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European Journal of Political Research33: 41–71, 1998. 41c 1998Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
The history of conditional agenda-setting in European institutions
GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPELUniversity of California, Los Angeles, USA
Abstract. The purpose of this article is twofold. Our first goal is to make explicit an institution-alist theory of European integration. This theory is based on the concept of ‘conditional agendasetting’, which we argue has played an important role in European integration. According tothis theory, the fact that Commission proposals are more easily accepted than modified by theCouncil has accelerated the pace of integration. This finding brings us to the second goal ofthis article which is to investigate, by studying the history of EU institutions, whether or notthese institutions were the result of conscious planning. We demonstrate that while some ofthe founding fathers (Hallstein, Spaak) and opponents of the EU (de Gaulle) had an accurateunderstanding of the institutional structures created in Rome, later participants in the integra-tion process did not. In particular, the arguments surrounding the Single European Act indicatea lack of understanding of the full implications of the institutions selected.
Introduction
European Treaties from Rome to Maastricht make it easier for the Councilto accept Commission proposals than to modify them. Article 189a(1) of theMaastricht Treaty specifies: ‘Where in pursuance of the Treaty, the Councilacts on a proposal from the Commission, unanimity shall be required for anact constituting an amendment to that proposal: : : ’. Article 189c(e) of thesame Treaty mandates: ‘The Council, acting by a qualified majority shalladopt the proposal as re-examined by the Commission: : : ’. Similar articlesexist in the Single European Act, as well as in the Treaty of Rome. FollowingTsebelis (1994, 1995a) we call this power of the Commission (and, as we willshow in a while, of the European Parliament too) to make proposals that areeasier to be accepted than modified ‘conditional agenda setting’.
The term ‘agenda setting’ refers to who introduces the specificwordingof legislation, and has to be differentiated from the initiation of legislation.1
We focus on the specific wording and not on the mere general idea of it,because of the obvious regulatory consequences of the wording: changingthe date of enforcement of a rule, or the limit amount of a substance hassignificant redistributive consequences among countries as well as amongcompanies and individuals. The qualifier ‘conditional’ refers to the fact that
42 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
the Council can ultimately decide to modify the Commission’s proposal, butsuch a modification requires a unanimous decision.
The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to make explicit aninstitutionalist theory of European integration based on the implications ofArticle 189. According to this theory, while legislative decisions concern-ing the European Union are made by the Council of Ministers, the propos-als for these decisions originate either from the Commission (consultationprocedure) or from both the Commission and the Parliament (cooperationprocedure). Therefore, within the institutions of the Union, European actors(Commission or Parliament) are vested with conditional agenda-setting pow-ers. We argue that ‘conditional agenda setting’ is to a great extent responsiblefor the pace of European integration.
This realization brings us to the second goal of this article which is toinvestigate, by studying the history of the institutions of the EU, whether ornot these institutions were the result of conscious planning. We will showthat the EU institutions prescribe conditional agenda-setting since the Treatyof Rome (1957). However, for reasons that will become clear in the text,conditional agenda-setting did not become the rule of decision-making untilalmost a third of a century later, after the implementation of the SingleEuropean Act (1987).
The argument of the article is the following: Since the adoption of theSingle European Act (SEA) in 1986 conditional agenda-setting is, to a greatextent, responsible for European integration. This conception, interpretingintegration as the result of specific institutions, differentiates our approachfrom the other two major theories of integration: intergovernmentalism (whichattributes integration to the will of the governments that sign the treaties),and neofunctionalism (which attributes integration to spillover effects). Weexplain how specific institutions introduced in the Treaty of Rome, but appliedsystematically only after the SEA, are responsible for the existing level ofintegration of the Union, particularly the single market.
Given the importance of conditional agenda-setting for European integra-tion, we are interested in investigating its history. How did it come about whenoriginally adopted in 1957? Why was it put aside until 1987? Who promotedit and who opposed? For what reasons? These are partial questions takenfrom a larger theme: was the adoption of conditional agenda-setting institu-tions a conscious decision of European elites or a historical accident? To thisquestion our answer will favor the side of conscious planning, although wewill see that several, in fact, the overwhelming majority of, actors involved inthe process had a very incomplete, or a plainly wrong, understanding of theinstitutions they were putting in place or demolishing.
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 43
The article is organized into two parts. In the first, we explain the mechanismof conditional agenda-setting, demonstrate its results in terms of integrationand differentiate our institutionalist approach from the other two major theo-ries of European integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Inthe second, we present the history of conditional agenda setting, and througha detailed investigation of the writings of the principal actors we come tothe conclusion that its consequences were known to (some of) the foundingfathers of Europe. We conclude by arguing that, because of the opaqueness ofEuropean institutions, their effects are not well understood by the public oreven many European elites. While this opaqueness seemed deliberate in thebeginning, it may be responsible for reactions against European integrationobserved today.
Institutional and other explanations of European integration
The Treaty of Rome specifies that a proposal by the Commission to the Coun-cil of Ministers requires a qualified majority to be accepted but a unanimityof the Council for modification. This mechanism exists in the consultationprocedure which was introduced by the Treaty of Rome (1957) and survivesin the SEA (1986) and Maastricht (1991); it also exists in the cooperation pro-cedure introduced by the SEA and preserved by Maastricht. It does not existin the so-called codecision procedure introduced by the Maastricht treaty. Inthis article we focus on the consultation and the cooperation procedures thathave been predominantly used for European legislation up to 1992.
The apparent difference between the consultation and cooperation proce-dures is that the second requires a second reading by all actors involved.The real difference revolves around the role of the Parliament. In the con-sultation procedure the Parliament plays an insignificant role, while in thesecond reading of the cooperation procedure it makes amendments which theCommission may (or may not) include in its own proposal. Tsebelis (1994)argues that this institutional ‘detail’ turns the Parliament into the conditionalagenda setter.2 In another article Tsebelis (1995a) provides examples of whenthe Parliament has exercised this new power. For our purposes, since boththe Commission and the Parliament are pro-European integration actors, itmakes no difference which one of them makes proposals to the Council. Bothprocedures attribute conditional agenda-setting powers to a pro-integrationinstitution.
How important is conditional agenda-setting power? We will present a sim-ple one dimensional model of integration which will enable us to understandthe role of the four major institutional actors (the Council, the Commission,
44 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
Figure 1. One-dimensional model of integration. (SQ, 1) = (SQU, 1) (SQU, 3) = (Q0, 3).Area of unanimous decision-making by Council: (SQ, SQU). Point of decision-making underconditional agenda setting: Q0. Decision by Court under unanimity by Council: (1, 7). Decisionby Court under conditional agenda setting: (3, 7).
the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice) in European decision-making.3
Figure 1 presents a simplified version of the problem. It assumes that theCommission and the Parliament have positions at the high end of the axisrepresenting integration, whereas most of countries composing the Counciloccupy positions at the low end. Following Tsebelis (1994), we select sevenvoters because the qualified majority ratio of five out of seven voters isapproximately the same as the actual qualified majority in the Council ofMinisters (62 out of 87).4 Assume also that the status quo is located at aposition of less integration than the ideal positions of the actors (SQ in theFigure) and that the position of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is pro-integrationist (somewhere close to the position of the Commission and theParliament). Let us also assume that all actors have ‘Euclidean preference’;that is, they prefer options closer to their ideal points and are indifferentbetween two options equally distant. These simple assumptions enable usto study decision-making under different procedures, as well as the role ofthe ECJ in each of them. We will focus on the following differences: (1)endogenous (by the Council) vs exogenous (by Commission or EP) agendasetting), and (2) unanimous vs qualified majority decisions in the Council.Instead of analyzing all the theoretical possible combinations we will focuson the institutional settings adopted by the EU.
1. Unanimity in the Council with endogenous agenda setting. If the optionsdiscussed in Council are introduced by the members themselves, then themembers will introduce their ownpreferredoptions (country 1 will introduceoption 1, country 2 option 2, etc.). The final outcome underunanimitywill besomewhere in the (SQ, SQU) area because country 1 will veto anything outsidethis interval. The positions of the Commission and the EP are irrelevant inthis configuration. Even if the Commission can make a proposal of its own, itwill be discussed under the same rules as the proposals made by the membersof the Council.
This decision-making system assigns important powers to the Council. Ina paradoxical way, it also assigns important powers to the European Court of
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 45
Justice. If the ECJ decides to legislate from the bench, it can select any pointwithin the Pareto set (in this case the (1, 7) interval) and this point cannot beupset by the Council through legislation. Suppose that the ECJ selects its ownideal point in Figure 1. The Council cannot modify this choice by unanimity,because the countries to the right of ECJ will object to a movement to theleft, and the countries to the left will object to a movement to the right. So,the inability of the Council to act essentially endows the ECJ with significantpowers.5
2. Conditional agenda setting (exogenous agenda setting with qualified major-ity for agreement and unanimity for modification). If the Commission or theEP can make a proposal which will be discussed in the Council under theprovisions of articles 189a (1) and 189c (e) (essentially qualified majority foragreement and unanimity for modification; see above), the agenda setter canaim at making a qualified majority of the Council better off than anything theywould decide by unanimity. Given that the Council can decide anything inthe (SQ, SQU) interval, if the EP or the Commission makes a proposal at thepoint rendering the pivotal member of the Council (3 in Figure 1) indifferentbetween it and SQU (point Q0 in the Figure), this point will be accepted by aqualified majority of the Council.6
Note that this procedure also produces a Council with a significant amountof inertia, but this inertia exists only when the Council wants to modifythe proposals of the EP and the Commission. Because agenda setting isexogenous (coming from the EP or the Commission), the outcome is notlocated at the ideal point of the pivotal member, but at the point making thismemberindifferentbetween the proposal and the default solution.
