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Japan Railway & Transport Review 39 • July 200418 Copyright © 2004 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

Amsterdam Airport—The GrowingImportance of Rail Access

Donald Hatch

Growth of Air PassengerTransport in the Netherlands

With its favourable location close to themost populous areas of north-west Europe,the Netherlands has always played amajor role in European transport anddistribution. The Royal Dutch Airlines(KLM) began commercial flying atAmsterdam Airport (Schiphol) 15 kmsouth-west of Amsterdam, well beforeWWII and Schiphol has remained theNetherlands’ dominant airport since thenwith 97% of total air passenger traffictoday. As at other airports, growth oftraffic has been extremely rapid overmost of the last 50 years, with passengernumbers rising from little more than1 million in 1960 and nearly 10 million in1980, to 40 million at present (Table 1).The reasons for this spectacular growthcannot be dealt with in detail here, butare important because we need tounderstand for planning purposes to whatextent growth is likely to continue. Thefollowing factors have all played greateror lesser roles: the increase in realdisposable incomes and particularly in

leisure time; the introduction of larger andlarger aircraft with scale economiesre f lec ted in lower real a i r fares ,culminating in the recent phenomenon ofthe low-cost airline; and growinginternationalization both in business andthe private sphere. The negative impactof competition from high-speed railservices on certain routes has until nowbeen limited, as far as Schiphol isconcerned. The doubling of traffic overthe decade 1993–2002 was more theresult of growing leisure traffic to charterdestinations both inside and outsideEurope than of buoyant business travel.Although there are virtually no domesticair passengers in the Netherlands, manyDutch have enough time and income totake three or even more short-breakholidays abroad each year. A typicalbusiness destination such as Frankfurtshowed only 33% growth over the lastdecade, while traffic to Barcelonaquadrupled. London remains Schiphol’sprimary destination with more than3 million passengers per annum, whileParis has shown only modest growth to1 million passengers, probably partly asa consequence of the introduction of fasterThalys high-speed rail services betweenthe Netherlands and the French capital;the rail journey time from Amsterdam toParis fell from more than 6 hours in 1993to a little over 4 hours by Thalys today.Although there was a slight decline in airtraffic at Schiphol in 2003 compared to2002, the prospects for future growthremain strong as described later in thisarticle.

Growing Problems withGround Access

Airports are attractive markets for railways,not only because growth in demand seemsalmost guaranteed, but also because thepassenger demand is well spread over thehours of the day and days of the week.Even the commuting traffic is less

concentrated than normal during theconventional rush hours because of thepatterns of shift working at airports andairlines. However, access to Schiphol wasalmost entirely road based until the 1980s.By the 1970s, the airport had been greatlyextended, and had good access from themain Amsterdam–The Hague motorwayand indeed from the whole of the growingDutch motorway network (Fig. 1). Thesmall land area of the Netherlands, andthe ease with which passengers in thosedays could be set down or picked up atthe terminal entrance, meant that accessby car was the main mode. There was norail access and the only public transportalternative was the KLM airline shuttle busto and from Amsterdam and The Hague.However, despite the growing motorwaynetwork, road traffic congestion wasincreasing, and it was soon realized thatbringing and fetching passengersgenerated four ‘kiss and fly’ car journeys,while driving and parking at the airportgenerated two park and fly journeys, andusing public transport generated none atall. In addition, airport employment wasalso growing rapidly, reaching more than50,000 today and generating considerablecommuter traffic. Ultimately, provisionof parking space for both passengers andemployees became a major constraint forthe airport authorities.

