
construct a foundation for [an appellant's] claiuns; failure to co>;nply with the zules
goveming practice in the appellate courts is a tactic which is ordinarily fatal."
Krenaer v. Cox (199b), 114 Ohio App.3d 41, 60. "If an argumeit exists that can
support [Appellant's contentions], it is not this court's duty to root: it out."
Cardone v. Cardone (May 6, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 18349, at *8. As Appellant's
argument fails to explain how the trial court erroneously determined certain facts,
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Judicial District
6
he has fs.iled to meet his burden ori appeal. Appellant's second assigmnent of
error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI
"DID MILLHOAN ERR BY DENYING THE JURY THEIRREQUEST TO BE GIVEN A COPY OF THE WRIT OFPROHIBITION AND THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS THATEVERYONE COULD PLAINLY SEE ON THE VIDEO,SHOWING THE :`1uIENS REA'.:OF [APPFLLANTT'$] 2BELIEFAND DISCUSSION WITH THE SHERIFFS, WHICH 'WASCONTINUALLY BROUGHT UP DURING THE TRIAL BYBOTH PARTIES?"
{¶.11} In his sixth assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
court erred by denying the jury their request to be given a copy of the writ ofi
prohibition and the writ of mandamus.
M12} It i:s a funela.mental rule of evidence that error cannot be based on a
ruling which "excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected,
and *** lthe substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or
was apparent from the context[.]" Evid.R. 103(A)(2). Consequently, we cannot
rule on the merits of tlppellant's sixth assignment of error until we can first
deterrnine that Appellant has properly preserved the issues on appeal. The trial
transcript reveals that Appellant never proffered these writs, and, thus, did not
preserve the issue for appeal. While Appellant testified regarding the writ of
prohibition and the writ of mandalnus, he failed to proffer this evidence at trial.
"The requirement of a`proffer of evidence' is more than just a mere technicality.
It allowg. for the trial,court to reconsider, in view of the context at trial, whether
Court of Appeals of Ohio,Ninth Judicial District
7
such evidence-should be admitted." Elliott v. Springer (Mar. 13, 1990), 4th Dist.
No. 88CA12, at *2. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Grubb (1986); 28 Ohio
St.3d 199, 202, set fortli the prooedure for preserving an argument regarding
temporarily excluded evidence:
"appellant could have proffered the teinporarily prohibited evidenceoutside the presence of the jury when the issue arose during trial and,if the proffered evidence was then excluded, he could have perfectedan appeal as of right from the trial court's final judgment at theconclusion of the case."
{¶13} As Appellant did not proffer this evidence at trial, he ifailed to
preserve this issue for appeal. Id. at 200; Elliott, supra, at *2. Aceordingly,
Appellant's sixth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSWIITIVSENT OF ERRflR III
"DID MILLHOAN ERR TO DENY THE THREE PROPOSEDJURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE CASE LAW THAT WASTAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE STATUTE UNDER`OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS' DEFINING: ACTS,FREE SPEECH RIGHTS, AND PRIVILEGES?"
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
"DID MILLHOAN ERR BY NOT PERMITTING THE STATE TOPROVE EACH ELEMENT OF THE CRIME, LEADING THEJURY TO BELIEVE THAT THE PREVIOUS TRIAL ORDERWAS LAWFUL, AND MAKING HER OWN RULING ON MANYFACTUAL ELEMENTS THAT WERE RESTRICTED FOR THEJURY TO CONSIDER AND DETERMINE?"
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
"DID MILLHOAN ERR BY WITHHOLDING FROM THE JURYCERTAIN FACTS THAT SHOWED THE (INTENT) `MENSREA' OF [APPELLANT], BEING A`MAJOR ELEMENT' OF
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Judioial District
8
THE OFFENSE AND A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THEPARTIES TO HAVE THE JURY DETERMINE THESE CERTAINFACTS?"
ASSI.GNMENT.QF ERROR VII
"DID MILLHOAN ERR BY NOT ALLOWING THE JURY TODECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHETHER OR NOT[APPELLANT] APPROPRIATELY COMMUNICATED, (WHENTHE JURY REQUESTED A COPY OF THE GREAT WRITSTH,AT WERE SHOWN ON THE VIDEO AND FILED IN THECOURT OF APPEALS, BUT HAD NOT BEEN ANSWEREID[])TELLING; THEM IT WAS IMPROPER AND TOTALLYINAPPRCQPRIATE FOR [APPELLANT] TO PASSCOMMUI3IICATION, KNOWING THAT [APPELLANT] (WASCONSIDItRED INCOMPETENT WITH AN ATTORNEY)COULD NOT BE HELD TO A HIGHER STANDARD OFCOMPETENCY THAT A JURY OF HIS PEERS. (COMPETENTPERSON^ WITHOUT AN ATTORNEY)[?]"
