AN ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Strategy

by

ANN KIAT ONG, MAJ, SC SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

B.Sc., London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, 1995

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003

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14. ABSTRACT Transnational terrorism has recently emerged as a serious security threat in Southeast Asia. This thesisexamines the conditions, causes, and nature of the transnational terrorist threat in the region. It analysesthe historical, political, economic, sociocultural, religiousethnic, and geostrategic factors in Southeast Asia,and the history, goals, strategy, operations, and transnational relationships of four selected Islamicfundamentalist groups in the region (namely Jemaah Islamiyah, Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia, MoroIslamic Liberation Front, and Laskar Jihad) that contribute to the emergence of the threat. The analysisdemonstrates that the underlying conditions and causes are complex, comprising both contributing andcountervailing elements. The nature of the threat displays limited indigenous roots, underpinnings oftemporal and non-lasting political and economic problems, and strong external influences. It concludesthat the emergence of transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia is essentially an external-influencedphenomenon with limited and weak internal coherence, and is therefore not an inherent and irreversibleprocess. A clear understanding of the conditions, causes, and nature of the threat can provide a frameworkfor the development of effective regional and national strategies to combat it.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Ann Kiat Ong Thesis Title: An Analysis of the Emergence of Transnational Terrorism in Southeast Asia Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chairman John A. Reichley, M.B.A., M.S.J., M.Ed. , Member Stuart D. Lyon, M.P.A. , Member, Consulting Faculty James B. Martin, Ph.D. Accepted this 6th day of June 2003 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

iii

ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by MAJ Ann Kiat Ong, Singapore Armed Forces, 66 pages. Transnational terrorism has recently emerged as a serious security threat in Southeast Asia. This thesis examines the conditions, causes, and nature of the transnational terrorist threat in the region. It analyses the historical, political, economic, sociocultural, religious-ethnic, and geostrategic factors in Southeast Asia, and the history, goals, strategy, operations, and transnational relationships of four selected Islamic fundamentalist groups in the region (namely Jemaah Islamiyah, Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Laskar Jihad) that contribute to the emergence of the threat. The analysis demonstrates that the underlying conditions and causes are complex, comprising both contributing and countervailing elements. The nature of the threat displays limited indigenous roots, underpinnings of temporal and non-lasting political and economic problems, and strong external influences. It concludes that the emergence of transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia is essentially an external-influenced phenomenon with limited and weak internal coherence, and is therefore not an inherent and irreversible process. A clear understanding of the conditions, causes, and nature of the threat can provide a framework for the development of effective regional and national strategies to combat it.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could not have been possible without the Lord’s grace, guidance, and

strength. It would also not have been possible without the advice and guidance from the

members of my thesis committee comprising Mr. John Reichley, Mr. Stuart Lyon, and

Dr. James Martin. I am grateful to the Combined Arms Research Library staff for their

assistance in sourcing for the many materials used in this thesis. I am also grateful to the

staff of the Graduate Degree Programs Office for their assistance in developing and

formatting this thesis. Last but not least, my deepest appreciation goes to my wife Shiao

Yee for her patience, understanding, encouragement, and support throughout the course

of the research and the school year.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................ iv ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................ vi ILLUSTRATION AND TABLES ............................................................................ vii CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................. 9 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .................................................................. 28 4. ANALYSIS ................................................................................................... 33 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................... 57 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 61 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .............................................................................. 64 CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.......................... 65

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ACRONYMS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

DI Darul Islam

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

KMM Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia

LJ Laskar Jihad

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

SEA Southeast Asia

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ILLUSTRATION AND TABLES

Figure Page 1. Map of Southeast Asia ...................................................................................... 4 Table 1. An Analysis of Conditions in SEA ................................................................... 34 2. An Analysis of Four Islamic Fundamentalist Groups....................................... 45

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has gained prominence as a threat to global stability since the 11

September 2001 attacks on the United States. Increased international efforts to combat

terrorism have uncovered extensive transnational linkages among terrorist organizations

throughout the world. In particular, evidence of Al Qaeda’s presence and the close

linkages among various extremist groups in Southeast Asia (SEA) have surfaced and

alarmed governments in the region. SEA has historically been plagued by localized

terrorism in individual countries carried out by extremist groups with various political

and religious agendas. These threats have largely been confined and handled within the

particular country with little impact on the security of the region. However, the divisive

and fragile political, economic, social, and security structures in many Southeast Asian

countries, which could present fertile grounds for transnational terrorist groups, have led

some analysts to label SEA as the second front of the global war against terrorism.

Two recent events corroborate the susceptibility of SEA to the threat of

transnational terrorism. In August 2002, Singapore carried out its second arrest of

members from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)--a transnational, clandestine, Islamic

fundamentalist group that seeks to create by force an Islamic regime in Muslim-

dominated parts of SEA; that is, from southern Thailand through the lower part of the

Philippines. The JI members were plotting to bomb the American Embassy and other

foreign targets in Singapore. They were also planning to attack the Singapore Defense

Ministry and the water pipeline between Singapore and Malaysia so as to instigate a

2

conflict between the two neighboring countries.1 In October 2002, Indonesia suffered one

of its most severe terrorist attacks on the tourist island of Bali. Two bomb explosions at a

popular nightclub killed about 180 people, most of them foreign, primarily Australian,

tourists. The terrorist attack in Bali has prompted Indonesian authorities to the existence

of transnational terrorists operating in Indonesia2 and to undertake various measures to

deal with the threat.

The emergence of SEA as a second front in transnational terrorism appears

unequivocal. The contributing factors identified by various analysts include SEA’s large

Muslim population base, its porous borders, large numbers of established Islamic

fundamentalist groups with close linkages to one another and other international terrorist

groups such as Al Qaeda, governments that are unable or unwilling to deal effectively

with the terrorist threat, economic problems that create social inequalities and divisions,

and inadequate cooperation among regional countries.

However, some analysts differ in the severity of the transnational terrorist threat

in SEA. On the one hand, Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan (analysts at The Heritage

Foundation) suggest that SEA will be “another important front” in the United States’

global war against terrorism and the region is “both an ideal safe haven for him (Osama

bin Laden) and a potential base of operations from which he could launch terrorist

counteroffensives against the United States.”3 On the other hand, John Gershman (senior

analyst at the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Asia/Pacific Editor for Foreign

Policy in Focus) believes that the transnational terrorist threat in SEA is overestimated

and that an overmilitarized response could be counterproductive. Based on a closer

analysis of the terrorist groups and situation in SEA, Gershman’s reasons for a lesser

3

threat in SEA include the absence of state-sponsored terrorism, the profound ethnic and

religious diversities that prevent the establishment of a fundamentalist hegemony by any

one group, the democratic nature of the major Southeast Asian countries, and the lack of

popular support for the major extremist groups in the region.4

As international and regional anti-terrorism efforts begin to converge on SEA, an

in-depth understanding of the conditions and causes that promote the threat of

transnational terrorism in SEA is critical to ensure that these efforts are appropriate and

effective. While the various analysts touch on these conditions and causes, there is

generally insufficient depth and breadth in their analyses. As such, this thesis seeks to

provide a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the emergence of transnational

terrorism in SEA, which will provide a useful basis for the development of strategies to

combat it.

Scope

The scope of this thesis is focused on the conditions and causes in SEA that

provide fertile grounds for the emergence of transnational terrorism. It analyzes the

impact of historical, political, economic, sociocultural, religious-ethnic, and geostrategic

factors influencing SEA’s security environment on the development of transnational

terrorism. In particular, the thesis focuses on transnational terrorism developing as a

strategy among major Islamic fundamentalist groups operating within the six core

members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--Indonesia, Malaysia,

the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei (figure 1)--where there are significantly

large Muslim populations and substantive support for these fundamentalist groups. While

4

other extremist groups with non-Islamic agendas also exist within SEA, such as the

communist New People’s Army in the Philippines, the Islamic fundamentalist groups

have presently exhibited the closest transnational linkages with the organizational ability

to carry out attacks on a transnational scale that can present a significant threat to the

region as a whole.

Figure 1. Map of Southeast Asia. Source: CIA World Factbook [map on-line]; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/reference_maps/southeast_asia.html; Internet; accessed on 20 March 2003.

5

The four widely recognized major Islamic fundamentalist groups selected for the

purpose of this thesis are: the JI, the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) in

Malaysia, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, and the Laskar

Jihad (LJ) in Indonesia. These groups are not all, but they are sufficiently representative

of the emerging transnational terrorist threat in SEA. The thesis analyzes the history,

goals, strategies, operations, and transnational relationships of these fundamentalist

groups with reference to the underlying conditions in SEA that encourage the adoption of

transnational terrorism by these groups.

Research Questions

The thesis answers the primary research question of why transnational terrorism is

emerging in SEA. The two secondary research questions addressed by the thesis are:

what is the nature of the emerging threat of transnational terrorism, particularly in

connection with Islamic fundamentalism in SEA, and what are the underlying conditions

and causes in SEA that lead to the development of transnational terrorism. The two

tertiary research questions addressed by the thesis are: what is the impact of historical,

political, economic, sociocultural, religious-ethnic, and geostrategic factors influencing

SEA’s security environment on the development of transnational terrorism, and what are

the history, goals, strategies, operations, and transnational relationship of the four Islamic

fundamentalist groups with reference to the above factors in SEA.

6

Assumptions

The thesis makes three key assumptions: the selected Islamic fundamentalist

groups are sufficiently representative of the emerging transnational terrorist threat in

SEA, overt sources about the Islamic fundamentalist groups provide sufficiently

indicative data for the required analysis, and significant linkages exist between the

emergence of transnational terrorism among the Islamic fundamentalist groups and the

underlying factors influencing SEA’s security environment.

Definitions

To facilitate clear understanding, it is important to define the term transnational

terrorism as used in the thesis. The thesis does not intend to participate in the ongoing

debate about the correct definition of terrorism. It suffices that a sufficiently broad and

generally accepted definition be used. Bruce Hoffman’s (author of Inside Terrorism)

definition of terrorism, which combines the key elements of 109 different definitions of

terrorism from different countries and agencies, is used in the thesis; that is, the

“deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in

the pursuit of political change.”5 The thesis also does not intend to enter into the debate

about the difference between terrorism and insurgency. It sees terrorism as a method and

does not prejudge the legitimacy of the causes in the employment of terrorist tactics.

