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I N S T I T U T E
COUNTRY BRIEFSouth Korea
Frida AnderssonValeriya Mechkova
Country BriefSERIES 2016:10
THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE
June 2016
Please address comments and/or queries for information to:
V-Dem Institute
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711
SE 40530 Gothenburg
Sweden
E-mail: contact@v-dem.net
V-Dem Country Briefs are available in electronic format at www.v-dem.net.
Copyright © 2016 University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute. All rights reserved.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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About V-Dem Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing andmeasuringdemocracy. V-Dem’s multidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges thecomplexityoftheconceptofdemocracy.TheV-Demprojectdistinguishesamongfivehigh-levelprinciplesofdemocracy:electoral,liberal,participatory,deliberative,andegalitarian,whicharedisaggregatedintolower-levelcomponentsandspecificindicators.
KeyfeaturesofV-Dem:
• Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 22 lower-level components ofdemocracy such as regular elections, judicial independence, direct democracy, andgenderequality,consistingofmorethan400distinctandpreciseindicators;
• Coversallcountriesanddependentterritoriesfrom1900tothepresentandprovidesanestimateofmeasurementreliabilityforeachrating;
• Makesallratingspublic,freeofcharge,throughauser-friendlyinterface.
WithfourPrincipalInvestigators,twoProjectCoordinators,fifteenProjectManagers,morethanthirtyRegionalManagers,almost200CountryCoordinators,severalAssistantResearchers,andapproximately2,600CountryExperts,theV-Demprojectisoneofthelargest-eversocialsciencedata collection projects with a database of over 15million data points. The databasemakeshighlydetailedanalysisofvirtuallyallaspectsofdemocracyinacountry,whilealsoallowingforsummarycomparisonsbetweencountriesbasedonaggregatedindicesfordifferentdimensionsofdemocracy.UsersfromanywhereareabletousetheV-Demonlineanalysistoolswhichcanbe found at theproject’swebsite.Governments, development agencies, andNGOs canbenefitfrom the nuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such asselectingcountryprogrampriorities,informingprogramdesignsandmonitoringimpactoftheirprograms.
Methodology:
Unlikeextantdatacollectionprojects,whichtypicallyuseasmallgroupofexpertswhorateallcountriesoraskasingleexperttocodeonecountry,theV-Demprojecthasrecruitedover2,600localandcross-nationalexperts toprovide judgmentsonvarious indicatorsaboutdemocracy.The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factual information from existing data sourcesabout constitutional regulations and de jure situation with expert coding for questions thatrequire evaluation.Experts’ratingsareaggregatedthroughanadvancedstatisticalmodelthattakesintoaccountthepossibilitiesthatexpertsmaymakemistakesandhavedifferentscalesinmind when coding. In addition, bridge-coders - experts who code multiple countries - arerecruitedtocalibratethescalesofestimatescross-nationally1.
1ForfurtherdetailsandinformationabouttheV-Demmethodology,seehttp://v-dem.net.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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South Korea
Introduction This V-Dem data brief illustrates the democratic development of South Korea from 1900 to2014.ThepurposeistoprovideaconciseoverviewoftheV-DemdatacollectedforSouthKorea.The historical development of the five V-Dem principles of democracy - electoral, liberal,egalitarian, deliberative and participatory – is analyzed, accompanied by an overview of thefemale rights index. In addition, the brief delves further into the different components anddetailedindicatorsofthemainprinciplesofdemocracy2.Weanticipatethatthisbriefwillbeausefulresourceforpolicy-makers,practitionersandcitizen-leddemocracyassessments.
South Korea officially declared its independence on 13 August 1948, and two days later thecountrywasformallyestablished.ThecountrywasunderJapaneserule from1910until1945whenJapanwasdefeatedinWorldWarII.FollowingtheJapaneseoccupation,thecountrywasdividedwiththeUnitedStatesadministeringinthesouthandtheSovietUnioninthenorth,inaccordance with a United Nations arrangement. Due to disagreement between the twocountries,twoseparategovernmentswereestablishedin1948andbothgovernmentsdeclaredthemselves as the legitimate and true government over the whole country. Following theKoreanWar,thetwogovernmentsturnedintowhatweconsidertobeNorthandSouthKoreatoday.
ThehistoryofSouthKoreaischaracterizedbyalternatingdemocraticandautocraticperiodsofrule. The country’s governments are numbered from the First Republic to the current SixthRepublicandvarygreatlyintheirlevelsofdemocracy.
The First Republic was initially largely democratic, but became increasingly autocratic overtime.TheSecondRepublicofferedahigh levelofdemocracy,butwasoverthrownbytheautocraticmilitaryregimewithinayearoftakingpower.ThefollowingThird,Fourth,andFifthRepublicswere seemingly democratic, but theywere generally regarded as extensions ofmilitary rule.AgradualdemocraticstabilizationistakingplaceduringthecurrentruleoftheSixthRepublic.
Principles of Democracy The radar chart below in Figure 1, offers a quick overview of the five V-Dem indices ofdemocracy in South Korea at four different points in time: 1905, 1950, 1995 and 2014. Allindicesinthefigurerangefrom0to1,whereascoreof0suggeststhatacountrydidnotevincethecharacteristicsofdemocracyrelevanttothisparticular indexatthispoint intime,while1correspondstothebestpossiblesituationforthisindex,accordingtotheV-Demmeasures.
In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component of democracy is fundamental andunderstood as an essential element of the other principles of representative democracy –liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian; without it, we cannot call a regime“democratic”. However,we recognize that countries can have “democratic qualities”,withoutbeing democracies. As a result, the aggregation formulae for all high-level principles ofdemocracy include the measure of electoral democracy. Thus, for example, “ParticipatoryDemocracy”isacompositescoreoftheelectoralandtheparticipatorycomponents.
Figure 1. Principles of Democracy Indices
2AllindicatorsandindicescanbefoundinGlossaryofTermsinAppendixI.Foranoverviewofthestructureofthe
indices,pleaseseeAppendixII.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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In the beginning of the 20th century, the level of democracy in South Korea is nearly non-existent with scores of 0 on all five high-level indices. A certain degree of democraticdevelopment, mainly in terms of the electoral aspect, takes place between 1905 and 1950.Deliberative and participatory democracy, on the other hand, have not experienced muchchangewhenone looksat thescores in1905and1950.The largestdemocraticenhancementacrossall indicescanbenotedwhencomparing1950to1995.Thecountryachievesscoresofalmost .8 in termsofelectoralandegalitariandemocracy,suggesting thatrulersaregenerallybeing held responsible by their citizens through electoral competition, that political and civilsociety organizations are able to operate freely, and that there is freedom of expression. Inaddition,thedistributionofpoliticalpoweracrosssocialgroupsislargelyequal.
The liberal democracy score increases from .2 in 1950 to.6 in 1995, and the deliberativedemocracyscore fromaround0to .6. Hence, theprotectionof individualandminorityrightsagainst the “tyranny of the state” and public deliberation between political elites and thecitizens have advanced, although there is still room for improvement. The country is leastdemocratic in the participatory sense, where a score of only .5 is achieved in 1995. Theparticipatoryprincipleofdemocracyreflects theactiveparticipationbycitizens inallpoliticalprocesses,electoralandnon-electoral.Nosubstantialimprovementshavetakenplacebetween1995and2014.
InFigure2below,welookfurtherintotheaforementionedindicesandgraphthecomponentsthat go into the five higher level principles indices of democracy: the electoral, liberal,egalitarian, participatory and deliberative aspects. The development of these components inSouth Korea overmore than one hundred years is displayed togetherwith the female rightsindex3.
3Thescaleofeachindexandindicatorisspecifiedwithinparenthesesinthelegendofeachfigure.Inall indicatorsand indices graphed, a lower score corresponds to a less democratic level, while a higher score suggests amoredemocraticlevel.PleaseseeAppendixIformoreinformationoneachoftheindicatorsandindices.
