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The End of A Road:

The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe

AbatteredcampaignposterforPresidentialhopeful,MorganTsvangirai,inanelectionthatlefttheoppositionbruisedanddisempowered

Solidarity Peace Trust

Johannesburg

October 2013

TheSolidarityPeaceTrustisanon‐governmentalorganisation,registeredinSouthAfrica.TheTrusteesoftheSolidarityPeaceTrustarechurchleadersofSouthernAfrica,whoareallcommittedtohumanrights,freedomanddemocracyintheirregion.

TheobjectivesoftheTrustare:

Toassistindividuals,organisations,churchesandaffiliatedorganisationsinSouthernAfrica,tobuildsolidarityinthepursuitofjustice,peaceandsocialequalityandequityinZimbabwe.ItshallbethespecialconcernoftheTrusttoassistvictimsofhumanrightsabusesintheireffortstocorrectandendtheirsituationofoppression.Tel:+27(39)6825869Fax:+27(39)6825869

selvan@solidaritypeacetrust.org http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org

VoicesfromMatabeleland–

OpinionsonwhatcontributedtotheelectionresultsZANUPFandthecampaignFear…‘IvotedforZANU‐PFeventhoughIdonotsupportthem.ThewarveteranstoldusthattherewouldbewarifMDCwon,whoeverwantsasituationagainlikethatinthe2008elections?’[Oldman,Nkayi]Food…‘Theotherthingwastherice;thericeissuewasaproblem.Youseefoodwasusedincampaigningandpeoplehadnochoice.Theyendedupgivingthatbucketofriceanexaggeratedvalue,maybebecauseitcouldhavefoundthemwithoutmealiemealathome.…Whenelectiontimecomestheyhavenochoicebuttovoteforthatbucketofrice.…’[Middleagedman,Insiza]Favours…‘Wealsolostonstrategy,astechnicallyZANU‐PFhadanupperhand,theyannouncedacancellationofoutstandinglocalauthoritybills,givingatangiblereprievetotheelectorateanditwonthemsomedegreeofsupport.’[MDC‐Tlawyer,Bulawayo]Regaliaandvisibility…‘ZANUgavejustanyone,ifyouhappenedtobenearwhentheywerepassingbytheywouldgiveyou,eitheracap,oradoek[scarf],totieyourhead,theywerenotdiscriminating.Otherpartiesdidnothave‐yourecogniseHighlanders[soccer]fansbytheirregalia,butsomesupportersoftheseotherpartiesdidnothavetheirpartyregalia–theseotherpartiesendeduplikeschoolchildrenwhojustweartheirschooluniformsbecausetheyaretoopoortohavetherightclothessothatyouknowwhotheyare.’[Oldman,Umzingwane]…Witchcraft‘ThosecapsandshirtsfromChina,theyweretakentoapowerfulN’angainChipinge,sothatwhenanyonewavedthoseZANU‐PFcapsintheairovertheirheads,theyendedupvotingforZANUPFoncetheywereinthepollingstation,nomatterwhotheyreallysupported…’[Youngman,Bulilima]Assistedvoting…‘Theywouldaskagedpeople,“GogocanIgowithyouinsidesothatIcanassistyou?”Thatwasaplot.Agedpeoplewouldwanttogoin,votefastandgohome.Theywouldintheendagree,thoughnotfully.Likebeinghonestaboutwhowouldtheyreallywanttovotefor.’[YoungMan,InsizaSouth]

MDC‐TandthecampaignImposedcandidates….‘L.M.came,hefirstspokeaboutdevolution.Intheendheintroducedthecandidateheimposed,andthenweaskedhim‐weaskedhimwhatkindofdevolutionhewastalkingabout.Becauseyouspokeaboutdevolutionfirst,andthenforyoutointroduceyourimposedcandidate…?Hethenwentontosaybecauseheisatnationallevelwhateverhesaysgoes.Hesaidthatevenifhegotthatpersonfromthetoilet,itwasamustforustovoteforhim.Wesaidno!Wedon’tknowthatperson.Thingsgotmessedup.’[InsizaSouth]

Reactionstoelectionoutcome

ThinkingofJoshuaNkomo….‘Ijustdonotunderstandwhythiskeepsonhappeningthisway.Iamsodisappointed.Ihavebeendisappointedbyeveryelectionsince1980.WemetMrJoshuaNkomoinperson,atNjeleleHill,andweclearedeverythingwiththespiritsforhimtowin.MaybeMugabehasgotastrongergodthanallofusandthatiswhyhewins,nomatterhowpeoplevote….’ [Oldlady,Matobo]‘WhatIcansayisthatintermsofpoliticsIhavenoalignmenttoanyparty,butwhoeverleadsinagoodway‐I’mnotevensayingthereisonewhoisleadinginagoodway‐but,inthe1980s,thissideinMatabelelandtherewasNkomo,hewastheonewhomwelookedupto.Whenthingsstartedgettingtoughhesaid,“Mypeople,thingsaretough‐ifIcontinuegoingouttoothercountries,thismatterwillnotbehandledwell.Ibetterjointhesepeople,sothatweuniteandIfixthingsinternally”.HethenleftuswithMugabe.Evennowwearesayingitisokaywhereweare,whoeverisinoppositionisnotofconcerntous.…WewillspeaktotheonewhowasleftonthethronebyNkomo.’ [Oldman,Gwanda]Depression…‘It’saparalyzingelectionresulttoeveryone,thefutureisbleak.Theywillcontinuetofilltheirbellies,whilewesuffers.’ [Oldman,Lupane]‘Ifheistheonewhohastakenoverthewholecountrywhatcanyoudo?Wherecanyougoto?Thereisnowayout,iftheseradiosaretellingusthetruth,tosaythatoldmanhaswon,whatcanwedo,nothing.’ [Oldlady,Umzingwane]Pleasure…‘IamgladthatZANUPFhaswon–theyhavepromisedusthatwecanownfactoriesnow,soIamwaitingtobegivenpartofafactory.’ [Youngman,TsholotshoSouth]

CONTENTS

PARTONE: THEENDOFAROAD

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7 TheConstitutionalProcess……………………………………………………………………….. 7 ThePossibilityofRegionalandInternationalConsensusinthe

Interregnum betweentheReferendumandtheElection……………………………. 9TheElectionProcess………………………………………………………………………………… 11ExplainingtheElectionResults………………………………………………………………… 15TheStrategiesofZanuPF………………………………………………………………………… 15TheLimitationsoftheMDCs……………………………………………………………………. 23RegionalandInternationalFactors…………………………………………………………… 25Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………. 26

PARTTWO: UNDERSTANDINGTHERESULTS 28 A. BACKGROUNDTOTHEELECTIONS 29

i. FearandCoercion………………………………………………………………………………….. 29ii. Theunlikelihoodofjustice……………………………………………………………………… 29iii. Electionviolations2013…………………………………………………………………………. 30iv. Assessingthevotingfigures……………………………………………………………………. 30

B. ARETHEREPATTERNSTOBESEEN? 32

1. OverallVoteComparisons…………………………………………………………………………… 32

i. Generalobservations……………………………………………………………………………. 32ii. TheMDCsandtheVote………………………………………………………………………….. 32iii. ZANUPFandtheVote…………………………………………………………………………….. 34

2. ThePresidentialVote2013………………………………………………………………………….. 35i. Matabeleland:numerically,ashrinkingstronghold................................................ 35

3. TheDividedOppositionVoteinMatabeleland–andBeyond…………………………. 364. VotersTurnedAway……………………………………………………………………………………. 385. AssistedVotes……………………………………………………………………………………………… 39 6. ConstituencieswithMoreThan50%IncreaseinVotersfrom2008‐13…………… 41

C. CONCLUSION 44

INDEXOFFIGURESANDTABLES

Thereporthasimagesofelectionpostersfromthe2013campaigndispersedthroughout.Figure1:VotesCastinFiveKeyElectionssince2000:byParty(x1000)…………………………….. 33Figure2:PresidentialVotebyCandidateandProvince:2013…………………………………………….. 36Figure3:PercentageofvotersturnedawaybyProvince:2013…………………………………………… 38Figure4:Comparingilliteracyrates(UNESCO)with%assistedvotes…………………………………. 40

byProvince(ZEC)Figure5:Percentageofconstituencieswithmorethana50%increasein…………………………. 41 votesbetween2008and2013:byProvinceFigure6:Constituencieswithmorethan50%voteincreasein2008:…………………………………… 43 Whichpartywonthese52seats?Table1:RecordofVotesinMatabelelandconstituencieswonbyZANUPF………………………… 37 onadividedoppositionvote.

APPENDICESAppendix1: Table2:PresidentialVotesperprovince:3maincandidates(ZEC)………………. 46Appendix2: Table3:RecordofVotesinfourconstituencieswonbyZANUona dividedoppositionvote………………………………………………………………………………… 46Appendix3: Table4:VotersturnedawaybyProvince(ZEC)as%oftotalvote………………… 47Appendix4: Table5:Assistedvotesbyprovince(ZEC)comparedto

literacyrates(UNESCO)………………………………………………………………………………. 47Appendix5: BulawayoandHarareconstituencieswithmorethan50%

increaseintotalvoterssince2008.…………………………………………………………. 48Appendix6: Violationsofthe2013ElectionSummarised.…………………………………………..

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC AfricanNationalCongressAU AfricanUnionCIO CentralIntelligenceOrganisationCOPAC ParliamentarySelectCommitteeEU EuropeanUnionGPA GlobalPoliticalAgreementHofA HouseofAssemblyIMF InternationalMonetaryFundMDC MovementforDemocraticChangeMDC‐T MovementforDemocraticChange–TsvangiraiMDC(M/N) MovementforDemocraticChange(Mutambara/Ncube)MKD Mavambo/Kusile/DawnNCA NationalConstitutionalAssemblyPIMZ ProgressiveandInnovativeMovementofZimbabweRAU ResearchandAdvocacyUnitSADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunitySPT SolidarityPeaceTrustUK UnitedKingdomUNESCO UnitedNationsEducationXXUSA UnitedStatesofAmericaZANUPF ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion(PatrioticFront)ZAPU ZimbabweAfricanPeople’sUnionZEC ZimbabweElectoralCommission

ZESN ZimbabweElectoralSupportNetworkZRP ZimbabweRepublicPolice

TheEndofaRoad

Introduction1

TheGlobalPoliticalAgreement(GPA),whichsetouttopreparethepoliticalprocessforagenerallyacceptableelectionafterthedebacleofJune2008,wasmarkedbyseverecontestationsalltoocharacteristicofthebattleforthestatethatconstitutedthepoliticsoftheagreement.Atalmosteverystageoftheagreementintenseconflictsovertheinterpretationoftheaccordlefttheirdebrisonthepoliticalterrain,attheheartofwhichwasthemeaningof‘sovereignty.’Aroundthisnotion,ZANUPFinparticularwovedenselayersofpoliticaldiscourse,combinedwiththecoerciveuseofthestatethatitcontinuedtocontrol.ThemajoraimofthisstrategyonthepartofZANUPF,wastomanipulateandstallthereformprovisionsintheGPA,regroup,andreconfigureitspoliticalresourcesafterplungingtothenadirofitslegitimacyinthe2008electoraldefeat.

In2009,SolidarityPeaceTrust(SPT)publishedamonograph2thatprovidedacomprehensiveoverviewoftheGPA,settingoutitscentraldynamicsandthekeystructuresandprocessesinvolvedinthepoliticsofthisperiod.Theaimofthisreportisnottorepeattheanalysisprovidedinthatbook,buttoprovidesuccinctcoverageoftheelectionthatbroughtthatagreementtoaclose.MoreoverthereportwillalsoprovidesomepointerstothefutureofZimbabweanpolitics.

TheConstitutionalProcess

Between2009and2013akeyareaofcontestationbetweenthepartiestotheGPAwasthestruggleforconstitutionalreform.ArticleVIoftheagreementsetoutthe‘fundamentalrightanddutyoftheZimbabweanpeopletomakeaconstitutionforthemselves’,alsostipulatingthattheprocesswouldbecarriedoutbyaSelectCommitteeofParliamentcomposedofpartiestotheGPA.Constitutionalismandtheconstitutionalreformisoftenahighlycontestedprocesswithdifferentpartiesbringingdifferentpoliticalagendasandcompetingimaginariestotheprocess.Zimbabwewasnoexceptiontothistrendandsincethe1990’sthemajorpoliticalpartiesoftenfoughtouttheirrivalpositionsonthisterrain.

Forthenationalistscomingoutoftheliberationstruggle,constitutionalismandthelawhavehadacomplicatedhistory.Ontheonehand,thesediscourseswereconstitutiveoftheirdemandsagainstthecolonialstateandhelpedtoconceptualisetheirownlegalityand 1ThisIntroductionandthesectionontheconstitutiondrawfromB.Raftopoulos,‘TowardsanotherstalemateinZimbabwe?”NOREF,October2012.2BrianRaftopoulos(Ed),TheHardRoadtoReform:ThePoliticsofZimbabwe’sGlobalPoliticalAgreement.WeaverPress,Harare.

legitimacy.Theyhavealsoplayedanimportantroleinbothlocatingtheirdemandsandimaginingthepossibleformsofafuturestate.3Ontheotherhandthisgenerationofleadersalsoviewedtheliberationstruggleasanalternativetoconstitutionalism,withthewarofliberationleadingtothedestructionofthecolonialstateandtheestablishmentof‘people’spower’howevernebulouslydefined.4

TheconstitutionalcompromisesagreedatLancasterHousein1979weretheresultofaconvergenceofnational,regionalandinternationalpressuresthatinauguratedthepoliticsofthepost‐colonialstate.Onceinpower,ZANUPF,asinthecaseofotherpost‐colonialpoliticalparties,instrumentalisedtheuseoftheconstitutiontoconcentratepowerinthePresidencyandtoreconstructthepowerrelationsbetweenthestateandoppositionpolitics.

WiththesigningoftheGPAin2008,constitutionalreformbecameoneofthemajorissuesofcontentionbetweentheparties.Afterthreeyearsofdelays,obstructions,logisticalandfinancialsquabbles,andaproblematicoutreachprogramme,adraftconstitutionwasproducedthroughtheParliamentarySelectCommitteeprocess(COPAC),inJuly2012.Importantlyintermsoftheprocess,allpartiestotheagreementweresignatoriestothedraft,leadingtothelogicalconclusionthatatalltimestheprincipalsofthepartiesandtheirrespectiveleadershipswerefullyinformedofthediscussionsoftheCOPACteam.

However,inamovethatreplicatedpreviousinterventionstoblockconstitutionalreformandeschewitscommitmenttotheGPA,ZANUPFplacedanotherobstacleintheprogressofthereformprocess.InAugust2012,PresidentMugabepresentedtheleadersoftheMDCformationswithaZANUPFredraftoftheCOPACdraft,onthegroundsthatthelatterwasdraftedinoppositiontothe‘viewsofthepeople’gatheredduringtheoutreachprocess.Thisredraft,describedbyZANUPFas‘non‐negotiable’,attemptedtoundotheCOPACprocess,underminetheGPAandonceagainforcetheZimbabweancitizenryintoanationalelectionwithoutanewconstitution.Moreover,theZANUPFdrafteffectivelydismissedthemajorreformsincludedintheCOPACdraftandproposedareturntothekindofexecutivepowersandparty‐staterulethatZANUPFhadcraftedsince1980.

BothMDCformationsobjectedstronglytothisZANUPFposition.Afterweeksofpoliticalhaggling,theparties,underpressurefromtheSADCfacilitationteam,agreedtotaketheCOPACdrafttoanAllStakeholdersConferenceheldinOctober2012.ThefewdisagreementsonthedraftthatresultedfromtheConferencewerefinallyresolvedbythe

3JocelynAlexander,‘Nationalism,self‐governmentinRhodesiandetention:Gonakudzingwa,1964‐1974,’JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies,vol37,no.2,2011,pp.551‐569.4IbboMandaza,‘MovementsforNationalLiberationandconstitutionalisminSouthernAfrica,’inIssaShivji(Ed)StateandConstitutionalism,AnAfricanDebate,SAPESBooks,Harare,1991,pp.71‐90.

partyPrincipalsinJanuary2013,andbyPresidentialProclamation,the16thJulywassetasideasthedaythatareferendumwouldbeheldontheconstitutionaldraft.Whilethedraftwasacompromisedocumentwhichstillcontainedadisturbingconcentrationofexecutivepowers,italsoputinplaceimportantchangessuchaspresidentialtermlimits,moreaccountabilityofthesecurityandjudicialservices,amoreindependentnationalprosecutingauthority,limiteddevolutionofpower,andstrongercitizenshiprights.

