identity and interdependence: two views on groups

Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups

Simon Columbus

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

simon@simoncolumbus.com

November 21, 2016

Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 1 / 49

Three Questions

What does it mean to be a group?

What are the forces that govern group life?

How can (and should) we study group life?

Lewin (1948, p. 84)

Situations are Games

Any interpersonal situation can be represented as a ‘game’, a matrix ofoutcomes given choices.

Kelley et al. (2003)

Game Theory

In game theory, each matrix has a solution

a pure or mixed strategy a payoff-maximising player should play

Outcome Controls

Interdependence theory decomposes the matrix into sources of control:

the person’s own actions (‘Actor Control’, AC)

the partner’s actions (‘Partner Control’, PC)

the interaction between their two actions (‘Joint Control’, JC)

Outcome Controls

the person’s own actions (‘Bilateral Actor Control’, BAC)

the partner’s actions (‘Mutual Partner Control’, MPC)

the interaction between their two actions (‘Mutual Joint Control’,MJC)

Outcome Controls

the person’s own actions (‘Bilateral Actor Control’, BAC)

the partner’s actions (‘Mutual Partner Control’, MPC)

the interaction between their two actions (‘Mutual Joint Control’,MJC)

Interdependence theoryA theory of how people control their own and other’s outcomes.

Outcome Controls

Dimensions of Interdependence

From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamentaldimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary:

Degree of interdependence =PC 2

e + JC 2e

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e

In some situations, individuals control their own outcomes; in othersituations, they are fully dependent on their partner’s actions.

Basis of interdependence =PCe

The basis of interdependence varies from exchange, in which each persondetermines their partner’s outcomes, to coordination.

Conflict of interest = 2 ×(

ACe × PCk + ACk × PCe + JCe × JCk

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e + AC 2

k + PC 2k + JC 2

)Interests vary from corresponding to conflicting.

Asymmetry of dependence =PC 2

e + JC 2e

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e

−PC 2

k + JC 2k

AC 2k + PC 2

k + JC 2k

Dependence ranges from a person having unilateral power over theirpartner to depending unilaterally on their partner; with symmetricdependence in the middle.

e + JC 2e

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e

Conflict of interest = 2

(ACe × PCk + ACk × PCe + JCe × JCk

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e + AC 2

k + PC 2k + JC 2

)Asymmetry of dependence =

PC 2e + JC 2

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e

−PC 2

k + JC 2k

AC 2k + PC 2

k + JC 2k

e + JC 2e

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e

Conflict of interest = 2

(ACe × PCk + ACk × PCe + JCe × JCk

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e + AC 2

k + PC 2k + JC 2

)Asymmetry of dependence =

PC 2e + JC 2

AC 2e + PC 2

e + JC 2e

−PC 2

k + JC 2k

AC 2k + PC 2

k + JC 2k

Future interdependence

Information certainty

Summary

Interdependence is the idea that in interpersonal situations, one’soutcomes are, in part, determined by the actions of others (and onemay likewise control their outcomes)

Any situation can be represented as a matrix of actions and outcomes

A person’s outcomes are controlled by

the person’s own actionstheir partner’s actionsthe interaction between their two actions

Each situation is characterised by six dimensions of interdependence

Degree of interdependenceBasis of interdependenceConflict of interestAsymmetry of dependenceFuture interdependenceInformation certainty

The Minimal Group Paradigm

Minimal Group Paradigm

What is the least of a group people will still favour over another?

You can reward and punish other participants. For each matrix, how wouldyou like to divide rewards and punishments?

Tajfel et al. (1971)

People favour their in-group—even when the group is based on anarbitrary characteristic.

Tajfel et al. (1971)

Social Identity Theory

The Social Identity Approach

Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974) and Self-categorisationTheory (Turner et al., 1987)

Two parts of the self, personal and social identity,

“the part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from hisknowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups)together with the emotional significance attached to thatmembership.” (Tajfel, 1974)

Social Identity Theory

People are motivated to maintain positive self-esteem

As a consequence, people are motivated to maintain a positive socialidentity

When people self-categorise as belonging to a group, merecategorisation initiates thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that attemptto positively differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup

The meta-contrast principle

Without the presence of an outgroup, ingroup categorisation does notoccur and subsequent discrimination should not emerge (VanKnippenberg & Wilke, 1988)

Not as Minimal as You Thought

In Tajfel et al.’s experiments, who rewarded the rewarders?

‘Implicit interdependence’: If I control their outcomes, maybe theycontrol mine. . . ? (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989)

i.e., participants assumed mutual partner control (Yamagishi, Jin, &Kiyonari, 1999)

Not as Minimal as You Thought

In Tajfel et al.’s experiments, who rewarded the rewarders?

‘Implicit interdependence’: If I control their outcomes, maybe theycontrol mine. . . ? (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989)

i.e., participants assumed mutual partner control (Yamagishi, Jin, &Kiyonari, 1999)

Outgroup Favouritism

If participants knew their outcomes were determined by outgroupmembers, they favoured—the outgroup (Rabbie et al., 1989).