Assuming that the agenda setters are more pro-integrationist than the mem-bers of the Council, the consultation and cooperation procedures producesignificantly more pro-integrationist results than unanimous decisions in theCouncil for two reasons. First, the pivotal member of the council moves fromthe least integrationist member under unanimity (member 1 in the Figure) tosome more pro-integrationist member (member 3 in the Figure). Second, thepivotal member cannotproposeits own ideal point, but has to accept or rejectthe proposal made by the agenda setter, and consequently it will be madeindifferentbetween this proposal and the default solution. As we shall see inthe historical part of the article, while the first reason was correctly identifiedby all actors involved, most of the protagonists and opponents of Europeanintegration failed to understand the second reason fully.
Finally, the role of the ECJ is restricted by this procedure (conditionalagenda setting) compared to the previous one (unanimity and endogenousagenda). While the ECJ could make any decision in the (1, 7) interval and
46 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
see it stand (i.e., not overruled by legislative means), now it is restricted tothe interval (3, 7). The reason is that anything to the right of 7 is overruledby a unanimous decision of the Council, and anything to the left of 3 isoverruled by a coalition of the EP or Commission and a qualified majority ofthe Council.
This summary account of European legislative procedures (prior to theadoption of codecision) provides an institutional explanation of the rhythmof integration, as well as identifying the principal actors that carry it through.According to our argument, after 1987 the institutional rule (conditionalagenda setting by the Commission and the EP) caused accelerated integration.In addition, the inability of the political system to decide by unanimity broughtthe ECJ to the forefront of developmentsconnected with integration. A similarbut more detailed account of the role of the ECJ can be found in Weiler (1991).Our contribution is that we relate the decrease of the role of the Court to theability of the political system to legislate. How does our account compare toother theories of integration?
There are,grosso modo, two alternatives to our theory of integration:neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Both these theories attemptto explain the successes and failures of European integration over the pastforty years through an analysis of historical events and their consequences.The two approaches differ significantly in their foci and, consequently, theirexpectations. Neither of them, however, addresses or incorporates the endur-ing role of the European institutions in the integration process. As a result,both theories are hampered in their attempts to explain the stop-and-go paceof European integration.
Neo-functionalism was an early adaptation of functionalist theory. Func-tionalist theory predicted that integration would occur through a gradualprocess of allegiance-swapping at the level of the individual (Mitrany 1966).As citizens began to have their needs and demands met by supranationalorganizations instead of the standard national bodies, their natural reactionwould be to shift their personal allegiance towards the supranational institu-tions. Integration would then occur at the level of the individual, through thecreation of a supranational ‘community’ in which social and economic goods(welfare) would be distributed by the new supranational institutions.
The neo-functionalist approach differs from its predecessor in that the levelon which integration occurs is more abstract and the action is well removedfrom the general public. Neofunctionalism holds that integration is achievedthrough a process of political ‘spill-over’ in which gains toward integration inone policy arena lead to calls for similar gains in adjacent arenas (Haas 1958).Thus, through a gradual process, initially minor advances towards European
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 47
integration expand to encompass broad, often significant, policy areas, andwhat began as economic integration ‘spills-over’ into political integration(Lodge 1983: 14–16).
The process of spill-over can occur in two ways: either through the activi-ties of technicians and bureaucrats who exchange information amongst them-selves, or through the growth of functional dependencies. The first methodoccurs when advances and benefits achieved within the integrated policy are-na are noted and desired by functionaries and participants in other closelyassociated arenas (Haas 1958: 243, 283–317). These actors then actively andeffectively lobby for the expansion of integration such that it includes theirown policy arena. This expansion can occur either through formal govern-ment intervention or through bureaucratic channels. In fact, ‘spill-over doesnot presume continued enthusiasm on the part of elites; indeed its signifi-cance is most evident in the continuation of regional integration even as elandeclines’ (Keohane & Hoffman 1991: 19).
The second path towards further integration predicted by the neo-func-tionalist approach occurs when limited expansion of integration in one pol-icy arena forces similar measures in adjacent arenas. This occurs when thetwo policy areas are functionally linked such that they cannot function effec-tively if one is integrated and the other is not. The ‘imbalances created bythe functional interdependence or inherent linkages of tasks can press polit-ical actors to redefine their common tasks’ (Nye 1971: 200). This form ofneo-functionalism helps to explain the belief held by early observers of theEuropean Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Com-munity that ‘the so-called economic integration of Europe is essentially apolitical phenomenon’ (Hallstein 1972: 22) and that ‘although the processof integration may be termed economic, it is essentially political’ (Hallstein1972: 29).
During the 1970s a new understanding of the integration process was devel-oped. To a large extent this approach was inspired by the debilitating effectson integration caused by the staunch opposition of General de Gaulle duringhis tenure as leader of France, though most particularly after 1961. The abilityof a single leader to effectively block both the expansion (British entry) andthe depth (stage III of the Treaty of Rome) of European integration led manyto discard earlier neo-functionalist theories in favor of the intergovernmentalapproach (Moravcsik 1991: 41; Taylor 1983). This theory focused on theactivities of the political elite of the member-states rather than technocratsand their manipulation of the effects of initial policy integration.
Intergovernmentalism holds that integration occurs through the consciousdecisions by national political leaders to create new agreements and treatieswhich further integration to some, often limited, extent. Thus, progress toward
48 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
further integration can only be achieved when there is consensus or ‘prefer-ence convergence’ among national leaders. Leaps forward in integration suchas the SEA are explained in terms of preference convergence. Keohane &Hoffman (1991: 23–24) write that ‘the Single European Act, like the Treatyof Rome, [: : : ] resulted less from a coherent burst of idealism than from aconvergence of national interests around a new pattern of economic policy-making’. The task for intergovernmentalists is then to explain why and whenpreference convergence occurs. This is complicated by the general assump-tion that all national leaders believe at a fundamental level that it is necessaryto protect national sovereignty (Moravcsik 1991: 26–27).
According to intergovernmentalism, the decision by national political lead-ers to expand integration is motivated by external factors, such as an economiccrises or changing world markets. These external events serve as catalysts forintegration, since the challenges they pose can be better met by a united andintegrated Europe than individual member-states acting alone. In particular,the growth of trading blocks and the inability of individual countries to com-pete in the world market are believed to have led many national leaders tosupport further economic integration (Keohane & Hoffman, 1991: 19, 22).Individual Member States can also be moved toward further integration bydomestic pressures which cannot be adequately addressed within the nationaldomain.
Intergovernmentalist theory has been either uninterested or unable to explainor incorporate the day-to-day realities of European integration (Keohane &Hoffman 1991: 15; Garrett & Tsebelis 1996). One variant focuses on thecontent of Treaties. For example, Moravsick (1993: 473) argues: ‘(f)rom thesigning of the Treaty of Rome to the making of Maastricht, the EC (EU) hasdeveloped through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each ofwhich sets the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation. The mostfundamental task facing a theoretical account of European integration is toexplain these bargains’. By focusing predominantly on ‘defining moments’such as the elaboration of new treaties or accords, intergovernmentalismignores the broader picture. The text of agreements alone is not enough toexplain progress towards integration. Many agreements, such as the SolemnDeclaration (1983), have led to little or no change; while others, such asthe SEA – which was initially believed to have little impact on the powersof the EP – have unexpected consequences (Keohane & Hoffman 1991: 3).A great deal depends on what occurs within the Unionafter the treaties oraccords have been signed. Intergovernmentalism cannot explain the differ-ences in implementation because of its singular focus on the political eliteof the member-states, to the exclusion of the daily implementation and inter-
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 49
pretation of treaties and accords created during the ‘defining moments’ ofEuropean Integration.
Other forms of intergovernmentalism (Scharpf 1988) study decision-makingin the Council as if the outcomes depended on the Council alone. In terms ofsubject matter this variant is closely related to our approach, but by focusingexclusively on the Council this approach completely ignores the fact thataccording to the treaties this institution does not set its own agenda, butrather discusses proposals that the Commission presents, and these proposalsare privileged by the rules to become outcomes (conditional agenda setting).The reader can refer back to Figure 1 and see the differences in predictionsbetween endogenous decision-making in the Council and conditional agendasetting, so we will not discuss this variant any further.
Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism focus on very differentaspects of the European Union; consequently, they arrive at very differentexplanations of both the process and relative success or failure of Europeanintegration. While neo-functionalism holds that integration occurs throughspillovers and slow progress, intergovernmentalism focuses on large definingmoments where leaders of the member states are the actors. In the former,action occurs at the level of the bureaucracy or technocrats and is largelyunnoticed by both the political elite and the general public. In the latter, inte-gration is due to the actions of the political elite, most often through highlypublicized treaties and accords. While in many respects these two theories ofintegration are exact opposites, there is one key similarity: neither is able toexplain why European integration has progressed at different speeds over timeor why different institutional actors have been the prime movers in differentperiods. Our approach attributes these differences mainly to the institution ofconditional agenda setting.
