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German liberalism and the militarisation of civil society, 18131848/49
Doron Avraham*
Department of General History, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
(Received 19 November 2009; final version received 12 February 2010)
From the beginning of nineteenth century German liberals endeavoured to reform thearmies of different German states, subject them to constitutional authorities, open theirranks to members of civil society and turn military service into a civic obligation. After
the Wars of Liberation and during the Vormarz years, the liberals struggle fordemocratically oriented armed forces was combined with their opposition to restorativeregime and their hopes for the national unification of Germany and the formation ofcivil society. The liberals campaign, however, turned military service and military
values into authentic manifestations of the ideal civil society. Military service wasadmired for the qualities it bestowed on those who bore arms and the values guiding itsmembers as citizens. Paradoxically, military service became the founding institution of
civil society. This process found further expression upon the renewed establishment ofthe civil militias (Burgerwehren) during theVormarzand the central role they played inthe 1848 revolution. They were intended to introduce alternative forces into the army,but they ended up performing popular military and policing activities. Through this
process, theBildungideal in the formation of civil society declined considerably, andthe liberals actually contributed to the militarisation of society.
Keywords: militarism; liberalism; civilian; Germany
For decades it has been widely considered that militarism was a dominant characteristic of
German history until 1945. The Prussian heritage and the leading role that Prussia played
during the unification process of Germany and afterwards were among the factors that
helped foster this historical image of Germany. This militaristic nature is frequently
attributed to the traditional ruling elites of the Prussian monarchy. Together with the
agrarian aristocracy and the bureaucracy, the officers corps constituted the central pillar
of the old regime. From the early nineteenth century, members of those elites became the
social backbone of the emerging conservative ideology.1 The close correlation between
conservatism and militarism that developed during this century was a serious obstacle tothe liberals aspiration to change the division of power and reform the political system.
The liberals attempts to restructure German society and its political system still form
the basis of the investigation of German liberalism, since its beginning in the late
eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth. Many studies have tried to explain the
hesitant course taken by liberals towards fulfilling their ideological aims, and their
ultimate capitulation to Bismarck upon national unification in 1871. The latter won the
liberals support with his realpolitik and the formation of a nation state, which they longed
to establish for decades. They were willing, though, to compromise about civic and
ISSN 1350 7486 i /ISSN 1469 8293 li
*Email: doron591@bezeqint.net
European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire
Vol. 17, No. 4, August 2010, 605628
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political liberties instead of posing a real liberal and democratic challenge to the new
state.2 Alongside their limited political achievements, the liberals inability to thoroughly
address social problems has been attributed to the movements failure to engage with the
lower strata of society and its prime focus on its own interests as members of the
Burgertum. In their adherence to laissez-faire economy these liberals discard the peasantsand the artisans who especially in 1848 needed their political leadership and left them
to the conservatives manipulation. The unsuccessful handling of the liberals with social
problems drove them into cooperation with the conservative aristocracy during the Empire
period at the cost of civic democracy.3 Indeed, in comparison with the development of
liberalism in France or England, the relatively conservative nature of the German liberals
and their limited ability to act as a political opposition are striking. Nonetheless, the
constellation in those two nation-states differed from that in the loose German Reich and
later the Confederation. The latter, that is, the Confederation, was also confronted with
other kinds of challenges and problems that stemmed from the political fragmentation of
Germany.4 In this article I focus on one of the objectives that German liberals sought to
realise an objective whose meaning and consequences have not been sufficiently
appreciated by historians that of a thorough reform in the structure, composition, and
tasks of the armed forces. I argue that after the defeat by Napoleons army and until the
1848 revolution and beyond, liberals from different German states supported the
democratisation and liberalisation of the military but at the same time incorporated
militaristic values into their vision of ideal civil society. It was this admiration for the
formative and educational values perceived in military service, and their transfer from the
military to the civil sphere, that contributed to the militarisation of German society well
before the foundation of the German national state. This process, however, was different
from the militarism that emerged in the Empire period. From the last third of the
nineteenth century militarism was a result of the popular respect and approbation the armywon as a result of a series of military victories that brought about national unification.5 But
German liberals in the years discussed here did not admire the armed forces only for their
specific achievements, if any. Rather, they conceived the military itself and military
service as the founding agents of ideal citizenship.
The two main concepts around which this article revolves liberalism and militarism
have a variety of definitions. Here, I will employ two theories that seem to be most suited
to the context of this discussion.
Since political parties in the modern sense did not exist in Germany until the early
1860s, liberalism and liberals cannot be defined according to a single coherent platform.
They belonged to a framework of the kind described by Ludwig Wittgenstein as a familyof ideas and behaviour patterns. This so-called family of ideas includes complicated
network of similarities, overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail.6 Quite often republicans and democrats were also
counted among the liberals, although their worldviews and actions went beyond those of
the mainstream liberals and were combined with a revolutionary agenda.
These divisions imply the multifaceted nature of liberalism, but do not suffice to
understand its essence as a political ideology, nor its particularly German features. It might
be useful therefore to turn to the theory of liberalism elaborated by the Bavarian jurist
Johann Christoph von Aretin in 1816, which also considers the specific German political
context of the first half of the century. In an article published under the title What is
liberal? (Was heit liberal?), Aretin tried to forge a synthesis between the main
principles of liberalism and the political reality of Germany, while basing his definition on
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focuses first on its more universal appeal: the essence of the concept does not derive from
its French or English version, but rather from the Latin expressionliber(free or liberated).
Hence it can be applied to everything that is free first and foremost the freedom of
human beings.7 In a more concrete manner, Aretin believed that liberal political ideas
should manifest themselves in a constitutional system whose ultimate embodiment is theState of Law (Rechtsstaat). It is to be governed by the rational general will and strive for
the welfare of the people and the freedom and security of civil societys members. This
definition does not seem to deviate from the classical principles of liberalism. However,
later in his argument he reveals the more particular German aspects of this ideology. In
England, he claims, the liberal element emerges in a gentlemanly appearance or in the
person of the gentleman. But Aretin fails to find any appropriate German equivalent to
these concepts.8 And there is also a difference as regards the French version of liberalism.
While the French essay that Aretin draws on speaks of the institutionalisation of criticism
against the government in the form of a parliamentary opposition, the German jurist is
satisfied with the mere articulation of criticism.9 Accordingly, his political vision seeks a
limited popular sovereignty. He thinks that monarchism should continue to prevail as the
main form of political government, one that will secure civil liberties resolutely.10
Though Aretins perception of liberalism reflects some of its main German
characteristics, it cannot be considered as a paradigmatic definition. Among German
liberals there were those who sought a reform from above without being confined to a
popular constitutional system, while others believed that the power of the monarch should
be considerably limited and that the peoples representatives should be allowed to make
decisions on crucial issues such as war and peace. Nevertheless, if one follows Thomas
Nipperdeys judgment of the liberals in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution, it might be
more appropriate to treat German liberalism as a movement of the political centre, not of
the left,11
and therefore view Aretins definition as corresponding with this judgment.Militarism, a word that acquired common usage in the 1860s,12 also has a variety of
definitions, and in many of them a clear contrast is evident between what are considered
militaristic values and liberal principles. An early conceptual contrast of this kind, one that
designates the modern division, was made as early as the eighteenth century by Immanuel
Kant. Following practical and moral reason, claims the philosopher in a somewhat utopian
belief, war should not take place, neither between individuals nor between states, as this is
not the appropriate way to seek the individuals rights. In his essay on Eternal Peace Kant
considers the republican political structure as the ideal one for guaranteeing peaceful
relations between states and securing the interests of the citizen. He predicts that standing
armies will eventually disappear since they generate a constant arms race and pose tooheavy a burden on states. Improving citizens welfare, based on a private property
economy, will ultimately necessitate pacifism. Moreover, for Kant the mere idea of
soldiering, of sending people to die in a war, violates fundamental human rights because it
treats the soldiers as machines, not as human beings. At the same time Kant does not
ignore the need for armed defence, but he maintains that it should be performed only
according to republican principles, i.e. following the citizens decision and through their
voluntary recruitment for a limited period of service.13
The core of Kants concept forms the basis for the various modern theories of
militarism. One of these definitions, which also reflects the argument presented here, is
found in Alfred Vagts discussion of militarism. Vagts differentiates between the military
way and militarism. An action conducted according to the military way is directed
towards accomplishing specific missions with the minimum cost to life and other
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constitutes a diversity of customs, interests, symbols and practices, which, though
connected directly to the army, are transferred to politics, economy and culture. It denotes
the prevalence of the military spirit, ideals, and scales of values in the life of a state.
