i ain't no fool: deciding to litigate in person in the
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I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the
Civil Courts
Bridgette toy-Cronin*
The number of litigants in person (LiPs) is thought to be rising in New Zealand. This is of increasing concern to the judiciary, court staff, and lawyers who oppose LiPs in proceedings. This article focuses on why people decide to litigate in person. It reports the results of a qualitative study involving LiPs, court staff, lawyers and judges in the New Zealand District (including Family) and High Courts. It contrasts the perceptions of judges and lawyers as to why people litigate in person with the reasons given by LiPs. The evidence suggests that the bench and bar’s perception, that people either choose to go without a lawyer or are forced to do so by cost, is not entirely accurate. Instead, the evidence suggests people have many overlapping reasons for litigating in person, some of which go beyond those contemplated by the bench and bar. These additional reasons include popular understandings of law and legal services, and the conflicting and confusing messages that are communicated to the public about the courts’ accessibility to litigants. These additional reasons are not well understood by lawyers and judges. As a result, they often interpret LiPs’ decisions to litigate in person as arrogance or unreasonableness. A more nuanced understanding of why people litigate in person is therefore required in order to change the way court staff, lawyers and judges perceive LiPs’ conduct and to perhaps alter the approach they take to assisting LiPs during the litigation process.
*SeniorLecturerandDirectoroftheLegalIssuesCentre,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofOtago.IwouldliketothankProfessorJohnDawson,AssociateProfessorNicolaTaylorandtheReview’sanonymousrefereesforcommentsonanearlierdraft.
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I Introduction
Thenumberoflitigantsinperson(LiPs)iswidelythoughttobegrowinginNewZealandandintheothercommonlawcountries.1So,whyarepeoplegoingtocourtwithoutalawyer?Thisarticlebuildsonresearchfromotherjurisdictionsaboutwhypeople litigate inperson, reportingresultsofaqualitativestudyinNewZealand.Thisstudyasked,amongotherquestions:whydopeoplelitigateinperson?TheevidencecollectedsuggeststhatagapexistsbetweentheperceptionsoflegalprofessionalsastowhypeoplelitigateinpersonandthereasonsreportedbyLiPsthemselves. Italsosuggeststhatdecisionstolitigateinpersonarecomplexandoverlapping,andareinfluencedbyproblemsinthelegalmarketandbymisperceptionsaboutlegalservicesandthelegalsystem.Theyarealsoinfluencedbymessagescommunicatedtothepublicabouttheaccessibilityofthecourtstolitigants.ThearticlethereforequestionstheoldsayingthatLiPsalways“haveafoolforaclient”,andsuggeststhatthedecisiontolitigateinpersoncanbeseen,inmanycases,asarationalresponsetoexternalfactorsandtoreasonable,ifinaccurate,perceptionsaboutthejusticesystem.
Inpart II, Ioutline themethodsused in the larger empirical studyfromwhichthedatadiscussedinthisarticlearedrawn.InpartIII,IreportthereasonsgivenbyLiPsfordecidingtolitigateinperson,andcomparethesereasonstojudges’andlawyers’perceptions,notingsimilaritiesanddivergences.Whilecostsappeartobeamajorfactorindecidingtolitigateinperson,itwasrarethatLiPs’decisionsweresolelyfinancialordrivenbyonlyonefactor.Thedichotomycommonlyreferred tobybenchandbar—betweenthosewho“choose”tolitigateinpersonandthosewhodosobecauseofexpense—isthereforeunhelpful.ManyLiPs’decisionswereinfactinfluencedbytheperceivedqualityofthelegalservicestheywouldbeabletoaccess,andbytheirlayunderstandingsofthefunctionoflawyersandthelegalsystem.Theirexperiencesandperceptionsonthesemattersarelargelyatoddswiththelegalprofessionandjudiciary’sunderstandings.InpartIV,Ithendiscussthesefindingswithinamoretheoreticalframework,lookingbothatthemessagesthatthelegalsystemsendsthepublicaboutaccesstothecourtsandatthestructureofthemarketforlegalservices.Inconclusion,IarguethatitmatterswhatjudgesandlawyersthinkaboutLiPs’reasonsforlitigatinginpersonbecauseitmayaffecttheirperceptionsaboutthemeritsofanLiP’scaseandabouthowmuchassistanceLiPsshouldbegiven.
1 SeeElizabethRichardson,TaniaSourdinandNeridaWallaceSelf-Represented Litigants: Literature Review(AustralianCentreforCourtandJusticeSystemInnovation,May2012)at[2.1];andHelenWinkelmann“Accesstojustice—Whoneedslawyers?”[2014]OtagoLR229at230.
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II Background and Methods
A Background
Thisstudytookplaceagainstabackdropofverysignificantshiftsinthelegalpractisingenvironment.ThemostobviousshiftwastheclosureofsixDistrictCourtsandrelocatingtheregistriesofsevenothers.2 The other significantchangewasthereductionoflegalaidspendingthroughanumberofpolicymeasures:theintroductionofthePublicDefendersService,the2014familyjusticereforms,loweringthethresholdsforaccessinglegalaidforgeneralcivilmatters,andintroducingfeesforaccessinglegalaidandcharginginterestonlegalaidloans.3Togetherthesechangeshavemeantthatlegalaidspendingdroppedfrom$172millionin2009/10to$130millionin2014/15.4Thesechangeshaveaffectedaprofessionthatalreadyhadasmallprotectedareaofwork,arguablycreatinganenvironmentwherethelegalprofession(oratleastpartsoftheprofession)hasbecomehighlydefensive,aprofessionundersiege.5
B Sample and design
TheempiricaldatareportedinthisarticlearedrawnfromalargerstudyIconductedexamininglitigationinpersonintheNewZealandcivilcourts,focusingoncaseswhereonlyonepartywasanLiPand theotherwas
2 MinistryofJustice“ChangestoCourtServices”(2013)<www.justice.govt.nz>.Thechangeswerebilledaschanges to“moderniseand improvehowwedelivercourtservices”butsomeofthechangeswerealsorelatedtoclosureofbuildingsbecauseofthefindingsofseismicriskassessmentsundertakenaftertheCanterburyearthquakes.
3 MinistryofJusticeSustainable Legal Aid: Factsheet — Legal Aid Changes (April2011).Forfurtherdiscussionofthe2014familyjusticereformsseeTimBlackandothersThe New Family Justice System — fundamental changes(paperpresentedtotheNewZealandLawSocietyContinuingLegalEducationConference,Wellington,March2014);andMarkHenaghanandMeghanNicholson“FamilyLaw”(2014)2NZLRev321at347–353.ForchangestothelegalaidthresholdsseeLegalServicesRegulations2011,regs5and6.
4 MinistryofJustice,aboven3;andMinistryofJusticeAnnual Report(29September2015)at134.
5 DonnaBuckingham“LegalgovernanceinNewZealand:Reportingacademicallyfromtheco-regulatoryramparts”(KeynoteAddresstotheAustralianandNewZealandLegalEthicsColloquium,FlindersUniversity,VictoriaSquare,28November2013)arguingthat“theshrinkingallocationofstatelitigationresources”hasputsystemicpressuresonNewZealand’slegalprofession,creatingethicalstrainatanindividuallevel.
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represented.6Inthatstudy,Iusedseveralqualitativemethods:interviewswithparticipantsinthelitigationprocess,analysinglitigationdocuments,andobservationofparticipants.Theresearchparticipants includedLiPs(34),courtstaff(8),lawyers(16)andjudges(13).LiPswerecurrentlitigantsor thosewithcases thathadconcludedwithin thepreviousyear.Theyparticipatedbywayofanintervieworbywayofamorecomprehensivecasestudy.Thesecasestudiesincludedmultipleinterviews,(often)numerouse-mail exchanges, ongoing reviewof case-related correspondence anddocuments,andwherepossible,observationoftheLiPincourt.7Interviewsweresemi-structuredandlasted60to80minutes.8LiPswererecruitedbywayofadvertisementsatcourts,communitylawcentresandonline,aswellasbywordofmouth.TheLiPparticipantshadcasesintheFamilyCourt(21),DistrictCourt(3)andHighCourt(10).Ofthatgroup,IconsideredfiveLiPs“persistent”,whichIdefinedasanLiPlitigatingathirdorsubsequentproceeding.9OncetheLiPcasestudiesandinterviewswerecompleted,Iinterviewedjudgesandlawyers.ThejudgespresidedintheFamilyCourt(4),DistrictCourt(4)andHighCourt(5).ThelawyerspractisedintheFamilyCourt(5),FamilyandDistrictCourts(2),oringeneralcivillitigation(withnofamilylawpractice)(9).Interviewswithjudges,lawyersandcourtstaffeachlastedapproximately40minutes.Irecordedandtranscribedall theparticipantinterviews.
6 BridgetteToy-Cronin“KeepingUpAppearances:AccessingNewZealand’sCivilCourtsasaLitigantinPerson”(PhDThesis,UniversityofOtago,2015).CaseswherebothpartieswereLiPs,atleastbeforethe2014familyjusticereforms,werethoughttobelesscommon.IncaseswhereonlyonepartyisanLiPthepotentialforunfairness,andtheabsenceofsharedprofessionalnormsandetiquette,arealsomoststark.
7 Ihad66conversations(onthephone,Skype,orinperson)withLiPsinthecasestudiesandapproximately510e-mailexchangeswith thecasestudyLiPs,either readingcorrespondence theyforwardedme,ordiscussing theircasewith thembye-mail.Ireviewed139litigationdocumentsrelatingtotheLiPcasestudiesandIobserved21daysorhalf-daysofcourtproceedings.
8 TheinterviewbeganwithanopenquestionabouthowtheyhadcometobeanLiPandthenbecamemoredirectedtospecificissues,includingthehistoryofthecase,decisionsaboutlegalrepresentation,previousexperienceincourt,assistancewiththeircase,legalresearch,andinteractionwithopposingpartyandcounsel.Itwentontoexplore,whererelevant,theirexperienceincourt,issuesaroundcosts,andenforcementofjudgments.WithLiPsparticipatingonlyinaninterview,Ialsoaskedaboutsuggestionstheymighthaveforsystemicchanges.
9 Toy-Cronin,aboven6,at93.Thisdidnotincludeappeals(althoughallthepersistentlitigantsalsoappealed)butratherthreeormoreseparateproceedings,oftenaroundthesameissue—forexample,judicialreview,privateprosecutions.
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Commonlysocialscienceresearchersassignparticipantspseudonymstoprotectanonymitybutthisisnotalwaysappropriate.10ThesmallsizeoftheNewZealandlegalcommunityandsmallnumberofcasesthatproceedtotrialmeant thatassigningpseudonymswasunlikelytobeeffectivetoprotectconfidentiality.InsteadIhaveuseddirectquotesfromindividualLiPparticipantsinthetext,butwithnopseudonymsattached.Thisissothequotescannotbeaggregated,byreferencetosuchpseudonyms,toconstructacompositepicturethatmightbeusedtoidentifyparticularparticipants.