Once the properties of conditional agenda setting are understood, the nextlogical step is to study how and why it came into existence, as well aswhether its adoption (and its elimination) was the result of conscious planning.Consequently, while the first part focused on the effect of an institution(conditional agenda setting) on policy outcomes, the second part will focuson the design of the institution itself.
Since conditional agenda setting was adopted in intergovernmental con-ferences the second part of this article will study events related to suchconferences (as well as study groups commissioned by them or associatedwith them). Because we will be studying intergovernmental conferences thereader may think that our approach is a variant of intergovernmentalism.Alternatively, because we argue that several of the actors involved had noclear understanding of the policy outcomes that could be generated by theselected institutions the reader may think that our approach resembles neo-
50 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
Table
1.In
stitu
tiona
lpla
nsfr
omth
eT
reat
yof
Rom
eto
the
Sin
gle
Eur
opea
nA
ct
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
EE
CT
reat
y(1
957)
Fou
chet
I(1
961)
Fou
chet
II(1
962)
Lux
embo
urg
Com
prom
ise
(196
6)T
inde
man
s’R
epor
t(1
975)
Pla
nad
opte
d?Y
ES
NO
NO
YE
SN
opr
ecis
epl
an/n
osp
e-ci
ficch
ange
sad
opte
d
Quo
rum
requ
irem
ent
inC
ounc
ilN
otm
entio
ned.
Not
men
tione
d.N
otm
entio
ned.
Not
men
tione
d.N
otm
entio
ned.
Dec
isio
nru
lein
Cou
ncil
(maj
ority
orun
anim
ity)
Art
.14
8:‘S
ave
asot
h-er
wis
epr
ovid
edin
this
Tre
aty,
the
Cou
ncil
shal
lac
tby
am
ajor
ityof
itsm
embe
rs’.
Art
.6:
‘The
adop
tion
ofde
cisi
ons
nece
ssar
yto
achi
eve
the
goal
sof
the
Uni
onsh
allb
eby
unan
i-m
ous
cons
ent’.
Art
.6:
‘The
adop
tion
ofde
cisi
ons
nece
ssar
yto
achi
eve
the
goal
sof
the
Uni
onsh
allb
eby
unan
i-m
ous
cons
ent’.
Poi
nt1:
‘Agr
eem
ent
todi
sagr
ee’.
The
Fiv
est
at-
edth
ata
‘reas
onab
lede
lay
inor
der
toar
rive
ata
solu
tion
acce
pt-
able
toal
lin
acco
rdan
cew
ithna
tiona
lan
dC
om-
mun
ityin
tere
sts’
,w
asac
cept
able
.P
oint
2:T
heF
renc
hde
lega
tion
stat
edth
at‘th
edi
scus
sion
mus
tco
ntin
ueun
tila
deci
sion
coul
dbe
reac
hed
with
unan
imou
sco
nsen
tby
all
mem
ber
stat
es’.
Sec
tion
V.C
.2.a
‘re-
cour
seto
maj
ority
vot-
ing
inth
eC
ounc
ilsh
ould
beco
me
norm
alpr
actic
ein
the
Com
mun
ityfie
ld’
Effe
ctof
abst
entio
nson
outc
ome
ofvo
teA
rt.
148.
3:‘A
bste
ntio
nsby
mem
bers
pres
ent
inpe
rson
orre
pres
ente
dsh
all
not
prev
ent
the
adop
tion
ofac
tsw
hich
requ
ireun
anim
ity’.
Art
.6:
‘The
abse
nce
orab
sten
tion
ofon
eor
two
mem
bers
shal
lnot
bean
obst
acle
toth
eco
nclu
-si
onof
ade
cisi
on’.
(The
deci
sion
sar
eob
ligat
ory
fort
hose
who
part
icip
ate
inth
eir
adop
tion.
)
Art
.6:
‘The
abse
nce
orab
sten
tion
ofon
eor
two
mem
bers
shal
lnot
bean
obst
acle
toth
eco
nclu
-si
onof
ade
cisi
on’.
(The
deci
sion
sar
eob
ligat
ory
for
thos
ew
hopa
rtic
ipat
ein
thei
rad
optio
n.)
Not
spec
ifica
llym
entio
ned.
Not
spec
ifica
llym
entio
ned.
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 51
Table
1(c
ontin
ued)
.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
EE
CT
reat
y(1
957)
Fou
chet
I(1
961)
Fou
chet
II(1
962)
Lux
embo
urg
Com
prom
ise
(196
6)T
inde
man
s’R
epor
t(1
975)
Am
endm
ent
proc
edur
ean
dre
quire
men
tsA
rt.1
49:‘
Whe
re,i
npu
r-su
ance
toth
isT
reat
y,th
eC
ounc
ilac
tson
apr
o-po
salf
rom
the
Com
mis
-si
on,
unan
imity
shal
lbe
requ
ired
for
anac
tco
n-st
itutin
gan
amen
dmen
tto
that
prop
osal
’.
Not
spec
ifica
llym
entio
ned.
Not
spec
ifica
llym
entio
ned.
Not
spec
ifica
llym
entio
ned.
Not
spec
ifica
llym
entio
ned.
Sta
tus
orro
leof
Com
-m
issi
onpr
opos
als
Art
148.
2:‘If
topi
cre
quire
squ
alifi
edm
ajor
-ity
votin
g,41
/58
isre
quire
dfo
ra
Com
mis
-si
onpr
opos
al’.
Art
.10
:‘T
heE
uro-
pean
Pol
itica
lC
omm
is-
sion
assi
sts
the
Cou
n-ci
l.It
prep
ares
and
exec
utes
itsre
solu
tions
(delib
era
tions)’
.
No
role
spec
ified
for
the
Com
mis
sion
asfa
ras
legi
slat
ive
initi
ativ
eis
conc
erne
d(s
eeA
rt.9
).
Rem
ains
unch
ange
d(s
eeE
EC
Tre
aty)
.S
ectio
nV.
D.1
(pg.
31):
‘The
Com
mis
sion
can
cons
ider
ably
influ
ence
the
dete
rmin
atio
nof
Com
mon
polic
ies
byth
epr
opos
als
whi
chit
sub-
mits
toth
eC
ounc
il’.
Sta
tus
orro
leof
non
Com
mis
sion
prop
osal
sA
rt14
8.2:
Cou
ncil
pro-
posa
lsre
quire
41/5
8vo
tes
and
atle
ast
8m
embe
r-st
ates
infa
vor.
Art
.7:T
heP
arlia
men
-ta
ryA
ssem
bly
‘can
pres
entr
ecom
men
da-
tions
toth
eC
ounc
il’.
All
prop
osal
sw
ere
tobe
non-
Com
mis
sion
pro-
posa
ls(n
ost
ruct
ure
for
prop
osal
sfr
omou
tsid
eth
eC
ounc
il).
Rem
ains
unch
ange
d(s
eeE
EC
Tre
aty)
.S
ectio
nV.
A.1
:‘T
heC
ounc
ilsh
ould
imm
e-di
atel
yal
low
the
Par
-lia
men
tto
take
initi
a-tiv
esby
unde
rtak
ing
toco
nsid
erth
ere
solu
tions
whi
chth
eP
arlia
men
tad
dres
ses
toit:
:
:
this
shou
ldbe
give
nle
gal
valu
eth
roug
ha
Tre
aty
amen
dmen
t’.
52 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
Table
1(c
ontin
ued)
.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
EE
CT
reat
y(1
957)
Fou
chet
I(1
961)
Fou
chet
II(1
962)
Lux
embo
urg
Com
prom
ise
(196
6)T
inde
man
s’R
epor
t(1
975)
Pow
erof
initi
ativ
elie
sw
ith?
Com
mis
sion
,al
thou
ghA
rt15
2:‘T
heC
ounc
ilm
ayre
ques
tth
eC
om-
mis
sion
toun
dert
ake
any
stud
ies
the
Cou
ncil
con-
side
rsde
sira
ble
for
the
atta
inm
ent
ofco
mm
onob
ject
ives
’.
Unc
lear
,it
appe
ars
that
the
pow
erof
initi
ativ
elie
sw
ithth
eC
ounc
il,w
ithth
eP
arlia
men
tan
dth
eC
omm
issi
onha
ving
the
poss
ibili
tyof
reco
m-
men
ding
prop
osal
s.
The
pow
erof
initi
ativ
ew
asto
lieco
mpl
etel
yw
ithth
eC
ounc
il.N
om
entio
nw
asm
ade
ofth
eC
omm
issi
on’s
right
topr
opos
e,an
dth
eP
ar-
liam
ent
was
give
nth
erig
hton
lyto
addr
ess
oral
ques
tions
toth
eC
ounc
il.
Rem
ains
unch
ange
d(s
eeE
EC
Tre
aty)
.P
ower
ofin
itiat
ive
lies
prim
arily
with
the
Com
-m
issi
onw
ithth
ere
c-om
men
datio
nth
attr
uepo
wer
sof
initi
ativ
ebe
give
nto
the
Eur
opea
nP
arlia
men
tth
roug
hth
ead
optio
nof
aT
reat
yam
endm
ent.
