getting as on the three fs: the educational and fiscal opportunities in decentralization lant...
Post on 31-Mar-2015
217 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
Getting A’s on the three F’s: The Educational and Fiscal Opportunities in Decentralization
Lant Pritchett
Varad Pande
Outline (but with several big “asides”)
Fiscal issuesFiscal issues
Decentralization and Primary Education Reform in India: The Two Questions
Decentralization and Primary Education Reform in India: The Two Questions
An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles
An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles
A ‘Modest Proposal’ for ReformA ‘Modest Proposal’ for Reform
Decentralization And Primary Education Reform in India
India is Trying to Decentralize
Indian Needs Primary Education
Reform
73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution devolve political power to local governments
States modify Acts and hold elections to local governments
Functions in XI and XII Schedules devolved to local governments
73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution devolve political power to local governments
States modify Acts and hold elections to local governments
Functions in XI and XII Schedules devolved to local governments
Continued low enrolment, completion and achievement despite central and state schemes (and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)
Much lower educational indicators for poor, who suffer disproportionately
Continued low enrolment, completion and achievement despite central and state schemes (and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)
Much lower educational indicators for poor, who suffer disproportionately
Question 1: How to Do Education Delivery in this
Decentralizing Context
Question 1: How to Do Education Delivery in this
Decentralizing Context
Question 2: Is Well-Designed Decentralization the
Right Model for Primary Education Reform?
Question 2: Is Well-Designed Decentralization the
Right Model for Primary Education Reform?
0
5
10
UP Rajasthan MP AP Kerala Poland Chile Colombia
Fiscal
Administrative
Political
‘Unbalanced’ Decentralization
• Political Decentralization has happened (election of PRIs)but…
• Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization remains weak
• Political Decentralization has happened (election of PRIs)but…
• Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization remains weak
Source: World Bank (1999)
Decentralization in India Has to date been Unbalanced and Incomplete
Unbalanced Decentralization in India in an International Context
De
ce
ntr
ali
zati
on
In
de
x (
0-1
0)
Decentralization and Education
• Decentralization is no panacea—there are enormous risks to decentralization that could worsen service delivery
• Badly designed decentralization also has fiscal risks (and missed opportunities)
• Getting the “three F’s” properly aligned is difficult
Decentralization is Neither a Necessary nor Sufficient Condition for High Quality Education
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0
children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Fis
cal d
ecen
tral
izat
ion
(S
chn
eid
er)
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0
children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Po
litic
al d
ecen
tral
izat
ion
(S
chn
eid
er)
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0
children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Ad
min
dec
entr
aliz
atio
n (
Sch
nei
der
)
Correlation between Decentralization Indicators and Primary Education Outcomes
Source: Analysis based on data from Governance and Service Delivery Indicators Dataset, Pippa Norris, Kennedy School of Government, (2004)
No evidence of high correlation between decentralization and education outcomes in cross-country analysis
No evidence of high correlation between decentralization and education outcomes in cross-country analysis
The problem that a State Finance Commission Faces
Assign
“vertical shares”
(revenues)• Central • State• Local
Assign functions
(across tiers)
• Education• Health• Roads• Water
Finance Finance FunctionsFunctions??
A plausible sounding procedure:
• Assign functions (across tiers of PRI) by sector and activity (including mandates for minimum standards—e.g. universal primary education)
• Cost those functions at the standards demanded/expected
• Calculate the vertical share to transfer adequate resources to each tier to carry out its functions—make revenue assignments
UnbundlingFunctional Allocation and Recommendations
Status quo Analysis
First Principles of Public Finance and Accountability
•Disaggregate into functions and activities:
- Logical, mutually exclusive and exhaustive (MECE) functional classification
- Consistent with Indian public administration delivery system
Who provides these functions and activities today in India?
What are the key functions and activities in Primary Education?
How to decide who should provide which functions and activities?
What changes are required to the current system of service delivery?
•Analyze de jure functional allocation of each tier by studying existing legislation
•Analyze de facto functional allocation (on-the-ground picture) by conducting surveys and interviews
•Based on this systematic analysis, propose changes to current system
•Develop a detailed proposal for reform of primary education that draws on the findings of our analytical approach
Our Analytical Approach To Effective Decentralization
•Use First Principles of Public Finance find optimal allocation from public finance perspective
•Use First Principles of Accountability to address the accountability issues
Step 1: Unbundling
Function Activity
Gra
m
Pa
nch
aya
t
Use
r G
rou
ps
Curriculum designLearning achievement standardsPlans for physical expansionPlans for quality improvementSocial CapitalPhysical CapitalBeneficiary SelectionChoice of students for targeting programsEnrolmentRecurrentTextbook choice/purchaseLearning materialsMaintenanceMaintenance of school buildings/facilitiesMonitoring of school processesHiringAssignmentTrainingSalarySupervisionDismissal
Monitoring and Evaluation
Tests of learning achievement
BlockCentral
Standards
Planning
Asset Creation
Operation - Non Teacher
Operation - Teacher
Responsibility
Se
rvic
e
Pro
vid
er
(sc
ho
ol)
Village
State District
Question: What are the Key Functions and Activities in Primary Education?Question: What are the Key Functions and Activities in Primary Education?
