supreme judicial court docket no. oj-17-1 before … e.g., opinion of the justices, me. sup. jud....
Post on 27-Apr-2018
213 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT _________________________
DOCKET NO. OJ-17-1
_________________________
BEFORE THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR OPINION OF THE JUSTICES
_________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF THE MAINE STATE SENATE
TIMOTHY C. WOODCOCK, ESQ., Bar No. 1663
RYAN P. DUMAIS, ESQ. Bar No. 4244
KADY S. HUFF, ESQ. Bar No. 5406
EATON PEABODY
80 Exchange Street
P.O. Box 1210
Bangor, Maine 04402-1210
207-947-0111
Attorneys for Maine State Senate
{EP - 02401399 - v1 }i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
II. DISCUSSION
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RCVA REQUIRES A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ...................................................... 3
B. THE SENATE HAS SERIOUS DOUBTS RELATING TO ITS POWER
AND AUTHORITY TO TAKE ACTION IN SEATING ITS OWN
MEMBERS ................................................................................................. 3
C. THE RCVA CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE
CONSTITUTION’S ELECTION PROCEDURES ................................... 6
D. ARTICLE IX, SECTION 12 DOES NOT PROVIDE AUTHORITY FOR
THE ENACTMENT OF THE RCVA OR STATUTORY
AMENDMENTS THERETO ..................................................................... 8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098 (Me. 1983) ............................................................... 8
National Labor Relations Board v. Canning __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) ..... 9
Opinion of the Justices, 2004 ME 54 ................................................................. 1, 2, 3
Opinion of the Justices, Sup. Jud. Ct. OJ-98-1 (July 31, 1998)................................. 1
Opinion of the Justices, 460 A.2d 1341 (Me. 1982) .................................................. 1
In Re Opinion of the Justices, 2002 ME 169 ............................................................. 2
{EP - 02401399 - v1 }ii
Opinion of the Justices, 70 Me. 560 (1879) ......................................................... 8, 10
Opinion of Justices, 70 Me. 570 (1880) ................................................................ 5, 7
STATUTES
21-A M.R.S. § 723-A(1)(J) ........................................................................................ 1
MISCELLANEOUS
1780 Massachusetts Constitution, Pt. 2, ch. I, § 2, art. II, Pt. 2, ch. II, § 1, art. III ... 7
1780 Massachusetts Constitution, Pt. 2, ch. I, § 2, art. I, Pt. 2, ch. I, § 3, art. I, Pt. 2,
ch. II, § I, art. II .......................................................................................................... 7
1820 Maine Const. Art. IV, Pt. 1, § 5, Art. IV, Pt. 2, § 3, Art. V, Pt. 1, § 3 ......... 7, 9
1857 Maine Const. Amendments, Arts. IX, §§ 7-9 ................................................... 5
1871 Laws of Maine, ch. 4, §§ 1-96 .......................................................................... 9
Brief of the Attorney General, ............................................................................... 3, 4
Committee Brief ......................................................................................................... 5
Brief of Maine House Republican Caucus and Maine Heritage Policy Center ........ 5
Brief of Marshall Tinkle, Esq., .................................................................................. 6
John Adams, P. Smith (ed. 1962) ............................................................................. 7
John Adams, Revolutionary Writings 1775-1783, G. Wood, (ed. 2010) ................. 7
League Brief ............................................................................................................... 8
M. Tinkle, The Maine Constitution ........................................................................... 9
Me. Const., art. IV, Pt. 1, § 5 ..................................................................................... 7
Me. Const., art. IV, Pt. 2d, § 5 ............................................................................... 2, 4
{EP - 02401399 - v1 }iii
Me. Const., art. IV, Pt. 2, § 3 ..................................................................................... 3
Me. Const., art. IV, Pt. 3, § 3 ..................................................................................... 4
Me. Const. art IX, § 12 .............................................................................................. 9
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }1
I. INTRODUCTION
A solemn occasion has been presented on the facts before us.1 The briefs
filed with this Court on March 3, 2017, by the Proponents of the Ranked Choice
Voting Act (“RCVA” or “Act”) have established certain points reassuring the live
gravity of the questions propounded.2 First, there appears to be general agreement
that, as enacted, the Act is incomplete. While statutorily describing the concept of
voting by ranked choice or, as the Proponents put, by “preference”, the Act on its
face does not establish the process for determining votes in any “round”3, other
than, arguably, the first round. Whether implementation can be done by statute or
by constitutional amendment and how it should be framed remain in dispute.
