the iaea and the control of radioactive sources brian dodd president-elect health physics society

The IAEA and the Control of The IAEA and the Control of Radioactive SourcesRadioactive Sources

The IAEA and the Control of The IAEA and the Control of Radioactive SourcesRadioactive Sources

Brian Dodd

President-ElectHealth Physics Society

2

International Atomic Energy AgencyInternational Atomic Energy Agency

“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

138 Member States

2247 Staff from more than 90 countries

6 Departments

3

Authorized functions (Statute):Authorized functions (Statute):

To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses...

To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses...

To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts...

4

Authorized functions (Statute):Authorized functions (Statute):

To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable materials...are not used to further any military purpose...

To establish...standards of safety for protection of health...and to provide for the application of these standards...

5

Six Departments of the IAEASix Departments of the IAEA

Management Policy, Legal Advice, and Administrative Support

Nuclear Sciences and Applications Peaceful Uses of Nuclear

Technology Safeguards

Verification of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Material

Technical Co-Operation Technology Transfer

Nuclear Energy Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle, and Waste Management

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Six Departments of the IAEASix Departments of the IAEA

Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Office of Nuclear Security Division of Nuclear Installation Safety Emergency Preparedness and Response Division Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety

Policy and Programme Support Section Waste Safety Section Radiation and Transport Safety Section

• National and Global Infrastructure Enhancement for Radiation, Transport and Radioactive Waste Safety

• Radiological Protection of Patients• Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials• Control of Radiation Sources

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HIERARCHY HIERARCHY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDSOF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Guides

Fundamentals

Requirements

underlying principles - aimed at politicians and regulators

specify obligations and responsibilities

recommendations to support

requirements

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Other Lower-Level DocumentsOther Lower-Level Documents Safety Reports

Technical Documents (TECDOCs)

Conferences and Symposium Papers Series

Accident Reports

Others

10 10

‘‘ORPHAN’ORPHAN’ SOURCES are radioactive SOURCES are radioactive sources which:sources which:

Were never subject to regulatory control; or

Were initially regulated, but then: Abandoned, Lost or misplaced, Stolen, or Removed without authorization.

11 11

‘‘VULNERABLE’VULNERABLE’ SOURCES are SOURCES are radioactive sources which:radioactive sources which:

Are currently under regulatory control; but

For which the control is insufficient to provide assurance of long term safety and security.

Note: Vulnerable sources could relatively easily become orphaned.

12 12

‘‘DISUSED’DISUSED’ SOURCES are radioactive SOURCES are radioactive sources which:sources which:

Are no longer in use or intended to be used.

Note: a disused source may still represent a significant radiological hazard.

It differs from a spent source in that it may still be capable of performing its function; it may be disused because it is no longer needed.

13

Concern was raised in Dijon in 1998 Concern was raised in Dijon in 1998 because of accidents with orphan sourcesbecause of accidents with orphan sources

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GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil

1985: Private radiotherapy clinic closed down Unit dismantled,

Cs-137 source capsule ruptured causing major contamination

1987: teletherapy head stolen

50.9 TBq (1375 Ci) caesium-137 teletherapy machine left in abandoned clinic

15

GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil

Exposure of large number of public:112 000 people monitored 249 people contaminated 49 people 0.1 - 6.2 Gy 4 people died

6 y old girl 18 y old man 22 y old man 38 y old mother

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GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil

85 houses significantly contaminated 200 people evacuated 7 houses demolished

Major contamination of property:

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GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil

Total volume of waste = 3500 cubic m 3800 metal drums 1400 metal boxes 10 shipping containers

18

Gilan, IranGilan, Iran 1996: Ir-192 source

used for industrial radiography falls out of shielded container

Manual worker picks up source and puts it in chest pocket

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Gilan, IranGilan, Iran

Resulting in severe

radiation burns to the chest

20

Istanbul, TurkeyIstanbul, Turkey December 1998: Two containers sold as scrap and broken open 3.3 TBq (88 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshielded Containers dumped 10 persons with acute radiation syndrome 404 persons medically examined 23.5 TBq (636 Ci) cobalt-60 source unaccounted

