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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
Claim No CV2014-02496
BETWEEN
PAMELA HUNT
Claimant
AND
JENNIFER DANIEL
PERMANENT SECRETARY IN
THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
1st Defendant
HARRILAL SEECHARAN
CHIEF EDUCATION OFFICER IN
THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
2nd Defendant
THE TEACHING SERVICE COMMISSION
3rd Defendant
THE COUNCIL OF ELDERS OF
THE SPIRITUAL SHOUTER BAPTIST FAITH A/C
THE COUNCIL OF ELDERS OF THE
SPIRITUAL BAPTIST FAITH OF
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
4th Defendant
AND
MS. ROSEANNE RONDON
1st Interested Party
ARCHBISHOP BARBARA GRAY-BURKE
2nd Interested Party
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THE COMMITTEE FOR THE COUNCIL OF ELDERS OF THE
SPIRITUAL BAPTIST (SHOUTERS) FAITH OF
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO LIMITED
3rd Interested Party
Before the Honourable Mr. Justice Robin N. Mohammed
Appearances:
Mr. Martin G. Daly S.C. and Mr Christopher Sieuchand instructed by Mr Kendell Alexander for
the Claimant
Mr Avory Sinanan S.C. and Ms Donna Prowell instructed by Ms Amrita Ramsook for the 1st and
2nd Defendants
Mr. Douglas L. Mendes S.C. instructed by Mr Anthony Bullock for the 3rd Defendant
Mr Rajiv Persad and Mr. Kiel Taklalsingh instructed by Mr Ronald Boynes for the 4th
Defendant, the Second and Third Interested Parties
JUDGMENT
I. Background:
[1] The Claimant, Pamela Hunt, filed a claim for Judicial Review against the Defendants and
Interested Parties seeking several declaratory reliefs that relate to the application for her
transfer and/or removal as principal of the St. Barbara’s Spiritual Shouter Baptists
Primary School (the “School”) made on the 3rd December, 2012 and the decision to
commence a formal investigation into several allegations made against her.
[2] After the 3rd Defendant, the Teaching Service Commission (the “TSC”), filed its affidavit
in response, Pamela applied to withdraw several of the reliefs and in particular,
discontinued her entire claim against the TSC. The Court permitted the withdrawal of the
claim, however the parties were in disagreement on the issue of costs and as such
submissions were filed and exchanged.
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[3] A decision on the entitlement of costs for the Claimant’s application to withdraw the
claim against the TSC was delivered on the 10th January, 2018, together with this
decision.
[4] At the date of the submissions, the Court had before it only one affidavit in response to
the Judicial Review claim, being the affidavit of Veronica Creed on behalf of the TSC.
Pamela did not file her supplemental affidavit until the 31st March, 2015 and, in response,
the 2nd Interested Party, Archbishop Barbara Burke (“Mrs. Burke”) filed hers on the 8th
May, 2015. The 1st and 2nd Defendants then put in their affidavit of Zorisha Mohammed-
Ali on the 14th May, 2015.
[5] By an application filed on the 23rd June, 2015, the Claimant sought to strike out several
of the paragraphs of the affidavits of Zorisha Mohammed-Ali and Mrs. Burke.
Pamela’s application also sought an order requiring (i) both deponents to attend Court for
cross-examination on specific paragraphs of their affidavits; and (ii) specific disclosure
of certain letters and documents referred to in each deponent’s affidavit.
Pamela then sought permission to file affidavits of herself and Archbishop Dorothy
Hercules in reply to the affidavits of Mrs. Burke and Zorisha Mohammed-Ali.
[6] The Court is yet to deliver its decision on the above mentioned applications.
[7] Evidential objections of the 1st and 2nd Defendants were filed on the 31st July, 2015
against Pamela’s affidavit and supplemental affidavit of the 15th July, 2014 and the 31st
March, 2015 respectively. The parties exchanged submissions on the 30th November,
2015 and a decision was delivered on the 10th January, 2018 together with this decision.