C Analysis
Mymethodofdataanalysis,whilenotrigidlyadheringtoanyparticulartradition,wasderivedfromwhatisknownasgroundedtheory.ItfollowedStraussandCorbin’sencouragementtorecognisethatanalysisofqualitativedataisa“fluidanddynamic”processand“shouldberelaxed,flexible,anddrivenbyinsightgainedthroughinteractionwithdatarather thanbeingoverlystructuredandbasedonlyonprocedures”.11 It involvesanattemptat“steppingintotheshoesoftheotherandtryingtoseetheworldfromtheirperspective”.12Toexploretheinterview,observationanddocumentarymaterial,Icombinedinsightsderivedfromtheworkofauthorswhodiscussqualitativedataanalysis,totryto“crackopen”thedataanddevelopcodesandthemestogrouprelevantinformationtogether.13
10 KatjaMGuenther“Thepoliticsofnames:rethinkingthemethodologicalandethicalsignificanceofnamingpeople,organizations,andplaces”(2009)9QualitativeResearch411;andMaryCarolHopkins“IsAnonymityPossible?WritingaboutRefugeesintheUnitedStates”inCarolineBBrettell(ed)When They Read What We Write: The Politics of Ethnography(Bergin&Garvey,Westport(CT),1996)121.
11 JulietCorbinandAnselmStraussBasics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory(3rded,SAGEPublications,ThousandOaks(CA),2008)at12.
12 JulietCorbin “Taking anAnalytic Journey” in JaniceMMorse and others (eds)Developing Grounded Theory: The Second Generation(Routledge,NewYork,2009)35at41;andseealsoat40.SeealsoAlanBrymanSocial Research Methods(4thed,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2012)at28–32.
13 HowardSBeckerTricks of the Trade: How to Think About Your Research While You’re Doing It(UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,1998);CorbinandStrauss,aboven11;DavidSilvermanA Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Qualitative Research (2nded,SAGEPublications,London,2013);Bryman,aboven12,at564–590;PatBazeleyQualitative Data Analysis: Practical Strategies(SAGEPublications,London,2013);andRobertMEmerson,RachelIFretzandLindaLShawWriting Ethnographic Fieldnotes(2nded,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,2011)at171–199.
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Qualitative studies of any kind, but especially small-scale, single-researcherstudiessuchasthis,areoftenattackedasanecdotal,subjective,ornotgeneralisable.14ThiskindofscepticismmaybeparticularlylikelyinNewZealandwherethereisalimitedtraditionofsocio-legalresearchandapolicyaudiencehungryfor“objectivefacts”,especiallythosedrawnfromlargedatasetsthatclaimtopresentarepresentativeportraitofthesubject.15 Smaller-scalequalitativestudiesofthekindIhaveconductedcan,however,investigateatopicinmuchgreaterdepth,andwithmoreflexibility,thanalargequantitativeproject.Moresubtleaspectsoftheexperiences,motives,biasesandreactionsofparticipantsintheprocessmightbeuncoveredthanwouldemergefromalarge(andthereforenecessarilysuperficial)datasetonthesubject.
III Previous Studies
AnumberofstudiesintheUnitedKingdom,UnitedStates,CanadaandAustraliahavegatheredevidenceaboutwhypeoplelitigateinperson,eitheraspartofasurveyorfrominterviewdata.SomestudieshavefoundthatLiPsexplainandrationalisetheirdecisiontoproceedalonebyreferencetomultiplefactors.16Inothers,thereasonsforlitigatinginpersonaresometimespresentedasadichotomybetweenhavingtodosoforfinancialreasonsandchoosingtodoso.17Thatis,theysupporttheideathatLiPseither“can’tpay”or“won’tpay”forlegalassistance.
14 Bryman,aboven12,at405–407.ForaspecificexampleseeAssywhodismissesas“anecdotal”theresearchreviewedabovethatsuggestsaprimaryreasonforlitigatinginpersonisfinancial:RabeeaAssyInjustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation (OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2015)at20.
15 AustinSarat“LawandSociety”inJamesRHackneyJr(ed)Legal Intellectuals in Conversation: Reflections on the Construction of Contemporary American Legal Theory (NewYorkUniversityPress,NewYork,2012)87at107;andPennyDarbyshireSitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges(HartPublishing,Oxford,2011)at12–14.
16 RichardMoorheadandMarkSeftonLitigants in Person: Unrepresented litigants in first instance proceedings (Department forConstitutionalAffairsResearchSeries2/05,March2005)at20;JulieMacfarlaneThe National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants — Final Report (Treasurer’sAdvisoryGrouponAccesstoJustice,May2013)at38;andLizTrinderandothersLitigants in person in private family law cases(MinistryofJustice,November2014)at18.
17 See,forexample,RosemaryHunter“LitigantsinPersoninContestedCasesintheFamilyCourt”(1998)12AJFL171at172;TaniaSourdinandNeridaWallace“Thedilemmasposedbyself-representedlitigants:Thedarkside”(2014)24JJA61at62;JohnDewar,BarryWSmithandCateBanksLitigants in Person in the Family Court of
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 729
A Financial
Mostpreviousstudiesreportthatthemainreasonpeoplelitigateinpersonis that theycannotafforda lawyer,anddonotqualifyfor legalaid,ortheir legalaidfundinghasceased.18Peoplewhofallwithinthis“justicegap”—becausetheycannotaffordrepresentationbutdonotqualifyforlegalaid—areconsideredtomakeupalargeproportionoftheLiPpopulation.19 Additionally,claimsmaybeofsmalleconomicvalue,sothateventhoughthepersoncanpayforlegalservices,lawyers“cannoteconomicallyhandlethem”.20LiPsmaymakeacost-benefitanalysisanddecidethatinstructingalawyerisnotthebestuseoftheirscarceresources.21
B Perceptions about the case and litigant
Oneaspectofthiscost-benefitanalysismaybetheLiP’sperceptionthattheircaseissimpleenoughtohandlethemselves.22Gennreportsthisasthemostcommonreasonforlitigatinginperson,andMathergivesitasaprimaryreason,alongwithconcernsaboutcost.23LiPsmayalsobelievetheyare
Australia(FamilyCourtofAustralia,ResearchReportNo20,2000)at36;andHazelGenn“Do-it-yourselflaw:accesstojusticeandthechallengeofself-representation”(2013)32CJQ411at427(suggestingtwobroadalthoughporouscategoriesofpeoplewhocannotpayand“[v]exatiousorquerulouslitigants”).
18 KimWilliamsLitigants in person: a literature review(MinistryofJustice,ResearchSummary2/11,June2011)at4–5.WilliamscitesPaulaHannaford-AgorandNicoleMott“ResearchonSelf-RepresentedLitigation:PreliminaryResultsandMethodologicalConsiderations”(2003)24JustSysJ163;MoorheadandSefton,aboven16,at20–21;Dewar,SmithandBanks,aboven17,at33;Macfarlane,aboven16,at39;LynnMather“ChangingPatternsofLegalRepresentationinDivorce:FromLawyerstoPro Se”(2003)30JournalofLawandSociety137at149;Trinderandothers,aboven16,at13–15;andRichardson,SourdinandWallace,aboven1,at[2.3].
19 MelissaSmith,EstherBanburyandSu-WuenOngSelf-Represented Litigants: An Exploratory Study of Litigants in Person in the New Zealand Criminal Summary and Family Jurisdictions(MinistryofJustice,July2009)at42;andRosemaryHunterandothersThe Changing Face of Litigation: Unrepresented Litigants in the Family Court of Australia(LawandJusticeFoundationofNewSouthWales,Sydney,2002).
20 MauroCappellettiandBryantGarth“ForewordtotheAcess-to-Justice-ProjectSeries”inMauroCappellettiandGarthBryant(eds)Access to Justice: A World Survey(Sijthoff&Noordhoff,Alphenaanderijn,1978)atix.
21 Trinderandothers,aboven16,at15;andMacfarlane,aboven16,at9. 22 Trinderandothers,aboven16,at16;andMacfarlane,aboven16,at9;Williams,above
n18,at4. 23 HazelGennandSarahBeinartPaths to Justice: What People Do and Think about Going
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betterpositionedthanalawyertoconveythedetailsoftheircasetothecourtbecausetheyknowthesedetailsintimatelyandaremoremotivatedtowinthanalawyerwhowasrepresentingthemwouldbe.24
It isalsopossiblethatalawyer’sperceptionsoftheircasemayhaveaffectedtheirrepresentationdecision.Thatis,alawyermayhaverefusedtoactforthemonthegroundthattheircaseisunarguable.Trinder’sstudyinthefamilycourtsofEnglandandWalesnotedthat,whilethiswasapossiblereason,itwasrarewithinthestudygroup.25Alternatively,iflawyersperceivea litigant is likely tocomplainorbeademandingfixed-feeclient (forexample,legallyaided),theymaybeunwillingtoproviderepresentation,sothelitigantmayhavedifficultysecuringalawyer.26
C Keeping lawyers out
Inaddition,somepeoplemaylitigateinpersonbecausetheyaredisenchantedwithlegalservices.This isoftenexpressedas“[a]nti-lawyer”sentimentorgeneraldistrustoftheprofession.27Otherstudieshavefoundthat thissentimentisusuallyrelatedtotheLiP’spreviousexperiencewithaparticularlawyer,ratherthanlawyersgenerally.28Macfarlane’slargeCanadianstudyfoundthatasignificantnumberofLiPshadchosentolitigate inpersonafterbecomingdissatisfiedwiththeircounsel“doingnothing”,ornotbeinginterestedinsettlingtheircase,ornotlisteningorexplaining,ormakingmistakes.29SomeLiPs,believingtheycantakethematterforwardwithoutassistance,maybemotivatedbyadesire“tounderstandandtoparticipateactivelyintheirpersonallegalaffairs”.30
to Law(Hart,Oxford,England;Portland,Oregon,1999)at22;andMather,aboven18,at149.
24 MoorheadandSefton,aboven16,at16;Smith,BanburyandOng,aboven19,at46;andTrinderandothers,aboven16,at16.
25 Trinderandothers,aboven16,at31. 26 MoorheadandSefton,aboven16,at19(suggestingthatindemnityinsurersincreasingly
discouragesolicitorsfromtakinghigh-riskclientsorcases,makingrepresentationfortheselitigantsdifficulttosecure).
27 JonaGoldschmidtandothersMeeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and Court Managers(AmericanJudicatureSociety,Chicago,1998)at10.SeealsoDewar,SmithandBanks,aboven17.
28 Smith,BanburyandOng,aboven19,at44. 29 Macfarlane,aboven16,at45.SeealsoMacfarlane,aboven16,at44and46–50;
Williams,aboven18,at4–5;andDewar,SmithandBanks,aboven17,at1(reporting“highlevelsofdistrustoflawyersandthelegalprofession”).