00,20,40,60,81
ElectoralDemocracy
LiberalDemocracy
ParticipatoryDemocracy
DeliberativeDemocracy
EgalitarianDemocracy
1905
1950
1995
2014
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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Thedemocracycomponents inFigure2, reflecta rathervolatiledevelopment inSouthKoreaovertime.However,afewgeneraltrendsareevident.Thefirstlargeimprovementintermsof
democraticdevelopmenttakesplace inrelationto independencefromJapan in1948,wherea
significant improvement is noticed among the different components, although to varying
extents.Thelargestchangetakesplaceintermsofegalitarian,electoralandliberaldemocracy.Greatenhancement in termsof femalerights isalsoevident. Improvements in termsofpublicdeliberationandpoliticalparticipationaremoregradualovertime.
Anotherspike,reflectedinmanyofthecomponents,takesplacein1959-1960,markingtheend
of theFirstRepublic and thebeginningof the SecondRepublic. Themoredemocratic Second
Republicisonlyinplaceforlessthanayear,explainingthedropthatfollowedforthecountry
acrossmanyofthecomponents.
Inthemid-tolate1980sasteepdemocraticimprovementcanbeseenacrossallcomponents.
This reflects aperiod inwhichmillionsof citizens,mainly students, carriedoutmassiveanti-
government protests as part of the June Democracy Movement in 1987. This was the same
monththatthegovernmentannouncedtheDeclarationofPoliticalReforms,includingacallfor
direct presidential elections and a respect of civil rights. Later that same year a referendum
approvedarevisedconstitutionanddirectpresidentialelectionswereheld.Atthispoint,andin
thefewyearsthatfollowed,evenintothe90s,SouthKoreareached.8oraboveinalldemocracy
components,exceptfortheparticipatorywhichpresentsascoreof.6.Sincetheendofthe90s,thecountryhasremainedonapproximatelythesamelevelsacrossallcomponents.
Inordertotrackdownmorespecificaspectswithinthesevariousdemocraticdevelopments,we
furtherexploreeachofthesixcomponentsofdemocracytotakeacloserlookattheindicators
andindicesconstitutingthem.
The Electoral Component The V-Dem electoral democracy component indexmeasures the core value ofmaking rulers
responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate during
periodicelections;whetherpoliticalandcivilsocietyorganizationscanoperatefreely;whether
electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematicirregularities;andwhetherthechief
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executiveof a country is selected (directlyor indirectly) throughelections.Figure3 displaysthefoursub-indicesthatconstitutetheelectoralcomponentindex.
The indices inFigure3, displaya volatiledevelopmentover timeduringaperiodofpoliticalinstabilityreflectedinthedata.
Thefirstgeneralelections,bothtotheConstitutionalAssemblyandtothepresidentialpostaftertheJapanesecolonization,areheldin1948.Asreflectedabove,theelectionsintroduceuniversalsuffrageandthedirectelectionofapresidentbythepeople.Thecleanelectionsindex,however,suggeststhattheseelections,andtheonesthatfollowedoverthenext30years,wereplaguedbyregistrationfraud,systematicirregularities,governmentintimidationoftheopposition,votebuying, and election violence. Just before and during independence, a substantial increaseoccurredintermsofextendedfreedomofassociation,indicatingthatparties,includingpartiesoftheopposition,wereallowedtoorganizeandtoparticipateinelectionstoalargerextentthanbefore,and thatcivil societyorganizationscouldorganizeandoperatemore freelywithin thesociety.
For the 1960 presidential election allegations were made that the election results had beenmanipulated and that widespread corruption was occurring. This led to the protests thatdeveloped into theAprilRevolution.The electionwas annulled, and the incumbentpresidentwent into exile while the First Republic collapsed. Although the Second Republic was moredemocraticinnature,itwasshort-livedandfollowedbymilitaryrulebetween1961and1963.Theeventsofpoliticalinstabilityaredisplayedinthefreedomofassociationindex,whichshowsa significant drop before bouncing back to the middle of the scale. Further political turmoilfollowed the 1971 elections, in which the re-elected incumbent president Park Chung-heedeclaredastateofemergencypartlyduetothethreatoftheoppositiongainingthemostseats.He further opened up for a reunification with North Korea, which was never implemented,dissolved theNationalAssemblyandsuspended the country’s constitution.When thiskindofperiodofinstabilityoccurs,itdecreasesthequalityofelections,freedomofassociationandthedirectelectionoftheexecutive.
After1980,stabilityandasharpimprovementintermsoffreedomofassociationtakeplaceandthecountryreachesascoreofover.8.Since1980,theexecutivehasalsobeendirectlyelected.Duringthe90s,electionsbecameincreasinglyfreeandfair,andbytheturnofthecentury,the
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countryhadreachedascoreof.9onthescale.Aslightdownwardtrendhastakenplaceplacein
recentyearsandcouldbesomethingtokeepaneyeoninthefuture.
The Liberal Component The liberaldimensionofdemocracyembodies the intrinsicvalueofprotecting individual and
minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the state.” This is achieved through
constitutionally protected civil liberties and strong rule of law, and effective checks and
balancesbythejudiciaryandthelegislaturewhichlimittheuseofexecutivepower.
Theliberaldemocracycomponent,displayedinFigure4,includesthreeindices:equalitybeforethelawandindividualliberty,legislativeconstraintsontheexecutive,andjudicialconstraintsontheexecutive.Thethreeindicesfollowasimilardevelopmentovertime,yetondifferentlevels.Following independence, the judicial equality and individual liberty for SouthKorean citizens
have increased substantially. Laws have become increasingly transparent and rigorously
enforced,publicadministrationhasbecomemoreimpartial,andcitizensenjoyalargerdegree
ofaccess to justice, securepropertyrights, freedomfromforced labor, freedomofmovement,
physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion. Similarly, the executive respects the
constitutionmore,andcomplieswithcourtrulingstoalargerextent,andthejudiciaryisableto
act in a more independent fashion.
The legislative constraints on the executive captures the extent to which it is capable ofquestioning, investigating, andexercisingoversightover the executive.Data exists from1948
whenthelegislaturewasestablished.
Thecountryexperiencesan increase inall three indices in1960,marking the transition from
the FirstRepublic to the SecondRepublic. Thedrop right afterwards is a consequence of the
militaryrulewhichfollowedtheshortlivedSecondRepublic.Atthatpoint,theconstraintonthe
executivebythelegislativeandjudiciarywasbasicallynon-existent.
Following theefforts towardsdemocratizationsby the JuneDemocracyMovementduring the
late 1980s, the country experienced great improvements in all three aspects of liberal
democracy.Sincethen,thecountryhasscoredabove.8onallindices.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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The Participatory Component The participatory dimension of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and activeparticipationbycitizensinallpoliticalprocesses;itemphasizesnon-electoralformsofpoliticalparticipationthroughsuchchannelsascivilsocietyorganizationsandthroughthemechanismof direct democracy. Figure 5 displays the four sub-indices that compose the participatorydemocracycomponent.
Figure 5 displays the indices that make up the participatory democracy component, whichscoresthe lowestcomparedtotheotherdimensions inthe first twofigures.Forparticipatorydemocracy,thescoresofthedifferentindicatorsvaryfromnearthebottomofthescaletothetop,indicatingthat,inSouthKorea,someparticipatoryaspectsofdemocracyaremuchstrongerthanothers.
Thecountryhas received lowscoreson thedirectpopular vote index throughout the century,suggestingthatinstitutionalizedprocessesbywhichcitizensregistertheirchoiceoropiniononspecificissuesintheformofreferendumsandplebiscitesarenearlynon-existent.
Civilsocietyparticipationhasbeenverylimited,historically,evenafterindependence.Notuntilthelate80sdidthecitizensofSouthKoreabecomeinvolvedincivilsocietyorganizations.Afterthe JuneDemocracyMovement an increase in participation followed, leading almost to a topscoreof1.
The country’s historically low scores on the local government and the regional governmentindicessuggestthattheidealofdirectlyelectedsub-nationalbodiesautonomousfromunelectedactors was far from achieved prior to the 90s. However, today it has been partly attained,althoughcertainlimitationsoftheirautonomypersist.
The Deliberative Component The deliberative component of democracy captures the core value that political decisions areguidedbythepursuitofthepublicgoodandshouldbeinformedbyrespectfulandreasonabledialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochialinterests,orcoercion.
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Note, that the indicators displayed in Figures 6, 7 and 8 have different scales, which arespecifiedinparenthesesinthelegendofeachfigure.