[8] Also on the 31st July, the 4th Defendants, along with the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties (the
“Applicants”) applied to have the matter dealt with as a private law claim. The grounds
of this application were that the remaining reliefs sought by the Claimant were academic
and were solely private law in nature and therefore, not resolvable by judicial review
proceedings. The Applicants filed their submissions in support on the 16th November,
2015. Submissions in response were filed by the Claimant on the 30th November, 2015.
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[9] Accordingly, having considered the Applicants application and submissions, the Court
gives its decision as follows:
II. Submissions & Analysis:
[10] The Applicants submitted the following with respect to the remaining reliefs sought by
the Claimant against them:
a. Declaration that the application made against the 4th Defendant for the transfer or
removal of the Claimant from her post as principal of the School is null and void;
That this relief is purely academic at this point.
b. Declaration that the 4th Defendant’s denial of access to the School to the Claimant
was oppressive and unconstitutional;
That this relief is really an employer-employee dispute and is therefore a private
law issue.
c. As against the 4th Defendant and the 2nd Interested Party:
Damages for defamation;
Damages for intentional infliction of emotional stress;
Damages for intimidation;
Damages for unlawful interference with the Claimant’s contract of employment;
Damages for assault;
Damages for procuring a breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment;
That all the above claims are private law claims.
d. As against all the Defendants:
A declaration as to the identity of those persons properly constituting the Board of
Management of the School;
That this is not appropriate for a judicial review court and/or is academic.
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[11] In addition to the above, counsel for the 4th Defendant submitted that the Claimant has
also employed inappropriate procedures to ventilate her claim by joining interested
parties without regard to the CPR.
[12] Essentially, the Applicants have four challenges to the claim and/or reliefs sought by the
Claimant:
a. That the Claimant’s attempt to join other reliefs is not permissible under Part 56.9
CPR as these reliefs amount to breaches of constitutional rights and breaches of
private common law rights in tort and employment law;
b. That some of the reliefs as listed are academic and should be struck off;
c. That the Claimant’s attempt to join the Interested Parties was not done in the proper
procedure and accordingly, amounts to an abuse of the process of the court;
d. That the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties do not wish to be part of the claim and should
not have been joined considering that (i) only private law claims have been made
against the 2nd Interested Party; and (ii) there has been no claim against the 3rd
Interested Party.
[13] Part 56.9 of the CPR states:
a. “The general rule is that, where permitted by the substantive law, the applicant may
include a claim for any other relief or remedy that arises out of or is related or
connected to the subject matter of an application for an administrative order.
b. The court may, however, at any stage—
i. Direct that any claim for other relief be dealt with separately from the
application for an administrative order; or
ii. Direct that the whole application be dealt with as a claim and give
appropriate directions under Parts 26 and 27; and
iii. In either case, make any order it considers just as to the costs that have
been wasted because of the unreasonable use of the procedure under this
rule.”
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Joinder of private law reliefs:
[14] It is not disputed that the reliefs sought at (c) above against the 4th Defendant and the 2nd
Interested Party are all private law claims for damages. It is also undisputed that there
exist parallel remedies in the common law for most, if not all, of these reliefs that seek
damages. The question is, however, pursuant to Part 56.9, whether the substantive law
justifies the inclusion of these common law claims on the grounds that they were related
or connected to the judicial review claim.
[15] Counsel for the 4th Defendant relied on the cases of Thakur Persad Jaroo v the A.G.1
and Belfonte v the A.G.2 to argue that the judicial review process is not best suited to
private law causes of action since its procedures are not as robust and do not allow for a
wider scope of cross-examination and pleadings. He submitted that, while these cases
refer to constitutional motions, they can similarly be applied to judicial review
proceedings. The Court is inclined to agree with this submission. In fact, Part 56.9 of the
CPR applies to ‘administrative orders’, which encompass both constitutional motions
and judicial review proceedings.