30 Hannaford-AgorandMott,aboven18,at163.SeealsoMacfarlane,aboven16,at48.
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ResearchintheUnitedKingdomsuggeststhatbusinesses,inparticular,maywishtoproceedunrepresentedtoavoidthedisputebeingperceivedastooadversarialwiththeresultthatitdamagesongoingrelationships.31ThisisoflessrelevanceintheNewZealandHighCourt,wherebodiescorporatemustusuallyberepresented.32TheconcernformaintainingrelationshipsmaybeofparticularimportanceintheFamilyCourt,however,whereparentshaveanongoingrelationshipwiththeirex-partner.33
D Openness of the court
MatherhasarguedthatcourtshaveawayofcommunicatingtheirdegreeofopennesstoLiPsandthatthisinfluencesthenumberofpeoplewillingtoattempttolitigatewithoutalawyer,althoughWilliamsstates“thereislittleempiricalevidenceforthis[claim]”.34ANewZealandMinistryofJusticestudyreportsthatlawyersandcourtstaffbelievethatpeoplelitigateinpersonbecausetheFamilyCourtistryingtobemorelitigant-friendly.35 Moorhead andSeftonalsoconcludethatthe“opennessandsupportivenessofcourtstounrepresentedlitigants”isareasonforwhypeoplegounrepresented.36
Ratherthancourtscommunicatingopenness,otherauthorshavearguedthattheavailabilityoflegalinformationonlinecancreatethe(oftenfalse)impressionthatthisinformationwillbesufficienttoenablepeopletolitigateinperson.37
Inthefollowingsection,Irelatethisliteraturetothefindingsofmystudy.
31 MoorheadandSefton,aboven16,at16(referringtoJohnBaldwinLay and Judicial Perspectives on the Expansion of the Small Claims Scheme(2002,LCD,London)).
32 Re G J Mannix Ltd[1984]1NZLR309(CA)at312. 33 Smith,BanburyandOng,aboven19,at45(citingoneexampleofaFamilyCourtcase
wherethelitigantdecidednottoinvolvealawyersoasnottoaggravatetheotherparty).Thismayberelatedtodomesticviolence:seen47below.
34 Williams,aboven18,at5.SeealsoMather,aboven18. 35 Smith,BanburyandOng,aboven19,at47. 36 MoorheadandSefton,aboven16,at252. 37 ForauthorssuggestingonlineinformationencourageslitigationinpersonseeMather,
aboven18,at142;Macfarlane,aboven18,at35;andGoldschmidtandothers,aboven27,at10.FordiscussionofthedifficultyLiPsencounterinusingonlinematerialseeMacfarlane,aboven18,at63–67;andTrinderandothers,aboven16,at89–91.
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IV Why People Litigate in Person
A Can’t pay: Unable to access legal services
MostjudgesandlawyersIinterviewedcitedconstraintsontheabilitytosecurelegalservicesasthemajordriverfortheperceivedincreaseinLiPs.Manyspecificallyidentifiedpeoplefallingwithinthe“justicegap”asbeingLiPs:
Totheaverageearningpersonthecostofprivaterepresentationisoutsidetheirmeans,buttheyprobablywon’tgetlegalaid.(FamilyCourtJudge)
[P]eopledon’thavethefundsandtheycan’tgetlegalaid.Ithinkthatistheprimaryreasonforpeopleappearinginperson.(HighCourtJudge)
Judgesandlawyerswerewellawareoftighteningrulesthatmadelegalaiddifficulttosecure,particularlyingeneralcivillitigation.38
Twolawyers(bothinfamilylawpractice)expresslydisagreedwiththeideathatthereareanylitigantswho“can’tpay”:theybelievedallLiPswereinthecategoryof“won’tpay”.Onesaidthattheideathattherewerepeoplewhodidnotqualifyforlegalaidbutcouldnotaffordfeeswas“ridiculous”,citingreducedratesandflexiblepaymenttermsthatmanylawyersoffered.Theothercharacterisedlitigantsinpersonaspeoplewho“don’twanttospendthemoneytheyhave”.
(1)LiPs’perspectives
TheLiPsidentifieddifficultypayingforlegalservicesasamajordriveroftheirdecisions.Manyofthoseabovethelegalaidthresholdfellinthe“justicegap”andcouldnotpayprivately:“Youcan’tpay$500perhourwhenyouearn$500perweek”(HighCourtLiP);LiPsarethe“workingpoor”whocannotaffordtopay“$350to$500perhour”(McKenzieFriend39 andformerFamilyCourtLiP).
Itisnotonlytheabsolutecostoflegalfeesthatisrelevant,butthescaleofthefeesproportionatetothevalueoftheclaim.Wherethestakesareloworofnomonetaryvalue,thelitigantwilllosemoneymakingtheirclaim,evenifsuccessful.40Thisisbecausethecostsrecoveredaregenerallyless
38 Seediscussionatn3above. 39 A“McKenzieFriend”isalitigationassistantincourt.Thetermoriginatesfromthe
UnitedKingdomcaseMcKenzie v McKenzie[1970]3AllER1034(CACiv). 40 Forexample,casesinvolvingcareofchildren,judicialreview,andmanyDistrictCourt
cases.
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thantheactualcostsincurred.TheycouldperhapsaffordsomelegalfeesbutcannotaffordtolosemoneyordonotwantwhatwouldbeatbestaPyrrhicvictory—winningthecasebutlosingmoney.
Inlinewithpreviousresearch,thesefindingssuggestthatmostlawyers,judgesandLiPsagreethatfinancialreasonsareimportantandthatpeopleoftenbecomeLiPsbecausethey“can’tpay”.41However,LiPscitedseveralotherfinancialfactorsnotidentifiedbymostlawyersandjudges.First,LiPswereinfluencedbythedifferencesbetweenthelegalfeesindicatedandthefeescharged—forexample,adiscrepancyof$20,000.ThismadetheseLiPsunsureofwhethertheycouldcontinuetoaffordrepresentation.ThisfactorwascommonwheretheLiPhadoriginallyengagedcounselwithaparticularbudget inmind,butexhaustedthatbudgetwithoutreachingaresolutionofthematter.
Second,itwasnotonlyLiPswhofellinthe“justicegap”,butalsothosewhoqualifiedforlegalaid,whofeltunabletoaffordlegalrepresentation.Civillegalaidisusuallyaloan,securedagainsttheLiP’shomeiftheyownone.OneFamilyCourtLiP,whoalsoadvisesotherLiPs,said“peopleworryaboutgettingcaveatsontheirhouses”.Theyseedecidingwhetherornottoapplyforlegalaidasacalculationbetween“los[ing]yourhousetogetyourkidsback,or…keep[ing]yourhouseandnotget[ting]yourkidsback”.
Third, thosewhoqualified for legal aid (and thereforewerenot inthe “justicegap”) couldnot alwaysfinda lawyer.Onegroupof theselitigantshaddifficultyfindingalawyerwhowouldworkforlegalaidrates,particularlywherethecaserequiredspecialistexpertise.Acivillitigationlawyercalledthisa“hugeproblem”.42Thesecondgroupmayhavefoundithardtofindalegalaidlawyerbecausetheywereperceivedasdifficultandthefeeavailablewouldbeinadequatetorecompensethelawyerforthetimespent.Asonelawyerexplained:“Youhavetobemindfulofthecase…particularlyifyouaredoinglegalaid.”Ifthecaseisdifficultbecauseofthe“personaldynamicsinvolvedaroundtheclient’sapproach”,theneachstepmaytakemuchlonger.Thentheadditionalfeescannotnecessarilyberecoupedfromaclientwhomayargueaboutthebill,andwouldbeverydifficulttorecoupfromlegalaidunderthesetfeeregime.LiPswhohadpreviouslybeenrepresentedandthenspentaperiodasanLiPwerealsoquotedhighfees,payableupfront,foranewlawyertoreviewtheirfile.
41 Seen18above. 42 Thelawyerhadbeena legalaidproviderandhaddone“theoccasionalcasefora
deservingcause”,buthadrecentlyremovedhisnamefromthelegalaidlistbecause“theratesaretooparsimonious,itisjustnotworthdoing”.Anothercivillitigationlawyer,whenaskedaboutthenumberoflegalaidlawyersinhisspecialistarea,said“thereareafewnotverygoodones”.
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Thesefeesprobablyreflectedboththecostofcomingtogripswithalong-runningfileandadesirebythelawyertohavemoneyupfrontfromaclienttheywerelikelytoperceiveashighrisk.43
ThesearethefinancialfactorsthatareatplayinLiPdecisionstoproceedinperson,butthereareotherfactorsaswell.LawyersandjudgessawtheseotherfactorsasindicatingtheLiPswereinaseparatecategory,andtheyarediscussedassuchbelow.However,LiPsofferedthemasadditionaloroverlappingreasonsforproceedinginperson.44
B Won’t pay: Doing a “better job” than a lawyer
JudgesandlawyersalmostallconsideredtherewasalsoaseparatecategoryofLiPswhowerelitigatinginpersonbecausetheythoughttheycoulddoabetterjobthanalawyer:
Theywouldperceivetheycandoitbetter thananyoneelseandthat itdoesn’tmeritalawyer.(DistrictCourtJudge)
Thereareotherswhoaretherebecausetheygenuinelyfeeltheycandoabetterjobthanthelawyers.(HighCourtJudge)
SomejudgessawthisasacommonbeliefamongLiPs,whileothersthoughtitmotivatedasmallnumber.Onejudgewenton tocharacterisepeoplewhothinktheycandobetterthanalawyeras“obstructiveanddifficult”.Alawyerreferredtoitasanelementof“arrogantthinking:‘Idon’treallyneedalawyer,Iknowbetter’”.LawyerssuggestedthisarrogancemotivatedsomeLiPsto“lawyer-up”atalatestageofproceedingswhentheyrealisetheirconfidencewasmisplaced:
Theywouldlawyer-upimmediatelybeforeahearingbecausetheyknewtheycouldn’tmanagethehearing.That isaprettycommonpatternforrepresentation,immediatelybeforeahearing,“OhIcan’tmanagethissoI’mgoingtogetalawyer”.(Familylawyer)
CommentslikethisimportasuggestionofLiParroganceandunwarrantedconfidence,andevenaninferencetheyaremanipulatingthesystemtotheirownadvantage.
43 MoorheadandSefton,aboven16,at19. 44 Seen16above.
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 735
(1)LiPs’perspectives
NoLiPsreferred tobelievingtheycoulddo“better thana lawyer”butseveralreferredtothinking,at leastat theoutset, thattheycoulddo“aswellasalawyer”.Thesepeoplealsogavefinancialreasons,however,asafactormotivatingtheirdecisiontolitigateinperson.Thisbeliefwasnotnecessarilyanexpressionofarrogance,asperceivedbylawyersandjudges,butoftenarosefromtheirnegativeexperienceswithlawyersandfromtheirperceptionsoftherolethatlawyersperform.45
(a) Experiences of lawyers’ services
SomeLiPsfeltthelegalservicetheyhadbeengiven,eitherlegallyaidedorprivatelyfunded,wasveryrudimentaryorincompetent.ThisincludedLiPsbelieving that lawyersmissedfilingdeadlines, omitted causesofactionfrompleadings,46madeerrorsinsettlementdocumentsthatmadethemunenforceable,orsubmitteddocumentswithspellingandgrammaticalerrorsthatdemonstratedincompetence.
