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O R I G I N A L P A P E R
Prospects of peace negotiation in Papua
Timo Kivimäki
Published online: 19 December 2007
# Springer-Verlag 2007
Abstract The Papuan conflict resembles the conflict in Aceh. Also some of the models
of conflict resolution can undoubtedly be imported for Papua from Aceh. However, the
existence of large migrant groups, the lack of a coherent organization of the rebel side,
and the more extreme nature of economic grievances in Papua than in Aceh, give the
conflict problem in Papua its own characteristics. This article speculates about how
much Papua could learn from its own past and how much lessons it could emulate from
other areas to establish its own mechanisms of peace negotiation.
At first sight, the conflict in Papua looks much like that in Aceh; it is a separatist war against
the Indonesian government, which has largely failed in developing the territory despite its
vast natural resources. Despite similarities, there are also very significant differences
between Papua and Aceh. The root of most of the strategic differences is that unlike Aceh,
Papua does not have a unified rebel movement, that would offer a serious military
challenge to the government and that would be subordinate to one unified leadership
structure. As a result, making peace in Papua would not give as many political points in
Jakarta as peace in Aceh did: not too many lives have been lost by the military and the
problem is not as serious in Papua, and thus there is not as much political will behind peacein Papua. Furthermore, in absence of a unified command, the Papuan rebellion cannot be
ended by persuading one organization only to abandon their armed struggle.
Papua has had negotiations on Special Autonomy Law (Law 21/2001), in 2001.1
This process could have shown the way to some improvement, but since the
commitment of the government under President Megawati Sukarnoputri and
especially civil servants under her government to the conclusion of the process
AEJ (2008) 6:69 – 79
DOI 10.1007/s10308-007-0155-x
1
An excellent analysis of this informal negotiation process can be read at McGibbon ( 2004) and Sumule(2003).
Dr. Timo Kivimäki is a Leader of ASEM Education Hub Thematic Network on Peace and Conflict Studies
(http://www.nias.ku.dk/research/timo_kivimaki/ ).
T. Kivimäki (*)
NIAS — Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Leifsgade 33, Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: timo.kivimaki@nias.ku.dk
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was very weak, it was not implemented. Thus the process did not result in ending
occasional violence, protest and repression in the territory. The new government
under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has finally started implementing some of the
parts of the special autonomy law, but this might have been too little too late to
rebuild the confidence of Papuans. Furthermore, the negotiation process had severalweaknesses which prevented the buildup of feeling of ownership to the process
among the radical members of the independence movement.
I have previously (Kivimäki 2006) suggested the initiation of another peace
negotiation process that would emulate lessons both from the previous special autonomy
consultation of 2001, and the Aceh peace process, and apply them to the Papuan
conditions. A faction of the independence movement, Organisasi Papua Merdeka
(OPM) has started taking steps on such a path to peace and democracy and has started to
build up an organization that could facilitate communication between various
constituencies and the negotiating panel in possible internationally facilitated peacenegotiations. A coalition of the independence movement, the West Papua Coalition for
National Liberation has been created for the task of communication between fragments
of the OPM for peace negotiation purposes. But so far the government has not been
interested any of the presented formula for internationally facilitated negotiation.
This article looks at lessons that other peace processes could give to the prospect
of peace negotiations in Papua. The intention is to summarize some of the arguments
I have presented in my more comprehensive study on the Papuan peace process
(2006), update the previous construct and look at how comparative peace process
studies can contribute to the planning of peace negotiations in Papua.
What went wrong with Papua’s previous processes of conflict resolution?
The consultation for Special Autonomy Law has so far been the main forum of conflict
resolution in Papua. However, before it was possible several other processes needed to
take place. Autonomy law consultation was preceded by a process of consolidation by the
independence movement. The first effort was taken already in 1998 with the
establishment of Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (FORERI) on July
24, 1998. As one of its tasks, FORERI established an extensive negotiation panel, the
Team of 100. The team represented 25 areas each with four representatives (Human
Rights Watch 2000, p. 3; Sumule 2003, pp. 353 – 354; International Crisis Group 2001,
p. 12). The Team 100 of the West Papuan Community had, in principle, a mandate to
negotiate with Indonesian leadership. However, the flexible mechanisms of commu-
nication were missing between the negotiators and their constituencies. Instead the team
was an arrangement with which the independence movement managed to communicate
its position for independence to the president of Indonesia. “ Negotiations” were
initiated with President B. Jusuf Habibie in autumn 1998. According to President
Habibie (2000), the process with the Team of 100 was a shock to the Indonesian
government. However, it could have been one of the reasons why the government
eventually felt to need to compromise with Papua by offering it special autonomy.
