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Towards Lasting Peace and Stability
Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan
UN and GCTF Good Practices for
Rehabilitation and Reintegrtation of Violent Extremist Offenders
Presented by
Dr. D.M. Stone, MajGen USMC (Ret)
Detention: Viewed as a Problem
Historic failures in custody and care serve as recruiting tools for foreign fighters.
Detention had also served as a place for insurgents to conduct recruiting, training, and disciplining of future combatants.
Defining Strategic Success
VICTORY• Establish an alliance with
moderate Iraqis
• Empower them to effectively marginalize violent extremists
• Provide momentum to the process of reconciliation with Iraqi society
•Phase I: Apply COIN principles to TIF, separate extremists from population, and protect populations both inside and outside the TIF
•Phase II: Defeat the insurgency within the TIF, succeed in the battlefield of the mind, and identify ideas which are contagious
•Phase III: Engaging populations with detainees, families, and releasees and establish a “social epidemic” which advances the objective of empowering the moderate ummah to marginalize the violent extremists within Iraq
The Plan
TF-134 Goals
• Ensure standards of care and custody
• Determine if detainee is Imperative Security Risk
- if so, reduce the risk, replace the destructive ideology
- when no longer a threat, release
• Identify detainees who are Enduring Security Risks
• Collect information from detainees and provide intelligence
• Defeat any insurgency within the TIF
CRRBCapture MAG CELL &
Release Detention
Previous Detention Process (before July 2007)
GO ReviewUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Govt of Iraq Reintegration & Reconciliation
MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting
EducationCivics & Islamic Discussions
VOTECH & Work Programs
Family Advocacy
Pledge & Guarantor Post-ReleaseRelease
MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment & Transition In
MNFRC RehearingC2X/Corps Vetting
Capture
Current Engagement Process
Interrogation
AFTER
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
The Powder Keg Exploding,Jihadist University
2004-2007Poor Intelligence
Inability to Segregate Extremists
Inadequate Command and Control
In 2007 there were a total of SIX detainee murders and up to 25 severe mutilations.
In 2008 there have been zero detainee murders and zero mutilations.
No Services
BEFORE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Empowering moderates through:
Intelligence
AFTER
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Segregating Violent Extremists