Identifying the constitutional infirmities in the RCVA will assist the Senate in
deliberating on and passing any such implementing legislation or recommending
1 A solemn occasion arises “when the questions are of a serious and immediate nature, and the situation
presents an unusual exigency.” Opinion of the Justices, 2004 ME 54, ¶ 3, 850 A.2d 1145, 1147 (citation
omitted). 2 While the Proponents contend that the Justices categorically refuse to opine on questions involving
enacted laws, the Justices have given such opinions on multiple previous occasions. See, e.g., Opinion of
the Justices, Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. Docket No. OJ-98-1 (July 31, 1998),
http://courts.maine.gov/opinions_orders/opinions/documents/OJ98_1.htm (finding a solemn occasion and
providing an opinion relating to a newly enacted statute regarding taxes); Opinion of the Justices, 460
A.2d 1341 (Me. 1982) (finding a solemn occasion and answering questions relating to the
constitutionality of an enacted citizens initiative). 3 21-A M.R.S. § 723-A(1)(J).
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }2
any necessary constitutional amendment. The need for the Senate to consider
appropriations, as set forth more fully in the Senate’s principal brief also remains.4
Second, the questions propounded to the Justices present an unusual
exigency. “[S]uch an exigency . . . exists when the body making the inquiry,
having some action in view, has serious doubts as to its power and authority to take
such action under the Constitution or under existing statutes.” In re Opinion of the
Justices, 2002 ME 169, ¶ 6, 815 A.2d 791, 794. As discussed below, the Senate is
constitutionally tasked to “determine who is elected to the office of Senator by a
plurality of votes” in each district. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 5 (emphasis added).
This poses a very real conflict for the Senate in carrying out its constitutional
duties.
Third, the Act would impose duties and responsibilities on the Secretary of
State which are not authorized by Article IV, Part First, Section 5 of the Maine
Constitution nor in any other part thereof. Conversely, the enlargement of the
Secretary’s electoral responsibilities diminishes the responsibilities that Article IV,
Part First, Section 5 assigns to local governments and their elected and appointed
officials.
4 The Justices have previously provided an opinion indicating “the members of the Maine Senate ... have
told us that they need our opinion in order to undertake their responsibilities. We take them at their word
that an opinion ... would assist and inform the Senate... in their deliberations.” Opinion of the Justices,
2004 ME 54, ¶ 7, 850 A.2d 1145.
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }3
Finally, the Proponents assert that constitutional authority for the Act resides
in the words “vote” and “plurality”—that these words possess elastic and mutable
qualities which accommodate the introduction, by statute, of an entirely new voting
system. This contention directly implicates the Senate’s constitutional duty and
obligation, following an election, to decide who is lawfully entitled to membership
in the Senate.
II. DISCUSSION
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RCVA REQUIRES A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.
Upon reviewing the briefs of the Proponents, it appears that to fully
implement the Act, a constitutional amendment will be required. The rationale for
this assertion is set forth in the initial brief of the Attorney General.5 In order to
appropriately implement the Act, the Senate seeks guidance from this Court.
Should the Court conclude an omission from the Act could be filled statutorily, the
Senate requests guidance on its form and substance. See generally, Opinion of the
Justices, 2004 ME 54, ¶ 7, 850 A.2d 1145.
B. THE SENATE HAS SERIOUS DOUBTS RELATING TO ITS
POWER AND AUTHORITY TO TAKE ACTION IN
SEATING ITS OWN MEMBERS.