Soon after, there was another process of consolidation of the independence
movement. But this process seemed to have been more motivated by the explicit
intention to work for independence not for negotiation with Jakarta. In early 2000,
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there were several meetings by people on the side of the independence movement
including a traditional mass consultation (Musyawarah Besar), and what became known
as the 2nd Papuan National Congress. From this followed the establishment of the
Papuan Presidium Council. This 22-person executive body was selected at the 2nd
Papuan People’s Congress by the 200 (later 501) member Panel Papua. The latter consisted of nearly all civil society constituencies and was established as the Papuan
legislature (International Crisis Group 2001; Alua 2002a, b). Papuan Presidium Council
sought an explicit negotiation mandate but was more seen as an organization that
already represented independent Papuan governance. As a result the process did not
manage to establish the position of the Papuan Presidium Council as the legitimate
negotiator on behalf of the independence movement. In addition to this process failing
to invite the exiled OPM leaders, and it also failed to mandate the Papuan Presidential
Council for negotiation. Finally, it ignored the wisdom of Ambassador Wiryono, related
to the need for communication between enemies, and failed to create any contact withthe “enemy” for negotiations. Yet the process did manage to create some links of
communication within the independence movement, especially inside the Papuan
province, and this could have helped the consultations for the special autonomy.
The reason why only the FORERI process led to explicit negotiation, and why other
processes led to the mobilization of independence activities, was simply the fact that in
this dialogue initiative the Papuan side dealt with their opponent from the very beginning.
Preparation for dialogue in Papua has too often meant the mobilization of one side
without an effort to kick-start a pre-negotiation process. According to many studies of
the preparation of dialogue, early contacts with“
the enemy”
are important so that the preparation will not lead to the consolidation of unilateral positions, but contributes to
the redirection of attitudes towards interests instead of positions, and to the
understanding of negotiation as an effort to fit the core interests of negotiating parties
rather than fight between opposite positions (Sounders 1991, pp. 57 – 70; Rothman
1992; Zartman 1989, pp. 237 – 253). However, with the exception of FORERI, where
the resistance movement worked closely with the Indonesian State Secretariat, “ pre-
negotiation” has often been explicitly exclusive, with preparations on one side only.
The process for special autonomy was an exception to the exclusiveness. It
involved extensive informal civil society dialogue which attempted to involve all
segments of the Papuan society. It consisted of consultation and informal dialogue
under the auspices of Governor Jacobus Solossa and his technical assistance team
from the University of Cendrawasih. Consultation of people was not limited to the
centers of the province, but it tried to reach even the most remote stakeholders.
Insider ’s analysis of the process reveals that many independence-minded people,
including members of the Papuan Presidium Council, were indeed consulted, and
some participated in the dialogue (confidential interview material). Even the leader
of the Papuan informal negotiation of special autonomy, Governor Jacobus Solossa,
could be seen as a radical, since he was one of the members of the Team of 100
Papuan leaders who in February 1999, represented Papua in a national dialogue that
demanded that President Habibie accept Papuan independence.2 Yet McGibbon
(2004, pp. 19 – 20) concludes that the most radical elements were out of the
2 For the list of Members of the Team of 100, see Human Rights Watch (2000).
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consultation because of the setup of the process. The entire consultation took place
in Papua and thus ruled out both the exiled and jailed independence leaders and the
fighters of the movement who were hiding from prosecution in the jungles of Papua.
The fact that the consultation took place inside Indonesia made it difficult for the
Indonesian government to speak to their real enemies. Most radical elements stayedout, and those that stayed did not dare to express views that were considered illegal by
the Indonesian party to the process. Like the conclusion in the Burma/Myanmar
chapter of this special issue, exclusion and negotiation under coercion does not
necessarily produce results that the constituencies of negotiating parties can live with.