Development of Rail Links toSchiphol (1979–2007)

The Dutch favour the bicycle for journeysup to 3 km, the car for up to 300 km, andflying for longer journeys. For a long time,the norm was a car journey to Schiphol—preferably as a passenger in a friend’s orrelative’s vehicle—for a flight to Paris orLondon. A railway to serve Schiphol, anda high-speed line (HSL) via Schiphol forjourneys to Brussels and beyond, had longbeen a pr inc ipa l pro jec t o f theNetherlands Railways (NS) to improve itsshare of the important 30–500 km market

Table 1 Growth of Air Passengersat Schiphol AirportAmsterdam

Year Passengers Annual growth rate

(million) average (%)

1950 0.3

1955 0.7 15.0

1960 1.3 14.0

1965 2.4 13.0

1970 5.0 16.0

1975 7.5 8.5

1980 9.4 4.5

1985 11.5 7.5

1990 16.5 6.2

1995 24.9 8.5

2000 39.3 9.6

2003 39.9 0.5

2004 (est.) 41.7 4.5

Source: Schiphol Airport Amsterdam annual reportsNote: Departures, arrivals and transfer passengers

Japan Railway & Transport Review 39 • July 2004 19Copyright © 2004 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

Figure 1 Access to Schiphol Airport (1980)

where faster rail has a competitive edge.NS was also anxious to increase railcapacity in the busiest ‘Randstad’ part ofthe Netherlands, an area comprised ofAmsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam andUtrecht with a total population of about6 million (more than 30% of the Dutchpopulation). The old line from Amsterdamto The Hague and Rotterdam was indirectand operating at full capacity, andAmsterdam Centraal Stat ion wasbecoming less and less central as citydevelopment spread south towards theairport. The original plan was toquadruple the tracks from The Hague toLeiden and build a new line from therevia a tunnel under Schiphol to a newterminal s ta t ion in the south ofAmsterdam. High costs and localresistance forced the plan for thisAmsterdam terminal to be rejected—awise decision in retrospect, because theinability to run through trains makes aterminal station very inconvenient.Instead, a long-term plan to use a morecircuitous but existing alignment aroundthe city was adopted. Figure 2 shows the

development of rail infrastructure atSchiphol and around Amsterdam since theearly 1980s. Clearly, the connection toSchiphol was more than jus t anindependent new line to link the airportwith its city, as is the case with somerecently opened lines such as the

Heathrow Express (UK) and ArlandaExpress (Sweden). From the start, it wasdesigned as an integral part of the NSnetwork, providing services to Schipholfor a large proportion of the populationand adding capacity for a wide range ofadditional Randstad services. This typeof development required major long-terminvestment.The first step was the 1979 start of a shuttleservice to Schiphol from a new station atAmsterdam Zuid/WTC (World TradeCentre), serving a completely newunderground station adjacent to theairport terminal. However, the 6-minutejourney at a 20-minute frequencyattracted few passengers because the linewas still isolated from the rest of thenetwork. The first major growth in trafficcame when the line was extended in 1981(becoming the Schiphol Line) offeringservices from The Hague (33 minutes) andRotterdam (51 minutes with a stoppingservice). There were no intercity (IC)services until the Westtak (Westernconnection) was opened in 1986 to offerfrequent through IC services fromAmsterdam Centraal (16 minutes), TheHague (27 minutes), and Rotterdam

Railways

Leiden

Haarlem

SchipholAirport

The HagueRotterdamBelgium

Utrechtand southand east

Amersfoortand northand east

Motorways 0 5 10 km

Figure 2 Development of Rail Infrastructure to Schiphol (1979–2007)