[16] Sharma CJ, along with Warner and Archie JJA in Belfonte supra, summarised the
principles as stated in Jaroo as follows:
“What is evident from Thakur Persad Jaroo and other similar cases is that
the determining factor in deciding whether there has been an abuse of
process is not merely the existence of a parallel remedy but also that the
pursuit of the application to the High Court must be viewed as being made
for the sole purpose of avoiding the normal judicial remedy for unlawful
administrative action”
[17] This principle was further discussed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General v
Siewchand Ramanoop3 where their Lordships stressed on the need to examine the
1 59 WIR 519 2 68 WIR 413 3 [2005] UKPC 15
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purpose for which the application is made in order to determine whether it is an abuse of
process where there is an available common-law remedy:
“…where there is a parallel remedy, constitutional relief should not be
sought unless the circumstances of which complaint is made include
some feature which makes it appropriate to take that course. As a general
rule, there must be some feature which, at least arguably, indicates that
the means of legal redress otherwise available would not be adequate. To
seek constitutional relief in the absence of such a feature would be a
misuse, or abuse, of the court's process. A typical, but by no means
exclusive, example of a special feature would be a case where there has
been an arbitrary use of State power.”
Their Lordships continued:
“…where several rights are infringed, some of which are common-law
rights and some for which protection is available only under the
Constitution…it would not be fair, convenient or conducive to the proper
administration of justice to require an applicant to abandon his
constitutional remedy or to file separate actions for the vindication of
his rights.”
[18] Lord Hope of Craighead in Jaroo supra4 provided another example of a ‘special feature’
in a case that would justify a joinder of the public and private law actions:
“Their Lordships wish to emphasise that the originating motion
procedure under s 14(1) is appropriate for use in cases where the facts
are not in dispute and questions of law only are in issue. It is wholly
unsuitable in cases, which depend for their decision on the resolution of
disputes as to fact. Disputes of that kind must be resolved by using the
procedures which are available in the ordinary courts under the
common law.”
4 At paragraph 36.
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[19] On a conjoint reading of the substantive law identified above and Part 56.9 CPR, it
appears that the Claimant can be justified in joining the private and/or common law
claims for damages to the judicial review claim if: (i) a special feature exists that would
make it fair and in the interests of the administration of justice to do so; and (ii) that the
common law relief is sufficiently connected and/or related to the judicial review claim.
[20] The Claimant challenged three primary decisions of the Defendants and/or Interested
Parties in the judicial review claim: (i) the decision to institute the Regulation 90
disciplinary investigation against her; (ii) the decision to apply for her transfer and/or
removal; and (iii) the decision to transfer and/or remove her as principal of the School
and prevent her access to the compound.
Damages for defamation
[21] The relief of damages for defamation was sought as a result of various media reports
dated the 28th and 29th August, 2014 and on the 22nd and 23rd April, 2014, in which the
2nd Interested Party, Mrs. Burke, made accusations that Pamela: (i) was negligent in her
duties as principal; (ii) failed to account for monies that she spent; and (iii) strayed from
the religious tenets of the School. These were more or less the same allegations that led
to the decision to apply for her transfer and to institute a disciplinary investigation against
her, both of which Pamela sought judicial review against.
[22] The Claimant submitted that when this Court gave directions at the case management
conference (the “CMC”) on the 21st January, 2015, the Defendants had knowledge of the
contents of the Claimant’s affidavits and therefore, would have known of any disputes of
facts that arose. Nevertheless, no objections were raised nor was the Court ever notified
of any factual disputes.
The Court does not find this submission to be at all persuasive. The primary issue dealt
with at the CMC of the 21st January, 2015, was the Claimant’s application to withdraw
its claim against the TSC along with the attendant issue of costs. There was also the TSC’s
application for permission to file a supplemental affidavit. Therefore, only the reliefs
sought against the TSC were discussed in this CMC.
Page 9 of 16
[23] In any event, there appears to be no facts in dispute on the claim of defamation in the
affidavit evidence of the Claimant and Mrs. Burke. Pamela, in her supplemental affidavit
of the 31st March, 2015, accused Mrs. Burke of making untrue statements that diminished
her reputation “...among her peers, co-workers, teacher and students at the School,
parents of those students and the public generally.”5 Mrs. Burke, in response, did not
deny that these statements were made. Rather, she stated that “any and all statements
which I have made to the media are based on truth and/or are fair comments which I
have made based on the events and tenure of the Applicant.”
