An assessment of the safeguardanti-ballistic missile system

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Authors Ho, Carol Kui Yin, 1947-

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFEGUARD ANTI-BALLISTIC'MISSILE SYSTEM

by-Carol K.Y. Ho

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of theDEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree ofMASTER OF ARTS

In the Graduate CollegeTHE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

19 7 0

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of re­quirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judg­ment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholar­ship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED: k.

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTORThis thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

ROBERT M. LAWRENCEAssociate Professor of Government

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Robert M. Lawrence, of the Department of Government, University of Arizona, for his advice and counsel. His patience and perseverance made this thesis possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

CHAPTERXo INTRODUCTION I2. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABM SYSTEM . , ... . . k

3. THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM.......... .......... . . . 20Technological Aspects of the Safeguard System ... 20Safeguard: Phase I ............. . . . . . . . 23Comparison of the Sentinel and Safeguard Systems •. 29Safeguard: Phase II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE CONTROVERSY . . . . . . . . 35Perceived Nature of the Threat . . . . . . . . . . 39

Intent of the Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 39Capability of the Soviet Union . . . . . . . . k-2Vulnerability/invulnerability, of

United States Polaris Force . . . . . . . . 46Controversy: Technical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Technical Objections to the SafeguardABM System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51(l) The System’s Reliability . . . . . . . 52

■ (2) Testing of the Safeguard Systemand its Components . . . . . . . . . . 53

(3) The Radar’s Vulnerability . . . . . . . 5(4) The Interceptor Missiles' Limits

of Dependability . . . . . . . . . . . 55(5) Functioning of the Computer System . . 55Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Penetration Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

The Technical Case for the ABM System . . . . . 60Testing of the Safeguard ABM System . . . . 6lRadar Blackout . 62Penetration Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Controversy: Economic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66Controversy: Political . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Communist China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Neutral Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

iv

V

TABLE OF CONTEMTS— Continued Chapter : Page

C OnC lu S 3. OnS .e o * o o o o o o @ o o o o a - o 6 o o ■ e T*'5. FOUR SELECTED POLICY AREAS . 77

ABM and Strategic Stability . . . . . . . ...... 77ABM and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8lABM and Nuclear Non-proliferation . . . . . . . . . . 86ABM and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) ... 90

6. . A PROPOSAL FOR THE 1970's: SABMIS . . . . . . . . . . '9k

7 e CONCLUSIONS e . o o . . . o . . . . . .. • e e e e e e o « e 103REFERENCES . . . « . « . ® ... . . . . . * . . .. . . . . . . . . 106

ABSTRACT

The intent of this research is an assessment of a major weapon system:', the: Safeguard Anti-ballistic Missile System. I have examined the history and development of the anti-ballistic missile system, be­ginning; in. 19-5.,. and including the Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules, Nike-Zeus, IJ'ike-X,. Sentinel and Safeguard systems. I also studied both the af­firmative and negative arguments in the Safeguard controversy and con-., eluded that.the perceived nature of the threat (in this case, the intent and capability of the Soviet Union and the invulnerability/vulnerability of the United.States polaris forces) influenced one's views on the technical.,. economic, and political feasibilities of this weapon system. Moreover,,. ABM's, interaction with selected policy areas— international stability,, arms control, nuclear proliferation, and SALT were discussed. In. conclusion, II recommended the adoption of a proposal for the 1970's: SABMI.S (Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System), which I believe offers: many advantages, such as mobility and invulnerability, against, a nuclear, attack from the Soviet Union or Communist China.

vi

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The problem ol devising and deploying defenses against ballis­tic missiles has faced policy makers for more than a decade. The sub­ject has become a focal point in the national debate over basic national security policy since the Johnson and NixOn Administrations have made decisions to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. In this thesis I studied the background and development of the anti- ballistic missile system, focusing primarily on the Safeguard ABM, the key issues in the missile defense controversy, Safeguard's im­plications for selected policy areas, and a proposal for the 1970's.

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate a major weapon sys­tem. There has been much controversy surrounding the decision to de­ploy an anti-ballistic missile system. However, much of the information presented to the public has been fragmentary. The news media has occasionally reported the on-going arguments of this contro­versy and the Congressional hearings and reports have been debated in rather restricted, but not classified, circles. It is the intent Of this thesis to place this weapon system in a historical and political perspective. It is timely in light of the recent Congressional, hear­ings and debates, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) at Helsinki and Vienna, the publication of various position books and

1

papers on the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system,. and the Chinese launching of their first earth Satellite, which means China has an ICBM capability,

The justification for this research project is that the anti- ballistic missile system is just one of the many new technologically advanced weapons systems that are currently undergoing RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation), and in some instances, deployment by the United States government. Weapons such as MIRV, AMSA, ULMS, and advanced supersonic manned bombers will usher in a new .age of weaponry . There appears to be no weapon plateaus, cuased by technological con­straints , in sight now unless man arbitrarily sets one. At this criti­cal level, it is both wise and prudent to evaluate our government's defense program in relation to the Safeguard Anti-ballistic Missile System. .

The second chapter of this thesis is historical and contextual study of the development of the anti-ballistic missile system. More specifically, the emphasis is on the study of the past and present of this weapon system. I researched the background of the ABM. This en­tailed an examination of the evolution of the United States' develop­ment of an ABM capability, beginning in 1945, and including the Nike- Ajax, Nike-Hercules, Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, Sentinel, and the Safeguard systems. The third chapter is an explanation of the Safeguard ABM system— the technological aspects of the system. Safeguard: Phase I, comparison of the Sentinel and Safeguard systems, and Safeguard:Phase II. The fourth chapter is a presentation of the significant is­sues in the Safeguard ABM controversy, both negative and affirmative

arguments and positions. These issues are: l) the perceived nature of the threat; 2) technical feasibility of the Safeguard ABM; 3) economic. feasibility; and k) political implications for Western Europe, Asia, Communist China, and neutral nations. The fifth chapter is an explana­tion of the interaction of ABM with selected policy areas--such as stability, arms control, nuclear proliferation and SALT. The sixth chapter is a proposal for the 19701s: SABMIS (Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System). •I believe that the 19701s will be the era of the Navy and Oceanic Systems, which offer many .strategic advantages, such as mobility and invulnerability.

The scope of this thesis covers the evolution of the ABM--its origins in 19 -5 up to the decision to deploy it in 1969--and.a policy recommendation for the 1970's. The method of inquiry is primarily historical-descriptive.

To 'summarize, the intent of this thesis is an analysis of a major weapon system and its implications for national security policy.I believe that all too often the American public has been ignorant of the,development and deployment of weapons systems costing billions of dollars and the implications and political and economic costs of these systems. It is the intent of this thesis to examine our defense pro­grams with a new intensity.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABM SYSTEM

The history and development of ballistic missile defenses, like other weapon systems, have been subject to changes in the per­ceived nature of the threat,■advances in weapon technology, and nat­ional and international events. In 19 5* when the first Nike was envisaged, its chief targets were to be propeller-driven planes of ' subsonic speeds. Much later, the nature of the perceived threat shifted from enemy piloted bomber planes to intercontinental ballistic missiles« Advances in technology also played a major role in the de­velopment of air defenses. All of the air defense systems from Nike- Ajax.to the current Safeguard ABM, have been updated and modified as advances in missile, radar, computer and electronic technology occurred World events, such as the development, deployment, and build-up of intercontinental ballistic missiles by both the United States and the Soviet Union, the acquisition of atomic and thermonuclear capabilities . by the two superpowers and later by China, the possibility of greater nuclear proliferation, and the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow, influenced the development and deployment Of an ABM system on the part of the United States.

The beginnings of the anti-ballistic missile system can be traced back to the Nike-Ajax, the first in a series of guided missile

h

1air defenses.- The nature of the threat in the 1940's and early 1950's was. thought, to he enemy bombers. The development of the first Nike be­gan in 1944 when the Anti-Aircraft. Artillery Board recommended a devel­opment program for a controlled anti-aircraft rocket projectile as a defense against enemy bombing attack. On February 8, 1945# Army Ordi­nance authorized Western Electric’s Bell Telephone Laboratories to study the technical problems involved. Bell Telephone recommended a supersonic surface-to-air missile and a development contract was drawn with 'Douglas Aircraft. After the Korean War, the missile was installed around key centers to protect large cities and industrial centers vul­nerable to enemy bombers. The Nike-Ajax was conceived of as essential­ly a defensive weapon. It was designed to provide greater protection of. American cities than was possible with the more limited ranges and altitudes of the conventional anti-aircraft guns.

The Nike-Ajax system consisted of two major parts. The first was the missile itself, a supersonic rocket twenty feet long and one foot in. diameter with two sets of fins for guidance and steering. The missile carried an explosive warhead, a rocket propulsion input and electro-magnetic guidance equipment. It also provided its own propul­sion by burning liquid fuel. The second part of the Nike was a complex electronic control system, containing approximately 1,500,000 individual parts., When alerted by a radar, air warning net of the approach of en­emy bombers, the electronic system tracked the target and launched the missiles from ground batteries.

The Nike series of air defenses were named after Nike, the goddess of victory in Greek, mythology.

6The Nike-Ajax had a range of twenty-five to thirty miles and

a ceiling of ten to twelve miles. The speed in flight was close to 1,000 miles an hour.

In 1955 Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, called the Mke-Ajax, "the best anti-aircraft weapon now. available," However, the Nike was not without its critics. The Air Force, which operated anti-bomber fighters such as the F-1021s, publicly criticized the wea­pon system's limitations. Their principal objections were:

(1) The Nike-Ajax is essentially a short-range weapon, which must be emplaced so close to a city's heart that any enemy bomber carrying a thermonuclear weapon could cause great devastation, to the def ended city even if it were shot down,

(2) Contrary to the Army's assertion that the Nike-Ajax can shoot down any plane flying today, the weapon has never proved its-efficacy against modern high-flying trans-sonic or supersonic planes like the B~47« The Nike radar can eas­ily be jammed.

(3) The Nike-Ajax cannot carry a nuclear anti-aircraft warhead. The Air Force admits that such a warhead may be.de­veloped, in time, but maintains it could not be used with safety to the city defended until Nike's range is much great­er than it is now.

Moreover, other objections to the Nike-Ajax were that the few tests of the weapon system which were held, were not thorough and the weapon did not perform well. Also it is questionable whether or not the Nike could intercept high-speed, high-altitude bombers before they dropped their bombs, or low flying bombers operating below the radar range. ,

2New York Times, November 2?, 1955, Sec. IV, p. 6.

- 7Hanson W. Baldwin Hew York Times national security affairs

writer; noted that defense authorities were well aware of Nike-Ajax"slimitations„ However, the plan was approved to provide a fractionalincrease in security for the United States over a period of the nextfew years. Baldwin observed that:

The Hike may have a technological "life" of a decadej after that new birds will fly the skies and long-range intercon­tinental missiles with speeds of 15,000 miles an hour may tilt the balance strongly toward the offense. Meanwhile the interservice differences will be settled only by time and technological developments, which will profoundly change both services as we know them today.

In 1957, an improved version of the Hike-Ajax replaced its .predecessor in some 80 anti-aircraft batteries around the nation. TheHike-Hercules, an anti-aircraft missile with a range of 80 to 100 miles, and a speed of approximately 2,200 miles an hour, was designed to carry a nuclear warhead. The Hike-Hercules was twenty-seven feet long, and two feet in diameter. This ground-to-air missile had a capability of reaching altitudes of 150,000 feet. The booster, 14.5 feet long, was made up of a cluster of four-solid propellant rockets.

The introduction of the new Hike into the.air defense network was viewed as the second part of a program to multiply defensive strength by adding atomic power.

The installation of the Hike-Hercules in sites around the na­tion, in 1957, coincided with the Soviet press agency's (Tass) report of the successful test of a "very long-range ballistic missile," the TR-3• Within six weeks of this, the Soviet's Sputnik I was launched.

3Ibid.

In November*. 1958, the United States successfully fired its first in­ter continental ballistic missile* the Atlas. The job of continental air defense planning thus became even more difficult in light of a new generation of weaponry. • In 1959> Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy, disclosed that the Pentagon's Master Plan for continental air. defense called for a reduction of funds for defenses against possible surprise attack by bombers. This move underscored the belief that bomber defenses were becoming obsolete in view.of the United States and the Soviet Union's development of ICBM's, and.the deemphasis both na­tions were placing on bombers. The consensus was that because of

greatly exaggerated intelligence estimates of Soviet bomber strength, by alarmist Air Force testimony of some years ago and by pressure from scientists, the nation built up a tre­mendous and costly defensive system against the piloted bomb­er that is now obviously disportiona.te to the rather unimpressive threat.

In addition to a phase-out of bomber defenses, the defense plan called for an increased effort to perfect the Army's Nike-Zeus, "the first true anti-missile missile.” The New York Times remarked that no one could trace the origin of the term "ABM," though the news­paper noted that the anti-missile idea probably occurred to the British when the first V-2 crashed on London in September, 1944.

In February, 1955* the United States Department of Defense contracted feasibility studies for the proposed Nike-Zeus with BellTelephone Laboratories. In January, 1957, the Army called for full

— 'New York Times, June 21, 1959, Sec. IV, p. 7.%ew York Times Magazine, May 4, .1969, p. 32.

' ■ 9deployment of the Mike-Zeus based on findings of the Bell Telephone studies. In January, 1958, Defense Secretary,.McElroy, termed the ABM development as "urgent" because of Sputnik and other indications of . Soviet ICBM capabilities0

The Nike-Zeus was a system that concentrated on intercepting incoming ballistic missiles beyond the atmosphere. The system uti­lized four powerful radars and high-speed digital computers to deter­mine the intercept course and provide' this data to the firing battery.: The three-stage} solid-fuel, intercepting rocket, employed a relative­ly low yield nuclear explosive charge (kiloton range) to intercept the incoming ballistic missile in the terminal stage of its trajectory.If detonation of the Nike-Zeus warhead was close enough, the burst of neutrons emanating from it was thought sufficient to neutralize the enemy warhead or prevent it from exploding. The timetable for the whole system was about 100-l80 seconds, however, overall effectiveness was uncertain.

The Bike-Zeus system presented advantages as well as difficul­ties. Former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, before a House subcommittee in 1961, cited the advantages of the Nike-Zeus System.

Successful development may force an aggressor to expend addi­tional resources to increase his. ICBM force. It would also make accurate estimates of our defensive capabilities more difficult for a potential enemy and complicate the achievement of a successful attack. Furthermore, the protection that it would provide, even if for only apportion of our population, would be better than none at all.

6 ~U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before a subcommittee of theCommittee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, Part 3, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,''l95l%"pp. l67dj"cited by Benson D. Adams, "McNamara's ABM Policy, 1961-67," Orbis, XII (Spring, 1968),p. 201. "

10However, McNamara decided that the advantages of the weapon

system did not outweigh the difficulties involved. McNamara urged forcontinued research and development, and not initial deployment due totechnical, as well as strategic considerations. -

There is still considerable uncertainty as to its technical feasibility and, even if successfully developed, there are many serious operating problems yet to be solved. The sys­tem itself is vulnerable to ballistic missile attack, and its effectiveness could be degraded by the use of more so­phisticated ICBM's screened by multiple decoys. Saturation of the target is another possibility, as ICBM's become easier and cheaper to produce in coming years.. Finally, its a very expensive system in relation to the degree of protec­tion that it can furnish.7

Critics of the Nike-Zeus charged that the system as it stood in 1959, had three main difficulties. First, the Zeus Acquisition Radar (ZAR) could not discriminate effectively between the real war­heads, decoys, penetration aids, and chaff. Second, they questioned the ability of the system and the ZAR, in particular, to cope with a saturation attack. These first two difficulties stemmed from the fact that the "eye" of the radar system rotated. Therefore, critics charged that the ZAR could take only a periodic check for incoming objects rather than a constant watch. This severely limited the amount of in­formation that the system could gather about incoming targets. Third, the critics.noted that the Nike-Zeus was a poiht-defense system and this posed a political problem. How many and which cities would be defended? Also, it was possible for the enemy to avoid the system's range and attack the countryside, .generating a fallout attack on the

7lbid., p. 17.