Functions and Activities in Government Primary Schooling in Rural India
Output: A Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Classification of Primary Education into Functions and ActivitiesOutput: A Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Classification of Primary Education into Functions and Activities
Function
Gra
m
Pan
chay
at
Use
r G
roup
s
Operation - Non teacherOperation - TeacherMonitoring and Evaluation little, not systematic
Responsibility
Service Provider (school)
Village
State Govt
District BlockCentral Govt
Standards Setting
Planning
Asset Creation
little, not systematic
Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE FACTO
Function
Gra
m
Pan
chay
at
Use
r G
roup
s
Operation - Non teacher
Operation - Teacher
Monitoring and Evaluation
BlockCentral Govt
Standards Setting
Planning
Asset Creation
Responsibility
Service Provider (school)
Village
State Govt
District
Question: Who provides these functions and activities today?Question: Who provides these functions and activities today?
Step 2: Status Quo Analysis
Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE JURE
Lessons
• Current system is highly centralized with little role for PRIs / User Groups
• Schools / teachers have little or no autonomy… or accountability
• Current system is highly centralized with little role for PRIs / User Groups
• Schools / teachers have little or no autonomy… or accountability
Principle
What are the First Principles of Public Finance?
Explanation
Unit Cost of production declines as scale of production increases
Implication
Activities with significant economies of scale should be done by a higher level of government
The actions of one agent affects other agents
Activities with significant externalities should be done at a higher level of government, so that the ‘external’ effect can be ‘internalized’ in the system
Equity may imply financial support to education at a large enough geographic scope to allow for redistributive transfers to equalize across smaller units
Step 3: Use First Principles: Public Finance
Economies of Scale
Externalities
EquityNeed for equitable spread in inputs, process or outcomes
The more heterogenous the demand for the activity is likely to be, the more locally it should be done
Heterogeneity of Demand
Variation in local needs and preferences between regions
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
What is the size of ‘optimally sized catchments area’ of a service provider to jurisdiction?
State Population: 30-80 million
Zilla Parishad Population: 800,000-2 million
Block Panchayat Population: 60,000-600,000
Gram Panchayat Population: 2,000-20,000
Economies of Scale
State Population: 30-80 million
Zilla Parishad Population: 800,000-2 million
Block Panchayat Population: 60,000-600,000
Gram Panchayat Population: 2,000-20,000
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Optimal Catchments Areas for LEVELS of Education
Primary schoolsSecondary Schools
Universities
Whereas the optimal catchments area for a primary school is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…
…the optimal catchments area for a University is district / state level (State jurisdiction)
Whereas the optimal catchments area for a primary school is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…
…the optimal catchments area for a University is district / state level (State jurisdiction)
Economies of Scale
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
State Population: 30-80 million
Zilla Parishad Population: 800,000-2 million
Block Panchayat Population: 60,000-600,000
Gram Panchayat Population: 2,000-20,000
Operation
Setting learning achievement standards
Monitoring and Evaluation (process and outcome)
Asset Creation
Planning
Primary School
Optimal Catchments Area for FUNCTIONS of Primary Education
Whereas the optimal catchments area for Operations is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…
…the optimal catchments area for a Setting Learning Standards is state level (State jurisdiction)
Whereas the optimal catchments area for Operations is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…
…the optimal catchments area for a Setting Learning Standards is state level (State jurisdiction)
Economies of Scale
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Functional Allocation according to Economies of Scale Criterion`
Economies of Scale
Function
StateDistrictBlockGPSchool
Monitoring and Evaluation
Public Finance First Principle
Externalities / System-wide
EffectsEquity
Heterogeneity of Demand
Economies of Scale
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher
Planning
Asset Creation
Equity Doesn’t Require Centralization
Equity Doesn’t Require Centralization
Equity Concerns are Important
Equity Concerns are Important
Major inequity / variations in primary education levels exists between districts within states
This creates equity rationale for centralization of education delivery
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Equity
44.074.5
104.0
04080
120
Muzaffarnagar Lucknow Muradabad
59.885.6
120.0
04080
120
Kannur Kollam Idukki
Gross Enrolment Rate - UP (2003-04) Gross Enrolment Rate - Kerala (2003-04)
This does not imply all functions in primary education should be done by higher levels of government….