AS'S^UNMENT.. OF ERR0R VITIi :.... ^- .
"pID rfHE STATE PROVIDE LAWFUL/PROPERDpCUMLNTATION TO AFFORD [APPELLANT]KNOWLEDGE AS TO WHY HE WAS BEING CHARGED ANDHOW To D.EFEND HIS CASE, WHEN THE STATE'S`COMPL INT' AND `AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE'DOES N T LIST ANY SPECIFIC ACTS SHOWING THAT[APPELL NT] COMMITTED A CRIME?"
{¶14} "An appellant bears the burden of affuxnatavely demonstrating error
on appeal." Hutchison v. Henderson, 9th Dist. No. 2Q862, 2002-Ohio-4521, at
¶39, quoting In re.Hidtahidel, 9t1i Dist. No,. 21009, 2002-0bio-3627, at ¶58. Tlus
Court notes that Appellant lias failed to cite to any legal authoiity that would
suppoit these issues aaid thus has failed to assert how the trial court's actiorisi
constitut^d error. In re Spence (Mar. 28, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 99CA007522, at *6
Couit o€Appeals of Olnio, Ninth Judicial District
9
(declinvig to address assignment of error where appellant failed to icite law
applicable to issue under review). As such, Appellant has declined tol provide
citations to authorities supportuig his third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth
assignments of error as mandated by App.R 16(A)(7) and Loc.R. 7(A)(6). See
State ex rel. Rothal v. Smith, 151 Oliio App.3d 289, 2002-Ohio-7328, at ¶90;
Aragle, supra, at *2. "If an argument exists that can support this assigrnment of•
error, it is not this court's duty to root it out." State v. Cl fford, 9th Dist. No.
20871, 2002,4Ohio-4531;..^at^¶15, quoting Cardone, supra, at *8. Accordingly,
Appellant's third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth assignments of error are
overruled.
III.
{¶15} Appellant's assignments of error are overruled, and the judgxnent of
the Wayne County Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affuzned.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a. special manda.te issue out of this Couzt, directing the
Wayne County Murucipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Oliio, to eany this
judgment into execution. A certified copy of tktis jourual entry shall constitute the
rnandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
CouSt of Appeals of Oliio, Nintli Judicial District
10
Imiaaediaterly upon! the filu:tg hereof, this document shall constitute the
journal entry of judgment, audit shall be file starnped.by the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E).
The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this
judgment to the parties . and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket,
p.ursuanttto,App,R: 30. - ..-
COsts,.taxedt,Q Appellant.
FOR THE COURT
SLABY, P. J.DICKINSON, J.CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
ELDON GLICK, pro se, Appellant.
MARTIN FRANTZ, Prosecuting Attorney and LATECIA E. WILES, AssistantProsecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Judicial District
WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
215 NORTH GRANT STREETWOOSTER OH 44691
330-287-5657
9/4107
207 NORTH MAIN STREETORRVILLE OH 44667
330-682-4085
TRIAL / HEARING NOTICE - CASE NO. CRB-06-01-00048
CHARGES: OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS;
STATE OF OHIO vs. ELDON GLICK
The above captioned case has been set for EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
on 10/05/2007 at 1:00 pm, in WOOSTER-COURTROOM A, before the Honorable
CAROL WHITE MILLHOAN.
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT:
ERIC HEILAND1226 W 11TH STREETPO BOX 553LORAIN, OH 44052
ELDON GLICK17600 E. LINCOLNWAYDALTON, OH 44618
Bill WeplerAssignment Commissioner
WAYNE COUNTY COMMON PLEASTIM NEAL, CLERK OF COURTS107 W. Liberty St., P O Box 507
Wooster, Ohio 44691(330-287-5590)
FIRST NOTICE OF COSTS DUE
To: ELDON GLICK17600 EAST LINCOLN WAYDALTON OH 44618
Case No. 06-CA-0058STATE OF OHIO vs. ELDON GLICK
The balance due in the above captioned case is $79.15.
Prompt payment would be greatly appreciated.
TIM NEAL,CLERK OF COURTS
By: a/]Deputy ClrkDate: September 24, 2007
NOTIC1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of appellant's Motion for Stay of
Appellate's Judgment and Execution Order has been duly served upon the party(ies) at their last
known address(es) by hand delivery or by United States Mail, first class postage prepaid:
Martin Franz (0002625)Wayne County Prosecutor115 W. Liberty StreetWooster, Ohio, 44691(330) 262-3030
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STATE OF OHIO
Done at Wayne County this 26th day of September A.D. 2007,
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