Haarlem

Leiden

Sloterdijk

RAI

Zuid/WTC

Schiphol Airport

Duivendrecht

Amsterdam Centraal

Utrecht EindhovenArnhemMaastricht

AlmereLelystad

North HollandNorth Holland

BrusselsParis

HSL 2007

1981

1986

1979 1981

2003

1993

1987

2005

The Hague, Rotterdam, Brussels

AmersfoortZwolleGroningenEnschede

Network to 1979

HSL under construction

Schiphol Line

Zuidtak (southern link) & Flevoline

Japan Railway & Transport Review 39 • July 200420


Copyright © 2004 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

(45 minutes), plus an hourly servicefrom Antwerp and Brussels. An hourlyall-night service linking Schiphol with thefour main Randstad cities was opened atthe same time and proved very popularwith airport and airline employees.The connection around the south ofAmsterdam (Zuidtak) was completed in1993, allowing through services toSchiphol from Hilversum and Amersfoortin the east and to the new polder cities ofAlmere and Lelystad. A new station wasopened at Duivendrecht, allowinginterchange for passengers from Utrechtand the south and east of the country andsaving considerable time compared totravelling via Amsterdam. The IC serviceto Schiphol from the north and east(Groningen, Leeuwarden and Enschede)continued to run via Amsterdam Centraaluntil 1996 when through IC services toSchiphol via the southern link wereintroduced, saving 25 minutes. TheThalys h igh-speed se rv ice f romAmsterdam via Brussels to Paris wasint roduced in 1996. I t runs v iaSchiphol on the conventional line toBrussels (2 hours and 22 minutes) andon to Paris (4 hours and 30 minutesthen, but now 3 hours and 52 minutesafter the opening of the HSL section southof Brussels).Emphasis on providing direct links to theairport by trains from as many cities inthe Netherlands as possible continued

with the opening (December 2003) of arail connection at Sloterdijk, allowingthrough services from the heavilypopulated North Holland area. 2006 willsee further improvements when four trainsan hour via Utrecht (from Eindhoven andArnhem, respectively) are planned toserve Schiphol using a new connectionat Duivendrecht. Utrecht then will beabout 30 minutes from the airport, insteadof the current 36 minutes with a change.This will be the first regular direct ICservice from Utrecht to Schiphol, althoughthere has been a stopping service viaHilversum since 1993. The planned 2007opening of the HSL, which diverges fromthe existing line south of Schiphol, toRotterdam and Antwerp will considerablyshorten journey times to Schiphol fromRotterdam, Belgium and Paris (see HSLsection).

Market Growth andRail Market Share

As far as growth is concerned, Schipholis now Europe’s fourth largest airport (afterLondon Heathrow, Paris Charles deGaulle and Frankfurt). With its relativelylarge proportion of transfer passengers(about 40%), the aim of becoming aEuropean hub has been very successfullyachieved. However, KLM and its partnerairlines still account for nearly 50% of allaircraft movements. 2003 saw 40 million

air passengers at Schiphol of which24 million were passengers travelling toand from the airport. Furthermore, therewere about 25 million commutingjourneys to and from the airport ,generating about 8 million rail journeysin addition to a similar number of airpassengers using rail for access. Despitevarious proposals to build a secondairport either on reclaimed polder landor even in the North Sea, such plans haveeffectively been abandoned in favour offurther concentrated growth at Schiphol;the logistics of providing (rail) accesswere a significant factor in this decision.In 2003, a fifth runway was opened,albeit several kilometers from theterminal building. Long-term proposalsfor additional rail access to a secondterminal at Schiphol are discussed later.What are the ‘key factors for success’ inimproving rail’s market share for accessto airports? Conventional wisdom is thatthe choice of rail or road is madeprincipally on the basis of convenienceand reliability, and that price is a lessimportant factor.Convenience covers aspects like thejourney to the station of origin and theprovision of a direct rail link to the airport(or at least one with an easy change),because most journeys involve carryingluggage, especially in the fast-growingleisure segment. Rail–air through ticketingand luggage check-in are elements of the

Artist’s impression of NS Intercity rolling stock (NS) Double-deck train serving Schiphol Airport Station (NS)