The fact that the statements were made by Mrs. Burke in the media reports is therefore
undisputed. Rather, the issue to be decided is one of law and concerns the availability of
the defences of justification and/or fair comment. Resolution of this issue can be
sufficiently achieved by submissions thereby removing the need for any cross-
examination and/or additional pleadings that are available in an ordinary defamation
claim.
[24] It is therefore this Court’s opinion that the Claimant is permitted under Part 56.9 of the
CPR to include the relief of damages for defamation to the judicial review claim.
Damages for intimidation; unlawful interference; intentional infliction of emotional
distress; and procuring a breach of contract
[25] There exists, within the law of tort, parallel remedies for each of the above reliefs sought6.
This Court must determine whether there is a sufficient connection between these reliefs
and the judicial review claim and whether there is a special feature that enables them to
be joined.
[26] The tort of unlawful interference is one of uncertain ambit and relatively undeveloped.
It consists of “...one person using unlawful means with the object and effect of causing
damage to another.” In this case the unlawful interference occurred with respect to the
Claimant’s contract of employment and was occasioned by the removal of the Claimant
5 Paragraph 19 of the Claimant’s supplemental affidavit dated the 31st March, 2015 6 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 17th Edn. Chapter 15.
Page 10 of 16
from her office as principal and preventing her from accessing the School’s compound.
This relief is connected and/or relative to the order of mandamus and the quia timet order
sought against the 4th Defendant and/or the 2nd Interested Party in the Fixed Date Claim.
Further, Mrs. Burke has not disputed the fact that she, by her actions, prevented the
Claimant from accessing the School compound and/or that she was involved in the
application for the Claimant’s removal. There are therefore no issues of fact that are in
dispute with respect to this relief sought.
Accordingly, this Court finds that there is sufficient justification for the relief of damages
for unlawful interference with the Claimant’s contract of employment being joined to the
judicial review claim.
[27] With respect to the relief sought for the tort of intimidation, the Court notes that there
does exist a factual dispute of whether acts that amounted to intimidation were occasioned
by Mrs. Burke.
Mrs. Burke stated in her affidavit of the 8th May, 2015 that “...I was not in any manner
intimidating or attempting to oppress the Applicant.”
Determining this issue would likely require cross-examination and therefore, would not
be appropriate for judicial review proceedings. The Court will therefore exercise its
discretion under Part 56.9 (2) to direct that the relief of damages for intimidation be dealt
with separately from the judicial review application.
[28] The claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress arose from the mental and
emotional distress that Pamela experienced as a direct result of the allegations made
against her along with the application made for her removal, both of which form the basis
of the judicial review claim.
In her affidavit, Pamela stated that she first experienced distress after she had been
informed by SS III Mohammed-Ali that the Ministry intended to take disciplinary action
against her. Pamela stated that some 6 days after being so informed, she began to
experience “…difficulties sleeping…” and “…felt emotionally traumatized”7.
7 Paras 81 & 83 of the Claimant’s affidavit of the 15th July, 2014
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Accordingly, there is a connection between the claim of emotional distress and the
judicial review application.
Further, Mrs. Burke never responded to the claims of emotional trauma in her affidavit
and Zorisha merely admitted that Pamela informed her that she was considering sick leave
“…because of the negative toll the situation was having on her health.”
Therefore, as no factual dispute appears in the affidavits on this issue, this relief is
permitted to be joined to the judicial review claim.
[29] The tort of procuring a breach of contract is concerned with inducing a third party to
breach his contract to the damage of the other contracting party, without reasonable
justification or excuse8. The Court does not find that the Claimant has provided sufficient
evidence to justify the bringing of this relief.
The operation of this tort is best explained by a simple analogy: A induces B to break her
contract with C. In such a case, only C can sue A; B cannot. Thus “...where cricket
authorities imposed a ban aimed at persuading players who had entered into contracts
with a promoter, to withdraw from the contracts whether or not it was lawful to do so,
the promoters (not the players) brought an action based on this tort.9”
Accordingly, Pamela, being the party who was induced to break her employment contract
allegedly by the Applicants’ actions and/or decisions, would not be the appropriate party
to bring an action under this head.