Theseerrorsdidnotneedtobesignificantbeforetheyunderminedtheclient’strustinthelawyer.Oneofthelawyersinterviewedforthestudyhadalsobeenaclient.Hislawyerhadmadeanerrorduringhiscase,andwhileitwasrelativelyminorandrectifiable,ithadalmostendedhisrelationshipwiththelawyer:
Theemotionsskewyourperceptionandaffectyourjudgement;onemistakebythelawyerundoesthetrust.[Inowrealisethatwithclients]youreallyhavetoworkhardatthem,toexplain,towinandthenkeeptheirtrust.
Anotherissuewasnottechnicalcompetencebutthelevelofpersonalisedservice given to the client. Some of the Family Court LiPs had leftrepresentationbecausetheyfelttheirbusylawyershadlittletimeorinterestinunderstandingthemasindividualsandfelt“pushedthroughthesystem”orthattheywere“justanothercasetobeprocessed”.AccordingtooneLiP,herlawyertoldhershewas“lowvalue”becausethelegalaidratethelawyerwasreceivingwasathirdofhisusualcharge-outrate.Somelitigantsdecided
45 LiPsweresometimesalerttothepotentialofappearingarrogant.AsoneFamilyCourtLiPsaid,speakingdefensivelyaboutherdecisiontolitigateinperson:“I’dbearroganttothinkthatI’mfromthepublicandIknowitall.”
46 AcivillegalaidclientaskedhislawyerforanexplanationaftertheJudgecriticisedtheomission.Thelawyersaiditwasomitted“becausewithlimitedlegalaidfunding,IhadtofocusonwhatIconsideredthestrongestargument”(LiPprovidedthelawyer’se-mailtome).
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toleaverepresentationpartlybecausetheyfelttheirlawyerdidnotbelievethem.47Othersreferredtolawyersbeingunableorunwillingtoengagewiththeemotionalaspectsofthecase.48
Insomeinstances,theLiPsaidtheproblemswithlegalservicesweremoreseriousandtheyfeltbulliedbytheirlawyer.AsaFamilyCourtLiPsaidofherlawyer:“Shescaredme,shewasverypushy,shefrightenedme…shesaidifIdidn’tdowhatIwastold…[mychild]wouldbetakenawayfromme.”AnotherFamilyCourtLiPwithaprivatelyfundedlawyersaid:
Shewasabully.Shewouldn’tanswermycallsfortwoweeksatatimeandthenshe’dmakeitoutthatitwassuchabigdeal…likesheisgoingoutofherway.
WhilenolawyersorjudgessuggestedthatLiPsmightdecidetoproceedinpersonbecausetheyhadbeengivenpoor-qualityadviceorservice,manyreferredtothevariablequalityoflegalwork.IndiscussinginterventionstoassistLiPsincourt,onejudgereferredtothe“morecommonsituation,whereonesidehasgotaverygoodlawyerandtheotheroneishopeless”.Judgesandregistrystaffalsocommentedonthepoorqualityofdocumentspresentedbysomelawyers:
[LiPdocuments]varytremendously,justasdocumentsfiledbylawyersvarytremendously.…[S]omelawyers’documentsareequallywordyandunorganised.(HighCourtJudge)
You’dbesurprisedhowterriblesomelawyers’submissionsare.(HighCourtJudge)
LiPreportsofpoor-qualityservicefromlawyersarebasedontheirpercep-tionsonly,buttheJudges’commentssuggestthatLiPperceptionsmaybecorrectinsomeinstances.
Itisalsopossiblethatsomelitigantsrightlyperceivethattheirabilities,andtheircommitment to theircase,willoutstrip thatofa lawyer,oratleastlawyeringofthequalityorquantitythattheycanafford.Lawyersandregistrystaffreferredtooccasionallyencounteringlitigantswhowereexcep-
47 Thisissuewascitedbyalitigantwhothoughtherlawyercouldnotseethroughherex-partner’spublicpersona,whichshesaiddivergedfromhisabusivebehaviourinprivate.SeeNanSeuffert“LawyeringforWomenSurvivorsofDomesticViolence”(1996)4(1)WaiLRev1at52.
48 SomeLiPsinfamilylawcasessaidthattheystruggledtorelatetoyounglawyerswhohadnoexperienceofmarriageandchildren.OtherLiPs,ingeneralcivilandfamilycases,referredtolawyers’discomfortwithemotion.
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 737
tionallyableor“outstanding”,althoughtheyemphasisedthiswasunusual.ManyjudgesobservedthatafewLiPsdoa“goodjob”ofputtingtheircase.
(b) Perceptions of lawyers’ services
TheotherissuerelevanttowhysomeLiPsbelievetheycandothejobaswellasalawyeristheirperceptionofwhatalawyer’sworkentails.ThegreatmajorityofLiPsinterviewedhadengagedalawyeratthebeginningoftheirproceedingsbutthenleftrepresentation.Whiletheywererepresentedtheyhadgainedconfidenceandexperiencefromwatchingtheirlawyermanagingtheircase.Othershadgainedexperienceofthecourtsystemfromtheirownprofessionallife.49SomeLiPsalsoencounteredencouragementandsupportfromothers,particularlypeoplewhohadpreviouslylitigatedinperson,whichstrengthenedtheirconfidencetoproceedwithoutalawyer.50
These litigants tended tominimise the role that lawyers perform,reducingit tofillingoutpaperwork,knowingtheprocess,oramendingdocumentsto“justputthelawyerbitsin”(FamilyCourtLiP).Organised,confidentindividualswhohadsomeexperience(eitherinaprofessionalcontextorasaclient)orsomesupportfrompreviousLiPsfelttheycoulddothisworkthemselvesandwereunpreparedtopay(andborrowtopay)thelawyer’shourlyrate.AsaformerLiP,nowactingasaMcKenzieFriendintheFamilyCourt,explained:
I’vegotguyswhoareengineerson$50/hour.Whentheyseea lawyergetting$450/hour, theyarejustcompletelydisgustedbyit,particularlywhentheworkisdonebehindthescenes.Andtheythink,well,Icandothat.
ThispreviousexperienceinlitigationandsupportfromotherswasimportantnotonlyinprovidingwhatLiPssawassufficienttechnicalskillstorunthelitigation,butalsoindemystifyingtheprocess.AnumberofLiPswhogainedexperienceinitiallyasrepresentedlitigantsreferredtohavingovercomethe“fearandemotion”ofcourt(FamilyCourtLiP)andthefactthatthishadgiven them theconfidence toappear inperson:“I’mover the fearnow…Iknowallofthisisfearandit’sjustartificial”(HighCourtLiP).ByproceedinginpersonsomeLiPsalsofoundthat,notonlyhadtheyovercomethisfear,butthattheynowappreciatedthesenseofcontroltheyhadgainedovertheirowncase:“Self-representingformebegantomakemefeelincontrolandbecomepartofthesystem”(FamilyCourtLiP).
49 LiPparticipants’previousprofessionalexperienceincludedrolesasexpertwitnesses,policeofficers,alegalsecretaryandaprobationofficer.
50 EncouragementcamefromvarioussourcesincludingMcKenzieFriends,formerLiPs,avaluerappointedinacase,andanLiP’sformerlawyer.
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Afurtheraspectof theLiPs’perceptionsof lawyers’workwas thecommonideathatthelawyerhadfailedtoprogresstheircase:“Ihadspentanawfullotonlawyersandhadwonzero,absolutelynothing”(FamilyCourtLiP).TheLiPsdidnotnecessarilyblamethisfailureontheir individuallawyer.Someblamedtheintransigenceoftheopposingparty,particularlywheretheopposingpartywasbetterfunded(eitherbylegalaidorprivately).Otherssawitasalegalcultureproblemwithlawyersendlesslyexchangingletters,ratherthan“justgettingonwithit”andgoingtocourt,whenresolutionoutofcourtseemedunlikely.Fromthisperspective,lawyerswereseenasineffective,orevenabarriertoresolvingthecase.Afewsaidtheybelievedlawyersweretryingtodragoutproceedingstomakemoremoneybutmorethoughtlegalculturemeanttoomuchtimewasspenttryingtosettlethecase,ratherthanproceedingtocourt.Wherethelawyerwasviewedasmakingnoprogress,whetherornottheLiPthoughtitwasthelawyer’sfault,LiPsweredissatisfiedwithcontinuingtopaythelawyer.
Thus,throughtheirownexperienceswithlawyerstheyconsulted,theconfidencebuiltthroughobservinglawyersinaction,andthroughcontactwithotherLiPs,manyLiPscametobelieve(whethercorrectlyornot)thattheycouldlitigateaswellasalawyer,oratleastaswellasthelawyerstheyhadencountered.Thiswasnotsomucharrogance,asjudgesandlawyersinferred,asitwasa(mis)perceptionbasedontheirexperienceoflawyers’servicesandtheirbeliefsaboutthenatureoflegalwork.
C Won’t pay: Freedom to argue an unarguable case
Aconcernamongthelegalprofessionandjudiciarywasthatpeopleappearinpersonbecausetheyarebringinganunmeritoriousapplicationthatnolawyerwillargue:“Onesuspects they’ve triedoutcertain lawyerswhohavesaid,‘Youdon’thaveacase’”(HighCourtJudge).Thisgroupwasconsideredtobemadeupofbullishlitigantswho“aresuretheyarerightandtheycan’tseesense”(civillitigationlawyer),butwasalsoseentocontainthreesub-groups:thoseusingthecourtstomakeapoliticalstand,thosewhowere“hobby”litigators,andthosewhowere“obsessive”,“querulant”or“vexatious”(termsusedbylawyersandjudges).
Litigantsmakingapoliticalstandwereoftenarguingthatthecourthadnojurisdictionoverthem.TheHighCourtJudgessaidLiPsusuallymadethisargumentonthebasisofMāorisovereignty,oronthebasisthat“theyareasovereignstateandtheyhavetheirownseal”(HighCourtJudge).51As
51 ThesetypesofclaimsarisemostcommonlyinprosecutionsbytheCrownorbyothergovernmentagenciessuchasInlandRevenueorMinistryofFisheries,butalsoariseincivilcases;see,forexample,Gordon: Of the House of Israel v SextonHCHamiltonCIV-
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 739
oneHighCourtJudgeexplained,“theanswertothosequestionsis,fromalegalperspective,prettyobvious”,buttheirmotivationisto“ventilatetheirfeelingsaboutthesystemgenerally…Isuspectalsotheyknowtheyaregoingtolose,buttheyjustwanttogoonandmakeapoint”.For“hobby”LiPs,thejudgesthoughttheremightbearguableissuestotheircase,buttheywerealsocomingtocourtbecause,forthem,litigationwasapastimeinitself.Theseweremembersofthegeneralcommunity,orprisonersappearinginperson,who,whilepossiblyhavinganarguablecase,werealsomotivatedbytheenjoymentoflitigatingandabreakfromroutine.Thejudgesdiscussinghobbyorrepeatlitigatorsregardedthemwithcaution.Theywereseenaseitherobsessivelitigants,orontheirwaytobecomingobsessive:“Oncetheydecidethatlitigationisgoodsportthentheyarestartingtomoveintothequerulantcategory”(HighCourtJudge).