marketing strategy here. The conveniencefor carrying luggage is obviously a majorfactor in favour of the car, but fears ofmissed flights due to traffic congestion andthe expense and difficulty of parking arenegative elements.Reliability covers the risk of a majordelay that might mean missing a flight,either from traffic congestion or traindelays. Since passengers must usuallycheck-in well before the flight departuretime and fewer than 0.5% of railpassengers experience delays of morethan 30 minutes (less than 0.1% of railpassengers are delayed by more than1 hour), reliability may not seem as ign i f i can t f ac to r. In 2003, NSreceived only about 500 complaintsand 5000 compensation claims fordelays (of 30 minutes or more) ontrain journeys to Schiphol; this is less than1 journey in 1000 given the total of about8 million journeys to the airport. (NSrefunds 50% of the ticket price for delaysof 30–60 minutes at destinations and100% for delays of more than 60 minutes).However, personal security on trains is agrowing concern and increased policingis being implemented to prevent theftsfrom vulnerable foreign visitors, especiallyon the Amsterdam–Schiphol section.Recent qualitative market researchconducted by the Centre for MarketingAnalyses jointly commissioned by NS andSchiphol Group (airport operator) surveyedthe reasons that actually determine modalchoice. Both business and leisure airpassengers were covered by groupdiscussions and interviews. As with mostmodal choices, the findings confirmed thathabit and prejudice are the main factorsbehind the reasons to stay with the chosenmode. It is normal human behaviour tojustify one’s behaviour by praising thestrengths and ignoring the weaknesses ofone’s choice, and doing the opposite withalternatives. Consequently, both businessand leisure car users cited convenience,security, independence and privacy as

strengths, and the journey to the station,problems with luggage and changes, lackof comfort and information, etc., asweaknesses of the train. Conversely, railusers praised the train’s convenience inreaching the heart of the airport, especiallywhen frequent direct services are offered,and gave the risk of traffic congestion, andthe cost of parking at the airport asweaknesses of the car. In both cases, thereappears to be little willingness to consideranother mode, let alone change to it. Somesuggestions made to improve the rail modewere: upgrades to first class; betterinformation about delays; combi-tickets fortaxi and train; and better parking atdeparture stations. The aspects of betterluggage facilities, rail–air combi-ticketing,and a ticket guarantee in case of delays,are areas NS, KLM and Schiphol Grouphave developed as possible ‘product-plusses’ and some experiences arediscussed more fully below; it is thoughtthat implementing the other suggestionswould have only a marginal effect on themodal split, while being difficult and costlyin practice.Assuming the hurdle of the journey to thedeparture train station can be solved bythe use of car or ‘train-taxi’ (a form ofshared taxi operated at many stations byNS), how far has NS been successful inoffering what the survey highlighted asrail’s greatest strength, the provision offrequent direct train services to Schiphol?At present, all the busiest 30 stations (withmore than 7500 passengers boarding perday, 54% of total rail traffic) have directservices to Schiphol with the exceptionof Eindhoven, Arnhem, Den Bosch,Haarlem, Nijmegen, Tilburg, Alkmaar,Gouda, Amsterdam Amstel, Maastrichtand Ede-Wageningen. Current plansenvisage direct services from Eindhoven,Arnhem, Den Bosch, and Ede when theconnection at Duivendrecht is opened atthe end of 2005. Passengers from virtuallyall other stations can reach Schiphol withone change of train. I t is worth

mentioning that regular and frequentservices are the best known and mostused; pas t exper iments runningoccasional supplementary trains throughto Schiphol from Maastricht, Eindhovenand Utrecht, or from places in Germany,attracted relatively few customers andwere withdrawn to free track capacity forother services.Car parking away from the terminalbuilding is now mandatory and increasinglyexpensive (€22.50 (€1 = US$1.24) per dayfor short-term parking or €45 for 3 daysplus €5 per extra day for long-termparking). Long-term parking involves aninconvenient 10-minute bus ride to andfrom open-air car parks. At €65, just1 week of car parking is much moreexpensive that two return tickets fromUtrecht to Schiphol (€24, or only €14for railcard holders).Despite the resistance to changingmode mentioned above, this attentionto providing frequent direct services tothe airport has paid off in rail growth,both in terms of absolute numbers ofpassengers and in modal split. SchipholStation has become the Netherlands’sixth busiest railway station with about50,000 passengers per day (afterAmsterdam 150,000; Utrecht 130,000;The Hague 110,000; Rotterdam 92,000;and Leiden 54,000). The more than2 million annual trips in each directionbetween Amsterdam and Schiphol makeit the most common journey on the NSnetwork.The totals in Table 2 include passengerscommuting to and from the airport, but asimple comparison with the number of airpassengers in Table 1 shows that rail’sshare increased rapidly until about 1990and has remained steady since then. Infact, market share—or the modal split forrail—has grown from about 10% whenthe Schiphol Line was opened to 25% inthe early 1990s and to nearly 35% today.Table 3 shows the changes in the sharesof the various modes over the last decade




