the attention economy of
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The Attention Economy of Search and Web Advertisement
Alexander White Tsinghua University, School of Economics and Management
(joint with Kamal Jain, Microsoft Research)
October 28, 2011 Moscow
People Surf the Web
People Surf the Web Website Search % Bounce % Minutes on site
BBC.co.uk 11.8 35.9 6.6
Cooks.com 56.5 28.8 2.5
Facebook.com 6.7 12.8 32.2
HuffingtonPost.com 13.9 47.3 5.7
IMDB.com 30.2 31.1 4.6
MySpace.com 16.4 31.3 9.6
WebMD.com 36.5 45.0 4.2
Wikipedia.org 50.6 49.4 5.1
Yelp.com 42.1 47.8 3.8
Youtube.com 14.9 23.4 20.2
Source: Alexa.com
Typical Complement Sellers’ Problem:
Software
Hardware
Single Demand
PH PS
Double Marginalization: PH+PS > P*
• Cournot 1838, ch. IX
Typical Solutions: One Price Setter
Single Demand P = P*
With advertisement, however, there are two effects at play • Different websites have different advertising technologies
A Model
Ui =vi − δse +δcw( ), if visits both sites
0, otherwise
⎧⎨⎪
⎩⎪
A “Search Engine” (SE), a “Content Website” (CW), and “Users”
vi ~ v,v⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
SE and CW Profits
Πse = (ase − cse)D δse(ase)+δcw(acw)( )
Πcw = (acw − ccw)D δse(ase)+δcw(acw)( )
A Model
Timing 1. SE and CW set advertising levels 2. Users decide whether to search and visit content site
“Industry” Optimum
maxase ,acw{ }
(ase +acw − cse − ccw)D δse(ase)+δcw(acw)( )Necessary conditions at optimum:
aseΠ +acw
Π − cse − ccw =D
−D '·1
δcw'
These imply:
δse' (ase
Π ) = δcw' (acw
Π )
aseΠ +acw
Π − cse − ccw =D
−D '·1
δse'
Equilibrium
maxa j(a j − c j )D δ j (a j )+δ− j (a− j )( )
a j* − c j =
D
−D '·1
δ j'
Each site solves: j = se,cw
Necessary condition for each site:
Two Distortions
ase* +acw
* − cse − ccw =D
−D '·1
δse'
+1
δcw'
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
Equilibrium • Double Marginalization • “Mis-marginalization”
aseΠ +acw
Π − cse − ccw =D
−D '·1
δse'
Industry Optimum
δse' = δcw
'
Comparison
Until Now • One Search Engine • One Content Website
Let’s Compare With • One Search Engine • Perfectly Competitive Content Websites
Search Engine
Search Engine
Content Website
Content Websites
Comparison
Until Now • One Search Engine • One Content Website
Lets Compare With • One Search Engine • Perfectly Competitive Content Websites
Search Engine
Search Engine
Content Website
Content Websites
Key point Adding competition can reduce both
• Industry profits • Total welfare
Example
δse(ase) = ase2Advertising Technologies:
δcw(acw) =acw2
γ
vi ~U 0,v[ ]Users’ Valuations:
Zero Marginal Costs
Case 1: One SE, One CW
Choosing Advertising Levels—SE and CW solve:
maxase
ase 1−ase2 + acw
γ⎛⎝⎜
⎞⎠⎟2
v
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥ max
acwacw 1−
ase2 + acw
γ⎛⎝⎜
⎞⎠⎟2
v
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥
(Same Users)
Case 2: One SE, Competitive CWs Here, only search engine sets positive advertising
Choosing Advertising Levels—SE solves:
maxase
ase 1−ase2 + 0
γ⎛⎝⎜
⎞⎠⎟2
v
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥
Tradeoff: Double Marginalization versus Mis-marginalization
Total Profits
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
γ
One SE, Competing CWs
One SE, One CW
Tradeoff: Double Marginalization versus Mis-marginalization
Total Welfare
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
γ
v large
v small
One SE, Competing CWs
One SE, One CW
Proposition
a) Starting from the Nash Equilibrium outcome with a single SE and a single CW, if the CW advertising level, acw , is exogenously decreased, and the SE responds optimally, then total industry profits increase
b) Starting from an outcome featuring competitive CW advertising, if the CW advertising level, acw, is exogenously increased, then total industry profits increase, so long as
δcw' (ccw) <δse
' (ase* (δcw(ccw)))
What Can We Take from This?
• When complementary websites advertise differently, there are (at least) two sources of economic distortion:
• Level of distraction • Payoff from distracting
• Empirically, payoff from showing ads seems to be highly variable: In 2007, the CPM paid by advertisers varied from less than $1 to more than $100 (source: Evans ‘08)
• When evaluating conduct of firms in this industry, both of these issues should be taken into account
• Potential benefits of allowing sites to share information about users?
In the Paper
General, price theoretic treatment of the problem
• Start off with one site, examine different advertising technologies
a
!(a," )
a
!(a," )!a" '' large !a" '' small
In the Paper
General, price theoretic treatment of the problem
• Start off with one site, examine different advertising technologies
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
In the Paper
General, price theoretic treatment of the problem
• Start off with one site, examine different advertising technologies • Analyze problem with arbitrary number of sites
• Two fundamental distortions • Double marginalization • Mis-marginalization
In the Paper
General, price theoretic treatment of the problem
• Start off with one site, examine different advertising technologies • Analyze problem with arbitrary number of sites
• Two fundamental distortions • Double marginalization • Mis-marginalization
• Salop model: 1 search engine, n content websites • Study effects of differentiation, incentives for entry • Surprising result: In equilibrium, users benefit from more differentiation/ less entry by content websites
Ongoing Work
• Relate “non-transferability of utility” of this setting to two-sided platform competition
• Incorporate more flexible treatment of websites’ complementarity • Better understand relation to Cournot with
asymmetric costs (e.g. Schwartz ’89)
Search
Searchers
aw as + aw
Content
Direct Visitors
Partial Complementarity
Searcher benefit direct visitors, and direct visitors harm searchers
Unreliable Content Sites
λvi − as2 − aw ,1
2
(1− λ)λvi − as2 − aw ,12 − aw ,22
1 2
Related Literature • Surveys:
• Evans (RNE ’08), (JEP ‘09) • Link Structure:
• Katona & Sarvary (Marketing Science ‘08) • Dellarocas, Katona & Rand (NET ‘10)
• Competition Among Complement Producers: • Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebuff & Yoffie • Cheng & Nahm (RJE ‘07) • Lerner & Tirole (AER ’04)
• Advertising on Platforms: • Anderson & Coate (RES ’05) • Choi (IEP ’06) • Crampes, Hartichbalet & Jullien (JIE ’09)
• Search Engine as a Platform • Athey-Ellison (QJE ‘11) • Gomes (WP ‘11) • White (WP ’09)
Conclusion
1. Multiple websites are often complements 2. They use very different methods to turn user attention into revenue This combination of factors leads to two separate coordination problems 1. Double Marginalization: too much nuisance 2. Mis-marginalization: inefficient nuisance For websites, there is a tradeoff between solving one and solving the other
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