Effe
ctiv
eag
enda
-set
ting
pow
erlie
sw
ith?
Unt
ilth
eth
irdst
age
ofin
tegr
atio
n,or
igin
al-
lyse
tto
begi
nin
1966
,the
Cou
ncil.
Afte
r-w
ards
,w
ithth
ead
vent
ofqu
alifi
edm
ajor
ityvo
t-in
g,th
eC
omm
issi
onco
uld
pote
ntia
llyse
tth
eag
enda
.
Due
toth
eun
anim
i-ty
clau
se(s
eeab
ove)
agen
da-s
ettin
gpo
wer
rest
sw
ithth
eC
ounc
il.
Due
toth
eun
anim
i-ty
clau
se(s
eeab
ove)
agen
da-s
ettin
gpo
wer
rest
sw
ithth
eC
ounc
il.
The
Lux
embo
urg
Com
-pr
omis
ere
stric
ted
de-
cisi
on-m
akin
gto
unan
i-m
ous
cons
ent,
asa
resu
lt,ag
enda
-set
ting
pow
erre
mai
ned
with
the
Cou
n-ci
lde
spite
the
cont
in-
uatio
nof
the
requ
ire-
men
tson
amen
dmen
ts(s
eeab
ove)
.
Wer
em
ajor
ityvo
ting
inst
itute
d,w
ithth
eor
igi-
nalr
equi
rem
ent
ofun
a-ni
mity
toam
end
and
qual
ified
maj
ority
toad
opta
com
mis
sion
prop
osal
(with
EP
amen
dmen
ts)
the
Com
-m
issi
onw
ould
have
gain
edsu
bsta
ntia
lag
enda
-set
ting
pow
ers.
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 53
Table
1(c
ontin
ued)
.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Gen
sche
r-C
olom
boP
lan
(198
1)S
olem
nD
ecla
ratio
n(1
983)
EP
’sD
raft
Tre
aty
(198
4)S
ingl
eE
urop
ean
Act
(198
6)
Pla
nad
opte
d?N
O–
See
Sol
emn
Dec
lara
tion
YE
SN
OY
ES
Quo
rum
requ
irem
ent
inC
ounc
ilN
otm
entio
ned.
Not
men
tione
d.N
otm
entio
ned.
Not
men
tione
d.
Dec
isio
nru
lein
Cou
ncil
(maj
ority
orun
anim
ity)
Par
tII,
1:‘M
atte
rsco
ncer
n-in
gth
eE
urop
ean
Com
mun
i-tie
ssh
all
cont
inue
tobe
gov-
erne
dby
the
prov
isio
nsan
dpr
oced
ures
ofth
eT
reat
ies
ofP
aris
and
Rom
e,and
agre
e-
ments
supple
menta
ryth
ere
to’
(ital
ics
adde
d).
Una
nim
ityre
quire
men
tm
ain-
tain
ed.
Par
tII,
8.2:
‘Am
embe
rst
ate
whi
chco
nsid
ers
itne
cess
ary
topr
even
ta
deci
sion
byin
voki
ngits
‘vita
lin
tere
sts’
inex
cept
iona
lci
rcum
stan
ces
will
bere
quire
dto
stat
ein
writ
ing
itssp
ecifi
cre
ason
sfo
rdo
ing
so’.
Par
t2
(pre
ambl
e):
‘Mat
ters
with
inth
esc
ope
ofth
eE
uro-
pean
Com
mun
ities
are
gov-
erne
dby
the
prov
isio
nsan
dpr
oced
ures
laid
dow
nin
,or
purs
uant
toth
eT
reat
ies
ofP
aris
and
Rom
e,and
inag
ree-
ments
supple
mentin
gth
em’
(ital
ics
adde
d).
Sec
tion
2.2.
2:‘T
heap
plic
a-tio
nof
the
deci
sion
-mak
ing
proc
edur
esla
iddo
wn
inth
eT
reat
ies
ofP
aris
and
Rom
eis
ofvi
tali
mpo
rtan
cein
orde
rto
impr
ove
the
Eur
opea
nC
om-
mun
ities
’cap
acity
toac
t’.
Art
.22
.1:
‘The
Cou
ncil
shal
lvo
teby
asi
mpl
em
ajor
ity,i
.e.a
maj
ority
ofth
ew
eigh
ted
vote
sca
st,a
bste
ntio
nsno
tcou
nted
’.A
rt.
22.2
(a):
‘Whe
reex
pres
s-ly
spec
ified
byth
isT
reat
y:ei
ther
byan
abso
lute
maj
ori-
ty..
(b)
bya
qual
ified
maj
ority
(2/3
wei
ghte
dvo
tes)
.A
rt.2
2.2(
c)or
byun
anim
ityof
repr
esen
tatio
ns.
InA
rt.
22.3
,a
10ye
artr
ansi
-tio
npe
riod
was
crea
ted
durin
gw
hich
mem
ber-
stat
esco
uld
invo
ke‘v
itali
nter
ests
’but
they
had
tosu
bmit
writ
ten
just
ifi-
catio
nw
hich
wou
ldth
enbe
publ
ishe
d.
Sec
tion
1:‘In
stitu
tiona
lPro
vi-
sion
s’–
Thr
ough
out
the
EE
CT
reat
yth
ew
ords
‘the
Cou
n-ci
lsh
all
:
:
:
’.w
ere
repl
aced
by:‘
The
Cou
ncil
shal
l,ac
ting
byqu
alifi
edm
ajor
ityon
apr
o-po
sal
from
the
Com
mis
sion
,in
coop
erat
ion
with
the
Eur
o-pe
anP
arlia
men
tsh
all
:
:
:
’A
rt.
149c
‘Whe
reth
eE
Pan
dth
eC
ounc
ilar
eac
ting
unde
rth
eco
oper
atio
npr
oce-
dure
,an
dth
eE
Pha
sre
ject
edth
eC
ounc
il’s
com
mon
posi
-tio
n[b
yan
abso
lute
maj
ority
],un
anim
itysh
allb
ere
quir
edfo
rth
eC
ounc
ilto
acto
na
seco
ndre
adin
g’.
54 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
Table
1(c
ontin
ued)
.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Gen
sche
r-C
olom
boP
lan
(198
1)S
olem
nD
ecla
ratio
n(1
983)
EP
’sD
raft
Tre
aty
(198
4)S
ingl
eE
urop
ean
Act
(198
6)
Effe
ctof
abst
entio
nson
outc
ome
ofvo
teP
art
11,
8.2:
‘Gre
ater
use
shou
ldbe
mad
eof
the
poss
i-bi
lity
ofab
stai
ning
from
vot-
ing
soas
not
toob
stru
ctde
cisi
ons’
.
Par
t2.2
.2:‘
With
inth
eC
ounc
ilev
ery
poss
ible
mea
nsof
faci
l-ita
ting
the
deci
sion
-mak
ing
proc
ess
will
beus
ed,
incl
ud-
ing,
inca
ses
whe
reun
anim
ityis
requ
ired,
the
poss
ibili
tyof
abst
aini
ngfr
omvo
ting’
.
InA
rt.2
2,se
ctio
ns1,
2,an
d3
abst
entio
nsw
ere
not
coun
ted
agai
nstt
here
quire
dm
inim
umvo
te.
Not
spec
ifica
llyal
tere
dby
the
Sin
gle
Eur
opea
nA
ct.
Am
endm
ent
proc
edur
ean
dre
quire
men
tsN
otsp
ecifi
cally
men
tione
d.N
otsp
ecifi
cally
men
tione
d.A
rt.3
8.4:
The
Cou
ncil
ispe
r-m
itted
toam
end
adr
aftl
awby
sim
ple
maj
ority
(org
anic
law
sby
abso
lute
maj
ority
).H
owev
er,
ther
ear
eci
rcum
-st
ance
sin
whi
chno
amen
d-m
ents
are
allo
wed
(Art
38.3
).
Art
.14
9:‘W
here
,in
pur-
suan
ceof
this
Tre
aty,
the
Cou
ncil
acts
ona
prop
osal
from
the
Com
mis
sion
,un
a-ni
mity
shal
lbe
requ
ired
for
anac
tcon
stitu
ting
anam
endm
ent
toth
atpr
opos
al’.
Sta
tus
orro
leof
Com
mis
-si
onpr
opos
als
Par
tII,
9:‘T
heH
eads
ofS
tate
ofG
over
nmen
tst
ress
the
par-
ticul
arim
port
ance
atta
chin
gto
the
Com
mis
sion
asgu
ardi
anof
the
Tre
atie
sof
Par
isan
dR
ome,
and
asa
driv
ing
forc
ein
the
proc
ess
ofE
urop
ean
Inte
grat
ion’
.
Par
t2.
4:‘T
heH
eads
ofS
tate
ofG
over
nmen
tun
derli
neth
epa
rtic
ular
impo
rtan
ceof
the
Com
mis
sion
asgu
ardi
anof
the
Tre
atie
sof
Par
isan
dR
ome,
and
asa
driv
ing
forc
ein
the
proc
ess
ofE
urop
ean
inte
grat
ion’
.
Art
.37
.1:
‘The
Com
mis
sion
shal
lhav
eth
erig
htto
prop
ose
draf
tla
ws.