and gives a breakdown by motive anddomicile of the air passenger. Althoughrail has a strong share both for residentsof the Netherlands and for foreigners, aswell as for both business and leisuremotives, the main competition is still thepopular ‘kiss and fly’ use of the privatecar.In 2002, slightly more than 16 millionpeople used Schiphol Station; about halfwere air passengers with the remainderbeing mainly Schiphol workers going toand from the airport and representing abouta one-third modal split for rail forcommuting to Schiphol. A large numberof airport commuters use the extensive andsuccessful Star Network of bus routes runby the bus operator, Connexxion, servingthe airport.Given the importance of the foreign-passenger market (41% of all arriving anddeparting air travellers in 2002 were non-

Dutch), attention to the specific needs ofthis group in marketing the rail product isessential. In addition to the obvious needto provide information, signs, etc., at leastin Dutch and English, foreign passengerswill have little knowledge about possibletypes of onward transport, where to buytickets, fares, etc., explaining why visitorspredominantly use easy-to-ride but veryexpensive taxis. (A taxi journey to centralAmsterdam from Schiphol costs about€30 compared to about €3 for a railticket.) Active marketing of the rail modebefore and upon arrival at the airport isneeded, since the station althoughadjacent to the terminal is undergrounda n d t h e r e f o r e l e s s p r o m i n e n t .Announcements and written informationon-board arriving aircraft and in the arrivalhalls can all contribute. The NS ticket-vending machines in the airport luggagereclaim areas are mainly used by Dutch

residents because the machines aredifficult for newcomers to understand anddo not accept banknotes. Although thereis a 24-hour manned station ticket officeselling the whole range of domestic andinternational tickets and providing fullinformation (Fig. 3), it is not in the airportterminal building, and therefore notobvious to arriving foreign passengers.

Luggage and TicketingInitiatives

Apart from frequent and reliable throughrail services to the airport, two othermarketing initiatives designed to attractpassengers to use the train are provisionof a luggage check-in and handlingservice, and integration of the rail ticketwith the airline ticket. Both are tailor-made services that are rather labourintensive and not easily managed bycompanies used to dealing with masstransport. Although the NS experience todate been somewhat disappointing,renewed attempts are being made torevitalize what is in essence an importantproduct-plus. The following extracts arefrom a recent (May 2002) IATA study onrail–air intermodality and serve tohighlight this issue:‘The first obstacle is the lack of luggagecheck-in for all the journey and securityreasons.’ (Air France)‘Passengers prefer some assistance at theairport station to carry their luggage. Abetter service to help the passengertransferring his luggage between the airand rail terminals is a first good solution.The problem of security is especiallyrelevant in the case of luggage. Railwaysdo not have the airline facilities to takecare of luggage, and would face constantsecurity issues if they did. Moreover, fewpassengers have used (such a) service—business passengers are not interested, asthey carry little luggage, and leisurepassengers fear of loss of luggage, notk n o w i n g w h o w o u l d h a v e t h e

Table 2 Growth in Rail Passengers using Schiphol Station

No. of passengersNew service/event (first full year) (million)

1980 Amsterdam RAI–Schiphol shuttle service open 0.51982 Den Haag–Schiphol open 1.91987 Amsterdam Centraal–Schiphol via western link open 3.91991 Student free rail pass introduced 8.21994 Southern link and Duivendrecht interchange open 9.81996/97 Direct ICs to north and east; Thalys HST to Paris 12.12002 16.1

Source: NS

Table 3 Changes in Modal Split for Journeys to and from Schiphol

1994 2002 Business Business Leisure LeisureAccess mode (%) total total Dutch non-Dutch Dutch non-Dutch