Reconciliation Services
Proper Command and Control
* T
IFR
C S
ER
VIC
ES
BE
GIN
AR
RIV
AL
OF
16
TH M
P B
DE
DE
PA
RT
UR
E O
F 1
6TH M
P B
DE
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
JAN07
FEB07
MAR07
APR07
MAY07
JUN07
JULY07
AUG07
SEP07
OCT07
NOV07
DEC07
JAN08
FEB08
MAR08
APR08
Disturbance/Riot Escape Murder Tunnels
TF Bucca Force Reduction Impacts
* TIFRC Services did not start until Sep 07
Surge
AFTERBEFORE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
TIF Weekly Re-internments 2004-2008
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
401
7-2
3 O
ct 0
4
12
-18
De
c 0
4
6-1
2 F
eb
05
3-9
Ap
r 0
5
29
Ma
y -
4 J
un
05
24
-30
Ju
l 0
5
18
-24
Se
p 0
5
13
-19
No
v 0
5
8-1
4 J
an
06
5-1
1 M
ar
06
30
Ap
r -
6 M
ay 0
6
25
Ju
n -
1 J
ul 0
6
20
-26
Au
g 0
6
15
-21
Oct 0
6
10
-16
De
c 0
6
4-1
0 F
eb
07
1-7
Ap
r 0
7
27
Ma
y-2
Ju
n 0
7
22
-28
Ju
l 0
7
16
-22
Se
p 0
7
11
-17
No
v 0
7
6-1
2 J
an
08
2-8
Ma
r 0
8
27
Ap
r -
3 M
ay 0
8
2004
26 Week Moving Avg.
2005 2006 2007 2008
Pledge Start MNFRC StartReintegration Services Start
AFTERBEFORE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PV2 Byron Fouty
CACHE LOCATIONS
SAFE HOUSES
PENDING ATTACKS
MEETING PLACES
INTEL SUPPORT TO MISCAP
SOURCE OPNS
OVER 1000 INTERROGATIONS
TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT
INSURGENT AND TERRORIST TTPsCELLORGANIZATION
IDENTIFY INSURGENT LEADERS
IED EFFORTS WITH JIEDDO, CEXC, AND NGIC
WEAPON SMUGGLING ROUTES
UTILIZE LEGAL SYSTEM
INTEL SUPPORT TO SONS OF IRAQIDENTIFY SONS OF IRAQ INFILTRATORS
IDENTIFY RECONCILIATION CANDIDATES
AQI PERCEPTION OF SOI
ASSESS SONS OF IRAQ EFFECTIVENESS
IP CDR
ABUNUR
5XIIRsNINEWA
DEVELOP TARGETS
JIDC
4XEFP IIRs
RECOVERED
TIF Release & Re-Internment2004 2004-2005 2004-2006 2004-2007 2004-2008
Cumulative Releases 10350 20412 34368 43319 49632Cumulative Re-Internments 37 571 1606 2847 3145Cumulative Re-Internment Rate 0.36% 2.80% 4.67% 6.57% 6.34%
7 Sept-31 Dec 07 7 Sep 07-17 May 08Cumulative MNFRC Releases 3743 8546Cumulative MNFRC Re-Internments 6 28Post MNFRC Re-Internment Rate 0.16% 0.33%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cumulative Re-Internment
AFTER
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Detainees
Special Populations
- Youth
- Women
- Mentally challenged
- Foreign Fighters
- Enduring Threats
COIN Operations
Engagement Programs
- Civics
- Education
- Votech
- Jobs
- Religious Discussion
MNFRC
MEDIAGoI Partnerships
Western
Pan-Arab
Iraqi
INGOsICRC
Amnesty International
UN
Executive
Ministries
Legislature
MOJ MOE
MOHR
President
Vice Presidents
Prime Minister
Social/Cultural Outreach
Families
Tribes/Clans
Sheiks/Leaders
USG
& MNF-I
MNC-IUSM-I
CALL
OSD
“Bernie’s” Timeline (ISN 168058— al Shayie)
Dec 2004 – Failed VBIED attack on Jordanian Embassy31 July 05 – Turned over to Saudi ArabiaMar 2008 – Bernie meets the DCG-DO in Saudi Arabia
Sunday, 18 September 2005
Strategic Releases: Capitalize on external Arab IO capabilities using Foreign Fighter detainees willing to publicly speak against Jihad
Strategic Releases
There is inadequate prison bed space in which to house current and projected inmate populations.
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 17
Battlefield of the Mind
Moderates
GOI and CoalitionExtremists
United Nations Best Practices
• Defining Goals and Objectives• Prison Context• The Role of Different Actors• Reintegration Components• Looking to Other Relevant Fields
Defining Goals and Objectives
• #1 In developing a rehabilitation program, it is important to first clearly define the program’s goals and objectives and identify indicators of success and failure.
• #2. Good prison standards and practices can offer an appropriate starting point for building an effective, safe and smoothly operating rehabilitation program.
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 21
In Coalition and GIRoA detention/corrections, there is a lack of a validated inmate classification system to identify prisoners by category, risk and radicalization.
• #3. An importanat first step is developing an effective intake, assessment and classification system for new inmates.
• #4. Where possible, States should consider establishing separate facilities for those inmates going through the rehabilitation programs.
• #5. Ensure that all relevant staff are appropriately and professionally trained and educated to deal with the complexities of reintegration or rehabilitation efforts.
UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 23
“Radicalization”
Afghan Prisons U.S. DetentionAfghan Criminals
Radical Islamists
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone
The Role of Different Actors
• #6. Some measure of control should be maintained over the inmates’ communication, both within and outside the prison.
• #7. Rehabilitation Programs should incorporate a broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with close coordination among the relevant departments and personnel involved.