(1)LiPperspectivesonarguingthe“unarguable”
Lawyers and judgesmay overemphasise the extent towhichLiPs arepreparedtodeliberatelytakeanunmeritoriouscase.OnlytwoLiPsreferredtorunninganargumentorcasethatalawyerhaddirectlycounselledagainstasareasonforbecominganLiP.Oneoftheseinfactsucceededinsecuringcourtordersforaccesstohischildren,whenhereportedthatthelawyerheconsultedsaidhehadlittlechance.IftheLiP’srecountingoftheadviceisaccurate,itsuggeststhatnoteverycasethatalawyerthinksisunarguableisnecessarilyso.TheotherLiPbecameapersistentlitigant,bringingmultipleproceedings,manyofwhichwereunsuccessful.
ThisisnottosaythatLiPsareonlybringingmeritoriouscases.TwoLiPsinthestudymayhavebeenusingthelegalprocesstooppresstheiropposingparty.Thecourtaccusedthemofdoingsobuttheydeniedthisanddidnotcitethisasareasonforlitigatinginperson.52Bothweremenwhoseopposingpartywasanex-partnerwhohadaccusedthemofdomesticviolence.53
ThisstudydidnotassessthemeritsofLiPs’cases,sonofirmconclusionscanbeofferedon this issue.TheTrinder study in the familycourtsofEnglandandWalesdid,however,assessmeritandfoundthatLiPsbrought
2006-419-1765,15December2006.ForadiscussionofLiP“Freemen-on-the-Land”intheCanadiancontextseeAmySalyzyn“Canada:Foreclosures,Freemen,ForeignLawSchoolsandtheContinuingSearchforMeaningfulAccesstoJustice”(2013)16LegalEthics223at226–228.
52 Theywere takingnotonlycoreproceedingsagainst theopposingparty,butwerealsolaunchingcollateralproceedings,suchasjudicialreviewandanactionundertheHarassmentAct1997.
53 Thisisconsistentwithdomesticviolenceresearchwhichhasdiscussedabusivepartnersusingthelegalsystemtofurthertheabuse;see,forexample,Seuffert,aboven47,at50.
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nomoreunmeritoriousapplicationsthanrepresentedlitigants.Thatstudyalso found that therewereequalnumbersofpersistent litigantsamongLiPsandthosewhowererepresented.54LegalprofessionalsmaythereforeoveremphasisethepointthatLiPslitigateinpersonbecausetheywanttobringanunmeritoriouscase.
Onereasonforlitigatinginpersonlawyersandjudgesdidnotmention,but thatfeaturedinsomeLiPs’reasoning,wasthebenefitofbeingfreefromtheculturalandstructuralrestraintsimposedonlawyers.AfewLiPsbelievedlawyerswouldratherprotecttheirreputationandavoidannoyingajudge—forthesakeofsuccessinlatercasesandtheirstandinginthelegalcommunity—thanstronglyarguethecasethattheLiPwantedputforward.Somealsobelieved that lawyerswouldnot zealously litigateanycasedirectedagainstlawyers,judgesorthegovernment:“theyarenotwantingtotakeontheirbrethrentolynchthem”(HighCourtLiP).Afewcriticisedlawyersformakingcommentsincourtsuchas“I’minyourHonour’shands”(surrenderingtheadvocacyrole)and“myclientinstructs”(signallingtothebenchthelawyerdoesnotagreewiththeinstructions).55Thesebeliefsweremostcommonamong(butnotexclusiveto)persistentlitigants.TheseLiPssawthepurposeoftheirlitigationasgoingbeyondtheirimmediatecase,asexposingwhattheysawascorruptionin“thesystem”.56Aslawyersare“partofthesystem”,theseLiPsdidnottrustlawyerstoadvocatetheircase.
D Won’t pay: Come to court and justice will be done
Onejudgeandsomelawyerssuggestedthatitmightbebeliefsaboutthecourtsystemthatwasdrivingrepresentationdecisions:abeliefthatjusticewillbedone,regardlessofrepresentation.Thisispartlydrivenbymessagesfromthecourts.Asacivillitigationlawyerobserved,peoplewhohavehad“acoupleofscrapsintheDisputesTribunal”(wherelitigatinginpersonismandatory)canbeledtobelievethat“gettinginvolvedinaDistrictCourtorHighCourtproceeding…mightnotbemuchofastepup”.Online,simplifiedforms,aswerebeingusedintheDistrictCourtduringthisresearch,canalsogivetheimpressionthatallcourtsareaccessibleinperson.
OnejudgeandsomelawyersalsothoughtthatcommunitybeliefsaboutthecourtsandjusticemaybefuellingtheincreasingnumbersofLiPs.One
54 Trinderandothers,aboven16,at31–32. 55 ForadiscussionofsignallingtothecourttheclientisactingagainstadviceseeLloyd
CHarris“TheEmotionalLabourofBarristers:AnExplorationofEmotionalLabourByStatusProfessionals”(2002)39JournalofManagementStudies553at569–570.
56 Thisbeliefwascoupledwitha(seeminglycontradictory)beliefthatbybringinglitigationtheywouldexposethatcorruption.
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 741
lawyercitedthedo-it-yourselfattitudeofKiwicultureasapossibledriver.AjudgeinAucklandcommentedthatimmigrantcommunities(alargeandgrowingpartoftheAucklandpopulation)“havefaithinourjudicialsystem…andthereforetheydon’tneedtogetalawyerbecausethepooroldafflictedNewZealandjudgewilldeliverforthem”.
LawyersalsoreferredtoclientsandLiPshavinga“rose-tinted”viewofjustice.Asafamilylawyerexplained,shethoughtLiPswerethosewhobelievedtheydidnotneedprofessionalassistancebecause“theyworkonthebasisofwhatisfairandwhatisnotfair”.TheseLiPsdonotseealawyerasnecessary:“Alltheyhavetodoisgothroughtheprocessandgettheinformationoutfromtheirperspectiveandthejudgewillcometotherightanswer.”
(1)LiPs’perspectivesonthejusticesystem
SomeLiPs’commentssupported the lawyers’ impressions,as theLiPsexpressedastrongbeliefthatthecourtswoulddeliverjusticeandthereforehaving a lawyerwas unnecessary. LiPs suggested a lawyerwas onlynecessaryifyouhadsomethingtohide,57butifyouare“honestandtellthetruth…youcan’tgowrong”(FamilyCourtLiP).
LiPsexpressingthisbeliefplacedsignificantweightonknowingthefactsoftheircase.Consistentwithotherstudies,58manyLiPsthoughttheirdetailedknowledgeofthesefacts,outstrippingwhattheythoughtalawyercouldorwouldlearnaboutthem,wouldbenefitthemandtheircase:
[Alawyer]…wouldhavebeenuselesstous.Becausewewouldhavehadtogothroughthepalaver,gettingthemtogettogripswithourcase.Theyweren’tmotivatedtotheextentthatwearemotivated.(HighCourtLiP)
Noneoftheselitigantssuggestedthelawyermightnotneedtoknowtheircasewiththislevelofdetail,orthatallthedetailmaynotbelegallysalient.Instead,theyassociateddetailedknowledgeoffactswithsuccess.
ForsomeoftheseLiPs,presentingthelegalcase(includingresearchingthelegalmerits)seemedunnecessary,becausetheythoughtoncetheirtruthwaspresentedtheanswerwouldbeobviousonthejusticeofthecase.AssuggestedbyastudyinEnglandandWales,thejusticethatLiPsdrewupon
57 FordiscussionaboutthisconceptionoflawyersseeMarcGalanterLowering the Bar: Lawyer Jokes and Legal Culture(UniversityofWisconsinPress,Madison(WI),2005)at34.
58 Seen24above.
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includedassumptionsaboutthelawandtheirownmoralreasoning,ortheydrewuponsomemixoflegalprinciplesandtheirsenseofjustice.59
OthersLiPsconsideredthat thelegalaspectsof theircasewouldbeaddressedbythejudgebecause,asalayperson,theycouldnotbeexpectedtoknowthelaw.Sotheyonlyneededtopresentthefacts.Theyalsocommonlyassumedthatthecourtstaffandjudgewouldassistthemandwouldmodifyaspectsoftheprocess,includingthelanguageandprocedure,toensuretheycouldparticipate:
Myunderstandingofthenormalcourtisthatifyouself-representthereisarequirementforthelawtobefairandequal—thattheymustbringtheirterminologyandallthatdowntoyourlevel.(FamilyCourtLiP)
Similarly,aFamilyCourtlawyerrelatedastoryofanLiPphoningforfreeadviceabouthisaffidavitandsubmissions:“Hejustwantedmetotellhim,hethoughtitwasmydutytotellhim.”Tosomeextentthisexpectationwasborneout.Manycourtstaff,lawyersandjudgesdogooutoftheirwaytoassistLiPsaccessthesystem.60
E No single reason
AstrikingaspectofLiPs’narrativesaboutwhytheylitigatedinperson,inlinewiththeinternationalstudiescitedabove,wasthemultipleandoverlappingreasonstheyoffered.61Nostrictdichotomybetweenthe“can’tpays”and“won’tpays”thereforeseemstoexist.Butthissupposeddichotomyisstillfrequentlyreferredto,andrecentlyitwasevenproposedthatdifferentformsofassistancemightberequiredforLiPsdepending,atleastinpart,onthesedifferentmotivesforproceedinginperson.62Thismayinpartbemotivatedbythepoliticalcontext.Whenagitatingformorelegalaidfunding, it isexpedienttoemphasisethenumberofpeoplewhoareproceedinginpersonbecausethey“can’tpay”.Similarly,whencomplainingabouttheburdenLiPsplaceonthecourt,itisadvantageoustoemphasisethenumberofpeoplewho
59 RichardMoorhead“ThePassiveArbiter:Litigants inPersonandtheChallengetoNeutrality”(2007)17SocialandLegalStudies405at409.
60 Forexample, thereweremanyincidentsreportedbyLiPsin interviewsorwhichIobserved,ofcourtstaff, lawyersandjudgesspending timeexplainingprocessandproceduretoLiPs.OtherassistanceincludedjudgesandopposinglawyersignoringminorproceduralflawsinLiPdocumentsandlawyerssendingopposingLiPsphotocopiesofcourtrulesorchaptersfromatextbookonadvocacy.
61 Seen16above. 62 See,forexample,Richardson,SourdinandWallace,aboven1,at[2.8].
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 743
litigateinpersonbecausethey“won’tpay”.63Therealityhoweverismorecomplex,sothepointthereforebearsrepeating:evenincaseswherethereasonforlitigatinginpersonwasostensiblyfinancial,theLiPsinvolvedstilloftenexpressedambivalenceaboutwhethertheyreallyneededorwantedalawyer.People’sreasonsforlitigatinginpersonareembeddedinawebofconceptionsaboutthenatureofthelegalmarket,thefunctionslawyersandcourtsperform,andtheirnotionsofjustice.Thiscomplexitycannotbecapturedadequatelyinasimpledichotomy.
V Discussion
Thesefindingsas towhypeople litigate inperson largelyconcurwithpreviousresearch.What, then,dotheseoverlappingandmorecomplexexplanationsmeanforthelegalsystemandthelegalprofession,andwhataretheimplicationsforindividualLiPs?