Kiss and fly1) 41 33 27 18 48 22Park and fly 13 10 27 1 11 1Train 25 33 33 34 28 46Bus 1 1 1 0 2 1Taxi 10 10 9 30 6 17Shared vehicles2) 5 10 3 7 6 9Other including hire car 4 3 0 10 0 4Total 100 100 100 100 100 100No. of air trips (millions) 23.6 3.8 4.4 10.2 5.2

Source: Schiphol Airport Amsterdam1) Passengers driven to airport by friends or relatives2) Airline/hotel buses, charters, taxi-buses (discrepancies between total and segments due to non-

response)


responsibility for their luggage.’ (SNCF)‘Luggage is one of the most eminentfactors concerning convenience duringrail travel. Offering luggage services willincrease demand for intermodality. In anideal state of service the passenger wouldship his luggage to the final destinationaddress before starting the trip to theairport.’ (Düsseldorf Airport)Attempts by NS to provide an attractiveluggage check-in service have had achequered history. In the late 1980s, NS,KLM and Schiphol Group cooperated inproviding check-in desks at the Rotterdamand Den Haag stations. Passengers couldhave their luggage checked-in andsecurity sealed by trained NS staff, butthey still had to carry it themselves ontothe train, and hand it in at a specialcounter at the airport. However, the costswere high and only a few passengersmade use of the service, so it was

discontinued after a trial period. In 1995,the same three bodies cooperated inrunning a train service from Enschede inthe east of Holland direct to Schiphol.Customers had a reserved first-class seat,a stewardess travelled on the train andweighed the luggage, which was thenchecked-in by airport staff on arrival atSchiphol. Boarding passes were issuedon the train, reducing the check-in timeto 45 minutes. The service was offered atthe standard first-class train fare with a 6%supplement, but was expensive to run,somewhat inflexible, not available on allt rains, and did not at t ract manypas senge r s . I t ha s s ince beendiscontinued. During 2003, NS startedlooking again at ways of handling railpassengers’ luggage in cooperation withthe TPG Post, the Dutch postal service.Research indicates that inconvenienceand fear of loss or delay are major factors

deterring use of any luggage system thatinvolves separate collection and deliveryof luggage to the airport, but avoidingthese deterrents by carrying one’s ownluggage is itself a major factor in deterringuse of the train. On average, airpassengers have just one item of luggageto check-in with just 20% carrying two ormore items. Any system is likely to belabour intensive and introduction of a newservice is only at the test phase. Perhapsa simple and low-cost improvementwould be to extend the availability ofluggage trolleys to other major stations aswell as Schiphol, and accept thatpassengers who are not self-sufficient indealing with their own luggage will tendto choose other modes, such as car or taxi.The demand for through ticketing,meaning one ticket for both the rail andair parts of the journey, is more an issueof offering a product-plus than eliminatinga real deterrent to the use of rail. In 2000,NS negotiated an arrangement with KLMsuch that a business ticket on a KLM flightwas valid for a first-class rail journey fromand to any station in the Netherlands; aneconomy airline ticket offered the samefacility but in second class. This gave KLMa marketing edge in price-sensitivemarkets but the arrangement wasdiscontinued in June 2003. Although thefixed price per ticket paid by KLM coveredthe abstraction of revenue for NS and ledto some growth in traffic, KLM found thatthe product -p lus o f fe red by thearrangement did not attract sufficient extrapassengers from competitor airlines tocompensate for the costs. Rail’s poorreliability image—especially in 2001—was a contributing factor despite the smallactual risk of a major rail delay leading toa missed flight. NS and Schiphol Grouphave recently explored whether all airpassengers can be offered free rail travelto and from the airport combined withsome form of reliability guarantee.Although such an arrangement wouldattract passengers from road to rail and

Figure 3 Schiphol Station Concourse




contribute to reduced road congestion tothe airport, the costs for the airport arelarger than the available budget and earlyintroduction is unlikely.