Public deliberation in SouthKorea, presented inFigure6, has been very limited historically,andwhenthecountrygainedindependencethisdidnotchange.Thewaveofdemocratizationinthe late80s,however,did indeedhavepositiveeffectson thequalityand inclusivenessof thepublicdialogueofthecountry. Oneofthelargestimprovementstakesplaceintermsofthebreadthoftherangeofconsultationwhenimportantdecisionsaremadeatelitelevels.Beforethechange,consultationincludedonlygroupsloyaltotherulingelite,whereaslater,italsobegantoincludeaselectrangeofsociety,laborandbusinessrepresentatives.
Anotherchangeoccurssurroundingtheextenttowhichpoliticalelitesjustifytheirpositionsintermsof the commongoodwhen important policy changes are discussed. Prior to the 1980sjustificationswereoffered in termsofspecificbusiness,partyorconstituency interestsratherthan in terms of the common good. Since then, justifications have been based on explicitstatements of the common good, for themost part,which benefit society as awhole. This isindicatedbyascoreofcloseto4forthecommongoodmeasure. Acrucialaspectofpublicdeliberation is theengagementof thesociety.Beforetherevolution,thepublicbelowtheelitelevelswerealmostalwayseitherunawareofmajorpolicydebatesorunabletotakepartinthem.Followingthemovementtowardsdemocratization,deliberationhasbecomeactivelyencouraged.Arelativelybroadsegmentofnon-elitegroupsoftenparticipateinthediscussions,asreflectedbytheengagedsocietyindicator.
Assuggestedbytherespectforcounterargumentsindicator,thedevelopmenthasbeenslowerinterms of political elites acknowledging and respecting counterarguments, since they tend toacknowledge the arguments without making explicit negative or positive statements aboutthem.
ThelowestscoreforSouthKoreaintermsofpublicdeliberationisforthereasonedjustificationindicator,reflectingthatelitestendtoofferonesinglesimplereasonwhenjustifyingwhytheyexpectproposedpolicies tohavepositiveoutcomes, rather thanofferingamorenuancedandcompletejustificationfortheirdecisions.Itisinterestingthatthehighestlevelofdeliberationisreachedaround the turnof the century,whereaspublicdeliberationactuallydecreases a few
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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years later. This suggests the possibility that the country could be facing some challenges intermsofdeliberativedemocracy. The Egalitarian ComponentThe egalitarian idea is one in which material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actualexerciseofformalrightsandliberties;henceamoreequaldistributionofresources,education,andhealthacrosssocioeconomicgroupsshouldenhancepoliticalequality.
Figure7showstheeightindicatorswhichcomposetheegalitariandemocracycomponent.Asisevidentfromthefigure,thedevelopmentsofthedifferentegalitarianindicatorsinSouthKoreavarygreatlyovertime.
Socialgroupequalityforcivilliberties(orangeline)ishistoricallyhighand,accordingtoitsscoreofcloseto4,membersofallsocialgroupshaveenjoyedthesamelevelofcivillibertiessincethelate1980s.
Thecountryexperiencedsignificant improvements inpowerdistributedby socialgroup (blackline)andeducationalequality(blueline)followingtheendoftheJapaneseoccupationandthemove towards independence in the mid-40s. The country achieved the highest level ofeducationalequality in1990,asthedatasuggeststhat lessthanfivepercentofSouthKoreansfacechallengesinexercisingtheirbasicrightsasadultcitizensduetoalowqualityofeducation.The country reached a score above three in the power distributed by social group indicator,which indicates that either all social groups possess some political power,with some groupshavingmorepowerthanothers,orthatdifferentsocialgroupsalternateinpower.
Equality in terms of health develops more gradually over time, as is evident in the healthequality indicator (purple line). In the 90s the country reached a level of equal healthcarequality. The score of 4 indicates that the share of SouthKorean citizenswho cannot exercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensduetoalackofaccesstogood,qualityhealthcareislessthanfivepercent.
Theendof themoreautocraticFirstRepublic in1960seems tohavehad the largestpositiveinfluenceonpowerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition(redline)andparticularisticorpublicgoods(yellowline).Thedevelopmentofamoreequalpowerdistributionbetweenthewealthyandthepoor,however,slowsdownandendsupwithascorebelow3in2014,suggestingthat
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wealthy people still enjoymuchmore political power than the average citizen or the poorerpopulation.Aquitediscretedownwardtrendcanbeseeninthefigure,suggestingthatthecountrymightbemovingtowardsaslightlylessequalpowerdistributioninthisaspect.
Theparticularisticorpublicgoodsindicatormeasureswhethermostpublicexpenditurestargetspecificgroups,partiesorcorporations,orthesocietyasawhole.Accordingtothefigure,socialand infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goodsprograms.Sincetheturnofthecentury,mostsocialandinfrastructureexpenditureshavebeenpublic-goodsbutasignificantportionisparticularistic.
Acloselyrelatedaspectofequality ismeasuredbytheindicatormeans-testedvs.universalistic(light blue line). It captures whether welfare programs are means-tested (e.g. cash-transferprograms)orbenefit allmembersof society (e.g education, national healthcare schemes, andretirement programs). In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, welfare programs that benefiteveryone and do not stigmatize certain unprivileged groups, such as poor people, are moredemocratic from an egalitarian perspective than means-tested programs which only targetthese particular groups.ThedevelopmenttowardsmoreuniversalisticwelfareprogramsinSouthKoreahasbeenrathersluggish,withthegreatestenhancementtakingplacefollowingtherevolution.Inrecentyears,the countryhas receiveda scoreof close to4, suggesting thatmostwelfare statepolicies areuniversalistic,althoughasignificantportionisstillmeans-tested.
Thedistributionofpowerbygender(greenline)istheaspectofequalityinwhichSouthKoreaperforms theworst, reflectedbya scorebetween2and3which indicates thatmenstillhavemorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.
Female Rights Equality betweenwomen andmen is indivisible fromdemocracy at all levels, and is broadlyrecognizedasapre-conditionfortrulyrepresentativeandresponsivegovernments.TheV-Demfemale rights index focuses on the ability of women to participate in the open discussion ofpoliticalissues,toparticipateincivilsocietyorganizations,thefreedomofmovement,therighttoprivateproperty,theaccesstojustice,thefreedomfromforcedlabor,andanequalshareinthe overall distribution of power. Figure8 displays the seven indicators that constitute thisindexforSweden.
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The female rights index is comprised of seven distinct indicators, included in Figure 8.The different aspects of female rights are strengthened at different points in time.The independence from Japan resulted in top level scores in termsofproperty rights (yellowline) and the freedom from forced labor for women (orange line). Virtually all women haveenjoyedbothrightseversince.
SouthKoreanwomenreachfullfreedomofdomesticmovement(blackline)tenyearslater,withascoreof4ontheindicator.Women’saccesstojustice(greenline)expandsmoregraduallyovertime,butsincetheJuneDemocracyMovementin1987,secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforthewomenofSouthKoreahasalmostalwaysobserved.
Thedevelopmentoffreedomofdiscussionforwomen(purpleline)followsasimilarpath,exceptfor adrop in1970. Since the late1980s, however,women’s right todiscuss is virtually fullyrespected, meaning that freedom of speech by South Korean women in their homes and inpublicspacesisnotrestricted.Femalerightshavebeenfullyachievedinalmostallaspectssincetherevolution,althoughwomenarestillstrugglingtoachievethesamepoliticalpowerthatmenhave(lightblueline).
Concluding Remarks ThisdatabriefdepictsthedemocraticdevelopmentofSouthKoreafrom1900to2014,basedondata from key V-Dem indices and indicators. Overall, the data reflect the volatile history ofSouthKoreawithalternationsbetweenmoreandlessdemocraticgovernments.Themajorityoftheindicesandindicatorsreflectindependencein1948andtheJuneDemocracyMovementin1987,aswellasthedemocraticreformswhichfollowedtheseevents.Sincethelate1980s,thecountry has had scores between .8 and 1 in all democracy components, except for theparticipatoryaspectwhichhasreachedascoreof.6.