Itm
ayw
ithdr
awa
draf
tla
wat
any
time
until
the
EP
orC
ounc
ilha
vead
opte
dit’
.A
rt.
37.3
:‘T
heC
omm
issi
onm
aypu
tfor
war
dam
endm
ents
:
:
:
[whi
ch]
mus
tbe
putt
oth
evo
teas
apr
iorit
y’.
The
phra
se‘a
ctin
gon
apr
o-po
salf
rom
the
Com
mis
sion
’is
repe
ated
thro
ugho
utth
ete
xtof
the
SE
A.N
osp
ecifi
cm
entio
nof
addi
tiona
lpow
ers
ofin
itia-
tion
are
mad
e.
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 55
Table
1(c
ontin
ued)
.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Gen
sche
r-C
olom
boP
lan
(198
1)S
olem
nD
ecla
ratio
n(1
983)
EP
’sD
raft
Tre
aty
(198
4)S
ingl
eE
urop
ean
Act
(198
6)
Sta
tus
orro
leof
non
Com
-m
issi
onpr
opos
als
Par
tII,
3.3:
The
Eur
opea
nP
ar-
liam
ent
was
tobe
give
nth
epo
wer
tom
ake
‘reco
mm
enda
-tio
ns’
toth
eC
ounc
ilan
dto
dem
and
are
spon
sebu
tnot
the
expl
icit
pow
erof
initi
ativ
e.
No
spec
ific
men
tion
mad
eof
non-
com
mis
sion
prop
osal
sfr
omei
ther
the
Eur
opea
nP
ar-
liam
ento
rth
eC
ounc
il.
Art
.37
.2:
‘On
are
ason
edre
ques
tfr
omth
eE
Por
the
Cou
ncil,
the
Com
mis
sion
shal
lsu
bmit
adr
aft
law
con-
form
ing
tosu
cha
requ
est.
Ifit
fails
todo
so,P
arlia
men
tor
the
Cou
ncil
may
intr
oduc
ea
draf
tla
wco
nfor
min
gto
thei
ror
igin
al.
See
abov
e.
Pow
erof
initi
ativ
elie
sw
ith?
The
Pla
ndi
dno
tsp
ecifi
cally
prop
ose
toch
ange
the
stat
usqu
oas
far
asth
epo
wer
ofin
i-tia
tive
was
conc
erne
d.
Pow
erof
initi
ativ
eap
pear
sto
rem
ain
with
the
Com
mis
sion
.N
osp
ecifi
cm
entio
nis
mad
e.
The
pow
erof
initi
ativ
elie
sfo
rth
em
ost
part
with
the
Com
-m
issi
on,
but
prov
isio
nsar
em
ade
toal
low
the
othe
rtw
obo
dies
tofo
rce
the
com
mis
-si
on’s
hand
som
ewha
t.
Pow
erof
initi
atio
nre
mai
nsin
the
hand
sof
the
Com
mis
sion
.
Effe
ctiv
eag
enda
-set
ting
pow
erlie
sw
ith?
The
plan
mai
ntai
ned
the
sta-
tus
quo
ante
ofth
eL
uxem
-bo
urg
Com
prom
ise-
agen
da-
setti
ngpo
wer
rem
aine
dw
ithth
eC
ounc
ildu
eto
the
unan
im-
ityre
quire
men
t.
The
decl
arat
ion
calle
dto
for
the
impl
emen
tatio
nof
the
EE
Ctr
eatie
s,bu
tit
did
not
spec
ifica
llyca
llfo
ran
end
toth
eL
uxem
bour
gC
ompr
o-m
ise.
As
are
sult
agen
da-
setti
ngpo
wer
rem
aine
dw
ithth
eC
ounc
il.
Afte
rth
e10
year
‘initi
atio
n’pe
riod,
the
coun
cil
wou
ldbe
forc
edto
mak
ede
cisi
ons
bym
ajor
ity(s
impl
eor
qual
ified
)vo
te.
how
ever
,th
eC
ounc
ilca
nam
end
prop
osal
sby
sim
-pl
em
ajor
ityvo
tes
thus
,on
ceag
ain
plac
ing
full
agen
da-
setti
ngpo
wer
inth
eha
nds
ofth
eC
ounc
il’.
Due
toth
eun
anim
ityre
quire
-m
ent
for
amen
dmen
tby
the
Cou
ncil
and
qual
ified
maj
or-
ityfo
rad
optio
n,th
eE
Pga
ins
the
pote
ntia
lto
set
the
agen
dath
roug
hth
est
rate
gic
use
ofam
endm
ents
(ass
um-
ing
they
are
adop
ted
byth
eco
mm
issi
on).
56 GEORGE TSEBELIS & AMIE KREPPEL
functionalism. Both impressions would be misplaced, however, because thebasis of our analysis is the institutions of the EU, not some government con-ferences or some amorphous processes. It is the study of these institutions thatdetermines what in the preferences and behavior of governments as well astransnational elites is important (in our case preferences related to conditionalagenda setting) and what is not (for example preferences related to foreignpolicy).
The history of an institutional innovation
The history of majority voting within the Council, and conditional agenda-setting power for the Commission and EP, has been a history of contentiousbattles. Did the participants fully understand what they were battling for?Undoubtedly, the potential veto power inherent in unanimous decision-makingwas clear to everyone involved, but the more subtle and, as we have shown,equally important battle was over the power of conditional agenda-setting. Ifwe are to study the extent to which this second aspect of the decision-makingrule was understood, we should trace the history of the creation and theimplementation of majority voting in the Council. We divide this history intothree stages; the creation of conditional agenda-setting power (1955–1957),its demise (1958–1966), and its restoration (1969–1987). Table 1 presents theinstitutional details (or lack thereof) of a series of plans covering the periodfrom the Treaty of Rome to the Single European Act. The reader should referto it as we present the history of the period for the exact provisions we analyzein the text. In particular, in the final row of the table we trace the existenceand location of agenda-setting power under each plan.
Stage 1: Creation (1955–1957)
The general ideals and goals which inspired the Rome Treaty establish-ing the European Economic Community (EEC) can be traced back to thelate 1940s (Churchill 1948: 198–202). Notions of federalism and Europeanunity were extremely popular and widespread after the end of the secondWorld War. Although several institutions were created prior to the EC withthe hope of unifying the European states (the OEEC, Council of Europe,etc.), only its direct predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC, established in 1952), had a supranational structure. However, sincethe High Authority (which in subsequent treaties became the Commission),was empowered under the ECSC treaty to make decisions on most majorissues (ECSC Treaty, Art. 8–16) as well as initiate all proposals, the institu-tional structure of conditional agenda-setting was absent.
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 57
The institutional innovation of conditional agenda-setting came in theTreaty of Rome, where, for the first time, the power of initiative and thepower of decision were given to separate institutions. The founders of theRome Treaty, frustrated by the impotence of many of the early Europeanorganizations and disillusioned by the failure of the ECSC’s supranationalstructure to deal effectively with the coal crisis, attempted to move beyondprevious experience, balancing international cooperation with elements ofsupranationalism. This was achieved through the creation of truly suprana-tional institutions such as the Court and Commission, which exercised veryreal powers over the member-states (albeit in limited arenas), while leavingultimate decision-making power in the hands of the national representatives(e.g., the Council). The ability of the Commission to manipulate the eventu-al legislative outcomes of the Community decision-making process throughstrategic action was built into this balance. By allowing the Commission toinitiate legislation while requiring unanimity in the Council for any amend-ment of a Commission proposal and only a qualified majority to adopt theproposal (after the third stage of implementation), the Rome Treaty estab-lished the Commission as conditional agenda-setter (Treaty of Rome, Art.149). It is difficult to judge, however, the extent to which the authors of theRome Treaty were aware of the potential effects that the institutions theycreated would have on the pace of European integration.
The compromise between the pure intergovernmental cooperation of theOEEC and the strongly supranational character of the ECSC was orchestrat-ed by a group of government representatives of the Six, led by Paul-HenriSpaak. In 1955 the Benelux countries issued a memorandum calling for fur-ther development of cooperation between the Six and suggesting that boththe economic and atomic futures of Europe be pursued in cooperation witheach other (Benelux Memorandum, 1955). The Leaders of the Six agreed toconvene a committee to study the possibility of future economic and atomiccommunities (Resolution of Foreign Ministers, Conference at Messina, 1955).The resolution called for a committee to be formed, consisting of ‘govern-mental representatives’ of the Six, as well as experts and representatives fromthe ECSC, OEEC, and the UK. This committee was charged with devising atreaty which would effectively establish a European Economic Community(final section, points 1–7, resolution of Messina conference, 1955).
The committee was established in June 1955 and was to report back to thesix Ministers of State by the first of October of that same year. The actualminutes of the proceedings of the Spaak committee (named after its Belgianchair) and the variousgroupes de redactionare not currently available tothe public; however the working drafts of the Treaties as well as histories ofthe individual articles are.7 Theseprojects de redactiontrace the history of
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Article 149 which grants the Commission conditional agenda-setting power.Through the draft version of 27 December 1956 there was no mention ofthe requirement for unanimity in order to amend a Commission proposal;in fact no mention of the amendment procedure was made at all (MAE 838f/56 in). By 14 January 1957, however, the draft did include a first version ofwhat was to become Article 149 (MAE 101 f/57, Article 10.3). The changewas discussed in the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 12February after being introduced by Spaak himself. There was little discussionand the change was adopted without reservation (MAE 498 f/57 gd).
