norm enforcement, dependence networks and the international criminal court

Norm Enforcement, Dependence Networks and the International

Criminal CourtJay Goodliffe

Brigham Young University

Darren HawkinsBrigham Young University

Christine HorneWashington State University

Daniel NielsonBrigham Young University

Research Puzzle

• Why would any state commit to enforce international human rights norms?

• Signing and Ratifying Statute of the International Criminal Court is a Commitment

International Criminal Court Commitments

• Delegate Authority to an Independent Prosecutor

• Accept Court’s Binding Jurisdiction upon Ratification

• Allow Court to Act in Relatively Permissive Conditions: Territorial State or State of the Nationality of Accused has Accepted Court’s Jurisdiction

Norms

• Our definition: Rules that are socially enforced

• In IR, enforcement of norms is generally decentralized

• ICC: Centralized norm enforcement mechanism

Why Commit to the ICC?• Dependence Networks• Benefits:

– Cutting Transaction Costs– Lock-in

• Costs:– Policy– Unintended Consequences– Flexibility

• Imitation and Principles:– Regional and Global Trends– Principled Commitments

Dependence

• Sociology Network Literature: Horne (2001, 2004)

• Dependence: the value that states place on goods (can be anything) available from an exchange partner and the number of alternative sources they have available.

Dependence Networks

• Well-known forms of dependence in IR:– Bilateral/Dyadic Interdependence (relying on

a particular partner)– Global Dependence (relying on all)

• Dependence within a Network:– A set of partners on whom a state relies for

goods

Consequences of Dependence Networks

• The more dependent A is on B, the more power (ability to reward and punish) B has over A.

• Dependence increases the extent to which actors engage in behavior that is pleasing to their network partners.

• One such behavior is norm enforcement.

Diffuse Reciprocity

• Actors want to please their network partners

• Rewards and punishments from those network partners are not explicitly contingent or equivalent

• Actors undertake behavior anticipating some payoff down the road (or fearing punishment for failure to do so)

Dependence Network Hypothesis

The more dependent a state is on states who sign or ratify (do not sign or ratify) the ICC, the more (less) likely that state will also sign or ratify the ICC

Measuring Dependence Networks• States value many types of goods• Some providers are more important than

others• Dependence Index

– Trade Partners weighted by value of trade– Alliance Partners weighted by capabilities– IO Partners with shared memberships in

significant IOs

Important Clarification• Not Arguing that states will cut off trade,

security or IO ties due to a state’s position on the ICC

• Rather, they will use those relationships to reward or punish states appropriately– Example: greater or lesser cooperation on

alliance policies or on bilateral trade issues• States anticipate such rewards and

punishments whether they occur or not: Rarely explicit or equivalent

Benefits: Reduced Transaction Costs

• Theoretically well-established• Conventional Wisdom in ICC case• Security Council created Yugoslav and

Rwandan Tribunals• Became increasingly costly over 1990s• Measure: UN-mandated contribution to

budgets of these tribunals

Benefits: Lock-in

• Moravcsik (2000)• New and unstable democracies create

human rights regimes to “lock in” democratic principles in the face of domestic uncertainty (backsliding).

• Established democracies and autocracies do not.

Measuring Lock-in

• New Democracy – New Democracy if Polity ≥ 7 & <10 yrs

• Unstable Democracy × Polity Score– Unstable if Polity > 0 & drops 3 points

• Regime Volatility × Polity Score– Regime Volatility = standard deviation of

Polity Score (1975-2003)

Costs

• Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006): Convention Against Torture

• Policy Change: How hard is compliance?• Unintended Consequences: How likely will

this be used in an unintended way?• Flexibility: When would human rights

abuse be helpful?

Measuring Costs: Policy ChangeHow hard is compliance?

• Polity Score– −10 to +10, where +10 is the most democratic

• Empowerment Rights Index (lagged)– 0-10 scale, with 10 as the most respectful

• Physical Integrity Rights Index (lagged)– 0-8 scale, with 8 as the least abusive

Measuring Costs: Unintended Consequences

How likely will this be used in an unintended way?

• Legal System– Common Law

• Power– ln(GDP)

• Exposure: Forces abroad

Measuring Costs: FlexibilityWhen would human rights abuse be helpful?