A Accessibility and popular understandings of courts
SomeLiPscanbeseenasacceptingat facevalue the invitationof thestate to solve their own disputes in the courts. Sally EngleMerry, inheranthropological studyof legalconsciousnessamongworking-classAmericans,arguesthatanumberofreformsinthe20thcenturycreatedanenvironmentinwhichworking-classpeoplefelttheycouldbringtheirproblemstocourt.64Thisincludedthedevelopmentof thewelfarestate,newlegislationregulatingfamilyandneighbourhoodlife,subsidisedlegalservicesforthepoor,high-profilecivilrightslitigation,andtheactivismofthe1960sanditsassociatedlegislation.EngleMerryconcludes:65
Thesechanges[welfarereformandcivilrightslitigation]createdanewideologyofthestateasfriendlyandsupportive,astheprotectorofthepoorandweakandastheregulatorofthestrong…Duringthetwentiethcentury,thelawhasgraduallytakenonanewfaceastheprotectoroftheweakandvulnerable,asatoolforachievingsocialjustice,andasaweaponagainstbigbusinessandcorporatepower.Thus, thegovernmenthasinasenseinvitedordinarypeopletobringtheirproblemstothecourts.
63 TheauthorthanksananonymousrefereeofthisReviewforthesuggestion. 64 SallyEngleMerryGetting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among
Working-Class Americans(UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,1990)at176–178. 65 At178.
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TheNewZealandenvironmentis,ofcourse,differenttothatoftheUnitedStates.NewZealanddoesnothave judicial reviewof legislationnorahistoryofcivilrightslitigationthatmirrorscasessuchasBrown v Board of Education.66However,manyofthechangesthatoccurredintheUnitedStateslegalenvironmentinthe20thcenturyalsooccurredinNewZealand.Therewasincreasinglegislationregulatingaspectsoffamilyandneighbourhoodlife,thereweresignificantwelfarereforms,therewerereformstomakethecourtsmoreaccessible,67andlegalaidwasintroduced.68TheNewZealandgovernmentcanthereforealsobeseenasextendinganinvitationto thepeopletousethecourts.
Sarat, citingEngleMerry, argues that theUnitedStates (likeNewZealand)isatleasttheoreticallycommittedtoanideologythatreliesbothonprotectinglaw’sautonomyandonpromotingits“opennessandavailabilitytosociallyandpoliticallydisadvantagedgroups,tothoseseekingredressforinjuriesinflicted,protectionfromfutureharm,orvindicationoftheirmembershipinthecommunity”.69Hearguesthat, ifcourtscanmaintaintheappearanceofbothaccessibilityandautonomy,thentheycanprovidea“terrainofcontestationonwhichthepowerlesscanholdthepowerfultoaccount”.70Thisinturnprotectsthelegitimacyofthecourts,projectingtheappearancethattheyareaccessibletoall,notsimplyadomainoftherich.71
66 AlthoughNewZealanddoeshaveahistoryoflitigationinrelationtoMāorirightsandahistoryofstrongdecisionsfromtheCourtofAppeal.SeeMichaelTaggart“Rugby,theAnti-apartheidMovement,andAdministrativeLaw”inRickBigwood(ed)Public Interest Litigation(LexisNexisNZ,Wellington,2006);andSamBookman“ProvidingOxygenfortheFlames?TheStateofPublicInterestLitigationinNewZealand”(2013)25NZULR442.
67 In1976theSmallClaimsTribunalsAct1976establishedwhatisnowknownastheDisputesTribunal,forcommonformsoflow-valuedisputes.
68 TheLegalAidAct1969introducedcivillegalaidtoNewZealandforthoseof“smallormoderatemeans”:seeLegalAidAct,LongTitle.
69 AustinSarat“GoingtoCourt:Access,Autonomy,andtheContradictionsofLiberalLegality”inDavidKairys(ed)The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique(3rded,BasicBooks,NewYork,1998)97at97.SeealsoJudithResnikandDennisCurtisRepresenting Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms (YaleUniversityPress,NewHavenandLondon,2011)atxv(arguingadjudicationisdemocraticasindividualscanobligeotherstotreatthemasequals).
70 Sarat,aboven69,at97–98.RichardLAbel“Delegalization:ACriticalReviewofItsIdeology,Manifestations,andSocialConsequences”inErhardBlankenburg,EkkehardKlausaandHubertRottleuthner(eds)Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht: Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (West-deutscherVerlag,Opladen,1980)27at41makesasimilarargument.
71 DavidMTrubek“ComplexityandContradictionintheLegalOrder:BalbusandtheChallengeofCriticalSocialThoughtaboutLaw”(1977)11Law&Society529at541;Sarat,aboven69;andResnikandCurtis,aboven69,at17.
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 745
LiPs,therefore,canbeseenasrespondingtomessagessentbythecourtsthatcitizensarewelcometocomeandsettledisputesbeforethem.72
Whencitizenswanttotakeupthisrightofaccess,however,“liberaltheorystressesthelimitsofcitizencompetence.Participationisfacilitatedbytheinterventionoftrainedlegalspecialists.”73Thatis,citizensarewelcome,butcomewithalawyer.Thelawyerthentakestheroleofscreeningclaims,encouragingsettlement,andtranslatingtheclaimintolegalform.74LiPs,however,takethemessagethatcourtsareaccessibleatfacevalue,andignorethemessagethattheaccessmustbemediatedbyalawyer.
B Failure to convince consumers of the value of professional services
SowhyareLiPsnotacceptinglegalservicesasnecessary?Abel,reviewingtheoriesofthelegalprofession,arguesthatinordertoconstructaprofessionalserviceasavaluablecommodity,“[f]irst,theconsumermustacknowledgethevalueoftheproducer’sservices.…[s]econd,consumersmustbeconvincedthattheycannotproducetheservicesthemselves”.75Successinachievingthesegoalsreliesonanumberoffactors, includingtheaffordabilityoftheservice, thecommunity’sbeliefsabout theservice, thenatureof theprofessionalexpertiseonoffer,andtheabilityoftheprofessiontoresistchallengestoitshegemony—forexample,bypara-legalprofessionals.76
(1)Legalmarket
Theshortpointisthatlegalservicesarepricedatsuchalevelthatmany(orevenmost)peopleareunableorunwillingtopurchasethem.77Asdiscussedabove,thiswasrecognisedbyallthegroupsofparticipantsinthestudyastheprimaryreasonforpeoplelitigatinginperson.
72 ThissupportsMather’sandMoorheadandSefton’ssuggestionthatdecisionstolitigateinpersonareinfluencedbythecourt’sprojectionofopenness.Seen34andn36above.
73 Sarat,aboven69,at102. 74 WilliamLFFelstinerandAustinSarat“EnactmentsofPower:NegotiatingRealityand
ResponsibilityinLawyer-ClientInteractions”(1992)77CornellLRev1447at1459. 75 RichardLAbelThe Legal Profession in England and Wales(BasilBlackwell,Oxford,
1988)at8. 76 At8–10. 77 TheCivilJusticeCouncilnotedthatintheUnitedKingdomcontext,“…thosewhocannot
affordlegalservicesandthoseforwhomthestatewillnotprovidelegalaidcomprisethelargerpartofthepopulationofEnglandandWales”:Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or self-represented litigants): A Report and Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor and to the Lord Chief Justice(CivilJusticeCouncil,November2011)at[31].
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Theconventionalreasonsofferedforwhylegalfeesarehigh,accordingtoHadfield,are:“lawyersareanavariciouslotwhowillbleedyoudry”;“legaltrainingisexpensive”;and“lawyersenjoyastate-grantedmonopolyoverwhichtheycontrolentryforthepurposesofprotectingthepublic”.78 However,Hadfieldconcludesthatnoneofthesereasonsare“particularlycompelling”,althoughtheyholdsomekerneloftruth.79Instead,shearguesthattherearemultiplesourcesofimperfectioninthelegalmarketthatcauselegalresourcestobe“pulleddisproportionatelyintothecommercialsphere,andindividualsarelargelypricedout”.80Thisisa“deep,structural”problemrather than,as iscommonlyassumed,afailureof lawyers tomeet theirprofessionalobligations.81Theresultisacommoditythatmostindividualssimplycannotafford.82
(2)Relationshipsbetweenlawyersandclients
Oneof themajor reasonsLiPsoffered for litigating inpersonwas theperceptionthattheyhadpreviouslyreceivedapoor-qualitylegalservice.TherearenoNewZealandstudiesexamininglawyers’performance,butsomeLiPssawproblemswiththeirformerlawyer’sbehaviour,rangingfromincompetencetoabusiveness.Thejudgesandlawyersinterviewed,ontheotherhand,didnotofferbadlawyeringasanexplanationforlitigatinginperson.Yettheydidnotetherewasvariablequalityinlawyers’work—asinternationalresearchshows.83Thisvariationmayoccurforavarietyofreasons.Forexample,theymaybeinadequatelyfundedsospendlittletimeonthecase,84ortheymayberespondingtoinstitutionalpressurestorapidly
78 GillianKHadfield“ThePriceofLaw:HowtheMarketforLawyersDistortstheJusticeSystem”(2000)98MichLRev953at954.
79 At954. 80 At956.Thesourcesof imperfectionaredevelopedat lengthin thearticlebutcan
besummarisedas(a)thecomplexityofthelaw;(b)themonopolythestatehasovercoercivedisputeresolution;and(c)theunifiednatureofthelegalprofession.
81 At1001. 82 Abel,aboven75,at10. 83 RichardMoorhead“LawyerSpecialization—ManagingtheProfessionalParadox”
(2010)32LawandPolicy226;WilliamLFFelstinerandBenPettit“Paternalism,Power,andRespectinLawyer–ClientRelations”inJosephSandersandVLeeHamilton(eds)Handbook of Justice Research in Law (KluwerAcademic,NewYork,2001)135at146whereFelstinerandPettitlist15US-basedstudiesfromthe1960s–1990sthat“indicat[e]thatlawyersfrequentlydoinfactneglectandshowlittlerespectfortheirclients”;andDrewASwank“InDefenseofRulesandRoles:TheNeedtoCurbExtremeFormsofProSeAssistanceandAccommodationinLitigation”(2005)54AmULRev1537at1577.
84 DeborahLRhode“AccesstoJustice:Again,Still”(2004)73FordhamLRev1013at1014(notingthat,intheUnitedStates,forlawyersrepresentingindigentcriminal
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 747
processcasesandmaintainrelationshipswithjudgesandcourtstaff.85Thesepressuresmayencouragelawyerstousevariousstrategiesthatcan,Newmanargues,be“construedasclientabuse”,suchas:86
[A]ctingliketheboss;makingthebigdecisions;playingmindgames;usingvague,ambiguousandineffectivelanguage;exaggeratingtheharmfuloutcomesto theclient;pressuringtheclient toacceptapleadeal;andignoringclient’sinstructions,decisionsandbestinterests.
Whereclientsperceivetheyarereceivingpoorservice, thisunderminesdemand,astheclientperceivestheyaregettinglittleofvalue.