Dealing with ContinuedPassenger Growth at Schiphol

Despite economic recession, threats ofterrorism, and the recent substitution ofsome short-haul traffic by improvedIntercity Express (ICE) rail services toGermany, Schiphol seems almost certainof continued growth in passengernumbers. Current forecasts are for at least67 million passengers in 2015, 60% morethan today and an annual growth of 4.5%.This forecast takes account of additionalsubstitution of short-haul passengers,principally to Paris, and to a lesser extentBrussels and London, by high-speed trainservices from 2007, as well as positiveeffects of growing leisure demand and theimpact of low-cost airlines. There are twoother Schiphol-specific developments:the proposed privatization of the airport,and the merger between KLM and AirFrance announced in autumn 2003. Theformer is not expected to have a significanteffect on traffic volumes or the modal split,but the effects of the latter are stilluncertain while the ramifications of the

deal are worked out. The airport does notexpect a major effect on traffic flows inthe first few years after the merger giventhe guarantee that Air France mustmaintain KLM as an independent carrierand retain its most important destinations.The two a i r l ines have s t rong lyc o m p l e m e n t a r y n e t w o r k s a n drationalization of sales and service ratherthan of routes is expected.Apart from the major investment requiredat the airport itself to cope with suchgrowth, dealing with demand for accessto the airport will require both acoordinated transport policy and heavyinvestment in infrastructure to furtherincrease the coverage, frequency andquality of train services, as well as effectivemarketing to encourage passengers toswitch to rail and/or other public transportfor journeys to the airport.Since there are no plans for any substantialincrease in road capacity on the alreadyheavily congested motorways serving theairport, or for increasing the number ofairport parking spaces, the transport policyremains focused on increasing the marketshare of public transport, especially rail.Plans to introduce some form of roadpricing in the Netherlands have recentlyreturned to the government’s agenda, andLondon’s experience with congestion

charging is being closely followed.However, this is a complex area withconsiderable public resistance. Althoughroad pricing is an inevitable long-termsolution to unrestrained car usage, it isunlikely to have any effect on the modalsplit to Schiphol before 2010 at theearliest. The current situation is that some30% of departing air passengers are stillbrought to the airport by car and a further10% park there. Rail’s market share inthe early days of the rail link was around10%, but has grown gradually to about35% today. Longer-term plans call for atleast a 50% market share. Given thecurrent forecasts for passenger growth atSchiphol, this means that NS alreadyneeds to plan to double the number oftrains serving Schiphol from 14 to 27 perhour in each direction by 2007. Thisincludes incorporating six fast paths forthe Thalys and domestic high-speed trainsto operate on the new HSL, four using thenew connection at Duivendrecht (Fig. 2),and one ICE path from Frankfurt and Kölnwithout sacrificing existing services andoffering a higher level of punctuality thannow. Exactly how this can be donewithout massive investment in additionalinfrastructure is currently the subject of amajor project to redesign the NS timetablein that year. (The route is alreadyquadruple-tracked through Schiphol withsix tracks in the station tunnel.) Muchwork has been done on a new approachcalled ‘Building and Utilizing,’ which aimsto increase the capacity of the entireexisting Dutch network by makingrelatively small investments in tracklayout, energy supply and signallingwithout extensive track quadrupling. Theroute through Schiphol is a good testingground for this approach. The requiredincrease in capacity seems possible witha €75-million investment in more flexiblesignalling and points, etc., albeit withsmall increases in running times. Copingwith traffic growth after 2010 will requiremajor new investment; present proposals

Departing KLM jumbo jet at Schiphol Airport (D. Hill)


are for a second terminal to the north-westof the current one with additional parallelrail tracks to serve it diverging from andrejoining the existing line, and runningalongside an extension of the Amsterdammetro. Some form of ‘people-mover’would be required to connect the twoterminals, which might be severalkilometers apart. In addition, there areplans to extend the north–south line of theAmsterdam metro to the existing terminal.