The Maine Constitution provides that candidates chosen by the Electors
prevail if they obtain a plurality of the votes. Me. Const., art. IV, Pt. 2, § 3
5 See Brief of the Attorney General, at 2.
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }4
(incorporating by reference art. IV, Pt. 1, § 5). Following each election, the
Senate is constitutionally required to seat members “elected by a plurality of the
votes to be Senator in each district.” Id. at art. IV, Pt. 2, § 5 (emphasis added).
The Senate’s determination is in addition to its more general right to “be the judge
of the elections and qualifications of its members…” Id. at art. IV, Pt. 3, § 3. This
means that the Senate has a constitutional duty to interpret and apply the word
“plurality” as the standard by which it is to fulfill its seating duties under Article
IV, Part Second, Section 5 as well as Article IV, Part Third, Section 3.
As a co-equal branch of State government and subject to applicable
standards of justiciability and judicial review, the Senate is empowered and, at
times, required to interpret the Maine Constitution. The RCVA, however, is
intended to create circumstances in which a candidate who garners a plurality in
the first round may ultimately lose to a candidate who, in the second or later
rounds, garners a greater aggregate of first and lower rankings of preferences.6
While the Senate takes no position on the desirability or beneficial effects of the
RCVA electoral system, it is a virtual certainty that, following the 2018 elections,
candidates who prevailed in the first round and candidates in the same districts in
the second or later rounds will present themselves to the Senate for seating, thus
presenting the Senate with the obligation to determine which candidate has
6 See, e.g., Brief of Attorney General, 7-9.
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }5
obtained a plurality of the votes within the meaning of Article IV, Part Second,
Section 5 and, as well, within the meaning of Article IV, Part First, Section 5.7
This situation would result in a constitutional crisis of the first order.
Partisan passions always lie more or less beneath the surface. As if our own
times were not example enough, the political crisis over the 1879 elections amply
and dramatically illustrates this reality.8 Antidotes to the emergence of these
passions lie in respect for the rule of law which is critically reinforced for the
clarity of political and electoral procedures. Those same materials equally
demonstrate that recourse to guidance from this Court pursuant to Article VI,
Section 3 and this Court’s repeated acceptance of jurisdiction under that provision,
together with the physical and moral courage of Joshua L. Chamberlain, caused the
crisis to abate peaceably. Waiting until the many issues generated by
implementation of the Ranked Choice System have crystallized into actual
elections are at issue and, perhaps, the control of the Senate by one party or the
other shall hang in the balance would expose the Senate and, potentially, the
7 Before the Senate is presented with this determination, presumably the Governor will have summoned
candidates that the Governor had decided “appear to be elected” in accordance with Article IV, Part
Second, Section 4. However the Governor may have made that determination, it will not be binding on
the Senate. See, e.g., Opinion of Justices, 70 Me. 570, 586 (1880) (declaring 1871 Revised Statutes, ch. 2,
§ 25 unconstitutional); 1869 Laws of Maine, ch. 67 (see Appendix 1). 8 See Brief of Maine House Republican Caucus and Maine Heritage Policy Center at 15-24 (“Caucus
Brief”); Committee Brief at 21-24. To the extent that the Proponents contend that the change from a
majority to plurality standard was prompted by the 1879 election crisis, that point lies only for the office
of Governor. By 1879, elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate were governed by a
plurality standard. Also, well before 1879 election crisis, elected constitutional offices of Judge of
Probate, Register of Probate, Sheriff, and Municipal Judge were determined by a plurality standard. See
1857 Maine Const. Amendments, Arts. IX, §§ 7-9.
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }6
Judiciary, itself, to the most searing partisan passions. Article VI, Section 3
empowers this Court to provide guidance and clarity well in advance of any
circumstance in which power may hang in the balance. The Senate respectfully
urges that certain challenge posed by its eventual application of the standards in
Article IV, Part Second, Section 5, at this time, present this Court with a solemn
occasion within the meaning of Article VI, Section 3.