11population by ground-bursting large megaton weapons upwind from the target cities. Thus, if Nike-Zeus were deployed, it would be necessary to build fallout shelters on a nation-wide scale. McNamara acknowl­edged the importance of civil defense shelters in his statement before the House Armed Services Committee in 1963.

The effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense sys­tem in saving.lives depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defense system. Indeed, in the absence of adequate fallout shelters, an active defense (ABM) might not significantly increase the proportion of the population . surviving an all-out nuclear attack.

Research and development continued in an effort to overcome these and other difficulties in the Nike-Zeus system. An assembly of individual radars were developed to provide sharper vision for the system. Also, the Thiokol Chemical Corporation solved the problem of casting a solid propellant and Douglas Aircraft successfully put the three stages■ of the missile, together.' In late 1961, the Nike-Zeus performed its first test-firing.and then, on July 19, 1962, it Suc­cessfully intercepted an Atlas ICBM over Kwajelin Island, in the Marshall chain. Critics of the Nike-Zeus argued that this was a con­trolled. experiment under "laboratory" conditions. . They contended that in a real attack the Zeus crew would not know -when and from what direc­tion the attacking missile would come.

The Nike-Zeus ABM program, under the direction of the Army's Research Projects Agency, was reevaluated. The result was a new

8U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of. Secretary of Defense . Robert 8. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the • Fiscal Year I96A-I968 Defense Program and 1964 Defense Budget,.Jan­uary 36, 1963, pp. 48-49 cited by Benson D. Adams, McNamara1 s ABM Policy, 1961-67," Orbis, XII (Spring, 1968), p. 205.

12'developmental program called Nike-X, which was aimed at protecting the entire United States against nuclear attack from the Soviet Union.

The Nike-X was a combination of an advanced radar system, Ifelti-function Array Radar (MAR) and Perimeter Acquisition Radar .(PAR), the Elke-Zeus, long range anti-missile, missile and the Sprint, a new shorter range, fast accelerating missile. The Sprint missile was de­veloped by the Martin Marietta Corporation in 1963 and tested two years later. While the Sprint was being developed, work on extending the range of the Nike-Zeus was in progressi Its range had to be increased to make the system economically feasible. If this task could not be accomplished, a large number of expensive missile farms and radars would have to be spread out over the nation.

It is germane to note that significant international, events occurred which could have influenced the development, and subsequent deployment, of an ABM system. In 1963, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed, prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The treaty prohibited the testing of ABM nuclear components above ground. In 1964, Communist China detonated its first atomic bomb, and in May,1966, she exploded a hydrogen device. In October, 1966, China tested its first missile-delivered device, equipped with a low-yield fis­sionable warhead. In December, 1966, China detonated a second thermo­nuclear device. '

In 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for the deployment of Nike-X. Secretary of Defense McNamara countered their argument by stating that the deployment of an ABM system on the part of the United

13States would only result in a similar response by the Soviet Union McNamara explained his decision against deployment of'the Nike-X in terms of Assured Destruction/Damage Limitation. In essence, he stated that:

Every weapon system competes with every other weapon system to determine which combination will insure an optimal Assured Destruetion/Damage Limitation force. In practical terms,. the defensive Nike-X must compete against the offensive ICBM wea­pon on a cost-effectiveness basis to determine whether the high cost of Nike-X warrants its deployment, or whether its mission can be accomplished more cheaply by a larger number ot ICBM*s.10

McNamara examined the threat faced by the United States stra- :tegic forces and his judgment against deployment of the Nike-X wasbased in large part on the need to build”optimal Assured Destruction/

11Damage Limitation capability. . He reasoned thatThe United States has an ABM weapon which will work to "some degree" but does not contribute significantly to the Damage Limitation mission, while more ICBM1s at less cost would en­hance the Damage Limitation Force. Hence, at this point,Nike-X is not ready to become a part of an optimal mix of strategic forces.

However, the situation took on new dimensions in November,1966, when McNamara announced, at a news conference in Johnson City, Texas, that a Soviet ABM called Galosh, was being deployed around Mos­cow. One political commentator observed that every decision to

^Benson D. Adams, "McNamara's ABM Policy, .1961-67," Orbis, XII (Spring, 1968), p. 214.

10Ibid.•L1Ibid., p. 215.12Ibid.

. 14withhold Nike-X production was a holding action designed to forestallSoviet deployment of an ABM system* The effort failed because the

" 11 Soviets did not cooperate.Intense pressure by the military and friends in Congress built

up for countering Galosh by deploying Nike-X. The Joint Chiefs ofStaff proposed a two-step deployment plan. The first step called fora $9,9 billion program to provide 25 cities with ABM defenses and thesecond step planned for a $19.4 billion program to extend this defenseto 25 more cities and build more Sprints to thicken the defense of the

14 'largest 25 cities.The pressure took on a definite partisan-political character

when the Republican National Committee} in a pre-election year when President Johnson was still in the running for re-election, issued a 55-page pamphlet titled, "Is LBJ Right?". The article concluded that LBJ was moving too slow on Nike-X deployment measures, One commenta­tor observed that Nike-X was now aimed at Republican, not Soviet, missiles.

On September 18, 1967, Defense Secretary McNamara announced that the United States has decided to deploy a "thin" Nike-X system around the country. This action was said to be designed as a defense against the relatively, small number of ICBM' s that Communist China was expected to have in the early 1970's. The system would also have given some protection against an accidental or authorized launching of a

- 7 T ~Ibid, p.. 225.^ New York Times Magazine, May 4, 1969, p. 124.

- ■■ 15 small number of missiles from the Soviet Union« In November, 1967,the Nike-X was:officially renamed Sentinel.

McNamara stated that the Sentinel ABM system, "the system '• specifically designed against the Chinese threat would consist of PA ls (Perimeter Acquisition Radars), MSRs. (Missile Site Radar), long-range Spartan area-defense missiles, and later, some Sprint local-defense

15missiles for certain special purposes," the latter were probably in­tended to protect command and control centers.

In January, 1 9 6 8, President Johnson asked $1.2 billion for the fiscal year 1969 for manufacture and. deployment of the Sentinel ABM . system and an additional $269 million for further research into im­proved missile defense. In March, President Johnson indicated that the Sentinel ABM was of highest national priority. Debate continued in the Senate. A motion to postpone deployment was defeated 3 to 52. The Senate voted the $277 million asked by the Administration for be­ginning the estimated $5.5 billion system. In October, the entire amount requested by the Administration for Sentinel— $9 6 3 .6 million—- was authorized and appropriated by the Ninetieth Congress.

The Sentinel system planned for a nationwide system of about 15 sites in such locations as: Albany, Ga; Chicago; Dallas; GrandForks Air Force Base, North Dakota; New York; Boston; Detroit; Los Angeles; San Francisco; Salt Lake City; Seattle; Sedalia, Missouri;

^Abram .Chayes and Jerome “Wiesner (eds.), ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System (New York:Harper and Row, 1969), PP• 2 7-587

16Oahu, Hawaii; Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming; and. Malmstrom Air Force

l6Base, Montana. These areas were selected as sites because of their key geographic and strategic locations.

However, the selection of Sentinel sites were met by angry,and, sometimes, hostile reaction from metropolitan residents and mem-;

*

bers of Congress. The lew York Times reported that in Boston, Chicago,Detroit, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu, objectionswere raised by city countils, church groups, conservationists, unionleaders, real estate developers, peace groups, and scientists, to the

17emplacement of nuclear weapons in their cities and suburbs. TheCongressional Quarterly Weekly Report stated that in three locations,Boston, Chicago and Seattle, where ground-work for Sentinel seemed to

iSbe the most advanced, area residents were particularly irate. Thebasic contention was that the location of sites near populated areasposed a potential nuclear hazard. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democratof Massachusetts, said that an accidental explosion in a Spartan silo"could cause total destruction in an area five miles in diameter and

19serious destruction over a far greater ares." Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird attempted to calm fears over the potential hazard by

16Congressional-Quarterly Weekly Report, December 13, 1968,Vol. 26, p. 3275.

17New York Times, February 9, 1969, p. 1.18Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, op. ci t p . 3273. •*~%ew York Times, February 9, 1969, p. 18.

- 17saying that "the possibility of any kind of accident is almost nil.He reassured residents that in handling about 15,000 nuclear weaponsall over the world, the United States has never experienced an accident

21that resulted in a nuclear explosion. Laird's.statements were, re­iterated by the Army, who remarked that the missiles were equipped withmany safety devices, but that the Army could not devulge the nature of

22these devices lest the enemy learns how to neutralize it. This made opponents of the Sentinel sites even more upset. In a public meeting, Democratic Congressman Abner Mikva accused the Army's spokesman.Colonel Robert Marshall of the Sentinel (ABM) System Command, of re­fusing to answer questions about "material that I could show you in

23Popular Mechanics Magazine.Residents also feared that the location of Sentinel sites in

' their communities would make it a more probable enemy target. Other objections were that property values would decrease, insurance rates would rise, and television reception would be damaged by the ABM's high powered radars.

In 1969 Senate opposition to the ABM system mounted. Many senators questioned the technical, economic, and political feasibility

20New York Times, February l4, 1969, p. 1.21Ibid. '^ Vfall Street Journal,. January 28, 19 9, p. 1.23Ibid.

18of the anti-ballistic' missile system* as well as its interaction with

. policy areas such as non-proliferation* arms control* Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks (SALT)* and international stability (See Chapter 4).Also, Senate, as well as public opposition to the deployment of an ABM .system centered around the high cost of military and defense spending.The New York Times, in its editorial section, commented as.follows:

The debate over the Sentinel ABM system, however, is sympto­matic of a deeper tide of disenchantment with the military.For the first time since World War II, Congress, is beginning to question whether the military may not have, acquired inor­dinate influence over policy, both foreign and domestic; - . whether the military by the very global extension, of its power may hot be leading-the nation .into unintended commitments; whether the military by the very expensiveness of its new wea-’ pons, which always seem,to turn out more costly than originally

■ estimated, may. not be consuming funds that could be better used on domestic programs.

In February, Senator Edward Kennedy asked Secretary of Defense Laird to freeze ABM deployment, pending completion of a strategic wea­pons system review. In February, Secretary Laird authorized.a tempo­rary halt in Sentinel deployment pending a review of all major weapon systems. Opponents of the system characterized this halt as a

25"tactical" move by .the Nixon Administration. Actually, they noted,"All that got halted was some land clearing at two sites outside ofBoston. Research and development and manufacturing of the system's

26missiles and radar continued unabated. The New York Times commented on this temporary measure as cited:

2k „New York Times, February l6, 1969, Sec. IV, p. 1.25New York Times, February 13, 1969, p. 1.^New York Times, February 9, 1969, P.* 1.

19. When Defense Secretary Melvin-R. Laird announced this week a ... temporary halt'in placing the system, one of the principal reasons was that it was becoming increasingly unlikely that the Senate would approve further deployment money. 7

On March 19, 1969, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee start­ed hearings on the feasibility of .ABM deployment. The Senate Committee's hearings addressed themselves to pertinent questions in the ABM contro­versy. These questions were: -

l) Has the nation's retaliatory capability been impaired by the recent build-up in Soviet offensive strength or can the United States wait before deciding to protect its retal­iatory forces?

.2) If its retaliatory forces need protection, is the anti­missile defense the best way, or are there other more efficient and cheaper ways, such as hardening Minutemen missile silos, deploying more Minuteman and Polaris missiles, or placing more strategic bombers on airborne alert?

3) By defending Minuteman bases and developing multiple warheads for the missiles, is the United States not engaging in a provocative act of seeming to acquire a first-strike capability, thus triggering a further build-up in Soviet de­fensive and offensive power in the nuclear arms race?

4) By deploying an antimissile defense system and develop­ing multiple warheads for offensive missiles, might not the Soviet Union and the United States be throwing away perhaps their last opportunity to limit their strategic arms r a c e ? 2 °

On March l4, 1969, President Nixon announced his proposals for a modified Sentinel ABM system. The system, in his words, was "truly a 'Safeguard' system; a defensive system only.” On August 6, after much public and Senatorial, debate, the United States Senate voted 51-50 to deploy the Safeguard system. An attempt to limit fund­ing to only research and development was defeated 49 to 50.

27lbid.28. New York Times, March l6, 1969, p. 1.

CHAPTER 3

THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM :

On March 14/ 1969, President Richard M. Hixon announced his decision to deploy a ballistic missile defense system. The system, named Safeguard, was a modification of the Sentinel Anti-Ballistic Missile system, which was proposed earlier by the Johnson Administra­tion., In this chapter, I propose to explain the technological aspects of the Safeguard system, outline Safeguard's Phase I as proposed by President Nixon on March 14, 1969; contrast Phase I with the Sentinel program, and outline Phase II as proposed by the Nixon Administration on February 24, 1970•

Technological Aspects of the Safeguard SystemThe anti-ballistic missile system has been called several names

over the past twelve years. In 1956, it was named. Nike-Zeus. In 1963, it was renamed Nike-X. In 1967, its name was changed to Sentinel. Now it is Safeguard. Whatever its name, the ABM is technically the same system it was several years ago, with improvements and modifications made in the various missiles, radars, and computers.

The enemy warhead is detected and tracked by some com­bination of radars. The information obtained by the radars is interpreted and processed by sophisticated computer facil­ities. The destruction of the incoming warhead is accom­plished by an interceptor (missile) warhead exploding in the vicinity of the incoming warhead. The sheer magnitude of the

20

21

task, intercepting an enemy warhead.- traveling at 4' .miles per second with an interceptor traveling more slowly, seemed to give meaning to the metaphor of "hitting a "bullet with a bullet o"-*-

An ABM system is composed of three major parts--radars, com­puters and. missiles, plus interconnecting communications and controls. The Safeguard system uses two separate radars, The first is the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), which detects enemy missile war­heads. as far as 1,500 miles away. The PAR computes the incoming war­heads' trajectory and tracks' them until they are within range of the Missile Site Radar (MSR). The job of this second radar is to plot the path of the incoming warheads, discriminate between the real war­heads and the decoys, and’.guide the interceptor missiles to the point of intercept. The computers involved in the Safeguard system are highly complex and sophisticated. The computers perform many func­tions simultaneously--receive radar signals, identify potential tar­gets, track incoming objects, predict trajectories, distinguish between warheads and decoys, correct for blackout effects, allocate and guide interceptor'missiles, and arm and fire them when they.are within range of a target. All of these functions must be done, with precision and accuracy, within a time period of ten minutes, at the most. The Safeguard system is comprised of two interceptor missiles which carry thermonuclear warheads. The Spartan is a long-range missile with a warhead in the multimegaton range. Its function is to intercept the incoming warheads while they are still beyond the

"'"Johan Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (eds.), Why ABM?(Hew York: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 3»

22earth's atmosphere and about 400 miles away. The Spartan operates' in the vacuum of space, where the blast of an explosion would have no ef­fect. The Spartan-s warhead is designed to disarm the enemy's warhead by releasing a large quantity of X-rays that damage the central elec- . tronics inside the enemy's re-entry vehicle. 1 If the incoming warheads manage to elude the Spartan and enter the earth's atmosphere, the war­heads and the decoys assume different characteristics. The retarding effect of the atmosphere acts as a filter, thus the light-weight ob­jects, such as decoys, -are. slowed downy- while the heavier objects, \

2such as nuclear warheads, continue on at a faster rate. When the in­coming warheads are within 100,000 feet of their target, the Safeguard system fires - its Sprint missiles. The Sprint is a small (27 feet tall, 4|- feet in diameter), high-acceleration, short-range missile. It is designed to intercept at altitudes of up to 20 miles, though most in­tercepts occur at 5 to 10 miles. The Sprint's warhead is in the kiloton range. It is intended to destroy the enemy's warhead through a combination of blast, heat and radiation.