Moreover, militarism values military institutions and ways above those of civil life and
carries the military mentality and modes of acting and decision into the civilian sphere.Therefore, Vagts concludes that the opposite of militarism is civilianism.14 One
implication of this definition is that military service bears qualities that are essential for the
appropriate conduct of civil society. A similar perception of militarism can be seen in the
definitions made by other scholars who contrasted militaristic conduct with modes of
thought and actions that are closely connected to paradigms and ideologies such as
modernism and liberalism.15 Otto Hintze, for example, recognised a growing tension
between military command, militaristic behaviour, and monarchical regime on the one
hand, and the aspirations to establish a republican constitutional system on the other. 16
Militarism was also contrasted with pacifism, since the first concept, according to Gerhard
Ritter, reflects a preference for using force and military techniques, instead of applying
peaceful solutions in cases of conflict between states.17 In her study about the military
service and civil society Ute Frevert interprets militarism as effects of military
socialisation on civil societys mentality, rituals and conduct in peacetime.18
The dichotomy created between militarism on the one hand and civilianism and
liberalism on the other hand might be reduced if the developments in the military forces and
armies in Europe since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are taken into
account. General conscription marked the emancipation of the individual from the old
compulsory service system, and the transformation from absolutist states and armies into
modern ones. In principle, the duty of military service did not distinguish between
aristocrats and common people. It put an end, even if only theoretically, to the social and
political arrogance that was part of military service in the old armies and blurred theseparation between civilians and soldiers. The soldier did not cease being a civilian during
his military service. As shown by Max Weber, the state retained the sole authority to order
the use of force, but from then on civil society also possessed military, violent strength, as
wars were conducted not merely between rulers but also between peoples. In this regard, the
obligation of military service might appear similar to general voting rights, since the two
systems are evidence of a democratisation process that awards rights in return for duties.19
This democratic transformation, however, should not necessarily dull the difference
between military service and the liberalisation of civil society. The citizen who served in
the army and the free citizen had a different status, with significant variations. A citizen
who functioned as a soldier had to obey his superiors orders and to act according to rigidrules, using the devastating force at his disposal in a war situation. As a soldier, that citizen
was subordinated to one ethical system that determined his personal patterns of behaviour
and the values he was obliged to comply with. On the other hand, the civilian, when
released from service, was a private person who put his trust in the law and the judicial
system, and their authority in the life of state and society. Unlike the unified military ethic,
there were diverse civil ethics and concepts, suited to the specific political ideologies
within which they had developed.20 The independent citizen had the freedom to choose
among different modes of conduct, politically as well as socially.
Attempts at military liberalisation
Early attempts to influence changes in the armed forces could be discerned within the
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rationalisation of political authority and the legal system, the abolition of social privileges,
the creation of parliaments and reform in the armies. A constitution should secure the civic
status of the individual as an equal citizen and annul the correlation between the estate-
structure and its legal manifestations in the army, as well as the special military
jurisdiction. Such changes were intended to considerably limit the dominance of thearistocracy in the army, especially in the officer corps, and consequently dismantle it as a
bastion of the old regime. The creation of alternative armed forces of this kind meant that
citizens would be entrusted with arms and the conduct of war; the political rights they were
to enjoy also entailed the obligation to defend them by force of arms.21
In this period, however, liberals were unable to bring about any transformation in the
army, and the first challenge posed by liberal conceptions to the militarys dominance
within the state occurred in the wake of the defeats by Napoleons armies in the battles of
Austerlitz (1805) and Jena (1806), which brought about the collapse of the German Reich.
Though many German states underwent a reform process as a result of Napoleons
occupation, some of the most comprehensive reforms regarding the military forces, as well
as in other areas, took place in Prussia. The reorganisation of state and army also coincided
with the German national awakening and German liberals hopes to create a new, modern
framework for the conduct of national political life. And it is at this point that liberal
tendencies could also have gained practical expression in the formation of new, modern
armed forces, modelled on the French version of the peoples army. Attempts to create a
modern nation-state, as reflected in the French Revolution, necessitated the construction of
a popular-based army whose soldiers would perform their duties on the basis of civic
consciousness and national solidarity. Such an army would guarantee the existence of the
national state, or, in other words, the national state would serve as the rationale of the army
whose members were citizens of the state. All aristocratic privileges within the army
should be abolished. However, the process by which the peoples army in France cameinto being the army that had been formed through mass conscription (levee en masse) in
order to defend the nation and the achievements of the revolution was not repeated in the
German lands. In the French case, mass conscription and the wars were the completion of
the revolutionary act aimed at emancipation from an absolutist regime and the application
of liberal civic principles. In France, therefore, revolution and war were interlinked.22 On
the right bank of the Rhine, events took a different course. There was no liberal revolution
in which an emancipated society and a nation were forged together with the army. Rather,
change was the result of a limited and controlled process conducted from above.
The new direction could already be perceived in 1807, with the personal changes in the
armys command. The Prussian Armys new generals not always of Prussian origin,some not even of aristocratic descent were entrusted with the task of rehabilitation.
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, joined by Grolmann, Boyen and Clausewitz, conducted the
military reform process. Under their command the Prussian Army underwent thorough
changes. More than 200 officers of aristocratic descent were coerced to resign, and the
officers ranks were opened to other classes. New structures and tactics were applied, and
for the first time a Ministry of War and the position of Chief of the Prussian General Staff
were established. One of the most important changes took place in February 1813, when
all exemptions from military service were terminated and the road toward universal
conscription was paved. In March a royal decree announced the creation of the Landwehr
militia. It was to comprise men aged 17 to 40 who did not serve in the regular army, the
Heer. Subsequently theLandsturmwas established as a guerrilla unit, to be joined by men
who had not taken part in other armed forces. In September 1814 the Wehrgesetz was
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The organisation of these two institutions, the Landwehrmilitia and the regular army, and
service within their ranks, were considerably different. Unlike the rigid, hierarchical
structure of the army, its professional command and stiff discipline, the militia had less
tightened regulations, and was conceived as a volunteer force. It had its own commanders,
and an independent middle class officers corps. Its members did not wear uniform on aregular basis; they were legally committed to exercise in their home area, and only twice a
year in a more distant location. Unlike in the army, in which training and various activities
were preformed also in times of peace, service in the Landwehrwas only during wars.
Moreover, members of the militia were subject to civil jurisdiction and not to military law,
as were the soldiers. As to the duration of the service itself, when joining the Heerevery
recruit had to serve three years, and another two years in the army reserves. Then he would
join the first reserves of theLandwehrfor six years, and serve an additional seven years in
the second reserves. Service in the volunteer corps was only one year.23
Unlike reforms in other fields, the armys reorganisation seemed to prove its efficiency
in a relatively short period of time, as Prussia, together with its allies, finally defeated
Napoleon in 1814. This victory was not a result of the military reforms alone. Yet for many
at that time, especially liberals with national aspirations, the new course taken by the armed
forces, together with the recently created Landwehrmilitias, was of crucial importance.