The Court therefore moves to strike off this relief.
Academic Reliefs:
[30] In addition to the above, the Applicants sought to strike off the relief sought:
a. Against the 4th Defendant for its decision to apply to transfer the Claimant from her
post as principal; and
8 Clerk & Lindsell ibid at paragraph 15-02 9 Para 15-02 ibid.
Page 12 of 16
b. Against all Defendants by seeking a declaration as to the identity of the board of
management for the School,
on the ground that they had become academic.
The grounds for both applications were that the Claimant had resigned since December,
2014 and therefore, there was no longer any need for this Court to spend time deliberating
on these issues that had now become academic.
[31] In the English High Court case of the Queen v Liverpool City Council10, the applicants
applied to have their challenge against the respondent discontinued. The applicants had
initially believed that they were threatened with redundancy and filed for judicial review.
However, after leave was granted, some of the applicants were satisfied that they were
no longer under threat. Simon Brown J agreed that the proceedings of these applicants
had become academic.
Similarly, having resigned, Pamela is no longer under any threat of being transferred or
removed and accordingly, this relief is academic. As stated in the Application of
Trinidad and Tobago Information Access11, “Declaratory relief in judicial review will
not be granted if issues raised are academic, hypothetical and/or premature and,
moreover, a combination of all three...”
[32] The other relief, which concerns the composition of the board of management, is not, in
this Court’s opinion a claim appropriate for judicial review. As stated in the text Judicial
Review12, “The question in any particular case is not whether the decision-maker is, on
general terms, amenable to judicial review, but whether a particular decision is.” Part
56.2 (a) of the CPR states that an application for judicial review made by a person, as
opposed to a group or body, must show “…that he has been adversely affected by the
decision which is the subject of the application.”
10 1993 5 Admin L.R. 669 11 HCA No. 1054 of 2004. 12 5th Edn, Sir Michael Supperstone, James Goudie Q.C. & Sir Paul Walker
Page 13 of 16
The U.K. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary13 describes judicial review as “…a type of
court proceeding in which a judge reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action made
by a public body.”
The emphasis here is that there must be a complaint against the decision of a public body
by the Claimant for there to be a valid claim for judicial review. This particular relief
identifies no decision made by any of the Defendants in this claim to which this Court
must review.
Accordingly, this relief is hypothetical and will not be granted.
Mixing of constitutional relief with judicial review proceedings:
[33] The law applies equally to this issue as it does to the joining of the private law claims.
Part 56.9 of the CPR expressly allows the joining of any other relief provided it is
permitted by substantive law and is related or connected to the judicial review claim.
The relief in question here was sought against the 4th Defendant for denial of access of
the Claimant to the School. It was claimed that this decision contravened sections 4 (a),
(b), (d) & 5 (b) of the Constitution.
The Court agrees that this relief is related to the judicial review claim. Further, the fact
that Pamela was denied access to the school was never challenged by the 4th Defendant
as no affidavit on their behalf was ever submitted.
[34] Accordingly, pursuant to Part 56.9 (1) of the CPR, the Court sees no difficulty in joining
this constitutional relief to the judicial review claim.
Joinder of Interested Parties:
[35] Part 56.14 of the CPR permits a judge, at the hearing of a judicial review application, to
allow any person or body which appears to have a sufficient interest in the subject matter
of the claim to make submissions whether or not he has been served with the application.
13 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/judicial-review/
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[36] In the Civil Court Practice 201714 it is stated that a claim for judicial review may be
brought against one defendant or, in appropriate circumstances, against two or more
defendants.
Further, “if a claimant considers that any person is directly affected by the claim, they
must identify that person as an interested party and serve the claim form on that
person. A defendant must also identify in its acknowledgement of service a person who
the defendant considers is an interested party because the person is directly affected and
the Court will consider making that person an interested party when considering
permission.”