As long as Standard Setting and M&E are done by higher level of governments, AND redistributive equalizing fiscal transfers are done, goal of equity can be achieved
Source: DPEP MIS Database http://www.dpepmis.org/webpages/edatabase.htm
Function
StateDistrictBlockGPSchool
Monitoring and Evaluation
-
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher
Planning
Asset Creation
-
Public Finance First Principle
Externalities / System-wide
EffectsEquity
-
-
Heterogeneity of Demand
Economies of Scale
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Functional Allocation according to Equity Criterion
Equity
Function
StateDistrictBlockGPSchool
Monitoring and Evaluation
Public Finance First Principle
Externalities / System-wide
EffectsEquity
-
-
-
Heterogeneity of Demand
Economies of Scale
-
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher -
Planning
Asset Creation
- -
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Public Finance
Standard Setting and Monitoring by State Government, and Asset Creation and Operation by low-level PRIs is effective
Standard Setting and Monitoring by State Government, and Asset Creation and Operation by low-level PRIs is effective
What are the First Principles of Accountability?
Activities that require decisions to be made using individual judgment in local context
Activities that require several repeated transactions at the local level
Step 3: Use First Principles - Accountability
DiscretionaryTransaction-
IntensityInferring
PerformanceWhere can performance be better inferred – locally or technically
Examples
Does the service require many local transactions? (Transaction Intensive)
Does the service require decisions made in local context? (Discretionary)
No YesNo - Central BankingYes Immunization Ambulatory Care
ImplicationActivities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability
Activities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability
24.7%
85.5%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Bottom 40% Top 20%0
25
50
75
100
Karnataka Kerala Rajasthan WestBengal
65.4%
96.9%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Bottom 40% Top 20%
Aside on Accountability: Quality of Government Primary Schooling in India is very low…especially for the Poor
Enrolment
Framework for Judging Quality
AchievementCompletion
Percent of 6-14 yr olds currently in school
(1998-99)
Average78.8%
Percent of 15-19 yr olds completed at least Grade 8
(1998-99)
Average49.6%
Percent of children with Inadequate Primary Learning Achievement for
Math of Age for Class 5 or in Grade 5
Note: Framework adapted from Warwick and Reimers (1995); Enrolment and Completion data from ‘Educational Attainment and Enrollment Profiles’, Filmer (2004); test scores analysis for government and government aided schools only based on data from Singh, Jain, Gautam and Kumar (2005)
…+ Anecdotal Evidence of low quality (Pratichi Trust, PROBE Report, etc.)…+ Evidence of student migration from government to private schools
67.6%
81.7%
69.7%
53.8%
Not reaching Grade 5Scoring < 50% in Grade 5 (Govt School)
Mechanical learning to a large extent.
Single digit addition : 18% of students (for example 3+3)
Single Digit Subtraction: 12% of students (for example 9-2)
Counting Kites : 54% of Students
Highest percentage in any class is 77% of Students (which is low)
Best performances are in number concepts in maths and in following instructions and recognising letters/sounds associated in language
AOA: Learning achievement from Baseline study in AP
AOA: Learning by age
Math Level By Age
71%57%
44%34%
24% 25% 20% 20%
21%
26%
29%
33%
32% 32%33% 32%
6%10%
12%15%
19% 16%17% 17%
3% 7%15% 18%
25% 27% 30% 32%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Age
Per
cen
t in
Ag
e C
oh
ort
Math Level = 3
Math Level = 2
Math Level = 1
Math Level = 0
* Data based on the testing of 17,608 children in 4 random blocks in the District of Jaunpur, UP. Child tests are weighted by total number of children in village divided by number of children tested in village.
AOA: The low quality is caused by ‘systemic’ and not ‘managerial’ failures; and thus requires an institutional solution
Teacher Absenteeism
Teacher Absenteeism
19
15 1411
1617
2725
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Uganda India Indonesia Zambia Bangladesh Papua NewGuinea
Ecuador Peru
Source: Kremer et al (2004), pg 9
% Teacher Absence Rates by Country
Country
Level of Parental Satisfaction
Level of Parental Satisfaction
Other EvidenceOther Evidence
59.0%60.0%
0%
25%
50%
75%
with childprogress
with teacher
Source: The Pratichi Education Report (2002); Berliner and Biddle (1994) pg 113
Level of Parental Dissatisfaction (West Bengal)
Evidence
‘Non’ Teaching: “Teaching practices have been reduced to a
minimum…it has become a way of life” (PROBE) Growth of Private Schooling…which meets the differentiated
(quality) demand…even among the poor (Tilak et al.)