TheNationalConstitutionalAssembly(NCA),whichhadopposedtheCOPACprocess,filedanapplicationtotheHighCourtinFebruary2013seekinganorderinterdictingtheZimbabweElectionCommission(ZEC)fromconductingthereferendum.TheNCAsoughtthecourtorderonthegroundsthattheProclamationbedeclaredunlawfulandultraviresSection3oftheReferendumActChapter2:10.PredictablytheHighCourtrejectedtheNCAcase‘initsentirety’statingthatthePresident’sconductwas‘notsubjecttoreviewbyacourt.’5

Thereferendumwentaheadonthe16thMarch2013,withtheoverwhelmingmajorityofvoters,3,079,966,votingforthenewconstitution,whileasmallnumber,179,489,votedagainst.Thetotalnumberofvotescastwas3,259,454.6Thereferendumvoterecordedthelargestvoterturnoutinthepost‐colonialperiod,withmarkedincreasesineachprovinceincomparisonwiththeMarchelections.HarareandthethreeMashonalandProvincesrecordedthelargestturnouts,whiletheSouthernMatabelelandregionsrecordedthelowest.7ThemajorreasonsforthelargevoterturnoutincludedthebroadconsensusoftheGPApartiesonthedraftconstitution,therelaxedvotingrequirements,thelesscomplexvotingprocedureandthe‘relativelyprevailingpeacefulpoliticalengagements.’8OminouslythelargevoterturnoutalsogaveanindicationthatZANUPFwasmobilizingitssupportbaseinpreparationforthegeneralelections,andthatthepartyhadbeensteadilyregisteringvotersinpreparationforthisforthcomingevent.

ThePossibilityofRegionalandInternationalConsensusintheInterregnumbetweentheReferendumandtheElection

IntheaftermathofthereferendumthereappearedtobeagrowingconsensusbetweenSADC,theEUandtoalesserextenttheUSonthewayforward.SADCcommendedZimbabweforholdingacredible,freeandfairconstitutionalreferendum,’andurgedtheGPApartiesonceagainto‘finalisetheoutstandingissuesintheimplementationoftheGPA

5ConstitutionWatch11/2013,Harare,2ndMarch2013.6ZimbabweHumanRightsBulletin,“Zimbabweresoundinglyvotesforanewconstitution,”19March2013.7ElectoralResourceCentre,“‘MiracleVotes’‐AnanalysisoftheMarch2013Referendum.”March2013.8Ibid.

andpreparationsforholdingfreeandfairelectionsinZimbabwe.’9Twomonthsbeforethis,aFriendsofZimbabwemeetingheldinLondonattendedbyseveralEUmembers,theUS,Canada,JapanandAustraliaaswellasthepartiestotheGPA,alsoissuedastatementofencouragementonthesuccessofthereferendum.ThestatementwelcomedandsupportedSADC’sleadroleasguarantoroftheGPA,notedthe‘breakthroughoftheconstitutionalreferendum’andreemphasizedWesternsupporttoSADC‘intheireffortstofacilitatetheGPAandtheroadmapforelections.’10

InMay2013,a‘QuickPolicyInsight’paperfromtheEuropeanParliamentreachedoutfurthertoSADCandtotheGPAparties,providingacriticalperspectiveonbothZanuPFandtheMDCandstressingtheneedforbuildingstrongerpoliticalinstitutions.Thestatementread:

GovernmentturnoverdoesnotguaranteedemocraticchangeinZimbabwe.ZanuPFlacksdemocraticroots;buttheMDChas,foritspart,donelittletoproveitstrustworthiness.Ratherthanaskingwhoisinpower,internationalanalystsmightwanttoputastrongerfocusonhowtoactuallyimproveZimbabwe’spoliticalcultureandinstitutions.11

Inadditionthedocumentwarnedthat:

…..foreignactorsneedtobeawareofthehighdegreeofsuspicionprevalentinZimbabwe.Theinternationalcommunityshouldactwithgreatcaretoavoidunintentionallycausingacounterproductivebacklash.12

InadditiontotheseoverturestheDanishGovernmenthad,inMarch2013,statedthatitspositiontowardsZimbabwewasthat‘therisksofnotengaginginthecurrentcrucialtransitionprocessisgreaterthantheriskofengaging.’13TheIMFforitsparthadinJuneofthisyearapprovedaStaff‐MonitoredProgrammeforZimbabwecoveringtheperiodApril‐December2013,inwhichitwouldsupporttheZimbabweanauthorities’‘comprehensive

Dialogue,HisExcellency,PresidentoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,PresidentJacobZuma,totheSADCOrganTroikaonPolitics,DefenceandSecurityCooperation.Pretoria,SouthAfrica,9March2013.10FriendsofZimbabweCommuniqué,London,26March2013.Thedelegationstothemeetingincluded:Australia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,CzechRepublic,Denmark,theEU,Finland,France,Germany,Ireland,Italy,Japan,theNetherlands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,theUK,theUS.11EuropeanParliament,Director‐GeneralforExternalPolicies,“Zimbabwe’s2013generalelections:Agenuinewindofchange?”DGEXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2013.28May2013.12Ibid.13MinistryofForeignAffairs,Denmark,DANIDA,“Denmark‐ZimbabwePartnershipPolicy2013‐2015,”March2013.

adjustmentandreformprogramme’.Thiswouldinturnbean‘importantsteppingstonetowardshelpingZimbabwere‐engagewiththeinternationalcommunity.’14

Thus,bytheendofJune2013therewasagrowingconsensusbetweenSADCandtheEUinparticularaboutthesuccessofthereferendumandtheneedforgenerallyacceptablefreeandfairelections,evenifthiswasunderlinedbynaggingdoubtsaboutthepossibilityofsuchanoutcome.TheEUlinkeditsre‐engagementtothemanagementoftheforthcomingelections,andstatedthatitwas‘readytoengagewithwhatevergovernmentthatisformedasaresultofpeaceful,transparentandcredibleelections.’15TheUS,asitdidthroughouttheperiodoftheGPA,16tookaharderlinestatingthatwhileitapplaudedtheholdingofasuccessfulreferendum,iturgedtheZimbabweGovernmenttowelcomebothdomesticandinternationalobserverstomonitortheelections.ThispositionsetoutbyUSAssistantSecretaryforAfricanAffairs,JohnnyCarson,earnedanimmediaterebukefromtheZimbabweanPresidentialspokespersonforputtingforwardsuch‘obnoxious’conditions.17NotwithstandingtheUSposition,thereappearedtobeanincreasingconvergencebetweenSADCandtheWestontheneedforfreeandfairelectionsinZimbabwe,anemergingconsensusthathad,bymid2013,alreadypushedtheEUintoasubstantivemovementawayfromthe‘sanctions’measuresimposedbytheMugaberegimefromtheearly2000’s.However,aswillbediscussedfurtherinthepaper,thisseemingconvergencebarelyconcealedthetensionsandcontradictionsinthediscoursesontransitionatplaybetweenandsometimeswithinthesegroups.

TheElectionProcess

Ashehaddonepriortothe2008election,incontraventionoftheGPA,Mugabeproceededtotakeaunilateralpositiononthesettingoftheelectiondate.NotwithstandingtheunfinishedreformagendasetoutintheGPA,andagainstthepersistentrecommendationsofseveralSADCforaontheneedforafullimplementationoftheGPAbeforeanelection,MugabeandhispartysetintrainaseriesofprocessesthatwouldonceagainimperiltheSADCfacilitationprocessinZimbabwe.Onthe2ndMay2013Mr.JealousyMawarire,theDirectoroftheCentreforDemocracyinSouthernAfrica,andwidelybelievedtobeworkingforZANUPF,filedanurgentapplicationtotheSupremeCourtseekinganorderdirecting 14InternationalMonetaryFund,‘IMFManagingDirectorApprovesaStaffMonitoredProgrammeforZimbabwe.’PressReleaseNo.13/174,13June2013.15ReportoftheDelegationoftheDevelopmentCommitteeoftheEuropeanParliamenttoZimbabwe(29April‐3May2013.)3July2013.16B.Raftopoulos,‘AnOverviewofthePoliticsoftheGlobalPoliticalAgreement:NationalConflict,RegionalAgony,InternationalDilemma,’inB.Raftopoulos(Ed),TheHardRoadtoReform,opcit.17USseektoobserveZimbabweelections.www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/16751‐us‐seek‐to‐observe‐zimbabwe‐elections.htmlAccessedon08/04/13.

thePresidenttoproclaimelectionstobeheldnolaterthanthe30thJune.Mawariremadehisclaimundersection18oftheoldConstitution.BythetimethemattercametocourtitwasheardbytheConstitutionalCourtwhichwassetupunderthenewconstitution,thecompositionofwhichwaslargelyinfluencedbyZANUPF.Predictably,byamajoritydecisiontheCourtwasinagreementwithMawarire’sclaim,butstatedthattheelectiondateshouldbesetfor31stJuly.

Thiscontroversiallegaldecision18allowedZANUPFtopushaheadwithitspreferreddatefortheelection,largelybypassingtherequirementsforconsultationwithotherpartiestotheGPA,andtheSADCdemandsforthefullimplementationoftheagreementbeforeelections.TheimmediateresponseofLindiweZulufromtheSADCfacilitationteamwasthat:

Withorwithoutthecourtruling,wearegoingaheadtomeetthepartiesasthefacilitationteamaheadoftheSADCsummitwhich(decision)wasagreedoninAddisAbaba.Allpartieshavebeeninvited.Asthefacilitatorputitatthesummit,wewantthecomfortofhavingaclearroadmaptotheelections,withtimelinesagreeduponbythepartiesthemselves.Theultimateistohavecredibleelections.Wewanttoavoidthe2008scenario.19

Zulu’sstatementresultedinahailofinvectivefromZANUPFspokespersonsthatcontinuedpastattacksonherandwasapreludetoamajorverbalassaultbyMugabehimself.PartyideologueJonathanMoyo,drawingonthelanguageofsovereigntyandconstitutionalism,calledZulu’scommentsan‘attackonournationalsovereignty’andcalledonZimbabweansto‘opposeandrejectthispatronizingandillegitimateposturingbyourneighbours.’20DespitetheseattacksZuma’sreporttotheSADCTroikaonthe15JunereiteratedtheconcernsofZulu’sposition.NotingthatmostoftheareasagreedtobytheGPApartiesinJuly2011undertheframeworkof‘ZimbabweElectionsRoadMapandTimelines’hadnotbeen‘adequatelyimplemented’,Zumareportedthattheproposaltoholdtheelectionson31stJuly‘isfraughtwithlegalcontestation,politicaldisputeandheightenedtensionsevenwithintheInclusiveGovernment.’21

AttheSADCsummitheldinMaputoon15thJune2013,theregionalgroupendorsedthereportofthefacilitatorbutacknowledgedtherulingoftheConstitutionalCourt.It 18ForoneofthemanydiscussionsofthisdecisionbycivicgroupsinZimbabweseeD.Matyszak,“‘BeforeandAfter’:OldWineinnewbottles:TheConstitutionalCourtRulingontheelectiondate.”3rdJune2013.19DumisaniSibandaandEversonMushava,‘Roadmapwilldecidepolls‐Zuma.’www.zimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/17602‐roadmap‐will‐decide‐polls‐zumahtmlAccessedon06/06/13.20‘MoyoandMutambarablastsZuma’.www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/17616‐moyo‐and‐mutambara‐savages‐zuma.htmlAccessedon06/06/13.21ReportoftheSADCFacilitator,HisExcellency,PresidentoftheRepublicofZimbabwe,PresidentJacobZuma,attheSADCExtra‐0rdinarySummit,Maputo,Mozambique,15June2013.

recommendedthattheGovernmentofZimbabweengagetheConstitutionalCourttoseekmoretime‘beyondthe31Julydeadline’forholdingtheHarmonisedElections.22ItwasveryclearthatSADC,notwithstandingthewarningsfromZuma’sreport,wasbendingtoMugabe’sstrategy,deferringonceagaintotheissueofsovereigntyaroundtheCourtdecision.TheExecutiveSecretaryofSADCTomazSolomaomadeitclearaftertheMaputosummitthat‘decisionsofthecourtsaretoberespected.’23TheAUChairNkosozanaDlamini‐Zumatookthesameposition,alsoexpressingtheneedtorespecttheruleoflawandthejudiciary.24

Followingthesummit,ZANUPFmadeacourtappealforanextension,designedtofailandsubmittedwithouttheconsultationofthetwoMDC’s.PredictablytheConstitutionalCourtdeniedtheappealandtheelectiondateofthe31stJulywasconfirmed,inthefaceofaclearlackofpreparednessfortheelections.AstheInternationalCrisisGroupreported,thevotersrollwasinashambles,thesecurityforcesremainedunreformed,thepublicmediawasgrosslyimbalanced,theZimbabweElectoralCommission(ZEC)wasunder‐fundedandlackedtimeforpreparation,andtheZECfailedtoprovideanelectronicvoters’rolltoallcandidatesbeforetheelectioninbreachofSection21oftheElectoralAct.Moreoverthevoterregistrationprocesswas‘hamperedbyresourcerestrictions,showedbiasagainsttheregistrationinthecities‐especiallyHarare,andendedon10Julyamidprotests.’25ThislackofpreparednesscontinuedtobeaconcerntotheSADCfacilitationteamwithLindiweZuluonceagainvoicingherconcernsafterthechaoticprocesssurroundingthespecialvoteorganizedforpoliceinmidJuly,designedtoallowpolicewhowouldbeondutyon31stJulytovoteearlier.Zuluobservedthat,“Weareconcernedbecausethingsonthegroundarenotlookinggood,”statingalsothatZumahadcalledMugabetotellhimthathewasnotpleasedwiththerun‐uptothepoll.26

MugaberespondedangrilytoZulu’sstatement,hurlinginsultsather:

Anordinarywomansays‘noyoucan’thaveelectionsonJuly31.’Really,didsuchapersonthinkwe,asacountry,wouldtakeheedofthisstreetwoman’sutterances?27

MoreoverinyetanotherdisplayofpoliticalbrinkmanshipMugabethreatenedtowithdrawfromSADCiftheorganization‘decidestodostupidthings.’TheSouthAfricanPresidency

22Communiqué:SADCMaputomeetingonDRC,ZimbabweandMadagascar,Maputo,15thJune2013.23‘Elections:SADCwillrespectcourtappealruling.’www.newzimbabwe.com/news‐11438‐Elections+SADC+will+respect+appeal+ruling/news.aspxAccessedon18June2013.24‘AUchiefwadesintoelectiondaterow.’www.newzimbabwe.com/news‐11431‐AU+chief+wades+into+election+date+row/news.aspxAccessedon17June2013.25InternationalCrisisGroup,Zimbabwe’sElections:Mugabe’sLastStand.AfricaBriefingNo.95,Johannesburg/Brussels,29July2013.26‘‘ZimbabweElection‘notlookinggood’,SouthAfrica.”www.safpi.orgAccessedon22July2013.27SibusisoNgalwa,‘Zuma’senvoyshrugsoffBob’sstreetslur.’SundayTimes,7,July2013.

immediatelyissuedastatementdistancingitselffromZulu’scommentsanddenyinganyreportsthatZumahadbeenintouchwithMugabeaboutelectionpreparations.28

Thus,afteraprotractedprocessoffacilitation,andthecontestedandfrustratingexperienceofanInclusiveGovernment,theHarmonisedElectionswentaheadon31stJuly2013.AlthoughtherewereclearindicationsthatonceagaintheMDCsfacedmajorobstaclesintheelections,theextentofZANUPF’s‘victory’shockedmanyobservers.InthePresidentialvoteMugabereceived61%ofthevote,comparedtothe44%hehadwonin2008;Tsvangirai’svoteplungedfrom48%in2008to33%in2013.IntermsoftheparliamentaryseatsZanuPFincreaseditsnumberfrom99seatsin2008to159in2013,whiletheMDC‐T’snumberdroppedfrom99seatsin2008(withthesmallerMDCformationwinning10seats)to49in2013.Moreoverthetotalnumberofvotescountedincreasedby25%between2008and2013,withZANUPFincreasingitsshareofthevoteby83%betweenthesedates,withthepercentageoftheMDC‐Tdroppingto–2%inthisperiod.