• Military Disputes (external)• 0-5, 5 = war

• Threat of Violence (World Bank’s “Political Stability”)• ~N(0,1)

Imitation and Principle

• Imitation: Regional or Global Trends– More countries who support a strong ICC in

your region or globally• Principled Commitments

– Voluntary contributions to the international tribunals established by the Security Council

Method

• Duration Model (discrete-time in months)– No restrictions on hazard shape

• Missing Data multiply imputed via Amelia

Dependent Variable

• Examine Signing and Ratifying/Acceding Separately

• Duration begins in July 1998– (or when country comes into existence)

• Censoring date – December 2000 for Signing– December 2004 for Ratifying

Network Dependence Variable

Dependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variable

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Network Dependence Variable Dependence Network Index (3-month lag) 2.066 (0.999) 0.039

Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variable

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Network Dependence Variable Dependence Network Index (6-month lag) 3.398 (1.626) 0.037

Benefits VariablesDependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Reduced Transaction Costs Variable ln(Tribunal Costs) −0.115 (0.268) 0.667 Lock-in Variables New Democracy 0.174 (0.302) 0.564 Unstable Democracy × Polity Score −0.021 (0.063) 0.733 Regime Volatility × Polity Score −0.020 (0.009) 0.025

Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Reduced Transaction Costs Variable ln(Tribunal Costs) 0.017 (0.318) 0.956 Lock-in Variables New Democracy −0.541 (0.427) 0.205 Unstable Democracy × Polity Score 0.151 (0.107) 0.160 Regime Volatility × Polity Score −0.038 (0.015) 0.014

Cost: Policy Change VariablesDependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Cost: Policy Change Variables Polity Score 0.057 (0.032) 0.073 Empowerment Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.110 (0.052) 0.035 Physical Integrity Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.053 (0.088) 0.548

Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Cost: Policy Change Variables Polity Score 0.163 (0.058) 0.005 Empowerment Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.077 (0.087) 0.378 Physical Integrity Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.119 (0.094) 0.206

Cost: Unintended Consequences

Dependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Cost: Unintended Consequences Variables Common Law Legal System −0.238 (0.229) 0.297 ln(GDP) −0.153 (0.088) 0.081 ln(Forces Abroad) 0.110 (0.037) 0.003

Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Cost: Unintended Consequences Variables Common Law Legal System −0.211 (0.286) 0.462 ln(GDP) −0.076 (0.112) 0.495 ln(Forces Abroad) 0.048 (0.053) 0.374

Cost: Flexibility VariablesDependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Costs: Flexibility Variables Military Disputes −0.019 (0.067) 0.781 Threat of Violence −0.058 (0.216) 0.789

Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Costs: Flexibility Variables Military Disputes −0.162 (0.103) 0.118 Threat of Violence −0.256 (0.233) 0.273

Imitation and PrincipleDependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Imitation Variable Regional Trends (3-month lag) −0.151 (0.716) 0.834 Principled Commitment Variable ln(Voluntary Contributions) 0.045 (0.060) 0.454

Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables

Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value

Imitation Variable Regional Trends (6-month lag) 0.301 (0.829) 0.717 Principled Commitment Variable ln(Voluntary Contributions) 0.112 (0.095) 0.240

Analysis StatisticsDependent Variable: Signing ICC Number of Observations 2724 Number of Failures (Signatures) 119 Number of Countries 158 Log-likelihood (χ2) p > χ2 −415.9 (154.9) 0.000

Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Number of Observations 9359 Number of Failures (Ratifications) 82 Number of Countries 159 Log-likelihood (χ2) p > χ2 −390.5 (147.0) 0.000

Notes: Dependent variable is signing or ratifying/acceding to the International Criminal Court statute. Coefficients are complementary log-log regression estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; p-values are for two tails. Missing values filled in via multiple imputation.

What Influences ICC Commitment?

• Network Dependence• Level of Democracy (Policy Cost)

• Not Lock-in• Not Region• Not Principled Commitments• Not Transaction Costs

Limitations

• Dependence cannot explain initial committers, only subsequent committers

• Measurement of independent variables• Generalizability to other treaties, other

international commitments