“Best practice” level of absence
7.0%
72.0%
21.0%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
A or B Grade C Grade D or F Grade
Grades given by Parents to Child’s school (USA)
Result: People voting with their feet (and pocketbooks) out of the sectors:
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
Uttaranchal
Kerala
Maharahstra
Tam
il Nadu
Uttar
Karnataka
Madhya
Andhra
Rajasthan
Him
achal
Chhattisgarh
Gujarat
West
Haryana
Orissa
Jharkhand
Bihar
Assam
Per
cen
t o
f st
ud
ents
in
urb
an a
reas
in
re
cog
niz
ed s
cho
ols
in
pri
vate
(ai
ded
or
un
aid
ed)
sch
oo
ls
More than half in private
2/3 or more in private
Chile's share of primary in private schools (with full privatization) is 45.5%
AOA: What is ‘Accountability’? – Demystifying the Elements of the Accountability Relations
DelegationDelegation
Feature
FinancingFinancing
EnforcingEnforcing
PerformingPerforming
InformingInforming
There are Five Features to Any Accountability Relationship
What
You give a task to the accountable ‘agent’
Example 1: Buying a Sandwich
You ask for a sandwich
Example 2: Going to a Doctor
You go to the doctor to be treated
You give the ‘agent’ the money to do the task
You pay for the sandwich
You pay the doctor for the treatment
The ‘agent’ does the assigned task
The sandwich is made for you
The doctor treats you to try cure your ailment
You find out how well the ‘agent’ has done the work
You eat the sandwich which informs you of its quality
You see if you are feeling better – you assess the performance of the doctor
You reward good performance and punish bad performance
You choose whether to buy a sandwich from the seller the next time, affecting his profits
You go to him next time (if he was good) or choose to go somewhere else if not
Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
Relationship 1: VOICE – The Long Route, first leg
Citizens
Policy Makers
VOICE
VOICE
Citizens can elect Policy Makers based on quality of public services they receive (VOICE)…
But, Citizens…
- may vote along ethnic / ideological lines (DELEGATION)
- may not be able to attribute service to appropriate Policy-Maker (INFORMING)
- may think Policy-Maker tenure is too short (ENFORCING)
Citizens can elect Policy Makers based on quality of public services they receive (VOICE)…
But, Citizens…
- may vote along ethnic / ideological lines (DELEGATION)
- may not be able to attribute service to appropriate Policy-Maker (INFORMING)
- may think Policy-Maker tenure is too short (ENFORCING)
Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
Service Providers
Policy Makers
COM
PACT
COM
PACT
Well-meaning Policy Makers can influence Service Providers to improve service delivery performance (COMPACT)…
But, Policy Makers…
- may not be able to specify exact contracts (DELEGATION)
- may not be able to monitor Service Providers (INFORMING)
- may not be able to alter incentives of Service Providers (ENFORCING)
Well-meaning Policy Makers can influence Service Providers to improve service delivery performance (COMPACT)…
But, Policy Makers…
- may not be able to specify exact contracts (DELEGATION)
- may not be able to monitor Service Providers (INFORMING)
- may not be able to alter incentives of Service Providers (ENFORCING)
Relationship 2: COMPACT, long route second leg
Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWERCLIENT POWER
Clients can play major role in tailoring service-mix to their local needs and monitoring Service Providers (CLIENT POWER)
But, Clients…
- often do not have choice (lack of competition)
- often cannot infer provider effort (INFORMING)
- often do not have powers to discipline bad Service Providers (ENFORCING)
Clients can play major role in tailoring service-mix to their local needs and monitoring Service Providers (CLIENT POWER)
But, Clients…
- often do not have choice (lack of competition)
- often cannot infer provider effort (INFORMING)
- often do not have powers to discipline bad Service Providers (ENFORCING)
Relationship 3: CLIENT POWER – The Short Route
Pratichi Trust (A. Sen’s NGO) report on West Bengal:
“According to you what are the main problems of primary schooling?”
The Sabhapati of a Panchayat Samiti in Puruliya needed no time to reply:
“Teachers do not teach.”
AOA: Accountability at the local level…Pratichi Trust report:
We, the villagers, forced him to come to school at 10:30 and made him stay in the school until 3:30…”
Says a villager in Puruliya
AOA: local client power?
“We, the villagers, forced him to come to school at 10:30 and made him stay in the school until 3:30…”Says a villager in Puruliya
Result of this attempt at local accountbility? “He slept, got his body massaged by the
children, and read the newspaper. How long can you watch him leaving aside your own work?”
Source: World Development Report, 2004
Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
The Three Relationships of Accountability in Service Delivery
Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWERCLIENT POWER
Policy Makers
VOICE
VOICE
COM
PACT
COM
PACT
5.9
1.8
7.3
1.8
0
5
10
15
UttarPradesh
West andCentralAfrica
South andEasternAfrica
Asia LatinAmerica
8-13.5
37.824.723.721.721.2
10
25
40
Kerala Karnataka Rajasthan West Bengal Bihar
0%
50%
100%
Boy Girl
Yes 98%
AOA: The key missing accountability relations in Primary Educationbetween parents and teachers are Informing and Enforcing
DelegationDelegation
Feature of Accountability
FinancingFinancing
EnforcingEnforcing
PerformingPerforming
InformingInforming
Is this the Key Problem?
Somewhat: Diffused
objectives but Parents want to delegate (i.e., send children to school)
Yes, many teachers are not performing adequately
Evidence
Yes, no usable info on class performance; parents not actively involved in school / teaching matters
Is it important for your child to be educated?