HSL

When the Dutch HSL was in the planningphase, KLM’s PR department reacted bysaying,‘We are not afraid of competition from thehigh-speed train. On the contrary, KLMfully supports the high-speed line. Thehigh-speed train will free up some short-haul paths for intercontinental flights.’Indeed, NS and KLM formed an alliance tosuccessfully bid for the operation of serviceson this line from 2007. The plans for ahigh-speed line from Amsterdam viaRotterdam to Antwerp and Brussels, linkingwith the high-speed network from Paris andLondon, date from the 1980s. The line wasrouted via the new Schiphol Line becausea new line into Amsterdam was not thoughtfeasible, and use of the currentinfrastructure to give access to bothAmsterdam Centraal and AmsterdamZuid/WTC was the only real option. Someintercontinental passengers are expected totransfer to the HSL for onward journeysfrom Schiphol to Brussels, Paris, etc., butthe majority of substitution from air to HSLwill be passengers boarding for Brussels,Paris and London in the major cities ofAmsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam, orchanging from other domestic trains ontothe high-speed services at those stations.In fact, the HSL will carry more domesticpassengers than international, and accessto Schiphol, principally from Rotterdam (sixhigh-speed trains per hour with two

originating in Breda, near the Belgianborder), will be improved when thedomestic high-speed trains start to operate.Breda (not currently served by direct trainsto Schiphol) will have a journey time ofonly 47 minutes compared to 90 today.The journey from Rotterdam to Schipholwill be halved to 20 minutes, but there willbe no improvement in the 15-minutejourney from Amsterdam Centraal. It is notyet known whether access to these high-speed trains will be limited by reservationor subject to market pricing or yield-management system, and whether or howthe smart-card ticketing currently underdevelopment will apply to these trains. Thesuccessful NS/KLM tender for operating theline foresees a considerable payment to thegovernment in track-access charges, so thatadditional revenue will be required.Eventually, one may expect domestic high-speed services giving faster access to andfrom Schiphol to be extended viaconventional tracks to Eindhoven and otherimportant cities, as proposed in NS’soriginal 1999 submission (rejected by thegovernment at that time). The verydesirable through service to London withits very large leisure and business marketsremains a long-term objective, but variousconstraints (principally security related tothe Channel Tunnel and immigration)unfortunately mean that early introductionis unlikely. Instead, an inconvenientchange at Brussels will still be needed, afactor that has a major negative effect onthe attractiveness of the international railproduct.When the HSLs in the Netherlands andUK are completed, journey times from

Schiphol to Brussels, Paris, and Londonwill be 1 hour and18 minutes, 2 hoursand 48 minutes, and 3 hours and28 minutes (assuming a through service),respectively.

Conclusions

Rail traffic to and from Schiphol AirportAmsterdam is likely to continue to growstrongly as a consequence of both thegrowth in air travel and of further increasesin rail’s market share. Despite the heavyinvestment required to cope with suchgrowth, the traffic is profitable for therailways since it is less peaked in time andplace than most major flows. With thecompletion of the HSL, the additionalconnection at Duivendrecht, and thedoubling of train frequencies from 2007,Schiphol looks set to become theNetherlands’ fifth most important station,after the four main Dutch cities. Withfrequent and reliable through trainservices, and adequate marketing, rail canplay an important and growing role inproviding access to a major Europeanairport, thereby reducing the costs andenvironmental impact of ever-increasinginvestment in road access. �

Donald Hatch

Mr Hatch is an Account Manager in the Business Strategy Department of NS, where he is responsible

for the performance contract between the railway and the Dutch government for services on the trunk

rail network, for international benchmarking, and also for the cooperation between NS and JR Kyushu.

Before joining NS in 1984, he worked in marketing at London Transport and as a marketing consultant

with McKinsey in Amsterdam. He has a degree in economics from the University of Cambridge.

He contributed an article about Dutch–Japanese railway cooperation to JRTR 24.

amsterdam airport—the growing importance of rail access · ground access airports are attractive...

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