It isalsopossiblethatsomeclientsreject legalservicesbecausethedominantformoflegalserviceistoseparatetheemotionalfromthelegalaspectsofacase.87Attemptingtodosomayonlyalienatesomeclients.Whenlawyersconstantlyreturntheattentiontofactualmatters,ratherthantheiremotionalsignificance,theeffectmaybetoexpressindifferencetowardstheaspectsthataremostsignificanttotheperson.88LiPsmay,ofcourse,nothaveanaccurateunderstandingofthedegreeoflegalassistancetheyneed.Thepoint,however,is thatwhenlawyersdonot“doemotion”,orwhenwell-intentionedbutjuniorlawyersfailtorelatetotheemotionalaspectof
accused,“adequatepreparationisaquickroutetofinancialruin”). 85 Lawyersinsomecourtsmaybelockedintothetypeofexchangerelationshipdescribed
inAbrahamSBlumberg“ThePracticeofLawasConfidenceGame:OrganizationalCooptationofaProfession”(1967)1Law&SocietyReview15,wherelawyersactas“doubleagents”,convincingtheircriminaldefendantclientstoplea-bargain.Seeat22wherehedescribestheroleofthedefencelawyer“doubleagent”aspartofa“rathertenuousresolution”tothe“almost irreconcilableconflict”between“intensepressurestoprocesslargenumbersofcasesontheonehand,andthestringentideologicalandlegalrequirementsof‘dueprocessoflaw’,ontheotherhand”.ThecontextthatBlumbergdescribesisspecific,butitispossiblethatelementsofsuchanexchangearealsooccurringinthecivilcourtswheretherearehighvolumesofcasesandmanyofthelawyershaveanongoingrelationshipwiththecourt.
86 DanielNewmanLegal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice(HartPublishing,Oxford,2013)at142.
87 Harris, aboven55, at571suggests that“‘emotionaldetachment’ is equatedwith‘rational’competence”inboththelegalandmedicalprofessionsandthatbarristersconsiderbeingemotionallydetachedallowsthemtoargueanypoint,regardlessofpersonalbeliefintheirclient’scase.SharynRoachAnleuandKathyMack“Magistrates’EverydayWorkandEmotionalLabour”(2005)32JournalofLawandSociety590at591alsoarguethatoneofthefunctionsoflegalrepresentativesisto“filteroutormanage”thelitigant’semotionssothatonlythelegallysalientcaseispresentedtothecourt.Thisprocessbeginsinthelawyer’soffice:AustinSaratandWilliamLFFelstiner“LawandStrategyintheDivorceLawyer’sOffice”(1986)20Law&SocietyReview93.
88 SaratandFelstiner,aboven87,at132.
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acase,theirclientsdonotgetwhattheyfeeltheyneed,andarethereforelesswillingtopurchasetheirservice.
(3)Popularunderstandingsoflawandlawyers
Abel argues thatwhether consumers believe they need a professionalserviceispartlydeterminedbybeliefsprevalentintheculture,“overwhichprofessionalsonlyhavelimitedcontrol”.89TheLiPs’reasons,asdiscussedabove, includedbeliefsaboutwhat lawyersdoandhowtheadversarialsystemworks,thatledthemtobelievetheycoulddothejobaswellasalawyer.Thiswasnotexpressedasabeliefthatthecasewassimpleenoughtomanage themselves,whichprevious researchsuggests is acommonreasonforlitigatinginperson,90butratherintermsofminimisingwhatrolelawyersperform.LiPsalsobelievedthatwhattheylackedinexperienceorprofessionaltrainingcouldbemadeupbyotherbenefits.Inparticular,someLiPsbelieveditisbeneficialtobeabletotelltheirwholestorythemselves,withafullcommandofthedetailandcontrollinghowitispresentedtothejudge.Thisisaseductiveideaifcoupledwiththeotherbeliefthatagoodcaseonlyrequiresthatthefactsbeputbeforeajudgeforjustice(withoutreferencetolegalprinciple)tobedone,andforthetruthtocomeout.Thisfinding is consistentwithConley andO’Barr’s studyof the discourseemployedbyLiPsinsmallclaimslitigation(pre-trialandpost-trial).TheyfoundthatoneofthetasksLiPsoftenfailedtoperformwasreframingtheirproblemintoajusticiableissue.Theyinsteadpresentedtheirnarrativetothecourtandexpectedthecourttoextractthecauseofactionandtheoryofthecasefromthatpresentation,ataskthatacourtinanadversarialsystemdoesnotperform.91
These laybeliefsabout thecivil justicesystemand thenatureofalawyer’sfunctionsminimisethevalueof theservicethat lawyersoffer,making it less likely that consumersholding suchbeliefswillwant topurchasetheirservices.Judgesandlawyers,however,caneasilyinterpretsuchbeliefsasarrogance,becausetheydistrusttheassumptionthatajobforwhichtheyhavetrainedformanyyearscanbeperformedbyanyone.
(4)Alternativestolegalservices
A further factor inminimising the valueof a lawyer’s service, and inencouraging LiPs’ belief that they can do the job themselves, is the
89 Abel,aboven75,at8. 90 Seen22above. 91 WilliamMO’BarrandJohnMConley“LayExpectationsoftheCivilJusticeSystem”
(1988)22Law&SocietyReview137.
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 749
experiencepeoplegainthroughlitigating—aspara-legalprofessionals,representedlitigants,orpreviousLiPs.LiPsreferredtolosingtheirfearofthecourtsandgainingtheexperiencethatenabledthemtoconfidentlyrepresentthemselves.EngleMerrynotesthislossoffearaspeoplehavemorecontactwiththecourts,bothcriminalandcivil:92
Withexperience,thecourtgraduallyceasestobeaplaceforaweandfear,onewhichimposesharshpenaltieswithinexorablefirmness,andbecomesa somewhatpliant, if excruciatinglycomplex, institutionwhich,withpressureandpatience,cansometimesbemadetoyieldhelp.
Thisconfidencesometimesevaporatedaslitigantsmovedfurtherthroughthecourtprocess,particularlyiftheyhadtorunatrialthemselves,butthelossoffearwasanimportantpartofdecidingtolitigateinperson.
Networkshavealsoemerged,onlineandinperson,forsupportingLiPsdoingthiswork.Thesupportdoesnotconsistsomuchof thematerialsavailableonlinetoexplaincourtprocesses,whichotherresearchhassuggestedmaystimulatedecisionstolitigateinperson.Itisinsteadagrowingnetworkoflike-mindedpeoplewhoformaself-helpsupportgroup.93Thegrowthofthesenetworksmayreflectthegrowthofsocialnetworksgenerally,orbeakintothegrowthofself-helpsupportgroupsforthosewithvariousillnessesorconditions,ortheirfamilymembers.ThismayinturnaffectthenumberofLiPs,producingasnowballingeffectwhensomeLiPs(orformerLiPs)supportotherstodothesame.DuringthisresearchIlearnedoftwoFacebookgroupsofferingassistance,bothemotionalandlegal,forpeoplemakingFamilyCourtapplications.SeveralofNewZealand’smostpersistentLiPshavetheirownwebsites,shareresources,andcommentoneachother’smaterialonline,aswellasmeetingeachotherinperson.IalsolearnedofMcKenzieFriendsofferingservices,mostlyunpaid,butsometimesforafee,94supportingpeopleindraftingcourtdocumentsandattendingcourthearings.Thisdevelopmentcanbeseenasachallengetotheprofessionalhegemonyoflawyers,orastheriseofanalternativerepresentationmodelforlowercost,makingthecourtmoreeasilyaccessedinpersonormorecheaply.
92 Merry,aboven64,at142. 93 Seen37above.MaterialsavailableonlineinNewZealandarecurrentlylimited. 94 Chargingafeeissupposedlyprohibited:LawCommissionDelivering Justice for All:
A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals(NZLCR85,2004)at[92],n44;andMihaka v Police[1981]1NZLR54(HC).ContrasttheUnitedKingdomwhereMcKenzieFriendsarepermittedtochargeforservices.AconsultationiscurrentlyinprogressonMcKenzieFriendsinthecourtsinEnglandandWales:LordChiefJusticeofEnglandandWalesReforming the Courts’ Approach to McKenzie Friends: A Consultation(CourtsandTribunalsJudiciary,February2016).
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Abelpointsoutthatthischallengetolawyers’hegemonycanresultinmorepeopledecliningtopurchasetheirprofessionalservices.95
C Reasons for litigating in person: Why it matters what judges think
Anumberoftheoriescanthereforebedevelopedtoexplainwhypeoplelitigateinperson,andinincreasingnumbers.Giventhereisarighttolitigateinperson,however,whydoes itmatterwhat judges(or for thatmatterlawyersorcourtstaff )thinkofpeople’sreasonsforcomingtocourtwithoutalawyer?Thejudgesalmostuniformlysaidtheyhadnowayofknowingwhypeoplewerelitigatinginpersonanditdidnotmatterinanycase:
Thereareallsortsofreasonsthatpeoplechoosetoactinperson…Idon’tthinkwecangetintothattoomuchreally.Ijustcan’tseehowitispossible.Allyoutryanddoisactfairlyinthecircumstances.(HighCourtJudge)
Despitethiscaution,repeatedbyalmostalljudgesinterviewed,therewasevidencethattheabsenceofalawyersignalstoajudgethatalitigantmightbeunreasonable.OneHighCourtJudgereferredtothisexplicitly:
It iseasytostartout thinkingthereasontheyare inpersonisbecausethey’vebeencompletelyunreasonableandhaveburntoffalltheirlawyers.Butsometimesthatisnotthecase,soIjusttrytokeepanopenmind.(HighCourtJudge)
Lawyersandjudges,asdiscussed,referredtosomelitigantsappearinginpersonbecausetheircasewasnotarguableandnolawyerwouldactforthem.OneHighCourtJudgereversedthispremiseandsaidthat, if thepersonsaidthattheywerelitigatinginpersonbecause“noonewillactforme”, thenthe“bellsareringingforthisbeinganobsessivelitigant”.Asdiscussed,theremaybeawiderangeofreasonswhy“nobodywilltakemeon”.Itmightbebecausethelitiganthasaweakcase,butalternativelyitmightbebecausetheLiPcannotfindalawyerwiththeexpertisetheyneedforasumtheycanaffordoronewhowillworkonlegalaidrates,ortheymighthaveanuneconomicclaim—thatis,thevalueoftheirclaimislessthanthecostofbringingit.WhileLiPspointtosuchreasonsfortheirlackofrepresentation,oftentoappealtothesympathyofthejudge,thejudges’perceptionsindicatethatthesestatementsmaystillbeinterpretedassignsofunreasonablenessandevenobsession.
95 Abel,aboven75,at8–10.
I Ain’t No Fool: Deciding to Litigate in Person in the Civil Courts 751
Thereisalsoevidenceofsuchreasoninginjudicialdecisions.ThejudgeinonecasereferredtoanLiPashavinghad“anumberoflawyers”andnotedtheselawyers’seniorityandcompetence.ThisLiPhadhadthreepriorlawyers,oneofwhomwascourtappointed.Theopposingparty,whowasrepresented,hadhadtwolawyers,butnomentionwasmadeofthis.InsteadthejudgeusedtheLiP’shistoryofrepresentationassupportfortheargumentthatshewasconductingherselfunreasonablyinthecase.