Yes 89%
Source: PROBE Report, pg 14
No, teachers are paid very well relative to other countries
Average Salaries as multiple of Income per capita by Region
Average = 6.1 Note: Uttar Pradesh figure is for 1995-96; all others are quoted from Carnoy and Welmond (1996); Source: Mehrotra and Buckland (2001)
% Teacher Absence Rates by Indian States All India Average 25%
34.0% 29.0%0%
25%
50%
VECs PTAs/MTAs
% Households Aware of Existence and activities of Community Structures
Source: CAG Report (2001)
Yes, parents have little or no powers to discipline or reward teachers
Kremer et al (2004) find only one case of teacher dismissal ever in 3000 government schools surveyed
No monetary incentives possible for high performing teachers under current government teacher terms of employment
AOA: Alternative Explanations for Low Quality are Unlikely to be Sufficient
Lack of Adequate Public Expenditure
Lack of Adequate Public Expenditure
Presence and Demand for Child Labor
Presence and Demand for Child Labor
Lack of Parent InterestLack of Parent Interest
1
2
3
Child labor is not big enough – NSS (1993) shows only 8 percent
Most child laborers work as family labor, so their time is fungible
Even if child labor is ‘high’, direction of causality is not clear
Is it important for a boy to be educated?
Parents’ Attitude to Education in India
Yes 98%
No 1%No
Response 1%
Is it important for a girl to be educated?
Yes 89%
No Response
1%
No 10%
Source: PROBE Report, pg 14
Parents, even poor parents, seem keen to educate their children
Parents, even poor parents, seem keen to educate their children
65
70
75
80
1993 1999
%
Enrollment rate among 5-11 year olds
Budget expansion approaches don’t seem to have worked in India – e.g.: District Primary Education Program (DPEP)
Budget expansion approaches don’t seem to have worked in India – e.g.: District Primary Education Program (DPEP)
DPEP Districts
Non-DPEP Districts (with same criteria)
Source: Jalan and Glinskaya (2003)
End of long aside on accountability?
• Publicly provided primary education is not performing well
• Accountability is a key problem• Decentralization alone won’t improve
accountability• But possibly decentralization informed by
accountability analysis can improve services
What are the First Principles of Accountability?
Activities that require decisions to be made using individual judgment in local context
Activities that require several repeated transactions at the local level
Step 3: (back from long aside on accountability) Use First Principles - Accountability
DiscretionaryTransaction-
IntensityInferring
PerformanceWhere can performance be better inferred – locally or technically
Examples
Does the service require many local transactions? (Transaction Intensive)
Does the service require decisions made in local context? (Discretionary)
No YesNo - Central BankingYes Immunization Ambulatory Care
ImplicationActivities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability
Activities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability
Step 3: Use First Principles –Accountability
Discretionary, Transaction-intensive and Locally Evaluatable activities like Asset Creation and Operations should be decentralized to PRIs
Discretionary, Transaction-intensive and Locally Evaluatable activities like Asset Creation and Operations should be decentralized to PRIs
Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Accountability
Function
Operation - Non teacher High High Local
Operation - Teacher High High Local / Technical
Monitoring and Evaluation Medium Medium Local / Technical
Technical
Asset Creation High
Standards Setting
Planning Medium
Accountability First Principle
Transaction Intensive?
Who Can Best Infer Performance
(Technical or Local)?
Medium
Local /Technical
Local /Technical
Low
Medium
Low
Discretionary?
Function
Gra
m
Pan
chay
at
Use
r G
roup
sOperation - Non teacher
Operation - Teacher
Monitoring and Evaluation
Support
BlockCentral Govt
Standards Setting
Planning
Asset Creation Support
Support
Responsibility
Service Provider (school)
Village
State Govt
District
Step 4: Optimal Allocation based on First Principles Analysis
Functional Allocation in Primary Education –Based on First Principles Analysis States do
Standards Setting and Monitoring
PRIs assume responsibility for actual Operation
- As much as possible as low as possible
- Higher PRI tiers back-up on professionalism, technical
States do Standards Setting and Monitoring
PRIs assume responsibility for actual Operation
- As much as possible as low as possible
- Higher PRI tiers back-up on professionalism, technical
First Principles of Public Finance First Principles of AccountabilityFunction
Operation - Non teacher Yes Yes Local
Operation - Teacher Yes Yes Local / Technical
Monitoring and Evaluation No Yes Technical
Accountability First Principle
Transaction Intensive?
Who Can Best Infer Performance
(Technical or Local)?
Yes
Bit Technical
Local
No
Somewhat
No
Discretionary?