The history of less democratic regimes is captured by the low level of the clean electionindicator,whichachievesjustabove.2upuntilthedemocracymovementinthe80s.Hence,thecountry struggled with serious electoral challenges of registration fraud, systematicirregularities,governmentintimidationoftheopposition,votebuying,andelectoralviolencefora largepart of the20th century.The scoreof above .8 since the90s, however, reflects SouthKorea’sgreatimprovementsovertimeinthisregard.
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Thecountryalsoshowedhighscoresinsomeaspectsofdemocracyevenbeforethedemocracy
waveduringthelate80s.Theequalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertiesshowsscoresof.6inthebeginningof1950sandsocialgroupequalityforcivillibertiesascoreof3outof4in1910.Sincethe1980s,femalerightshasadvancedtoveryhighlevels,withtheexceptionthatwomenofSouthKoreastilldonotholdasmuchpoliticalpowerastheirmalecounterparts.
Appendix I. List of variables. Thisisalistofalltheindicesandindicatorsincludedinthecountrybrief.
Itcontainsthequestionandthequestionalternativesaswellasinformationofaggregation,
scale,datareleaseandcitation.ThesecanalsobefoundintheV-Demcodebook.
VariablesincludedinFigure1.
Electoraldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_polyarchy)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofelectoraldemocracyinitsfullestsenseachieved?Clarifications: Theelectoralprincipleofdemocracyseekstoembodythecorevalueofmaking
rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s
approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society
organizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematic
irregularities; andelectionsaffect the compositionof the chief executiveof the country. In
between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of
presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual
scheme,electoraldemocracyisunderstoodasanessentialelementofanyotherconception
of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some
other.
Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the
indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr),
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clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom ofexpression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between thoseindices. This is halfwaybetween a straight average and strictmultiplication,meaning theaverageofthetwo.It isthusacompromisebetweenthetwomostwellknownaggregationformulas in the literature,bothallowing "compensation" inone sub-component for lackofpolyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-componentaccordingtothe"weakestlink"argument.TheaggregationisdoneatthelevelofDahlssub-components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index isaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_polyarchy=.1*v2x_suffr+ .1*v2xel_frefair+ .1*v2x_accex+ .1*v2x_frassoc_thick+ .1*v2x_freexp_thick+.5*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex*v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_freexp_thick.
Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_freexp_thickv2x_EDcomp_thickDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Liberaldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_libdem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofliberaldemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting
individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of themajority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthequalityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionallyprotected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checksandbalancesthat,together,limittheexerciseofexecutivepower.Tomakethisameasureofliberaldemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_libdem=.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_liberal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_liberal
Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_liberalv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Participatorydemocracyindex(D)(v2x_partipdem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofparticipatorydemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by
citizens inallpoliticalprocesses, electoralandnon-electoral. It ismotivatedbyuneasinessabout a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracythustakessuffrageforgranted,emphasizingengagementincivilsocietyorganizations,directdemocracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatorydemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_partipdem=
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.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_partip+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_partip
Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_polyarchyv2x_partipDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Deliberativedemocracyindex(D)(v2x_delibdem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofdeliberativedemocracyachieved?Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which
decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one inwhich public reasoningfocused on the common goodmotivates political decisions—as contrastedwith emotionalappeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle,democracyrequiresmorethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsoberespectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—amonginformedandcompetentparticipantswhoareopentopersuasion.Tomakeitameasureofnot only thedeliberativeprinciple but also of democracy, the index also takes the level ofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_delibdem=
.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_delib+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_delib
Scale:IntervalSources:v2xdl_delibv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5.Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)
Egalitariandemocracyindex(D)(v2x_egaldem)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofegalitariandemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political
power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. Thisperspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civillibertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhaveapproximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection underthe law, and influenceoverpolicymakingandpolicy implementation. If suchequalitydoesnot exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, andhealthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.Tomakeitameasureofegalitariandemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.
Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_egaldem=
.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_egal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_egal
Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_egalv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
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VariablesincludedinFigure2.
Electoralcomponentindex(D)(v2x_EDcomp_thick)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheelectoralprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and
accountabilitybetweenleadersandcitizensthroughthemechanismofcompetitiveelections.This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil societyorganizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematicirregularities;andthechiefexecutiveofacountryisselected(directlyorindirectly)throughelections.
Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by itsweakest linkof freedomofassociation,suffrage,cleanelections,andelectedexecutive.Theindexisthusaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_EDcomp_thick=v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex.
Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_frassoc_thickv2x_suffrv2xel_frefairv2x_accexDatarelease:3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Participatorycomponentindex(D)(v2x_partip)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheparticipatoryprincipleachieved?Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by
citizens inallpoliticalprocesses, electoralandnon-electoral. It ismotivatedbyuneasinessabout a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracythustakessuffrageforgranted,emphasizingengagementincivilsocietyorganizations,directdemocracy,andsubnationalelectedbodies.
Aggregation:Thisindexisformedbyaveragingthefollowingindices:civilsocietyparticipation(v2x_iccpart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power(v2xel_locelec),andelectedregionalgovernmentpower(v2xel_regelec).
Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_iccpartv2xdd_ddv2xel_locelecv2xel_regelecDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Egalitariancomponentindex(D)(v2x_egal)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheegalitarianprincipleachieved?Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political
power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. Thisperspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civillibertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhaveapproximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection underthe law, and influenceoverpolicymakingandpolicy implementation. If suchequalitydoes
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and
healthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.
Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysismodel including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position
(v2pepwrses), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group
equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq),
equalaccesstohealth(v2pehealth),powerdistributionaccordingtogender(v2pepwrgen),
shareofbudgetallocatedtopublic/commongoods(v2dlencmps),andtheshareofwelfare
programsthatprovideuniversalratherthanmeans-testedbenefits(v2dlunivl).
Scale:IntervalSources: v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrgen
v2dlencmpsv2dlunivl
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Liberalcomponentindex(D)(v2x_liberal)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheliberalprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting
individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the
majority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthe
qualityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionally
protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks
andbalancesthat,together,limittheexerciseofexecutivepower.
Aggregation: This index is formedbyaveragingthe following indices:equalitybeforethe lawand individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and
legislativeconstraintsontheexecutive(v2xlg_legcon).
Scale:IntervalSources:v2xcl_rolv2x_juconv2xlg_legconDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Deliberativecomponentindex(D)(v2xdl_delib)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentisthedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which
decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one inwhich public reasoning
focused on the common goodmotivates political decisions—as contrastedwith emotional
appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle,
democracyrequiresmorethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsobe
respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among
informedandcompetentparticipantswhoareopentopersuasion.
Tomeasurethesefeaturesofapolitywetrytodeterminetheextenttowhichpoliticalelites
givepublicjustificationsfortheirpositionsonmattersofpublicpolicy,justifytheirpositions
intermsofthepublicgood,acknowledgeandrespectcounter-arguments;andhowwidethe
rangeofconsultationisatelitelevels.
Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysismodelincludingthefollowingindicators:reasonedjustification(v2dlreason),commongood
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justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of
consultation(v2dlconslt),andengagedsociety(v2dlengage).
Scale:IntervalSources:v2dlreasonv2dlcommonv2dlcountrv2dlconsltv2dlengageDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Femalerightsindex(D)(v2x_gender)
Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Towhatextentarewoman’spoliticalrightsprotected?Clarifications:Politicalrightsindexfocusesontheabilityofwomentoparticipateindiscussions
ofpoliticalissues,participationincivilsocietyorganizations,freedomofmovement,theright
toprivateproperty,accesstojustice,freedomfromforcedlabor,representationintheranks
ofjournalists,andanequalshareintheoveralldistributionofpower.
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for CSO women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists
(v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom of
discussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef),
property rights for women (v2clprptyw), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), and
powerdistributedbygender(v2pepwrgen).
Scale:IntervalSources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw
v2pepwrgen
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure3.
Freedomofassociation(thick)index(D)(v2x_frassoc_thick)
Projectmanager:AllenHicken,MichaelBernhard,JanTeorellQuestion: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to
participateinelections,andtowhatextentarecivilsocietyorganizationsabletoformandto
operatefreely?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars),
opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry
and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections
indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within
electionregimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg).