Thus, a recognized insurgent group with a legitimate cause will be considered to be

engaging in terrorism if the group uses terrorist tactics as an instrument to achieve its

objectives. Transnational is defined as “extending or going beyond national boundaries.”6

As such, transnational terrorism is defined in the thesis as terrorism involving activities,

7

organizations, targets, victims, and institutions of more than one country. Further, to

differentiate transnational terrorism from international terrorism, the former involves

primarily non-state actors while the latter involves direction and sponsorship by state

actors.7

Limitations

The thesis is limited to an analysis of general trends and conditions in SEA that

have an impact on the emergence of transnational terrorism in the region. It focuses on

regional-level conditions rather than country-specific factors. As such, it does not seek to

examine in detail the conditions within each SEA country that may contribute to the

transnational terrorist threat. The thesis is also limited to a strategic and operational level

analysis of the four Islamic fundamentalist groups, with emphasis on understanding the

causes of the four groups’ shift toward the adoption of transnational terrorism. It does not

seek to study the four groups’ organizations, operations, and tactics in detail. Thus, the

widely available materials about these four groups and their publicly announced goals

and strategies would be sufficient for the purpose of this thesis. The final limitation is that

the thesis does not seek to address the strategies to combat transnational terrorism, though

it aims to derive a framework from the nature, conditions, and causes of the emerging

transnational terrorism that will be useful for the development of appropriate and

comprehensive strategies to deal with it.

8

Anticipated Problems

The thesis anticipated in its research the problem of insufficiency of research

materials at the Combined Arms Research Library or in the United States on the

fundamentalist groups and situation in SEA. As such, a significant amount of the research

relied on what was available on the Internet, especially articles and information generated

from SEA. Relevant research materials were also sought from academic and research

institutes based in SEA.

Conclusion

Finally, by elucidating the underlying conditions and causes of the emerging

transnational terrorism in SEA, the thesis hopes to make a contribution to the

international and regional efforts to deal with the emerging transnational terrorist threat.

1Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the

Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, January 2003), 11-14.

2“Indonesia ponders Al Qaeda link,” CNN.com, 13 October 2002 [article on-line]; available from http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/13/ bali.blast.chew/index.html; Internet; accessed on 6 March 2003.

3Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan, “Southeast Asia and the War against Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1496 (23 October 2001): 1.

4John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 61-62.

5Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 43.

6Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v. “transnational”, May 1993.

7Louise Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors” in The Future of Terrorism, ed. Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 2001), 210.

9

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Given the recent emergence and attention on the threat of transnational terrorism

in SEA, there is limited authoritative and substantive literature on this field of study. The

established literature focuses mainly on localized terrorist threats, rather than

transnational terrorism, in SEA. As such, there is a gap in addressing the nature,

conditions, and causes of the transnational terrorist threat in SEA as a region.

Nevertheless, the possibility of SEA as a second front in the global war against terrorism

prompted a proliferation of commentaries and analyses that provided useful research

materials for this thesis.

Emergence of Transnational Terrorism in SEA

Beginning with the contributing factors to SEA’s emergence as a second front in

transnational terrorism, Heritage Foundation analysts Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan

put forward the following: SEA’s large Muslim population base, a large number of

established Islamic fundamentalist groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda, weak and corrupt

governments that are unable or unwilling to deal effectively with the terrorist threat even

though they oppose it, and inadequate cooperation among regional countries. Though the

vast majority of Muslims are moderates and do not support terrorism, they provide

“fertile ground for Al Qaeda to recruit fighters, raise money, and find safe harbor.” The

result is a region that is both “an ideal safe haven . . . and a potential base of operations”

for Al Qaeda.1 While the majority of Islamic fundamentalist groups in SEA have

10

domestic agendas and limited resources to expand their fight outside their home

countries, the availability and influence of foreign support can lead to the rise of

transnational terrorist agendas, objectives, and activities in SEA. As such, Dillon and

Pasicolan urge the United States to help regional governments to identify domestic

Islamic fundamentalist organizations with foreign support and to cooperate with them to

cut off that support, among other proposed initiatives.2

Interhemispheric Resource Center senior analyst John Gershman advocates

similar underlying conditions that facilitate the emergence of transnational terrorism in

SEA. In addition, he identifies the economic problems and fragile democratic institutions

of many countries in SEA that lead to the “economic marginalization and political

subordination of large segments of their populations.”3 However, Gershman goes deeper

in his analysis of these underlying conditions to show that the transnational terrorist

threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism may be overstated.

First, there is “a profound ethnic and religious diversity (including in the practice

of Islam) that characterizes the area that militates against the establishment of a

fundamentalist hegemony by any one group.” Islamic fundamentalist groups fall into

distinctly different categories, namely, “movements that focus on cultural and spiritual

renewal, political parties, armed and unarmed organizations fighting for autonomy or

secession for Muslim areas, radical Islamist paramilitary groups, and transnational

terrorist cells and networks.” The largest and most influential groups are in fact political

parties or revivalist organizations with broad-based moderate Muslim support and

opposed to terrorism such as the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia.4

11

This leads to the second point that the Islamic fundamentalist groups engaged in

transnational terrorism actually do not have broad-based popular support or lack serious

transnational agendas. For example, the only “groups in the region that have

demonstrated a capacity for large-scale attacks--the JI and the KMM--are made up of the

well-educated middle classes. . . . Both the JI and KMM have small memberships and

only limited ties to more broad-based Islamist groups.”5 The JI “advocates the creation

through force of an Islamic state from southern Thailand through the lower part of the

Philippines.” Other prominent militant organizations such as “several organizations

operating in southern Thailand, the Moro National Liberation Front and Moro Islamic

Liberation Front in the Philippines, and the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia” are in

effect community-level organizations with genuine domestic political agendas relating

more to demands for secession or autonomy than the creation of an Islamic regime

throughout SEA. Another category of militant Islamic organizations is the “radical

Islamist paramilitary that blur the edges between criminal gangs and militias” such as the

Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and the LJ in Indonesia. These groups mix politics with

criminal activities such as extortion and racketeering. 6

Thirdly, all the major SEA countries are generally democratic and opposed to

terrorism, thereby making violent Islamic fundamentalism less attractive. In summary,

Gershman sees the terrorist groups in SEA as possessing primarily localized political

objectives while those with transnational objectives lack popular support. As such, he

urges United States policy makers to focus efforts away from a militarized response,

which may be counterproductive, to a broader response to improve the economic

12

conditions of the SEA countries and strengthen their weak and fragile democratic

institutions and regional and intergovernmental organizations.

The Director of Singapore’s Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Barry

Desker, reaches similar conclusions as Gershma n. On conditions within SEA, he also

notes that SEA is “a region notorious for its porous borders, large populations of urban

and rural poor, and both Muslim and non-Muslim armed extremist groups.” SEA also has

20 percent of the world’s one billion Muslims, Indonesia hosting the world’s largest

Muslim population of 170 million. Desker advocates that the war on terrorism must be

focused at the political, economic, and ideological levels to win the hearts and minds of

the global Islamic community, instead of a predominantly military approach. Such a

comprehensive approach is essential to redress the widening West-Islam divide.7

Underlying Conditions in SEA

Political scientist Robert C. Bone’s study of contemporary SEA in 1962 provided

some insights into the underlying historical, political, social, and cultural conditions in

SEA that could remain relevant and impact the emergence of transnational terrorism.

Bone described contemporary SEA as “an exciting cultural complexity, a political fiction,

and an international problem of uncertain but disturbing proportions.”8 The term

“Southeast Asia” came into general use during World War II only as a matter of

geopolitical convenience for military strategists, thus betraying the inherent complexities

and diversities within the region.

Historically, SEA’s favorable geopolitical position at the crossroads between the

Pacific and Indian Oceans, coupled with abundant agricultural resources, had constantly

13

attracted the attention of outside interests. The waves of Malay, Indian, Chinese, and

more recently European immigration into SEA throughout hundreds of years had resulted

in a patchwork of racial, religious, and ethnic diversities that were deeply ingrained in the

social and cultural fabric of SEA. These diversities were accentuated by European

colonization, which introduced artificial boundaries and external models of state

organizations into SEA, rather than allowing them to develop indigenously. While the

newly independent countries in SEA struggled with their new identities and roles with the

end of the colonial era after World War II, new pressures and influences arose. SEA had

barely begun to assimilate the impact of European colonialism when it was faced with

accelerating change after World War II and entered into the Cold War between two

superpowers.

The result of all these external shocks into SEA was the incomplete political,

social, and cultural integration within the individual countries of SEA and within SEA as

a region. Such incomplete integration within artificially defined societies created major

problems such as competing institutions and ideologies, uneven sociocultural and

economic development, and the troubles of minorities and regionalism. The deeply

rooted and severe faultlines within SEA made it an inherently unstable and vulnerable

region that could be torn apart by either internal or external forces.

Airpower Research Institute’s Professor of Asian Studies, Dr Lawrence E.

Grinter, contributed a further insight into the underlying conditions in SEA in his article

on “Realities of Revolutionary Violence in SEA in 1990.” He argued that the diversities

and divisions within SEA have alienated numerous minorities and other groups from the

mainstream political, economic, and social life, and led to a history of political violence

14

been used as a means of rectifying grievances.9 Having analyzed the different

revolutionary experiences of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Cambodia, Grinter

concluded that the origins of revolutionary violence in these countries are fundamentally

internal. He believed that the roots of political violence in most SEA countries spring

from internal socio-economic problems and dilemmas, and are limited in transcending

national boundaries. Thus, he urged policy makers to address the specific underlying

causes and dynamics of the political violence.10

RAND analyst Angel M. Rabasa provides a more recent analysis of the security

situation in SEA after the 11 September attacks on the United States. SEA continues to be

an area of geostrategic importance as it is the “crossroads between the concentration of

industrial, technological, and military power in Northeast Asia and the Indian

subcontinent and the Middle East.”11 The straits and sea lanes of communications in SEA

are critical to seaborne trade, especially oil imports, and military movement between the

Pacific and Indian Oceans. After the Cold War, SEA turned its attention toward

managing the emergence of an increasingly powerful China, which is becoming more

assertive, especially in its competing claims over the South China Sea with several SEA

countries. Internally, SEA continues to be plagued by outstanding territorial disputes and

tensions among its member countries--problems left over from the colonial era.