Theresponseoftheregionalandcontinentalbodiestotheelectionswasunanimouslyfavourable,unliketheirpositioninthediscredited2008plebiscite.SADCdeclaredthepoll‘free,peacefulandgenerallycredible,’notwithstandingitsunwillingnesstopronounceit‘fair’becauseoftheabsenceofanelectronicvoters’role.29TheAUcommendedZimbabwefor‘agenerallypeacefulcampaign,’observingthat‘fromanhistoricalperspectiveandincomparisontothe2008elections,Zimbabwehasmadeanimportanttransitionintheconductofitselections.’30JacobZumaexpressedhis‘profoundcongratulations’toMugabeandurgedallpartiesinZimbabweto‘accepttheoutcomeoftheelectionsaselectionobserversreportedittobeanexpressionofthewillofthepeople.’31TheonlydissentingvoiceinSADCwasBotswana,whichcalledforanindependentauditoftheelectoralprocess.32However,asinthepastBotswana’sdissentwassoonbroughttoheelwithinthesolidarityframeworkofSADC,andthebodywentfurthertoelectMugabeitsDeputyChairpersonatitsMalawisummitinAugust2013.WhilethispositionwasendorsedbytheChineseandRussianGovernments,theelectionsreceivedendorsementneitherfromthe 28‘SouthAfricaregretsunauthorizedstatementsonZimbabwe.’www.thepresidency.gov.za21stJuly2013.29SADC,SummaryStatementoftheSADCElectionObservationMissiontotheHarmonisedElectionsintheRepublicofZimbabweheldon31July2013.2August2013.30AfricanUnion,AfricanUnionElectionObservationMissiontotheHarmonisedElectionsof31July2013,intheRepublicofZimbabwe.PreliminaryStatement.2August2013.ThesamepositionwastakenbytheCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA)whocongratulatedZimbabweon‘thegeneralatmosphereofpeaceandtranquility’intheelections,whichwouldgo‘alongwayincontributingtotheconsolidationofdemocracyinZimbabwe.’COMESAElectionObserverMissiontothe31JulyHarmonisedElectionsintheRepublicofZimbabwe,’3August2013.31‘Zimbabwe:StatementbyJacobZuma.’www.safpi.orgAccessedon7August2013.32StatementbytheGovernmentoftheRepublicofBotswanaonthe2013ElectionintheRepublicofZimbabwe.Gaborone,5August2013.

EUnortheUS,withbothexpressingdoubtsaboutitsfreeandfairstatus,andwiththelattermakingitclearthatUSsanctionswouldcontinue.TheUNcommendeda‘broadlypeacefulelectionday,’butstressedthatconcernsaboutcertainaspectsoftheelectionprocessshouldbepursuedthroughestablishedchannels.33

TheMDCformationsandthemajorcivicbodiesrejectedthelegitimacyoftheelectionswithclaimsofelectionfraud.Mugabe’simmediateresponsetothischallengewaslessthangracious:

Thosewhocannotacceptdefeatarewastingtheirtime.Theycanevengohangiftheywant,butevendogswillnotsniffattheircorpses….Wevoteddemocratically.Webroughtdemocracy.Wehavedelivereddemocracyonaplatter.Iftheydonotwanttotakeit,letitbe,butthepeoplehavedeliveredit.’34

HoweverafteraninitialthreattochallengetheresultsintheConstitutionalCourtTsvangiraidroppedtheactionandbothpartiesdecidednottochallengetheresultsanyfurtherinthecourts.

ExplainingtheElectionResults

WhiletherewerealwaysclearindicationsthattheMDCswouldcontinuetofacemajorchallengesinattemptingtodefeatZANUPFatthepolls,thesheerscaleofthelatter’svictoryleftmanyZimbabweansandpoliticalobserversstunned.InexplainingtherecentvictoryofMugabeandZANUPFthreeareasneedtobeanalysed:ThestrategiesofZANUPFinthecontextofthetransformedpoliticaleconomyofZimbabwe;theweaknessesoftheMDCformations;thepoliticsofSADC,theEUandUS.

TheStrategiesofZANUPF

MuchofthecommentaryontheelectionsresultsfromtheMDCsandthecivicmovementhasconcentratedontheviolationsoftheelectorallawbothbeforeandduringtheelectionprocess.Mostofthesefactorshavealreadybeenreferredtoabove.Addedtothese,itisclearthatZANUPFsystematicallyblockedthecentralreformsoftheGPAthroughouttheperiodoftheInclusiveGovernment.35EvenasZANUPFlargelykepttheenergiesoftheMDCsconcentratedonthesingleissueofconstitutionalreform,theformerconcentrateditsactivitiesonelectionpreparationsfromtheinceptionoftheGPA.Thisstrategywascombined,fromlate2012,withthesystematicarrestandharassmentofcivilsocietyleadersmonitoringanddocumentinghumanrightsviolations,providingpsycho‐socialand

33StatementAttributabletotheSpokespersonfortheSecretary‐GeneralonelectionsinZimbabwe.NewYork2August2013.www.un.org/sg/statements/Accessedon6August2013.34EversonMushavaandObeyManayiti,‘Tsvangiraicangohang‐Mugabe.’NewsDay13August2013.35SeeB.Raftopoulos2013opcitfordetailsonthisissue.

legalsupporttovictims,andthoseworkingonvoterregistrationandvotermobilization.Theseinterventionsofreformblockageandcivicintimidationwerecombinedwiththe‘harvestoffear’drawingonthememoriesofthebrutalitiesofthe2008election.36Thusthelonghistoryofauthoritariannationalismandstatebrutalityhascontinuedtoplayamajor,ifdifferentiated,roleinthecountry’spolitics.

HoweveritisalsoclearthatMugabeandhispartyhaveretainedasubstantialsocialbaseinthecountry,aswasevidencedevenduringthegenerallyacceptedfirstroundoftheHarmonisedElectionsinMarch2008.Moreoverthemaintenanceofthissocialbasehasnotbeenbasedsolelyonviolenceandcoercionbutonacombinationoftheideologicallegaciesoftheliberationstruggle,thepersistentmemoriesofcolonialdispossession,andthelandreformprocess.AsFonteinhaswrittenwhiletheauthoritarianturninZimbabweanpoliticshasexcludedsuchgroupsastheurbanpoor,farmworkers,womenandwhitecommercialfarmers,‘itdidsimultaneouslymanagetoappealtosome…localisedaspirationswhichhavebeenthwartedsince1980.’37AsFonteinalsoobserves‘theredistributionoflandtothelandless,howevercorrupt,politicisedandindeedviolenttheprocessmayhavebeen,alongwiththeincreasinginvolvementofbothwarveteransandtraditionalleadersinlocalpoliticalstructures…..wereveryastutepoliticalmoves.’38ThissocialbasehasbeenrenewedandexpandedwithinthecontextoftheradicalchangesinZimbabwe’spoliticaleconomysince2000.Thedeconstructionofformerwhiteowned,largescalefarmsandtheirreplacementbyapreponderanceofsmallfarmholdershasradicallychangedthesocialandpoliticalrelationsontheland.Followingthelandredistributionprocess,70%ofthelandisnowheldbysmallfarmproducers,13%bymiddlescalefarmers,and11%bylargefarmsandestates.This‘re‐peasantisation’hasresultedinchangesinwealthdistributionfromalandedracialminorityto‘mostlylandlessandland‐poor’classes.39Moreoverthesechangesonthelandhavecreatedanew‘entrepreneurialdynamism’and‘productivepotential’resultinginnewareasofeconomicactivitywithnovelmarketingandvaluechains,evenifitstillunclearwhethertheserestructuredrelationsonthelandwillbedominatedbypatronagerelationswiththeZANUPFstateorbecomethesourceofsustainablelivelihoods.40

36P.Zamchiya,Pre‐ElectionDetectors:ZanuPF’sattempttoreclaimpoliticalhegemony.CrisisinZimbabweCoalition,Harare,2013,p.20.37J.Fontein,“‘WeWanttoBelongtoOurRootsandWeWanttobeModernPeople’:NewFarmers,OldClaimsAroundLakeMutirikwa,SouthernZimbabwe,”AfricanStudiesQuarterly,10,4,2009,p15;andJ.Fontein,‘SharedLegaciesoftheWar:SpiritMediumsandWarVeteransinSouthernZimbabwe,’JournalofReligioninAfrica,36,2,2006,pp.167‐199.38Fonteinopcitp.15‐16.39S.Moyo,‘ThreedecadesofagrarianreforminZimbabwe,’JournalofPeasantStudies,38,3,2011p.499.40I.Scoones,N.Marongwe,B.Mavedzenge,F.Murimbarimba,J.Mahenehene,andC.Sukume,‘Zimbabwe’slandreform:Challengingthemyths,’JournalofPeasantStudies,38,3,2011,p986.

ThenewformsinwhichZANUPFanditsstateorganshavepenetratedthesenewsocialrelationshaveaffectedtheformsofZANUPFdominanceintheseareas.Differentformsofgovernmentalityhavedevelopedintheresettledareas,characterisedbywhatMurisacallsthe‘fusionoftraditionalandmoderninstitutions,whichbringtogethercustomaryandpopularpoliticalfunctionariestoserveonthesameplatforms.’ThroughthesestructuresZanuPFhaschanneledvariousruralprogrammesandformsofpatronageappealingtovariouspopulardemandsaroundirrigation,farminputs,marketingofproducts,educationandelectrificationintheruralareas,evenasitformallysigneduptothemoreneo‐liberaleconomicprogrammesagreeduponbytheInclusiveGovernment.41HoweverMurisaalsowarnsthattheincreasingmovetowardsre‐institutingtraditionalauthoritiesresemblesthecolonialstatepracticesofimposedtraditionalstructures.42Thisisareminder,asParthaChatterjeewarns,that‘whilemanyofthetechniquesofpoweradoptedbythepost‐colonialstatewerethesametechniquesdeployedinthecolonialperiod,theideologicalgroundofjustificationwasnowanti‐imperialist.’43ThisdescriptionclearlyresonatesintheZimbabwecontext.

ThedevelopmentofZANUPF’ssocialbasewasalsovisibleintherapidgrowthoftheinformalminingsector.Inthe1990’sthissectorwasinitsincipientformandwasnotanareathatZanuPFactivelycultivated.AsYerosnoted,goldpannersinthisperiodlackedaccesstochannelsofpoliticalrepresentationandwerelargely‘unorganisedandunrepresented.’44Howeverbythe2000’sthissectorgrewrapidlywithinthecontextofthefastgrowingbyminingsector,whosecontributiontotheGDPgrewfrom3.2%in2008,to9.5%in2010reaching13%by2012,withthemineralsectoraccountingfor73%ofthecountry’stotalexports.45ThisgrowthledMawowatoconcludethatthegovernment’spolicyemphasisonthecentralityofthepeasantryandsubsistencefarmingintheruralareas,mayhavemaskedtherealityofthedominanceoftheminingsector,inwhichsmallscalemining,largelycarriedout(71%)byyoungmenunder35,accountedfor40%oftotaloutput.46

41ZanuPFmemberDr.SikanyisoNdlovunamedthekindofprojectsthatZanuPFwereengagedinduringtheperiodoftheInclusiveGovernmentin‘IbboMandaza’sriggingallegationsinsane,’TheHerald,8August2013.42T.Murisa,‘SocialOrganisationintheAftermathofFastTrack:AnAnalysisofEmergingFormsofLocalAuthority,PlatformsofMobilisationandLocalCooperation,’inS.MoyoandW.Chambati,LandandAgrarianReform:BeyondWhiteSettlerCapitalism,AfricanInstituteforAgrarianStudies,HarareandCODESRIA,Dakar,2013,p283.43ParthaChatterjee,‘Empireasapracticeofpower:empireasideologyandastechnique.’www.humanityjournal.org/blog/2012/08/empire‐practice‐power‐ideology‐an.....Accessedon10/01/2012.44P.Yeros,‘ThePoliticalEconomyofCivilisation:Peasant‐WorkersinZimbabweandtheNeo‐colonialWorld.’PhDThesis,LondonSchoolofEconomics,UniversityofLondon,2002.45S.Mawowa,‘ThePoliticalEconomyofCrisis,MiningandAccumulationinZimbabwe.’PhDThesis,UniversityofKwazuluNatal,2013,p,76.46Mawowa,p150.

Astheminingsectorbecamethemostimportantareaofaccumulationandpatronageintheshrinkingcrisiseconomy,theZimbabweanstatecompromisedwithlargeminingcompanieslikeZimplatsandallowedittooperateinthecountryonveryfavourableterms.InthecaseofZimplatsthecompanywasalloweddirectaccesstoforeigncurrencyandanexemptionfromsurrenderrequirementsimposedonotherexporters,andtherighttoconductmostofitsfinancialtransactionsoutsidethecountry.Thiseffectively‘insulateditfromZimbabwe’shyperinflationandthecollapsednationalpaymentsystem.’47Thisaccommodationwithforeigncapitalcanalsobeseeninthepolicyonlandwhereby2009,1.7millionhectaresoflandwasbeingutilizedbyacombinationofagro‐industrialplantations,conservanciesandminingfarmlandsownedbytransnationalcorporationsandfocusedonexportproduction.48

Thus,asMartensobserves,undertheInclusiveGovernmenttheMinistryofMines,ledbyaZANUPFminister,reversedits2008policyofclampingdownonillegalmining,andsoughttoextenditssupporttothissector.Itwaslittlewonderthen,thattheZimbabweArtisanalandSmall‐ScaleMiningCouncil(ZASMC)representing25,000small‐scaleminers,welcomedZANUPF’svictoryin2013.49Mawowaclearlysumsupthepoliticalimplicationsofthesechangesintheminingsector:

Astheeconomicsituationworsened,theparty‐statepatronagesystemhasbecomemoreentrenched.Thishasbecomeclearerwiththeindigenizationandempowermentpolicywherepartyaffiliationisthesinglemostimportantcriterionforaccesstostatemediatedeconomicopportunities.Thepartymanifestsitselfasalocalizedcapitalistoligarchy….

Thepatronageaccumulationattendingthisperiodhavehowevernotexcludedpossibilitiesforupwardmobilityamongthesomewhatindependentminers.Itisthesepossibilitiesthatsuggestthat,inspiteofZimbabwe’sseriouseconomiccrisis,somethingscontinuedtoworkandindeedasformalitydeclined,newaccumulationpathsemerged.50

Theemergenceofthis‘shadoweconomy’hasnotunderminedtheexistenceofthecentralstateauthority,butinsteadthelatterhasadaptedtotheeconomicchangesthroughasystemofpatronagethat‘reliesonseveralconduitsofcoercivepower’that,thoughnotalwayscoordinated,subordinatethemselvestothecentralityofthepartyandthestate.51 47Mawowa,p92.48Moyo2011,opcit,p.499.SeealsoS.Moyo,‘Landconcentrationandaccumulationafterredistributivereforminpost‐settlerZimbabwe,’ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,38,128,2011,pp.257‐276.49J.Martens,‘ZimbabweElections:Whatiftherehadbeennorigging?’InternationalPolitics,01/2013,RosaLuxemburgStiftung,SouthernAfrica,p5. 50Mawowa2013,opcit,pp.185‐86.51Mawowap.189.

ThisanalysisofthechangingformsofstateauthorityaccordswithMcGregor’sexcellentanalysisofthereconfigurationofthestateontheZambezifrontierduringtheperiodoftheZimbabwecrisis.McGregordescribeshowthechangesinlivelihoodonthisfrontierblurredtheboundariesbetweenlegalandillegalactivities,withunregulatedactivitiesbecomingenmeshedwithbureaucraticcontrolsandtheimplicationofstateagents.52Thelongtermresultsofthisartisanalandsmallscaleminingisnotyetclearbutintheshorttermitsdevelopmentalpotentialappearstobeveryfragile,andwhereminingwasonceadriverofurbanizationintheZimbabweaneconomy,inthepost2000period,miningtownsbecame‘havensforinternallydisplacedpersons.’53

InadditiontomobilizingamongsttheinformalsectorminersandcontrollingtherevenuesfromthediamondminesinChiadzwa,54ZANUPFalsosteppeduptheirmobilisationeffortswithintheincreasinglyinformalisedurbansector.Thelatterdisplacedmanufacturingtobecomethesecondlargestemployerintheeconomyby2011,withthelargestnumberofinformalsectoremployeesworkinginthewholesaleandretailtrade,andrepairofmotorvehiclesandmotorcycles.55InZimbabwe,asinotherpost‐colonialstates,whatDenninghascalledthe‘specterofwagelesslife’isnolongerviewedasatemporarycondition,butincreasinglyasthe‘mainmodeofexistenceinaseparate,almostautonomouseconomy.’56Withtheshrinkingofformalsectoremploymentintheeconomygenerally,andinmanufacturingintheurbanareasinparticular,therateofunionizationalsodeclinedfrom200,000in1990,to197,000in1997,and162,000in2013.Thustherateofunionizationtoestimatedtotalemploymentintheformalsectorhasrangedfromaround13‐16%betweentheyears1990‐2013.57ThelowlevelsofunionisationandthegrowinginformalisationoftheeconomyhaveunderminedtheeffectivenessoftripartiteindustrialrelationsstructuresandincreasedtheavenuesfordealingwithlabourissuesthroughmoreinformalisedstructureswithgreatervulnerabilitytothepoliticalinfluencesofZANUPF.