Therefore, the Claimant would be justified in including (i) Ms Roseanne Rondon, the
Acting principal; (ii) Mrs. Burke; and (iii) the Committee of the Council of Elders, as
Interested parties if (a) each has a sufficient interest in the judicial review claim to make
submissions; and/or (b) they are directly affected by the judicial review claim.
[37] At the outset, the Court notes that there were reliefs sought specifically against the 1st and
2nd Interested Parties only, which make them directly affected by the judicial review
claim. However, considering that Pamela was eventually instructed by SS III
Mohammed-Ali to return to the School as Principal and did so on the 29th August, 201415,
it is clear that the relief sought against Ms Rondon, along with her interest in the matter,
had become academic.
[38] With respect to Mrs. Burke, as the 2nd Interested Party, the Court finds that there is
sufficient interest for her to make submissions as an Interested Party in the matter. She
has several reliefs sought against her and has already filed an affidavit in response to the
claim. She is also the person alleged as responsible for both the allegations which led to
the disciplinary investigation against Pamela as well as the application for her removal as
principal.
[39] The Court notes, however, that there was no relief sought against the Committee, the 3rd
Interested Party, and therefore, it cannot be said that they are directly affected by the
14 (The Green Book). Procedure and Guidance: Court guides: Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide at para
2.3 Multiple Claimants/Defendants/Interested Parties. 15 Para 11 of Pamela’s Supplemental Affidavit.
Page 15 of 16
judicial review claim. Its interest as a party to these proceedings, however, can be seen in
its role. Mrs. Burke described them as “…a committee that was set up to help manage
and oversee the day to day operations of the…” 4th Defendant. Further, Mrs. Burke
claimed that she was the President of the 3rd Interested Party16.
While it can be said that the Claimant was justified in including the 3rd Interested Party
to the claim, the Court retains its discretion to decide whether there is any use in receiving
submissions from them under Part 56.14 (2).
[40] Accordingly, the Court does not view that the Claimant’s decision to include any of the
Interested Parties to the claim to be an abuse of process. However, the inclusion and the
interest to these proceedings of the 1st Interested Party, Ms Roseanne Rondon, has
become academic and the Court shall remove her from the Claim.
The 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties shall remain.
III. Disposition:
[43] Having considered the Applicants’ application and the submissions of both parties,
the Court makes the following orders:
1. The Claims made against the Applicants for the following reliefs are
considered by this Court to be appropriately joined to the Judicial Review
Claim herein:
i. Damages including aggravated and/or exemplary damages for
defamation;
ii. Damages including aggravated and/or exemplary damages for
unlawful interference with the Claimant’s Contract of Employment;
and
iii. Damages including aggravated and/or exemplary damages for
intentional infliction of Emotional Distress.
16 At para 5 of Mrs. Burke’s affidavit.
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2. The Claim for damages including aggravated and/or exemplary damages for
Intimidation is not appropriately joined in the Judicial Review Claim and will
be dealt with separately pursuant to Part 56.9 (2) (a) of the CPR.
3. The Claim for damages including aggravated and/or exemplary damages for
procuring a breach of the Claimant’s Contract of Employment will be struck
out.
4. The Claim against the 4th Defendant seeking a declaration that the application
made for the transfer and/or removal of the Claimant from her post as
Principal (Primary) of the School is null and void and of no effect is struck out
on the grounds that it has become academic.
5. The Claim against all the Defendants seeking a declaration as to the identities
of those persons properly constituting the Board of Management of the School
is struck out on the grounds that it is hypothetical and/or not appropriate for
Judicial Review Proceedings.
6. The Claim against the 4th Defendant for a declaration that the denial of access
of the Claimant from the School is unconstitutional is appropriately joined to
the Judicial Review Claim pursuant to Part 56.9 (1) of the CPR.
7. The 2nd & 3rd Interested Parties shall remain as Interested Parties in the
Judicial Review Claim.
8. The 1st Interested Party shall be removed as an Interested Party from this
Judicial Review Claim.
9. The parties shall the address the Court on the issue of costs.
Dated this 10th day of January, 2018
__________________
Robin N. Mohammed
Judge
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