Armed forces of that kind expressed the republican idea of the armed people (Das Volk in
Waffen). They were not manned by aristocratic officers but by the people who supposedly
embodied the idea of civilian life. These German liberals associated the arming of the people
with the republican sense of freedom: the emancipated citizen who is supposed to enjoy
equal rights also has a duty to protect his nation-state, the very state that guarantees his
freedom. Yet the liberals ideal of republicanism did not correlate with that of democracy or
popular sovereignty. Rather, it was based on the free will and active participation of the
citizen for the bonum commune (common good).24
In this regard one can find a basicresemblance with the argument of the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson about the need
to create a militia of citizens, and who, like the German liberals, had national orientation but
not a national state. Arguing against his compatriot Adam Smith who believed that in
order to avoid damage to the economy, and to ensure effective military operation, only a
professional army should be employed Ferguson maintained that republican patriotism
should manifest itself in the active participation of the citizen in war. Since the individual
was not an end of the society but part of its specific historical development, he should act in
accordance with it. War, thus, is one of the last integrative bonds left to hold society together
and save the national spirit in a period of economic individualism.25 For Kant (mentioned
above), Ferguson, and German liberals, membership in civil militias had then reasserted therights of the citizen who acted for the common good, and established a republican ideal. For
the German liberals, however, a joint action of citizens for the benefit of all did not entail a
classical republican or democratic constitutional structure. Their constitutional ideal was an
amalgamation of monarchical and parliamentarian principles an ideal that combined
absolutism and democracy. Republicanism of this kind was a result of classical political
theories adapted to specific historical circumstances.
The address of the Prussian king before the outbreak of the war in the words An mein
Volk was perceived by the liberals in the same republican manner: the people were called
upon to fight the French armies and perform their civic and political rights and duty. The
creation of volunteers regiments as well as the hasty recruitment of theLandwehrmilitias
were seen as steps in this direction. The growing number of recruits also encouraged an
unprecedented number of women to actively join the war. Following the French example,
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disguised women and some undisguised others participated in the Prussian anti-Napoleonic
wars between 180615. This experience in itself might serve as an indication of the
gendering process of the nation, and of the interdependence between the military service and
the civic status and rights of the individual. The duty to fight for state and nation brought
with it the demand for civil rights. It is this correlation, as some historians argue, that wasamong the reasons that drove also women to join the armed forces, although their zeal and
patriotism did not change the way in which those female warriors were accepted by men.
The latter saw the carrying of arms by women as a threat to the natural, social and gender
order. Therefore, those who have to fight and consequently win their rights as members of
the nation and the state, those who actually embody them, are male alone. 26
The reforms in the army improved Prussias military abilities, and its armed forces
became better organised.27 However, universal conscription met with some opposition.
Members of the propertied bourgeoisie lamented the damages that absence from
productive activities would create in the wake of military service; others expressed their
concern over the spiritual and cultural emptiness that accompanies soldiers lives.
Desertion was not a rare phenomenon. Some of those who participated in the Wars of
Liberation were more concerned about protecting their own particular Heimatthan about
the national German cause. But these discrepancies could not obscure the achievements of
the reforms and the victory of the German states over Napoleon, which in itself was
regarded as a clear popular demonstration of German nationalism. These wars became the
founding myth of German nationalism and were followed by increasing activities at this
early stage, mostly intellectual aimed at creating a German national state.28
Some liberal-minded nationalists maintained that the popular, national and
democratic-like aspects of the military reforms and the wars of 1813 15 also had
educational significance.29 A few years before the wars, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the
founder of the gymnastics movements, the Turnerschaft, and later the Burschenschaftwrote in hisDeutsches Volkstum(1810) about the importance of masculine training. In the
chapter dedicated to peoples education, he maintained that the physical instruction of
young men was indispensable for the future defence of the fatherland.30 It was a
precondition for the establishment of a national militia, constituted by the Volk. Through
gymnastic exercises theVolkwould become manly and patriotic; according to democratic
principles, social differences among members of the Turnerschaften and Burschenschaf-
tenwould disappear. Such training and activities, as Matthew Levinger argues, reflected a
new kind of popular politics.31 This is the background to Jahns assertion that he who
abandons the flag (while fighting) without being injured should be denied his civil rights.32
Similar ideas were expressed in 1813 by the poet and writer Ernst Moritz Arndt, whosought to awaken German men and mobilise them for a Volkskrieg against Napoleon.
Liberation from the French yoke was possible, according to Arndt, only if the whole
nation, represented by its masculine part, bore arms. The peasant and the Burgershould
aim to follow the old German model, that of the Niebelungen. True Germans should
re-acquire the warriors qualities that characterised their forefathers. Therefore, in war
men would regain the proper education that had been lost. Only when theBurgeracted like
a man, like a warrior, would he be able to protect his state. It was essential, he argued, to
educate citizens in the art of war.33 In his essay on theWehrmannschaft, Arndt added that
the first and most important aim of the Defence Troops was to return every citizen to the
framework of his natural right and natural duty.34 Jahn and Arndt, like liberals in Europe
and America during the revolutionary age, believed that arming the people is the best
guarantee for its political freedom. Yet the importance ascribed to the armed citizen by
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elsewhere by the people through revolutionary process. For these Germans, the ultimate
framework for civic qualification was to be found within the armed forces and through war
itself, not necessarily by civil, political actions.
The Congress of Vienna and the subsequent age of Restoration did not follow the
course of political development that the liberals had envisioned. A German national statewas not formed, and the conservatives reasserted their dominant positions. They viewed
theLandwehras a politically unreliable organisation that ought to be subjected to the loyal
Heer. From 1819, and under the pressure generated by the higher command of the regular
army and the conservative aristocracy, the Landwehr was considerably restricted. The
number of its training days was reduced, 34 regiments were dismantled, 16 divisions were
appended to the standing army, its separate supervision was abolished, and officers of the
Heer were appointed to various commanding positions within its ranks. The armys
officers had occasionally behaved in an insulting and arrogant manner towards their
counterparts in theLandwehrwhom they treated with disdain as unqualified soldiers. Such
a conduct on behalf of the army was intended to bring the Landwehr in line,35 thus
reasserting the dominance of the traditional forces. And it is here that a difference can be
discerned between the German and the British model. Though the civil dimension in the
British case was manifested mainly in the formation of volunteer corps since 1794, and not
merely in militias like the Landwher (which in Britain were very similar to that of the
regular army), it acquired other status. Similar to the Landwehr, these corps of armed
British civilians was committed to full time military service in case of invasion or local
insurrections, and had their own command and administration. But unlike the Prussian
armed civilian organisation, they won various benefits on behalf of the authorities, and in
the next decades grew in numbers and activities. Unlike the suspicious attitude of the
Prussian army and government towards the Landwehr, the British civilian corps turned
into the largest of the auxiliary military forces, and became the reliable force of theestablished authority. Most of the British volunteer corps was disbanded in 1814 and many
of their members joined local militia. However, this act was not a result of a political
distrust, as in the Prussian case, but stemmed from the governments decision to establish
more systematic organisation and administration of the armed forces.36 In Prussia, on the
contrary, keeping the strength and the special supervision of the militias had clear political
aspect. For the liberals, therefore, the struggle against the dominance of the Heerand in
support of the Landwehr became closely connected with their efforts to transform the
political and constitutional structure of the German nation.