It is possible to make inferences about the extent to which the variousnational representatives desired or were aware of the Commission’s potentialto act as conditional agenda-setter given the institutions created by the RomeTreaty. The member-states of the Six had established their preferences onsupranationalism when the ECSC was created. The Belgian government hadbeen in favor of a supranational institution since the Schuman Declaration in1950 (Van Zeeland 1953: 26). Germany had also been in favor of a stronglysupranational approach to European common action. Other countries, suchas the Netherlands, were wary of overt supranationalism and preferred acooperative, intergovernmental approach (Mayne 1962: 91). It is also possibleto glean some information about the positions and understandings of the actualmembers of the Spaak Committee from their speeches and writings, beginningwith the chair of the Committee. Spaak was an ardent supporter of majorityrule since he believed that ‘all the international organizations where the ruleof unanimity is in operation – which is at the same time that of the veto – havebeen without exception, incapable of fulfilling their tasks’ (Spaak 1956: 56).Years later, while addressing the British Young Conservative group in 1967,Spaak underlined the untenable nature of the unanimity requirement in theCouncil established by the Luxembourg Compromise, stating that ‘unanimitybetween six is already difficult to obtain; it will be worse with seven or moremembers’ (Spaak 1967: 14). Thus, it is clear that Spaak preferred a moresupranational approach to decision-making in order to avoid the threat of anational veto. When he introduced the requirement for unanimity in orderto amend a Commission proposal, Spaak noted the responsibility that thisconferred upon the Commission in regard to modifications of those proposals,noting that the Commission could refuse to incorporate any changes that itfelt were ‘contrary to the general interest’ of the Community (MAE 498 f/57gd: 11).
In addition, Chancellor Adenauer’s hand-selected representative to theSpank Committee, Walter Hallstein, had a very clear understanding of theinstitution of conditional agenda-setting and the power that it gave the Com-mission. This is evident in many of his speeches and writings. Shortly after
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 59
the Rome Treaty was ratified he noted that ‘proposals made by the Commis-sion can only be amended by a unanimous decision of the Council, here itis interesting to note that the principle of unanimity works out to the advan-tage of the supranational element’ (Hallstein 1958: 36). In addition, RobertMarjolin ‘who played a key part in the preparation of the two Treaties ofRome that created Euratom and the European Economic Community’, alsoappears to have been aware of the potential for conditional agenda-settingcreated by the unanimity requirement for Council amendment of Commis-sion proposals (Diebold 1981: 5; preface to Marjolin 1980). Lecturing on thedifferences between the High Authority of the ECSC and the Commission ofthe EC Marjolin remarked that: ‘The Commission of 1958 does not enjoy thepre-eminence of the High Authority of 1952. Nevertheless, the Commissionof the Common Market was more influential than the High Authority. TheCommission’s position was strengthened by the fact that the Council of Min-isters could amend the Commission’s proposals only if all governments werein agreement. Otherwise it could only accept or reject them’ (Marjolin 1880:44).
Several actors not directly involved with the Community until after thecreation of the 1957 Treaty also were cognizant of the potential for conditionalagenda-setting inherent in Article 149. As early as 1962 Richard Mayne, whoserved as liaison between Great Britain and the Community, noted that ‘theCouncil can normally only decide on proposals from Commission, and canonly amend proposals if all its members unanimously agree. In this way,although its powers are less than those of the H.A. [High Authority] theCommission’s influence is very much greater’ (Mayne 1962: 127). Thus,the power of the Commission to set the agenda was well understood, eitherimplicitly or explicitly, by numerous active participants in the developmentof the Communities during this period.
It is not possible, however, to assert that the rest of the designers of the RomeTreaty were fully aware of the conditional agenda-setting power they created.The Treaty was a compromise between those who wanted less integrationand more intergovernmental cooperation, on the one hand, and the staunchintegrationists who desired a federal Europe, on the other. Those in favor of ahigher level of integration (such as Spaak and Hallstein) were able to createinstitutions which called for majority rule among sovereign states, insuringthat integration would progress within this institutional setting by allowingthe Commission to set the agenda through its power of initiative. Despite thecreation of these structures, for thirty years after the signing of the RomeTreaty the Commission was unable to participate in the Community decision-making to the full extent prescribed by the Treaty because majority voting
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was not actually implemented in the Council until the implementation of theSingle European Act (SEA) in 1987.
Stage 2: Demise (1958–1966)
The battle over the implementation of majority voting in the Council did notbegin until shortly after General de Gaulle came to power in France in 1958.The General was a known opponent of supranationalism, but he very muchsupported intergovernmentalism and the close cooperation of independentsovereign nation states (de Gaulle 1960, and 1971: 189–191). According tothe Treaties of Rome, majority voting in the Council on a limited set of issueswas to begin on 1 January 1966 as the third stage of integration began (EECTreaty, Art. 8, points 3–6). General de Gaulle made several attempts to havehis ideas accepted by his European allies. The first two, under the name ofFouchet Plan8 I and II, failed, while the third, known as the Luxembourgcompromise, was successful.
In 1960 de Gaulle launched his first attempt to circumvent majority decision-making in the Council by suggesting regular meetings of the political leadersof the Community’s member-states to discuss political questions that con-fronted the Community as a whole (de Gaulle 1960). The Council, underpressure from the General, agreed to establish an intergovernmental commit-tee to explore the possibilities of political cooperation and eventual politicalunion. The result of this committee was the first Fouchet Plan (see Table 1,second column, for details). The plan introduced unanimous decision-makingin the Council, enabling it to set its own agenda (thus completely abolishingconditional agenda setting by the Commission; Art. 6).
Nevertheless de Gaulle felt that the French delegation had made too manyconcessions and took it upon himself to rewrite the plan, disregarding manyof the compromises that had been so meticulously constructed during theprevious months. The new plan, labeled Fouchet II, was a severe disappoint-ment to the other members of the Community, who felt that they had beenbetrayed by France and in particular by de Gaulle (see Table 1, column 3, fordetails). The result was predictable: the other members of the Council refusedto accept the Fouchet II plan and instead tabled a new plan independently ofFrance in 1962. By this time, however, momentum had been lost and nothingcame of the new plan.
In 1966 de Gaulle succeeded in achieving a de facto end to majority votingthat was to last until 1987. The path that de Gaulle followed, arriving ulti-mately at the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, demonstrates the extremesto which he was willing to go in order to avoid majority voting and whathe perceived as a concomitant loss of national sovereignty. Jean Monnet, theso-called grandfather of the European Community wrote that ‘behind all of
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 61
this [the French boycott] could be glimpsed the desire to prevent majorityvoting becoming normal practice in the Community from 1966 onward, asthe Treaty laid down. I suspect that this was the goal on which de Gaulle wasirrevocably bent’ (Monnet 1978: 482–483). Paul-Henri Spaak also noted deGaulle’s distrust of majority decision-making and believed that the Generalwould use British membership as an ‘opportunity to obtain modification ofthe whole system regulating the representation of the majority’, stating that he‘could not easily conceive that he [de Gaulle] would not seize the opportunityoffered to him to have suppressed in the Treaty that part which he has alwaysdetested’ (Spaak 1967: 14).
The battle which led to the Luxembourg compromise began over a proposedplan by the Commission to fund the newly agreed Common Agricultural Poli-cy (CAP), a program that was desired in particular by France (de Gaulle 1971).A new funding program had to be established by 1 July 1965, which wouldlast through 1970. The Commission, led by its president, Walter Hallstein,pushed through a proposal calling for the direct and independent fundingof the CAP through agricultural levies and customs duties. The amount thatwould be raised was expected to exceed the needed amount significantly, andthe Commission’s proposal suggested that this ‘extra’ income could be usedto finance projects other than those already accepted by the governments. Inaddition, the proposal called for increasing the budgetary powers of the Euro-pean Parliament and indirectly the Commission (Marjolin 1981: 1: 58–59).The new plan was announced publicly before being submitted to the membergovernments. A general uproar followed. General de Gaulle had long beensuspicious of Commission President Hallstein and viewed his unveiled feder-alist tendencies with mistrust, stating that Hallstein was ‘wedded to the thesisof the super-state, and bent all his skillful efforts towards giving the Commu-nity the character and appearance of one’ (de Gaulle 1971: 148). De Gaulleseized the opportunity and argued that the episode illustrated a Commissionattempting to exceed its powers to the detriment of the national sovereigntyof the member-states (de Gaulle, press conference 1965).
Beginning in July 1965 after an inconclusive Council meeting over theimpending budget crises, France began its so-called ‘empty chair’ policy.In effect, France boycotted the Community for seven months, causing aprofound crisis which in the end was resolved only through the LuxembourgCompromise (see Table 1, column 4, for details). The compromise itself hadnothing to do with the financial proposals which had purportedly inspiredthe crisis. Instead, the compromise dealt solely with the issue of majorityvoting in the Council, which was due to come into effect that same year. Thecompromise was an ‘agreement not to agree’ (Marjolin 1980: 56–59). Thetext of the compromise reaffirmed the desire of the other five members of
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the Community to move forward with majority voting, although they werewilling to delay decisions ‘when issues very important to one or more membercountries were at stake’. This was not enough for the French, who stated that‘the French delegation considers that, when very important issues are atstake, decisions must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached’(Extraordinary Session of the Council, 18 January 1966, EC Bulletin, 3/66,part b, paragraphs 1–3). This divergence of opinion was noted by all sixmember-states, and an agreement was reached that this difference of opinionshould not hamper the ‘the Community’s work being resumed in accordancewith the normal procedure’ (EC Bull. 3/66, part b, paragraph 4).