Standards Setting
Planning Somewhat
Technical
Asset Creation Yes
Key Messages
Function
Monitoring and Evaluation
Public Finance First Principle
Externalities / System-wide
EffectsEquity
-
-
-
Heterogeneity of Demand
Economies of Scale
-
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher -
Planning
Asset Creation
- -
As discussed, Many Models of Education Decentralization have not worked well
Decentralize without unbundling
Decentralize without unbundling
Decentralize Non-Teacher Operations (But not Teacher Operations)
Decentralize Non-Teacher Operations (But not Teacher Operations)
Decentralize Functions, concurrently, without
devolving F or F
Decentralize Functions, concurrently, without
devolving F or F
1
2
3
Indonesia Experience
Latin America Experience
India Experience (1995-2005)
-Pushed all functions to district level (below provinces)-Bad monitoring systems means that little information about regional performance is available to stimulate competition or disseminate good or bad practices
-Pushed responsibility to local governments…-…But without enhancing operational control at local level (e.g.: Argentina)
-Devolved functions (including primary education) to PRIs…-…But PRIs do not have adequate finance or control over functionaries to implement their mandate
Gra
m
Pa
nch
aya
t
Use
r G
rou
ps
StandardsPlanningAsset Creation Operation - Non TeacherOperation - Teacher
Hiring
Assignment
Training
Salary
Supervision
Dismissal -
Monitoring and Evaluation
Responsibility
Se
rvic
e
Pro
vid
er
(sc
ho
ol)
Village
State District
Function
BlockCentral
Greater Operational Responsibility to PRIs, especially forTeachers
Greater Operational Responsibility to PRIs, especially forTeachers
But our Analysis Avoids these Pitfalls by Suggesting
Countervailing Forces to build accountability via decentralization
Strengthen Centre and State for Standard
Setting and Monitoring
Strengthen Centre and State for Standard
Setting and Monitoring
1
2
Consistent Standard Setting is Critical To Provide the Guiding Framework for Local Governments to Operate and Manage
Uniform Monitoring is Essential for Quality Control, Designing Rewards & Recognition Systems and Generating Credibility
The Two Big Messages from Our Analysis
What we are not saying
“just turn schools over to GPs/SMCs”—without clear “delegation” and without strengthening the “information” and “enforcement” this just pushes the problem lower.
“Districts play no role”
Districts play key role at the technical level in planning and pedagogical support
Here is where it gets interesting for “finance”
• Suppose for a minute that a state government has decided to follow these recommendations and is going to devolve primary education to PRIs (for real).
• What does the “finance” F corresponding to this “function” F look like?
• It all depends on the “functionaries” F
Four alternatives:
• Full-on voucher scheme (a la Chile)—equal transfer per (weighted) student to all schools, public and private (not discussed).
• “Functionaries” remain a “state” problem so financing is dual (cash and in kind)
• “Functionaries” are transferred to schools with a cash budget but wages/employment conditions fixed
• “Functionaries” are transferred and “block grant” financing.
What is the key fiscal issue?
• How does one compute the per child “standard unit cost” of a year of school (ignoring capital costs)?
[That is, the formula for a block grant could have all kinds of weights—for girls, for SC/ST, for “marginality”—off of a standard unit cost]SUC=Teacher cost + non-teaching cost
Teacher cost/child= (wage per teacher)*(number of teachers)/(number of children)
Teacher wages: the key parameter
Desiderata: “Level and structure of compensation appropriate to attract, retain, and motivate teachers of desired quality.”
• Structure is awful (for all goals)
• Level of compensation?
Level of teacher compensation?
1.9 2.1
1.48 1.68
00.5
11.5
22.5
Publicsector toprivate-formal,1993/94
Publicsector toprivate-formal,1999/00
Publicsector toprivate-
formal, PSMcorrected,1993/94
Publicsector toprivate-
formal, PSMcorrected,1999/00
Ratio
of w
eekl
y ea
rnin
gs
• Gov’t vs. organized pvt sector is high.
• Teachers vs. private sector is high.
• Existing teachers vs. “contract” or “alternative” teachers is high.
• International comparisons is high.
Pluses and Minuses of Alternatives: GPs/SMCs don’t H/F/A teachers, teachers are “assigned” and come “in kind”
Pluses
• No political fight with teachers
• GPs/SMCs do control “operating” budgets and possibly some gains there.
Minuses
• Accountability won’t work—no gains from decentralization
• No cost savings
GPs/SMCs control teacher H/F/A, unit cost at current wages, wages
fixedPluses
• Accountability might work at the local level
Minuses:
• No fiscal savings• No reallocation to
more productive uses.• With complete control
and high wages corruption is inevitable.
GPs/SMCs control teacher H/F/A, unit cost at current wages, wages
market determined Pluses
• Accountability might work at the local level
• Reallocation to productive uses (within education, between education and other uses?)
Minuses:
• No fiscal savings to state
GPs/SMCs control Assignment, unit costs at “true” cost, wages
market determined
Pluses
Best chance for accountability
Fiscal savings shared state/PRI
Reallocation to other uses
Minuses
Enormous political battle with teachers/teachers unions
One integrated proposal: Functions
• Centre/state sets curriculum, learning achievement targets and takes responsibility for monitoring and evaluation.