Scale:IntervalSources:v2psparbanv2psbarsv2psoppautv2elmulparv2cseeorgsv2csreprssDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferentaggregationformulaforthethinner index
v2x_frassoc)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Cleanelectionsindex(D)(v2xel_frefair)
Projectmanagers:StaffanLindberg,JanTeorell
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Question:Towhatextentareelectionsfreeandfair?Clarifications:Freeandfairconnotesanabsenceofregistrationfraud,systematicirregularities,
governmentintimidationoftheopposition,votebuying,andelectionviolence.Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis
model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap),electionvoterregistry(v2elrgstry),electionvotebuying(v2elvotbuy),electionothervotingirregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election otherelectoralviolence(v2elpeace),andelectionfreeandfair(v2elfrfair).Sincethebulkoftheseindicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeatedwithinelectionregimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg)
Scale:IntervalSources: v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace
v2elfrfairDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Shareofpopulationwithsuffrage(D)(v2x_suffr)
Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in
nationalelections?Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age,
residence,havingbeenconvictedforcrime,orbeinglegallyincompetent.Itcoverslegal(dejure) restrictions, not restrictions thatmay be operative in practice (de facto). The scoresreflect de jureprovisionsof suffrage extension inpercentageof the adult population as ofJanuary 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined bycitizens inthecaseof independentcountriesorthepeople living intheterritorialentity inthe case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universalmale suffrage only iscodedas50%.Yearsbeforeelectoralprovisionsareintroducedarescored0%.Thescoresdonot reflectwhether an electoral regimewas interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions,electoral laws, or the like explicitly introducenewregulationsof suffrage, the scoreswereadjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other thangender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity,religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by combininginformationontherestrictionswithdifferentkindsofstatisticalinformation(onpopulationsize, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.),secondary country-specific sources, and – in the case of very poor information – theconditionsinsimilarcountriesorcolonies.
Aggregation:v2elsuffrage/100Responses:PercentScale:IntervalSource:v2elsuffrageDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Electedexecutiveindex(dejure)(D)(v2x_accex)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or
indirectly)?
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Clarifications: This index attempts tomeasurewhether the chief executive is elected, eitherdirectly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected
legislaturethatthenappointsthechiefexecutive.
Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with
limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only implies
selectionand/orapproval,notthepowertodismiss.
This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not be
interpretedasanimportantelementofdemocracyinitsownright.
Aggregation: There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account inconstructingthisindex,allofwhicharescaledtovaryfrom0to1.First,whethertheheadof
state is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). Second, the extent to which the legislature ispopularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature isunicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the
weightdefinedbywhichhouseisdominant(if legislatureisbicameral).Third,whetherthe
headofstate isappointedbythe legislature,or theapprovalof the legislature isnecessary
for theappointmentof theheadof state (c1=1,otherwise0). Fourth,whether theheadofgovernmentisappointedbythelegislature,ortheapprovalofthelegislatureisnecessaryfor
theappointmentoftheheadofgovernment(c2=1,otherwise0).Fifth,whethertheheadofgovernmentisappointedbytheheadofstate(d=1)ornot(d=0).Sixth,whethertheheadofgovernmentisdirectlyelected(e=1)ornot(e=0).Definehoswastheweightfortheheadofstate.Iftheheadofstateisalsoheadofgovernment(v2exhoshog==1),hosw=1.Iftheheadofstatehasmorepowerthantheheadofgovernmentovertheappointmentanddismissalof
cabinet ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal power,hosw=.5.Definetheweightfortheheadofgovernmentashogw=1-hosw.Theformulais:
v2x_accex=
hosw*[max(a1,b*c1)]+hogw*[max(a1*d,b*c1*d,a2,b*c2)]
Scale:IntervalSources: v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg
v2exdfcbhsv2exdjcbhgv2exdfdmhsv2exdfdshgv2exhoshog
Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure4.
Equalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyindex(D)(v2xcl_rol)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public
administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure
propertyrights,freedomfromforcedlabor,freedomofmovement,physicalintegrityrights,
andfreedomofreligion?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct),
transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for
men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym,
v2clprptyw),freedomfromtorture(v2cltort),freedomfrompoliticalkillings(v2clkill),from
forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig),
freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of domestic movement for
men/women(v2cldmovem,v2cldmovew).
Scale:Interval
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Sources: v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkillv2clslavemv2clslavefv2clreligv2clfmovev2cldmovemv2cldmovew
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Legislativeconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2xlg_legcon)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentisthelegislatureandgovernmentagencies(e.g.,comptrollergeneral,
general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercisingoversightovertheexecutive?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodeloftheindicatorsforlegislaturequestionsofficialsinpractice(v2lgqstexp),executiveoversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislatureoppositionparties(v2lgoppart).
Scale:IntervalSources:v2lgqstexpv2lgotovstv2lginvstpv2lgoppartDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Judicialconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2x_jucon)
Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: Towhat extent does the executive respect the constitution and complywith court
rulings,andtowhatextentisthejudiciaryabletoactinanindependentfashion?
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliancewithjudiciary (v2jucomp), compliancewith high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence(v2juhcind),andlowercourtindependence(v2juncind).
Scale:IntervalSources:v2exresconv2jucompv2juhccompv2juhcindv2juncindDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure5.
Civilsocietyparticipationindex(D)(v2x_cspart)
Projectmanager:MichaelBernhardQuestion:AremajorCSOsroutinelyconsultedbypolicymaker;howlargeistheinvolvementof
people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidatenomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through partyprimaries?
Clarifications:Thesphereofcivilsocietyliesinthepublicspacebetweentheprivatesphereandthestate.Here,citizensorganizeingroupstopursuetheircollectiveinterestsandideals.Wecall these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no meanslimitedto,interestgroups,laborunions,spiritualorganizations(iftheyareengagedincivicorpoliticalactivities),socialmovements,professionalassociations,charities,andothernon-governmentalorganizations.
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Thecorecivilsocietyindex(CCSI)isdesignedtoprovideameasureofarobustcivilsociety,understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely andactivelypursuetheirpoliticalandcivicgoals,howeverconceived.
Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for candidate selection –national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSOconsultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’sparticipation(v2csgender).
Scale:IntervalSources:v2pscnslnlv2cscnsultv2csprtcptv2csgenderDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Localgovernment(D)(v2xel_locelec)
Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorellQuestion: Are there elected local governments, and –if so – towhat extent can they operate
withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesatthelocallevel?Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local
governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected localgovernmentsbutwherethosegovernmentsaresubordinatetounelectedofficialsatthelocallevel (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to acountryinwhichlocalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictionsfromunelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, localgovernmentsremainsubordinatetotheregionalandnationalgovernments.)
Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected,1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructisthen scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr)scaledtovaryfrom0-1.
Scale:IntervalSources:v2ellocelcv2ellocpwrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Directpopularvoteindex(D)(v2xdd_dd)
Projectmanager:DavidAltmanQuestion:Towhatextentisthedirectpopularvoteutilized?Clarification:Directpopularvotingrefersheretoaninstitutionalizedprocessbywhichcitizens
ofaregionorcountryregistertheirchoiceoropiniononspecificissuesthroughaballot.Itisintended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usuallyunderstood.Itcapturessomeaspectsofthemoregeneralconceptofdirectdemocracy.Thetermdoesnotencompassrecallelections,deliberativeassemblies,orsettings inwhichthevoteisnotsecretorthepurviewisrestricted.Likewise,itdoesnotapplytoelectionsforrepresentatives.
Aggregation: Thisindexmeasureshoweasyit istoinitiateandapproveadirectpopularvoteandhowconsequentialthatvoteis(ifapproved)?Easeof initiationismeasuredby(a)theexistence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed(v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level ofgovernment (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorumspertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbindci), (c) supermajority
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(v2ddspmjci),and(d)districtmajority(v2dddistci).Consequencesaremeasuredby(a)thelegal status of the decisionmade by citizens (binding ormerely consultative) (v2ddlegci),and (b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past(v2ddciniyr).