The Nixon Administration plans to deploy the Safeguard system 3in two phases.

2Note that it is generally not practical to include heavier decoys in a missile's payload because the extra weight robs the missile's real warhead of its explosive power.

3The first phase of Safeguard was announced by President Nixon on March it, 1969. The second phase was outlined by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.on'February 2t, 1970.

23The first phase will include the deployment of PAR and,

MSR radars as well as Spartan and.Sprint interceptors around Minuteman sites, at Grand Forks .(North Dakota) and Malstram (Montana) Air Force Bases. The purpose of this deployment is to give, limited protection to a part of pur deterrent, and to provide the operational experience that will he bene­ficial to the second deployment phase.

■ The character of the second phase of the Safeguard de­ployment is to be dependent on the nature of the threat per- deived after the initial phase of the deployment is completed. Three options are considered. The first phast two option is designed to increase the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force if the Soviet ICBM threat increases. This option would de­ploy two additional.PAR/mSR and Spartan/Sprint sites at two other Minuteman wings in addition to adding a heavier com­plement of Sprint missiles at the.existing batteries. Washington, B.C. would also receive protection if this op­tion were exercised. The second option of providing heavier protection to the U.S. bomber force would be exercised if the Chinese ICBM threat increased to the point where U.S. ■ cities would be severely threatened. Under this option, the area rather than point defense aspects of Safeguard would be , emphasized by the procurement of additional Spartan missiles.

■ Safeguard: Phase I. President Nixon, on March l4> 1969, outlined the objectives,

purposes, characteristics, alternatives, and implications of the first phase of the Safeguard system. The proposed missile defense system is characterized as truly a safeguard system, a defensive system only." The deployment of the Safeguard system is designed to fulfill three objectives:

(1) Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

(2) Defense of the American people against the kind'of nuclear attack.which Communist China is likely to mount with­in a decade.

Niolst and Schneider (eds.), op.cit., pp. 9-10*

2b

'(3) Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source

In making this decision. President Nixon stated that he con­sidered three other alternatives. These alternatives were deployment of a system which would attempt to defend American cities from an at­tack by the Soviet Union; continuation of the previous administration’■s Sentinel program; and an indefinite postponement of deployment while continuing research and development.

The first alternative was rejected by the President because "it is not now within our power to do so" (to provide the American population with complete protection against a major nuclear attack) President Nixon noted that a heavy defense system still could not pre­vent a catastrophic level of American fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. A saturation attack by the Soviet Union could exhaust the Safeguard system (see Chapter A). Furthermore, such a heavy-system might be misconstrued by an opponent as the forerunner of an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent, warned President Nixon.

The second alternative, a continuation of the Sentinel program, was also rejected because "it did not provide protection against some

7threats to our retaliatory forces which have developed subsequently." President Nixon noted that developments since 1967, when the decision

5Weekly Compilation:of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5> No. 11, March 17,19597 p." 4067" ' ” "

6Ibid.^Ibid., p. 407.

25to deploy Sentinel was made, have occurred which required a modifica­tion of the Sentinel system. He cited the buildup of Soviet strategic forcesj

(1) The Soviets have already deployed an-ABM system which protects to some degree a wide area centered, around. Moscow.We will not have a comparable capability for over. 4 years.We believe the Soviet Union is continuing their ABM deployment, directed either toward improving this initial system, or more likely, making substantially better second-generation ABM components.

(2) The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large missiles with warheads capable of destroying our harden­ed minuteman forces.

(3) The Soviet Union has also been substantially increasing the size of their submarine-launched ballistic missile force.

(k) The Soviets appear to be developing a semi-orbital nuclear weapon system.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that the Soviet Union was "build­ing at a rapid rate the kinds of weapons which could be used to erode

9our essential deterrent force." Laird noted that the Soviet Union continued to deploy SS-gs and SS-lls, the Soviet's ICBMs. He com­mented, on this deployment as follows:

It is apparent that the Soviet Union by deploying the SS-9 is intent on acquiring a "first-strike" capability-- or an ability to launch such a devastating attack on Amer­ican missile and bomber forces, that the United States could not retaliate.

With.its large warhead and accuracy, the SS-9 would be capable of knocking out a large portion of the 1,000 missile Minuteman.force, even those sitting in the security of

8Ibid.New York Times, March 22, 1969, p. 17°

. . 26super-hardened silos. The deterrent force of Polaris sub-

, marines with 656 missiles, is threatened by Soviet anti­submarine warfare developments.

Therefore, if it is going to maintain its deterrent strength, the United States has no alternative - but to pro­tect some of the Minuteman bases with the Safeguard system against the SS-9- °

Ultimately, President Nixon and Secretary Laird are referring to the concept of pre-post launch invulnerability and the idea of deterrence when they cite the threats to American retaliatory forces. "A deterrent force aims to prevent an enemy attack. It is fully ef­fective if the enemy who would like to attack in order to obtain a certain objective abstains from doing so. In that sense, the entire military power of a country can function as a deterrent.For the deterrent to be effective, a nation's forces must be invulnerable to .an opponent's first-strike (pre-launch invulnerability), and invul­nerable after launch (post-launch invulnerability). Invulnerability plays a dominant theme in the discussion of delivery systems. The United States claims that it has an invulnerable second-strike force. That is, if the United States is struck first, it can respond by launching its retaliatory forces. It is important to have both pre­post launch invulnerability to make deterrence effective.

The last alternative, postponement of deployment while con­tinuing research and development, was also rejected by President Nixon

•*~%ew York Times, March 24, 1969, p. 30.11Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense (New

York: Random House, 1959) > P. 28. “ ——

because, in his words, it "posed too many risks." He remarked that"research and. development does not supply the answer to many technical

12issues that only operational experience can provide."According to the President, the.primary purpose of the Safe­

guard system is to save lives, by preventing war . ... "and that is why the emphasis of the system is on protecting our deterrent, which is the best preventive for war."^ President Nixon noted that modern technology provided several choices to insure the survival of American ' retaliatory forces. One option would be to increase the number of sea- and land-based bombers. This was ruled out because "it provides only marginal improvement of our deterrent, while it could be misinterpreted by the Soviets as an attempt to threaten their deterrent. It would therefore stimulate an arms race. Another option, that of further hardening bur ballistic missile forces by placing them in more strong­ly reinforced underground silos was rejected because "hardening by it­self is not adequate protection against foreseeable advances in the

15accuracy of Soviet offensive forces." The third, and the acceptedoption, was "to begin a measured construction on an active defense of

l6our retaliatory forces."

• Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, op. cit., p. 401. ibid.

14Ibid., p. 407.

28President Nixon stated that the Safeguard system .would use

components previously developed for the Sentinel system. However, henoted that the deployment would, be changed to reflect the new concept.The new system would provide for:

Local defense of selected Minuteman sites and an area defense designed to protect our bomber bases and our command and con- • trol authorities. In addition, this new system will provide ,a defense of the continental United States against an acciden­tal attack and will provide substantial protection against the kind of attack which the Chinese communists may be capable of launching throughout the 1970's. This deployment will not re­quire us to place missile and radar sites close to our major cities.7

President Nixon estimated that the total cost of installing the Safeguard Would be $6-7 billion.

Another major characteristic of the Safeguard program is its . flexibility. President Nixon.stressed the fact that the program would be subject to a yearly assessment of the threat. "Each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at. that time. Moreover, we will take maximum advantage of the informa­tion gathered from the initial deployment in designing the later

18'phases of the program." He added that "since our deployment is to be closely related to the threat, it is subject to modifications as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China.

^Ibid., p. 408. 18Ibid.19Ibid.

29

Comparison of the.Sentinel and Safeguard Systems'The Safeguard program, as initially proposed by President

Hixon, is similar to the Sentinel system. However, there are certain differences between the two systems in terms of purpose, deployment schedule, number of missiles and sites, cost, and PAR and MSB deploy­ment. Phase I of Safeguard has as its primary purpose, unlike Sen­tinel's, the protection of the United States nuclear retaliatory forces, not its population. Accordingly, the ABM batteries will be>. deployed near missile launching sites and strategic bomber bases, not near the cities (except Washington, B.C.). In terms of deployment, • the Sentinel system called for a fixed deployment schedule. The Safe­guard system will be a "phase system." On an annual basis, the Safeguard system will be reviewed. Its dimensions could be expanded or reduced depending on the extent of the perceived enemy threat, the progress of international talks on arms limitation, and any advances in ABM technology. Sentinel's arsenal would have had about 750 Spartans and Sprints, while Safeguard initially will probably include 350 to 400. Also, Sentinel would have had fifteen sites while Safe- guard is initially programmed for and began with only two sites--one in Montana (Malstrom Air Force Base) and one in North Dakota (Grand Forks Air Force Base)— the first of which will not be completed until 1973« The other ten Safeguard sites may be located in Southern New . <England, Washington, B.C., Florida-Georgia, Michigan-Ohio, Whiteman Air Force Base, Texas, Warren Air Force Base, Upper Northwest, Central California, and Southern California. The estimated deployment costs ■ Of the two' systems differ.

30

The Safeguard deployment DoD costs, not including AEG ($1.1 billion) and R&D'($2>5 billion) costs, exceed Sen­tinel by '$1.1'billion ($6.6 vs $5«5 billion respectively).This additional cost is the effect of adding two more PAR sites (five for Sentinel, seven for Safeguard) and a total of eleven rather than five radar faces. Similarly, the number of MSB faces has been increased’from thirty-four to forty-eight to improve the system coverage, and the number of Sprint missiles (to protect radar sites) has been in­creased a c c o r d i n g l y .

As further changes over the Sentinel system, the Safeguard system would add to the PAR radars, (one in Florida and one in Califor­nia) to scan the oceans and seek out submarine-launched missiles.This change is a response to the Russian buildup of Polaris-type missiles fired from submarines.

In addition, all local MSB radars will be given k faces, for as many points on the compass, to allow them to scan over 360 degrees. This is designed against submarine .missiles and against the new Soviet fractional orbiting bomb (FOB's).

Safeguard: Phase IIOn February 24, 1970, the Nixon Administration announced its

plans for Phase II of the Safeguard system. Safeguard's Phase II is not unlike the Sentinel ABM system, which the Johnson Administration recommended and the Nixon Administration later modified. The Sentinel system had as its primary purpose, the protection of the nation's major cities from an unsophisticated Chinese nuclear attack or an accidental and limited Soviet missile launching. President Nixon, on March 14, 1969, stated that Safeguard's Phase I would be a modification of the

20Holst and Schneider (eds.), op. cit., p. 10.

Sentinel system and would, instead, have as its primary purpose the protection of the United States nuclear retaliatory forces, not its population. However, on January 30, 1970, President Nixon announced that the ABM system would he expanded to provide an area defense around US population areas against the possible future attack by Communist China. Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield commented on this second phase of Safeguard by saying that, "The President has resurrected the Chinese threat, which he said, about a year ago, 'If

First,.a purpose of defending our Minutemen. sites against anymajor nuclear power, and second, an area defense to cover the possi-

22bility of attack by any minor nuclear power. .The President explained that:Our.decision involves area defense. The Minuteman defense

is only effective insofar as an attack by a major power, taking out our retaliatory capacity.

The area, defense, on the other hand, is absolutely essen­tial as against any minor power, a power, for example, like Communist China. I don't anticipate an attack by Communist China, but if such a power had some capability with ICBM's to reach the United States, an area defense, according to the information we have received, is virtually infallible against that kind of potential attack and, therefore, gives the United

21I remember correctly,' 'he couldn't buy.'"President Nixon stated that an expansion of the ABM system

would be done with two purposes in mind:

States a credible foreign policy in the Pacific area which it otherwise would not have. 3

February 2"7~1970j p7-95T

^ New York Times, February 1, 1970, p. 1.22Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 6, No. 5,

32On February. 2k, 19%0, Defense Secretary Laird outlined the

proposed second phase of the Safeguard system. Phase II involved spending an estimated $920-million in the twelve months starting July 1 to defend the Minuteman complex at .'Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and to do preliminary work, without any commitment to build sites, at five locations--Washington, D.C., Southern New England,

2Washington State, Michigan-Ohio, and Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Defense officials said that all twelve sites in the Safeguard, program would have to be built to shield the entire nation against the Chinese missile threat. If the United States decided to proceed with the rest of the program, it could be fully operational by 1977 or 1978; Defense officials noted. The cost of the full 12-site Safeguard program, as . estimated by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, had increased in cost, since the original estimate, by $1.6 billion. Packard at­tributed the increase to: $395"million due to the rise of inflationover last year, $595-million to stretching out the time and completingthe whole program, and 650-million to "design changes and better (cost)

25estimates."The plan announced by Secretary Laird' is "less ambitious" than

the plan proposed to President Nixon by the Department of Defense and the Army on January 29, 1970. Besides the new site at Whiteman Air Force Base, the Pentagon called for the construction of a defense site

2kNew York Times, February 25, 1970, p. 1.25Ibid.

33in-upper Washington State. "The site in Washington State would be aimed to start a defense strictly against China in hopes of achieving a full defense against China by the mid-nineteen-seventies, when China is expected to have anywhere from 15 to 40 intercontinental missiles«"■

President Nixon attributed the decision to scale down the Pen­tagon's proposal partly to fear of an adverse reaction in Congress.It has been reported that some leading Safeguard defenders, such asSenator Henry Jackson, Democrat of Washington, "who not incidentally

27is up for re-election," have doubts about the wisdom of starting a thin anti-Chinese area defense. Mr. Jackson endorsed the additional Minuteman production in the Phase II of Safeguard, as "a prudent and necessary response to the continuing Soviet build-up of strategic of­fensive forces," but he expressed doubt-about "the wisdom of moving.

28now to the thin anti-Chinese area defense.”Much more than last year, the program has become involved in

the debate over national priorities, over domestic programs vs. mili­tary expendituresj and over spending vs. inflation. In. an electionyear, that debate gains certain personal pertinency for Senators who

29have to justify their ABM decisions to the- electorate.

^New York Times, January 30, 1970, p. 12.27New York Times, March 1, 1970, Sec. IV, p. 3< 28Ibid.29Ibid.