• #8. Psychologists can play a key role in the rehabilitation process and should be fully integrated into these programs.
The Next
Attack
Just One Cell Phone Call Away . . .Serena Hotel
Attack
CPD HeadquartersBombing
Pol-i-Charki Wing 3Take Down
Bombs
KidnappingsAssassinations
CPD Action
Insurgent Retaliation
• #9. As the personnel in most frequent contact with the inmates, it is important that prison officers understand and are carefully attuned to the rehabilitation process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery.
• #10. When appropriate, States should integrate religious scholars into the rehabilitation process.
• #11. Law enforcement officers who are interviewing inmates during the rehabilitation process should receive specialized training and should coordinate these activities closely with the rehabilitation professionals.
• #12. Victims and victim’s advocates can be powerful voices and States should consider including them in rehabilitation programs, where appropriate.
• #13. Former violent extremists can be influential with those going through the rehabilitation process and should be included where possible and appropriate.
• #14. Charismatic members of the community can also help inspire change and should be included in rehabilitation programs where possible and appropriate.
Reintegration Components
• #15. Rehabilitation efforts should include behavioral and cognitive skills programs.
• #16. Rehabilitation programs should include basic education courses where possible and appropriate.
• #17. Rehabilitation programs should include vocational skills training and employment assistance where possible and appropriate.
• #18. States should consider finding ways to recognize the achievement of inmates who have completed the rehabilitation program.
• #19. States should consider whether inmates should be eligible for sentence reduction or other more lenient treatment based on the completion of rehabilitation courses.
• #20. States should consider whether additional financial support can be provided to inmates and their families who have completed the rehabilitation courses.
• #21. States should consider developing aftercare programs to enable the treatment to continue after the inmate has left the prison setting.
• #22. Consideration for protective measures should be given when there is evidence that a reformed terrorist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of family members, upon release from custody.
• #23. Formal or informal, parole-like monitoring post release can be an effective method to prevent recidivism.
• # 24. Families should be integrated where possible and appropriate into rehabilitation programs.
• #25. Fostering a welcoming community environment for the inmate post-release is critical to long-term success.
Other Relevant Fields.
#26. As States design rehabilitation programs, they should look, as appropriate, to other relevant fields beyond terrorism for lessons learned.
33
Success Dependencies
Isolate insurgent
forces from
external support
Political Will
War Strategy
Police Training
Agriculture
Reconstruction/PRT
Rule of Law
Corrections
CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
Kuwait City
Hamadan
Ahvaz
Dezful
Tigris R.
Euphrates R.
IRANIRAN
H3
22
6
Baghdad
1
KUWAITKUWAIT
JORDANJORDAN
H4
Tallil
2
5
12
1
10
1
Mosul Irbil
An Najaf
Kirkuk
Al Kut
Al Amarah
Ar Ramadi
Ar’ar
As Samawah
Umm Qasr
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Baqubah
Ar Rutbah
Dayr az Zawr
Rafha
Karbala
Sulaymaniyah
Al Qaim
Bashur
Al Hillah
Samarra
Fallujah
Al Kufa
Dahuk
Az Zubayr
Safwan
Tall Afar
Ad Diwaniyah
KarbalaKarbala
Al Muthanna’Al Muthanna’
Al BasrahAl Basrah
Dhi QarDhi Qar MaysanMaysan
WasitWasitBabilBabil
Al QadisiyahAl Qadisiyah
Al AnbarAl Anbar
DiyalaDiyala
Salah ad DinSalah ad Din
NinawaNinawa
At TamimAt TamimAs SulaymaniyahAs Sulaymaniyah
ArbilArbil
DahukDahuk
An NajafAn Najaf
9
SYRIASYRIA
SAUDIARABIASAUDIARABIA
LSA ANACONDALSA ANACONDA
FLB SYCAMOREFLB SYCAMORE
FLB JOSHUAFLB JOSHUA
FLB CEDARFLB CEDAR
4
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PL ALPHAPL BRAVO
OBJ CHARLIE
BATTLEFIELD
of the MIND
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