The effects of the compromise were deep and enduring. Although initiallythe other five member-states opposed the requirement of unanimity, theycame not only to accept it, but also to support and protect it against a series ofattempts to regain majority voting. The Luxembourg Compromise heralded‘a change of ethos, at first rejected by the Five, but later, especially afterthe first enlargement, eagerly seized upon by all’ (Dinan 1994: 59). Butwere the participants aware of the repercussions that their actions wouldhave on the process of integration as a whole? While all of the participantsclearly understood that the unanimity requirement meant the continuationof the national veto, was there a clear understanding of the impact on thecommission or its ability to speed integration through manipulation of thelegislative agenda?9
There are two reasons to believe that de Gaulle, at least, had a clear under-standing of the impact of his actions. The first is that both the Fouchet Plan(s)and the Luxembourg Compromise, which were initiated by de Gaulle, dealtspecifically and emphatically with the question of majority rule decision-making in the Council. The Fouchet Plan(s) was an attempt to bypass, therebyrendering insignificant the Council of the EEC, where majority rule loomedin the none too distant future and legislative initiative resided primarily inthe hands of the supranational Commission. When this plan failed, de Gaulleused the first available opportunity to force the issue and ‘make a unilater-al declaration reserving the right to continue to say “No” ’ (Monnet 1978:484). The fact that he chose to make his stand on a Commission proposal,which clearly demonstrated the potential power of that body to further Euro-pean integration, seems an unlikely coincidence. De Gaulle railed against thepotential power given to the Commission by the unanimity requirement foramendments after the initiation of the third stage, stating that ‘from that timeon, proposals made by the Brussels Commission would have to be adopted, ornot, as is by the Council of Ministers, without the States being able to changeanything, unless miraculously they were unanimous in drafting an amend-ment’ (de Gaulle, press conference 1965: 171). By asserting France’s right
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to continue to say ‘no’, de Gaulle not only preserved national sovereignty,he seriously damaged the public image of the Commission. A Commissionwhich he viewed as overtly supranational and eager to force a Federal Europeon the Six. By debilitating the Commission and banishing the threat of major-ity voting de Gaulle was able stunt the development of European integrationfor twenty years.
Stage 3. Restoration (1969–1987)
The effects of the Luxembourg Compromise were long-lasting despite the factthat de Gaulle himself remained in power only for an additional two years.Community development from 1969 through 1987 is a chronicle of repeatedattempts to implement the provisions established in the Treaty of Romeand institute regularized use of majority decision-making in the Council ofMinisters. The initiation of this third stage of development can be traced backto the 1969 summit meeting at the Hague called by de Gaulle’s successor,George Pompidou. But it was the 1974 Paris summit that called on then-Belgian Prime minister Leo Tindemans to write a report on political unionthat really initiated the slow voyage back to full implementation of the treatyand majority decision-making in the Council. This report came to be knownas the Tindemans Report after its primary author (see Table 1, column 5 fordetails).
The Tindemans Report made several suggestions for potential improve-ments to the Council, including ‘enhanced coherence, recourse to majorityvoting, and a strengthening of continuity’ (Tindemans Report, EC Bull, 1/76,section V, part C, point 2, paragraphs a. and b.). All of these were aimed, how-ever, at speeding up the decision-making process and blocking a national vetomore than anything else. The Council received the Tindemans Report in 1975,but by then the rapidly worsening economic conditions combined with theBritish referendum on remaining in the Community had become the Council’sfocus. As a result, the report was set aside and few of its recommendationsadopted. The question of majority voting was not directly addressed.
The next attempt to institute majority voting in the Council came shortlyafter the first directly elected Parliament was installed. The plan was spon-sored by two members of the Council, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, then GermanForeign Minister, together with Italian Foreign Minister Emiho Colombo (seeTable 1, column 6 for details). This plan advocated ‘more effective decision-making structures’ and greater Community involvement in external affairs(EC Bull. 11/1981: 88). While the central focus of the plan was Europeancooperation on foreign policy and security issues and not the specific issueof majority voting in the Council, it did explicitly tie efficiency to majorityvoting (EC Bull. 11/1981: 90).
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The Genscher-Colombo Plan fared only slightly better than the TindemansReport. Due to its moderate nature the Plan received only lukewarm receptionsby both the European Parliament and the Commission. In addition, it wasrejected by Greece, Denmark, and the United Kingdom who objected tothe restoration of majority voting in the Council. However, the Genscher-Colombo Plan became the basis of the Council’s Solemn Declaration madein Stuttgart later in 1983 (see Table 1, column 7 for details). Although theSolemn Declaration was only a pale reflection of the original plan, it ‘didrecommend greater respect of the Treaties as far as voting was concerned, re-affirming that the application of the decision-making procedures laid downin the Treaties of Paris and Rome [were] of vital importance in order toimprove the European Communities’ ability to act’ (EC Bull. 6/1983, section2.2.1). This timid call for implementation of the Treaties was largely ignored,however, and decision through unanimity continued to be the norm.
The next call for majority-voting in the Council came from the EuropeanParliament in the form of the European Draft Treaty (see Table 1, column8 for details). The Draft Treaty proposed a merger of the political and theeconomic realms under one treaty. Structurally, the Draft Treaty called forthe institutions to remain very much the way they were; however, addition-al voting procedures were added in order to allow for a variety of differentdecision-making possibilities depending on the particular topic and arena ofthe debate. In particular, those areas explicitly covered by the Rome Treaty orthose more effectively dealt with at the Community level (subsidiary) wereto be decided through ‘common-action’, or majority rule. Other areas, andin particular those previously dealt with in the European Council, were tobe resolved through ‘cooperation’, or unanimous consent (EC Bull. 2/1984:11, point 10.1). One particularly important concession to national sovereign-ty was the creation of a ten-year transition period during which individualnations could still claim ‘vital national interests’ (as in the Luxembourg Com-promise), thereby vetoing any policy (EC Bull. 2/1984: 13, point 23.3). Theveto was made more difficult, however, by a provision which forced the coun-try employing the veto to justify itself to the Commission. The reason for thedelay in the decision-making process was also to be made public.
Despite their insistence on majority decision-making in the Council (andthus an end to the national veto), the authors and supporters of the Draft Treatywere almost certainly unaware of the potential implications of conditionalagenda-setting. In fact, had the Draft Treaty been ratified, the Commission’spower to act as a conditional agenda-setter would have been nullified (asnoted in Table 1, column 8, final row), and the Parliament’s would never havebeen realized. The proposed Draft Treaty would have allowed the Councilto amend as well as accept a proposal by an absolute or qualified majority
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(the European Draft Treaty, EC Bull. 2/1984, Art. 38.4). Thus, despite theinstitution of majority voting, the potential for the EP and the Commissionto set the agenda through the strategic location of proposals and amendmentswould not have been realized. Allowing the Council to change a proposal aseasily as it can accept one removes agenda setting powers from Europeanactors (both the Commission and the EP). This demonstrates the extent towhich the issue of effective decision-making and ending the national veto hadbecome the primary motivation behind calls for majority decision-making.It appears that the potential impact of majority voting on the power of theCommission and the EP to set the legislative agenda was not understood evenby those who would most avidly have supported it. Indeed, in the case of theEP’s Draft Treaty, it was those who stood to gain the most from conditionalagenda-setting who were designing institutions that would have completelynullified its impact.
The Draft Treaty was passed by the EP on 14 February, 1984; however, itwas never ratified or accepted by the Member States. Instead, it served as akind of rough draft for the Single European Act (SEA), which was passed in1985 and came into effect in 1987 (Table 1, column 9). Part of the impetus thatkept the Draft Treaty from becoming merely another failed attempt at reformcame from the unexpected support of French President Francois Mitterrand.Altiero Spinelli, a leader in the federalist movement and therapporteurforthe Draft Treaty, had made a statement directly calling upon Mitterrand andFrance to support institutional reform (Burgess 1989: 184–185). Mitterrandresponded (to the surprise of many) by giving a speech before the EuropeanParliament less than four months later. In his speech, Mitterrand called forinstitutional reform in the EC and more restricted use of the veto in the Councilof Ministers (EC Bull. 5/1984: 137–138). French support guaranteed that theDraft Treaty would not simply be ignored by the member-states. At the June1984 European Council meeting at Fontainebleau, the European Councilagreed to convene two ad hoc committees on European Union. The moreimportant of the two committees was given the task of making ‘suggestionsfor the improvement of the operation of European cooperation in both theCommunity field and that of political, or any other co-operation’ (Keatinge& Murphy 1987: 217). This committee came to be known as the DoogeCommittee after its chair, majority leader of the Irish Senate, James Dooge.Because of what many perceived to be the importance of the committee, itwas also known as Spaak II, after the Spaak committee that had prepared theoriginal draft of the Treaties of Rome in 1956.