Furthermore, the fact that these consultations were on special autonomy and not open
for more radical solutions, meant that the preconditions of dialogue were harsh for the
independence movement. The option they were fighting for was out of the menu of
choice. Yet the Papuan leaders of the consultation tried to make the agenda as inclusive
as was possible within the framework set for them by the Indonesian government.Member of the Governorial Assistance Team, Mr. Agus Sumule (2003, p. 358)
describes the approach of the special autonomy negotiations as follows: “We proposed
that the Seminar should not treat the issues of M (‘merdeka’ or independence) and O
(‘otonomi’or special autonomy) as M or O, or M against O, or O against M, but
should be M and O — meaning both M and O were the rights of the people and should
not be made to conflict with each other.” While the approach of the facilitators was
inclusive and focused on the core interests of the stakeholders the mandate of the
negotiation was too strict to allow independence movement ’s full participation. Many
of the OPM ruled themselves out: they wanted independence and since that was not onthe menu, there was nothing to talk about. As a result, both the fact that negotiations
were held in Indonesia, and due to the limitations of the negotiation agenda, the
benefit from negotiation were limited: OPM violence was not significantly reduced.
On the Indonesian side the negotiation on the Special Autonomy was neither totally
inclusive. The process sidelined the bureaucracy of the ministry of the interior, and this
proved to be a failure. Furthermore, the negotiations were conducted under President
Abdurrahman Wahid, whose policies towards separatist territories were part of the reason
for his later impeachment. As a result even the new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri did
not fully commit to the autonomy law. Special Autonomy Law was often objected to by
her administration. For example the Jakarta-appointed governor of Irian Jaya (Papua) in
1998, Freddy Numberi openly attacked the law by saying that Irian Jaya was not ready
for it (AFP: “Indonesian Governor says Irian Jaya not ready for greater autonomy”,
August 25, 1998). However, due to the limitations of the negotiation process, the main
resistance to the law came from the central government, especially the ministry for the
interior under President Megawati. This resistance effectively rendered the implemen-
tation of the law impossible. Some of the other laws implemented afterwards were in
clear contradiction with the special autonomy law, and these contradictions in the legal
governance of the province were not even seriously raised by Megawati’s government.
Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the Special Autonomy Law, for example, refers to Papua as the
former province of Irian Jaya, which covered the entire Papuan area, and Chapter 1
defines the instruments of autonomy as instruments of a single province. Article 4 of the
Chapter IV of the law negatively defines authority over issues related to the division of
the province to the province of Papua. Yet, later the province was divided into three by
the Presidential Decree 1/2003. In other words, the presidential decree was unlawful.
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However, the President referred to an earlier legislation in her decree, Law 45/1999 on
The Establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai
Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City. But even so, the
legal setting is confusing: if we consider Papua being divided before the special
autonomy law, then why did the autonomy law treat Papua as one province?In addition to the ministry of the interior, also the Indonesian military was
sidelined from the negotiations of special autonomy. At the time of its negotiation
the president and the military were in deep disagreement about most of the issues
regarding Papua. It seems that the military did not respect the president but considered
his actions with great suspicion: at times the president was seen as a threat to
Indonesia’s unity. For example, while President Abdurrahman Wahid lend his support
to the forum that created the Papuan Presidium Council, the Papuan police and the
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) later pursued and jailed most of the leadership of
this civilian organization. While the murder of Theys Hiyo Eluway, the Chair of thePapua Presidium Council, was prosecuted in accordance with the Indonesian judicial
system, the number two in the Indonesian Armed forces’ hierarchy, General Ramizard
Riyacudu, said that the TNI soldiers responsible for the murder were “heroes” of
Indonesia and that the act of murder was a normal “military act in the service of the
nation” (‘“Special” Testimony’, Tempo, January 7 – 13, 2002). Clearly, the special
autonomy consultations did not pacify the Indonesian military, and thus the result of
the process was not very promising.
However, the process had two main strengths that could be utilized in the future.
Since the implementation of the special autonomy required the cooperation of the parliament, it was probably wise for the consultation process also to involve
parliamentary delegations. During Special Autonomy negotiations the parliament
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) established a Special Committee on Papuan Special
Autonomy (Panitia Khusus, Pansus)3, which was specially mandated to look after
the interests of the parliament in the consultation on the law. The special committee
consisted of representatives of the main parties, roughly in their parliamentary
proportion. As a result of their work, the law on special autonomy was easily passed
in the form that it had been negotiated. Compared to the process of Aceh peace
negotiations, the involvement of the parliament in Papuan special autonomy
consultations made the parliamentary implementation of the consensus easier.
Furthermore, the autonomy consultations innovated an interesting concept of regional
consultations that made it easier for even remote areas to feel ownership of the process. In
Papua, where the independence movement is fragmented, and the people’s opinions are
not easy to collect into a common position, such a time-consuming process of regional
consultations seems necessary and should be considered in any future negotiation between
Papua and Jakarta on the relationships between the province and the national center.