21

Istanbul, TurkeyIstanbul, Turkey1993: 3 disused teletherapy

sources packaged and stored by a private company awaiting return to supplier in USA

Inappropriate storage facilities

February 1998: 2 packages transferred to

inappropriate storage facilities

22

Samut Prakarn,Thailand,Thailand October 1999: 3

disused teletherapy sources stored by a private company at unsecured parking lot

Jan/Feb 2000 unauthorized removal of one unit - dismantled for scrap

15.7 TBq (425 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshielded 10 people highly exposed 3 of whom died no contamination

23

Lilo, GeorgiaLilo, Georgia

Lilo military training center 1997: 11 Georgian soldiers

developed radiation induced skin lesions and acute radiation syndrome

Abandoned sources (Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226) found at various locations:

in coat pocketon building sitein buildingsburied in groundsin refuse moundon soccer pitch…

1997, LILO

POTIMATKOJI

ZUGDIDISANTREDIA

KAHISHI

Dec.2001, LJA

Radiological accidents in Georgia.Radiological accidents in Georgia.

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December 2001, Lja, Georgia

A group of woodcutters find 2

hot ‘objects’ in the forest. (unshielded

strontium-90 sources,

each approx. 30,000 Ci !)

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The back of patient 2 on 6 January 2002

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… sources later discovered beside a path, under a rock, on the edge of a 50m-

deep 30°-slope.Source

Source

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29

Source Recovery in Georgia

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Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)

RTG’s were used in various civilian and military applications (e.g. to power navigational beacons and communications equipment in remote areas…)

Several 100’s Sr-90 powered navigational beacons operated

in the Artic from Novaya Semlaya to the Bering Strait.

These generators also appeared in Belarus …

… and elsewhere in Asia…

… completely unsecured!…

… and easily removable by the public! ...

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Radiological Accident Statistics Radiological Accident Statistics (1944-2000)(1944-2000)

~ 400 reported accidents ~ 3000 exposed persons > 100 deaths, more than half involving

patients In addition, orphan sources can be mixed

up with scrap causing contamination problems

Illicit trafficking involves orphan sources but very few orphan source incidents are due to illicit trafficking events

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At Dijon it was recognized that inadequate control (safety and security) has caused many serious accidents

Orphan sources were, and are, a major concern

So, IAEA was asked to develop and implement an action plan as well as to develop guidance to begin to address the issues

Summary so far...Summary so far...

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Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance

IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10

IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10

Major Findings of the Conference:Investigate formulation of an international undertaking on the safety & security of sources

Dijon September

1998

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Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance

IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10

IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10

• Approved by BoG & endorsed by GC Sept 1999• Some issues not resolved

SCOPE

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Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance

REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12

REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12

Draft REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2002/35/Add.1-GC(46)/11/Add.1

Draft REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2002/35/Add.1-GC(46)/11/Add.1

Draft REVISEDCategorization of Radioactive Sources

Draft REVISEDCategorization of Radioactive Sources

September 11

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International Conference on International Conference on Security of Radioactive SourcesSecurity of Radioactive Sources

High-level conference Held 10-13 March 2003 Over 720 participants From over 120

countries Two major findings

with other topical findings

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Endorsed by GC

GC(47)/RES/7

Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance

REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9

REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9

Scope

IAEA/CODEOC/2004

G8 Evian SummitJune 2003

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Endorsed by GC

GC(47)/RES/7

Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance

IAEA/CODEOC/IMP-EXP/2005

Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13

Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13

G8 Sea Island SummitJune 2004

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Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance

REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12

REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12

Discussed making the Code legally binding – but no consensus

Many countries trying to implement the Code

IAEA to revise Action Plan (again)

Next conference in ~3 years

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Categorization of Radioactive Categorization of Radioactive SourcesSources

Category PracticeActivity Ratio

A/D

1RTG’s; Irradiators;

Teletherapy; Gamma KnifeA/D ≥ 1000

2Industrial gamma radiographyBrachytherapy (HDR/MDR)

1000>A/D≥10

3Fixed industrial gauges with high activity sources (level, dredge, conveyor gauges etc.)