Another emerging threat is that of international terrorist and radical networks

associated with radical Islamic ideologies. This is particularly significant as SEA has the

largest concentration of Muslims in the world, with more than 200 million Muslims in

Indonesia, Muslim majorities in Malaysia and Brunei, and significant Muslim minorities

in Singapore, southern Thailand, and southern Philippines. Though the radical Islamic

15

groups represent a small minority of Muslims in SEA, they have the potential to

radicalize the mainstream Muslim population and destabilize secular and moderate

governments in the region.12

To deal with these major problems, ASEAN has been remarkably successful since

its inception, notwithstanding the diversities inherent in SEA. ASEAN has also been

relatively effective in promoting economic and limited security cooperation against

transnational security threats. Shortly after the 11 September attacks on the U.S., ASEAN

leaders adopted the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism at

the Seventh ASEAN Summit in November 2001. They committed themselves to counter,

prevent, and suppress all forms of terrorist acts, and to strengthen existing

counterterrorism and transnational crime efforts.13 Nevertheless, Rabasa assesses that the

1997 economic crisis in SEA and subsequent political crisis in Indonesia have weakened

ASEAN as a regional grouping and diluted its effectiveness in dealing with transnational

terrorism. In addition, the resultant deterioration of economic, social, and political

conditions has produced an environment favorable to the activities of terrorists, radical

groups, and separatists.

As such, Rabasa sees today’s SEA as a region of continued geostrategic

importance and potential, but weakened politically, economically, and socially both as a

regional grouping and as individual countries by the 1997 economic crisis. This has

hindered SEA from dealing effectively with the major problems arising from its historical

and inherent faultlines. Rabasa therefore urges the United States to support and

strengthen the political, economic, and security structures in the region so that SEA can

16

regain its strength, stability, and cohesion to act individually and together to counter the

emerging transnational terrorist threat.14

Four Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

Having surveyed the historical and present conditions in SEA, the focus is now

turned toward the four selected Islamic fundamentalist groups. The JI and KMM are at

present the only groups with a transnational agenda that advocate the creation of an

Islamic regime throughout Muslim-dominated parts of SEA. The JI is a clandestine

network spanning at least five countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and

Singapore) in SEA, while the KMM is based in Malaysia. JI traces its historical roots

back to Darul Islam (DI) in the 1940s, an Indonesian organization that fought against

Dutch colonial rule. After Indonesia gained its independence in 1949, DI continued its

armed struggle to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. In 1985, DI elements fled to

Malaysia to escape suppression by the Indonesian government and renamed themselves

JI. JI’s former leader, Abdullah Sungkar, established close ties with Al Qaeda when he

participated in the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, JI has been sending

selected recruits to train in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. JI’s goal, strategy, and

operation have developed under Al Qaeda’s influence, and it shares the anti-west

ideology of global jihad propagated by Al Qaeda. JI operates Al Qaeda-type networks

and cells, and receives advice and instructions on its operational plans from Al Qaeda.

For example, JI’s plans to attack targets in Singapore received approval from Mohd Atef,

one of Osama bin Laden’s trusted aides. Al Qaeda has also used JI’s leader Riduan

Isamuddin (better known as Hambali), as the linkman for the region.15

17

KMM is a much younger group established in 1995 by Zainon Ismail, a former

mujahidin in Afghanistan (that is, someone who has fought in the Soviet-Afghan War).

KMM began with the aim to transform Malaysia into an Islamic state through violent

means.16 However, KMM’s connection with JI has expanded its goal to a transnational

level. Malaysian police have assessed the KMM to have seventy to eighty members

operating in networks throughout Malaysia.17 Both the JI and KMM allegedly share the

same leaders from Indonesia, Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali. Both JI and KMM

members tend to be middle-class professionals and do not appear to have the broad-based

popular support for their bold vision. They operate like transnational criminal

corporations and make up for their shortcomings by using modern communication

technologies to plan and coordinate their actions.18

To sustain their formidable vision and conduct operations throughout SEA, the JI

and KMM collaborate extensively with other radical Islamic groups both within and

outside the region. Their linkages with other Islamic fundamentalist groups in the region

began to surface in recent years. Evidence from recently detained JI members show that

dozens of them have trained in MILF camps in Mindanao in the 1990s. In 1997, MILF

allowed JI to set up its own training facility in Camp Abu Bakar, known as Camp

Hudaybiyya. Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, a key Indonesian JI member, has also served as a

demolitions expert and explosives trainer with MILF.19 The KMM has also been linked to

the Laskar Jihad in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Outside the region,

FBI chief Robert Mueller has singled out JI as Al Qaeda’s foremost Southeast Asian

collaborator. Both JI and KMM also have members trained in Afghanistan, received over

18

$140,000 from Al Qaeda over three years, and established Al Qaeda-type cells

throughout SEA.20

The emerging evidence has shown that the JI is at the core of an extensive and

complex terrorist network in SEA. Through its visionary and shared fundamentalist

Islamic goal, and supported by foreign Islamic fundamentalist organizations, it is able to

overcome national and geographical barriers and bring together several Islamic

fundamentalist groups into deep ties and mutual cooperation. In 1999, JI formed a

regional alliance of jihad or mujahidin groups called the Rabitatul Mujahidin in the hope

that the groups could cooperate and share resources for training, procurement of arms,

financial assistance, and terrorist operations.21 JI’s modus operandi in SEA bears the

influencing marks of Al Qaeda, with the conduct of transnational terrorism used as a

means to achieve its vision. Though the JI and KMM may be small groups without broad-

based popular support, their daring vision, extensive linkages with regional and extra-

regional radical groups, and strong support and influence by Al Qaeda will continue to

present a formidable transnational terrorist threat and potentially radicalize and

destabilize an inherently divided region.

The MILF was formed in 1977 with the aim of establishing an independent

Islamic state in the southern Philippines22--a predominantly Muslim region with the

“worst poverty, income inequality, infant and maternal mortality rates, and literacy

levels.”23 The Philippine government’s failure in addressing the grinding poverty,

political subordination, and anti-Muslim discrimination in the southern Philippines has

contributed to the MILF’s cause. With 15,000 members, it is currently the largest Islamic

separatist group in the Philippines today. To achieve its aim, the MILF has mounted a

19

series of terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets in southern Philippines. The

MILF has also unsuccessfully attempted peace negotiations with the Filipino government

from 1997 to 1999.24 In August 2001, the MILF negotiated a ceasefire agreement with

the government and negotiations are ongoing, despite violations by both sides.25 Unlike

the clandestine JI and KMM, the MILF is a “community-level organization, enjoys mass

membership bases, has genuine political agendas, and (with exceptions) generally limits

their violence to military targets.”26

The MILF has denied charges that it is linked to Al Qaeda or supports a global

terrorism agenda. It is cooperating with the Philippine government and reaffirming its

commitment to peace talks so as to evade the corrosive “terrorist” label and any

subsequent crackdown measures by global counter-terrorism forces.27 However, the

emerging evidence appears to prove otherwise. Al Qaeda has reportedly used the

Philippines as one of its operational hubs through the MILF. The Al Qaeda-MILF

relationship can be traced back to the Soviet-Afghan war when Osama bin Laden sent his

brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, to the Philipines in 1988 to recruit Filipino

Muslim fighters. The MILF, under the leadership of Hashim Salamat, was reported to

have sent a thousand fighters to Afghanistan as it saw the training of the fighters as vital

to the strengthening of the MILF. Since 1991, Khalifa has begun to establish a permanent

Al Qaeda network in the Philippines. Through a charitable front organization, the Islamic

International Relief Organization, Khalifa was able to channel money to provide financial

support to the MILF.28

While the MILF appears to be no more than a domestic separatist movement,

emerging evidence of its connections with Al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalist

20

groups in SEA have caught regional and international attention. Though not professing to

possess a transnational agenda, its participation in transnational terrorist activities reflects

a dangerous trend that is emerging in SEA.

LJ was founded in 2000 with the goal of establishing an Islamic state in the

Moluccas and Sulawesi in Indonesia. It is known for its unrelenting attacks on Christian

populations on the islands of the Moluccas and Sulawesi. The members adhere to the

stricter Wahhabi creed of Islam espoused by Al Qaeda and see Christians as belligerent

infidels, thereby giving them the religious basis to kill. The deep animosity between the

two religions on the Moluccas and Sulawesi, the relative failure of the Indonesian

government in meeting the basic needs of the people, and the alleged covert support from

Indonesian military hardliners hoping to destabilize the post-Suharto government of

former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid contribute to LJ’s 10,000 strong

membership and its rise as the largest and most organized militant Muslim organization

in Indonesia.29

Similar to MILF, LJ’s leaders have denied linkages with Al Qaeda and even

denounced Al Qaeda’s ideology as not in line with true Islam. However, emerging

evidence has again demonstrated otherwise. LJ’s leader, Jafar Umar Thalib, has

acknowledged connections with the KMM, a probable Al Qaeda collaborator. Indonesia’s

National Intelligence Agency also claims to have evidence of former Al Qaeda training

camps in the Moluccas and that Al Qaeda fighters have been fighting on Sulawesi Island.

LJ has also received money from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and

Afghanistan.30 LJ’s emerging connections with Al Qaeda and other Islamic

21

fundamentalist groups in SEA have corroborated the trend of transnational terrorism as

an emerging means to achieve primarily domestic separatist aims.

Linkages with Al Qaeda

Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna provides further insights into why Al Qaeda

has chosen SEA as one of its new base of operations. He points out that SEA's

democratic space, corrupt regimes, weak leaders, lax security environment, a support

base of 240 million Muslims, and the potential for inter-religious conflict have provided

fertile ground for existing, emerging, and foreign Islamist terrorist groups to advance

their aims and objectives. He explained that though the Muslims in SEA are more

tolerant and moderate than their Middle Eastern counterparts because they live in the

shadow of large Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu communities, they are slowly being

politicized and radicalized in their attitude toward non-Muslims and the West. This is due

to religious conflicts in places such as the Moluccas and Mindanao, the general attitude

of the West to the Muslim world, and large-scale proselytizing activity, some of which is

spearheaded by Al Qaeda. As a result, at least 100 politically active Islamist parties and

active terrorist groups have emerged in SEA, especially in Indonesia, since the middle of

1998.31 These developments have made transnational terrorism an increasingly serious

threat in SEA.

Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, in its White Paper on the JI threat,

provides greater definition on the development of Al Qaeda’s links with SEA, and the

radicalization and transnationalization of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the region. It

believed that the most significant factor was their involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war,

22

which gave the key figures of these groups firsthand experience of the glory of jihad and

its eventual victory over the Soviet Union. Besides transferring their experiences and

skills acquired in Afghanistan back to the region, these key figures also formed a loose

and trusted brotherhood together with their Al Qaeda trainers to support each other if any

need arose. Thus, through this brotherhood, which includes JI, MILF, and several other

Islamic fundamentalist groups in SEA, Al Qaeda is able to enjoy secure, reliable, and

easy access into the region.32

Another aspect of the Al Qaeda link to SEA is the impact of the U.S. global war

on terrorism on the security of the region and its efforts to combat transnational terrorism.

U.S. antiterrorism efforts in SEA, such as the reinvigorated U.S.-Philippine military

cooperation, have raised suspicions about the re-establishment of U.S. presence in the

region.33 More importantly, regional fundamentalist groups have perceived the US-led

war on terrorism as an assault against Islam. The U.S. has become a single and easily

agreed upon enemy as propagated by Al Qaeda and appeared to have replaced regional

problems, such as the Moluccas, as the main object of their wrath.34 Such a perception

has also permeated to the larger moderate Muslim majorities in the region and required

U.S. sensitivity when dealing with the region. The U.S. should be particularly sensitive to

Indonesia and Malaysia’s delicate internal situations. For example, although Indonesian

President Megawati has expressed support for the international campaign against

terrorism, she will continue to be vulnerable to domestic Islamic opposition and to other

radical factions.35

23

Historical Development of Religious-motivated Transnational Terrorism

Finally, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman provides some useful background on the

historical development of international terrorism, particularly Islam-related terrorism,

which may help explain the development of transnational terrorism in SEA. Hoffman

argued that modern international terrorism first occurred on 22 July 1968 when three

armed terrorists from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacked an Israeli

commercial airline en route from Rome to Tel Aviv with the purpose of trading the

passengers for Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel.36 What made this hijacking

significantly different from previous ones was that it was meant as a bold political

statement, carried out from another country, and targeted at an international audience.

The intent was to shock and stimulate worldwide fear. PLO terrorists had come to

appreciate that operations perpetrated in foreign countries and involving foreign

nationals, including innocent civilians, were a reliable means of attracting attention to

themselves and their cause. Technological advances, globalization, and the development

of global media also facilitated international terrorism. The success of the PLO in

publicizing the plight of the Palestinians through the “internationalization” of its struggle

with Israel has since served as a model for the development of international terrorism. 37

The rise of Islam-related terrorism has its roots in the success of the Iranian

revolution in 1979 that transformed Iran into an Islamic republic. Iran began to export its

revolution worldwide and became one of the first countries to sponsor Islam-related

terrorist activities. “The Iranian revolution is held up as an example to Muslims

worldwide, exhorting them to reassert the fundamental teachings of the Quran and to

resist the intrusion of Western, particularly the United States, influence into the Middle

24

East.”38 The United States’ support for Israel and many local reactionary regimes is

generally perceived as the cause of the region’s problems. Violence and coercion are not

only permissible to achieve the worldwide spread of Islamic law, but a necessary means

to this divinely sanctioned end. Many prominent Muslim clerics in the region also lent

their support to the Iranian voice and helped to radicalize the beliefs and attitudes of a

new generation of Muslims within and outside the Middle East. Thus, with the beginning

of the Iranian revolution, religion has become a powerful transnational force in

international relations, and religious terrorism has great potential for transcending

national borders.39

Hoffman also showed that religion-related terrorism tends to result in less

discriminating and higher levels of casualties than secular terrorist organizations due to

their radically different worldviews, value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and

justification, and concepts of morality. For the religious terrorist, violence is a divine duty

and therefore transcends moral, political, and practical constraints. Where secular

terrorists seek largely to correct a flaw in the system, religious terrorists seek the creation

of a new system. Religious terrorist groups also do not have a specific constituency from

which they derive support, unlike secular terrorist groups. The combination of these three

factors leads to a sanctioning of limitless violence on a virtually open-ended category of

targets.40

Conclusion

In conclusion, a current literature review provides useful insights into the

underlying conditions in SEA that favor the emergence of transnational terrorism, the

25

goals, strategies, and operations of the four selected Islamic fundamentalist groups and

their transnational linkages, the extent of Al Qaeda influence in the region, and the

historical background and development of transnational, particularly Islam-related

terrorism. The analysis of these interrelated factors would uncover the underlying

conditions, causes, and nature of transnational terrorism in SEA and explain why it is

emerging in the region.

1Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan, “Southeast Asia and the War against

Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1496 (23 October 2001): 1.

2Ibid., 2.

3John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 61.

4Ibid., 62-64.

5Ibid., 62.

6Ibid., 66-67.

7Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2002): 162.

8Robert C. Bone, Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Random House, 1962), 3.

9Lawrence E. Grinter, Realities of Revolutionary Violence in Southeast Asia (Alabama, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, March 1990), 1.

10Ibid., 8.

11Angel M. Rabasa, “Southeast Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests,” RAND Corporation, December 2001, 1.

12Ibid., 4.

13Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, “Terrorism: Southeast Asia’s Response,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 January 2002, 1.

14Rabasa, 10.

26

15Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the

Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, January 2003), 6-9.

16Ibid., 3.

17“Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM).” Federation of American Scientists [article on-line]; available from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/kmm.htm; Internet; accessed on 6 March 2003.

18Gershman, 68.

19Home Affairs, 8.

20Reyko Huang, “In the Spotlight: Jemaah Islamiah,” Center for Defense Information, 18 October 2002, 1.

21Home Affairs, 7.

22Reyko Huang, “In the Spotlight: Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” Center for Defense Information, 15 February 2002, 2.

23Gershman, 69.

24Francisco L Tolin, “The Response of the Philippine Government and the Role of the AFP to address Terrorism,” National Defense College of the Philippines [article on-line]; available from http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/tokyopaper.htm; Internet; accessed on 29 January 2003, 2.

25John Gershman, “U.S. Takes Antiterrorism War to the Philippines,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Global Affairs Commentary, 15 January 2002.

26Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” 67.

27Huang, “In the Spotlight: Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” 1.

28Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (August 2002): 298-299.

29Reyko Huang, “In the Spotlight: Laskar Jihad,” Center for Defense Information, 8 March 2002, 1-2.

30Ibid., 1.

31“Gravity of Terrorism Shifting to Region,” Singapore Straits Times, 15 October 2002.

27

32Home Affairs, 4-5.

33Banlaoi, 1.

34ICG Asia, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” ICG Asia Report No. 43 (11 December 2002): 2.

35Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Fluornoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), 275.

36Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 67.

37Ibid., 68.

38Ibid., 96.

39Louise Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors” in The Future of Terrorism, ed. Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 2001), 215.

40Hoffman, 94-95.

28

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There is currently limited authoritative work that addresses this area of research.

There is also little primary evidence because of the recent phenomenon of transnational

terrorism in SEA, except for sporadic revelations from governmental and intelligence

agencies inside and outside of SEA. Consequently, this thesis addresses the underlying

conditions and causes of transnational terrorism in SEA rather than the specifics of

transnational terrorist activities in SEA. The research focused on both the historical

conditions and current developments within SEA and the selected Islamic fundamentalist

groups that contribute to the emergence of transnational terrorism in SEA. The research

methodology was primarily based on a qualitative and inductive analysis of the research

materials. Specifically, the research process sought answers to different but related

components of the thesis, and to draw the appropriate linkages from the different

answers, and deduce the relevant conclusions and recommendations for the thesis. The

research process was done at three levels.

Tertiary Level

It began with a data-gathering tertiary level that sought to obtain information

about the historical and current conditions and developments in SEA and the four

selected groups known to be involved in transnational terrorism. It also gathered initial

perspectives on why SEA provides fertile grounds for the development of transnational

terrorism. Specifically, it focused on a comprehensive range of historical, political,

29

economic, sociocultural, religious-ethnic, and geostrategic factors within SEA that

provides a balanced perspective on the underlying conditions that may contribute to the

emergence of transnational terrorism in the region. In addition, to provide an objective

and balanced analysis, the research also considered aspects of the six factors that may

impair the development of transnational terrorism in SEA.

On the four groups, the research selected a diverse range of Islamic

fundamentalist groups from different SEA countries so as to provide a better

representation of Islamic fundamentalism and transnational terrorist relationships and

activities in the region. The four groups are different in their history, goals, strategies,

size, and modes and areas of operations. Another criterion of selection was the widely

acknowledged involvement in transnational terrorism by the four groups and the

existence of transnational linkages among these four groups and with Al Qaeda.

Research on the four groups was focused at the strategic and operational levels

rather than the tactical level. Specifically, it studied their history, goals, strategies,

operations, and transnational relationship, with emphasis on identifying the causes

leading to the groups’ adopting transnational terrorism as part of their strategies and

operations. It sought to identify both positive and negative causes for the emergence of

transnational terrorism in SEA. The answers to the tertiary level questions provide the

building blocks for further analysis to address the secondary level questions.

Secondary Level

The secondary level draws linkages from the tertiary level research materials to

derive the nature of the transnational threat and its emergence in SEA. By studying the

30

unique conditions and causes in SEA and their linkages with the development of the four

selected groups, the secondary level analyzes and derives systemic conditions and causes

leading to the emergence of transnational terrorism in SEA.

The analysis was done at two sub-levels. The first sub-level involved the separate

analyses of SEA and the four groups so as to derive the underlying conditions and causes

in the region leading to transnational terrorism. The analysis of the six factors within

SEA highlighted regional-level trends, identified contributing and countervailing factors,

and summarized the complex conditions within the region. The comparative analysis of

the four groups sought an in-depth understanding of the underlying causes pushing the

groups toward transnational terrorist action. The second sub-level involved a joint

analysis of the conditions in SEA and the causes of the four groups to derive a clear and

proper understanding of the nature of the emerging threat of transnational terrorism in

SEA. The answers to the secondary level questions provide the clues and directions to

address the primary thesis question in a structured and systematic manner.

Primary Level

The primary level draws the relevant conclusions from the secondary level

analysis in a systematic framework to explain why transnational terrorism is emerging in

SEA. It consolidates the analysis and facilitates the understanding of the nature,

conditions, and causes of transnational terrorism in SEA. The answer to the primary level

question will provide useful insights and a systematic framework for the development of

strategies to deal with the threat of transnational terrorism in SEA.