C. THE RCVA CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE
CONSTITUTION’S ELECTION PROCEDURES
As noted, the Proponents argue for expansive and admittedly novel
interpretation of the words “vote” and “plurality.”9 This historical and legal fact
prompts two conclusions: First, that the framers of the Maine Constitution used
the word “vote” to mean the choice by an Elector that was complete and entire
upon casting.10
Second, that the procedures established in Article IV, Part First,
Section 5 were based on that meaning and relied upon it for the electoral standards
and processes it imposed. The provenance of this provision supports this
conclusion.
This fundamental electoral provision was derived from the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution. cf., Me. Const., art. IV, Pt. 1, § 5; 1780 Massachusetts
9 See e.g., Brief of Marshall Tinkle, Esq., at 23 (noting “alternative voting systems were not anyone’s
radar screen” when plurality standards adopted). 10
Since 1820 the Electors have gone to the polls and cast votes in which they make a choice for one
candidate over other candidates for the same office. This choice between alternatives has been the
functional definition of what it means to cast a vote.
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }7
Constitution, Pt. 2, ch. I, § 2; art. II, Pt. 2, ch. II, § 1; art. III.11
(See Appendix 2).
Moreover, by the time Maine separated from Massachusetts; its citizens had had
nearly 40 years with annual elections held under the authority of the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution. See Id. at Pt. 2, ch. I, § 2; art. I, Pt. 2, ch. I, § 3; art.
I, Pt. 2, ch. II, § I; art. II.
Both Constitutions placed responsibility for elections squarely at the local
level but this was no carte blanche. Both Constitutions imposed specific duties on
local election officials and, throughout, required that their discharge of these duties
be open and public. Perhaps by omission, the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution did
not expressly require the Senate election results to be publicly declared. See Id. at
Pt. 2, ch. I, § 2, art. I. The Maine Constitution differed by deliberately requiring,
for Representative, Senator, and Governor, that local election officials “declare
[the votes] in open town meeting.” 1820 Me. Const. art. IV, Pt. 1, § 5; art. IV, Pt.
2, § 3; art. V, Pt. 1, § 3.
The purposes of these detailed procedures and responsibilities, exercised
openly at the local level by designated and accountable officials are self evident.
Yet, in the wake of the 1879 election crisis, this Court made their purposes plain.
These constitutionally imposed procedures were intended to ensure the integrity of
11
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution was, for the most part, written by John Adams. John Adams, P.
Smith (ed. 1962) at 438-444. The Committee draft on the 1780 Constitution included these electoral
provisions. John Adams, Revolutionary Writings 1775-1783, G. Wood, (ed. 2010) at 249-277.
(Appendix 3)
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }8
the electoral process. See Opinion of Justices, 70 Me. 560, 561 (1879); Opinion of
Justices, 70 Me. 570, 598 (1880). Thus, when the Proponents urge that the
Constitution requires a liberal construction (see, e.g., League Brief at 7, 20, citing
Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1102-1103 (Me. 1983)), it is these self evident and
judicially construed purposes that require such construction. Under the Act, at
some point, either at the outset or in successive “rounds”, the sorting, counting,
and, declaring of votes must recede from public view. Whether the objectives of
Ranked Choice Voting warrant this consequence is beside the point; by its plain
procedures and purposes, the Maine Constitution forbids it.
D. ARTICLE IX, SECTION 12 DOES NOT PROVIDE
AUTHORITY FOR THE ENACTMENT OF THE RCVA OR
STATUTORY AMENDMENTS THERETO.
The Proponents have identified Article IX, Section 12 of the Maine
Constitution as authority for the Act. They have not, however, placed it any
particular context. The context for this provision strongly indicates that assertions
it authorizes broad legislative authority are unfounded.