Thus,justastheformsofrulehavechangedintheruralgovernancestructures,sohavetheybeenaffectedinthegovernanceandadministrationofurbanlabourrelations.Thetradeunions,whichwerethemosteffectivemobilisationbasefortheMDC‐Tinthelate1990’shavebeenseverelyweakenedbyacombinationofshrinkingformalemployment,statecoercion,weakeningorganizationalcapacity,splitsinthecentrallabourfederation,

52J.McGregor,CrossingtheZambezi:ThePoliticsofLandscapeonaCentralAfricanFrontier,JamesCurrey,Suffolk,WeaverPress,Harare,2009.53A.Kamete,‘Ofprosperity,ghosttownsandhavens:miningandurbanizationinZimbabwe.’JournalofContemporaryAfricanStudies,30,4,2012,pp.589‐609.54GlobalWitness,‘ReturnoftheBloodDiamond:ThedeadlyracetocontrolZimbabwe’snew‐founddiamondwealth.’London,2010.55ZimbabweNationalStatisticsAgency,2011LabourForceSurvey,GovernmentofZimbabwe,May2012,p103.56M.Denning,‘WagelessLife,’NewLeftReview,66,Nov/Dec2010,p.86.57ZimbabweCongressofTradeUnionsdatabase2013.

andlossofleadershiptothepartypoliticalsphere.AsthestrengthofTsvangirai’spartyweakenedinthisarea,ZANUPFescalatedtheirinterventionswithurbanitesatlocalgovernmentlevel.AsMcGregorobserves,ZANUPFhasreliedon‘coercivemeasuresandirregularenticementstomaintainthelocalstateasasystemofpatronagewhenchallengedundertheInclusiveGovernment.’Moreovertheprivatizationandderegulationoflocalauthoritycontrols‘providedopportunitiesandresourcestofuelZANUPFaccumulationandpatronagethroughpartylinkedbusiness.’58WithlittletoofferintermsofnewemploymentopportunitiesZANUPF,buildingontheblockagestheyhadbuilttothefewattemptsmadebytheMDCtoimprovetheextremelypoorstateofmunicipalgovernmentinheritedbytheInclusiveGovernment,madeapopulistdecisiontocancelalloutstandingratepaymentsaweekbeforethe2013elections.Asoneofitselectionpostersread:

COUNCILBILLSCANCELLED.ZANUPFsaysyesMDCsaysno.Dollarisationledtounfairlyhighoutstandingbills,ZANUPFunderstandsthatpeoplearestrugglingandthat’swhywehaveclearedyourbills.59

Onceagain,ZANUPFcombineditsformalaffiliationtostabilisationmeasuresundertheinclusivegovernmentwithpopulistelectoralinterventions,withlittleregardforthelonger‐termimplicationsofsuchmeasures.ThecumulativemessagingoftheseZanuPFpolicyinterventionswasbroughttogetherintheparty’selectionmanifestowhichwasentitled‘Indigenise,Empower,DevelopandcreateEmployment.’ThekeythemesofthismanifestoincludedZANUPF’smonopolyclaimtohave:deliveredliberationfromcolonialruleandcarriedoutthe‘ThirdChimurenga”oflandre‐distribution;providedtheguardianshipofnationalsovereigntyandidentity;guaranteedfreedom,democracy,non‐violenceandpeace;embarkedonanewprogrammeofindigenisationtoincreasepopularownershipofnationalresourcesandprovidegrowthandemployment.60AsMugabelookedtowhathetermedthe‘quickyieldingsectorofminingandagriculture,’itwasclearthatZANUPFwasconstructingitssocialbasebothfortheelectionsandforitsfuturedevelopmentvision,asonebuiltaroundreconstructedagriculturalandminingsectors,combinedwiththeinformalsectoractivitiesoftheurbanareas.Inadditiontotheparty’sruralsupportersandthoseintheinformalminingsector,thisvisionalsofoundsomeresonanceamongstthe47%youthunemploymentintheurbanareas61particularly,aswediscussbelow,inlightofthedisappointingperformanceoftheMDCsintheInclusiveGovernment.

58J.McGregor,‘Patronage,“powersharing”andthepoliciesofurbancontrolinZimbabwe,’JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies,(forthcoming2013.)59DailyNews30July2013.60ZanuPFElectionManifesto:Indigenise,Empower,DevelopandCreateEmployment.2013.61LabourForceSurveyopcit,p70.

Above:campaignpostersforMavambo/Kusile/Dawn,ledbySimbaMakoni,andZAPUledbyDumisoDabengwa:neitherpartydrewmorethanahandfulofvotes.Below:ZANUPFpromotedindigenizationatthecentreoftheircampaign

ImagesfromtheMDC‐Tcampaign,whichtargetedtheurbanclassesandfocusedontheshortcomingsofZANUPF’syearsinoffice.TheposterbelowleftshowsZANUPFcabinetministerspayingbarefoothomagetoalocalwomanwhoclaimedtohavefoundrefineddieselcomingfromarock,andMugabewithastaffcampaigningwiththeVapostorichurch.Belowright,anadvertremindsvotersofemptyshelves,hyperinflationandpoliceviolence.

Tosumupthissection,theZANUPFelectoralstrategyin2013clearlymovedawayfromitsdominantrelianceonviolenceintheJune2008runoff,althoughselectivecoercion,intimidationandthememoryofthe2008events,werenotabsentinthisround.Acombinationofcoercion,consentandpoliticalblockagesinthecontextofareconstitutedsocialbaseservedtoprovidetheMDCswithaformidablepoliticalchallenge.62MoreoverthedivisionsandpartydisorganisationofZANUPF’s2008campaignweredealtwiththroughamuchtighterpartyorganizationandelectioncampaign,runasTendiobserves,bya‘networkofpartyofficials,youthandretiredmilitaryofficerswhofoughtinZimbabwe’sliberationwar.’63Theshockofthe2008defeatinconditionsofsevereeconomiccrisisandthelifelinethrowntothepartybytheGPA,providedadecisivejolttoMugabeandhisparty,alongwiththerealisationthattheycouldnotgetawaywithanotherviolentMarch‐June2008electioncampaign,whatevertheircontinuedrelianceonthelongmemoriesoffearandviolenceintheZimbabweanelectorate.

TheLimitationsoftheMDCs

WhentheMDCwasformedin1999itgrewfromabroad‐basedsocialmovementthathademergedfromacombinationoftradeunion,constitutionalreformandhumanrightsbasedactivism.Itdevelopedalanguageofdemocratizationthatcombinedthediscoursesofthesedifferentbutconnectedthreadsofprotestandstruckatoneoftheweakestpointsofthepoliticsofthepartyofliberation,ZANUPF.Fromthelate1990sintothe2000sthispoliticalformationbroughttogetheranallianceofmovementsandsocialforcesandledthedebateforpoliticalreforminthecountry.Thus,thispartygreworganicallyfromemergentsocialforcesthatalsoprovidedstrongintellectualargumentsfordevelopingaforcecapableofconfrontinganddefeatingthehegemonyoftherulingparty.AsthenovelistNoVioletBulawayodescribesit,thewordchangewasintheairanditfeltlikesomethingyoucould‘grabandputinyourmouthandsinkyourteethinto.’64HowevertheunitedMDCalsohaditsweaknesses,whichincludedunderdevelopedorganizationalstructures,lackofleadershipaccountability,andagrowingcultureofintra‐partyviolencedeployedwithinthecontextofagrowingfactionalismwithintheparty.Theseissuesandothersledtoasplit

62AsDavidMooredescribesit,“TheZanuPFapplied,Machiavellistyle,aclassicGramsciancombinationofforcefulpowerandslypersuasions‐thedialecticofcoercionandconsent‐toconfoundthefourteen‐year‐oldMDC.”D.Moore,‘InZimbabwe,ALutaContinua.’www.africanarguments.org/2013/08/12/in‐zimbabwe‐a‐luta‐continua‐…Accessedon13/08/13.63M.B.Tendi,‘WhyRobertMugabescoredalandslidevictoryintheZimbabweanelections.’www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert‐mugabe‐zimbabwe‐election‐zanu‐pfAccessedon19/08/2013.64NoVioletBulawayo,Weneednewnames,ChattoandWindus,London,p.29.

inthepartyin2005.65Thepartyalsofacedaconstantbarrageofpoliticalandlegalattacks,aswellasrepeatedboutsofelectoralviolencefromtheZANUPFstate.

Importantly,theMDC’sdiscourseondemocratisationandbroadlyneo‐liberaleconomicprogrammes,backedbyWesterncountries,wasalwaysfoundwanting,againsttheredistributivelogicofZANUPF’slandreformprocess,theideologicallegaciesoftheliberationmovement,andthediscourseofstatesovereignty.NotwithstandingtheseobstaclesthetwoMDCformationscontinuedtofightelectionsandin2008,againstgreatodds,theydefeatedZANUPFatthepolls,withMugabealsolosingthefirstroundofthePresidentialelectiontoTsvangirai.Asaresultofhorrendousstate‐ledviolencetheMDCswerepreventedfromtranslatingthiselectoralvictoryintostatepower,andtherulingpartyretaineditsincumbencyatthispointthroughthesheerforceofthestate.

UndertheGPA,theMDCformationswerealwaysatadisadvantageagainstapartythatcontinuedtocontrolthecoercivearmsofthestateandpersistentlyblockedkeyreformsintheagreement,despiterepeateddemandstoimplementthesereforms.TheirlackofexperienceagainstZANUPF’sabuseofstatecraftquicklyexposedtheMDCsweaknessesasdidotherfactors,suchastheinabilityofthetwoformationstoworktogetherundertheInclusiveGovernment,leadershipindiscretions,growingcorruptionparticularlyatlocalgovernmentlevel,andafailuretoclaimitssuccessesinthefaceofZANUPF’smonopolycontroloftheelectronicmedia.66TheradicalchangesinZimbabwe’spoliticaleconomyinthe2000sasdiscussedabove,andparticularlythereconfigurationoftheMDCs’urbansocialbase,drasticallyweakenedthesupportbaseoftheMDC‐Tinparticular,andthecombinationoftradeunionactivistsandtheurbanmiddleclassthatinthe1990scouldbringthecountrytoastandstill,wasnolongeravailableinsuchnumbersforsuchmobilization.Theeffectsofeconomicdemobilizationandmassivediasporisationwhittledawaythestrengthofthesesocialforces.67

BothMDCshavebeguntheprocessofassessingtheimplicationsoftherecentdefeatandtheprospectsofanotherlong‐termstruggle.Inadditiontoclaimsoffraudintherecentelection,theMDC‐Tpointedtoanumberofinternalproblemsthatweakenedtheirchallenge.Theseincluded:ElitecaptureofthepartybytheStandingCommittee;absenceofintelligence;failuretoimplementagreedpositions;failuretofollowuponissues;absenceofrespect,trust,communication,properplans,clearfundraisingplan,clearcampaign

65B.RaftopoulosandK.Alexander(Eds),ReflectionsonDemocraticPoliticsinZimbabwe,InstituteforJusticeandReconciliation,CapeTown,2006.66J.Muzondidya,‘TheOppositionDilemmainZimbabwe:ACriticalReviewofthePoliticsoftheMovementforDemocraticChange(MDC)PartiesundertheGPATransitionalFramework2009‐2012,’inB.Raftopoulos(Ed)TheHardRoadtoReform,opcit2009.67J.CrushandD.Tavera(Eds),Zimbabwe’sExodus:Crisis,Migration,Survival,SAMP,CapeTown,IDRC,Ottawa,2010.

strategy;theneedtoreconnectwithcivilsociety;dysfunctionalprovincialstructures;theneedforanewparadigm;lackofpartydiscipline;theneedtodiscardidiomsandmannerismsthatalienatedthesupportbase;transformfromamovementtoapoliticalparty;needtodeliverandshowdifferenceofperformanceinlocalgovernance.68Alltheseissuespointtoapartythathasnotbeenabletostrengthenitsorganizationalandstrategicframeworkagainstarepressiveregimethathasconstantlyharasseditsleadershipandstructures.However,since2009theseweaknesseshaveerodedthesupportofbothMDCs,aswasevidentfromopinionpollscarriedoutin2012,whichshowedadropinsupportfortheMDCsandTsvangiraiandanupsurgeinpopularityforMugabeandhisparty.69Theseweaknessesand,ofparticularimportancetotheelectioncampaign,thefailureofthetwoMDCformationstodevelopanelectoralpactin2013,resultedinthelossofseveralseatstoZANUPFduetoasplitvote.ForexampleinMatabelelandSouth,8ofthe13seatswerelosttoZANUPFbecauseofthethisfactor,whileinMatabelelandNorthaunitedoppositionwouldhavewon11ofthe13seatsinsteadofwhichZANUPFwon7outofthe13.TogetherthesefactorsmeantthattheMDCswereamuchweakerforcein2013thantheywerein2008.

RegionalandInternationalFactors

ForSADC,andSouthAfricainparticular,themajorpriorityinsettlingtheZimbabweancrisiswastoensurestabilization,notdemocratization.70InpracticethismeantthatdespitethepersistentcallsfromtheregionalbodyandtheSAfacilitationteamforthefullimplementationoftheGPApriortoelections,therewaslittleevidence,beyonddiplomaticexhortations,thattheorganizationwaswillingorabletotakefurtheractions.Thus,inthefaceofZANUPF’sunwillingnesstofullyimplementtheGPAreforms,SADCeventuallysettledforminimalelectoralreforms,anewconstitution,andtheabsenceofthelevelsofviolencethatmarredthe2008elections.GuidedbyliberationsolidaritywithZANUPFandtheneedtostabilisethepoliticalsituationwiththesupportofpolitical‐militaryestablishmentinZimbabwe,ZumablinkedinthefaceofMugabe’shumiliatingaffronttoSouthAfrica,andSADCtookwhatcanonlybedescribedasasupinepositionontheelectoraloutcome.TheMDC‐T’scommentontheSADCelectionreportclearlyexpresseditsdissatisfactionwiththeregionalposition:

68MDC:NSCStrategicPlanningRetreat,Harare,12September2013.69SeeFreedomHouse,‘Changeand“New”PoliticsinZimbabwe,’Harare,18August2012.70ForafullerdiscussionofthisseeB.Raftopoulos,‘AnOverviewoftheGPA,’opcit2009.

ThereportsetsaverypetrifyingprecedentforSADCifthisisthequalityofobservationthatissatisfactoryfortheregion.71

Withregardtointernationalforces,theSADCfacilitationeffectivelykeptthematbaywiththeirresponsetotheInclusiveGovernment,movingbetweenarangeofpositionsincluding,nominalsupportfortheprocess,humanitarianassistancefortheInclusiveGovernment,andacontinuationofasanctionsregime,thoughwithagradualmoveawayfromthispolicybytheEU.Intheaftermathoftheelection,thoughnotliftingthesanctionscompletely,theEUtookanotherstepinthisdirectionbyliftingthestricturesagainsttheGovernmentofZimbabwe’sMiningDevelopmentCorporation,withBelgium,thecentreofglobaldiamondtrading,welcomingthemove.72TheUSontheotherhand,whonotedthe‘deepflaws’intheelectionprocess,statediscommitmenttomaintainthetargetedsanctions.73Forthepresent,thestrategyoftheWesterncountriesappearstobeawait‐and‐seeapproachinthehopethattheMugabegovernmentwilltonedownitsindigenizationpolicyandanti‐Westernrhetoric,graduallymovetowardsagreaterrapprochementwiththeInternationalFinancialInstitutions,andinsodoingprovideaface‐savingopportunitytoengagemorefullywiththeregime.