Liberal reaction to restoration: accommodating militaristic values
The beginning of Restoration and the consequent decreasing autonomy of theLandwehrin
Prussia marked the end of what many German liberals regarded as signs heralding
liberalisation. At the same time, however, it was obvious that recent developments had left
their mark on the statesocietymilitary relationship, and a renewed definition of the
division of power was necessary. The position of the standing army as a social elite and the
main tool of the monarchical executive was challenged by the idea of Volksbewaffnung.
But while this idea was widely acknowledged, there were uncertainties regarding its real
meaning. The conservatives insisted on the subordination of the Landwehrto the standing
army and declined any attempt to subject the military to any constitutional framework. The
only authority they were willing to recognise was that of the monarch. Those who served
in the army, especially officers, were expected to avoid any criticism against the
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approval of any political worldview that guided any of the governments measures. Such
an attitude was also manifested in public activities: the period 181548 witnessed the
formation of conservative veterans associations (Kriegervereine), which disseminated
militaristic values throughout society, mainly via their newspapers, and took issue with the
liberal persuasion of civic rights.
37
The conservative organisations, however, were not theonly ones whose actions acquired public attention. During the Vormarz the Landwehr
militias participated in festivals arranged by local population in different districts. These
events turned into a kind of a militaristic folklore that included feasts, demonstration of
patriotism through donation of ornaments to the soldiers uniforms, and other kind of
equipment. The presence of civil servants was also part of these events. 38 Such folklore
became part of the militaristic cult developed during the Empire years, though in the later
period it lost its spontaneous atmosphere, and were carefully arranged by the state as part
of the calendar of national events and celebrations.39
Beyond these popular aspects, the liberals approach differed from that of the
conservatives in other respects, though not radically. While taking steps to organise a
national liberal movement, they expressed criticism against the restorative regime and the
conservatives concept of army and Volksbewaffnung. And though it is difficult to clearly
assess their practical conduct regarding actual recruitment since some of the educated and
propertied bourgeoisie tried to avoid conscription, while others acknowledged its advantages
for their status both parts of the Burgertum advocated the steady democratisation of the
armed forces, which they saw as a crucial step towards modernising the political system and
creating a national state. One of the leading voices in this campaign was that of Carl von
Rotteck, the historian and liberal politician from Baden. In 1816 he published his first essay
on the ideal form of the military in a state that has undergone transformation from an
absolutist into a more modernised organisation. As a liberal who comprehended the lasting
changes created in the wake of the French Revolution, Rotteck believed that one of the mainfeatures of the post-revolutionary epoch was the inclusion of the people in a decision-
making process regarding issues that concerned its very existence, such as the conduct of
war, through constitutional political institutions. In this regard, he thought that the whole
nation, every citizen, should take part in the defence of the fatherland. Such military service
reflected the organic relationship between state and nation, and therefore every citizen is
obliged to perform it.40 Rottecks perception integrated the ancient ideal whereby active
civic participation in public life requires readiness to defend the fatherland in time of danger.
However, he did not support the complete dismantling of the standing army, but called for its
reform. He envisaged a regular army consisting only of volunteers, which would thus reduce
its size considerably. Alongside this army, local militias should be founded that would electtheir officers in an independent manner. This reorganisation of the military forces would
eliminate both the aristocratic character of the Heerand the officers corps privileges.41
Civil values were to replace the harsh orders and discipline.
The advantages brought about by democratisation of the armed forces were also
acknowledged by those liberals who, unlike Rotteck, supported mass conscription. Wilhelm
Schulz, a former officer from Hessen and a publicist who belonged to democratic circles,
saw, like Rotteck, the importance ofVolksbewaffnungas lying not only in its constitutional
significance but also in its moral and educational values. In 1825 he wrote that when people
belonging to different estates (Stande) serve together in the army, they are introduced to
progress. For example, peasants who serve with other Stande become acquainted with
innovations they could not have learned had they remained within the traditional confines
of land cultivation. When everyone performs military duties, then a blending of spirits of42
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The constitutional and civic-formative aspects of democratised military service
continued to occupy the attention of German liberals during the Vormarz. They acquired a
certain formal expression during the 1830s with the publication of the Staats-Lexikon,
edited by Rotteck and his close associate Carl Welcker. Under the entry Heerwesen:
Landwehrsystem, Welcker himself wrote that parents should aspire for their sons to fulfilmilitary duty, as it educates and enriches them. A warlike education (kriegeriche
Erziehung) is beneficial to their bodies and health, for acquiring a capable and free
personality and physical dexterity. It provides a serious education in civic sense, courage
and patriotism. It is the most excellent educational tool (das trefflichste Erziehungsmittel).
The army, according to Welcker, enhances the concern for the fatherlands and its own
honour; it should not be regarded as brutal and immoral training, but rather as a blessing and
a noble educational framework.43
More explicit appreciation of these educational and formative qualities for citizens-
in-arms was expressed by Wilhelm Assmann, a liberal historian and politician from
Braunschweig. In an essay written in 1831, entitled Die Bedeutung deutscher
Burgerbewaffnung, he identifies what he defines as the noble nature of man as a citizen
not only in his participation in the conduct of church and state, but also in the bearing of arms
and the defence against any obstacle to progress. Since the power of reason wins dominance
on earth, it is essential that everyone who fights for rights and truth should utilise not merely
the sword of the word (das Schwert des Wortes) but also the iron sword of violent action
(das eiserne Schwert der Gewaltthat) wherever violence hinders right. It is unlikely,
according to Assmann, that someone would give up what he cherishes as sacred without
violently fighting for it.44
The idea that military practices reflect the true essence of the people as citizens also
appears in the discussion on the conduct of German liberalism during the Napoleonic
Wars. Under the entry Liberal, Liberalismusin theStaats-Lexikonof 1840, written by theliberal jurist from Wurttemberg, Paul Achatius Pfizer, liberalism in Germany is compared
with the revolutionary practices of the French. The latter pursued radical ideas of freedom
by brutally violent methods, where every kind of weapon was legitimate. In contrast,
German liberalism, as it emerged and evolved through its early years (die erste
Jugendzeit), during the Wars of Liberation, demonstrated a different sort of conduct.
It displayed patriotism, responsibility and loyalty. In this period liberals proved their
devotion to their princes, while presenting modest and just requests. Had the German
rulers acted in the spirit of 181315, writes Pfizer, German citizens would not have had to
resist the states authority by force later on.45
It appears that, on the one hand, Rotteck, Welcker and other German liberals envisagedthe formation of a popular, democratic and highly motivated army. One can argue in this
regard that the ideal military service conceived by these liberals reflected the great
importance they attached to the concept of citizenship. The soldier, accordingly, is a
citizen who performs a civic obligation, not a person whose military service sets him apart
from the rest of civil society. On the other hand, this concept of military obligation also
implies a deeper militarisation of society: instead of treating the army as a special
institution with exclusive functions and an organisational structure that differs from that of
civil society, though constituted from its members and obliged to protect it, these liberals
gradually narrowed the gap between mere citizenship and the military. They thus blurred
the demarcation lines between soldier and citizen as individuals, between army and
society as organisations guided by diverse values and objectives. For them, soldiering and
citizenship were two closely interconnected existential situations, which in fact defined
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liberals, is forged during military service, where the recruits are trained to be worthy citizens.
The formative function of the military paves the way to the ultimate proper civilian life.