Well logging gauges10>A/D≥ 1

4

Brachytherapy (LDR except eye plaques & permanent implants)

Industrial gauges with lower activity sources (e.g. portable moisture/density gauges)

Bone densitometers; Static eliminators

1>A/D≥ 0.01

5Brachytherapy (eye pl. & perm implants);

XRF devices; Electron capture devices; Mossbauer sources: PET check sources

0.01>A/D

and

A>Exempt

Inc r

eas i

ng

Ris

k

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Some D values of interestSome D values of interest

Radionuclide D (TBq)D

(Ci)

Am-241 0.06 2

Co-60 0.03 0.8

Cs-137 0.1 3

Ir-192 0.08 2

Sr-90/Y-90 1 30Now published as Safety Guide RS-G-1.9

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Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Nuclear Security Plan of ActivitiesNuclear Security Plan of Activities

It has eight topic areas and is mainly focused on nuclear material (SNM); however,

It had two main thrusts for sources… Remediation of past problems Prevention of future problems

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1: Remediation of Past Problems1: Remediation of Past Problems

Collect, dispose of known disused sources

Secure vulnerable sources, especially high-risk sources (Tripartite initiative)

Search for, recover and dispose of orphan or vulnerable sources

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Collecting known disused Collecting known disused sourcessources

IAEA has for many years had campaigns to collect, properly dispose of, and secure the large number of disused sources around the world

Collection and conditioning of radium sources in Africa is a good example

Return of a 700 TBq (19,000 Ci) 137Cs source from Cote d’Ivoire to France is another

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Securing vulnerable sourcesSecuring vulnerable sources

Tripartite Initiative secured HIGH activity sources in some former Soviet Union countries: Azerbaijan Belarus Estonia Kazakhstan Moldova Tajikistan

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Tripartite PartnershipTripartite Partnership

USA brought $ and security team Russia brought information on sources

and technology and possible recycling of some sources

IAEA brought contacts, local knowledge, project management and co-ordination

100 kCi dismantled and transported to safe and secure storage.

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Many high activity radioactive sources are vulnerable...

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53~2,000 Ci Cs-137 ~10,000 Ci Co-60~40,000 Ci Sr-90

54

~3,500 Ci Cs-37 each

55

Several disused teletherapy heads

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Other ProjectsOther Projects

EU funding for work similar to Tripartite: Balkans Armenia

Six disused medical irradiators secured in: Tanzania Philippines

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Active Searches for

orphan sources

Surveyor Rappellinginto Ravine

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Passive searches for sourcesPassive searches for sources

IAEA published guidance on prevention, detection and response to illicit trafficking and inadvertent movement of radioactive materials (TECDOCs 1311, 1312, 1313)

ISO, IEC are each developing standards based on this earlier work

IAEA has a research project aimed at capability improvements: 28 labs and 18 countries are involved

IAEA, USA and EU have all provided equipment and training for border monitoring, with concentration in Eastern Europe and NIS countries

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IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking DatabaseIAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database

As of Dec. 2003: 335 incidents involving

non-nuclear, radioactive materials have been confirmed

However, more than 75% of these involve Category 4 & 5 sources

At least 50% of 335 appear to entail deliberate criminal activities, including about 20 incidents with Category 1-3 sources

Most of these seem to be amateurish groups motivated by financial gain

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Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Nuclear Security Plan of ActivitiesNuclear Security Plan of Activities

It had two main thrusts for sources… Remediation of past problems.