Conclusion

Itisfairtoconcludethatthepoliticsoftheopposition,bothpartyandcivic,thatemergedinthelate1990sandcontinuedthroughthefirst13yearsofthe2000shascometoanendinitscurrentform.Thepoliticalandeconomicconditionsthatgaverisetoitsemergencehavechangedsubstantially,evenifthechallengesfacingthecountryremainHerculean.ForZANUPFthemajortaskaheadistodeliveronitselectionmanifestointhefaceofenormousodds.Thiswillmostlikelygiverisetonewbattleswithintherulingpartyandprovidenewopportunitiesfortheemergenceofcriticalvoices.Thebattleforabroaderdemocratizationcontinues.

71MDCStatementonSADCelectionobservermissionsummaryreport.www.safpi.orgAccessedon09/09/13.72‘ZMDCtakenoffblacklist’.www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe.com/zimbabwe/18316‐zmdc‐taken‐off‐blacklist.htmlAccessedon27/09/2013.73‘ThetroublingpathaheadforUS‐Zimbabwerelationstestimony.’www.safpi.orgAccessed16/09/13.

CampaignpostersfortheMDCledbyWelshmanNcube.Thepartygainedafewpercentofthevoteandfourpositionsinparliamentviaproportionalrepresentation.

PARTTWO

UNDERSTANDINGTHERESULTS:

ANEVALUATIONOFTHEVOTINGPATTERNS

ZANUPFcampaignposters,withastrangelyyoung‐lookingRobertMugabe.

A. BACKGROUNDTOTHEELECTION

Thefirstsectionofthisreporthasdealtindetailwiththelonger‐termcontextofthe2013election,detailingtheshiftsinZimbabwe’seconomicandthereforepoliticalbaseduringthelifespanoftheGPA,aswellasreferringtothemonthsandweeksrunninguptothevote.Thissectionwillfocusprimarilyonthevotingfiguresandtheirimmediatecontext.

i. Fearandcoercion

Whilethe2013electionwasnotmarredbywidespreadviolence,theZimbabweanpopulationhasfreshmemoriesoftheviolenceofthe2008Presidentialrun‐off,inwhichthousandsofpeoplelostproperty,werebeaten,orweredisplaced,andinwhichmorethan300peopledied.In2013,whileactualphysicalviolencewasseldomreported,thereweremanyreportsofthreatsofviolence.74BearinginmindZANUPF’spropensitytoactonthreats,theelectionoutcomeneedstobeunderstoodfirstandforemostinthecontextofthreedecadesofviolenceagainsttheopposition.Inthewakeofthe2013election,therehasinfactbeenretributionagainstknownMDC‐Tsupportersinsomepartsofthecountrywithlossofpropertyanddisplacement,meaningthatthosewhoaretooafraidtostandupagainstthreatshavegoodreasonsfornotdoingso.75Theimpactofpoliticalviolenceisnotlimitedtoruralareas.AsnotedinPartOneofthisreport,theshiftintheeconomicpowerbaseoverthelastdecadehasentrenchedacoercivesystemofZANUPFpatronageinsomeurbanandperi‐urbanareas.ThecoercivenatureoflivingincertainHararesuburbsorsmalltownssuchasNorton,inwhichZANUPFhascometopredominateinwhatwereformallyMDC‐Tstrongholds,hasbeenpreviouslydescribed.76ZANUPFhasestablishedastrongholdoverMbareinHarareinthelastdecade,wherelivingintheareaandmaintainingownershipofacouncilhouseoramarketstandhascometodependentirelyonZANUPFpatronage.77ThelargevotesforZANUPFandtheirwinsinsomeperi‐urbanandsmalltownconstituenciesareaproductofthis.

ii. TheunlikelihoodofJustice

MartinLutherKingstatedthat,“Peaceisnottheabsenceofviolence,itisthepresenceofjustice”,andthelatterremainselusiveinZimbabwetoday.Thevastmajorityofvictimsofgovernment‐instigatedviolencehaveneverreceivedjustice,whichfeedstheirreluctancetoexposethemselvestofurtherlosses.Furthermore,ineveryelectionsince2000,theMDCshaveappealedaspectsoftheelectoraloutcomethroughthecourts.However,these

74Chitemba,B,“Mugaberelativewreakinghavoc,Zimbabweindependent,Harare,2013.MDC‐TInformationDepartment,pressstatement,3August2013cites“massiveintimidation”.Sokwanelewebsitelists222selfreportedincidentsofintimidation.75Moyo,N,“MDC‐Tcondemnsendlessattacksonitssupporters”,SWRadioAfrica,8August2013.InnorthernLupane,twoMDC‐Tmembershadtheirhomesburntdownonthenightof31July.(Personalinterviews.)76Alexander,JandChitofori,K,“TheconsequencesofViolentPoliticsinNorton,Zimbabwe,TheRoundTable,99:411,673‐686.2010.77Chikwanha,T,“Chipangano:Anorganisedcriminalnetwork”,DailyNews,Harare20July2013referstoZanuPFcontrolofMbareviaterrorandcoercion.

petitionsandtheirappealshavebeendraggedoutthroughtheentirefive‐yeartermofparliamentandhavebeenleftunresolvedbythenextelection,orhavebeendismissed.78

iii. Electionviolations2013

TheimmediateresponseoftheMDC‐Ttothe2013electionresultswasthattherewaswidespreadfraudandthattheresultswerenotbelievable.79ViolationsoftheConstitutionandtheElectoralAct,bothlegalandbureaucratic,havebeendetailedbytheMDC‐T,ZESNandthemedia,andaresummarizedattheendofthisreport.80TheMDC‐Thaslodgedpetitionsin39constituenciesandinduecoursetheywillpresenttheirevidencetothecourts.81However,bearinginmindthehistoryofZimbabweanelectoralpetitionssince2000,thepetitionsareveryunlikelytobesuccessful,andwillsimplyplaytheroleofplacingarecordoftheirregularitiesinthepublicdomain.

Noelectronicvoters’roll:Todatethereisnoelectronicroll,whichisindirectviolationoftheElectoralAct.Allcandidatesintermsofthelawareentitledtohavetheelectronicroll‘ingoodtime’beforetheelectiondate.Noelectronicrollmeansithasalsonotbeenpossibletoestablishthedemographicsofthefinalroll,includingwhether:

therewasarushofyoungvotersregisteredinthefinalweeksbeforetheelection,astheyweredramaticallyunderrepresentedontheMay2013roll.

whetherthepossibly100,000dead(agedover100years)onthepreviousrollhadbeenpurged.

howmanyslightvariationsofthesamevoternameandIDremainedontheroll,possiblyallowingthesamepersontovotemultipletimes.

IssuesofdeepconcernaroundallofthesefactorshadbeenraisedbyZESNandtheResearchandAdvocacyUnit’s(RAU)analysisbasedontheMay2013voters’roll.82

iv. Assessingthevotingfigures

Asotherreportsandaccountsoftheelectionshavealreadydetailedthebureaucraticandlegalbreachesoftheelection,thisreportfocusesonanassessmentofthevotes 78SPT,SubvertingJustice:theroleofthejudiciaryindenyingthewilloftheZimbabweanelectoratesince2000.Johannesburg,2005.SouthernEye:“LitigiousZimbabwetimeline”,Bulawayo,20June2013.79MorganTsvangiraiinitiallycontestedtheoutcomeofthePresidentialpoll:

SeethecaseofMorganR

TsvangiraivRobertMugabeand7OthersCC72/13.Thepetitionwaswithdrawnon17Augustonthegroundsthathedidnotbelieveitwouldgetafairhearing.Aten‐pagedocumentlistingthereasonsheandtheMDC‐Tdidnotbelievethepollwasfairwasreleased:DailyNews,“Tsvangiraidemandsfreshelectionsin60days”,Harare,10August2013.Also,SouthernEye,“TsvangiraihitsoutatConcourt”,Bulawayo20August2013.80SeeAppendix6.81ItseemstheMDC‐Tcouldberunningintoproblemsinfindingstrongevidenceforthesepetitions,asonehasalreadybeenwithdrawn.FelixShare,“MDC‐Twithdrawingelectionpetitions”,onwebsiteFreeandFairZimbabweElection,27September2013.82ZESNpressrelease,“Voters’rollunderminedpoll”.1August2013.ForsummaryofthemainRAUfindings:http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=389385&sn=Detail&pid=71619

themselves.Itcouldbearguedthatitisoflimitedusetolooksimplyatfiguresontheirown,withoutthecontextofknowingwhathasactuallyhappenedonthegroundinanyconstituencytoexplainthefigures.Forexample:

AremassiveincreasesinZANUPFvotersinsomeconstituenciesananomaly,orsimplyareflectionofZANUPF’sclaimtohaveregisteredhundredsofthousandsoftheirvotersoverthelastfiveyears?83

Inconstituencieswherethefiguresappear‘ordinary’orwithintheboundsofthehighlypossible‐suchaswherethetotalnumberofvotescasthasbarelychangedsincethepreviouselectionandthewinningcandidatewinsbyamarginofafewpercent‐weretherenonethelesseventsonthegroundthatinterferedwithafreeandfairvotingprocess?

SpecificOutcomesthatremainunknown

Morethan20,000independentobserversweredeployedcountrywide,morethan9,000ofwhichwerefromZimbabweancivicorganisations.Furthermore,everypoliticalcandidatewaslegallyentitledtotwopollingagentsineverypollingstationintheirconstituency:in96%ofpollingstations,therewereinfactoppositionpollingagents84.Theirmainresponsibilityistobepresentnotonlyduringthevote,butalsoduringthecountingofthevote.EverypollingagentissupposedtocompleteaV11form,recordingallaspectsofthevotecount,andreturnthistotheirpartyinduecourse.Consideringthelargenumbersofindependentobserversandpollingagents,itishardtoexplainwhytodatetherearenosystematicindependentsourcesofvotingstatisticsinthepublicdomaindowntotheconstituencyandwardlevelcountrywide,inparticularwithregardtoassistedvotesandvotersturnedaway.85Thisisaninexplicablefailing.Thegovernment‐runZEChasprovidedglobal,provincialfiguresratherthanconstituency‐basedfiguresformanyaspectsofthevote,andthisisallthatisavailabletodate.Itisnotpossibletoaccuratelyassessnumbersofvotersturnedawaycountrywideonapolling‐station‐by‐polling‐stationbasisforexample,noristherearecordofassistedvotesbypollingstationorbyconstituency.Havingaccesstothesenumberswouldgiveamoreaccuratepictureofhowmanyturnedouttovoteingivenconstituenciesorwards,howmanysucceededindoingso,andunderwhatconditions.86

83ThesemediaarticlesdatingbacktoOctober2012,showaconcertedeffortbyZANUPFtoregisteramillionnewvotersamongtheirsupporters.SundayMail,“Zanu‐PFstrongholdsrecordhighestnumberofnewvoters”,Harare,9‐15June2013.SundayMail,“MillionnewvotersforZanu‐PF”,Harare,2‐8December2012.DailyNews,“Mugabeshakesuptoyouthvote”,Harare,16October2012.TheStandard,“ZanuPFembarksondoor‐to‐doorcampaign”,Harare,28October28‐3November2012.DailyNews,“ZanuPFtargetsruralvote”,Harare,30October2012.DailyNews,“Mugabetargetswomenvote”,Harare,27November2012.84ZESN,ZESNreportonthe31JulyHarmonisedElections,Harare,September2013.http://www.zesn.org.zw/images/statements/ZESN_2013_Harmonised_Election_Preliminary_Statement_01_August_13‐1026hrs.pdf85Inafewconstituenciesthisinformationmaybeavailable,butisnotinthepublicdomain,saveforBulawayoEast.DavidColtartoftheMDCcirculatedhispollingagents’recordsofwhathappenedonapolling‐station‐by‐polling‐stationbasisandhisrigorousreportstandsaloneinthiselectionintermsofhelpingusunderstandwhatmighthavehappenedontheday.86ThemainNGOreportinZimbabwereleasedtodateisthatofZESN,releasedduringSeptember.Thisreportprovidesaverygoodgeneralbackgroundtotheelectionandsomeofitsanomalies.However,itdoesnotshed

Inspiteoftheabovereservations,itisnonethelesspossibletotracksomegeneraltrendsthatshowshiftsinelectionresultssince2000uptothepresentelections,aswellasothertrends.

B. ARETHEREPATTERNSTOBESEEN?

1. OVERALLVOTECOMPARISONSi. GeneralobservationsBearinginmindthebackgroundofbreachesofthelawunderlyingallelectionssince2000,theresultsasformallyrecordedmaynotbeatruereflectionofthewillofthepeopleinanyelection.Thatbeingsaid,areviewofthefiguressincethe2000electionshowscertainanddifferingtrendsinthevotesfortheMDCsandforZANUPF.Theelectionoutcomefor2013shouldbeseenasoneinaseriesoffivekeyelectionssincetheriseofMDCasasignificantoppositionpartyinthelate1990s.87Theseelectionsare:

Parliamentaryelectionsin2000and2005(HouseofAssembly) Presidentialelectionin2002 Harmonisedelectionsin2008and2013(HouseofAssemblyshowningraph) Inthefirst3elections,therewasoneunitedMDC,afterwhichthevotesforMDC‐T

andthatfortheMDC(M/N)areshownseparately.Allnon‐MDC‐Toppositionvotesaretotaled,under‘otherparties’‐MDC(M/N),ZAPU,MKDetc.

ii. TheMDCsandthevote

1. Thehighestoppositionvoteforasingleparty/candidatewasinthePresidentialelectionof2002,with1,258,401forMorganTsvangirai.

2. In2000and2005,theunitedMDCvote,andin2008and2013theMDC‐TvoteintheHouseofAssembly(HoA)–commonlyknownastheparliamentaryelection–hasremainedintheregionofslightlymorethan1,1millionvotes,withverylittledeviationfromthis.Thevariationacrossthethreemostrecentelectionshasbeenwithinarangeof43,000votes.

3. Howeverthecombinedoppositionvotewasover1,4millionvotesin2008and

around1,3millionvotesin2013. anymorelightontheintricaciesofthevotebyconstituencyorwardthantheirinitialsummaryreportreleasedearlyinAugust.MostofthefiguresquotedintheZESNreportarebasedonthosereleasedbyZEC,withoutanycommentaryonwhetherZESNfoundanynumericaldifferencesbasedontheirownobservers’reports.87FiguresarethosecitedinSPT,Punishingcitizens,SilencingDissent:theZimbabweElections2008.Source:africanelection,tripod.com/zw.html#2005_House_of_Assembly_Election.Figuresforthe2008Electionweretakenfromwww.zimbabwesituation.com/apr3b_htmlandsupplementedwithfiguresfrom Veritas.

4. Overthelastdecadetherehavebeenonaveragenomorethan1,3millionvotersbraveenoughtoconsistentlyvoteforoppositionparties,regardlessoftherisks–whichisdifferentfromconcludingthatthisrepresentsthefullextentoftheirsupportbase.Itisunclearwhattheoppositionsupportbasewouldbeinthecontextofatrulyfreeandfairelection.

FIGURE1:

*unitedMDCinfirst3,thenMDC‐Tinnext2.

5. In2008,TsvangiraireceivedfewervotesoverallinthePresidentialpollthanin2002,with1,195,562votes.AdividedoppositionmeantSimbaMakonioftheMKDpartywonacrucial8.3%(207,470votes)inthePresidentialvotethatyear.

6. In2013,Tsvangiraireceived1,172,349votesinthePresidentialcontest,orslightlylessthanthe2008vote.HehaswonfewervotesineachconsecutivePresidentialelection.

7. TheMDC‐Thasneverwonthepopularvote88attheHouseofAssemblylevel,includinginthe2008election,eventhoughtheywononeconstituencymorethanZANUPF.Thebalanceofpowerfortheoppositioninthe2008electionlaywiththeMDC(M/N),withtheirtenseats.MDC‐Treceived1,061,000inthe2008HouseofAssemblyelection–fewerthanforTsvangirairunningforPresidentinthesameelection.

88ThetotalvotecountforeachpartyacrossallconstituenciesatHouseofAssemblylevel.

8. Tsvangiraiasapresidentialcandidatehasconsistentlydrawnmorevotesthanhis

politicalpartyinallelections.Thismeansthatsomevotersarevotingforotherpartiesintheopposition,orforZANUPFatHouseofAssemblylevel,andthenvotingforTsvangiraiastheirpresidentialoption.89

9. ThesplitintheoppositionvotecostthetwoMDCs17seatsintheHouseofAssemblyin2013(Seebelowformoredetailsofconstituencies).Thisalmosttripledthe6seatslostintheHouseofAssemblyin2008,owingtosplitvotes.