Scale:IntervalSources: v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgrtlci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbindci v2ddthreci
v2ddspmjciv2dddistciv2ddlegciv2ddciniyrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Regionalgovernment(D)(v2xel_regelec)
Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorellQuestion:Arethereelectedregionalgovernments,and–ifso–towhatextentcantheyoperate
withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesattheregionallevel?Clarification: The lowest scorewould be reserved for a country that has no elected regional
governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regionalgovernments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at theregionallevel(perhapsappointedbyahigher-levelbody).Ahighscorewouldbeaccordedtoacountryinwhichregionalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictionsfromunelectedactorsattheregionallevel(withtheexceptionofjudicialbodies).(Naturally,regionalgovernmentsremainsubordinatetothenationalgovernment.)
Aggregation:First,regionalgovernmentelected(v2elsrgel)isrecodedsothat0=noneelected,1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructisthenscaled tovary from0-1andmultipliedbyregionalofficesrelativepower(v2elrgpwr)scaledtovaryfrom0-1.
Scale:IntervalSources:v2elsrgelv2elrgpwrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure6.
Reasonedjustification(C)(v2dlreason,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,i.e.beforeadecisionhasbeen
made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for theirpositions?
Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthestylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.
Responses:0:Nojustification.Elitesalmostalwaysonlydictatethatsomethingshouldorshouldnot
be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, “We must cutspending.”
1:Inferiorjustification.Elitestendtogivereasonswhysomeoneshouldorshouldnotbefordoingornotdoingsomething,butthereasonstendtobeillogicalorfalse,althoughtheymay appeal tomany voters. For example, “Wemust cut spending. The state isinefficient.”[Theinferenceisincompletebecauseaddressinginefficiencieswouldnotnecessarilyreducespendinganditmightundermineessentialservices.]
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2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifyingwhy theproposedpoliciescontribute toordetract fromanoutcome.Forexample, “Wemustcutspendingbecausetaxpayerscannotaffordtopayforcurrentprograms.”
3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex,nuanced and complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending becausetaxpayerscannotaffordtopayforcurrentgovernmentprograms.Raisingtaxeswouldhurteconomicgrowth,anddeficitspendingwouldleadtoinflation.”
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Respectcounterarguments(C)(v2dlcountr,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political
elitesacknowledgeandrespectcounterarguments?Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe
stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.Responses:
0:Counterargumentsarenotallowedorifarticulated,punished.1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are
ignored.2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by
makinganegativestatementaboutthemorthe individualsandgroupsthatproposethem.
3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative orpositivestatementsaboutthem.
4:Elitesalmostalwaysacknowledgecounterargumentsandexplicitlyvaluethem,eveniftheyultimatelyrejectthemforthemostpart.
5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, andfrequentlyalsoevenacceptthemandchangetheirposition.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Engagedsociety(C)(v2dlengage,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how
independentarepublicdeliberations?Clarification:Thisquestionreferstodeliberationasmanifestedindiscussion,debate,andother
publicforumssuchaspopularmedia.Responses:
0:Publicdeliberationisnever,oralmostneverallowed.1: Somelimitedpublicdeliberationsareallowedbut thepublicbelowtheelite levels is
almostalwayseitherunawareofmajorpolicydebatesorunabletotakepartinthem.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
24
2: Publicdeliberation isnotrepressedbutnevertheless infrequentandnon-eliteactorsaretypicallycontrolledand/orconstrainedbytheelites.
3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groupsparticipate,butitisconfinedtoasmallsliceofspecializedgroupsthattendstobethesameacrossissue-areas.
4:Publicdeliberationisactivelyencouragedandarelativelybroadsegmentofnon-elitegroupsoftenparticipateandvarywithdifferentissue-areas.
5: Largenumbersofnon-elitegroupsaswell asordinarypeople tend todiscussmajorpoliciesamongthemselves, inthemedia, inassociationsorneighborhoods,or inthestreets.Grass-rootsdeliberationiscommonandunconstrained.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Commongood(C)(v2dlcommon,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political
elitesjustifytheirpositionsintermsofthecommongood?Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe
stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.Responses:
0:Littleornojustificationintermsofthecommongoodisusuallyoffered.1: Specificbusiness,geographic,group,party,orconstituencyinterestsareforthemost
partofferedasjustifications.2:Justificationsareforthemostpartamixofspecificinterestsandthecommongoodand
itisimpossibletosaywhichjustificationismorecommonthantheother.3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group
interestsandonappealstothecommongood.4: Justificationsareforthemostpartalmostalwaysbasedonexplicitstatementsofthe
common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatestnumberorashelpingtheleastadvantagedinasociety.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Rangeofconsultation(C)(v2dlconslt,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of
consultationatelitelevels?Clarification:Becausepracticesvarygreatlyfrompolicytopolicy,baseyouransweronthestyle
thatismosttypicalofpolicymaking.Responses:
0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makesauthoritativedecisionsontheirown.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
25
1: Very little and narrow. Consultationwith only a narrow circle of loyal party/rulingelites.
2: Consultation includesthe formerplusa largergroupthat is loyal to thegovernment,suchastherulingparty’sorparties’localexecutivesand/orwomen,youthandotherbranches.
3:Consultationincludestheformerplusleadersofotherparties.4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business
representatives.5: Consultationengageselitesfromessentiallyallpartsofthepoliticalspectrumandall
politicallyrelevantsectorsofsocietyandbusiness.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure7.
Powerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition(C)(v2pepwrses,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerring Question:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocioeconomicposition?Clarification: Allsocietiesarecharacterizedbysomedegreeofeconomic(wealthandincome)
inequality.Insomesocieties,incomeandwealtharedistributedinagrosslyunequalfashion.Inothers,thedifferencebetweenrichandpoorisnotsogreat.Here,weareconcernednotwith the degree of social inequality but ratherwith the political effects of this inequality.Specifically,we are concernedwith the extent towhichwealth and income translates intopoliticalpower.
Responses:0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer
peoplehavealmostnoinfluence.1: Wealthypeopleenjoyadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Peopleofaverage income
havelittlesay.Poorerpeoplehaveessentiallynoinfluence.2:Wealthypeoplehaveaverystrongholdonpoliticalpower.Peopleofaverageorpoorer
incomehavesomedegreeofinfluencebutonlyonissuesthatmatterlessforwealthypeople.
3: Wealthypeoplehavemorepoliticalpowerthanothers.Butpeopleofaverageincomehave almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree ofpoliticalpower.
4: Wealthy people have nomore political power than thosewhose economic status isaverageorpoor.Politicalpower ismoreor lessequallydistributedacrosseconomicgroups.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Socialgroupequalityinrespectforcivilliberties(C)(v2clsocgrp,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaning
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
26
Question: Doallsocialgroups,asdistinguishedbylanguage,ethnicity,religion,race,region,orcaste,enjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties,oraresomegroupsgenerallyinamorefavorableposition?
Clarification: Here,civil libertiesareunderstoodto includeaccess to justice,privatepropertyrights,freedomofmovement,andfreedomfromforcedlabor.
Responses:0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general
population.1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the
generalpopulation.2:Membersofsomesocialgroupsenjoymoderatelyfewercivillibertiesthanthegeneral
population.3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general
population.4:Membersofallsalientsocialgroupsenjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Healthequality(C)(v2pehealth,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Towhatextentishighqualitybasichealthcareguaranteedtoall,sufficienttoenable
themtoexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens?Clarification:Poor-qualityhealthcarecanmakecitizensunabletoexercisetheirbasicrightsas
adult citizensby failing toadequately treatpreventableand treatable illnesses that renderthemunabletowork,participateinsocialorpoliticalorganizations,orvote(wherevotingisallowed).
Responses:0:Extreme.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast75percent(%)ofcitizens’ability
toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.1:Unequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast25percent(%)ofcitizens’ability
toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.2:Somewhatequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,tento25percent(%)ofcitizens’
abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-
qualityhealthcare,fivetotenpercent(%)ofcitizens’abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.
4: Equal.Basichealthcare isequal inqualityand less than fivepercent (%)of citizenscannotexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Particularisticorpublicgoods(C)(v2dlencmps)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindberg
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
27
Question: Consideringtheprofileofsocialandinfrastructuralspendinginthenationalbudget,how“particularistic”or“publicgoods”aremostexpenditures?
Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector,socialgroup,region,party,orsetofconstituents.Suchspendingmaybereferredtoas“pork,”“clientelistic,”or“privategoods.”