However, the process in the future has to be made less coercive, more inclusive,
and mechanisms need to be built to guarantee that the agreements are being
implemented.
3 For a good insider ’s analysis of the process leading to the adoption of the Special Autonomy Bill, see
Agus Sumule (2003). On the Parliamentary committee, see, p. 366. Mr. Agus Sumule was a member of
the Assistance Team to the Governor, in the drafting of the Special Autonomy Law.
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How can we learn from the past and from the experiences of other peace
processes
In order to end violence one needs to initiate a process that all parties with guns can feel
ownership of (Kelman 1990, p. 199 – 215). Those organizations that have a control over violence need to be taken into account for the sake of realism, in order to stop the
violence (Zartman and Touval 1985, pp. 27 – 45). One cannot pick and choose parties
that one wants to reward, because for conflicts to end you have to talk to the enemy, not
to your friends, as Ambassador Wiryono concludes in his article in this special issue.
Furthermore, in order to reach agreement that the constituencies of the negotiators
can live with, one also needs to make sure that the negotiation process is not
coerced. Since the Indonesian government is a party to the conflict, it might be
necessary for the government and the independence movement to invite an
independent third party to facilitate negotiations, as Indonesia’s chief negotiator in
Aceh, Ambassador Wiryono explains in his article of this special issue. For Papua,
this might be necessary also because of the fact that many of the conflict issues in
Papua are related to economic grievances. Involvement of the donor community
could be useful already at a stage when Papuan peace is on the drawing board. This
could secure that all the instruments of economic conflict transformation could be
mapped. Further, an international fund for Papua could be established for the benefit
of the economic transformation process. This could also offer an opportunity for the
exiled Papuans and any diaspora Papuans to contribute to peace rather than to war in
Papua. Too often, the only way to show loyalty to a conflict area one has had to leave,has been the option of contributing money to the militias and violent groups of the
area. An independently managed international fund for Papua that would define its
objectives strictly to serve the aim of addressing the pre-agreed list of economic
grievances of Papuans should be useful and it could be utilized in a similar manner as
in the case of Northern Ireland, as Willy McCarter explains in this special issue.
As the case of Aceh, also the experience of Papua shows that for the peace
agreement to be durable one also needs to make sure that those parties that can
control the implementation of the terms of the agreement feel ownership of the
process, or at least can be made to comply with it. The consultation for the special
autonomy law broke against both of these principles and failed to make the
agreement acceptable for the OPM or the civil servants that were supposed to
implement it. As a result the process did little to limit violence.
Thirdly, it seems important that in addition to purely military and security-oriented
negotiations, where the stakeholders controlling the guns can talk, broader talks could also
take place once the security situation has improved. Broader circles of the society should
also be involved in the settlement of disputes, in order to create democratic legitimacy for
the solutions of negotiation. The military peace process should not be the end of reform in
the relationship between the center and the province. It should be the beginning of a more
open and democratic reformation of this relationship (see Ahtisaari in this issue).
In practice, it seems that the formula of peace negotiation in Papua would require
the participation of the military. This would be needed in order to increase the
military ownership of the process. Success in the Papuan peace process would
depend, as was the case in Aceh, on the civilian subordination of the military. This is
especially so since the military violence is not always of the nature that can be
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resolved by agreeing on principles of peace. In many of the cases of military
violence, the motive has been opportunistic and illegal. Motives of violence have not
always had anything to do with principles that soldiers feel committed to. In cases
violence has been used to enforce the military’s monopoly of illegal drug trade, or
unauthorized road tolls. This is why the soldiers simply have to be controlled better so that they do not contribute to gainful violence. The use of transparency against peace
spoilers among the military is not be readily possible in Papua, as the province is still
largely closed off from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the
media. Creating transparency and allowing the media, NGOs and scholars to the
territory would therefore be good initiatives for the creation of an environment
conducive for peace-making. The ban in the area on activities of international
researchers and NGOs clearly contributes to the lack of transparency and the intensity
of military violence. In order to create an atmosphere conducive for military discipline,
the military’s sense of ownership of the peace process could be ensured by offering the
military a part in the negotiation. If the process was “owned” by the territorial
commanders, it would be more embarrassing for them if the peace achieved is sabotaged
by gainful violence by individuals of the military establishment.