• District takes responsibility for: planning asset creation (schools), hiring in eligible pool and promoting teachers, technical support (e.g. supervision, in service training) [with block].
• GP/SMC takes responsibility for all other aspects of the operation of schools (including assignment of teachers from eligible pool).
One integrated proposal:Finances
• Single block grant to GPs[SMCs] on a weighted per student basis with “efficient” SUC as the base (plus a transition fund to finance the gap of existing teachers)
• Set aside block grants to GPs/SMCs for “technical” functions (tied to district?).
• Slice for district to carry out its single responsibility functions (planning, assets)
• Slice for state for “high level” functions (especially for monitoring and evaluation).
One Integrated Proposal:Functionaries
• The “DTPC”—a mix between existing “contract” teachers and existing “state/district” cadres with eligibility at district level, assignment at GP/SMC level.
• Tricky issue of “who bears the cost of unassigned ‘permanent’ teachers?”
Big unresolved issues
• Block grant fungible across activities?
• Relationship between GP and SMC?
• Details of “transition fund”—reconciling supply/demand of existing teachers
55
63
33
42
51
60
46
52
0
20
40
60
Other RuralRajasthan
SK School
Evidence Suggests The “alternative” schools are Showing Considerable Success
64.0%51.0%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
PrimarySchool
SSK
Source: Analysis based on data from - West Bengal: Pratichi Education Report 2002; Rajasthan: World Bank PAD for Rajasthan DPEP, 1999, SIDA Evaluation Study and NSSO 52nd Round
Student Attendance on day of visit
Experiment One: SSK Schooling in West Bengal
25% higher
20.0%14.0%
0%
25%
50%
75%
PrimarySchool
SSK
43% lower
Teacher Absenteeism on day of visit
9.0%
24.0%
0%
25%
50%
PrimarySchool
SSK
Dissatisfaction with Teacher (Parent Response)
62% lower
Experiment Two: Shiksha Karmi (SK) in RajasthanTest Scores
15% higher
27% higher
16% higher
14% higher
Math LanguageGrade 1 Grade 4 Grade 1 Grade 4
83
72 71
85
51
63
0
20
40
60
80
100
Enrolment Rate Attendance Rate
SK
Rajasthan
All India
% Enrolment and Attendance
Higher Accountability can offset enormous other disadvantages
Greater autonomy for performance and local responsiveness works
Lower wages do not appear to reduce motivation
Higher Accountability can offset enormous other disadvantages
Greater autonomy for performance and local responsiveness works
Lower wages do not appear to reduce motivation
AOT: But the ‘Para-Teacher’ Model Is Not a Sustainable Systemic Solution to India’s Primary Education Crisis – Its Only a Quick Fix
Variance in Pay for Identical Work is Starkly
Visible
Variance in Pay for Identical Work is Starkly
Visible
Index of Primary School Teacher Salary in India
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
Index
‘Regular’ Government School Teacher(Rs 5000-9000)
Para-teachers(Rs 900-3500)
‘Regular’ Government Teachers get paid 3-6 times more than para-teachers
‘Regular’ Government Teachers get paid 3-6 times more than para-teachers
Note: Analysis of Teacher pay based on survey of para-teacher schemes in Govinda and Josephine (2004) and other studies of para-teacher systems in India
Pressure for ‘ex-post regularization’
Pressure for ‘ex-post regularization’
States under pressure to ‘regularize’ para-teachers when para-teacher lobby becomes substantial
Unplanned and ad hoc regularization can bankrupt already fiscally drained states
Variance in Quality of Training, Instruction and
Outcomes
Variance in Quality of Training, Instruction and
Outcomes
Quality of instruction varies immensely as no standards are established for hiring, training, performance evaluation and contract duration, e.g.:
- Qualification requirement for para-teacher varies across states from Grade 5 pass to Higher Secondary
- Training requirement for para-teachers varies across states from 12 days to 2 years
1
2
3
Rs.
We Make a Modest Proposal that Combines the Best Elements of the Current Formal and ‘Para-Teacher’ Systems
Apprentice (Shiksha Karmi)
Associate (Adhyapak)
Master (Maha-Adhyapak)
Phases of Teacher Professionalization
A District Professional Teacher Cadre (DPTC)
• Initial hiring done on renewable contract basis by ZP on GP recommendation
• Assignment to schools depends on GPs
• Permanence granted at end of contract periods, based on comprehensive evaluation- Technical Criteria: training, input indicators, teacher tests, peers Bottoms Up Criteria: Performance review and recommendation by GP/SMC
• Assignment still depends on GP (match S-D?)
• Few promoted to ‘Maha-Adhyapaks’ based on consistently exceptional performance evaluation ratings
Phases of Employment
Phases of Employment
Step jump when qualify for Adhyapak
1
Annual increment based on review, when Adhyapak
2
Step jump if qualify for Maha-Adhyapak
3
Compensation(Rs.)