34The New York.Times noted a contradiction in the Administra­

tion’s move to defend a third Minuteman site with Safeguard missiles.To a certain extent the Administration is caught in its

own argumentation. Last year, when hard pressed, it always fell back on the argument that the first two stations were needed as prototypes to develop and prove out the system.The Administration now finds itself in somewhat of a con- . tradictory position in advocating a third station before the ground has barely been scratched on the first two sites.3®

3°Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE CONTROVERSY

The Anti-ballistic missile system has been the subject of a nationwide controversy over national security policy since the Johnson and Nixon Administrations made affirmative decisions to develop and de­ploy the Sentinel/Safeguard systems. The .merits of the ABM system have been debated in both the public and private arenas;.in Congressional hearings--Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Appropriations Committee; in position papers published in books and.journals by eminent scientists, scholars, and Congressmen; and in the news media. ■ It is clear that the ABM contro­versy began when the precarious nuclear balance between the United States and. the Soviet Union was apparently threatened by the introduc-

ption of new weapons systems. The present strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union is based on mutual deterrence (derived from post- and pre-launch invulnerable strategic nuclear sys- terns) which is assumed to guarantee stability on the strategic level. Such deterrence is based on a second-strike assured destruction capa­bility of each superpower.

pAaron Wildavsky, "The Politics of ABM," Commentary, Vol. 48 (November, 1969)> 55 «

' C. P. Barnaby, "Arguments For and Against the Deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," in C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup (eds.), Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Pugwash Monograph II (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 26.

36The United States seeks to have a sufficient number and

• diversity of nuclear weapons to guarantee that, in the event of a surprise attack by the Soviet Union, it would be'able to strike back with enough force to destroy the aggressor.Since the Soviet Union also has sufficient capability to re­taliate after an attack, each country is believed to be de­terred. from launching a surprise attack against the other by the threat of mutual destruction.3

However, this precarious nuclear equilibrium could be affected by new weapons such as FOBS, MIRV and ABM. In November, 1967, Defense Secretary Robert S. "McNamara announced that the Soviet Union was de­veloping a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). The FOBS consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles, that travel in a par­tial orbital trajectory--about 100 miles above the earth's surface, as compared to 600 miles for conventional ICBM's. Thus, the FOBS are dif­ficult to detect with regular long-range and even the newer over-the- horizon radars. ' This technological advance affects the nuclear balance because.the FOBS can increase the first-strike capability against an opponent's strategic forces and are thus deemed destabilizing.

In December 1967, the Department of Defense announced the de­velopment of the Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry yehieles (MIRV). MIRV consists of a cluster of warheads carried in a nose cone of a single ICBM. Each of the warheads can be guided to a separate target. MIRV offers the advantages of making greater use of each missile and by releasing many real or dummy warheads it can confuse enemy radars and saturate enemy defenses. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are working on MIRV's and it is believed that the United States is probably ahead in MIRV development and could deploy

3Wildavsky, op. cit«, p. 55• '

' - ■ ■ ■ ■ 37it. by the late 197.0' s« MIRV is an important factor in the ABM con­troversy. Proponents of the ABM "believe that a ballistic missile de­fense system would help offset the destabilizing 3-for-one-10-for-one effect of MIRV; because an attacker would have to insure penetration of the defense by targeting several warheads on each of his enemy's

k "launchers. On the other hand, opponents of the ABM believe that thedeployment of an anti-ballistic missile system could be misconstrued by the Soviets as a first-step "toward achieving a first-strike capa­bility and thus move the Soviets to counteract with the deployment of MIRV. Moreover, critics charge that once MIRV is deployed it will complicate the Strategic ARMS Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union. They contend that reconnaissance satellites will be unable to detect whether a missile silo contains a sitigle headed rocket or a MIRV and thus would be difficult, if not impossible, to monitor. Thus, reach­ing an agreement with the Soviet Union may be difficult because the Soviet Union has never accepted more than national means of verifica­tion. However, as a rejoinder to this, Harold Brown, in his article ■"Security Through Limitations" suggests that "it is possible that evenwithout on-site inspection we can tell enough about each other's mis-

5siles to obtain reasonable assurance." "This is so because the prob­able number of warheads per missile is proportionate to the payload, of

^Robert L. Bartley, "Missile Debate: The Real Villain is MIRV;" Wall Street Journal, June 18, lg6$, p. 22.

Harold Brown, "Security Through Limitations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. >7, April 1969, p. 429.'

that missile, and. payload, in turn, is directly related to. the gross volume which we may be able to determine unilaterally." But the question remains: "How do we know if they cheat on a MIRV ban?"

It is clear that these technological advances (as well as others, such as the Underwater Long-Range Missile System) represent a new generation of weaponry which may alter the strategic nuclear bal­ance between the two superpowers. "There's a real chance that the ad­vances of technology will take us out of an era of mutual second-strike

7capability and into the era of mutual first-strike capability."The problem is that it is not enough to stop, the nuclear arms

race, the trick is to stop it at a level conducive to future stabil-8 : ' ity. This is where the controversy over the ABM begins. Analysts on

both sides of the debate agree on the necessity of freezing at a levelconducive to stability. However, they differ on exactly where thatlevel is. Proponents of the ABM believe that

Realistically, it is already too late to freeze right now.Since the arms race seems likely to continue awhile before being frozen,- an ABM is needed to insure the eventual freeze- ■ level will be a stable one. An ABM on both sides would pre­serve second-strike capability, :and mitigate the complexities introduced by minor nuclear powers. And should the (SALT) talks happen to fail, these same advantages would at least deflect the arms race in a somewhat less dangerous situation.

Tbid7Bartley, op. cit., p. 22.8Ibid.Robert L. Bartley, "ABM Debate: Watch Out For the Chaff,"

Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1969, p. 18.

39On the other hand,..opponents of the ABM argue that

The United States and the Soviet Union are right now at a . favorable point for stopping the arms race. The two stra­tegic arsenals are in rough parity. Even more important, both sides have "second-strike capability," the ability to absorb an initial nuclear attack and still retaliate over- ■ whelmingly.. Therefore, we ought to freeze nuclear arms right now, or at least preserve that option in impending Soviet-American arms talks

In this chapter I do not propose to make a case for or against the ABM, but to examine where the basic controversies lie and why each side adopted the positions and arguments that they did. I will dis­cuss both the affirmative and negative positions on the perceived na­ture of the threat, the technical,■economic, and political policy issues.

Perceived Nature of the Threat The source of conflict between the proponents and the oppo­

nents of the ABM originated in the differing views on the perceived nature of the threat. Specifically, from the United States viewpoint, the issues in question are the intent of the Soviet Union, the capa­bility of the Soviet Union and the vulnerability/invulnerability of the United States' Polaris force.

Intent of the Soviet UnionProponents of the Anti-ballistic missile system, such as

leaders in the Nixon Administration, view the intent of the Soviet Union as aiming towards a first-strike capability. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, stated that:

ko

The Soviets are going for a first-strike capability, and there is no question about' it. As recently as December, he said, "hard" intelligence was received that the Soviet Union ■was going ahead with deployment,of the.SS-9« He estimated that more than 20.0 of the missiles were deployed, and charts supplied by the Defense. Department to the subcommittee pro­jected that.nearly 500 would be deployed by 1975• Based on the size of the warhead.and the accuracy of the missile, the Secretary said "this weapon can only be aimed at destroying our retaliatory force.

However, this view is not shared by the' critics of the ABM who proceed to argue their case from the basic assumption that there is no intent on the part of the Soviet Union to launch a first-strike against the United States. In light of the United States1 devastating power, what country would consider that it could launch a nuclear at­tack upon the United States without suffering utter destruction in re-

12taliation? The components of the United States deterrent forces, as listed by Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are as follows:

First, our nuclear missile.submarines. We have 4l such submarines, They run quiet and deep in the ocean. They move steadily in the deep and can fire with deadly accuracy from relatively invulnerable positions. Each of these 4l sub­marines carries 16 Polaris nuclear missiles--among our newest and most accurate. So we now have' 656 .Polaris missiles, any one of which can be fired upon one of the approximately 200 towns and cities in the Soviet Union. Soon the Polaris will be replaced with the Poseidon. Each poseidon missile can have 10 nuclear warheads. Then, from the depths of the ocean 6,500 nuclear missiles could be 'rained upon the Soviet Union.

1 -INew York Times, ’March 22, 1969, p. 16.12U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Organ­

ization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Strategic and Foreign.Policy Implications of ABM Systems,. Part I, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. l6^(hereafter cited as Senate Foreign. Relations Committee Hearings).■

4i

We have about 1,000 Minutemen of which about 350 are in silos near the two missile defense sites in Montana and.

. . North Dakota, about which you-propose to deploy the anti-ballistic missile system. And soon, it should be added, . . these 1,000 Minutemen will have 3,000 warheads if the MIRV program continues. Then we have 7,000 tactical nuclear wea­pons, which I cannot cite, at other foreign bases.. In addi­tion we have about 1,000 warheads that can be carried by our bombers. ^

Moreover, critics contend that the perceived nature of the threat has been subject to "changes" by both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, and that "this is a weapons' system searching for a mission.

It has been well said that, this ABM system is a defense ' in search of a mission. . We have heard every possible kind of argument for it and many of these are contradictory. We are told at first that we had to have an ABM because of the Chi­nese threat. The Chinese do not even have an ICBM. And yes­terday Mr. Packard said the Chinese were no further along with one than they were 3 years ago. They can't even hit the Pacific Ocean, let alone a missile silo in Montana.

Next it was said that we had to have an ABM because the Russians had an ABM of. their own around. Moscow. But now it is clear that this system is mostly of the kind we consider­ed obsolete years ago, and that it has only 67 interceptors to stop our thousands of warheads.

We were told next that we had to have an ABM because the Russians were building a missile defense throughout Russia.But now it is clear that this Tallinn system has no signifi­cant capability against missiles.

Until a few weeks ago, or maybe it was a few days ago, we were told by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our security re­quired deployment of ABMs around 25 or 50 cities to protect our people. Now all of a sudden we are told that defense of the people in our cities is impractical and impossible. Ap­parently because of the commotion in Boston and Seattle, it is no longer necessary to the security of this country that we protect the people of our cities.

13Ibid.] k,Ibid., p. 165.

k2

We are told that we must begin to deploy the ABM so that .■ we can test its operational capability, something that canbetter be done at Kwajalein, where our test facilities are.

Finally, we are told that we have to protect our deter­rents, but this proposal, as I have pointed out, would atbest, or very most, involve only a very small fraction of our nuclear weapons«

Mr. Secretary, if, in fact this is a weapons system searching for a mission, it surely has not yet found it.

Capability of the Soviet UnionThere is a basic disagreement in the estimates of the Soviet

Union's capability to launch a first-strike against the United States. Proponents of the ABM hold that the Soveit Union has the capability to inflict a first-strike attack upon the United States. On the other hand, critics of the ABM believe that the. Soviet Union has neither the intent, nor the capability to launch such a strike.

To support their argument, proponents of the ABM cite intel­ligence reports on the rapid rate of Soviet strategic weapon building. Defense Secretary Laird, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee stated:

The Soviet ICBM force has more than quadrupled in the last 2 3/k years--from 250 operational launchers in June,1966, to more than 1,000, as of the end of March, 1969. On the basis ;of intelligence estimates prepared last fall, this force buildup was expected to level off after the Soviets had achieved a rough numerical parity with the United States in ICBM's excluding the older systems. However, if the Soviets were to continue to deploy ICBM's at the rate they deployed them in 19$7-68 they could have as many as 2,500 by the mid-1970's. ^

^ Ibid., (see Defense Secretary Laird's rebuttal on p. 6l)e"*Aj.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, Hearings, Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,1969, p. 7 (hereafter cited as House of Representa­tives Subcommittee on Appropriations).

43Also, the proponents note, there, is a serious threat to our

Minuteman force which is posed by the Soviets’ SS-9«At the present time the only serious threat to our ICBM

force is the large SS-9 ICBM which, with a warhead yield of up to 25 megatons and its presently estimated accuracy, could destroy a Minuteman in its silo« The Soviets now have. more than 230 of these missiles operational or under construc- ■ tion. According to the latest intelligence estimates, they are expected to have somewhere around 400 SS-9 types opera­tional by the mid-1970's, including a new version with con­siderably greater accuracy. 7

Third, proponents cite the dangers of Soviet deployment of MIRV to our Minuteman force.

Our real concern at this time is the prospect that the Soviets might install highly accurate MIRV’s on their large ICBM's and greatly improve the accuracy of their small ICBM's.If they do so, the survivability of our Minuteman force would be greatly endangered.-

The intelligence community considers it likely that the . Soviets will go on with the development of MIRV's and install

them in a new version of their SS-9 type ICBM's. Should they also greatly improve the accuracy of their small ICBM's, which the intelligence community considers possible, the sur­vivability of our Minuteman force as presently deployed would be virtually nil by the mid to late 1970' s .-9

Fourth, Defense Secretary Laird disclosed that the Soviet , buildup of submarine-launched ballistic missile force posed a threat to our manned bomber forces.

As already noted, the Soviet Union has come abreast of us in numbers of ICBM's; evidence is now accumulating that they intend to match us in numbers of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM's). We knew more than a year ago that they were constructing a new class of nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines with 16 tubes, and that they were testing a new

^Ibidp. 8. 18Ibid.19Ibid., p. 9.

astrategic liquid fuel submerged-raunched ballistic missile out to a range of about 1,500 n«mi. Y-class submarines have already been launched and several are believed to be : operations!o (They also have a number of H-class nuclear- powered submarines which carry 3-6 shorter range SLBM's).Even at a rate of construction of only six Y-class submarines a year the Soviet SLBM force could equal our own, in terms of number, by 1975• Nevertheless, with their currently es-. timated warhead yield and accuracy, these SLBM' s . could not constitute a threat to our Minuteman force. But, given our present radar coverage of the seaward approaches and no ABM defense of our bomber bases, they could constitute a severe- threat to the survival of our bomber forces— even those air­craft held on ground alert. This would be especially true if the Soviets design their SLBM's for depressed trajectory launch, which is not very difficult to do. If they were to

. do this with their SLBM's the flight time to a large number of bomber bases could be considerably r e d u c e d .

Thus, the proponents of the ABM believe that the Soviet Union poses a threat to our retaliatory forces and that "if we are to main­tain our deterrent strength the United States has no alternative butto protect some of the Minuteman bases with the Safeguard system

22against the SS-9."However, this view is not shared by the critics of the ABM

system who find that "it is almost unimaginable that our deterrence can be endangered by 1975 through a Soviet first-strike capability."^

21Ibid., pp. 9-10.22New York Times, March 24, 1969, P- 30 (Laird).23U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings,

Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fis- cal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength, Part II, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 1130'.

. ■ ■ > 5Dr. W'.K.H. Panofsky. Professor and Director of the Stanford

Linear Accelerator Center, of Stanford University, noted that the Soviet Union does not possess a first-strike capability. Such a capa­bility, he commented,;'-■would mean that . ..

The Soviet planners could make a decision with a high degree of confidence of success that they could launch an attack, against the United States strategic forces so well synchro­nized that all of its components— the U.S. land-based strategic missiles (MINUTEMM, .TITAN), the SAC bombers,, and the POLARIS and POSEIDON fleet, not to mention the tactical nuclear armed aircraft in Europe, would be taken out of action simultaneous­ly with .such a precision of timing that none of these forces could mount significant retaliatory action.