31

Research Materials

The research materials used for the thesis were based on four categories of

literature of varying type, source, and authority. First, research materials on SEA’s

history, development, and future challenges are based on longstanding and authoritative

works. They help to derive the conditions in SEA relevant to the emergence of

transnational terrorism. Second, research materials on terrorism in general and

international and transnational terrorism in particular were also based on longstanding

and authoritative works. They help to provide insights into the general conditions and

causes for the emergence of transnational terrorism. Third, as there are limited

authoritative works on the selected groups with respect to the emerging transnational

terrorism, the research materials are based mainly on recent research papers and

newspaper articles. To address their reduced authority, extra care was exercised to ensure

that the research papers and newspaper articles were carefully selected from reliable

research centers and compared with one another for consistency. They help to provide an

understanding of these groups, especially the causes for their adoption of transnational

terrorism. Fourth, with limited authoritative works on transnational terrorism in SEA, the

research materials in this area were also based on recent research papers and newspaper

articles. They help to provide insights and directions for the development of the thesis.

To provide a balanced perspective to the thesis, the research materials used for

this thesis came primarily from SEA, American, and Australian sources because of their

interests in the region. The American global war on terrorism has led to a proliferation of

research materials in international and transnational terrorism. Though the American

focus is primarily on the Middle East, some attention has been placed on SEA due to the

32

uncovering of extensive linkages between Al Qaeda and extremist groups in SEA. The

Australian focus in transnational terrorism in SEA has become more prominent after the

terrorist bombings in Bali.

Finally, given the current nature of the issue, this thesis addresses only the

underlying conditions and causes in SEA that contribute to transnational terrorism. It did

not seek to address all the new evidence on transnational terrorism in SEA that were

uncovered in the process of the development of the thesis, except for those that were

quintessential and pertinent to answering the primary thesis question. This approach

ensures that amid the emerging evidence, the thesis remains relevant and useful for

understanding why transnational terrorism is emerging in SEA.

33

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

A survey of the conditions in SEA revealed that there were both contributing and

countervailing factors to the emergence of transnational terrorism in the region. The

situation in SEA is more complex than what have been frequently portrayed. While there

are inherent vulnerabilities in SEA, other contributing factors to transnational terrorism,

namely developmental difficulties and external influence, are conditions that are temporal

and non-lasting in nature. Similarly, a comparative analysis of the four selected Islamic

fundamentalist groups also revealed both pull and push factors for them to engage in

transnational terrorism. While transnational terrorism has become more attractive as a

means for the four Islamic fundamentalist groups to gain external support and achieve

their individual goals, the linkages among them are actually tenuous and weak.

The two analyses, when taken together, demonstrate that the nature of

transnational terrorism in SEA has strong external influence but weak internal coherence,

and that the underlying conditions and causes are intimately linked, complex, and double-

edged in their influence on transnational terrorism in the region. Thus, though the current

situation in SEA, where transnational terrorist activities have begun to plague the region,

suggests that the contributing factors have overshadowed the countervailing factors, the

region is not destined as the second front of transnational terrorism. Rather, with a clear

understanding of the complex and multi-faceted nature, conditions, and causes of

transnational terrorism in SEA, a balanced and comprehensive strategy can be developed

to deal with it.

34

Conditions in SEA

The conditions in SEA that contribute to the emergence of transnational terrorism

are examined using six factors, namely, history, politics, economics, sociocultural,

religious-ethnic, and geostrategic factors. Table 1 provides a summary of the analysis of

the conditions in SEA.

Table 1. Analysis of Conditions in SEA Influencing Factors Contributing Conditions Countervailing Conditions History History of divisions and

violence. Primarily nation-based violence.

Politics Developing political institutions; Domestic political problems.

Declared commitment to combat terrorism.

Economics Recent economic crisis; Economic inequalities.

Underlying economic potential for recovery.

Sociocultural Immigrant societies; Incomplete integration.

Multi-cultural perspectives; Mutual understanding and tolerance.

Religious-Ethnic Rise of extremist Islam; External influence; Large Muslim population.

Largely moderate Islam; Different Islamic sects.

Geostrategic Prone to external influences; Porous region; Developing regional institutions.

Willingness to cooperate; Potential for regional resilience

Historical Factor

First, SEA has a history of organized groups using violence to achieve various

political goals. Such violence might be revolutionary, separatist, and religious-ethnic in

nature. SEA countries were all too familiar with revolutionary violence against their

colonial rulers, especially after the Second World War.1 For example, Indonesia engaged

in many years of armed struggle against its Dutch colonists before gaining its

35

independence. Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines had similar, though less violent,

experiences with the British and Americans respectively.

Separatist and religious-ethnic violence often succeeded revolutionary violence in

a number of SEA countries due to the adverse impact of colonization, which introduced

artificial borders and national identities on divergent religious-ethnic groups. Unable to

integrate these different groups into the national life, many SEA countries faced violence

from these groups demanding autonomy, independence, or the radical imposition of their

religious laws. For example, Indonesia is currently battling armed separatist forces in the

provinces of Aceh, Moluccas, and Sulawesi while the Philippines is faced with the same

situation in the province of Mindanao. In Indonesia, there are a number of Islamic

fundamentalist groups advocating the introduction of Islamic laws in the country and

some of the violent ones are also engaging in religious-ethnic violence against the

Christian minority.

Thus, while the degree and nature of violence varies in different SEA nations, the

character and utility of political violence has been imprinted on the region. The violent

roots of SEA history thereby provide favorable conditions for fundamentalist groups to

adopt terrorism, even at the transnational level, as they gravitate toward extreme actions

in their ongoing, but unsuccessful political struggles.

However, SEA’s experience with political violence has been largely national in

character.2 There has been little transnational cooperation historically in the pursuit of

various revolutionary, separatist, or religious-ethnic aims in the different SEA countries.

Thus, the emergence of transnational terrorism is not a natural outcome of SEA’s

36

historical conditions; rather, external influences played a significant role in transforming

the character of SEA’s historically violent roots.

Political Factor

Second, many SEA countries are still struggling with their developing political

and economic structures and institutions. SEA countries (except Thailand) gained their

independence only within the last fifty years. The political systems and cultures in several

SEA countries have not matured fully into stable and robust political entities. Many SEA

countries are still struggling with the consequences of colonization such as separatism,

and sociocultural and religious-ethnic conflicts. In addition, SEA countries’ political

development after their independence was complicated by the bipolar environment

created as a result of the Cold War. To make matters worse, SEA became one of the

battlefields for the proxy war between the US and Soviet Union, which served to warp

the political process in some SEA countries. As a result, political institutions are not fully

embraced and domestic political problems tend to place constraints on several SEA

countries’ ability to deal effectively with the threat of transnational terrorism. Indonesia

provides an excellent example.

Indonesia had been ruled under former President Suharto’s dictatorial control

since the early days of its independence, thereby curtailing political development in

Indonesia for more than thirty years. Indonesia only recently democratized its political

process after Suharto’s downfall in 1998. The number of political parties has increased

significantly, especially those with an Islamic constituency, which is representative of

Indonesia’s predominantly Muslim population. The existing secular government is

37

formed by a delicate coalition representing a multiplicity of interests, with increasing

influence from Islamic-based parties. The Indonesian government is still in a transitory

stage and beginning to function effectively and efficiently with multi-party and coalition

politics. Therefore, with respect to terrorism, the ruling government faces constraints in

its ability to adopt tough policies against Islamic fundamentalist groups to avoid

alienating the domestic Islamic constituency.3

While the difficulties posed by the problems of ongoing political development in

some SEA countries provide favorable conditions for the conduct of transnational

terrorist activities, the political climate in SEA is not entirely ineffectual and hopeless.

Notwithstanding their respective domestic difficulties, all SEA governments have

declared their commitment to combat transnational terrorism.4 While the extent of their

efforts may vary, the anti-terrorist posture by all SEA countries can serve as a dampening

factor on the emergence of transnational terrorism in SEA.

Economic Factor

Third, SEA has been struggling with poor economic conditions since the 1997

Asian financial crisis. Many SEA countries have plummeted from near double digit to

negative or near zero GDP growth rates.5 The crisis has also accentuated the economic

inequalities within many SEA countries, which fuels the dissatisfaction and discontent

among the poor and alienated segments of the population. Without adequate attention and

economic improvement, this growing segment of the population is highly susceptible to

provide the support and recruiting base for extremist activities, including terrorism, in

pursuit of goals that promise to redress their economic plight. Transnational terrorism

38

also becomes increasingly attractive because of the additional financial resources made

available from linkages with other terrorist groups. The situation in the southern

Philippines provides a good example.

Despite the Filipino government’s efforts to develop the predominantly Muslim

southern Philippines, the region remains the poorest and least developed in the country. 6

Though the government has granted autonomy to parts of the region in an effort to

address the problems, it has not significantly improved the situation due to

ineffectiveness and mismanagement on the part of the local officials. In addition, the

economic crisis worsens the situation. 7 As such, the Muslims in the southern Philippines

continue to support the violent activities of various Islamic fundamentalist groups

operating in the region, such as the Moro National Liberation Front, the MILF, and the

Abu Sayyaf Group. Recruitment from this desperate and disgruntled population base also

becomes easier with the immediate financial incentives provided by the fundamentalist

groups. In fact, adequate financial resources become an important element of these

fundamentalist groups to sustain their support and recruiting bases, thereby increasing the

attractiveness of criminal and transnational terrorism.

Thus, the present economic conditions in SEA create divisions and vulnerabilities

within SEA countries that can be exploited for transnational terrorist activities. Besides

the Philippines, similar economic inadequacies and inequalities can also be found in parts

of Indonesia and southern Thailand. However, SEA’s economic malaise is not a

permanent condition. Before the economic crisis, the Asia-Pacific region had been

described as the economic powerhouse of the world. Notwithstanding the possibility of

39

future economic downturns, the underlying economic potential within SEA is likely to

remain strong and capable of overcoming the temporary disruption.

Sociocultural Factor

Fourth, the sociocultural circumstances in SEA tend to have a divisive effect

within individual SEA countries and the region as a whole. History and geography have

made SEA a region of great diversity in the makeup of its society and culture. SEA has

historically served as the crossroads of great civilizations, such as China, India, and the

Middle East, because of its geographical location. Movement of ideas, people, and goods

among these civilizations used SEA as the convenient transit point, which was further

encouraged during the colonial period. The great influx of Chinese and Indian

immigrants during the 1800s, bringing with them their cultures and traditions, served to

dilute the homogeneity of the indigenous race and ethnicity in each SEA country. These

emergent divisions were worsened by the artificial territorial boundaries imposed by the

colonial rulers that did not consider sociocultural factors.8 Thus, to this day, SEA

countries continue to suffer from the incomplete sociocultural integration or mutual

acceptance of different segments of their populations.