Due to the fact that the stakeholders of the Papuan conflict include large numbers of
migrants to the territory, it is necessary to somehow involve migrant communities in the
peace process. This would be necessary both for reasons of fairness and of effectiveness.
Migrants represent a large portion of the Papuan population, and their collaboration is
necessary for the stability of peace. Already now there have been expressions of
religious grievances of the mostly Muslim migrants towards the primarily Christianlocal Papuans. The existence of migrant-based militias suggests that in addition to the
government and the military, migrants control part of the violence in Papua. According
to Laksmana.net, the patriotic militia, Satgas Merah Putih has thousands of members in
Papua. It has a history of attacking and intimidating pro-independence supporters
(Laksamana.net, April 2, 2003). Also clandestine militant organizations such as Laskar
Jihad, Satgas Merah Putih, and Islamic Defenders Front, have still recently been
operating in Papua as defenders of the group interests of Muslim migrants in Papua.
However, the participation of migrants is challenged by the fact that there is no unified
migrant organization in Papua. Yet, it could be imagined that the community of migrants
could be mobilized for some kind of representation in a consultative group for the
government negotiation panel. A migrant consultative committee could then involve the
main ethnic organizations of the migrant communities.
Finally, on the government ’s side, a similar parliamentary committee that was
used in the special autonomy consultations, could be established for a future peace
process in Papua. This committee could be a consultative body for the government
negotiation panel. Since any future negotiation process should involve extreme
elements on the side of the resistance, it would be important that the work of this
consultative body is confidential, so that parties do not seek the nationalist votes by
competing in toughness against the much hated separatists. With a confidential
parliamentary consultancy mechanism the parliament would be involved in the
peace process from the beginning, and yet the process would not be politicized too
much.
On the Papuan side and on the side of the independence movement any future
Papuan peace dialogue should also involve the radical supporters of independence,
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the main party and opponent of the Indonesian government in the conflict. After
Indonesian democratization many analysts have emphasized that Papuan resistance
has transformed from sporadic localized military activities of the OPM into a civilian
mass movement (International Crisis Group 2001; Sumule 2003). Much of the new
type of resistance is based on human rights organizations, environmental groups andChristian organizations. However democratization has not opened up political space
for separatist organizations like the OPM. Since the OPM is often felt as the
umbrella of the widespread popular desire for West Papua to secede from Indonesia,
the fact that the independence movement is operating on many platforms, including
legal ones, should not mean the marginalization of the OPM. One should not forget, that
the battle for the illegal objective of independence is mostly centered on the OPM. The
OPM still commands ideological power that can mobilize or prevent violence. It is now
tactically wiser to conduct the Papuan struggle by publicly taking distance from the
OPM, and using the sanctity of human rights organizations (until the recent escalation of the harassment of human rights organizations, including Elsham Papua) and religious
organizations. Yet the OPM is still an umbrella of the Papuan resistance4, and it
commands crucial importance both for war and peace in Papua. As many foreigners
hear when in Papua, on the level of ideas “Papuans are all OPM.”
Yet organizationally, the OPM’s fragmentation is a problem for any peace
negotiation. If an OPM negotiator makes a concession, all factions should submit to
that compromise. This is not possible without larger negotiation panels, consisting of
representatives of several factions, and consensual decision-making within panels.
Furthermore, there should be continuing communication between factions of theindependence movement to enable ownership of compromises among all factions.
According to some key individuals in the independence movement any dialogue
between independence and integration supporters should be preceded by dialogue
among supporters of independence (Tebay 2004). Such activities have indeed
already taken place in Sydney, in August 2004 in Holland in June 2003, and for
2007 there is a plan for a consolidation meeting in Vanuatu. Meanwhile during
2006 – 2007 a consolidation has taken place virtually (in the internet) inside and
outside Papua. The West Papua Coalition for National Liberation is at least one of
the coalitions that have been trying to act as an umbrella that could act as a
communication forum for the independence movement under a peace process. By
selecting international locations, the participants of these meetings have tried to
involve the forces marginalized and exiled by Indonesia. At the same time, by
operating virtually and secretly inside Papua, the umbrella-activity has tried to avoid
excluding the greater masses of Papuans. The development of a Papuan umbrella
organization seems necessary in order to consolidate the agency of the radical
Papuan resistance movements.
In addition to the umbrella of independence organizations and exile groups;
perhaps the West Papua Coalition for National Liberation, ordinary Papuans can also
be mobilized for a peace process by using already existing political channels. The
4 The idea of the OPM as an umbrella of Papuan resistance can be seen for example in Amnesty
International (2002).