These perceptions also mark the change in the liberals ethos of the individuals
genuine personality. The enlightened and progressive concept ofBildung humanistic
and aesthetic education and self-formation as part of an organic unity was partly discardedin favour of a more militant view of the individual as a worthy citizen, as explicitly
articulated by Assmann. In a similar manner, the warlike education envisioned by Welcker
was gradually perceived to be no less adequate for training a national liberal citizenry than
the humanistic and universal ideal of Bildung. The gradual detachment of liberals from
humanism might also correspond with what Nancy Rosenblum defined as romantic
militarism, embraced by a liberal such as Wilhelm von Humboldt. It does not oppose
liberalism but introduces another variation of it by imagining war as the ultimate occasion
for self-expression. Self-assertion and heroic individualism employed through militaristic
conduct thus replaced classical liberal principles of conventional civil society.46
German liberals during the Restoration and the Vormarz conceived the popular
foundations of military service as being essential to the development and sustenance of
civil society. Enlisting in the armed forces was in itself the fulfilment of a civic duty. At this
point, the difference between the liberals and the leaders of the armys reforms was clear:
the latter generals such as Scharnhorst and Boyen sought to soldier the citizens (turn
citizens into soldiers), while liberals strove to civilianize the soldiers (turn soldiers into
citizens). The soldiers would be inspired by a civic consciousness that would prevent them
from being totally subjected to individual rulers.47 However, the importance that the
liberals attached to the peoples army as a substitute for the old standing army points to an
opposite, perhaps unconscious, course of development inherent in this liberal vision. Their
new conception of military service as embodying civic qualities introduced militaristic
elements into liberal concepts of civil society.The historical circumstances reinforce this impression. During the Restoration and the
Vormarz, unlike during the French Revolution, there was no real and immediate need for
mass, universal conscription or for the maintenance of a large army, since there was no
concrete danger that threatened German lands or any major political development
resembling the French situation in 1793. On the contrary, the military ethic in German civil
society was adopted in times of peace, which explains how in 1843 Arnold Ruge, who was
one of the radical liberals in that period and belonged to the young Hegelians, was able to
write about the arming of the people in a purely civil context. The peoples education and
peoples armament (Volksbildung und Volksbewaffnung), the school and the army, he
claimed, should merge.
48
This ideal integration of values and institutions actuallyepitomises the essence of the new citizenship conceived by German liberals. Nonetheless,
the liberal conceptions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, imbued with the
universal and pacifist elements of the Enlightenment and the notion ofBildungas defining
free, modern citizenship, gave way, during the Vormarz,to more national and militaristic
standards in prescribing appropriate German citizenship. In the wake of the Wars of
Liberation, liberals perceived the war fought by the people, and the mere bearing of arms, as
formative factors of national and civic consciousness.49 Military force was now seen not just
as a means of liberating the nation from the yoke of foreign occupation and defending it
against enemies from outside, but as a precondition for securing basic civic freedom.
The cry for Volksbewaffnungor the arming of citizens, however, did not remain on a
declarative level, and the monopoly of force held by the conservative-oriented standing
armies was once again challenged. Political and social unrest encouraged actual deeds in
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the governments, especially the Prussian, used the army to crush them. Apart from the
1830 events, there were riots in Posen (1832), Cologne (1838), Schildesche (1845) and
Berlin (1847). In these and other cases, the government employed the citadel practice,
i.e. sending in the army, sometimes hundreds of soldiers, to violently suppress the rebels,
as the state was conceived as a citadel under siege.
50
These acts reinforced the militarysreactionary image and encouraged the formation of alternative armed organisations that
would embody the ideal of citizens-in-arms.
From the Vormarz, therefore, liberals advocated the establishment of civil militias,
Burgerwehren, in order first and foremost to protect citizens and their property against the
violent attacks by the lower classes, and thus prevent also the armys deeper intervention
in the civic sphere. These militias were not a new pattern of armed organisation. Initial
formations of this kind had been already created under the old regime, and after
Napoleons occupation of Germany Burgergarde based on the model of the French
Garde Nationale created in 1789 were established in Berlin and Brandenburg. Their
main task was to keep order. In the wake of the 1830 revolution and in light of the armys
use of force discussed above, the civil militias were re-established. Yet from the early
phase of their renewed activity, and especially during the 1848/49 revolution, as will be
discussed below, some crucial questions regarding the exact aims of the Burgerwehren
and their social composition hindered their coherent function. This simultaneous
development the reassertion of the armys dominant traditional status and the creation of
the civic militias as an alternative force seems paradoxical: the same liberals who
criticised the increasing interference of the military in civil life simultaneously advocated
arming civilians and military service as the best ways of teaching proper civil conduct.
This paradox was the outcome of the liberal postulate to create a modernised state and
emancipate society from absolutist patterns of rule while seeking to construct controlled
citizenship that would restrain that emancipated society through militaristic values. Thisparadox and its results were clearly reflected in the 1848 revolution.
Militarising the revolution
For many German liberals, the revolution was a means of solving a variety of national,
political and social problems. Divided by specific orientations, most liberals hoped to
reintroduce some of the changes that had been accomplished in the Reform period but
reversed during the Restoration, and to realise their demands, already raised during the
Vormarz. Among the overwhelming majority of the liberals, however, there was a
relatively wide consensus that a new army should be formed an army whose structure,composition, status and subordination to political authority should be redefined.
Building a new army, therefore, was one of the major revolutionary demands in the
upheavals of 1848. Liberals from German states hoped for the establishment of a peoples
army in which national solidarity between the soldiers, not class orientation and rigid
discipline, would dominate. Such trends were also manifested in a series of civic petitions
to the German governments, in the Frankfurt Parliament debates, and in efforts to
strengthen theBurgerwehrenthat were supposed to perform some of the armys functions,
on the one hand, and confront its oppressive acts, on the other.
Even before the outbreak of tumult, the Saxon liberal Robert Blum gave a speech on 6
March in which he lamented the division of the German people into those who bore arms
and those who did not. The former, acting like machines, turned against their brothers
when commanded to do so. The hope lay in the arming of all German citizens: that alone
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was created, there would be no need for armed force (bewaffente Macht).51 At a
revolutionary gathering held in Berlin in April 1848, speakers called forBurgerbewaffnung in
a form that could serve as a counter-model to all the deficiencies of the standing army. In such
organisations, values like brotherhood, freedom and the safeguarding of civil life would
replace the supremacy of uniform and arrogance that had characterised the old army.
52
In theNational Assembly of Frankfurt, liberal delegates reasserted the civic merits of carrying arms.
The Prussian representative from Trier, Ludwig Simon, advocated the idea of general
armament as a means of protecting constitutional liberties and confronting any attempt to
violently breach constitutional rights. The military should be subordinated to the
Reichsverfassung. For Simon, the creation of a peoples army (Volkswehr) could be an
effective instrument against Prussian despotism.53 The democrat from Dresden, Franz
Wigard, presented a more radical approach. He held that every German was entitled to have
his own weapon, including those who because of old age or physical disability could not serve
in the military. This is an original, real, German right that no one would never be able to deny
a German.54 In the parliament of Karlsruhe, a lawyer from Mannheim, Friedrich Hecker,
expressed a similar view. Every citizen, he claimed, should have his own weapon, buy it with
his own money, look after it and eventually bequeath it to his son. For Hecker, owning a
weapon was both a manifestation of patriotism and a precaution against unjust conduct by the
authorities, expressing the ideal of an armed people defending its freedom and rights.55
Efforts to bring about an immediate change in the nature and structure of the armed
forces could be discerned as soon as the revolution broke out. German liberals campaigned
for increasing the activities of the civil militias which, as mentioned, had already been
founded during the Vormarz. In 1848, however, the civil militias faced new challenges.
In the first months, different German governments opposed these organised forces and
tried to hinder the establishment of independent military groups not subject to the states
authority. In numerous German cities, the revolutionaries demand for a transformation ofthe armies occupied pride of place in their protests. In cities like Offenburg, Freiburg,
Heidelberg and Munster,56 citizens petitioned their governments for the integration of civil
militias with the army in order to create a new, popular defence force ( Volkswehr). For the
more radical liberals and the revolutionary democrats, the merging of the citizen and the
soldier, the civil militias and the regiments of the standing army, was a precondition for
establishing a new democratised army which was perceived as a guarantee of the freedom
and welfare of the people. Such an army would not be deployed against the people as were
the traditional monarchical armies.