In a study prepared by Dr. Ralph. E. Lapp, scientist-author, it was concluded that even on the basis of the most pessimistic De­fense Department figures, the Soviet Union would not acquire a first- strike capability with its SS-9 missiles even with MIRVs. The SS-9missile force projected by the Defense Department could not eliminate

25the. Minuteman as a deterrent force.Thus by 1976--the. period of danger postulated by the

Pentagon— Dr. Lapp's study suggests that the Soviet SS-9's each equipped with three five-megaton warheads, would be able to launch 1,000 warheads at the Minuteman bases.

In arguing that this, would not represent a first strike capability, the study follows this line of reasoning: Nomilitary strategist would empty all his arsenal in one oper­ation but rather would keep some weapons in reserve. Thus it is assumed the Soviet Union would fire 750 of its 1,000 SS-9 warheads. On the assumption that there would be 20$> launching and guidance failures, only 600 out of the 750 warheads would be launched successfully. Once launched, it must be assumed that there would be another 20% loss in warheads not correctly targeted. •

24Ibid., p. 1127.25For a rebuttal by Dr. Albert Wohlsetter of the University of

Chicago, see the New York Times, May 26, 1969, p. 13=

46

That leaves 480 SS-9 warhead's reaching' their targets.How many Mlnuteman silos they destroy then depends on the accuracy ,of the warheads, or what is known as their "circu- . lar probable error."

As shown indirectly in Mr* Packard's testimony, the Mlnuteman silos are hardened with concrete to resist 200 lbs. a square inch of blast pressure.

If a warhead at a circular probable error of 0.5 nautical miles, DoD charts show, 2.5 five-megaton warheads would be needed to produce a 95 probability of destroying such a silo.

If the circular probable error was reduced to 0.25 nauti­cal miles, 1.1 warheads would be required to achieve 95% probability of destroying the silo. This figure, the study says, means, two to any military realist since it would be reckless to target a single silo with a single warhead.

Thus assuming that all of the warheads detonate on im­pact and that two are targeted for each silo. 240. Mlnuteman silos would be knocked out in a first strike by the SS-9 missile force that the Defense Department projects for 1976.Left untouched would be 760 Mlnuteman.

The study concludes: "Clearly no military planner would contemplate a first-strike which left 760 Mlnuteman avail­able for retaliation. Only if the return fire could be limited to a residual 50 silos could a first-strike be con­templated.

Thus, opponents of the ABM hold that the Soviet Union has neither the intent nor the capability to launch a first strike against the United States.

Vulnerability/invulnerability of United States Polaris ForceThe controversy over the status of the United States retalia­

tory forces centers’around the vulnerability/invulnerability of the Polaris force in the mid-1970's. The Hixon Administration's view is that the Soviet strategic offensive missile forces could pose a very

26Hew York Times, April 9; 1969, p. 1.

serious threat to the survival of our own land-based strategic offen­sive -forces by the mid or.late■19701s and then we would have to he

27dependent upon our Polaris and:Poseidon forces. This is where the . controversy begins.. Proponents of the ABM argue that the Polaris force would be invulnerable up to the mid-1970's but beyond that its invul­nerability is uncertain, and therefore, we should not rely solely on this one deterrent force. Opponents of the ABM, on the other hand, contend that there is no question that the Polaris force is invul­nerable up to and beyond the mid-1970's•

The arguments that the proponents present, largely stems from the premise that it is too risky to rely upon only one of the three elements in our strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the possi­bility cannot be precluded that the Soviets in the next few years may devise some weapon, technique or tactic which might increase the vul­nerability of our Polar i s/P os e id on submarinesSecretary Laird, in testimony before the House of Representatives Appropriations Com­mittee, pointed out that the Polaris force -would be invulnerable to enemy attack up to the mid-19701s« He stressed the fact that the Polaris system would not be invulnerable forever. And that, "As a defense planner, I don't want to have all of my eggs in that one bas­ket of the Polaris submarine system. It would be a grave error for

29our country to put its entire deterrent force in that one system."

House of Representatives Subcommittee on Appropriations, op. cit., p. 10.

48General Earle Wheeler* substantiated Laird's claim that .we cannot.rely on just one. deterrent force'. He said in testimony before theAppropriations Committee:

The ability to achieve the objective of deterrence does not reside in any one element of U.S. offensive forces for all circumstances of war initiation, prosecution, and termina­tion, while any one of our offensive force elements (e.g.ICEM's, SLBM's or bombers) could, under certain circumstances possess the capability to inflict a very high or even unac­ceptable level of damage upon the enemy's military forces or ■ population centers, reliance upon only one force element to perform this task under all circumstances would constitute an unwarranted risk to the continued survival of the UnitedStates.3°

Critics of the ABM question the Nixon Administration's views on the vulnerability of the Polaris force in the mid-1970's.Dr. Harvey Brooks, Dean of Engineering and Applied Physics of Harvard University pointed out that the question of the vulnerability of the Polaris system cannot be thought of in either/or terms--that is, one

31cannot say absolutely that the system is vulnerable or invulnerable.The question is:

Is the vulnerability sufficient or is it likely at any time in the distant future to be sufficiently great as to seri­ously erode the credibility of the deterrent force? That it seems to me, is quite a different thing from asking, is it possible that the enemy can find a Polaris submarine and destroy it? Because, it seems to me, that to erode the credibility of the deterrent requires a good deal more than the ability to find and destroy one submarine.3

Dr. Brooks enumerated three aspects.of Polaris vulnerability.The first is attrition--he imagined a scenario in which an enemy puts

30ibid., p. 73-31 -Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, part III,

op. cit., p. 626.32Ibid.

:• ; 49a killer tail on -each submarine, and gradually over a period of monthsor even years, destroys ship after ship, and gradually over the length

33of time essentially erodes the deterrent force„ - The second is whatDr. Brooks called sudden preemption, the sudden destruction of nearly

■ 34the whole fleet on a very tight time schedule. Third is the vulner­ability of the command and control communications system. He noted that it was exceedingly difficult to believe that these three aspects of the Polaris force was vulnerable to enemy attack. , .

Furthermore, Rear Admiral Levering Smith, Director of Navy • Strategic Systems Projects," stated that the Soviets cannot now and will not in the foreseeable future be able to successfully attack the

35United States $13-billion underwater nuclear deterrent force. He gave the following reasons for his firm belief in the invulnerability of the nuclear missile carried by the nuclear-powered Polaris sub­marines .

1) I am quite positive that Russian submarines cannot and are not following any of our Polaris submarines underwater. I am also quite positive that the new generation of Russian sub­marines that are getting close to operational status, that are now being tested, will also not be'able to follow our Polaris submarines.

2) The Russians have no specific new anti-submarine warfare methods the Navy knows of that would make the Polaris fleet vul­nerable to attack, despite Navy reports of a superior Russian sonar system or satellite detection capability.

33Ibid., p. 627.34Ibid.35Ibid., p. 623.

503) Neither the United States nor the Russians can or will

likely- ever be able to use satellites to detect submarines - under the water. "We have tried to use satellites to do that.The laws of physics will have to be changed to make it prac­tical. The chances of a satellite going over the right spot aren't very good. Its possible, but not practical, to use . ' satellites for submarine detection," Adrn, Smith said.

4) Although only 50 percent or 328, of the .656 Polaris intercontinental missiles are in station at one time and ready to fire within minutes of a presidential order, the Navy knows from actual test firings that their reliability is 85 to 95 percent

Both sides have presented their cases regarding the nature of the perceived threat (.intent and capability of the Soviet Union and the vulnerability/invulnerability of the United States retaliatory forces). However, the evidence is not clear or conclusive enough to choose among the alternatives with a great deal of assurance. The fact that the Soviets are building SS-9‘s at a rapid rate can be in­terpreted many different ways depending on the nature of one's threat perception. It is just a hypothesis, but I would hold that if one subscribes to the view that the Soviet Union threatens United States superiority,.or-that overwhelmingly superiority is needed in the face of a nuclear threat by the Soviet Union> or that Communism must be destroyed, one would also be more likely to favor the deployment of an ABM system. On the other hand, if one's threat perception is that the Soviet Union and the United States both feared nuclear war, or that the Soviets are just like us, then one would more likely be against the deployment of an ABM system. It is clear that one's views on the ABM is conditioned by the nature of one's threat perception.

36Ibid., pp. 623-24.

Controversy: TechnicalThough the Safeguard ABM .system.may not live up to Senator

Edward M. Kennedy's expectations of'it as "the single most complex' undertaking man has yet set for.himself in his time on earth, the ABM is an exceedingly complex technological system.: Because of itscomplexity, a controversy has arisen over whether the ABM can do its job or indeed whether it. will even work at all. The question is, in essence, "Does the Safeguard ABM .'work’?" In this.part, I will dis­cuss the critics' technical objections to the ABM.and the proponents' case for the ABM.

Technical Objections to the Safeguard ABM.SystemCritics of the ABM charge that "It cannot be made to work re­

liably and in the fashion claimed" and "Even if it could be made totperform according to plan, it could be overwhelmed and exhausted by relatively easy-to-achieve counter-measures, and so at best could

38provide only modest protection for the deterrent forces." Concern­ing the first objection, that the system does not 'work' reliably, critics cite: (l) The system's reliability; (2) the fact that therehas been no adequate testing of the Safeguard system and its compo­nents in war situations; (3) the radars' vulnerability; (4) the inter­ceptor missiles' limits of dependability; and (5) the functioning of the computer system.

0*7Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner (eds.), ABM: An Evalua­

tion of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System (New York: Harper and Row, T9 6 9 p. xvi.

38Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Part II, op. cit.p. 488.

(1) The System1s. Reliability. Physicist Leonard Rodherg,Associate Professor at.the University of Maryland/ remarked that thehistory of initial failures of far simpler, systems suggests that theprobability of catastrophic failure of a defensive ABM is quite high,"It is much higher<> in fact,' than for offensive systems, which are less

39intricate and more susceptible to adequate testing." Only if each of its major elements function properly can a system such as the ABM 'work.' Thus, the acquisition radar, missile site radar, interceptor missile and the.computer must carry out its assigned functions if a successful interception is to be accomplished.

What is the system's chances that a successful interceptionwill occur? Rodberg.holds that:

If all components of the system were to function at "rated" reliability (an unlikely eventuality under actual field con­ditions), the system would be available about 90 percent of the time (that is, the radars and computers would be func­tioning for that fraction of the time) and there would be a 50 to 70 percent chance of intercepting an incoming warhead if the single interceptor missile was functioning. This lat­ter fraction could be raised to 75 to 90 percent by allocating two successful interceptor missiles to each incoming warhead. Although this is expensive and might nearly exhaust the avail­able interceptors, it represents a.potential option when de­fending the important target. ^

Physicist Rodberg's estimates on the reliability of the ABMcomponents are as follows:

There is a small chance (perhaps 5 to 10 percent) that due to component failures in the radars or computers, the systems' }performance would be so degraded that it would fail to locate targets properly or to discriminate the targets from the

• Wildavsky, op. cit.,, p. 56.^Chayes and Wiesner (eds.), op. cit., pp. 116-117.

53decoys« In this case, there would be little chance of- suc­cessfully intercepting many warheads„ Last but most impdr- tant--there is a substantial likelihood that, in the course of a complicated engagement involving incoming warheads, de­coys, chaff, electronic countermeasures, blackout explosions and other unpredictable effects, the system would fail com­pletely for totally unexpected reasons. No amount of prior study can foreclose this possibility which, on the basis of past experience with far simpler weapons systems, must be judged to be quite likely.

(2) Testing of the Safeguard System and its Components. Crit­ics of the ABM point out that the Safeguard system has not been ade­quately tested. The point they make is that there is

reason to doubt that the long range radar (PAR) and the short range radar (MSR) parts of which: have not been built, let alone tested, will operate successfully, together in that al-. most instantaneous moment which it is necessary in case of a sudden attack and even more reason to doubt that the computer, which has been neither built nor tested, and which is far more complicated than any computer yet attempted, will operate properly when called upon to do so. Finally, it is logical to consider whether, even if these 3 separate components would operate properly as separate units, would they so operate when combined. For obvious reasons, the testing of any joint oper­ation has not been possible.

Another point concerning the testing of the ABM system was made by Dr. Herbert York, Professor of Physics at the University of Califor­nia at San Diego. He noted that even if the equipment were tested, there is a difference between the real world and the test range. The difference being that the test range equipment will never have been tested against the precise target or targets,that the deployed equip­ment would ultimately have to face. He stressed that he is "not here talking about some percentage failure inherent in the mathematical

^Ibid., p. 117.4pNew York Times, July 8, 1969, p. 12.

: ' 54distribution of its distances, nor statistically predictable failures in system components but, rather, about catastrophic failures in which at the moment of truth either nothing happens at all, or all intercep-

43 • ' - .tioris fail." .

(3) The Radar1s Vulnerability. Opponents of the ABM cite a critical weakness in the Safeguard’s radars. The Missile Site Radar (MSR), a key component in the Safeguard system is one of the most cost­ly, complex components - in the ABM system. The MSR provides guidance to the long-range Spartan interceptor missiles as well as the short- range Sprint missiles, providing the crucial terminal defense for the Minuteman bases.

The technical controversy over the MSR centers around whether or not the radar is so vulnerable to nuclear'explosions ("blackout effect") that/the:whole Safeguard system would collapse in the event of a large scale attack. .Critics charge that the radar, and possibly lasars, are highly vulnerable to the blast of a nuclear explosion and thus, they argue, to nullify the Safeguard defense, the attacker has only to knock out the MSR.

Dr. W.K.H. Panofsky, one of the leading authorities on radar, commented that:

Clearly an enemy in planning a first strike would attack pri­marily the more vulnerable radar and thereby totally deny the effectiveness of the defense. . . . since the Safeguard sys­tem contains only a few large radars destroy only a few targets to defeat

43Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Part I, op. cit.,p. 78.

44New York Times, May 3 > 1969# P« 16.

, uhe offense needs to the system.

" • - 55(4) The Interceptor Missiles8 Limits of Dependability<, The

guided, multistage ballistic missiles are extremely complex pieces ofmilitary hardware. Opponents of the ABM contend that there are limitsto the interceptor missiles', reliability. They note that:

Even with substantial flight testing, such weapons can have severe reliability problems. When deployed in operational sites, the Minuteman II missiles was found to have severe problems which did not show up in any of the tests.carried . on during its production or in test firings. It is reported .that Minuteman III has also had severe reliability problems, even,though its designers were able to build on extensive experience with the earlier Minutemen. 5

MoreoverThe reliability of military missiles, as determined through flight test programs, generally, ranges from 50 to %0 percent. Because many components are involved, it is generally very '

. difficult and expensive to increase the reliability substan­tially above this, even under test conditions, and there is always some hard-to-measure loss in reliability when the sys­tem is deployed in the field.