In2013,theseadditional17seatswouldhaveensuredthatthebalanceof

powerwaslessinfavourofZANUPFandwouldhavereducedthesignificanceoftheir2/3majoritytooneseatonly,asfollows:

o Takingtheproportionalrepresentationseatsintoaccount,andreallocatingthe17seatslosttoasplitvotetotheopposition,thebalanceofpowerintheHouseofAssemblywouldhavebeen: Outof270seats

ZANUPF: 180 66.6%OPPOSITION: 89 33.0%INDEP(ZPF): 1 0.4%

ThiswouldhavemeantthatZANUPFwouldhaveneededatotallyfullHouse

topassanychangestotheconstitution,forexample.Asitnowstands,theyhaveacomfortable34seatsoverthe2/3majority,holding79%ofallseats.

10. Aunitedoppositionwouldhavehadcontrolof4provincesoutoften,insteadofonly

two.TheimpactofadividedoppositionhastakenaheavytollonMDC‐alignedrepresentationingovernmentandthishasbecomemoremarkedwitheachelection.TheriseintheZANUPFvoteaddedtothenumberofseatslosttoadividedvotein2013,ratherthanalossinthecombinedoppositionvote.

ZANUPFandtheVote

11. TheZANUPFvotehasshownmuchgreatervariationoverthefiveelectionsthantheMDCvotehas.

12. ThetwolargestvotesforZANUPFhavebeenin2002and2013. In2002,RobertMugabereceived1,685,212presidentialvotes. In2005,ZANUPFreceived1,569,867votesintheParliamentaryvote.

89GenerallyinZimbabwe,votersseemtovoteacrosstheboardfortheironechosenparty,ratherthanvotingdependingoncaliberofcandidatesatward,constituencyandpresidentiallevel,butclearlythereissomediscriminationtakingplace.Inparticular,thedesireamongoppositionvoterstogetridofMugabehasledtovotersvotingforTsvangiraiaspresident,whiletheymaysupporttheirownsmalloppositionpartyatotherlevelsofthevote.

In2008,ZANUPFreceived1,112,773votesatHouseofAssemblylevel–byfaritslowestvoteinthelastdecade.

In2008,RobertMugabereceived1,079,730inthePresidentialvote. In2013intheHouseofAssemblyvote,ZANUPFreceived2,142,000 In2013RobertMugabereceived2,110,434inthePresidentialvote.

13. Comparingthe2013HouseofAssemblyvotewithvariouspreviousZANUPFtotals:

The2013voteshows:o 27%increaseovertheir2002voteo 36%increaseovertheir2005voteo 83%increaseovertheir2008vote

ItcouldbeperceivedthattheZANUPFvotewasonadownwardtrajectorypriortothiselection,withitsdramaticgainof1millionvotes.

ItcouldbeconcludedthattheZANUPFvotein2008wasanomalouslyLOWwhentakeninthecontextoftheirotherresultssince2002.

The2013electionvoteforZANUPFcouldbeseenasanomalouslyHIGH(83%jump)whencomparedonlywiththe2008result‐butthisislessthecasewhencomparedtotheZANUPFvotegenerallyoverthelastdecade.

14. InthetwoHarmonisedelectionsof2008and2013,Mugabehaswonfewervotes

thanZANUPFhasattheHouseofAssemblylevel,indicatingthatsomevoterswhovoteforZANUPFinrelationtoparliamentaryseats,donotvoteforMugabeastheirpresidentialchoice.Mugabeislesspopularthanhisparty.

2. THEPRESIDENTIALVOTE2013RobertMugabewonthevoteinsevenoutoftenprovinces,withTsvangiraiwinninginHarare,BulawayoandMatabelelandNorth.ZEConlyreleasedglobalprovincialfigures.90i. Matabeleland:numerically,ashrinkingstrongholdThelargestwinforTsvangiraiintermsofpercentageofoverallprovincialvotewasinBulawayo,withTsvangiraicapturing68%,WelshmanNcube7.2%andMugabe24%ofthevote.However,therewerealmostthreetimesasmanyvotesforTsvangiraiinHarareasinBulawayo–whichservestohighlightoneofthenotablefeaturesofthiselection,namelytheproportionallydwindlingnumberofvotesinthethreewesternprovincesofZimbabwe.MatabelelandNorth,MatabelelandSouthandBulawayoshowedthelowestprovincialvoterturnoutscountrywide.InmanyMatabelelandconstituencies,voterturnoutwasbetween33and41%andthetenlowestconstituencyvoterturnoutswereallinMatabeleland.

90SeeAppendix1forPresidentialvotesperprovince.

Thisisprobablyindicativeofthefactthatthesethreewesternprovincesarethemosthighlyaffectedbydiasporisation:thoseregisteredtovotearenolongerresident.Withtheopposition’ssupportbaseincreasinglycenteredinthesethreewesternprovinces,lowvoterturnoutshereposeaparticularchallengeinrelationtoeverwinningthepresidentialvoteinthefuture.Whiletheoppositionmightgainamongthegreatestproportionofvoteshere,gaugedasapercentageoftotalvoteineachprovince,innationaltermstheMatabelelandvoteisincreasinglyinsignificantatpresidentiallevel.TherearealmostthreetimesasmanyvotersinthethreeruralMashonalandprovinces,whichareZANUPFstrongholds,asinthethreeMatabelelandprovinces.

FIGURE2:

3. THEDIVIDEDOPPOSITIONVOTEMATABELELAND‐ANDBEYOND

Contrarytosomereportsinthemedia,MatabelelandNorthandSouthdidnotshowaconvincingswingtoZANUPFintherecentelections.91AnexaminationofthefiguresshowsthatinMatabelelandSouth,outof13seats,8werelosttoZANUPFasaresultofadividedoppositionvote.Ultimately,ZANUPFwonall13seatsinthisprovince.Theunitedoppositionvoteintheconstituenciesthattheopposition‘lost’inMatabelelandaveraged

91TheChronicle,“MatSouthinchangeofhearttowardsZanu‐PF”,Bulawayo,3August2013.SouthernEye,“HasMatabelelandfalleninlovewithZanuPF?”Bulawayo,4August2013.

55.2%ofthetotalvote,withoneconstituencyhaving59%ofthetotalvotesplitamongvariousoppositionplayers.Aunitedoppositionwouldhavewon8outof13seats,andthereforetheprovincialcontrolofMatabelelandSouth,insteadofwhichZANUPFwonacleansweep.Aunitedoppositionwouldhavewon11outof13seatsinMatabelelandNorth,insteadofwhichZANUPFwon7outof13seatsandcontroloftheprovince.

TABLE1: RecordofvotesinMatabelelandconstituencieswonbyZANUPFonadividedoppositionvote.

[Greenfor55%ormoreoftotalvote]

MATNORTH

ZANU‐PF

MDC‐T MDC ZAPU Indep(MDC‐T)

TOTALOPPVOTE

HwangeWest 6,864 5,441 1,401 251 915 8,00854%TsholotshoSouth 4,736 3,976 1,549 863 6,38857%LupaneEast 5,537 5,305 1,683 208 180 7,37657%LupaneWest 4,827 4,163 1,285 242 222 5,91255%NkayiNorth 5,184 5,102 1,039 307 6,44855%MATSOUTH

ZANUPF

MDC‐T MDC ZAPU Indep(MDC‐T)

TOTALOPPVOTE

GwandaNorth 4,246 3733 1,977 300 6,01059%InsizaSouth 4,660 2,007 2,384 320 455 5,16653%MatoboNorth 5,300 5,219 852 417 6,48855%MatoboSouth 4,692 4,596 764 478 5,83855%BulilimaEast 5,828 3,793 1,004 0 1,443 6,24052%BulilimaWest 4,722 3,784 1,645 293 5,72255%Mangwe 4,988 4,434 1,995 431 6,86058%Umzingwane 7,689 6,169 1,833 395 8,39752%Afurtherobservationtobemadeisthatinfiveofthelostconstituencies,therewasanMDC‐TindependentrunninginadditiontoMDC‐T,MDCandZAPU,splittingtheoppositionvotefourways.Inadditiontothe13seatslostinMatabelelandonadividedvote,fourmoreseatswerealsolostinKwekwe,Zvishavane,Masvingo,andKadomaasaresultofthetwoMDCsplusotherssplittingthevote.However,themarginofthecombinedoppositionwinwasheresmallerthaninMatabeleland.92

92SeeAppendix2forTableofVotesinthesefourconstituencies.

4. VOTERSTURNEDAWAY

TherehavebeenwidespreadallegationsthattheRegistrarGeneral’soffice,workingwithIsraelicompanyNIKUV,deliberatelymanipulatedthevoters’rolltoexclude/remove/re‐allocatevotersfromMDC‐Tstrongholdsinordertounderminetheirtotalvote.93NumbersturnedawayweregivenbyZECasaglobalfigureperprovince.94Thesefigureshavebeenconvertedtopercentageofvotescastperprovince.Itisnotpossibletosaymuchabouthowthesefigurescomparestatisticallytopreviouselections,asreportsforelectionsbackto2000simplydonotreportthepercentageofvotersturnedaway.

FIGURE3:

1. Hararehadmorethandoublethenumberofvotersturnedaway(15%)comparedtotheaverageacrossallprovinces(7.4%).Hararehadmorethantreblethenumberofvotersturnedaway,comparedtoZANUPFstrongholdsofMashonalandEastandCentral(4.9%).

93Kwaramba,F,“Electionriggingunderway:PM.‘HiredIsraelifirmtamperingwithvoters’roll”,DailyNews,Harare,2July2013.Ndebele,H,“Israelielectionsriggingmachineexposed”,ZimbabweIndependent,Harare,19‐25July2013.Mambo,E,“Israeliagentsrigresults”,ZimbabweIndependent,Harare,2‐8August2013.DailyNews,“Nikuvpaid$10mtorigpolls:MDC”,10August2013.94SeeAppendix4forexactfiguresperprovince.

2. MashonalandCentralandMashonalandEast,bothZANUPFstrongholds,hadthelowestturn‐awayfigure,at4.9%ofvoters.Thiswas56%oftheaverageturnawayrate,orslightlymorethanhalftherateexperiencedinotherconstituencies.

HarareisanMDC‐Tstronghold.TherewerealargenumberofcomplaintsinHarareaboutvotersbeingturnedawayfrompollingstationsthattheyhadvotedatinthepast,forbeinginthewrongwardorconstituency,ornolongerontheroll.95ItmustbenotedthatinMashonalandWest,aZANUPFstronghold,therewerealsounusuallyhighnumbersofvotersturnedaway–15%,thesamerateasinHarare.Aswedonothavetheconstituencyorwardfiguresforturn‐aways,itisnotclearifthispredominatedinpartsoftheprovincethathadswungtoMDC‐Tin2008,forexample.Bulawayo,anothermajorMDC‐Tstronghold,hadslightlyaboveaveragenumbersofpeopleturnedaway,butincertainBulawayoconstituenciestheturnawayratewashigherthantheoverallcityaverageof8.7%.BulawayoEastissuchaconstituency,wheretheturn‐awayratewas11%.96Turningaway8.7%ofvotersinanyelectionseemsaveryhighturnawayrate,andthiswascertainlypartlytheresultofthefailureofZECtoproducethevoters’rollingoodtime,whichwouldhaveallowedvoterstoclarifytheirwardsandpollingstationsaheadofvotingday,aswellastochallengetheirabsencefromtherollwhereappropriate.

5. ASSISTEDVOTESZECreportsthattherewere206,901assistedvoterscountrywide.Onthefaceofit,thisfigureisnotstatisticallyhigh,giventhatthereisanassumptionof86%literacyinZimbabwe.97ZEC’sfigureisonly5.9%ofvoters–i.e.considerablyfewerthanthe14%ofvoterswhomightbeassumedtobeilliterate.98Theward‐by‐wardbreakdownforassistedvotesisnotavailable,norarefiguresbyconstituency.Itistheprerogativeofanyvotertorequestassistanceornot,andintermsoftherevisedElectoralAct,s/healsohastherighttobringher/hisownassistantalong.Ifsuchavoterdoesnothavehis/herownassistant,thenthepresidingofficertogetherwiththreeotherswillprovidetheassistance.Assistedvotersarerecordedonspecificforms,anditistheresponsibilityofobserversandpollingagentstoalsorecordthem.ItisacknowledgedthatindividualswhocannotreadandwritecannonethelessoftenrecognizethesymboloftheirpoliticalpartyonaballotpaperandplaceanXbesideit,andthattheilliteracyrateisNOTequivalenttothenumberofpeopleneedingassistanceinan 95DailyNews,“Massivevotefraudunearthed”,Harare,1August2013.ZESNelectionreport2013,page88.96InformationfromDavidColtart’swebsiteandinhisinterviewwithSWRadioAfricaon23August2013.97UNESCOplacedZimbabwe’sliteracyrateamongover15yearoldsat85.97%intheir1999statistics,theirmostrecentfigure.Ifanything,followingmorethanadecadeofdisastrouseducationpolicies,literacyrateswillhavefalleninallprovinces.98SeeAppendix4forpercentagerateslinkedtoFigure4.

election.Itispossiblymorecommonlytheelderlyandthevisuallyorphysicallychallengedwhoneedassistance.

FIGURE4:

Itisnotpossibletocompareassistedvotingnumberswiththoseofpreviouselections,asthesehavenotbeenrecordedinthepasteitherbycivicsorbyZECintheirformalreporting.Whenstatementsaremadethatthiselectionsawhighnumbersofassistedvotescomparedtopreviouselections,itisunclearonwhatbasissuchassumptionsarebeingmade,astheresimplyarenobaselinefiguresinthepublicdomain.Therehavebeenrepeatedreferencesinthemediathatinacertainconstituency,orconstituencies,therewere10,000ormoreassistedvotes,buttheplace/swherethisallegedlyhappenedhavenotbeennamed.99While2013figuresforassistedvotesaregenerallyconsiderablybelowtheilliteracyrates,thedevilisinthedetailhere,asthereareconvincingreportsoffullyliterateindividualsbeingforcedtodeclarethemselvesilliterateandtovotewiththe

99BrianChitemba,“‘I’mreadytoengagewithMugabe’:MDC‐Tleaderopensuponrecentpolls,future”,ZimbabweIndependent,September20‐26,2013.Tsvangiraiisquotedasreferringto17,000assistedvotesinoneconstituency,whichhedoesnotname.TheBritishAmbassadorwasquoted,andcriticized,inthemediaforclaimingaconstituencywhere10,000ormoreassistedvotesweremade,butcouldnotnameit.

assistanceofknownZANUPFsupporters.ThisincludesindividualscitedinTsvangirai’soriginalelectionpetitionandindividualsinterviewedbytheauthorsthemselves.100Toconclude:thereareconvincingaccountsthatinsomeruralconstituencies,therewassystematic,coercedassistedvoting.However,theprovincialfiguresarenotunusuallyhighcomparedtotheilliteracyrates–andwehaveonlyZEC’sfigurestogoon.Theassistedvotefiguresfor2013willnowprovideabaselineforfutureelections.

6. CONSTITUENCIESWITHMORETHAN50%INCREASEINVOTERSFROM2008TO2013101

Commentatorshavepointedtothemassiveincreasesinsomeconstituencyturnoutsasindicativeofsomekindofirregularity,suchasallegedbusinginofvotersfromoutsideconstituencies,useoffalseregistrationslips,ordoublevotingbysomevoters.102ThefactthatsomanyofthehighturnoutconstituencieswereinZANUPFstrongholdshasbeenseenasindicativeofanattempttobolsterthepresidentialvoteforMugabe.

FIGURE5:

100ZESNElection2013report,page61,84‐87fordetailedincidentsnotedbytheirobserversofassistedvotingirregularitiesin17namedconstituencies.DailyNews,“‘Ican’treadandwrite’:Learnedvoterscoercedintoclaimingilliteracy”,Harare,4August2013.101SeeAppendix5foractual%increasesperconstituencyinall51,pluswhowoneachone:alsoforcomparativeincreases/decreasesinMDC‐TvsZANUPFvotesin15keyconstituenciesinHarare,ByoandruralMashonaland.102DailyNews,“Massivevotefraudunearthed”,Harare,1August2013.SouthernEye,“PollresultscauseoutrageasTsvangirairejectsoutcome”,Harare,2August2013.

o In45outof210constituencies,thevotescastwerebetween150%and190%ofthe

2008vote.o Inanothersixconstituencies,thevotescastweremorethan200%ofthe2008

figures:iethevotemorethandoubled.FiveofthesewereruralMashonalandconstituenciesandtheotherwasHarareSouth.AllwerewonbyZANUPF.

o Thismeansthatin24.3%ofconstituencies,therewerenotableincreasesinvotescast.

o InfourBulawayoconstituencies,thevotescastwere150%+ofthe2008vote.AllconstituencieswerewoncomfortablybyMDC‐T,andinallconstituenciesMDC‐TshowedvotegrowthaswellasZANUPF,althoughthelattershowedmoreofasurge(fromaverylowbase).