The final version of the Dooge Committee’s report was delivered to theEuropean Council at its 1985 meeting in Milan (previous drafts had beensubmitted at the Dublin summit in December 1984 and the Brussels Council
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meeting in March 1985). The proposal called explicitly for the ‘adoptionof the new general principle that decisions must be taken by a qualified orsimple majority’ (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the European Council,March 1985, part III, section A, point iv, subparagraph (a)). The committeewas divided, however, with the Danish, British and Greek representativesclearly opposed to the majority position, which supported an end to unanimity(footnotes 25–27 and subparagraph (b) of above text).
The proposal also included a section on implementation suggesting that anintergovernmental conference be convened in order to create a draft treatyon European Union which would take account of theacquis communautaire,the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration, the Dooge Report, and the European Par-liament’s Draft Treaty (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the EuropeanCouncil, March 1985, part IV). The same minority of countries opposed tomajority voting also opposed the proposal to convene an IntergovernmentalConference (IGC) (see footnote 36 to the report of the Ad Hoc Commit-tee). Despite this continued opposition by the British, Danish and Greeks,an IGC was called by the European Council at the Milan meeting in June1985 (EC Bull. 7/8, 1985: 7–11). The decision to call for an IGC was alsothe first time that a vote had been decided according to majority rule withinthe European Council. This was possible because Article 236 of the EECTreaty regulating the submission of proposed Treaty amendments does notrequire unanimity for the proposal to be studied, although it does require‘ratification by all Member States in accordance with their respective consti-tutional requirements’, before Treaty revisions can be implemented (Article236, EEC Treaty). Thus, ‘imposition by force of an IGC was potentially ofdubious value since Treaty amendments decided within the IGC had to bemade by unanimous consent’ (Burgess 1989: 202). This led many to believethat despite the growing impetus of the reform process it might stall duringthe IGC due to continued British, Greek and Danish opposition.
The IGC covered numerous policy areas. One of the most controversialwas the question of majority voting. Both the Genscher-Colombo Plan andthe European Parliament’s Draft Treaty called upon the Council to abideby the provisions established in the Rome Treaties, which clearly calledfor qualified majority voting on a large number of topics (Art 149, RomeTreaty). In other words, they called for a renunciation of the LuxembourgCompromise. In addition to these previous attempts at institutional reform,however, were added the demands of the national parliaments of Italy andGermany, both of which had passed resolutions calling for nothing less than‘EP/Council co-decision and generalized majority voting’ (Camera dei Dep-utati, 29.11.85, and Bundestag – 10. Wahlperiode – 181. Sitzung 5.12.85,Drucksache 10/4088). To these demands were added those of the European
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Peoples Party (EPP), a majority of the Socialists and the Liberals, who ‘madean appeal to extend majority voting and the powers of the European Par-liament’ (Agence Europe, no. 4202, 12/13.11.85: 4). The Commission alsoadded its support for ‘increased use of majority voting in the Council ofMinisters and new procedures of co-decision for the European Parliament’(Burgess 1989: 204).
While demand for increased majority voting was widespread, there was noguarantee that it would be achieved because of the requirement of unanimityin the IGC and the eventual need for national ratification. Britain, Denmark,and Greece continued to oppose radical treaty revisions and the impositionof majority rule (again, it should be remembered that their opposition wasto the removal of the national veto, not to an increase in Commission orEP power, or the subsequent increase in the pace of European integration).On the other side, the Italian representatives threatened to veto any proposalthat did not satisfy the European Parliament (Corbett 1987: 241) and theFrench and Germans had already demonstrated their desire to move Europetowards further integration. In the end a compromise was reached throughnumerous trade-offs within the Act as a whole. The SEA made a commitmentto qualified majority voting for most of the Single Market Program, as wellas allowing the future expansion of areas of majority decision-making to bedecided upon by unanimous consent (Dinan 1994 146; see Corbett 1987: 246and 261 for an accessible list of the areas dealing with the common internalmarket, which could be decided by a qualified majority vote).
What appears to have passed unnoticed throughout this process was thepotential for conditional agenda-setting by the Commission (and EP) ensconcedin the Rome Treaty, and the impact that this would have on the pace of Euro-pean integration. The language of the Single European Act as regards votingwithin the Council is identical to the Rome Treaty, indicating that the key bat-tle was over the scope of majority voting, i.e., which areas would be decidedby qualified majority and which by unanimity. The specific institutional pro-visions of the Rome Treaty were readopted without any question or dispute.Since they had never been applied policy makers had no experience with, orunderstanding of their full significance.
Conclusions
In this article we provided an alternative to dominant theories account ofEuropean integration. Our account is based on the institutional structure ofthe European Union and, in particular, on the conditional agenda-settingmechanism adopted in Rome and reintroduced and applied thirty years laterby the Single European Act. We demonstrated both theoretically and with
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examples that this mechanism literally doubles the impulse towards integra-tion generated by a shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting.
We claimed that this explanation is more accurate and more realistic thanalternative theories of European integration. Indeed, while alternative theo-ries are either optimistic (neofunctionalism) or pessimistic (intergovernmen-talism) about the pace of European integration, our account explains not onlythe pace but also the principal actors who pushed integration in differentperiods. In particular, we explain why integration was slow and took the formof mutual recognition imposed by the courts in the 1970s and early 1980s,whereas proceeded rapidly under the form of harmonization of standardswhen (after the Single European Act) the initiative passed to the Commissionand the Parliament. Our explanation is that the institutions (the LuxembourgCompromise on the one hand and the Treaty of Rome and SEA on the other)prevailing in the Union determined quite different strategies and outcomesconcerning integration.
We saw that at least three of the major figures in the battle revolving aroundthe institutions of the EU (Hallstein, Spaak, and de Gaulle) were aware of theconsequences of their strategies. The first two introduced the mechanism ofconditional agenda-setting and formed the institutions that would produce theremarkable speed at which integration progressed in the late 1980s and early1990s. The third foresaw the impact of the rules adopted in Rome and movedtenaciously to eradicate not only the qualified majority aspect of Europeandecision-making but also conditional agenda-setting.
We also discovered that the institutional outcomes we described in the firstpart of this article had not been recognized by a series of other actors involvedin the process of European integration. We saw that the institutions of theUnion were rarely discussed, that most plans offered general and vague wishesabout integration, and that at most the question of majority versus unanimitywas debated while the issue of agenda-setting was neglected. In this respect,the most telling example was the plan of the European Parliament itself,which insisted on receiving the power to veto legislation without realizingthat proposing legislation under the existing rules would give it more influenceover policies. It is ironic that with Maastricht the Parliament finally receivesthe veto power it had been requesting for so long (co-decision procedure)only at the expense of losing the conditional agenda-setting power it hadnever appreciated (cooperation procedure) (Garrett & Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis1997; Tsebelis & Garrett 1997).
THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING 69
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the Center for German and European Stud-ies of the University of California for financial support. The authors wouldalso like to thank Mr Estevens and Mr Goncalves of the European CouncilArchives, and Mr Jean Marie Palayret of the European Community HistoricalArchives for their invaluable assistance. George Tsebelis gratefully acknowl-edges a fellowship from the Simon Guggenheim Foundation and NSF grantNo. SBR 9511485 which made this work possible.
Notes
1. While the official right to initiate legislation before Maastricht lies exclusively withthe Commission, the Council and the Parliament could also request legislation (Jacobs,Corbett & Shackleton 1993), which makes it possible to locate the actual initiator. AfterMaastricht all three major institutional actors can initiate legislation.
2. He bases his interpretation on article 149.2d of the Single European Act, which withrespect to the second reading of the cooperation procedure specifies: ‘The Commissionshall, within a period of one month, re-examine the proposal on the basis of which theCouncil adopted its common position, by taking into account the amendments proposedby the European Parliament: : : ’.
3. For more detailed models where the actors are collective (instead of individuals) and thepolicy space is multidimensional (as opposed to one-dimensional) see Tsebelis (1994,1995a).
4. 5/7 = 0.714, and 62/87 = 0.712.5. For an analysis of European institutions and the ECJ along these lines see Cooter &
Drexl (1994). For a more general analysis of the role of multiple ‘veto players’ inpolitical systems and the independence of the judiciary see Tsebelis (1995b).
6. For a different rationale that produces outcomes that make the pivotal member indif-ferent between the proposal and thestatus quoas well as the claim that the EP has noagenda setting powers see Steunenberg (1994), Crombez (1996) and Moser (1996). Fora discussion of the conceptual and empirical problems of these approaches see Tsebelis(1996).
7. These documents were only recently made public despite the fact that the standard thirtyyear waiting period expired in the late 1980s because many were held in the nationaloffices of the Foreign Minister and unanimous agreement was required in the Council ofMinisters in order for them to be released. They are currently available at the Archives ofthe Council in Brussels and will eventually be copied and available in the other archivesof the Union.
8. Christian Fouchet was the French ambassador to Denmark.9. Keep in mind that the Empty Chair crisis occurred justbeforethe beginning of the third
stage, and therefore before there had been any practical experience with majority votingin the Council.
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Address for correspondence:Prof. George Tsebelis, Department of Political Science, Univer-sity of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USAPhone: (310) 825-5930; Fax: (310) 825-0778; E-mail: tsebelis@ucla.edu
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