(5) Functioning of the Computer System. Jerome Wiesner, Provost, Massachusetts Institute, of Technology, believes that it is more difficult to build the computer program than creating the "hard­ware." He and other critics of the ABM point out that every large scale computer system has had serious operational trouble with its software or operational program. The reasons for this are:

First the task of designing and debugging a program always takes much■longer than anticipated at the start. Second, even after extensive deployment and shakedown, the programs for complex systems contain many defects or conflicts that come to light only during the stress of operation, and so

il5 . .Chayes and Wiesner (eds.), op. cit., p. 113•

56it is quite common for a computer system to fail completely ("crash" as it is known in the profession) as some new de­mand is put on the system. Program, "bugs" are at least as serious a source of downtime on many■large computer systems as actual component failures.. Large computer programs have : proven to be extremely difficult to modify or "repair" with­out inadvertently introducing new "bugs." 7

The problems that the 'Safeguard program will have are enormous, Wiesner noted. First, the computer is designed to execute programs consisting of millions of instructions. Second, there are no working examples today of huge computer programs on the scale required by the ABM program, but the body of experience with complex problems of a smaller scale inspires no confidence in the ultimate reliability of the ABM system. There is, today no theory to account for the method of "debugging" a program; it remains an art. Moreover> it is possible, as has been shown by theorists in this field, to show mathematically that no such theory can be constructed. It will remain in a sense an+ 48 art

Wiesner concluded thatLarge computer programs can only be tested properly in their operational environment. It is not likely that it will be possible to simulate a nuclear attack well enough to have high confidence that the Safeguard system will actually func­tion as planned when it is truly challenged. In fact, I be­lieve that the odds are against it

Critics of the ABM believe that "even if the ABM system could be made to perform according to plan, it could be overwhelmed and ex­hausted by relatively easy-to-achieve countermeasures, and so at best

lj.7Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Part II, op. eit., p. 494.

^Ibid.49 -Ibid., p. 488.

' ' ' 57soit could.' provide only-modest protection for the deterrent forces."

Strategies. Richard L. Garvin and Hans A. Bethe, in their51article, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," asserted that offensive

tactics and cheap penetration aids could nullify, the effectiveness ofan ABM system. They presented two strategies an enemy could employ atno great cost to reduce the effectiveness of an ABM system. The. firststrategy is an all-warhead attack in which one uses large boosterrockets to transport many small (fractional megaton) warheads. Thewarheads from one missile can all be directed against the same large

52target (i.e., a city); these multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV's) are purely a penetration aid. Alternatively each of the re-entry vehicles can be given an independent boost to a different target, thus making them MIRV's. Since the Spartan interceptors will each cost $1-2 mil­lion, including their thermonuclear warheads. Garwin and Bethe con­clude that its reasonable to believe thermonuclear warheads could be delivered for less than it would cost the defender to intercept them. The second strategy for attack against an ABM defense is to precede ■ the actual attack with an all-decoy attack or mix real warheads with . decoys. Several hundred to several thousand such decoys launched by

"^Ibid., p. 488.51Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile

Systems," Scientific American, Vol. 218, March 1968, pp. 21-31.52MRV is a system of multiple warheads carried by one re-entry

vehicle (ICBM) which are not independently targeted but are dispersed for a general target area.

- 58a few large vehicles could readily exhaust the Safeguard system. The attack with real warheads would then follow.

The key point that Garwin and Bethe make is that the offensive has an advantage over the defense because it is easier to design a missile force to counter a defense that is already being deployed than vice versa.

Penetration Aids. ■It is important to understand that none of the ABM systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States. Let me make it very clear that it (cost) in itself is not the problem: the penetration of the proposed shield is the problem.53

Hans A. Bethe, in his article, "The ABM, China and the Arms Race" cited some penetration aids which the offense could use with their ICBM's. First, the attacker could employ balloons which could be made very thin (i.e., of" mylar) and thus could be made to weigh on­ly one or a few pounds. The outside surface has to be coated with metal, such as aluminum—-the coating is to make the balloon reflect the radar waves so that the balloon appears to the radar like a re­entry vehicle. Bethe added that the balloons would all be folded in small packages while the missile goes up through the atmosphere and then they would be released and inflated. The balloons would follow the same trajectory as the re-entry vehicle, for in space there is a near vacuum, until the atmosphere is encountered in re-entry. To pro­vide confusion for the radar it is necessary to disperse the balloons

53Hans A. Bethe, "The ABM, China and the Arms Race," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 25, May 1969, p. 4l.

■ ■ 59so that they make well separated targets for the radars. Second, Bethe suggested that the offense could make more sophisticated decoys than balloons if they wished. These decoys might consist of sturdy frames and some wires arranged to give the same radar cross section image as the re-entry vehicle. Third, Bethe noted that chaff is an effective means open to the attacker to penetrate ABM defenses. Chaff consists of very thin metal wires cut to a length to appear on the defensive radar. One hundred million such wires, cut to work against UHF radar, will weigh t-00 pounds and can be carried by the ICBM. A cloud of chaff hundreds of miles long, spread along the trajectory of the ICBM would look black to the radar and any re-entry vehicle or decoy could be concealed within it. If the defense wanted to hit the warhead above the atmosphere, it would have to send considerable numbers of inter­ceptors against the cloud. Fourth, decoys could be equipped with electronic devices that generate radio noise at frequencies selected to jam the defensive radar. There are many variations of such elec­tronic countermeasures, among them the use of jammers on the re-entry vehicles themselves. The last of the penetration aids that Bethe cited is the radar blackout caused by large numbers of free electrons released by a nuclear explosion.

The ABM system involves the explosion of high-speed nuclear weapons at a high altitude. Any such explosion ionizes the atmosphere: that is, it tears the electrons of the air atoms away from the rest of the atoms. These electrons are power­ful reflectors of radio waves . . . and atomic explosion would produce a much higher concentration of electrons, and would thus reflect radio waves of much higher frequency than the ionosphere. This gives radar blackout, for a certain length of time after the explosion. . . . A megaton

^Ibid., p. 42.,

' ' 6o

explosion at high'altitudes will cause blackout' of UHF waves which are to he used in the (PAR.) Perimeter Acquisition Radar 'for several minutes.55 .

Bethe stated that blackout could be caused by■the explosions of our Spartan missiles as well as by Soviet Union warheads. Thus, . the amount of fission in the Spartan warhead is kept to a minimum and plans are formulated when and where to fire the Spartans so as to cre­ate a minimum of blackout. The enemy, however, could purposely ex­plode warheads at high altitudes over our radars to employ maximum fission yield. Behind this blackout screen the enemy Could sendfurther, warheads which the radars could not detect.

The Technical Case for the ABM, SystemThe technical case for the Safeguard ABM is based on two

premises. First, the system will work, and second, even if it did not"work," technically, it would increase the effectiveness of the deter­rent. In testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Defense Secretary Laird was asked on what basis did he and his associates base their belief that the Safeguard ABM would work. Laird replied:

It is true that we have not yet demonstrated a Safeguard in­tercept capability, although we have demonstrated the prede­cessor system, the Hike-Zeus. We have, however, successfully fired both the Spartan and the Sprint interceptors. In the near future we shall start firings of Spartan and Sprint con­trolled by the Missile Site Radar. Then a few months later, integration tests will be made by tracking and intercepting

' incoming ballistic missile re-entry vehicles. All elements

55Ibid.

6iwill be used, the data processor, the Spartan and the Sprint, et cetera. The AEG.will continue to test the warheads in a'' series of underground shots.

Laird added that:I am sure that on the basis of our present testing of the Spartan and the Sprint, the successful testing of the Missile Site Radar, the assurances that we have had from the Atomic Energy Commission, as far as the warheads are concerned, that the system will w o r k . 57

In terms of refuting the arguments made by the critics of the ABM system, the proponents have refuted the allegations made about the testing, radar blackout, and penetration tactics of the Safeguard system.

Testing of the Safeguard ABM System. Concerning the problemof testing the Safeguard system, Secretary Laird, in testimony beforethe House Appropriations Committee, was asked "How will we be able totest the deployed Safeguard in the United States to assure ourselvesit will work?" He answered that the problem of testing the Safeguard ■was not insoluable.

We are hopeful we can go forward with such testing, even of the Minuteman missile within the United States.5° But this will have to be done, of course, without the warheads, and with our computers we can make the calculations as to whether the intercept would actually have taken p l a c e . 5 9

56House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, op. cit., p. 63.

5W .58Ibid.59Ibid., p. 6k.

62Radar Blackout. The possibility of radar blackout. Secretary

Laird'stated, will not invalidate the system.Over the past several years extensive analysis has been made of the effect of blackout 'on the ABM., both self -blackout caused by our own intercepts and the blackout caused by an enemy's high burst above the atmosphere, and also weapon debris that, escapes from the burst region at very high alti-

. tude detonation. But we believe that this can be handled by having an overlap of the PAR radar systems so that one PAR can coveg the same area while another PAR is temporarily blacked out.

As further substantiation of Laird's statement, John S. Foster,Director of Defense Research and. Engineering, stated:

We made a test in 1962 to determine the effect on radar of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere = So did the Soviet Union. From those tests we calculated the best kind of an attack to make against the Safeguard system. We also de­signed the Safeguard system to minimize the effectiveness of such attacks. As a consequence of these studies, we find that it is not worthwhile for the enemy to attempt a black­out attack.

Penetration Tactics. Herman Kahn, in his article, "Why WeShould Go Ahead with an. ABM," asserted that the ABM system will work.

There is not much question of whether the ABM system can be made to work in a sense that a light works when you turn on the switch. The answer to the old problem of whether you can shoot down one bullet with another bullet is basically,"Yes, if you use nuclear weapons."0

He refuted the argument that the Safeguard ABM could be easilypenetrated by cheap and easy to use penetration aids and decoys.

^Ibid., pp. 6l-62.^Ibid., p. 62.62Herman Kahn, "Why We Should Go Ahead with an ABM," Fortune,

June 1969, p., 120.

When■opponents of the ABM say it won't work, they usually mean • that a Soviet attack would outwit and overwhelm- it. They mean that it would be easier and cheaper to penetrate and nullify an ABM defense system than to build one. In the context of the U.S.-Soviet balance of forces, widely held assumptions about cost effectiveness of the ABM are simply out of date and have been at least as far back as the 1967 "posture statement" of Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense. The cost-exchange ratio, long thought to favor the offense, was there stated to be about equal for the ABM system he described. Penetration of the ABM cover can be achieved-~through superior numbers of attacking missiles, through decoys, chaff, and the jamming or blacking out of the ABM radar— but it is no longer easy orcheap. The Soviets may spend the required money, but again■kh a v Tnptv nrvh . -3

Kahn made the point, which other proponents of the ABM havealso made, that even if both sides believed that the defense systemcould be penetrated, for a large range of conditions and tacticsneither defender nor attacker could be absolutely certain. Thus,Kahn argued, the ABM poses an element of uncertainty to the attackerand may favor the defense«

In an actual attack against. an.ABM system the attackers' penetration tactics are also.likely, to depend on the effic­ient operation of many hundreds, perhaps thousands, of rel­atively involved mechanisms. It might therefore happen,, in practice, that the defense operated an order of magnitude or so better than expected, tpecause of the unreliability of some aspects of the offense.

, The case that is made by the proponents is that even if the ABM system did not "work" in the technical sense, it would still in­crease the effectiveness of the deterrent. The reasoning is that:

" The question the country faces is not whether the ABM can give complete protection, but rather what the ABM can do that is worth doing. Does an ABM system (in addition to providing some protection for missile sites) increase the

63Ibid.

. 64likelihood that in a large war a relatively small but extra­ordinarily useful portion of our assets will survive? will it be successful ..in saving, one or two large cities out of a hundred? will it save the last five of a hundred ports, the last five of a hundred steel mills? Here the fact that the penetration estimates are uncertain helps the defender rather than the attacker. Because the enemy could not attack all possible targets in overwhelming strength, a selective de~ /- fense could do well within the framework of these questions.

Kahn presented key points on why it would help to have Safe­guard even if it did not work. First, any defense system, including Safeguard, may lead the Soviets to modify their tactics and/or their warheads in such a manner that in the event of war the damage to the United States would be sharply lessened. For example, the portion of a missile’s payload that is used to carry decoys or chaff, or to shielding against x-rays and defensive blast effects, could not be used to carry nuclear warheads. Second, to the degree that the Soviets concentrated on selected targets in order to be sure of achieving pen­etration and destruction, other targets would be spared. And, third, the change in tactics and equipment is likely to result in significant compromises in performance. These benefits to the defense, sometimes called "virtual attrition," will accrue whether or not the ABM system actually works, and are additional to any attrition that the system it­self can impose.if it works as planned.

The technical controversy over the ABM is a difficult, if not impossible one to resolve. There have been eminent Ph.D.'s on both sides of the controversy who testified that the Safeguard ABM will or will not work. For example. Dr. Frederick Seitz gave this argument for the deployment of the ABM:

65'Ibid., p. 121.

65If I am concerned at my summer home about being attacked by a mountain lion, I can go through a great deal of signifi­cant preparatory work. I can test cartridges in the base- " ment. I can fire blanks in a gun, and be pretty sure that the system will work, if a mountain lion appears. I don't need.to acquire aunountain lion, and have him attack me as an Initial' test.

As a counter-example to Dr. Seitz's argument. Professor Abram Chayesarrived at a totally different conclusion.

If I were buying a gun to defend my house against burglars, and half the gun experts I talked to told me it wouldn't shoot, and I knew I couldn't try it out until the burglars got there, I think .1 would start looking around for some other way to protect.my house. 7

"How does a decision-maker without technical expertise make a decision68when those who should know are so divided?" One alternative is that

the decision-maker could look for historical precedents.. However,both the opponents and the proponents of the ABM point to historicalexperiences that buttress their argument.

The proponents of ABM say history teaches that the ponderance of scientists said the H-bomb could not be developed■and they were wrong. They point to the outstanding success with com­plex missions involving interacting technologies, such as Polaris and Apollo. They observe that in the past scientists have been surprised at how rapidly systems considered impos­sible came into being. Dr. Seitz mentions television, radar, jet aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and so on.The other side has no difficulty in finding its examples of failures from the Maginot Line, all-weather interceptors, the Distance Early Warning Line, Skybolt, and more. What history has to teach us, apparently, is that complex systems often do not work but that sometimes they do and, in addition, that it is very difficult to tell in advance which of these two cate­gories a weapons system, belongs in. 9

66 'Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 57°67Ibid.68Ibid.69• Ibid.

• 66It.is clear from the preceding discussion on the.technical.con­

troversy over the Safeguard ABM system, that "If you believe in the de­sirability of the ABM for other reasons, then you believe it will, and must and can be made to work. If you decide for other reasons that theABM is undesirable, then you attempt to show that it cannot and will

70not work."

Controversy: EconomicThere is an economic facet to the ABM controversy. Opponents

of the Safeguard argue that: (l) the cost of the Safeguard is out-of- proportion to its value; (2) it is futile to spend the required funds and then at the end be relatively at the same point of balance on the ■security scale, and.(3) there are urgent domestic needs.

Critics of the ABM note that the cost of this weapon system has been rapidly increasing. When the original "thin" Sentinel ABM system was proposed by the Johnson Administration in September, 1967, the estimated cost was placed at $5»5- billion. The Mixon Administra­tion modified the Sentinel proposal and estimated that the cost of this weapons system would be approximately $6.6 billion. Then in early May, 1969, the Defense Department stated that it had underes­timated the Safeguard's price by $1.2 billion by not including the Atomic Energy Commission's estimated costs for developing, producing and testing the ABM nuclear warheads. The system's total cost was then placed at $7.8 billion. However, on May 22, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Secretary Laird noted that these

70Ibid.

figures included neither the $500-miHion cost of extending the system ' to Alaska and Hawaii, nor the $2.5-billion cost of research, develop­ment and testing of the system's components. This raised the cost up to the present pre-production estimate of $10.8 billion and then there is inflation2 If recent experience in procurement of complex new weapons systems are any indication, critics note, the actual production and construction costs will exceed the original estimates by substantial amounts. In the end, they suggest, the cost of Safeguard deployment may exceed $13 billion, however, a "full" system might cost about $50 bil­lion. Critics contend that the money would not really be an issue if the perceived nature of the threat made an ABM necessary and if there were ho doubts that the system would indeed work.