(1)Thehistoryof“mad”LiPs
Partofthereasonforthisbeliefmightbefoundinthehistoricalbackground.Litigatinginperson,aslittleas20yearsago,wasveryrare.Asonelong-termcourtemployeesaidaboutLiPs,twodecadesagothere“werenone”:
Youdidn’tcometocourtwithoutalawyerunlessyouweresomekindofmadpersonandeveryoneherewouldhavesaid“Sheisthatmadperson,sheactsforherselfandshe’smad”.Itwascompletelyoutrageous[tolitigateinperson].
Whilewedonothaveanyfiguresforhowcommonitisnow,bestestimatesrangebetween10and30percentoflitigants,dependingonthecourtandtypeofcase.Nevertheless,thehistoricallybasedbeliefthatbeinganLiPequatesto“madness”,oratleastbeing“unreasonable”,remains.
(2)Theburdenofstereotypes
Thismayalsobeafunctionofstereotyping,wherethepowerfulingroup(thejudgesandlawyers)promulgatessocialstereotypesabout themorepowerless outgroup (LiPs).96 The stereotype of the outgroup is often“modelledona‘minorityoftheworst’”(themostquerulantLiP),whileanimageoftheingroupismodelledona“minorityofthebest”(themostcompetent,professionalanddedicatedlawyer).97Tajfelarguesthatsocialstereotypesserveseveral functions includingjustifyingactionsadversetotheoutgroup,andproviding“apositivedifferentiationof theingroupfromselectedoutgroupsatatimewhensuchdifferentiationisperceivedas
96 JohnTJostandJojannekevanderToorn“SystemJustificationTheory”inPaulAMVanLange,ArieWKruglanskiandEToryHiggins(eds)Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology(SagePublications,London,2012)313.
97 NorbertEliasandJohnLScotsonThe Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems(2nded,SagePublications,London,1994)at159.
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becominginsecureanderoded”.98Thelegalprofession,itsmonopolyunderthreat,99mightbemorewillingtousesuchstereotypestodifferentiateitself.
Fiskeconsidersanotherfunctionofstereotypes:thattheyanchorpeopletoastartingpointwhentheydealwithsomeonefromthestereotypedgroup,tellingthem“howmostpeopleinthegroupsupposedlybehave,whattheyallegedlyprefer,andwheretheircompetencesupposedlylies”.100Stereotypesallowpeopletoarrangecomplexinformationandcometoeasyjudgements,ratherthanconsideringothersonanattribute-by-attributebasis.101Thisalsomeans“peoplepreferentiallysearchforstereotype-matchinginformation”,wherepeoplenoticeinformationthatconfirmsthestereotypeandignoreinformationwhichisstereotype-inconsistent.102Thefact thatstereotypesreducecognitiveburdenmaymeanthatpowerfulingroups(suchasthelegalprofession)aremorelikelytoengageinstereotyping:“Thepowerless are stereotypedbecausenooneneedsto,can,orwantstobedetailedandaccurateabout them.”103TheseideasmayexplainwhylawyersandjudgesmightadoptacommonsetofbeliefsaboutLiPsmodelledonthemostdifficultones:stereotypesactasacognitiveshortcutandananchorforthinkingaboutthegroup’scompetenceaswellashelpingtomaintainprofessionalidentityagainstincursion.
Aslawyersandjudgesshareprofessionalunderstandings,lawyerscanappeal tothestereotypebymentioningtothejudgethatanLiPhashadmultiple lawyers.Thissignals tothejudgethat theLiPisunreasonable.One civil litigation lawyer recalled a case against anLiPwhohad15
98 HenriTajfel“SocialStereotypesandSocialGroups”inJohnCTurnerandHowardGiles(eds)Intergroup Behaviour(BasilBlackwell,Oxford,1981)144at161.
99 Thelegalprofession’sprotectedareaofworkissmall,withanumberofexceptionstothegeneralrulethatonlylawyershaveanaudienceinacourtortribunal:LawyersandConveyancersAct2006,s24.Thereareover100tribunalsinNewZealand,19ofwhichdeterminefirst-instancecivildisputes:LawCommission Table of all Bodies that may be Considered Tribunals(NZLCOP2,2007).Theirenablinglegislationoftenallowseitherlawyersorlayadvocatestorepresentparties(forexample,HumanRightsReviewTribunal:HumanRightsAct1993,s108(3)),ortheirlegislationmakeslitigationinpersonmandatory(forexample,DisputesTribunal:DisputesTribunalAct1988,s38(7)).LayadvocatesarealsoentitledtoappearintheEmploymentCourtandDistrictCourt(bothforindividualsinlimitedcircumstances,andforcorporations):EmploymentRelationsAct2000,sch3(2);andDistrictCourtsAct1947,s57.
100 SusanTFiske“ControllingOtherPeople:TheImpactofPoweronStereotyping”(1993)48AmericanPsychologist621at623.
101 Tajfel,aboven98,at163;Fiske,aboven100,at623. 102 SusanTFiske“Stereotypying,Prejudice,andDiscrimination”inDanielTGilbert,Susan
TFiskeandGardnerLindzey(eds)The Handbook of Social Psychology: Volume 2(4thed,McGraw-Hill,NewYork,1998)357at367.
103 Fiske,aboven100,at624(emphasisinoriginal).
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differentlawyersandexplainedthathementionedtothejudgethehistoryofrepresentationas“somethingthejudgemightthinkisrelevant…becauseIknowfullwell that thejudgewill thinkthat isprettypeculiar: thereissomethingwrongaboutthisperson”.
While15lawyersisundoubtedlyextreme,Ifoundevidenceoflawyersusingthissignallingtacticinmuchlessextremecases.Whenonelitigant’scasereachedtheHighCourt,shehadhadwhatappearedtobea“string”oflawyers.Herfirstlawyerwaspossiblynegligent.Shethenhadanopinionfromanotherlawyer,followedbyalegalaidlawyerwholackedexpertise.Shewasthenunabletofindanewlawyerwithexpertisewillingtoworkforlegalaidrates,andsobecameanLiP.Whenthemattercamebeforethecourt,Iobservedtheopposingcounselrepeatedlyreferredtoherhaving“firedherlawyers”or“walkedaway”fromherlawyers.Astheopposingcounselhadnowayofknowingthereasonsbehindthechangeinrepresentationthathadoccurred,thisclaimwaswithoutevidenceandwasalsoseeminglyirrelevantto the case. Itsonly relevancewas to encourage a sharedprofessionalunderstandingbetweencounselandjudgethatalitigantwithoutalawyer,andparticularlyalitigantwithahistoryofpreviouslawyers,waslikelytobeunreasonableandhaveaweakcase.
Thisisnot tosuggest that thefact thatajudgeisconcernedthat thepersonmightbeanobsessivelitigantmeansthejudgewilltreatthatlitigantunfairly.However,itdoesmeanthattheabsenceofalawyermightburdentheLiPwithapresumptionthattheyareunreasonableandthattheircaselacksmerit.TheLiPthenhastoworkhardtodisprovethis,rather thanstartingfromthepositionofarepresentedlitigant(evenonewithastringoflawyersbehindthem),thattheyhaveanarguablecase.
(3)Theeffectofperceivedreasonsonassistance
What judgesandlawyers thinkaboutpeople’sreasonsforrepresentingthemselvesmayalso affect the amountof assistanceoffered.Where apersonisperceivedtobelitigatingoutofnecessity,thatis,someonewho“can’tpay”,judges,lawyersandcourtstaffarepresentedwithaproblemofsystemicfailure.Theybelievethelitigantisdisadvantagedwithoutalawyer,butthatthelitigantcannotsecurerepresentationforfinancialreasons.InthatsituationtheymayfeelobligedtorepairthesystemicfailurebyhelpingtheLiP.Theyhavetheknowledgetoprovidehelp,but,iftheydoso,theyareconfrontedwiththetensionsthiscreatesintheirownroles:withthejudgesupposedtobeaneutralarbiter,thelawyerfortheopposingpartyafearlesspartisanadvocatefortheirownclient,andthecourtstaffneutralbureaucrats.ThesituationisdifferentwheretheLiPiscastashaving“chosen”toappearinperson, that is,someonewho“won’tpay”.Dewarsuggeststhatwhenjudgescategorisepeopleintohaving“chosen”tolitigateinperson,they
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considertheLiPhaswaivedanyrighttocomplainabouttheconsequencesofthatdecision.104Theprofessionalparticipantsthereforehaveaninterestinthecategoriesof“won’tpay”and“can’tpay”.ByconceptualisingLiPsasthosewho“won’tpay”,theycanavoidanymoralclaimthatlitigantsmightplaceontheirassistance.ThismeansinturnthattheycanprotecttheirownrolesfromthestraincreatedbyLiPs’appealsforassistance.Thiswasevidentinmanyjudges’comments.Thefollowingisanexample:
Ihavetorespectthefactthatthisisanadversarialsituation,thatpeoplehavehadtheopportunitytoconsultalawyer.Iknowthatissometimesnotfeasibleintermsofcost,buttheydohavethatopportunity.(DistrictCourtJudge)
Thissuggeststhat,evenwhenthejudgeknowsorsuspectsthelitiganthasnorealoptionbuttopursueamatterinperson,thejudgemaystillputtheminthecategoryof“won’tpay”toprotecttheirpositionofneutralarbiterfrombeingstrained.
(4)Conclusions
Theevidencesuggests thatmany,andprobablymost,LiPsaremakinga rational decision to litigate in person, based mainly on economicconsiderationsbutalsoonvariousotherreasonssuchaswithwidelyheld(mis)perceptionsabouttheciviljusticesystemandthevalueoflegalservices.Ratherthanbeinga“fool”foraclient,LiPscanbeseenasrespondingtothecourt’sprojectionofitsaccessibilitytothepublic,aprojectionitmakesintentionallytopromoteitslegitimacy.LiPsmayalsobeproceedingwithoutalawyerbecauseoffailureofthelegalmarkettoofferaservicetheycanaffordandbelieveisnecessary.Thesearedeepsystemicproblemsthatmayneedsystemicanswers.
Judgesandlawyers,however,whilerecognisingthatmanyLiPsaremotivatedbyfinancialreasons,expressedstrongundercurrentsofbeliefthatmanyLiPswerearrogant(inthattheybelievedtheycoulddobetterthanalawyer),orwereunreasonableorobsessive.Thesebeliefsareinturnrationalresponsestothefeltneedtoprotecttheirprofessionsandtheirroleswithintheadversarialsystem.However,theymayleadtodifferentialtreatmentoftheLiPsincourtandburdenanLiP’scasewiththeopeningassumptionthattheyareunreasonable.ThisisunfairtomanyindividualLiPs,and,ifgrowingnumbersofLiPsfeeltreatedunfairlyinthatfashion,thatmayinturnhaveadverseconsequencesforthereputationandpublicstandingofthecourts.
104 Dewar,SmithandBanks,aboven17,at35–36.
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