InseveraloftheconstituencieswhereZANUPFhadaverylargeincreaseinthevote,MDC‐Talsoshowedincreasesintheirvotingfiguresfor2008.MDC‐Twonaroundoneinfiveoftheconstituencieswheretherewasadramaticincreaseofthevoterturn‐outcomparedto2008.ZANUPFwonthebalance–over80%.InHarareSouth,wheretherewasamorethandoublingofthevoterturn‐outandaZANUPFwin,therehasbeenoverthelastfiveyearsthegrowthofalargeandverypolitically‐controlledpopulationintheperi‐urbanareasoftheconstituency.Thenewarrivalshavebeensettledonseizedperi‐urbanfarmsandareunderstrictZANUPFcontrol.103Thelargeincreaseinthevotehere,andthefactthatthisincreasewaspredominantlyforZANUPF,couldbeunderstoodinthislight.TheMDC‐TvoteinHarareSouthalsoincreasedsubstantially,to170%oftheirlastelectionvote,buttheZANUPFvoteincreasedby282%,i.e.itnearlytrebled.Itwouldbenecessarytotakethevotingpatternatwardlevelintoaccount,toestablishinwhichpartoftheconstituencyeachpartygainedvotes,asthemoreestablishedpartsofHarareSoutharemostlikelytovoteMDC‐T,thenewlysettledareasforZANUPF.ThethreeZANUPFstrongholdsofMashonalandWest,CentralandEast,whichwereacleansweepforthemapartfromoneMDC‐TwininChinoyi,showedthegreatestincreasesinvotescast.AlsoworthnotingisthefactthatamongMasvingoconstituencies,therewereNONEthatshowedamassiveincreaseinvoters,andinManicaland,therewereonly3suchconstituencies,oneofwhichwaswonbyMDC‐T.ThesetwoprovincesvotedconvincinglyforZANUPF,whowonalmostcleansweepshere.OtherexplanationsthanmassivegrowthinapparentvotingnumbershavetothereforebefoundforthelargeZANUPFvoteintheseconstituencies,includingthepossibleimpactofpreviouselectionviolence,andlossofsupportforMDC‐T.Landbeneficiariesandsupportfromsmall‐scaleminersislikelytobepartofthevotingpictureintheseprovinces.Inotherconstituencieswithlargeincreasesinvotes

103Interviewwithacademicresearcherconfirmstheareaisano‐gozonefornon‐ZANUPFmembersinwaysthataresimilartopartsofNortonandMbare.

FIGURE6:

BusingwasnotedinMtPleasantinHarare,wherehundredsofyouthswhoarenotknowntonormallyresidetheredisembarkedfrombusesandvoted.104

InHarareEast,theMDC‐Tvotewas122%ofthe2008figure,andZANUPF’sincreasedto320%oftheir2008figure–morethantreble.However,MDC‐Tnarrowlyretainedtheseat.

InBulawayoEast,Coltart’spollingagentsnoticedadramaticincreasein‘shavenheadedyouth’allvotingwithintheproximityofthearmybarracks,andmassivelybolsteringtheZANUPFvoteinthisconstituencycomparedto2008.105

TherehavebeenallegationsofpeoplefromMozambiquehavingpinkfingersinthedaysaftertheZimbabweelection,ostensiblybecausetheycrossedtheborderandvotedinborderconstituenciesattherequestofZANUPFfunctionaries.106

InMazoweWestandShamvaSouth,therewasadramaticlossinMDC‐Tvotes(‐42%)combinedwithanevenmoredramaticshiftinZANUPFvote(280%and256%respectively).ThismeantthattheMDC‐Twinof2008wasoverturnedinMazoweWest,withZANUPFreclaimingthisseat.ShamvaSouthwasoncemorereturnedtoZANUPF.

104TendaiBitiofMDC‐Twascapturedonvideoexposingthebusingofyouthsintothisconstituency.105SouthernEye,“Soldiersfingeredinvote‐rigging”,Bulawayo,11August2013.106Chiripasi,T,“TsvangiraiMDCsaysMozambicansvotedinZimbabwepolls”,VoiceofAmerica,15August2013.

InMazoweWestandShamvaSouth,thevotingpatterncouldbelinkedtothehistoryofbrutalandwide‐spreadviolencein2008,suggestingthatfearandcoercioncouldhavebeenparticularfactorsintheseconstituencies.ZESNandthemediahavealsoreportedcoercedassistedvotesintheseconstituencies.107

Theabsenceofanelectroniccopyofthevoters’rollthatcanbeanalysed,andcomparedtotherollusedin2008,makesitdifficulttoassessexactlywhathappenedinthiselection.However,itseemsareasonableassertionthatthemassmovementofnon‐urbanvotersintotraditionallymiddleclassurbansuburbsswayedthevoteinfavourofZANUPFinseveralHarareconstituencies.Thismassmovementwascombinedwith15%ofvotersbeingturnedawayinHarareconstituencies,manyofwhomreportedhavingvotedinthatconstituencyinthepast.Inotherwords,asizeablenumberoftheregularvotersofHararewereeffectivelydisenfranchisedandreplacedwithvotersfromoutsidethecity.

C. CONCLUSION

Electionresultssince2000showsomerecognizable,ifdepressing,trends.TheMDC‐Tvotehasremainedremarkablyconsistentoverthelastdecadeintermsofnumbers,whiletheZANUPFvotehasgenerally,withtheexceptionof2008,beenseveralhundredthousandvotesmorethantheoppositionvote.TheleapinonemillionvotesforZANUPFishardtoexplainbetween2008and2013‐butismorebelievablewhenseenas(only)27%higherthantheir2002vote.However,asallelectionshavebeenmiredincontroversysince2000,analyzingthefiguresmayrevealmoreabouthowZANUPFmanipulatesitsapparentsupportthananythingelse.Inthiselection,therewerewidespread,convincingreportsofcoercedassistedvoting,whichthegrossprovincialfiguresshedlittlelighton.Theassistedvotingfiguresinallprovincesremainwellbelowtheilliteracyrates,andtherearenofiguresfrompreviouselectionswithwhichtocomparethisyear’sassistedvote.Thefactthat15%ofvoterswereturnedawayinHarare,andonly4.9%inZANUPFruralstrongholds,combinedwiththebusingintoHarareofapparentlyruralvotersinlargenumbers,isindicativeofastrategyoftargetingcertainHarareconstituencieswiththeaimofclaimingthemforZANUPF.However,itremainstobeseeniftheMDC‐Telectionpetitionswillbeabletoprovethisinanyconvincingway.Thelargeincreasesinvotescastinthe51most‐affectedconstituenciescertainlyplayedakeyroleinZANUPF’selectionlandslide.WhilesomeoftheseseatswerewonbyMDC‐T,morethan80%werewonbyZANUPF.WhetherthemassiveincreasesinvoteswereinfactowingtoirregularitiesasMDC‐Tclaims,orwhetherasZANUPFclaims,totheireffortsto

107ZESN2013Electionreport,page85referstocoercedvotingreportedbytheirobserversinShamvaSouthandMazoweWest.Thisisreportedin17constituenciesintheZESNreport.

buildalargesupportbaseandtoregistertheirvotersoverthelastfiveyears,remainsunresolved.Thesplitintheoppositionvotecostthemdearly,andeffectivelyhandedanunassailabletwo‐thirdsmajoritytoZANUPFinthiselection.Iftheoppositionhadretainedthe17seatstheylosttosplitvoting,theywouldhavekeptZANUPF’sHouseofAssemblymajorityto67%,insteadofitscurrent79%.ThefiguresfromthelastfiveelectionsallpointtotheunlikelihoodofanyoppositionpartyunseatingZANUPFin2018,unlessZANUPFitselffacesdramaticinternalchallengeswhichshiftthepoliticallandscape.ThisconclusionisinlinewiththeargumentsmadeinPartOneofthisreport.Thesocio‐economicpowerbaseofZimbabwehasbeensignificantlyshiftedtoentrenchaZANUPFeliteandtoensuretheirsupportinruralandsomeurbanareasviapatronageandcoercion,andtheoppositionneedstoengagewiththisreality.HavingasupportbaseinHarare,othersmallurbancentresandinthreeincreasinglydepopulatingwesternprovinceswillnotbesufficienttodislodgeZANUPF.Whileacknowledgingtheunevenelectoralcontext,theinabilityofthecombinedoppositiontobreaktheceilingof1.4millionvotessince2002shouldbeseenasachallengetothemgoingforward.Inparticular,theinabilityin2005oftheunitedMDC,andin2008and2013ofMDC‐Tcontestingalonetobreakthe1.2million‐votebarrier,doesnotbodewell.Inthreeoutofthelastfourelections,ZANUPFhasscoredcomfortablyover1.5millionvotes–andover2millionin2013.Itisunclearhowmanypeoplewouldvotefortheoppositionifthevotingenvironmentwasgenuinelyfairandfreefromintimidation,orifhundredsofthousandsofvoterscurrentlyinthediasporawereenfranchised.Butthelikelihoodofeitheroftheseeventsoccurringbefore2018isremote.Thedemocraticmovementneedstorebuildandrestrategise,bearinginmindtheneedtoengageinnewwayswithadynamicandchangingelectorate,particularlyinruralareas,resettledareasandintheinformalminingsectors.TheseareallpartsoftheelectoratewhereZANUPF,bywhatevermeans,hasconvincinglycapturedthevoteinthiselection.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX1.

TABLE2: Presidentialvotesperprovince:3maincandidates(ZEC)

Mugabe Tsvangirai NcubeHarare 172,163 261,925 7,846MashWest 277,312 100,616 5,603MashCentral 327,455 46,533 3,525MashEast 320719 90,165 6,231Midlands 274,793 141,210 11,036Masvingo 285,806 104,912 9,878Manicaland 258,026 180,552 13,433MatNorth 81,207 98,596 13,003MatSouth 81,180 58,633 12,726Bulawayo 31,773 89,207 9,356

APPENDIX2.

TABLE3: Recordofvotesinfourconstituencieswon

byZANUPFonadividedoppositionvote.

ZANUPF

MDC‐T MDC ZAPU OTHER

TOTALOPP

MASVINGO

MasvingoUrban 10,988 10,424 672 149 11,24551%MASHWEST

KadomaCentral 9,571 9,005 959 221 10,18552%MIDLANDS

KwekweCentral 6,051 5,760 508 6,26851%ZvishavaneNgezi 9,015 8,720 595 97 9,41251%

APPENDIX3.

TABLE4: Votersturnedawaybyprovince(ZEC),as%oftotalvote*.

[*twohighestandtwolowestratesemphasized]PROVINCE

TOTALVOTES

Turnedaway

%Turnedaway

(1dp)Harare 423,003 64,483 15.2Bulawayo 130,505 11,388 8.7%Manicaland 459,036 42,525 9.2%MashonalandCentral 380,880 18,517 4.9%MashonalandEast 419,148 20,464 4.9%MashonalandWest 376,326 56,733 15%Masvingo 402,622 29,292 7.3%MatabelelandNorth 196,348 14,424 7.3%MatabelelandSouth 156,104 11,521 7.4%Midlands 440,982 35,543 8.1%Zimbabwe 3,480,047 304,890 8.7%

APPENDIX4.

TABLE5: Assistedvotesbyprovince(ZEC)*ComparedtoLiteracyrates(UNESCO)108

[*twohighestandtwolowestratesemphasized]

PROVINCE

Totalvotes

TotalAssisted

%Assistedvotes(1dp)

Literacyinprovince

Harare 423,003 4,089 1% 96.02%Bulawayo 130,505 2,313 1.8% 95.36%Manicaland 459,036 31,277 6.8% 85.13%MashonalandCentral 380,880 34,044 8.9% 74.98%MashonalandEast 419,148 27,974 6.7% 85.41%MashonalandWest 376,326 23,166 6.2% 81.7%Masvingo 402,622 34,950 8.7% 83.70%MatabelelandNorth 196,348 14,314 7.2% 78.64%MatabelelandSouth 156,104 9,462 6.1% 81.77%Midlands 440,982 25,312 5.7% 85.56%Zimbabwe 3,480,047109 206,901 5.9% 85.97%

108FiguresarefromUNESCO,1999.http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/zimbabwe/rapport_2_1.html109Includesspoiltballots.

APPENDIX5.

a.) TABLE6: BulawayoandHarareconstituencieswithmorethan50%increaseintotalvoterssince2008

[lessthanlastvote,morethan100%;morethan200%;morethan300%]

CONSTIT 2008MDC‐T

2013MDC‐T

%shiftMDC‐T

2008ZANUPF

2013ZANUPF

%shiftZANUPF

BulawayoSouth

230% 483 1,787 370%

MDC‐T

BulawayoEast

126% 1,031 2,842 280%

MDC‐T

BulawayoMakokoba

MDC‐T

BulawayoPelandaba

MDC‐T

HarareEpworth

15,468

ZANUPF

HarareEast

7619,538

MDC‐T

HarareNorth

ZANUPF

HarareSouth

20,069

ZANUPF

HarareMbare

10,932

145% 6,121 14,764 240%

ZANUPF

HarareMtPleasant

‐1.5% 1,738 7,945 357%

ZANUPF

b.) TABLE7: RuralConstituencieswherevoterturnoutincreasedby

morethan100%since2008[lessthanlastvote,morethan100%;morethan200%;morethan300%]

CONSTIT 2008

MDC‐T2013MDC‐T

%shiftMDC‐T

2008ZANUPF

2013ZANUPF

%shiftZANUPF

Mash.CenMazoweWest

‐42%

14,383

ZANUPF

Mash.CenShamvaSouth

2,669 1,514

‐43% 8,956 22,332 265%

ZANUPF

MashEastGoromonzi

6,456 11,112

172% 5,305 17,234 325%

ZANUPF

SouthMashWestHurungweCentral

1,399 4,267

305% 4,997 12,708 254%

ZANUPF

MashWestZvimbaEast

3,554 4,008

113% 5,197 13,113 252%

ZANUPF

c.) GENERALOBSERVATIONS

1. In16%ofconstituencies(n=7/45)witha50%to90%increaseinvoters,MDC‐Twon

theseat.o FourofthesewinswereinBulawayo,andonewasinHarare.o TheothertwowereDangamvurwainManicaland,whichwaswonbyanMDC‐T

Independent,andHwangeCentralinMatabelelandNorth.

2. In84%ofconstituencies(n=38/45)witha50%to90%increaseinvoters,ZANUPFwontheseat.FourofthesewinswereinHarare,inconstituencieswhereZANUPFhadpreviouslylosteveryelectionsince2000.

3. In3%ofall210constituencies,(n=6),therewasmorethana100%increaseinvoters,comparedto2008.

HarareSouthwastheonlyurbanconstituencywith100%+increase. theother5wereallruralMashonalandconstituencies. Inalloftheconstituencies(n=6)witha100%+increaseinvoterturnout,ZANUPF

wontheseat.AnalysedinmoredetailbelowarethefourBulawayoconstituenciesandthesixHarareconstituencieswith50%+increasesinturnoutsince2008,plusthe5constituenciesinruralMashonalandwith100%+voterincreases.Observationsofthese15constituencies1101. Inthemajorityofconstituencies(11outof15)whereZANUPFhadalargeincreaseinthevote,

MDC‐Talsohadanincreaseinvoters.However,theincreaseinZANUPFvotestendedtobefargreater.

2. InallfourBulawayoconstituencieswith50%+increases:a. ZANUPF’svotein2013rangedbetween135%and370%ofthe2008vote,withan

averagevote,comparedto2008,of260%oftheirpreviousvote.ietheZANUPFvoteintheseconstituenciesalmosttrebled.

b. TheMDC‐Tvoteinthesamefourconstituenciesrangedbetween126%and230%ofthe2008figure,andaveraged172%ofthe2008vote–almostdouble.