Another argument against deployment was made by the formerDefense Secretary McNamara who stated that:

Were we to deploy a heavy ABM dystem throughout the United States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage. It is futile for each of us to spend $4- billion, $40 billion, or $U00 billion— and at’ the end of all the deployment and at the end of all the effort, to be relatively at the same point of balance on the security scale than we are now.71

\

Finally, opponents of'the ABM, including church groups, mayors, city councilman and local officials, have cited the crises in our cities and rural areas where substantial federal aid is needed. To spend the $6 - 13 billion, or however much, on another weapons system would detract, it is claimed, available >funds from the urgent domestic needs. Senator George McGovern wrote that:

^George S. McGovern, "The ABM: Unsafe at Any Price," Progres­sive, Vol. 33, February 1969, p. 21.

68.A comparable investment in cleaning our cities, training our youth for jobs, strengthening our agricultural and natural resources, and attacking the misery which breeds disaster "both in our own society and in the developing countries will do far more to build American security and our leadershipfor peace.72 -

Proponents of the Safeguard system have refuted these charges in two basic arguments. The first is that A "price tag" cannot be placed upon a weapons system. The value of the ABM, in terms of in­creased security and' deterrence, cannot be measured in monetary terms.A second, and a different variation of the first argument is that the problem cannot be formulated in a choice between the ABM or domestic improvement. If financial cuts have to be made, let them be cuts in some of our less useful Vietnamese operations, or other United States military expenditures rather than from the ABM. Clearly, some pro­grams have to be squeezed, but to cut the ABM system because of pres­sures' on the military budget is very much like cutting the lean and

73leaving the fat. The ABM is one of the most important programs andtherefore, should be one of the last to be sacrificed. "It is not justanother increment in weaponry, but rather a system that deeply affects

74the entire range of strategic considerations in the years ahead."

Controversy: PoliticalThe Safeguard ABM has political implications for American re­

lations with other nations. This thesis will consider the issues

72Ibid., p. 22.73Kahn, op. cit., p. 216.74 •1 Ibid.

■ ' ' 69arising from the installation of a ballistic missile defense system in the United States on such countries as Western Europe, Asia, China, and neutral nations.

Western EuropeJohan Jo Holst, in his article "Missile Defense: Implications

for Europe," stated at the outset that:It is quite unlikely that something resembling a single "Euro­pean" attitude towards the missile defense issues will emerge either within the various European countries or as a concerted reaction from European governments. We should also note that governments do not perceive the implications of major military hardware decisions solely or even primarily in terms of cost- : effectiveness analysis or "macro-strategic" calculations. The political reactions to the BMD issues will be structured very largely in terms of how the various governments expect BMD to influence their own aspirations and predicaments.75

Thus, we cannot forecast any "united" attitude or position on the ABM in regards to Western Europe. However, there are certain im­portant issues that must be discussed in terms of the ABM and Western Europe. The first is the question of "How will Safeguard affect America's credibility in Western Europe?" and the second is, "How will Western Europe respond to Safeguard's deployment?"

Proponents of Safeguard take the position that a ballistic missile defense system would maintain, or even add to, US credibility vis-a-vis Western Europe. An ABM system that protects United States deterrent forces would make it less likely that the United States would be blackmailed by the threats or execution of exemplary attacks into backing down in a crises over Western Europe. It is argued that

Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (eds.), Why ABM? (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 187.

70American willingness to honor its guarantees would increase as the United States would be able to limit the damages from Soviet, Chinese, or other attacks.

A counter-argument to this is that the ballistic missile de­fense would not increase United States credibility, but would detract from it. The argument holds that:

The deployment, limited or unlimited, of so uncertain a system will not add to the West Europeans * sense of security for the future, much less their sense of confidence in the United States. More importantly, having assured the West Europeans for some years that, even after suffering a first strike, we possessed a second-strike capacity of weapons sys­tems in the ground, underwater or in. the air sufficient to destroy any attacker several times over, we. will have a dif­ficult task convincing them now th t-an ABM system is needed to make this deterrent e f f e c t i v e . 7°

Our allies understandably find it difficult to believe that we mean it when we say that we will risk our cities to save theirs. Wow.that the proposed ABM system no longer protects American cities, it offers no assurances to the Europeans along these lines. Any American President who realizes that his own cities would be wiped out in a nuclear - exchange is not likely to be much emboldened in any future. showdowns on the brink by the hope that at least part of his retaliatory capacity would survive. Thus the.ABM cannot make Europeans feel more secure, more certain of our coming to their defense. On the contrary, the more Americans talk about a defense against ballistic missiles, the more those in Europe will be fearful that we are preparing to let them be the choice targets of any future nuclear war while we stand by, invulnerable and alone.''

Concerning Western Europe's response to Safeguard, there are varying interpretations. Those in favor of the deployment of Safe­guard argue that, "From.the point of view of the middle-powers and

Theodore C. Sorensen, "The ABM and Western Europe," in Chayes and Wiesner (eds.), op. cit., p. l80.

^Ibid., pp. 180-181.

small powers in Europe, one of the most important considerations might well be the anticipated impact of BMD bn the political freedom of ac~

• 78tion on the international arena enjoyed by the non-superpowers."They assert that the ABM would contribute to the stabilization of the strategic balance. The fear of inadvertent or pre-emptive escalation to nuclear warfare would lessen in the calculations of the non-super­power decision-makers. Thus, ABM might erode the hegemonial positionof the superpowers to the extent that that dominance is associated -

79with their nuclear capabilities.On the other hand, opponents of the ABM point out that the

consequence of ABM deployment arise from a psychological and political factor. The results of the superpowers being protected by a defense shield while Europe remains undefended range from fuelling national­istic feeling of frustration, insecurity and resentment against the superpowers to a constructive tendency causing non-nuclear Europeanstates to move close together, thereby removing Europe from direct

80superpower confrontation.It is unclear how the Western Europeans will react to an ABM

system that is not yet fully deployed or even fully defined, "The Europeans will differ among themselves on such a matter. Much will de­pend upon how the Russians react, what political and military events

78Holst and Schneider (eds.), op. cit., p. 188.79Ibid., p. 189..80H. Afheldt, C, F. Barnaby, F. Calogero, J. Delbruck,

J. Prawitz, "Implications of Superpower Deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for Third Countries, Particularly Those in Europe," in Barnaby and Boserup (eds.), op, cit., p. 97♦

lie ahead and how the Pentagon attempts to justify the Nixon Adminis-8ltration's latest ABM proposal."

Asia.There are different, and conflicting viewpoints as to the ef­

fect an American ABM might have on nuclear proliferation in Asia.. Safeguard proponents contend that without the ABM the American guaran­tee might lose.its credibility and Asian nations such as India, Thai­land, Japan, might want to develop their own weapons systems. On the other side of the debate, Safeguard opponents point out that the ABM deployment would more likely accelerate nuclear proliferation because it would lend credibility to the Chinese, as well as the Soviet, threat. The Asian governments may feel the need for their own nation­al deterrent. C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup state that, "If the United States were to emphasize the adequacy of their present deterrent rather than opting for protective devices like the ABM such problems (proliferation) would be less likely to arise later.

Again,- it. is unclear what the Asian reaction to Safeguard’s deployment will be. However, Barnaby and.Boserup- advise that "one might do well in the West to take note of what the Asians say they

83want, not what Western theorists think they ought to want."_ _ _ _ _ _

Sorensen, op. cit., p. 179«82C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup (eds.), "The Implications of

the Deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," in Barnaby and Boserup, op. cit., p. 219.

Communist China"The entire question of United States ABM deployment against /

or in relation to China depends, - or should depend on. as sumptions, re­garding the aggressiveness and-opportunistic tendencies of China."®V- One view holds that the Chinese aggressiveness is probably largely a myth and that it is to a large degree the result of international isolation and of past and present containment policies. It is held that China's international behavior has been rational and predictable despite its verbal aggressiveness and that it is unrealistic to assume that China should want to launch an attack on the United States wheth­er ABMs are deployed or not. It is emphasized that there is no evi­dence for both China's intent and capability to launch an attack against the United States. An opposing view holds that there is a nuclear threat vis-a-vis Communist China. They cite China's nuclear detonations and rapid rate of ICBM capabilities as evidence of the burgeoning. Chinese threat. Fears of Chinese irrationality, miscal­culation, and blackmail are also cites.

Due to the fact that there is a basic difference in the per­ceptions of the. "Chinese threat," the implications of a US ABM on China also differs. Critics of the ABM, who by large also subscribe to the first view of the nature of - the Chinese threat, believe that deployment of an ABM would simply postpone China's integration into the world community. The ABM would, in effect, act as further

84.M. Leitnberg, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Deployment and China," in Barnaby and Boserup (eds.), op. cit., p. 139*

evidence of United States hostility towards Communist China» More­over, it could be misconstrued as a step- "taken by U = S. imperialists to continue with their nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats against China" and as "another anti-Chinese measure adopted to intensify theAdministration‘s collusion with the Soviet revisionist leading

85clique." Also, critics assert, if we deploy the ABM we perpetuate the suspicion, if not the conviction, in Peiking that we are deter­mined to maintain maximum military superiority over China«

On the other hand, subscribers of the view that there is a very real Chinese nuclear threat believe that the ABM will make more credible the-US deterrent„

Clearly, a conclusion regarding Safeguard's implications for Communist China is dependent on one's perception of the Chinese nu­clear threat and considerations connected with the SALT meetings.

Neutral NationsThe deployment of an ABM system affects neutral nations as

well because they have to consider their position in a possible war involving ICBMs and ABMs. H. Afheldt, C. F. Barnaby, F. Calogero,Jo Delbruck and J. Prawitz, in their article "Implications of Super­power Deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for Third Countries, particularly those in Europe," cite possible problems neutral nations might encounter with ABM. First, there is the probability that some missiles might get out of control and land in neutral territory.

^Allen S. Whiting, "The Chinese Nuclear Threat," in Chayes and Wiesner (eds.), op. cit., p. 170.

75Second, there is the danger of light flash from nuclear explosions in space which might' cause casualties in neutral countries (retinal burns, flash blipdness). Thus, the neutral countries might be induced to take countermeasures. This raises questions, about whether such meas­ures comply with the status of neutrality and of how far in space ter­ritorial atmosphere extends. Countries must decide whether to install electronic techniques designed to steer away or render inert missilespassing over their territory and this raises questions of international

86law and serious political problems for third countries.The controversy over the political implications of the Safe­

guard ABM system is centered around the ramifications of the deploy­ment of this weapon system on other nations. It is not certain how Western Europe, China, Asia, and neutral nations will react to an ABM system which is not yet fully deployed or even fully defined (Safe­guard Phase II has not yet been approved by Congress and there is some doubt that it can win Congressional approval). Clearly generalizations made for this varied a group of countries under these circumstances are tentative.

ConclusionsThe Safeguard Anti-ballistic missile system has been and still

is the subject of a nationwide controversy over national security pol­icy. The controversy has centered around varying, and often conflict­ing, perceptions of the nature of the threat, and the economic, technical, and political aspects of the Safeguard system. At bottom,

86H. Afheldt, et al., "Implications of Superpower Deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for Third Countries, Particularly for Those in Europe," in Barnaby and Boserup (eds.), op. cit., p. $6.

the proponents of the system premise their arguments on: (l) the ABMis necessary to our national security, and, (2) the system will work. Opponents "base their conclusions on an e n t i r e l y different set of premises: (l) there is no need for an ABM at this time, and (2) the system will riot work. Thus, an accurate evaluation of the ABM system is beset by doubts and uncertainties. In such a situation its in­evitable that there should be an intense debate about the various is­sues raised by the deployment of ABM systems. International Politics is, in any case, affected more by perceptions than facts, and in a situation when many O f the underlying issues are of a technological nature, difficult for the non-scientist to understand fully, and when there are many uncertainties associated with an accurate evaluation, perceptions are likely to become even more predominant.

8?C. F« Barnaby, "The Development and Characteristics of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems," in Barnaby and Boserup (eds.), op. cit.,P. 3.

CHAPTER 5

FOUR SELECTED POLICY AREAS

In this chapter I propose to examine the relationships be­tween the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System and four selected policy areas— strategic stability, arms control, nuclear non­proliferation, and the Strategic.Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

ABM and Strategic StabilityStrategic stability is a complex and dynamic relationship.

The concept of strategic stability, as it has been applied until now,refers primarily to the relationship of mutual deterrence between the

1United States and the Soviet Union. Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute, set forth three categories of events which can increase tensions between the superpowers and so upset strategic stability:

a) Events which can occur as a .consequence of deliberate actsoriginated on the part of one of them;

b) Events which, may occur as a consequence of deliberate actsoriginated by a nation aligned with one of the two majorpowers; or

c.) Events which may occur as a consequence of great power in­volvement in developments in an unaligned n a t i o n . 2

Richard B. Foster, "The Impact of Ballistic Missile Defense on. Arms Control Prospects," in James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., (eds.), Arms Control for the Late Sixties'(New York: D. Van NostrandCompany, Inc.,~ 1967), P* 84.

2Ibid.

77

78Considered in this context, strategic stability is a fluid

phenomena that is affected by changing events and circumstances. The introduction of the Safeguard ABM to the current strategic equation has significant implications. However} proponents and opponents of Safeguard differ on exactly what these implications are.

Those in favor of the ballistic missile defense system assert that the deployment of Safeguard is not a destabilizing factor. Their reasoning is that "The U.S.S.R. views the buildup of defensive systems

Oas a necessary, non-provocative act." Thus, "it is difficult to see how BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense), if deployed by either the United States or the U.S.S.R. or both, could be destabilizing.To under­stand this line of argument it is necessary to understand what is held to be the Soviet views of strategic stability and thus gain a clear conception of why Safeguard would be considered "non-provocative."

The Soviet view of strategic stability derives directly from their concept of the dialectical nature of military con­flict. The condition for stability of mutual deterrence is that of a balance of strategic offensive and defensive forces . apd measures.

Their views of air -and missile defense derive directly from this basic conclusion. Consequently, Soviet attitudes toward BMD appear much less mixed than our own: missile de­fense has been an accepted fact of the Soviet strategic en­vironment since at least as early as 1963. The favorable attitude toward a BMD also follows logically from the Soviet . Union’s traditional "institutional bias" toward defense»

3Ibid., p. 85.Ibid.

.79This background has provided the Russians with ample the­oretical basis for developing and deploying their missile defense systems.5

Thus, - according to this interpretation of the Soviet viewpoint, the deployment of a United States ABM would not necessarily warrant any response, and would.not lead into an "arms race," "The creation of an effective antimissile defense merely serves, to build up the security of peaceloving states and would increase the stability of mutual de­terrence seems to" reflect more precisely "Soviet strategic thinking.