For example, Thailand and the Philippines continue to face separatist demands

from Muslim minorities in southern Thailand and southern Philippines respectively due

to the inability to integrate them into the mainstream political and social environment of

the country. Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia have also experienced a number of racial

conflicts among their diverse racial and ethnic groups for various reasons since their

independence. Though such conflicts seldom occur today, historical experiences have

40

taught all three countries to continually manage issues of racial diversity in a careful and

sensitive manner so as to promote better social cohesion in their countries.

Therefore, the sociocultural division and incomplete integration within SEA

create region-wide conditions of differences, tensions, and unresolved problems that can

be exploited at a transnational level for terrorist activities. However, diversity has its

advantages. There is greater understanding, and therefore respect and tolerance for other

societies and cultures. Properly managed and incorporated, diversity can also provide a

rich multi-cultural perspective and environment within SEA that can help to moderate

radical and fundamentalist attitudes in the region. The moderate form of Islam practiced

by most Muslims in SEA also attests to the social and cultural sensitivities pervasive in

the region.

Religious-Ethnic Factor

Fifthly, the divisions within SEA also carry a religious-ethnic dimension that

matches the religious overtones of the present form of transnational terrorism. SEA has

the largest Muslim population in the world, primarily located in Indonesia. Due to

external influence such as the Iranian Revolution, the practice of Islam in SEA has

displayed increased politicization and radicalization, as well as the adoption of extremist

and violent actions to achieve political and religious aims. For example, since 1998, at

least 100 politically active Islamic parties have emerged in SEA, especially in Indonesia.9

In addition, the unresolved problems in southern Thailand, southern Philippines, and

Sulawesi in Indonesia, which have the common thread of Muslim minorities seeking

41

autonomy or independence from Buddhist or Christian majorities, continue to fuel the

existing religious divide between Islam and the other religions.

Thus, the large Muslim population, religious-ethnic tensions, increased Islamic

radicalization due to external influences, and unresolved Muslim-linked problems within

the region provide fertile ground for the emergence of transnational terrorism related to

Islam and the Muslim community in SEA. However, the shift toward radical and

extremist Islam in SEA is not an irreversible tide. There is still a moderate Muslim

majority that can potentially counter the influences of radical Islam. In addition, the

Muslim community in SEA is not a homogenous entity. There are many different Islamic

sects and ethnic groups that are deeply and profoundly diverse. Thus, the linkages among

the different Islamic groups in SEA are tenuous, thereby weakening the basis for

transnational terrorism.

Geostrategic Factor

Sixth, the geostrategic situation of SEA also increases the vulnerability of the

region to transnational terrorist activities. As mentioned before, the region is historically

prone to external influences due to its geostrategic location whereby its sea lanes of

communications are critical to seaborne trade between Northeast Asia and the Indian

subcontinent and the Middle East.10 From the great civilizations on both sides of the

region through the colonial era and the world wars to the bipolar Cold War environment,

SEA has been the center of proxy struggles among great powers. Thus, in the current

global war against terrorism, SEA again presents a suitable battlefield because of the

multiplicity of great power interest and involvement in the region, as well as the dispersal

42

of Al Qaeda elements from Afghanistan into the region. In particular, the dominant US

influence in the region, which is reminiscent of SEA’s colonial era, has been blamed as

the cause of SEA’s problems and exploited by both local and external extremist groups to

galvanize actions against them.11 Another vulnerability of the region is its porous

geography, which makes it difficult to monitor and control covert terrorist activities on

the thousands of islands straddling across SEA.12 The porous borders between SEA

countries also require a high degree of security and intelligence cooperation within the

region.

However, SEA is a relatively young regional entity, making its appearance only

after the Second World War. Its regional institution, namely ASEAN, has only been

established since 1967 and is still in the process of developing and consolidating stable

and robust cooperative mechanisms in the region. ASEAN had been making good

progress in the political and economic spheres, and embarking on the security sphere with

cooperation to deal with transnational crimes, until it was weakened as a regional

organization by the economic crisis. As each country focused on dealing with its own

political and economic problems, regional cooperation and resilience suffered.13 The

incorporation of the relatively less developed Indo-Chinese countries into ASEAN has

also contributed to the dilution of ASEAN’s economic integration. Both events would

serve to impede ASEAN’s development into a strong and cohesive regional organization,

which is a necessary condition to deal with a transnational threat.

Nevertheless, prior to the crisis, ASEAN had been an effective forum for the

building of mutual understanding, confidence, and trust, and the fostering of political and

economic cooperation among its member nations. For example, it was successful in

43

mustering its combined political and economic strength to deal with regional issues such

as the Cambodian conflict between 1978 and 1991, where ASEAN upheld its corporate

solidarity in challenging Vietnam’s military occupation of Cambodia in 1978 and

subsequently participated in the Paris negotiations that brought the conflict to an end in

1991.14 While the political, economic, and security cooperative mechanisms are still

recovering and developing, ASEAN governments have displayed a willingness and

commitment to cooperate in combating the threat of transnational terrorism. In the latest

Eighth ASEAN Summit, ASEAN governments maintained their commitment to

cooperate in the areas of intelligence exchange, border security, law enforcement, and

financial cooperation. They also agreed to establish a regional Counter-terrorism Center

in Kuala Lumpur.15 Though ASEAN’s effectiveness remains to be seen, the potential for

ASEAN to emerge in the long term as an effective and credible regional organization

remains high.

The geostrategic environment in SEA makes it vulnerable and prone to external

influence and manipulation, especially during a period when ASEAN’s regional

resilience has been weakened by the recent economic crisis. Without substantive

cooperation in the near term, ASEAN will face challenges in dealing with the threat of

transnational terrorism. Such conditions are favorable for the emergence of transnational

terrorism. However, ASEAN’s current weakness is only a temporary phenomenon. Based

on ASEAN’s track record and the current commitment of ASEAN governments in

cooperating to combat transnational terrorism, ASEAN can develop into a stable and

robust regional organization in the long term if its member nations continue to work

toward improving regional cooperation and resilience.

44

Summary

In summary, the underlying conditions in SEA contributing to the emergence of

transnational terrorism are founded on the inherent vulnerabilities of its diversity,

divisions, and fractious and violent history; the developmental pains of its young

political, economic, and regional institutions; and the susceptibility of the region to

external influences. However, the analysis also demonstrates that these conditions are not

permanent and irreversible. Embedded in these conditions are countervailing factors that

can reverse the emergence of transnational terrorism if the appropriate policies are

adopted to strengthen and promote them. Thus, the complex nature of the underlying

conditions in SEA requires clear understanding before the formulation of policies

appropriately tailored to stem the rise of transnational terrorism in SEA.

Four Selected Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

The causes of the emergence of transnational terrorism in SEA are examined

through a comparative analysis of the four selected Islamic fundamentalist groups’

history, goal, strategies, operations, and transnational relationships. Table 2 provides a

summary of the analysis of the four groups.

History

First, the comparative history and development of the four groups reveals that

transnational terrorism is both a recent externally influenced phenomenon and a desperate

reaction to the limited success of current terrorist tactics in established localized

45

Table 2. Analysis of Four Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

Factors Groups

History Goals Strategies Operations Transnational relationship

JI Established in 1940s; Invigorated in 1990s due to external influence.

Transnational Islamic state; Ideological root causes.

No basis for negotiation.

Clandestine cells and networks; Middle-class membership; External funding and support; Limited broad-based support.

Strong Al Qaeda linkage – resources, training, operations; Limited regional linkages – use of training bases.

KMM Established in 1995; Gained prominence due to external influence.

Malaysia and transnational Islamic state; Ideological root causes.

No basis for negotiation.

Clandestine cells and networks; Middle-class membership; External support; Limited broad-based support.

Strong Al Qaeda linkage – resources, training, operations; Limited regional linkages – use of training bases.

MILF Established in 1977; Largely localized; Recent transnational terrorist behavior.

Autonomous southern Philippines; Separatist and economic root causes.

Willing to negotiate.

Established command structure; Stable operating bases; Indigenous, broad-based support; Lack significant resources.

Limited Al Qaeda linkage – resources, training only; Limited regional linkages – use of training bases.

LJ Established in 2000; Largely localized; Recent transnational terrorist behavior.

Autonomous Moluccas and Sulawesi; Separatist and economic root causes.

Willing to negotiate.

Established command structure; Stable operating bases; Indigenous, broad-based support; Lack significant resources.

Limited Al Qaeda linkage – resources, training only; Limited regional linkages – use of training bases.

Contributing causes

External influence; Limited success in localized tactics.

Regional Islamic brotherhood; Some similarities but tenuous.

Mutually supporting and reinforcing structures; Limited internal resources; Attractiveness of external support.

Counter- vailing causes

Not indigenous; Only at the emergent stage.

More differences than similarities.

Utility relationship; Possible to sever linkages

46

separatist struggles. Though JI has its roots extending back to the 1940s, it is only

recently invigorated because of its external connections with Al Qaeda. Together with

KMM, they became active in the 1990s after establishing linkages with Al Qaeda during

the Soviet-Afghan war and receiving resources, training, and advice from Al Qaeda

operatives seeking to establish a branching network in SEA. The leaders and operatives

of JI and KMM have also received training from Al Qaeda training camps in

Afghanistan.16 Therefore, external resources and influence play a critical role in the

development of the JI and KMM, which leads to the embedding of transnational terrorism

as a modus operandi for the JI and KMM.

On the other hand, the MILF is an established separatist group in southern

Philippines since the 1970s. Over the years, it has resorted to the adoption of increasingly

violent terrorist tactics such as bombings and killings of both civilian and government

officials to further its goal to create an autonomous southern Philippines. Though its

activities have been localized within the Philippines, MILF’s limited success is pushing it

toward more extreme actions. Transnational terrorism has become an attractive option

because it offers external resources and support, as well as brings international attention

on the MILF’s cause in the southern Philippines. However, MILF has been cautious in

adopting transnational terrorist tactics. It has currently limited its involvement in

transnational terrorism to linkages and mutual support with other extremist groups, such

as Al Qaeda and JI operatives’ use of MILF bases as training camps, without conducting

transnational terrorist activities. MILF has also denied linkages with Al Qaeda for fear of

a severe governme nt and international backlash.17 In a similar way, though LJ was only

recently established in the 1990s, it was quick to grasp the attractiveness of external

47

support available by engaging in transnational activities. Recent evidence has also shown

that Al Qaeda and JI operatives have trained in LJ camps in Moluccas and Sulawesi,

notwithstanding denials by LJ.