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closest Papuans come to legal representation is the Papua Peoples’ Assembly
(MRP). This body was established in November 2005, according to Law No. 21/
2001 on special autonomy for Papua. This 42-member organization has the power to
approve candidates standing in governor ’s elections and for the People’s Consulta-
tive Assembly, as well as to make recommendations and give its approval for cooperative projects between the Papua administration and third parties. Within the
framework of Special Autonomy of the provincial order, the MRP is established to
represent ethnic Papuans. The MRP’s links with existing legal NGOs, human rights
groups and church leaders could also offer an important channel for consultations on
negotiations. If the MRP gets a role in peace negotiation, it could be one of the two
Papuan negotiators vis-à-vis the Indonesian government. While the MRP could
emulate the regional consultations introduced in the special autonomy consultations,
the coalition of the organizations, marginalized and exiled by the Indonesian
government would need to hold consultations with various independence organ-izations and exiled Papuans.
Still there will always be stakeholders that cannot be included in Papua peace
process. If the solution in Papua aims at something that would be democratic and
decentralized (so that Papua could decide on its own fate), the peace process could
be seen as open-ended. As was the case in Aceh, Papua’s relations could develop
even after political decisions had been reached to allow safe political mobilization
instead of violent military mobilization. A process similar to the one explained by
Ahtisaari in his essay, to allow the process to continue and different stakeholders to
have their chance, appears even more important in Papua, due to the fragmentationof Papuan society.
In summary, the structure of peace negotiation in Papua could look like the
following:
WPCNL MRP
Mandate/participation:
OPM &other illegal
pro-independence
groups, marginalized
secessionist Pa uans
Consultation:
unofficial mechanism
within and outside
Papua to the
secessionists.
Mandate/participation:
Legal democratic
mandate from Papuans
who have not
marginalized frompolitics.
Formal regional
consultation similar to
the one during the
drafting of Special
Autonomy Law.
GOI
Mandate: Legal
Mandate and
Participation of
the bureaucracy
involved in theimplementation of
Papuan administration,
including the TNI. Ideological
mandate of all
ro-Indonesians.
Consultation:
Ethnic and
religious
consultativecouncil of the
migrant groups.
Consultation:
Special
Committee of the
Parliament.
WPCNL = The West Papua Coalition for National Liberation
MRP = Papua Peoples’ Assembly
GOI = Government of Indonesia
OPM = Free Papua Movement
TNI = Military Forces of Indonesia
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Conclusions
Peace-makers in Papua could find the experiences of Aceh and other peace processes
useful and inspirational. At the same time, some of the solutions in the Papuan
Special Autonomy consultations could serve as inspiration also in a future peace-making in Papua.
Due to the fragmentation of Papuan society, and due to the problem of
implementing decisions, several consultation mechanisms will have to be innovated
to link stakeholders to the bargaining process on the terms of peace. Consultation
mechanisms between negotiators and their constituencies have been useful in several
negotiations. Also the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka used such a mechanism successfully
in the Aceh peace talks. The ongoing consolidation of the independence movement
is useful for the creation of an agency of the independence movement in peace
negotiation. But it is also useful for the creation of mechanisms of consultation for the potential negotiation process.
The Peace process in Papua should also require the attention of the international
community. Assistance is needed in the dispute resolution effort in order to
overcome the lack of trust between the warring parties. In order to avoid coercive
and authoritarian negotiations as in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the venue of
negotiation should optimally be outside Indonesia. Furthermore, as was seen in Aceh
and in Mindanao, the government as a conflicting party cannot be simultaneously a
negotiator and the source of good services of negotiation (see Ambassador Wiryono
in this special issue). Thus, international involvement is needed.Given that part of the grievances behind the motivation to fight for independence
are related to the extreme underdevelopment of the province, dialogue on Papuan
peace should involve the donor community from the outset. Due to the presence of
more complicated problems than in Aceh, related to the Indonesian and international
corporations operating in Papua, some level of involvement or representation of
these stakeholders should also be considered. In any case an international fund for
the transformation of conflict structures should be established to tackle the poverty-
related roots of violence. Here an international role is important as the Papuan
suspicion towards Indonesian development efforts often render Indonesian projects
less than useful in Papua. Peace in Papua requires political will on both sides of the
dispute; political will to negotiate, to compromise and to take risks for peace. But it
also requires some economic resources to demonstrate the benefits of peace.
References
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