Public-goodsspendingisintendedtobenefitallcommunitieswithinasociety,thoughitmaybemeans-testedsoastotargetpoor,needy,orotherwiseunderprivilegedconstituents.Thekeypointisthatallwhosatisfythemeans-testareallowedtoreceivethebenefit.
Youranswershouldconsidertheentirebudgetofsocialandinfrastructuralspending.Weareinterestedintherelativevalueofparticularisticandpublic-goodsspending,notthenumberofbillsorprogramsthatfallintoeithercategory.
Responses:0:Almostallofthesocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic.1:Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic,butasignificantportion
(e.g.¼or1/3)ispublic-goods.2:Socialandinfrastructureexpendituresareevenlydividedbetweenparticularisticand
public-goodsprograms.3:Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsbutasignificantportion
(e.g.,¼or1/3)isparticularistic.4:Almostallsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsincharacter.Onlya
smallportionisparticularistic.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Powerdistributedbysocialgroup(C)(v2pepwrsoc,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocialgroups?Clarification:Asocialgroupisdifferentiatedwithinacountrybycaste,ethnicity,language,race,
region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded insexualorientationorsocioeconomicstatus.)Socialgroupidentityiscontextuallydefinedandis likelytovaryacrosscountriesandthroughtime.Socialgroupidentitiesarealsolikelytocross-cut, so thatagivenpersoncouldbedefined inmultipleways, i.e., aspartofmultiplegroups.Nonetheless,atanygivenpointintimetherearesocialgroupswithinasocietythatareunderstood-bythoseresidingwithinthatsociety–tobedifferent,inwaysthatmaybepoliticallyrelevant.
Responses:0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the
population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.1: Politicalpowerismonopolizedbyseveralsocialgroupscomprisingaminorityofthe
population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.2: Politicalpower ismonopolizedbyseveralsocialgroupscomprisingamajorityof the
population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.3: Eitherallsocialgroupspossesssomepoliticalpower,withsomegroupshavingmore
power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one groupcontrollingmuchofthepoliticalpowerforaperiodoftime,followedbyanother–butallsignificantgroupshaveaturnattheseatofpower.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
28
4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic,caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social groupcharacteristicsarenotrelevanttopolitics.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Educationalequality(C)(v2peedueq,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Towhatextentishighqualitybasiceducationguaranteedtoall,sufficienttoenable
themtoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens?
Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between6 and16 years of agebut thisvariesslightlyamongcountries.
Responses:0:Extreme.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast75
percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines theirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
1:Unequal.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast25percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines theirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
2: Somewhat equal.Basic education is relatively equal inqualitybut ten to25percent(%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability toexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
3:Relativelyequal.Basiceducationisoverallequalinqualitybutfivetotenpercent(%)ofchildrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of childrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?Responses:
0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
29
Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Means-testedv.universalisticpolicy(C)(v2dlunivl,*_dos,*_ord,*_meanl)
Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Howmanywelfareprogramsaremeans-testedandhowmanybenefitall(orvirtually
all)membersofthepolity?
Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivilegedconstituents.Cash-transferprogramsarenormallymeans-tested.
A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes freeeducation, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some maybenefitmore than others from these programs (e.g.,when peoplewith higher salaries gethigherunemploymentbenefits).Thekeypointisthatpracticallyeveryoneisabeneficiary,orpotentialbeneficiary.
Thepurposeofthisquestionisnottogaugethesizeofthewelfarestatebutratheritsquality.So,youranswershouldbebasedonwhateverprogramsexist.
Responses:0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health,
retirement,unemployment,povertyprograms).1:Almostallofthewelfarestatepoliciesaremeans-tested.2: Mostwelfare statepoliciesmeans-tested, but a significantportion (e.g.¼or1/3) is
universalisticandpotentiallybenefitseveryoneinthepopulation.3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and
universalistic.4:Mostwelfarestatepoliciesareuniversalistic,butasignificantportion(e.g.,¼or1/3)
aremeans-tested.5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is
means-tested.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
VariablesincludedinFigure8.
CSOwomen’sparticipation(C)(v2csgender,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:MichaelBernhardQuestion:Arewomenpreventedfromparticipatingincivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)?Clarification:Pleasepayattentiontoboth(A)whetherwomenarepreventedfromparticipating
incivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)becauseoftheirgenderand(B)whetherCSOspursuingwomen’sinterestsarepreventedfromtakingpartinassociationallife.
Responses:0:Almostalways.1:Frequently.2:Abouthalfthetime.3:Rarely.4:Almostnever.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
30
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Freedomofdiscussionforwomen(C)(v2cldiscw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public
spaces?Clarification: Thisindicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichwomenareabletoengageinprivate
discussions,particularlyonpoliticalissues,inprivatehomesandpublicspaces(restaurants,public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by othermembers of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by thegovernmentanditsagentsbutalsoculturalrestrictionsorcustomarylawsthatareenforcedbyothermembersofthepolity,sometimesininformalways.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andextremelylow–rightstofreedomofdiscussion.
Responses:0:Notrespected.Hardlyanyfreedomofexpressionexistsforwomen.Womenaresubject
to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of politicalopinion.
1:Weaklyrespected.Expressionsofpoliticalopinionsbywomenarefrequentlyexposedtointerventionandharassment.
2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionallyexposedtointerventionandharassment.
3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in theprivate sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to softsanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women makepoliticalstatements.
4: Fullyrespected.Freedomofspeechbywomenintheirhomesandinpublicspacesisnotrestricted.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Propertyrightsforwomen(C)(v2clprptyw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoytherighttoprivateproperty?Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private
property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (whichmaylegally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious orsocialnorms.Thisquestionconcernstherighttoprivateproperty,notactualownershipofproperty.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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Thisquestiondoesnot askyou to assess the relative rightsofmenandwomen.Thus, it ispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andveryminimal–propertyrights.
Responses:0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyprivatepropertyrightsofanykind.1:Somewomenenjoysomeprivatepropertyrights,butmosthavenone.2:Manywomenenjoymanyprivatepropertyrights,butasmallerproportionenjoysfew
ornone.3: More thanhalf ofwomen enjoymost privateproperty rights, yet a smaller share of
womenhavemuchmorerestrictedrights.4:Mostwomenenjoymostprivatepropertyrightsbutasmallminoritydoesnot.5:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyall,oralmostall,propertyrights.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?Responses:
0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen(C)(v2cldmovew,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoyfreedomofmovementwithinthecountry?Clarification:Thisindicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichallwomenareabletomovefreely,in
daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and toestablishpermanentresidencywhere theywish.Note that restrictions inmovementmightbe imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictionssometimesfallonruralresidents,onspecificsocialgroups,orondissidents.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andextremelylow–freedomofmovement.Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political)criminals.Donotconsiderrestrictionsinmovementthatresultfromcrimeorunrest.
Responses:
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
32
0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement(e.g.,NorthKoreaorAfghanistanundertheTaliban).
1:Somewomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement,butmostdonot(e.g.,ApartheidSouthAfrica).
2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not.Alternativelyallwomenenjoypartialfreedomofmovement.
3:Mostwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovementbutasmallminoritydoesnot.4:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen(C)(v2clslavef,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Areadultwomenfreefromservitudeandotherkindsofforcedlabor?Clarification:Involuntaryservitudeoccurswhenanadultisunabletoquitajobs/hedesiresto
leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion.This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civicobligationssuchasconscriptionoremploymentincommandeconomies.
Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomenfromforcedlabor.Thus,acountryinwhichbothmenandwomensufferthesameconditionsofservitudemightbecodeda(0)forwomen,eventhoughthereisequalityacrossthesexes.
Responses:0: Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaboriswidespreadandaccepted(perhaps
evenorganized)bythestate.1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially
opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectivelycontainthepractice.
2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread andusually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particularareasoramongparticularsocialgroups.
3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in thecriminalunderground.Itisactivelyandsincerelyopposedbythepublicauthorities.
4:Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaborisvirtuallynon-existent.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
Accesstojusticeforwomen(C)(v2clacjstw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)
Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoyequal,secure,andeffectiveaccesstojustice?Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the
courtswithoutrisktotheirpersonalsafety,trialsarefair,andwomenhaveeffectiveabilityto seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel,defense,andappeal.