Years of service
The DPTC will have an initially fixed, and then a performance and seniority based compensation system
Apprentice (Shiksha Karmi)
Associate (Adhyapak)
Master (Maha-Adhyapak)
Initially fixed pay, later performance and seniority-based
Big jumps in salary levels across phases to serve as incentive to perform
Jump to Maha-Adhyapak rare and controlled, most spend career as Adhyapaks
Initially fixed pay, later performance and seniority-based
Big jumps in salary levels across phases to serve as incentive to perform
Jump to Maha-Adhyapak rare and controlled, most spend career as Adhyapaks
Key Messages3 Elements of Performance Based Pay
3 Elements of Performance Based Pay
Low-performing teacher track
High-performing teacher track
How Does Our Proposal For Teachers Stack Up Against Existing Systems in India?
Hiring
Assignment
Training
Salary
Supervision
Dismissal
Existing Formal Government
Existing Para-teacher
Existing Private
Our Proposal (DPTC)
•Done by state government
•Done by state government
•Done by state government, and district-level line agency
•Fixed (and generous) scale for life
•Little or none in substance
•Almost never done
•Done by GP, criteria varies
•Stays within village
•Varies: district line agency or parallel agency
•Fixed and small (‘honorarium’)
•Closely monitored by SMC/VEC or GP
•At will for unsatisfactory performance
•Done by school management
•Done by school management
•Varies: states have guidelines + large unrecognised sector
•Usually fixed (and somewhere between formal and para-teacher scales)
•Closely monitored by school management
•At will for unsatisfactory performance
•Done by ZP on criteria + GP recommendation
•Done by ZP on GP recommendation (GP has veto)
•Organized by ZP based on guidelines for phased training
•Fixed when SK; seniority and performance-based when Adhyapak
•Closely monitored by GP/SMC + technical criteria
•At will when SK; For cause when Adhyapak stage reached
HRD Ministry (Elementary Education Bureau)
Project Approval Board
Policymaker (State and Central Government)
State Department of School Elementary Education
State Implementation Society
District Education Committee / Office
Block Education Committee / Center
School Management Committee (SMC) or
VEC
Parent Teacher Association (PTA)
Schools (Teachers)
Organizational Provider
Frontline Provider
COMPACT
Client Groups
State Government
VOICE
CLIENT POWER (?)
MANAGEMENT
‘Client Power’ is particularly weak in the present framework
‘Client Power’ is particularly weak in the present framework
Accountability Linkages in Existing System: The SSA Framework
COMPACT strengthened as PRIs get management of TTEs
VOICE gets strengthened as clients see importance of participation in governance and service delivery decision
CLIENT POWER gets strengthened as SMCs/PTAs are involved in meaningful performance evaluation
COMPACT strengthened as PRIs get management of TTEs
VOICE gets strengthened as clients see importance of participation in governance and service delivery decision
CLIENT POWER gets strengthened as SMCs/PTAs are involved in meaningful performance evaluation
Accountability Linkages in Our DPTC Proposal: Redefining Voice, Compact and Client Power
HRD Ministry (Elementary Education Bureau)
Project Approval Board
Policymaker (State and Central Government)
State Department of School Elementary Education
School Management Committee (SMC) or
VEC
Parent Teacher Association (PTA)
Schools (Teachers)
Organizational Provider
Frontline Provider
Client Groups
State Government
VOICE
Zila Panchayat
Taluk Panchayat
Gram Panchayat
Policymaker (PRIs)
Gram Sabha
CLIENT POWER
COMPACT
Our Proposal Addresses Many of the Central Concerns of the Political Economy of Reform and Transition
Issue / Concern How It is Dealt With in Our Proposal
• ‘Grandfathering’: i.e., TTEs of all existing regular government school teachers to remain unchanged – no one is dismissed + salary protection
Opposition from existing ‘Regular’ Government
Teachers
• Para-teachers no longer exploited, as they are given a clear track for tenure (career progression plan) as per technical and bottoms-up criteria
Unfair Exploitation of ‘para-teachers’
• State gives transitional funds to PRIs to bear premium wage cost of existing ‘regular’ teachers
• Large block grants to PRIs to fund their new role
Bakrupting the PRIs by making them pay the
teachers
• Balances local control with higher level support for training, professional standards and monitoring
Quality of Schooling Outcomes
Not Addressing Question 2: Is a well designed Decentralization the Right Model for Primary Education Reform?
Indian Needs Primary Education
Reform
Continued low enrolment, completion and achievement despite central and state schemes (and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)
Much lower educational indicators for poor, who suffer disproportionately
Continued low enrolment, completion and achievement despite central and state schemes (and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)
Much lower educational indicators for poor, who suffer disproportionately
Question 2: Is Well-Designed Decentralization the
Right Model for Primary Education Reform?
Question 2: Is Well-Designed Decentralization the
Right Model for Primary Education Reform?
top related