the air force view of iamd in a joint environment...i n t e g r i t y - s e r v i c e - e x c e l l...

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e

Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Maj Gen Timothy M. RayDirector, Operational Planning,

Policy & Strategy11 Jul 2013

The Air Force View of IAMD in a

Joint Environment

This Briefing is Unclassified

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Air Force View

Homeland Defense

Regional Challenges

Air Force IAMD Lines-of-EffortOperational C2

Tactical C2/C3

Sensors

Engagement Systems

INTRO / BLUF

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Air Force View of IAMD

3

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR

• Attack Operations• Attacks on missile sites,

airfields, command and control, infrastructure

• Suppression of Enemy AirDefenses

• Fighter Escort• Fighter Sweep

DEFENSIVE COUNTEAIR

• Active Air & Missile Defense• Air Defense• Ballistic Missile Defense

• Passive Air & Missile Defense• Detection & Warning• CBRN Defenses• Camouflage, Concealment,

& Deception• Hardening• Reconstitution• Dispersion• Redundancy• Mobility

COUNTERAIR

IAMD

JP 3-01: Countering air and missile threats requires aholistic approach that includes:• OCA attack ops• Active AMD• Passive AMD• C2 and ISR

framework

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Missile DefenseMissile WarningAir DefenseC2Deterrence

Homeland Defense

4

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Regional Challenges

5

Our focus should always be on returning to the offense – we cannot be content to play catch.

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A2/AD Challenges Force Projection

6

US Sovereign Territory

3rd Party  Sovereign Territory

Adversary Sovereign Territory

Submarines Mines

Advanced Aircraft SAMs

ASUW

ASBM ASCMLABM 

LACM

Offensive Counter Cyber

Offensive Counter Space

Electronic AttackStrategic Mobility

Homeland as Sanctuary

Expeditionary Land Basing

Sea Basing

Qualitatively Superior Units

Secure Communications

Battlespace Awareness

Expeditionary Operations

Space

Cyber

Air

Land

Maritime

Highly ContestedContestedPermissive

Networked Integrated Attack in Depth Disrupt Destroy Defeat

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e

Four Pillars of IAMD

No Threat No Launch No ImpactNo

Consequences

Non-Proliferatio

n

Deterrence Active Defense

Offensive Operations

Passive Defense

Deter Employmen

t

Prevent or Limit Launche

s

Deny or Limit

Enemy Capability

Minimize Impacts

Mitigate Effects

Battle Management, Command & Control, Communication, and

IntelligencePOLITICAL

IAMD PILLARS

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Air Force IAMD Lines-of-Effort

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Command and ControlSensorsEngagement Systems

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JFC / JTF

JFACC/AADC

CTF IAMD

DAADC

AAMDC

Land-based Sensors and

Shooters

CRCRADC

AirborneSensors and

Shooters

Maritime Sensors and

Shooters

RADC RADCADAFCO

JFLCCTAAMDCOORD

JFMCC

1. JFMCC and JFLCC are supporting commanders to JFACC/AADC for IAMD2. Navy retains OPCON/TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships; Army retains OPCON/TACN of Army ADA forces3. AADC engagement control and authority for multi-mission IAMD ships is normally through a RADC designated

by JFACC and approved by the JFMCC

1. JFMCC and JFLCC are supporting commanders to JFACC/AADC for IAMD2. Navy retains OPCON/TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships; Army retains OPCON/TACN of Army ADA forces3. AADC engagement control and authority for multi-mission IAMD ships is normally through a RADC designated

by JFACC and approved by the JFMCC

Supporting OPCON / TACONLines of CoordinationEngagement Authority

Suppo

rted C

DR

JointArmyNavyAir

Force

Operational C2

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Tactical C2/C3

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CRC Modernization

AWACS 40/45

Joint Aerial Layer Network

5th – 4th Integration

Joint Track Management Capability

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Sensors

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3DELRR

TACAIR sensors

AWACS sensor way ahead

BMD tracking and discrimination

Space sensors

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Engagement Systems

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Air-to-Air

Air base defense

BMD engagement

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Airborne Weapons Layer Concept

• Fighter aircraft as launch platforms• Leverages evolving sensor and weapon technologies to develop

• Upper-tier weapon focused on exo-atmospheric intercepts – long range, fast (approx 3.5 km/s at burnout)

• Lower-tier weapon focused on endo-atmospheric intercepts –AMRAAM body, shorter range, slower (approx 1.75 km/s burnout)

BallisticMissile

Infra-Red Sensor Search

Infra-Red Sensor Search

Radar Search

IR AssistedRanging

IR Stere

o Rangin

g

Sensor-Only Platforms

RPA

Sensor / Interceptor PlatformsFighter, Bomber, RPA

C2BMC

Air DefenseNetworks

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Questions?

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