The military forces, as conceived by many liberals during the revolution, seem, ironically,
to embody the main features of their ideal of civil society. The new forces were to constitutethe authentic representatives of the national German citizenry. The social diversity and/or
solidarity of civil society were to be reflected in the most appropriate manner within their
ranks. Some of the moderate Prussian liberals, for example, requested that service in the
militias be limited to middle-class property owners, white-collar employees and educated
people. These were members of the Besitz- and Beamtenburgertum who represented the
respectable and conforming elements of society. In the Berlin Burgerwehr, most members
belonged to the bourgeoisie, while workers and members of democratic revolutionary groups
were denied admission. Radical liberals, on the other hand, maintained that membership
should also be opened to workers and other parts of the Pobel, to those among the people who
could not afford to purchase the required personal military equipment.57
In different strongholds of radicalism the cities of the Prussian Rhine such as
Dusseldorf, Krefeld, Cologne, and in Mainz, at the Grand Duchy of Hessen parts of
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during the summer of 1849. In these cities the militias included members of the bourgeoisie
as well as peasants and railway-workers. These were seen as representing civil society. In
Mannheim too, in the Grand Duchy of Baden, where bourgeois citizens had been alarmed by
the armed insurrection of the lower classes in April 1848, all eventually joined together in
the local Burgerwehr. Closer cooperation between the different social strata was alsomanifest in Lower Franconia. In this part of Bavaria, craftsmen, peasants, workers,
merchants, clerks and higher officials all came together in the regional Burgerwehr.58
The social heterogeneity of the militias also had political implications: the mere fact of
serving in these forces, which in principle was available to everyone, gave many people
their first-ever chance to actively participate in the political sphere regardless of the
individuals social origin, status, or wealth. People were entitled to join these forces
because they were citizens performing civic duties. In other words, the militias were the
founding institutions for civic political practices. The Burgerwehrwas an affirmation of
the individuals status as a citizen.
The newly opened ranks of the militias and their activities are evidence of the popular,
democratically oriented alternative to the traditional armed forces, as envisioned by the
liberals. Unlike the army, which had to carry out oppressive acts, the militias seemed to act
on behalf of the people, with the people. They were also different from other violent forces,
such as those evident in 1848 as in other revolutions. In contrast to the spontaneous and
uncontrolled revolutionary acts of aggression, activities within the militias during most of
this period were organised, supervised and focused, despite their origin in rebellion. Violent
confrontations between the Burgerwehren and the regular army were not very frequent,
though they did occur. After the completion of the imperial constitution by the Frankfurt
National Assembly in May 1849, bloody clashes broke out in different cities, especially in
Prussia, while units of the Landwehrand the Burgerwehrasserted their determination to
protect the new constitution against the reactionary policy of the governments. In Karlsruheand Heidelberg the civil militia declared a defensive war (Verteidigungskrieg) against the
governmental forces, while forming (in Karlsruhe) aGeneralkommando der Volkswehr. In
front of the regular armies, though, these militias had little chance of prevailing.59
However, the socially integrative potential of the militias, their patriotic commitment
and the rule of order apparent among their soldiers deepened the sense of national
integration. And though they acted independently in every city and usually were not under
joint command, their popular basis, as well as their cause and goals, and the understanding
that they were operating as part of the more general tendency of the Volksbewaffnung, lent
them an apparent national character. Furthermore, the mere armament of the city dwellers
introduced the traditional Stadrepublikanismus ideal: by forming the local militia thesecitizens tried to affirm their protesting stance against monarchical authorities (or even
absolutism) and the regular army at their disposal.60 But it is precisely here that an
important aspect of the militarisation of society is revealed: a civic consciousness was
created not only by civil actions such as demonstrations, strikes, barricades, festivals and
so on, but also, and maybe mainly, by bearing arms and performing policing and military
functions in other words through disciplining the citizens.
The change in the nature of recruits to the militias was also determined by the
fluctuating mood during the revolution. At first, as the revolution advanced, it seemed that
the German princes had decided to meet the demonstrators demands. However, the fact
that the radical and violent wave of the revolution was stalled after several months, as well
as the constant fear that its renewal would lead to anarchy, testified to the fact that most
liberals were reluctant to exploit the potential of revolutionary action. The threat of
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authorities in Wurttemberg and Saxony issued decrees ordering the reinforcement of the
militias, while entrusting them with the task of keeping order and security within the state.
It seems that the evolution of these armed organisations into a genuine military
organisation as opposed to the policing force that they had previously been was a result of
the revolutionary pressure. The fostering of hostile feelings against external enemiesprovided many with an additional motivation to enlist.61 Public debates and discussions in
the Frankfurt National Assembly portrayed conflicts between Germans and French as
frictions between the Teutonic and the Romance peoples;62 the war against Denmark was
a matter of national honour that overshadowed the European balance of power; and
arguments about possible restoration of Poland were justified by the notion that such a
state in the east could serve as a bulwark against Russian despotism.63 Moreover, the
decision by the Prussian government, as well as by the authorities in other German states,
to legalise the Burgerwehren and not to repress them might serve as additional
confirmation to the premise that their activities did not seriously threaten the political
order. In the autumn of 1848, after the Burgerwehrgesetz was issued in Prussia, most
members of the militias felt that they had not only lost their revolutionary dimension, but
had also become a force that imposed order on behalf of the government.
This development, however, is not surprising. Many spokesmen for the liberals, in
Heidelberg, Munster, Freiburg and other places in Germany, actually wanted to see the
popular militias as an integral part of the standing army, but not necessarily as a
revolutionary alternative.64 Finally, with the suppression of the revolution, the militias
were outlawed, in Prussia in October 1849 and subsequently in other German states in
Baden and Saxony in 1850 and in Wurttemberg in 1851.
In light of these historical developments, the question arises whether the 1848
revolution in Germany had a clear militaristic character. The political conflict between the
revolutionaries and the forces of order between liberals and democrats on the one hand,and conservatives and reactionaries on the other was not limited to parliamentary
debates, articles in the press or activities by various organisations. The militarisation of the
political discourse was also expressed in the initial inclination of both sides, the militias
and the regular army, to confront each other.65 Yet confrontations of this kind, between
those striving for change and those seeking to defend the existing regime, were not
substantially different in Germany from other armed clashes that occurred at the same time
elsewhere in Europe. They characterised all the revolutions in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, and cannot be regarded as an exclusive feature of the 1848
revolutions. What distinguishes the German case is the central place that military issues
occupied within the revolutionary discourse: the social composition of the army, its size,structure, subordination, functions and the significance of military service. This discourse
expressed the militarisation of the revolution far more than the violent clashes between the
revolutionaries, the militias and the standing army. Although these issues did not
overshadow the acute national, political and social problems that emerged in the wake of
the revolution, they nonetheless seem to have been reflected in the debate about the
military: service in the standing army, especially in the officer corps or the militias,
reflected the social divisions within German society and the civic status derived from
them; the importance of the constitutional system and its consequent civil rights directly
affected the nature of the obligation to military service and the ruling authorities of the
army; the participation of larger sections of society in the armed forces helped forge
German national identity and foster awareness of civil rights.
These circumstances suggest that themilitarisation of the Germanliberal discourse didnot66
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evident in the revolution itself the very revolution that symbolised a struggle for the
liberalisation and democratisation of the political and social systems. This militarisation was
a reflection of the militaristic tendencies that had been developing among German liberals
from the beginning of the century and found practical expression in the course of revolution.