110AsonlyMDC‐TandZANUPFwonanyoftheseconstituencies,theirrespectivevotesarecompared,withoutexaminingthetotaloppositionvote:noneoftheseconstituencieswaslosttoadividedvote.SeeAppendix6forTablesandfigures.

c. ThedramaticincreaseinZANUPF’s%voteinsomeBulawayoconstituenciesnonethelessdidnotseriouslychallengetheMDC‐Twininanyofthese.AllseatswerecomfortablywonbyMDC‐T.

d.) VOTERTURNOUTINCREASESBETWEEN2008AND2013–ALL51CONSTITUENCIES RuralConstituencieswith100%+increaseinvoterturnoutCONSTITUENCY %INC WONBYHurungweC MW 151.2% ZANUPFGoromonziS ME 117.8% ZANUPFZvimbaE MW 104.2% ZANUPFMazoweWestMC 103.5% ZANUPFShamvaSouthMC 101.9% ZANUPFBulawayoandHarareconstituencieswith50%+increaseinvoterturnoutBulawayoSouth 90.8% MDC‐TPelandabaByo 59.8% MDC‐TMakokobaByo 53.3% MDC‐TBulawayoEast 52.6% MDC‐THarareSouth 136% ZANUPFMbareHarare 77.4% ZANUPFMtPleasantHre 69.2% ZANUPFEpworthHarare 69.1% ZANUPFHarareEast 69.1% MDC‐THarareNorth 50.2% ZANUPFOtherconstituencieswith50%+increaseinvoterssince2008PROVINCE %INC WONBYManicalandDangamvura 71.1% MDC‐TMutareWest 50.0% ZANUPFMutasaSouth 60.4% ZANUPFMashonalandCentralBinduraNorth 85.8% ZANUPFMtDarwinSouth 74% ZANUPFMazoweSouth 69.2% ZANUPFMazoweNorth 67.2% ZANUPFBinduraSouth 64.6% ZANUPFShamvaNorth 55.8% ZANUPFMtDarwinWest 50.6% ZANUPFMashonalandEastMaronderaEast 81.7% ZANUPF

GoromonziWest 68.4% ZANUPFWedzaNorth 67.9% ZANUPFGoromonziNorth 61.3% ZANUPFMutokoSouth 57.4% ZANUPFSeke 57.2% ZANUPFChikombaWest 56.5% ZANUPFMurewaSouth 54.3% ZANUPFMashonalandWestChakari 90.2% ZANUPFChegutuWest 73.2% ZANUPFChinhoyi 61.7% ZANUPFKadomaCentral 81.0% ZANUPFKariba 57.9% ZANUPFMakonde 54.8% ZANUPFNorton 80.8% ZANUPFZvimbaSouth 74.3% ZANUPFChiredziWest 82.8% ZANUPFMidlandsChirumanzu 90.4% ZANUPFChirumanzuZ 73.8% ZANUPFChiwundura 51.5% ZANUPFGweruUrban 52.9% ZANUPFShurugwiNorth 58.7% ZANUPFZvishavaneNgezi 60.8% ZANUPF**splitvotewinMatabelelandNorthHwangeCentral 69.3% MDC‐TUmguza 83.3% ZANUPFMatabelelandSouthBeitbridgeEast 87.9% ZANUPF

APPENDIX6

VIOLATIONSOFTHE2013ELECTIONPRIORTOTHEELECTION:BREACHESOFTHELAW.111

1. Theinitialproclamationitselfwasinbreachofsection31HoftheLancasterHouseConstitution,whichwasstillinforceatthistime.Cabinetshouldbeconsultedbeforeannouncinganelectiondate,andyetMugabeannounceditunilaterally.Furthermore,intermsoftheGPA,allpoliticalpartieshadtobeconsultedandadateagreedonpriortoproclamation.

2. On13June,Section157(1)oftheConstitutionandSection4(2)(c)ofthePresidentialPowers(TemporaryMeasures)Actwerebreached,whenPresidentMugabeamendedtheElectoralActbyproclamation.BoththeConstitutionandtheActspecificallyexcludetheuseofPresidentialproclamationtoamendElectorallaw,whichcanonlybeamendedbyaspecificActofParliament.

3. Thevoterregistrationexercisewasnotdoneincompliancewiththeconstitution.Section6(3)ofthe6thScheduleoftheConstitutionstatesthattheRegistrarGeneralunderZECsupervision,mustconductaspecialandintensivevoterregistrationforatleast30daysafterthepublicationofthedateoftheelection.Thevoterregistrationexercisedidnotlast30days,andthemannerinwhichitwasrunwasbureaucraticallyobstructiveinHarareandelsewhere(seemoreonthisunderbureaucraticbreaches).

4. ThestatecontrolledmediaflagrantlypromotedZANUPFandexcludedtheopposition

partiesfromcoverageinnewspapers,ontelevisionandontheradio,apartfromnegativecoverage.ThisisaviolationofSection61(4)(b)and(c)oftheConstitution,andofSection160(G)oftheElectoralAct.Thelatterstatesclearlythatpublicbroadcastingmediamustensure“afairandbalancedallocationoftimebetweeneachpoliticalpartyandindependentcandidate”,andthat“eachpoliticalpartyandindependentcandidateisallowedareasonableopportunitytopresentacase throughthebroadcastingserviceconcerned.”

5. Section152oftheElectoralActwasappliedinapartisanmanner:thisstatesthatitis

illegaltodamagecampaignmaterialduringthecampaign,yetZANUPFsystematicallypulleddownpostersoftheoppositionwithimpunity,whilemembersoftheMDCwerearrestedforpullingdownasingleZANUPFposter.112

6. Specialvote:TheElectoralActallowscivilservantsondutyoverelectionstovoteinadvance.113

111InformationfromDavidColtart’swebsiteandinhisinterviewwithSWRadioAfricaon23August2013.Alsofrom‘CourtWatch’,andmediareports.112ColtartnotesapersonwasarrestedinhisconstituencyforremovingafewZANUPFposters,yetawhitetruckwithateamwasdeployedtosystematicallyremoveeverysingleMDCandMDCTposteroverastretchof20kmofroadfromtheairportintotown,infullviewofatleastonepolice‐mannedroadblock,andthepolicedidnothing,evenwheninformedbyColtartthatthiswashappening.113InformationonSpecialvoteevents,fromCourtWatch15/2013,5September2013.

TheMDCTfiledacourtapplicationchallengingthenumbersofpolicegivenspecialvotingrights,asaccordingtopayrollrecords,thereare44,113policeemployedandnotthe69,222whoweregrantedspecialvotes.Theirapplicationwasdismissed.

Thespecialvotewaschaotic,withthelegallyallocatedtwodaysbeinghastilyextended,butwithmorethan40%ofspecialvotersnonethelessfailingtocasttheirvotesbecauseofZEC’slogisticalfailures.

ZECwasgrantedanapplicationbytheConstitutionalCourtthatthose40%whohadnotvotedshouldbeallowedtovoteon31July,althoughthisisinexpresscontraventionoftheElectoralActasitopensthepossibilityofdoublevoting.

ItremainsuncleartodatewhatmeasuresZECundertooktoensurethatthose60%whohadvotedduringthespecialvotedidnotcastasecondvoteon31July,whichplacesthereliabilityoftheentirepollinquestion.

7. MOSTEGRESIOUSLY:Failuretoprovideanelectroniccopyofthevoters’rolltoall

candidates.ThisbreachedSection21(6and7)oftheElectoralAct,whichstatesthateveryregisteredcandidatemustbeprovidedwithanelectroniccopyoftherollingoodtimebeforetheelection.Suchcopyshouldbeinaformatthat“allowsitscontentstobesearchedandanalysed.”MDCTwasforcedtoapplytotheHighCourton30July(theeveoftheelection)withanurgentdemandthatZECgivecandidatesandpartiestheelectoralroll,whichithadnotyetdone!Onlyapaperrollwasprovided,afterthecourtruledZECmustproducetheroll,withZECstatingthata‘technicalfault’precludedhandingovertheelectronicroll.Todate,theelectronicrollhasnotbeenhandedoverwhichisahindranceinthemultipleconstituencyappealsthathavebeenplacedbeforethecourts.

8. Campaigning–Intimidation:TheElectoralActSection134forbidsintimidationinall

forms,bothverbalthreatsandphysicalviolence.Thereweremultipleandinsomeconstituencieswidespreadreportsofthreatsofdeath,violenceanddestructionofpropertyintheeventofZANUPFnotwinningincertainconstituencies.114Therewereisolatedreportsofelectionrelatedviolence,bothprecedingandfollowingthepoll.Inthewakeoftheviolenceof2008,theimpactofthreatscannotbeunderestimatedinassessingvotingpatterns.

9. Campaigning‐Bribery:TheActSection136statesthatitisspecificallyforbiddentooffer

materialrewardstovotersinreturnfortheirvotes,yetZANUPFconsistentlyandcountrywide‘treated’votersintheformoftonnesoffoodhandouts,withthepromiseofmoreaftertheelectionsintheeventoftheMugabefamilystillbeinginpower.Peoplewereallegedlypromisedlandinsomeinstances.Anypersonwho:“makesanysuchgift,loan,offer,promise,procurementoragreementtoorforanypersoninordertoinducesuchpersontoprocureortoendeavourtoprocurethereturnofacandidateatanelectionorthevoteofavoteratanelection”hascommittedtheoffenceofbribery,accordingtotheElectoralAct136(1)(c).115

114Sokwanelewebsitelists222selfreportedincidentsofintimidation.115Specificmaterialpromisesdifferfrompolicypromisesduringacampaign.Effectively,tooffermaterialgoodsinexchangeforavote,isabribe.Thisisdifferenttohandingoutcampaignmaterial,includingt‐shirts,capsetc,whichisaformofadvertisingusedworld‐wideduringcampaigns.Tonnesofmaizemeal,cookingoil,riceandotherfoodcommoditiesweredistributedatZANUPFrallies,withspecificpromiseofmoreinthefutureifZANUPFwontheelection.ThiswasaboveandbeyondtheprovisionoffoodforimmediateconsumptionthatroutinelyaccompaniesralliesinZimbabwe.ConversationswithvotersinruralMatabelelandshowthatthis‘treating’inaregionwherepeoplearestarvingwasinfluentialinvotingpatterns.

ONELECTIONDAY–BREACHESANDANOMALIES

10. PresenceofPoliceinsidepollingstationsalldayincludingduringthevotecount.ThisviolatesSections55(6)and62oftheElectoralAct.Policewerenotedcountrywideasbeingpresentinsidepollingstations,andofregularlygettinginformationaboutvotescast,assistedvotesandpeopleturnedawayfromthePresidingOfficerandrelayingthisonviacellphone,phoneandradio.Thisisentirelyillegal,aspolicearespecificallyprecludedfromanyvotingactivitiesinapollingstation.Policealsonotednamesanddetailsofvisitorstostations,andmostproblematically,werepresentinsidepollingstationsduringthecount.Section62isveryspecificastowhomaybepresentduringacount,anditexcludespolice.AsColtartcomments:“ThisisnomeretechnicalbreachoftheElectoralAct–itgoestotheveryheartofafreeandfairelection.Asstatedabove….theZRPgenerallyactsinapartisanmanner.LawinZimbabweisoftenusedselectivelyasaweapon,notasafineinstrumentofjustice.Accordinglythepresenceofpoliceofficersinpollingstationsduringthevoteandtheiractionsinrecordingvotescastwouldinitselfhavebeenhighlyintimidatory,especiallytomanyruralvoters.Theirpresenceandtherecordingofvotescastbypoliceofficersinboththevotingprocessandthecountmaywellhavefacilitatedamuchwiderfraud.”

11. Busingofvotersnotresidentinarea,andturningawayofresidentsInseveralurbanandruralconstituencies,itwasobservedthatbusloadsofpeoplenotusuallyresidentinthatareawerevotingenmasse,whileatthesametime,hundredsofvoterswhodidresideintheareaandhadregisteredthere,wereturnedaway.BulawayoEastcandidateDavidColtartmadethisobservation:

Isawhoardsofshaven‐headedyoungmeninmyconstituency,andwedidnotunderstandthefullimpactofwhattheyweredoinguntiltheevening.Thereweresevenpollingstationsthatwerelocatedwithina2kilometerradiusofBrady[army]Barracks,andwhentheresultscameout,theyborenorelationtohistoricaltrendsinthatarea.ZANUPFinthoseparticularpollingstationsgottentimesmorevotesthanIdid,whichwascompletelydisproportionatetowhathappenedinotherareas.Thenextthingisthathundredsofpeoplewereturnedawayinmyconstituencyforallegedlynotbeingonthevoters’roll.Thesewerepeoplethathavevotedbefore.116

TendaiBitimadeasimilarobservationinMountPleasant,wherehundredsofyouthswhoappearedunabletospeakEnglish(unusualinanurbanconstituency)werevotingunderclosesupervision,afterbeingbussedapparentlyfromadistantruralarea.Thesevoterswereallcarryingregistrationslips,indicatingthattheywerenewlyregisteredvoters.Therehavebeenallegationsthatcannotbeindependentlyverified,thatinsomeinstancestheregistrationslipswerefake.117

116InterviewwithSWRadioAfrica,23August2013.117SeeSPTvideoofBiticonfrontingtheseyouthinMountPleasant.SimilarbusingofvoterswasreportedbyindividualstoSokwanele.ThisincludedtheallegedbusingofvotersfromMozambiquetovoteinZimbabweanconstituenciesborderingthiscountry.

12. Assistedvoting:Finalnumbersofassistedvotershavenotbeenascertainedonaconstituency‐by‐constituencybasis,withZECprovidingaglobalfigureof207,000assistedvoters.Thisisnotonthefaceofitanunjustifiablylargenumber,beinglessthan10%ofallvotescastinacountrywith90%literacy.However,thenumberof207,000hasnotbeenconfirmedbypollingagentsandobservers,andasZEChasnotprovidedthenumberbyconstituency,wesimplyhavetotaketheirfigureatfacevalue.Theinabilityofpollingagentsandobserverstoverifythis‐oranyfigurerelatingtotheelectionforthatmatter‐isaseverefailingontheirpart. Forcedtomakeassistedvotes:therehavebeengeneralandspecificreportsofliterate

votersforcedtoaskfor‘help’fromknownZANUPFfunctionaries,toensuretheyvoted‘therightway’.118

Observersreportcorrectuseofthisvote:whilemanyassistedvotesmayhavebeencoerced,othersweregenuinelyneededandweremadeinaccordancewiththestatute,meaningthatindividualswerefreetochoosewhotheywantedtoassistthemwiththevote,andwereabletovoteconfidentially.Othersobservedassistedvotesbeingmadefortheopposition.

Whileinanycountry,informationonassistedvotingshouldbeavailableonacompletelytransparentbasisfromgovernmentforthebenefitofallcitizensandpoliticalparties,itisalsoafactthattheoppositionhadpollingagentsineverypollingstationinthecountry,andthatthisinformationshouldhavebeencollatedbyeveryparty.Therewere20,000independentmonitorsdeployedacrossthecountry,andwhiletheywerenotineverypollingstation,theycoveredasufficientproportiontohavegivenanotherviewonwhathappenedwithregardtohowmanyvoterswereturnedaway,andhowmanypeoplemadeassistedvotes.Thefacttheyhavenotbeenabletoprovidethisinformationis,again,aseriousfailureontheirpart.

POSTELECTIONEVENTS

TheHighCourtofZimbabweruledinZEC’sfavourthattheywerenotobligatedtoprovidetheMDC‐Twiththefinalvotingpatternsbyconstituencyandpollingstation.ThefailuretoreceivethisinformationfromZECwasamajorfactorinMDCTwithdrawingtheirelectoralchallengetothePresidentialresult–butiftheirownpollingagentshaddonetheirjobproperly,theywouldnothavehadtorelyonZECforthisinformationbutwouldhavehadtheirownrecordofwhathappenedbypollingstation.

Thepresidentialvotingpatternperconstituencyhasneverbeenreleased,onlyaglobalpercentagestatingthatRobertMugabereceived61%ofthevotetoMorganTsvangirayi’s36%andWelshmanNcube’s2.7%.Again–MDC‐TcannotchallengetheseglobalresultsastheirpollingagentsdidnotsystematicallyreturntheirV11formswithdetailsofthevoteperstationandconstituencytoindependentlyverifywhatwashappening.

118Sokwanelelists53suchinstances,somespecific,somegeneral.

‘TeamZANUPF’score‘victory’,withelectionmessagingfocusedonindigenizationand

invokingmemoriesofcolonialismandthewarofliberation.Coercionandmemoriesof2008violenceintimidatedmanyvotersintovotingforthem,butchangingeconomicforcesin

ZimbabwehavealsorebuilttheZANUPFsupportbaseinthelastfiveyears.

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