Thus, the limited success in established localized separatist struggles in SEA is

pushing MILF and LJ toward more extreme actions in the form of transnational terrorism

to achieve their objectives. However, comparison across the four groups also

demonstrates the differing degree of acceptance of transnational terrorist tactics. While

the JI and KMM have fully embraced transnational terrorism, MILF and LJ have

expressed caution in openly adopting transnational terrorism as their modus operandi.

Thus, transnational terrorism remains at an emergent stage in SEA that can be curtailed

with carefully tailored policies.

Goals

Second, the comparative goals of the four groups demonstrate that their

transnational terrorist linkages are supported by similarities that are tenuous in nature.

The regional Islamic brotherhood created by Al Qaeda and JI to provide mutual support

among Islamic fundamentalist groups is a loose and non-cohesive entity. There are in

effect greater underlying differences among the four groups than similarities, which

reflects the diverse Muslim sects, interests, and agendas throughout SEA. Both JI and

KMM’s goals are transnational in scope while MILF and LJ’s goals are localized and

nation-based. JI aims to create an Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia,

Singapore, Brunei, southern Thailand, and southern Philippines. While KMM’s goal

began with the creation of an Islamic state in Malaysia, it expanded to a transnational

48

goal under JI’s influence. On the other hand, MILF and LJ aim to create an autonomous

southern Philippines, and Moluccas and Sulawesi respectively. While the goals of the

four groups appear to overlap and provide possibilities for cooperation, there remains a

clear and fundamental difference between transnational and national-based goals. The

leap from a national-based goal to a transnational-based one will require fundamental

ideological and organizational changes that may have adverse effects on MILF and LJ’s

achievements thus far.

In addition, the root cause of JI and KMM’s goal is primarily ideological in nature

while the root causes of MILF and LJ’s goals are separatist and economic in nature. The

underlying dissatisfaction against SEA governments may be real and significant in some

parts of SEA, but it does not extend to all SEA countries. For example, the Muslim

community in Singapore was shocked to discover that Singaporean Muslims were part of

the JI and plotting to disrupt the peace, stability, and progress of the country. JI and

KMM’s small and limited membership base also demonstrate that there is a lack of

broad-based support for their goal.18 Further, the primarily middle-class membership of JI

and KMM also reveals that their grievances against the existing regional and political

environment are motivated mainly by ideology rather than socio-economic causes.

On the other hand, the root causes for MILF and LJ’s goals have more tangible

separatist and economic roots. Their dissatisfaction with the existing authorities is based

on the real separatist sentiments and economic grievances of the segments of the

population whom they represent. Southern Philippines, Moluccas, and Sulawesi have

suffered economic and developmental neglect compared to other parts of the Philippines

and Indonesia respectively. As a result, both MILF and LJ have a large membership of

49

15,000 and 10,000 respectively, and they also receive broad-based support from the

respective population in southern Philippines and Sulawesi. Thus, their root causes have a

clear and defined dimension with a specific support base. There is a stronger likelihood

of MILF and LJ achieving their localized goals than JI and KMM meeting their

transnational goals, since the regional governments are unlikely to give up their

respective sovereign claims.

While there are some overlapping similarities among the goals of the four groups,

they are at best tenuous in nature. The transnational goal of JI and KMM may incorporate

the localized goals of MILF and LJ, and thereby provide for cooperative opportunities.

However, it is unlikely to be able to bridge effectively the distinct transnational-national

divide. Their divergent root causes, support base, and likelihood of achieving their goals

in the present geostrategic reality also demonstrate that there are more fundamental

differences than similarities among the groups. Therefore, the connection between

transnational and local groups in SEA is likely to be limited and weak.

Strategies

Third, the different strategies adopted by the four groups serve to further

accentuate their differences. The strategy of JI and KMM is rooted in the use of

transnational terrorism to further their goal. They have established themselves in a

position with no basis for negotiation, as the existing authorities will never accept their

strategy of terror nor their unachievable transnational goal. In addition, the current

actions of both groups also demonstrate that they are intent on the use of violence to alter

50

radically the existing political structure and environment with no intention of negotiating

within it.

On the other hand, both MILF and LJ have demonstrated a willingness to

negotiate with existing authorities to achieve an end-state that is acceptable to all parties.

Both groups have entered into peace talks with the ruling governments to obtain

autonomy and developmental aid for their respective regions. Though the peace talks

have met with difficulties, some progress has been made. The Filipino government has

already granted autonomy to some parts of southern Philippines while the Indonesian

government is considering granting autonomy to Moluccas and Sulawesi. The strategy of

MILF and LJ demonstrates that terror is used only as a secondary instrument to achieve

their goals. Therefore, their shift toward the adoption of transnational terrorism is not an

irreversible trend since their goals can be reasonably met.

The stark differences in strategies among the four groups serve to deepen their

divisions and reflect the weak and tenuous linkages among the diverse Islamic

fundamentalist groups in the region. It also demonstrates that the transnational terrorist

threat is loosely connected and lacks cohesiveness. Meeting the reasonable demands of

some of the groups can have the effect of weakening the bonds of transnational terrorist

linkages among the various groups.

Operations

Fourth, the different operations, command organizations, and tactics of the four

groups reveal mutually supporting structures that favor transnational terrorist linkages so

as to exploit one another’s strength and weaknesses. Influenced and trained by Al Qaeda,

51

JI and KMM use networks of clandestine cells to plan and conduct their operations. They

possess a pervasive network of operatives throughout SEA and are able to conduct large-

scale simultaneous operations on a range of strategic targets. They also function like a

transnational corporation with linkages and access to substantial resources and

capabilities. Their preferred tactics are bombings and killings of foreign targets,

especially those of the US and their allies such as the UK, Israel, and Australia. However,

as they lack freedom of movement and any permanent operating and training base, they

have to send their operatives for training elsewhere, both within and outside the region. In

this case, both MILF and LJ stand to match the operational deficiencies of JI and KMM.

Both MILF and LJ are legitimate and established community-level organizations

with clear command and control structures. They are able to operate freely within their

area of operations. More importantly, they control territories that function as their

operating and training bases. Their tactics include bombings, kidnappings, and killings of

civilian and government officials within their respective countries. As a primarily

localized group dependent on a largely poor community, they lack the resources and

funding for extensive, large-scale action against the respective ruling governments. They

also do not have the operational reach to extend their activities beyond their immediate

area of operations, should they wish to do so. Thus, linkages with JI and KMM prove

attractive to MILF and LJ because of the availability of external access to funding,

resources, and capabilities.

The mutually supporting operational structure among the four groups is perhaps

one of the more direct causes of transnational terrorism in SEA. JI and KMM possesses

the conduit to external funding and resources which prove extremely attractive to MILF

52

and LJ, while the MILF and LJ possess training bases which are indispensable to JI and

KMM. Irrespective of their fundamental difference in goals and strategies, their ability to

support one another’s operations serves to create strong linkages among the four groups.

However, the utility rather than ideological nature of such transnational linkages also

reveals their inherent weakness, as it is possible to sever them by isolating their

operations.

Transnational Relationships

Fifth, a further analysis of the transnational relationships among the four groups

reveals the different nature and extent of these relationships. JI and KMM have

established strong external linkages to Al Qaeda, particularly since Al Qaeda is primarily

responsible for their revival as viable organizations. With limited support, operating, and

training bases, they are also highly dependent on the resources, training, and advice

provided by Al Qaeda. Though they attempt to diversify and overcome their weaknesses

by building linkages with other fundamentalist groups in the region, the linkages are

limited and largely utility in nature.

In contrast, while external funding and resources are attractive to MILF and LJ,

neither group is dependent on these linkages for their survival and operations. With a

large support base and a stable operating environment, they are able to sustain their

operations without external assistance. Thus, they have both weak linkages to

fundamentalist groups inside and outside of the region. In addition, they are fully

prepared to deny those linkages if they impair the achievement of their goals and no

longer serve their interests.

53

Though the external linkages of the four groups bring about the emergence of

transnational terrorism in SEA, the diverse motivations and interests in establishing these

linkages demonstrate inherent failings that can be exploited to curb the strengthening of

these linkages.

Summary

In summary, using the comparative analysis of the four groups as a reflection of

the circumstances in SEA, the causes for the emergence of transnational terrorism in the

region can be attributed to the determined, resourceful, and pervasive influence from

external terrorist organizations, especially Al Qaeda; the tenuous similarities but

fundamental differences in ideology and goals among Islamic fundamentalist groups; the

limited success of localized groups in addressing the separatist and economic root causes

of problems in the region; and the attractiveness of mutually supporting operating

structures, funding, and resources. However, there are inherent limitations and

weaknesses in the emerging nature of transnational terrorism in SEA because of the

underlying differences among the Islamic fundamentalist groups, the utility and non-

binding nature of the transnational linkages, and the fundamental weakness in an

external-influenced phenomenon. Thus, understanding the complexity of the goals,

motivations, and linkages of the four groups will help to clarify the nature of the

emergent transnational terrorism in SEA and the crafting of appropriate policies to deal

with it.

54

Joint Analysis

A joint analysis of the underlying conditions and causes further illuminates the

nature of the emerging transnational terrorism in SEA. First, transnational terrorism in

SEA has limited indigenous roots. Though the inherent vulnerabilities within SEA and

the tenuous similarities in goal and ideology among the Islamic fundamentalist groups

have contributed to the emergence of transnational terrorism, the analysis of the four

groups demonstrates that there is actually little broad-based support for transnational

ideology and goal in the region. In addition, the transnational relationship among the

Islamic fundamentalist groups is characterized by differences rather than similarities.

Thus, the indigenous underpinnings of the recent phenomenon of transnational terrorism

in SEA are weak and lacking in coherence.

Second, transnational terrorism in SEA arises on temporal and non-lasting

developmental problems in the region. It has emerged on the heels of a serious disruption

in the region’s ongoing political and economic development. The economic crisis has

both worsened the separatist and economic root causes of problems in the region, as well

as severely impaired the region’s ability to address them. As a result, the Islamic

fundamentalist groups are pushed toward more extreme actions, including transnational

terrorism, to achieve their objectives as long as these poor political and economic

conditions persist. Thus, the continuation of the phenomenon of transnational terrorism in

SEA will depend on the ability of the region to recover and develop stable and robust

political, economic, and regional institutions.