The failures of 1848/49 and the decade of reaction that followed rendered irrelevant everyattempt by liberals to influence and change the army.
Conclusions
In his comprehensive book about the army as the Erziehungsschule der Nation, Reinhold
Hohn claims that the armys educational function was not given to it by the people. It was the
army itself that embraced this role, as a result of the confrontation with civil society.
Since the Wars of Liberation, civil society had imposed challenges on the standing army
challenges that led to a conflict between army and society and reached a peak in the 1848
revolution. The army could have curtailed these challenges through an educational
process implemented during military service. This, he argues, is the only way of
understanding why the army constantly prepared the nation for war, not peace.67 While this
might be true, it does not provide sufficient explanation for the militarisation of Prussian and
German society as a whole. In their struggle to liberalise the political system, liberals
thought it essential to democratise the old army and turn it into a peoples army. But the
reforms they proposed do not imply that liberals adopted a pacifist attitude or were prepared
to fight only for a defensive cause. As shown in some recent studies of the post-1848 period,
liberals were among the main advocates of war during the 1850s and urged Prussia to
actively intervene in the Crimean War and the war between Austria and Italy.68 Yet the role
that liberals played in the militarisation of German society must also be measured by what
they considered as real citizenship. The victory over Napoleon, as they saw it, proved theimportance of modernising and democratisating the army. By fighting the predominantly
aristocratic and conservative nature of the old army, liberals hoped that the armed forces
would be built by members of an emancipated society. They popularised militaristic values
and patterns of behaviour and tried to assimilate them within civil society, thus turning them
into criteria of modern civil status. The liberals adoption of values such as discipline,
willingness for self-sacrifice, national solidarity, respect for authority, patriotism and
loyalty by citizens meant that they actually contributed to the creation of controlled
citizenship. Such citizenship was not meant to merely serve the personal and political
freedom of citizens, but to limit it by appropriate political and social conduct.
Consequently, the power of the old traditional army to enforce the authority of the monarchyand to oppress political opposition was to be replaced by that of a popular, modernised
and more liberal army that performed educational functions and hence ensured the
cultivation of proper citizenship. German liberals, therefore, formulated a new model of
citizenship in which military service and values were seen as preconditions for real
citizenship. It was this emphasis on military ideals rather than modern, progressive civic
values that thwarted their efforts to change the hegemony of the monarchy, the
conservatives and the military and, in the long run, during the Empire period, it intensified
the militarisation of society.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank the Yad Hanadiv Trust and the Minerva Stiftung for their generous
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Notes
1. On the correlation between political and social elites and the army see: Willems, Derpreuisch-deutsche Militarismus, 60 and Trox, Militarischer Konservatismus, 357.
2. The literature on German liberalism is most extensive. Here are some of the main criticaldiscussions about the political vacillation of German liberalism: Anderson, The Social and
Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858 1864, 440; Krieger,The German Idea of Freedom, 275 7;Bumann, Zur Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert. On the particularcase of liberalism in Baden and its decline after German unification see: Gall,Der Liberalismusals regierende Partei, 47596. The criticism against German liberalism culminated in theSonderweg theory, most explicitly presented by Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 18711918. On the decline of German liberalism since the late 1870s see: Sheehan, German
Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, 181 271 and Langewiesche, Liberalismus inDeutschland, 911. Recent research has kept this critical tendency: Backes, Liberalismusund Demokratie Antinomie und Synthese, 498 9, 503 6; Levinger, Enlightened
Nationalism,1912, 2279, 23940; Leonhard,Liberalismus, 54999.3. Examinations of such social tendencies among German liberals appear in many studies. The
following are among the most important: Hamerow,Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, 58 64;
Rohr,The Origins of Social Liberalism in Germany, 15866. One of the most interesting andchallenging interpretations of the social vision of German liberals is that of Lothar Gall. Gallanalyses the liberal vision of society in the first half of the nineteenth century regarding thecreation of klassenlose Burgergesellschaft. Yet this vision was too optimistic and could notsurvive beyond 1850, when liberals appeared more as Klassenpartei. See Gall, Liberalismusund burgerliche Gesellschaft, 99125 (especially pp. 1202). As to the close correlationbetween political liberalism and class interests see: James J. Sheehan, Liberalismus undGesellschaft in Deutschland 18151848. Recent research into German liberalism and thewelfare state argues that towards the end of the nineteenth century liberals eventually clung toindividual economic responsibility with a limited state interference in social matters. See: vonKieseritzky, Liberalismus und Sozialstaat, 4812.
4. For a comparative analysis of German, British and French liberalism see: Muhs, Deutscherund britischer Liberalismus. Versuch einer Bilanz, 223 59. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt und
Friedrich Lenger, Liberalismus und Handwerk in Frankreich und Deutschland, 30531.5. Regarding the militarisation process of the Empire years see: Clark,Iron Kingdom, 6003.
About the birth of burgerliche[r] Militarismus during the Empire period see: Forster, Derdoppelte Militarismus, 65.
6. See the discussion on this matter by Sheehan,German Liberalism, 5.7. Leonhard,Liberalismus, 1934.8. Backes,Liberalismus und Demokratie, 2512, 2967.9. Leonhard,Liberalismus, 1978.
10. Backes,Liberalismus, 2512, 2967; Leonhard,Liberalismus, 1945.11. Nipperdey,Deutsche Geschichte 18001866, 664.12. Stargardt,The German Idea of Militarism, 19.13. Kant,Samtliche Werke in sechs Banden, 661. See also Kater, Burger-Krieger: Immanuel Kant,
Adam Smith und Adam Ferguson uber Militar und Gesellschaft, 2746 (especially pp. 2834).14. Vagts,A History of Militarism, Civilian and Militarism, 134, 17. See also: Vogel,Nationen
im Gleichschritt, 2756. Wette, Fur eine Belebung der Militarismusforschung, 13.15. For the various definitions of militarism see: Berghahn, Militarism, 11. For a detailed
discussion, see pp. 7 30.16. Hintze, Staatsverfassung und Heerverfassung, 1334.17. Ritter, Staatkunst und Kriegshandwerk, 13.18. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 123.19. In his recent illuminating book about the centrality of wars and general conscription in the
formation of twentieth-century Europe, James Sheehan demonstrates how military service wasconceived in many European countries as part of this democratic transformation. While referringto the observations of Hippolyte Taine and Friedrich Engels about the indispensable correlationbetween universal suffrage and universal conscription Sheehan reveals their insight: since therevolutionary wars of the 1790s, when the whole nation carried arms, universal military serviceturned into an aspect of the general political participation and civil rights. See Sheehan,WhereH ll th S ldi G ? 16 7 A d l K i K i G ll h ft d Milit 215
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20. For differentiations of this kind see: Frevert,Die Kasernierte Nation, 1011. And see alsoHuntingtons discussion about the division between the military and civic spheres: Huntington,The Soldier and the State, 8990.
21. Marwitz, Die Grundlagen deutscher militarischer Tradition im Zeitalter des Absolutismus,603. And see also: Wolfgang Kruse, Burger und Soldaten, 4767.
22. On the correlation between revolution and wars as complementing processes of the nationsemancipation, see: Fehrenbach Die Ideologisierung des Krieges und die Radikalisierung derFranzosischen Revolution, 57 66; Kruse,Die Erfindung des Militarismus, 268 74, 300, 370 2;Ritter, Staatkunst, 602; Vagts, History of Militarism, 1169. It should be mentioned that thecharacteristics which Kruse attaches to militarism are similar to those described by Vagts, thoughhe thinks militarism, as it appeared in the French Revolution, was also an outcome of modernism.