Not as Robust as You Thought, Either

Yamagishi et al. (1999)

The Essence of a Group

What Makes a Group?

There is a difference between“perceiving oneself as merelysubsumed under the ‘sameabstract concept’ versus‘belonging to a group”’ (Lewinin Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988)

That difference, most simplyspeaking, is interdependence

“. . . reciprocation of the favor given to a particular ingroupmember is expected to come from any ingroup member ratherthan directly from that particular member.” (Yamagishi et al.,1999)

A System of Generalised Exchange

Nowak & Sigmund (2005)

A System of Generalised Exchange

Cooperation Through Reputation

Concern for their reputation makes people cooperative

When people know that their future interaction partners know abouttheir history, they behave more cooperative in the present (e.g.Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski & Wedekind, 2001, 2002; Seinen& Schram, 2006)

Both because cooperators are treated nicer, and are more likely to bechosen as interaction partners in the first place (cf. Roberts, 1998)

Cooperation Through Reputation

Concern for their reputation makes people cooperative

When people know that their future interaction partners know abouttheir history, they behave more cooperative in the present (e.g.Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski & Wedekind, 2001, 2002; Seinen& Schram, 2006)

Both because cooperators are treated nicer, and are more likely to bechosen as interaction partners in the first place (cf. Roberts, 1998)

Reputation Overcomes Boundaries

Observation by an out-group partner can lead people to favour otherout-group members (Chang, n.d.)

Gossip

Gossip spreads one’s reputation

A reputation is built from theexperience of one’s interactionpartners...

... but it is spread by partnersand onlookers alike

The group is the naturalcontainer for gossip

However, networks cantranscend group boundaries

Gossip

Gossip spreads one’s reputation

It is only gossip to futureinteraction partners thatenhances cooperation

... and only among those whodo not cooperate voluntarily

The larger the network ofpotential recipients of gossip,the stronger its effect

Wu et al. (2015,2016)

Bounded Generalised Reciprocity

Groups are containers for a network of generalised exchange (Yamagishi etal., 1999; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2000))

People prefer to cooperate with others who have a good reputation

Therefore, people are motivated to maintain a good reputation bycooperating

As a consequence, people have generalised trust that other in-groupmembers will cooperate

In-group Favouritism

Comparing Social Identity Theory and Bounded Generalised Reciprocity

Comparison SIT BGR

In- vs. outgroup + +Ingroup vs. stranger 0 +Outgroup vs. stranger 0 0Interdependence +/++ +/++Reciprocity +/+ +/++Common knowledge + +Unilateral knowledge + 0

Meta-Analysing Economics Games

Balliet, Wu, & de Dreu (2014)

In-group Favouritism

Comparing Social Identity Theory and Bounded Generalised Reciprocity

Comparison SIT BGR

In- vs. outgroup + +Ingroup vs. stranger 0 +Outgroup vs. stranger 0 0Interdependence +/++ +/++Reciprocity +/+ +/++Common knowledge + +Unilateral knowledge + 0

There is in-group favouritism in cooperation (d = .32)

Discrimination between in-group members and strangers (d = .30)

But not between out-group members and strangers (d = -.09)

More in-group favouritism in interdependent situations (d = .19)

No intergroup discrimination when reputational concerns are muted(d = .04)

In contrast, discrimination occurs when reputational concerns areactive (d = .32)

Overall, eight out of eight predictions of BGR were correct

Summary

Even where no objective interdependence exists, people may perceivea shared fate

The ‘Minimal Group Paradigm’ is not that minimal, after all

Interdependence is crucial to feeling ‘like a group’

Within a group, people expect generalised reciprocity

Generalised reciprocity is based on reputational concernReputation spreads via gossip

Generalised reciprocity explains intergroup discrimination better thansocial identity theory

Functional Interdependence Theory

How do people make sense of situations?

Over the course of evolution, our mind has been shaped to perceivevariations in interdependence

Take in cues from the environment (Brunswik, 1955)

Cues are integrated into internal regulatory variables (Tooby et al.,2008)

Four IRV represent the four dimensions of interdependence (Balliet,Tybur, & van Lange, 2016)

Functional Interdependence Theory

How do people make sense of situations?

People can distinguish five dimensions of interdependence (Gerpott,Balliet, & de Vries, forthcoming)

Degree of interdependence

Conflict of interest

Asymmetry of dependence

Future interdependence

Information certainty

Do perceptions of interdependence matter for cooperation?

Study 1: People played a prisoner’s dilemma

Study 2: People played a prisoner’s dilemma and a dictator game

Do perceptions of interdependence matter for cooperation?

Study 1: People played a prisoner’s dilemma

Study 2: People played a prisoner’s dilemma and a dictator game

ResultsPerceptions of interdependence explain 24% of variance in cooperation ina prisoner’s dilemma.

More cooperative when more interdependent, less conflict, and lesspower

People are more cooperative in the PD than the DG

Due to differences in perceived (greater) interdependence and (less)conflict

Where Do People Live?

Thank You

identity and interdependence: two views on groups

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