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
33
Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativeaccesstojusticemenandwomen.Thus,itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andextremelylimited–accesstojustice.
Responses:0:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisnon-existent.1: Secureandeffectiveaccess to justice forwomen isusuallynotestablishedorwidely
respected.2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor
problemscharacterizemost casesoroccur ratherunevenlyacrossdifferentpartsofthecountry.
3:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisusuallyobserved.4:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisalmostalwaysobserved.
Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem
Methodology,postedatDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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Appendix II. Overview of the structure of the indices.
StructureofAggregation–IndicesandIndicators DemocracyIndicesNames
Mid-LevelDemocracyandGovernanceIndicesNames
Lower-LevelDemocracyandGovernanceIndicesNames
NamesIndicators v2_tagIndicesandIndicators
ElectoralDemocracyIndex
v2x_polyarchy
Freedomofexpressionindex
v2x_freexp
Governmentcensorshipeffort-Media
v2mecenefm
Harassmentofjournalists v2meharjrn Mediaself-censorship v2meslfcen Freedomofdiscussion
formenv2cldiscm
Freedomofdiscussionforwomen
v2cldiscw
Freedomofacademicandculturalexpression
v2clacfree
Alternativesourceinformationindex
v2xme_altinf
Mediabias v2mebias Print/broadcastmedia
criticalv2mecrit
Print/broadcastmediaperspectives
v2merange
ElectoralComponentIndex
v2x_EDcomp_thick
Freedomofassociationindex(thick)
v2x_frassoc_thick
PartyBan v2psparban Barrierstoparties v2psbars Oppositionparties
autonomyv2psoppaut
Electionsmultiparty v2elmulpar CSOentryandexit v2cseeorgs CSOrepression v2csreprss
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
35
Shareofpopulationwithsuffrage
v2x_suffr
Percentofpopulationwithsuffrage
v2elsuffrage
Cleanelectionsindex
v2xel_frefair
EMBautonomy v2elembaut EMBcapacity v2elembcap Electionvoterregistry v2elrgstry Electionvotebuying v2elvotbuy Electionothervoting
irregularitiesv2elirreg
Electiongovernmentintimidation
v2elintim
Electionotherelectoralviolence
v2elpeace
Electionfreeandfair v2elfrfair Electedexecutive
index(dejure) v2x_accex
Lowerchamberelected v2lgello Upperchamberelected v2lgelecup Legislaturedominant
chamberv2lgdomchm
HOSselectionbylegislatureinpractice
v2exaphos
HOSappointmentinpractice
v2expathhs
HOGselectionbylegislatureinpractice
v2exaphogp
HOGappointmentinpractice
v2expathhg
HOSappointscabinetinpractice
v2exdfcbhs
HOGappointscabinetinpractice
v2exdjcbhg
HOSdismissesministersinpractice
v2exdfdmhs
HOGdismissesministersinpractice
v2exdfdshg
HOSappointscabinetinpractice
v2exdfcbhs
LiberalDemocracyIndex
v2x_libdem
ElectoralDemocracyIndex
v2x_polyarchy
LiberalComponentIndex
v2x_liberal
Equalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyindex
v2xcl_rol
V-Dem Data Brief South Korea
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Rigorousandimpartialpublicadministration
v2clrspct
Transparentlawswithpredictableenforcement
v2cltrnslw
Accesstojusticeformen v2clacjstm Accesstojusticefor
womenv2clacjstw
Propertyrightsformen v2clprptym Propertyrightsfor
womenv2clprptyw
Freedomfromtorture v2cltort Freedomfrompolitical
killingsv2clkill
Freedomfromforcedlaborformen
v2clslavem
Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen
v2clslavef
Freedomofreligion v2clrelig Freedomofforeign
movementv2clfmove
Freedomofdomesticmovementformen
v2cldmovem
Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen
v2cldmovew
Judicialconstraintsontheexecutiveindex
v2x_jucon
Executiverespectsconstitution
v2exrescon
Compliancewithjudiciary
v2jucomp
Compliancewithhighcourt
v2juhccomp
Highcourtindependence v2juhcind Lowercourtindependence v2juncind Legislative
constraintsontheexecutiveindex
v2xlg_legcon
Legislaturequestionsofficialsinpractice
v2lgqstexp
Executiveoversight v2lgotovst Legislatureinvestigates
inpracticev2lginvstp
Legislatureoppositionparties
v2lgoppart
DeliberativeDemocracyIndex
v2x_delibdem
ElectoralDemocracyIndex
v2x_polyarchy
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Deliberative
ComponentIndex
v2xdl_delib
Reasonedjustification v2dlreason
Commongood v2dlcommon
Respect
counterarguments
v2dlcountr
Rangeofconsultation v2dlconslt
Engagedsociety v2dlengage
Egalitarian
democracyIndex
v2x_egaldem
ElectoralDemocracy
Index
v2x_polyarchy
Egalitarian
ComponentIndex
v2x_egal
Powerdistributedby
socioeconomicposition
v2pepwrses
Powerdistributedby
socialgroup
v2pepwrsoc
Socialgroupequalityin
respectforcivilliberties
v2clsocgrp
Educationalequality v2peedueq
Healthequality v2pehealth
Powerdistributedby
gender
v2pepwrgen
Encompassing-ness v2dlencmps
Means-testedvs.
universalistic
v2dlunivl
Participatory
DemocracyIndex
v2x_partipdem
ElectoralDemocracy
Index
v2x_polyarchy
Participatory
ComponentIndex
v2x_partip
Civilsociety
participation
index
v2x_cspart
Candidateselection--
National/local
v2pscnslnl
CSOconsultation v2cscnsult
CSOparticipatory
environment
v2csprtcpt
CSOwomens
participation
v2csgender
DirectPopular
VoteIndex
v2xdd_dd
Initiativespermitted v2ddlegci
Initiativessignatures% v2ddsigcip
Initiativessignature-
gatheringtimelimit
v2ddgrtlci
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Initiativessignature-gatheringperiod
v2ddgrgpci
Initiativeslevel v2ddlevci Initiativesparticipation
thresholdv2ddbindci
Initiativesapprovalthreshold
v2ddthreci
Initiativesadministrativethreshold
v2dddistci
Initiativessupermajority v2ddspmjci Occurrenceofcitizen-
initiativethisyearv2ddciniyr
Localgovernmentindex
v2xel_locelec
Localgovernmentelected v2ellocelc Localofficesrelative
powerv2ellocpwr
Localgovernmentexists v2ellocgov Regional
governmentindex
v2xel_regelec
Regionalgovernmentelected
v2elsrgel
Regionalofficesrelativepower
v2elrgpwr
Regionalgovernmentexists
v2elreggov
CoreCivilSociety
Index v2xcs_ccsi
CSOentryandexit v2cseeorgs CSOrepression v2csreprss CSOparticipatory
environmentv2csprtcpt
Party
Institutionalizationindex
v2xps_party
Partyorganizations v2psorgs PartyBranches v2psprbrch Partylinkages v2psprlnks Distinctpartyplatforms v2psplats Legislativeparty
cohesionv2pscohesv
Femalerightsindex v2x_gender
CSOwomensparticipation
v2csgender
Percent(%)FemaleJournalists
v2mefemjrn
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Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen
v2cldmovew
Freedomofdiscussionforwomen
v2cldiscw
Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen
v2clslavef
Propertyrightsforwomen
v2clprptyw
Accesstojusticeforwomen
v2clacjstw
Powerdistributedbygender
v2pepwrgen
ElectoralRegime
Index v2x_elecreg
Legislativeorconstituentassemblyelection
v2xel_elecparl
v2eltype v2eltype_0 v2eltype v2eltype_1 v2eltype v2eltype_4 v2eltype v2eltype_5 Legislature
closeddownoraborted
v2xlg_leginter
Legislaturebicameral v2lgbicam Presidential
election v2xel_elecpres
v2eltype v2eltype_6 v2eltype v2eltype_7 Chiefexecutive
nolongerelected v2x_hosinter
HOS=HOG? v2exhoshog HOGappointmentin
practicev2expathhg
HOSappointmentinpractice
v2expathhs
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