23. For a detailed discussion about the different structure and nature of service in theLandwehrmilitia and the standing army see: Frevert,Die Kasernierte Nation, 81 95; Craig,The Politicsof the Prussian Army 16401945, 59 61, 74 5.
24. Nolte, Burgerideal, Gemeinde und Republik, 60956 (see especially pp. 61820). Prove,Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus und die Macht des Volkes,23 4. Regarding theconcept of the republican ideal in Hamburg during the Napoleonic rule see: Aaslestad, Payingfor War, 64175 (see especially 642, 662, 670). And see also the discussion by Hagemann,Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre, 289304.
25. Kater, Burger-Krieger, 34 43; Fania Oz Salzberger,Translating the Enlightenment,11720,1478.
26. On the participation of women in the Wars of Liberation see: Hagemann,Mannlicher Muth,813, 41627. Idem, Heroic Virgins and Bellicose Amazons, 50727 (see especiallypp. 509, 511).
27. The literature about the reforms in the Prussian army is extensive. Some of the important worksare: Meinecke, The Age of Prussian Liberation 1795 1815, 44 101; Wehler, DeutscheGesellschaftsgeschichte, 17001815, 46372; Craig, Prussian Army, 3753; Simon, TheFailure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1808 1819, 145 93; Nipperdey, DeutscheGeschichte, 536; Sheehan, German History 17701866, 30710. Regarding the reformsin the codes of behaviour and penalty see: Voigt, Die Gesetzgebungsgeschichte der
militarischen Ehrenstrafen und der Offizierehrengerichtsbarkeit im preuischen und deutschenHeer von 1806 bis 1918, 3041. Prove, Militar, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert,912.
28. Some of the latest works that deal with the national significance of the Wars of Liberation are:Echternkamp, Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus (1770-1840), 21632; Levinger,Enlightened Nationalism, 8993; Carl, Der Mythos des Bfreiungskrieges, 6382. A moretheoretical discussion of the formation of war-mythology see Gladigow, Gewalt inGrundungsmythen, 2338.
29. Earlier ideas about the noble features of war and warlike training, combined with liberalpolitical theories, were even expressed by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1792. See von Humboldt,
Ideen zu einem Versuch die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu Bestimmen, 76, 867.30. Jahn,Deutsches Volkstum, 534.31. Levinger,Enlightened Nationalism, 1067.32. Jahn,Deutsches Volkstum, 62.33. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 425.34. Arndt,Die deutsche Wehrmannschaft, 65.35. Craig,Prussian Army, 745; Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, p. 90; Hohn, Die Armee als
Erziehungsschule der Nation, 1913.36. For the British case see: Gee, The British Volunteer Movement 17941814, 13, 99, 153;
Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 17931815, 736, 934.37. Trox, Militarischer Konservatismus, 85, 939.38. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 846.39. Vogel,Nationen im Gleichschritt, 1117.40. von Rotteck, Ueber stehende Heere und Nationalmiliz, 234.41. See the discussion in Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 154, 221 3, 235 6.
42. Schulz, Irrthumer und Wahrheiten aus den ersten Jahren nach dem letzten Kriege, 767.43. von Rotteck and Welcker, Staats-Lexikon, 593. This entry is based on an essay written
by Welcker as early as 1829. See Welcker, Das innere und auere System der praktischen
D. Avraham622
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naturlichen und romisch- christlich- germanischen Rechts-, Staats- und Gsetzgebungs- Lehre,5978.
44. Assmann,Die Bedeutung deutscher Burgerbewaffnung geschichtlich enwickelt, 245.45. Pfizer, Liberal, Liberalismus inStaats-Lexikon, eds. Rotteck and Welcker, vol. 7, 718 9.46. Rosenblum,Another Liberalism, 933.
47. Hohn, Armee als Erziehungsschule, 43.48. Prove, Politische Partizipation und soziale Ordnung, 113. In this regard see also the
importance attached to the wearing of uniform and the correlation between army and civilsphere which it symbolised: Brandli, Von schneidigen Offizieren und Militarcrinolinen,205. On Ruge see also Wende, Arnold Ruge: Kavalleriegeneral der Hegelei, 2332.
49. Becker,Bilder von Krieg und Nation, 956.50. See the discussion on the armys oppression of unrest during the Restoration and theVormarz,
in Ludtke,Police and State in Prussia, 18151850, 1606, 18393.51. Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArchB), Nachla Robert Blum, Nr. 65, Die Stellung der Soldaten in
Deutschland. Von Rob. Blum (Gesprochen im Redeubungsverein am 6. Marz 1848). And seealso: BlumVolksthumliches Handbuch der Staatswissenschaften und Politik. Ein Staatslexikon
fur das Volk, 757. On Robert Blum see also Maentel, Robert Blum, 13445 (especiallypp. 1413).
52. Gheimes Staatsarchiv- Preuischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (GStaPK), Rep. 92, VI.HA. NachlassBenedikt Franz Leo Waldeck, Nr. 28: Die Burgerwehr besonders in Berlin. In der Sitzung desVereins fur Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg am 12. April [1848]. Vorgetragen von demGeheimen ArchiRathe und Professor der Staats- Wissenschaft Dr. Riedel, Burger undBurgerwehrmanne des 13. Stadt-Bezirkes, Berlin 1848. p. 16.
53. Stenographischer Bericht uber den Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden National-versammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, vol. 9, 6866.
54. Ibid. vol. 2, 1328.55. For Heckers argument, as well as that of Wigrad (mentioned above), see: Frevert,
Die Kasernierte Nation,1589. And see also Freitag, Friedrich Hecker: Der republikanischeSouveran, 4562 (especially pp. 546).
56. For petitions in Offenburg see: BArchB, Nachla Karl Mathy, Nr. 97, Die Volksversammlung
zu Offenburg, am 19. Maerz 1848. For Freiburg see: BArchB, Nachla Friedrich Hammacher,Nr. 71, Die Volkversammlung in Freiburg, am 26 Maerz 1848. For Heidelberg see: idem.Die Volkversammlung in Heidelberg, am 26 Maerz 1848. For Munster see: idem. An dieBuergergarde der Stadt Muenster [12.11.1848].
57. Regarding the Prussian case and militias in Berlin see Wolff, Darstellung der BerlinerBewegungen im Jahre 1848 nach politischen, socialen und literarischen Beziehungen, 336.And see also: Becker, Forderungen nach Volksbewaffnung 1848, 1353 4; Prove,Burgerwehren in den europaischen Revolutionen 1848, 9112.
58. For these cases see: Sperber, Rhineland Radicals, 36670; Nolte, Gemeindeburgertum undLiberalismus in Baden 1800-1850,327 8; Harris, Arms and the People, 144 5, 160.
59. Prove, Burgerwehren, 909 10. Muller, Soldaten, Burger, Barrikaden. Konflikte undAllianzen wahrend der Revolution von 1848/49, 48.
60. For this idea see: Nolte, Burgerideal, 624 5. Prove, Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus, 183.61. The number of members inBurgewehrendiffered considerably from one place to another. In
Prussia they reached about 30,000 people. In Hannover, a city which at that time had about30,000 inhabitants, about 3000 served in the militia; 12,000 people carried arms in Leipzig, andin a small city like Heilbronn they numbered 1200. See: Prove, Politische Partizipation, 128.Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 1701.
62. Vick,Defining Germany,195. And see also Jeismann,Das Vaterland der Feinde. Studien zumnationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverstandnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 17921918,1623.
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deutschen Revolution von 1848/49, 4254. On the continental level see Langewiesche, Die
Rolle des Militars in den europaischen Revolutionen von 1848, 91532.66. This argument is presented by Christian Jansen. See Einheit, Macht und Freiheit. Die
Paulskirchenlinke und die deutsche Politik in der nachrevolutionaren Epoche 18491867, 28.
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