Third, transnational terrorism in SEA displays a strong and significant external

element. A combination of factors makes transnational terrorism in SEA a largely foreign

55

import. On the one hand, the susceptibility of SEA to external influences presents the

region as a suitable alternative front for external transnational terrorist groups; on the

other hand, the availability and attractiveness of external support to indigenous groups

invites external influences into the region. Together with the existence of a determined,

resourceful, and pervasive external transnational terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda,

the stage is set for a primarily external-influenced phenomenon of transnational terrorism

in SEA.

In summary, the nature of transnational terrorism in SEA displays limited

indigenous roots, underpinnings of temporal and non-lasting political and economic

problems, and strong external influences. It is essentially an external-influenced

phenomenon with limited and weak internal coherence. The emergence of transnational

terrorism in SEA is therefore not an inherent and irreversible process.

1Lawrence E. Grinter, Realities of Revolutionary Violence in Southeast Asia

(Alabama, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, March 1990), 1.

2Ibid., 8.

3Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Fluornoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), 275.

4Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, “Terrorism: Southeast Asia’s Response,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 January 2002, 1.

5“Growth of Gross Domestic Product,” ASEAN, August 2002 [chart on-line]; available from http://www.aseansec.org/macroeconomic/aq_gdp21.htm; Internet; accessed on 6 March 2003.

6“World Bank Supports Social Fund Project to Promote Peace and Development in Mindanao,” World Bank, 6 December 2002 [article on-line]; available from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20079795~menuPK:34466~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html; Internet; accessed on 24 March 2003.

56

7“Country Brief: Philippines,” World Bank, September 2002 [article on-line];

available from http://www.worldbank.org.ph/facts.htm; Internet; accessed on 6 March 2003.

8Robert C. Bone, Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Random House, 1962), 3.

9“Gravity of Terrorism Shifting to Region,” Singapore Straits Times, 15 October 2002.

10Angel M. Rabasa, “Southeast Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests,” RAND Corporation, December 2001, 1.

11ICG Asia, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” ICG Asia Report No. 43 (11 December 2002): 2.

12For example, Indonesia is made up of about 13,000 islands while the Philippines is made up of about 7,000 islands.

13Rabasa, 4.

14Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Taylor and Francis Books Ltd, 2000), 84, 96.

15“Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit,” ASEAN, 3 November 2002 [article on-line]; available from http://www.aseansec.org/13154.htm; Internet; accessed on 6 March 2003.

16Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, January 2003), 6-9.

17Reyko Huang, “In the Spotlight: Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” Center for Defense Information, 15 February 2002, 1.

18John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 68.

57

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Taliban and Al Qaeda may have been routed in Afghanistan, but global terrorism is far from defeated. Terrorist cells, linked to global networks, exist in many countries, including in Southeast Asia. The Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group is a stark reminder that these are not faraway problems, but immediate threats to us here and now. 1

Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong

The threat of transnational terrorism in SEA is immediate and real. The analysis

of the underlying conditions in SEA and comparison of the four selected Islamic

fundamentalist groups reveals the complex conditions and causes of transnational

terrorism in the region. The emergence of transnational terrorism is a result of both

internal and external factors. In addition, both contributing and countervailing factors

exist. Thus, the answer to the question of why transnational terrorism is emerging in SEA

is not as straightforward as it has been portrayed to be.

To recap, the underlying conditions and causes leading to the emergence of

transnational terrorism in SEA are summarized as follows: inherent vulnerabilities of

diversity, divisions, and a fractious and violent history; developmental pains of young

political, economic, and regional institutions; susceptibility of the region to external

influences; determined, resourceful, and pervasive influence from external terrorist

organizations, especially Al Qaeda; tenuous similarities but fundamental differences in

ideology and goals among Islamic fundamentalist groups; limited success of localized

groups in addressing the separatist and economic root causes of problems in the region;

58

and the attractiveness of mutually supporting operating structures, funding, and

resources.

Four key points can be concluded from the joint analysis of the underlying

conditions and causes. First, though SEA possesses certain conditions and causes that

lead to the emergence of transnational terrorism in the region, they are weak and lack

coherence. The inherent vulnerabilities of political violence, and sociocultural and

religious-ethnic divisions have not translated into significant contributing factors, nor

have the similarities in goals and ideologies of the Islamic fundamentalist groups. Rather,

the underlying fundamental differences among these groups serve to undermine the

internal coherence of their transnational linkages. The emerging transnational terrorism in

SEA can best be described as unstable and tenuous in nature.

Second, transnational terrorism in SEA is not an indigenous product; rather, it has

strong external influences and arises out of temporal and non-lasting political and

economic problems in the region. The economic crisis has weakened the region

significantly in its ongoing political and economic development, thereby creating a

temporary vulnerability that can be easily exploited by external terrorist groups.

Furthermore, indigenous groups seeking to bolster their limited success with external

support in funding and resources accentuate the situation. The result is the emergence of

a transnational terrorism that is temporal and external-influenced.

Third, transnational terrorism is not an inherent and irreversible phenomenon. It

can be effectively tackled with comprehensive and appropriately tailored policies. Such

policies can focus on promoting the countervailing factors while curbing the contributing

ones. Thus, a clear understanding of the nature, conditions, and causes of transnational

59

terrorism in SEA can provide a framework for the development of effective regional and

national strategies to combat it.

Fourth, a strategy to combat transnational terrorism in SEA must incorporate a

comprehensive and balanced approach to address all the contributing conditions and

causes of transnational terrorism in SEA. The strategy must not focus solely on direct

military or law enforcement actions against these fundamentalist groups; it should

address the root causes and emphasize the battle for the hearts and minds of the Islamic

community in SEA. The complex nature of the threat requires a combination of political,

socio-economic, religious-ethnic, and security measures to deal with the threat

effectively.

To deal effectively with the nature, conditions, and causes of transnational

terrorism in SEA, a five-pronged framework is derived based on the conclusions of the

thesis. The five-pronged approach is proposed as follows:

1. Minimize inherent vulnerabilities, to include the promotion of multicultural

understanding and strengthening the moderate voice of Islam.

2. Maximize national and regional resilience, to include the strengthening of

national and regional political and economic institutions and cooperation.

3. Address root causes, to include economic development and reasonable level of

autonomy for troubled regions.

4. Cut external support, to include cooperation in intelligence, finance, law

enforcement, and security.

60

5. Undertake appropriate direct actions, to include a mixture of law enforcement,

military, and negotiation techniques to deal with the fundamentally different groups in

the region.

Recommendations

With a better understanding of the nature, conditions, and causes of the

emergence of transnational terrorism in SEA, it is recommended that:

1. Policy makers within and outside the region consider carefully the complexity

of the nature, conditions, and causes of the emerging transnational terrorism in SEA.

2. Tailor comprehensive and appropriate policies to address the conditions and

causes.

3. Consider and conduct further studies on the proposed five-pronged framework

to combat transnational terrorism in SEA.

1Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the

Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, January 2003), 2.

61

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Bone, Robert C. Contemporary Southeast Asia. New York: Random House, 1962.

Campbell, Kurt M., and Michele A. Fluornoy. To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001.

Grinter, Lawrence E. Realities of Revolutionary Violence in Southeast Asia. Alabama, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, March 1990.

Guelke, Adrian. The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System. London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995.

Hoffman, Bruce. Countering the New Terrorism. Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 1999.

_________. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Leifer, Michael. Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability. London: Taylor and Francis Books Ltd., 2000.

McDonald, George R. Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia and US Policy Issues: Case Studies of Thailand and Indonesia. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998.

Neher, Clark D. Southeast Asia in the New International Era. Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.

Pillar, Paul R. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

Reich, Walter. Origins of Terrorism. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990.

Taylor, Max, and John Horgan, eds. The Future of Terrorism. London: Frank Cass and Co Ltd., 2001.

Articles

Babbage, Ross. “Recovering from Terror Attacks: A Proposal for Regional Cooperation.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2002.

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Banlaoi, Rommel C. “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (August 2002): 294-312.

Borgu, Aldo. “Australia’s Defense after September 11.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2002.

Desker, Barry, and Kumar Ramakrishna. “Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia.” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2002): 161-176.

Dillon, Dana R. and Paolo Pasicolan. “Southeast Asia and the War against Terrorism.” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1496, 23 October 2001.

Gershman, John. “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 60-74.

_________. “U.S. Takes Antiterrorism War to the Philippines.” Foreign Policy in Focus, Global Affairs Commentary, 15 January 2002.

Hassan, Mohamed Jawhar. “Terrorism: Southeast Asia’s Response.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 January 2002.

Huang, Reyko. “Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response.” Center for Defense Information, 8 February 2002.

_________. “In the Spotlight: Jemaah Islamiah.” Center for Defense Information, 18 October 2002.

_________. “In the Spotlight: Laskar Jihad.” Center for Defense Information, 8 March 2002.

_________. “In the Spotlight: Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” Center for Defense Information, 15 February 2002.

ICG Asia. “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates.” ICG Asia Report No. 43, 11 December 2002.

“Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM).” Federation of American Scientists. Article on-line. Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/kmm.htm. Internet. Accessed on 6 March 2003.

Rabasa, Angel M. “Southeast Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests.” RAND Corporation, December 2001.

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Tolin, Francisco L. “The Response of the Philippine Government and the Role of the AFP to address Terrorism.” National Defense College of the Philippines. Article on-line. Available from http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/tokyopaper.htm. Internet. Accessed on 29 January 2003.

World Bank Group. “Country Brief: Philippines.” World Bank, September 2002. Article on-line. Available from http://www.worldbank.org.ph/facts.htm. Internet. Accessed on 6 March 2003.

World Bank Group. “World Bank Supports Social Fund Project to Promote Peace and Development in Mindanao.” World Bank, 6 December 2002. Article on-line. Available from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ 0,,contentMDK:20079795~menuPK:34466~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html. Internet. Accessed on 24 March 2003.

Government Documents

Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs. The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism. Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, January 2003.

Other Sources

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit.” ASEAN Secretariat, 3 November 2002.

_________. “Growth of Gross Domestic Product.” ASEAN Statistics, August 2002.

“Map of Southeast Asia.” CIA World Factbook. Map on-line. Available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/reference_maps/southeast_asia.htmlInternet. Accessed on 20 March 2003.

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., May 1993.

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