Nothing in the history or structure of Article IX, Section 12 suggests that it
was intended to invest the Legislature with broad authority to enact laws governing
election procedures. It has never been judicially construed.12
The entire provision
12
M. Tinkle, The Maine Constitution, supra at 164.
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }9
consists of one sentence which authorizes the Legislature to enact laws governing
the division of towns into voting districts. Me. Const. art. IX, § 12.
It appears, therefore, to be a successor to the original proviso which gave the
Legislature statutory authority regarding “classes” of towns and plantations. 1820
Me. Const., art. IV, Pt. 1, § 5.
Post-adoption practice is not an unerring guide to interpretation, but it has
been employed to interpret constitutional clauses. See National Labor Relations
Board v. Canning, ___ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559-2560 (2014) (and cases
cited therein). Where Article IX, Section 12 is concerned, the Senate is unaware of
any statutory scheme enacted after this provision was adopted that purported to
eliminate or override any either the Constitution’s mandate that elections be held
under the aegis of local governments and that local officials fulfill particular,
specified electoral duties.
When the electoral crisis of 1879 arose, a comprehensive election statute
was in place. See 1871 Laws Maine, ch. 4, §§ 1-96 (Appendix 4). In the ensuing
crisis, the Justices construed one section of it. See Opinion of the Justices, 70 Me.
at 565. The statutory election regime set forth at Chapter 4 of the 1871 Revised
Statutes is comprehensive. It imposes more detailed duties on local election
officials and provides civil and criminal punishments for negligent or intentional
disregard of those duties. Nowhere, however, does it purport to eliminate or
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }10
replace any of the processes, standards, or requirements set forth in the
Constitution. Id., passim.
Yet another post-adoption indicator is the constitutional amendment
providing for voting machines. If Article IX, Section 12 invested the Legislature
with broad lawmaking authority, it seems likely that it would have included the
power to authorize the use of voting machines. Yet, it is apparent that the
Legislature concluded that it lacked this power, as it reported out a constitutional
amendment authorizing this innovation which, after initially rejected by the voters,
was adopted and incorporated into the Constitution as Article II, Section 5. (eff.
Oct. 8, 1935, Amend. LIX). That the Legislature sought this authority is of
particular interest inasmuch as only 15 years earlier, it had amended Article IX,
Section 12. (eff. Oct. 1, 1920, Amend. XLVI). Placed in its proper context,
therefore, Article IX, Section 12 did not provide the Legislature with broad
statutory authority. However it might apply in other contexts, it is not authority
for the dramatic revision of the procedures and responsibilities that the
Constitution assigns under Article IV, Part First, Section 5.13
Therefore, Article IX, Section 12 is not authority for the Act or any statutory
amendment to implement it.
13
This conclusion is consistent with the Attorney General’s observation that “every time Maine has made
a major change in the election process, it has been done by constitutional amendment.” Attorney
General’s Brief at 2, n. 1.
{EP - 02401220 - v1 }11
Dated: March 16, 2017.
The Maine State Senate
By_________________________________
Timothy C. Woodcock, Esq. – Bar No. 1663
Eaton Peabody
80 Exchange Street
P. O. Box 1210
Bangor, ME 04402-1210—(207) 947-0111
By_________________________________
Ryan P. Dumais, Esq. – Bar No. 4244
Eaton Peabody
167 Park Row
PO Box 9
Brunswick, ME 04011 –(207)729-1140
By_________________________________
Kady S. Huff, Esq. – Bar No. 5406
Eaton Peabody
80 Exchange Street
P. O. Box 1210
Bangor, ME 04402-1210—(207) 947-0111
{EP - 02401186 - v1 }
APPENDIX TO REPLY BRIEF OF THE MAINE STATE SENATE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. 1869 Laws of Maine, ch. 67 ...............................................................................................1
2. Massachusetts Constitution, 1780 ......................................................................................3
3. Report of Constitutional Committee, 1779 ........................................................................29
4. Election Statutes, 1871 Laws of Maine, ch. 4, §§ 1-96 .....................................................60
top related