By end of 2005:Dismantlement and relocation of the highest risk

sources (~35) in 6 countries to be completedEleven high activity sources (~29,000 Ci) and 58

neutron sources recovered from Africa and Latin America

Prevention of future problems

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2: Prevention of Future Problems2: Prevention of Future Problems

Improve legal and regulatory infrastructure

Implement the Code of Conduct, including:

import/export controls on high risk sources strengthen or regain control with a National

strategy increase security of sources as needed

Involve manufacturers and distributors with issues such as source redesign, return of sources…

64

Legal and regulatory controlsLegal and regulatory controls

IAEA has published a large number of standards, regulations and guidance

Model Project for StrengtheningRadiation Protection Infrastructurehelps developing countries put these into practice

Radiation Safety Infrastructure Appraisals (RaSIA), now modified to include security of radioactive sources (RaSSIA)

>100 missions completed by end of 2005

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Code of ConductCode of Conduct

High level document to governments and regulatory authorities to serve as “guidance for the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations on the safety and security of radioactive sources”

66States committed States not yet committed

As of Oct 2005, 77 countries, G8 As of Oct 2005, 77 countries, G8 and EU have endorsed the Codeand EU have endorsed the Code

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Scope of CodeScope of Code

Focus on sealed, high-risk radioactive sources (essentially Cat. 1-3, withsome provisions only forCat. 1 and 2)

Excludes nuclear materials, as defined in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Excludes radioactive sources within the military or defense programs

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Examples…

Provide guidance on: Legislation Regulations Regulatory body Import/export controls

ContentsContents

Built on existingInternationalStandards

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SourceRegister

National register of radioactive sources for “at least Cat. 1 & 2” (~58 Countries trained in IAEA’s RAIS)

National strategies for gaining or regaining control over orphan sources

Strengthening Control over Strengthening Control over SourcesSources

States should develop:

71

Security measures needed to deter, detect and delay unauthorised access, removal of source, etc

Security MeasuresSecurity Measures

Maintain confidentiality of sensitive information

Countries should define domestic threat, and assess vulnerability

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Disused sources can be Disused sources can be particularly vulnerableparticularly vulnerable

Disused sources should be managed safely & securely (including financial provisions where appropriate)

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Import and Export of Radioactive Import and Export of Radioactive SourcesSources

Export Authorization from exporting state’s

regulatory body Notification of importing state’s

regulatory body Consent of importing state’s

regulatory body (Cat. 1 sources)

Import Authorization from importing state’s

regulatory body

But, so far only a few (11) countries have recommitted

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Co-operation with Manufacturers Co-operation with Manufacturers and Suppliers of Sourcesand Suppliers of Sources

ISSPA is drafting a Code of Good Practice for the industry (http://www.isspa-org.com/)

Manufacturers are participating in IAEA meetings to ‘minimize the consequences of malicious use’ through improved design and construction.

The IAEA has encouraged the development of

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Conclusions - USAConclusions - USA

The USA has been actively engaged in the international effort, and has been leading on many fronts

Several NRC orders, rulemakings and parts of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 are the direct result of the USA’s commitment to the Code of Conduct

The USA is funding many multi- and bi-lateral efforts to help ensure the safety and security of radioactive sources

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Conclusions - IAEAConclusions - IAEA

The IAEA’s work on the safety and security of radioactive sources has been quite extensive

However, it has no authority except over its own programs

So ultimate control of sources depends on each country and ultimately on the person with the authorization…So…

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Conclusions - HPSConclusions - HPS It’s time for a renewed vision for the

Radiation Safety Without Borders program Chapter to Country – Long term - years Person to person – Relationship based Professional support – Multiple mode

Resources, advice, experts on IAEA missions, funds to attend meeting

Help seed a foreign chapter, that develops into an independent national society that becomes an IRPA Associate Society

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Talk to me…Talk to me… BDC.mail@cox.net

(702) 254-2346 (Pacific)

BDodd.com

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Supplementary Ionizing Supplementary Ionizing Radiation Warning SymbolRadiation Warning Symbol