The counter-argument to this is that the ABM would have a de­stabilizing effect on US-USSR relations. Joseph I. Coffey, formerly Chief of the Office of National Security Studies at Bendix Systems Division, now on the faculty of the University of Pittsburgh, concedes that given the Soviet predilections for defensive systems,'their dif­fering views of the impact of such systems on strategic stability, and the fact that linkage between the U.S. actions and Soviet actions are at best tenuous, it is possible that the Soviets may proceed to do what they planned to do, thus not responding at all to the U.S. de­ployment of an ABM system. However, considering the fact that the American■"damage-limiting capability" cuts into the Soviet "assured destruction capability," the Soviets are more likely to respond to Safeguard’s deployment and thus initiate another spiral in the arms

5Richard B. Foster, The Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense Proposal and Arms Control Prospects for the 1970’s, Stanford Research Institute Report (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, June 1969), pp. 16-17.

6Ibid., p. 17.

80race. Coffey.illustrates the possibilities of Soviet actions and American reactions as follows:

If the Soviets reacted by increasing the number of their ICBM's} the United States might, in the interest of damage- limi tati on, have to strengthen further its ballistic missile defenses, as well as increase those strategic strike forces earmarked- for counterforee attacks on Soviet missile sites.Other Soviet options, such as argumenting the missile sub­marine. fleet or expanding the Long Range Air Force, could in­duce varying American responses, ranging from the buildup of anti-submarine warfare units and air defenses to the further expansion of U.S. strategic strike forces. Thus, if the Soviets attempted to offset the effects of American anti ballistic missiles by strengthening their strategic strike forces, they could in turn incite the United States to ex­pand its strategic offensive, forces, as well as to strengthen its air and submarine defenses.

Even if the response of the Soviets were directed largely 1 to the acceleration- of their own ballistic missile defense program, this could have a significant impact upon the U.S. strategic forces. At the very least, such a Soviet move could induce further expenditures for penetration aids and the accelerated development of those missiles, such as

, Poseidon, which are capable of carrying numerous decoys and/ or multiple warheads. It might well lead to .quantitative as well as qualitative improvements in U.S. strategic forces, particularly in intercontinental and submarine-launched bal­listic missiles, which could be used either to saturate Soviet anti-missile missile batteries or to reach large num­bers of smaller targets which might not be adequately pro­tected by terminal defenses .7, ,

The key point is that whatever the nature of the Soviet response, it could lead to a new round of interactions between offen- . sive and defensive forces and between Soviet and American programs for the construction of these forces.

Two different conclusions on the effect, of the Safeguard ABM on strategic stability emerge. One is that the ABM is not

7Joseph I. Coffey, "BMD: A Critical Appraisal— Arms Control and Ballistic Missile Defenses,” in Dougherty and Lehman, Jr. (eds.), op. cit., p. 70.

■ ■ - • 81destabilizing and the second is that the ABM is a destabilizing factor •in US-USSR relations. It is clear that the conclusion one reaches is dependent upon one's perceptions of the nature of Soviet reaction, or non-action, the threat inherent in each, and the effects on the nuclear . arms race.

ABM and Arms Control ABM regardless of who deploys it, whether■the United States . .

or/and the Soviet Union, will have a significant effect on arms control' negotiations. Again, however, opponents and proponents of the Safe­guard system differ oh exactly what this effect will be. Opponents reason that the ABM will: (l) rule out any possibility of general and complete disarmament; (2) increase tension and decrease security; and(3) set off a new, upward spiral in the arms race.

It is contended that the ABM, by introducing a new factor into strategic calculations, would necessitate a reorientation of the United . States proposal for a freeze on strategic forces. The argument is that the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles would rule out any possibil­ity of agreement on general and complete disarmament because the na- ■tions concerned would be engaged in strengthening their strategic

8forces. For example, since bombers may be a hedge against ballisticmissile defenses, the deployment of ABM's would make less acceptable

" 9and less likely bomber disarmament, whether total or proportionate.

r —Ibid., p. 74.9Ibid.

; ;■ 82 The ABM decision, critics argue, is of crucial importance, for

the future of arms control "because it comes at a time when both sides appear to be leveling off on the number of their offensive strategic nuclear weapons, at levels which could be characterized as having a rough parityThus, it is contended, the decision to deploy ABM is unnecessarily provocative. It will result in a period of increased tension, which usually follows increased expenditures for defensive and offensive strategic weapons. And, it is likely to elicit a Soviet response--such as increased numbers of deployed ICBM's and further im­provements in their Galosh ABM system— which would adversely, affect American security. Moreover, ABM is likely to start an upward spiral in the arms race. The Soviet Union may decide to develop and deploy new weapons systems to circumvent ABM. For example, the development of MIRV was an American response to the beginnings of the Soviet de­ployment of an ABM several years ago. Conversely, the deployment of MIRV by the Soviet Union could overwhelm any ABM deployed by the United States. Also, it is reported that the development of the frac­tional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) was devised by the Russians to counter the possibility of an American ABM.

Opponents of the ballistic missile system conclude that:Each new spiral in the arms race has left all nations less secure than before. Every indication points to the prospect that this next round--on which we are now unnecessarily em­barking with the decision to deploy the ABM— will leave both us and the Russians more vulnerable than ever before. It is

Bernard T. Feld, "ABM and Arms Control," in Abram Chayes and Jerome Wiesner (eds.), ABM; An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile Systein (New"Ifork: Harper and j ow, 1969), p. 190.

high time that we took the courageous decision to hreak this vicious cycle— to .substitute the reality of arms limitation for the illusion of military superiority. Toward this .end, the decision to forego ABM deployment while rigorously pur- . suing a missile limitation agreement will signal new hope that humanity may yet avert a nuclear disaster.

Those in favor of the ABM hold that ballistic missile defenses will not impede arms control and may even enhance-arms limitations. Their argument is premised on the idea that to treat ABM as if all de­ployments and all rates of deployment are equally undesirable is to

12fail to recognize the full range of real-world decision options.The point is that a monotonic perception of all weapons systems,whether offensive or defensive, being inherently "bad" is misleading.Safeguard's proponents argue that ABM would enhance and stabilizearms control agreements. First, the negotiating problems for an armscontrol agreement would be less acute if the United States and theSoviet Union possessed relatively symmetrical missile defense capa-

13bilities at the time the freeze went into effect. The reasoning is that since the Soviets have already deployed an ABM system, the United States is faced with the job of inducing the Soviets to dismantle its present ABM system and whatever ballistic missile defense it may have at the time the freeze goes into effect. This situation would com­plicate the negotiations on a freeze of strategic offensive weapons

1:LIbid., p. 192.12Richard B. Foster, "The Impact of Ballistic Missile.Defense

on Arms Control Prospects," in Dougherty and Lehman, Jr. (eds.), op. cit., p. 89.

13Ibid., p. 90.

8k

•with those of ABM reductions. The- point is that we would not he deal­ing- with equal reductions hut with a trade of their. dismantled ABM - against some other reduction on our side. Second, ABM will insure that the freeze.will be a stable one:

If we freeze.only offensive delivery vehicles ... the ad­vances by one side in the development or sophistication of the defense might upset the balance aimed at in the agree­ment. For that.case, the other side might increase its re­search and development expenditures on defense to restore the balance— and so we return to an "arms race," one re­stricted, however, to a competition.on active defense. Al­ternatively, the other side would be tempted to abrogate the offensive agreement by increasing its penetration capabil­ities through a test program for penetration aids based on advanced technologies, such as MIRV, in violation of the agreement. Thus, from the viewpoint of long-term arms con­trol objectives, a freeze (and later reduction) of strategic delivery vehicles that permitted no BMD at all would be less desirable than a freeze that permitted a certain level of BMD, at least of the Safeguard type of Coverage.

Third, ABM will facilitate disarmament agreements between the super­powers by reducing the obstacle the presence of other nuclear powers • (such as Communist China) would present.

It is hard to see how China could be induced, to accept an agreement to freeze strategic delivery vehicles unless, she had already acquired— or was permitted to acquire— a stra­tegic capability of her own that was not insignificant in relation to either the U.S. or the Soviet capability. But

■ given such a Communist Chinese capability, an agreement without active defenses would seem highly unstable. From the Soviet point of view, an.agreement that left Great Britain, Communist China, and/or France free to upset sta­bility might be equally risky. The problem will be com­pounded if nuclear proliferation continues. 5

Richard B., Foster, "The Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense Proposal and Arms Control Prospects.for the.1970's," Stanford Research Institute, op. cit., p. 27.'

15Ibid., p. 29-

' ' ■ - 85A Doak Barnett presents a counter argument in "A Nuclear China

1 z:in U.S. Arms Policy", in the April, 1970 Foreign Affairs. Barnett •contends that the wisest course for the United States to pursue re­garding ABMs in the SALT talks would he to try to. reach agreement with the - Soviets that neither they nor we will build anti-Chinese ABMs.This would check the United States-Soviet arms race and would open the possibility of improving relations with Communist China. Barnett sug­gests that the two superpowers should concern themselves with the job of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts. Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union should avoid strategic and arms control policies.that would be interpreted by China as being primar­ily anti-Chinese. . Such policies, he notes, will postpone rather than ' hasten the time when China may concern itself with problems of nuclear stability. Fourth, ABM will facilitate stability during the arms re­duction period.

If one envisages .a progressive reduction of strategic offen­sive forces, periods, of instability may occur as these forces are reduced, without active defenses, periods of acute in­stability may occur as the remaining offensive forces reach the lower levels. At lower levels of offensive armament.ac­tive defenses might be restabilizing because they would re­duce the incentives to violate the agreement.-7

Thus, Safeguard's proponents assert that ABM seems to hold promise of rendering otherwise risky and potentially unstable arms control arrangements far more stable and far less risky.

* A. Doak Barnett,."A Nuclear China in U.S. Arms Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, April 1970, pp. 427-442.

- Richard B. Foster, "The Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense Proposal and Arms Control Prospects' for the 1970's," Stanford Research • Institute, op. cit., p. 29.

86ABM and Nuclear Non-proliferation

A major objective of United States foreign policy is the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations ofthe world. The basic justification for this, policy is that as morenations acquire their own nuclear weapons the chances of nuclear warare much greater. President Kennedy, in a 1963 speech stated that:

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons, in so many, hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irrespon­sible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for Anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There, would only be the increased , chance of accidental war and increased necessity for the great -

non-nuclear states that they can obtain their objectives without ac­quiring nuclear weapons; that they need not acquire nuclear weapons to achieve "great power" status, and.that nuclear weapons will not make aggression easier or less dangerous. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy commented on the United States non-proliferation program:

Successful efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons... depend upon the development of a comprehensive program designed both to make it difficult for proliferation to take place and to create an international atmosphere in which potential nu­clear states will realize that acquisition of nuclear weapons will decrease their security, and they therefore will choose not to develop them. Such a program must have three elements:

l) It must provide security and protection to the legit­imate. interests of non-nuclear states.

to involve themselves In what otherwise would be local

To be successful, a non-proliferation program must assure

1«George Bunn, "U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy," in Dougherty and Lehman, Jr. (eds.), op. cit., p.152.

' ' 872) It must .deny, the utility of..nuclear weapons f or any

state with aggressive purposes. ■3) It must not permit the acquisition of nuclear weapons

or a nuclear test to increase the prestige, political influ­ence and power of a nation above and beyond the influence which it is;due because of its political and economic posi­tion.^

The first element in cur program is a Nuclear Non-prolifera­tion Treaty. On November 23# 1969# the United States and the Soviet Union signed this tieaty. President Nixon hailed it as a step toward making the world a safer home for all mankind. The Non-proliferation. Treaty provides that nuclear nations pledge not to aid in the prolif­eration of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear nations agree not to seek aid in developing their own nuclear arsenals. Twenty-two nations have already signed the treaty and 43 nations are needed for it to become effective.

A second element is the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or equivalent international safeguards over peace­ful nuclear activity. The United States urges the use of IAEA guide­lines for transfers of nuclear materials or equipment for peaceful purposes to nations which do not have nuclear weapons.

Third, the nuclear nations have shown progress toward nuclear- restraint. The Test Ban Treaty and SALT are steps in this direction..

The effect of ABM on non-proliferation is open to question. Proponents of the ABM, such as Herman Kahn, contend that with the in­creasing nuclear threat from other countries, "It seems both

. 19Ibid., pp. 152-1531.

. 88imprudent and unreasonable for the United States and the Soviet Unionto be completely,'-without ABM protection against the so-called 'Nth

20countries,' including, of course, China«" Kahn argues that it isin the major interest.of both the United States and the Soviet Unionthat there be only two superpowers. But, if neither of these nationshas an ABM, any country with a few missiles is a significant power be- :cause it can destroy several big cities. The Nth country problem will .grow steadily worse, despite the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.Kahn predicts that:

By the end of the century, any of the larger powers and many of the smaller ones should be able to obtain say, 500 missiles of current Minuteman capability for one or two billion dollars.

• A desire to challenge the two nuclear superpowers is not the Only, or even the dominant incentive for a country to acquire nuclear weapons. But an absence of U.S. and Soviet defenses might make such a force that much more attractive and, so might encourage the trend.21

The ABM, its proponents argue, will constitute a positive measure against proliferation of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear na­tions because if the United States and the Soviet Union acquire ABMs, it will prove fairly easy for them to keep their defenses overwhelming­ly ahead of any Nth country offense— and thus perhaps reduce some .na-

22tion's desires to acquire or improve nuclear establishments.Defensive systems, such as the ABM, are technologically advanced and are expensive to develop and deploy, thus the ABM provides further, assurance that there will be only two superpowers.

21Ibid., p.' 121.22Ibid.

" . 89Opponents of the ABM Believe that with the deployment of this

weapon system, there will he increased proliferation of nuclear wea­pons . First, the deployment of the Safeguard ABM would adversely af­fect our proclaimed policy of non-proliferation. Article VI of the Hon-proliferation Treaty, commits the nuclear powers to "pursue nego­tiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the- nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."The majority of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee believes that it would violate the spirit of this article if the United States pro­ceeded with the deployment of an ABM system before the promised arms limitation talks got underway. Moreover, Safeguard’s deployment, critics argue, might spur Japan, India, Israel and West Germany to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Japan and India may perceive the move as United States withdrawal from Asian affairs and an insulation against a Chinese nuclear attack. Thus, Japan and India, might feel threatened by the growing Chinese nuclear capabilities and build their own.nuclear arms. As a counter to this argument, proponents of Safe­guard' mention that a United States ABM might suggest to the non-nuclear nations,, such as Japan and India, that they need not "go nuclear" to protect themselves from China for the United States will do it because it is protected from Chinese missile blackmail. Opponents also note that Israel and West Germany may interpret the deployment as the main­tenance or reconstruction of a bi-polar world. Thus, it could lend support to the notion that nuclear weapons are essential to indepen-, dence.and national sovereignty. In any case, critics argue, it is

. • . ■ • 90difficult to see how United States deployment would decrease incentives'for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear nations.

ABM- and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)The United States and the Soviet Union met in.Helsinki on

November l6, 1969 to start preliminary negotiations on strategic arms limitations and met in primary session at Vienna on April l6, 1970.The object is to find a way for both nations to agree on a plan that would limit and perhaps reduce their nuclear arsenals. Behind the talks is the urgency to halt the development of nuclear weapons be­fore one side achieves another technological breakthrough that would start a new spiral in the arms race. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are working on the development of MIRV. The superpowers have reached a kind of strategic parity and one result of the Strate­gic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) could be to freeze this current bal­ance in weaponry. Secretary of State William Rogers stated that"What we hope that we can do is negotiate an arms limitation agree­ment that will keep us in the same relative position that we are (in) now, and which can be verified." The outlook is that both sides in­tend to bargain seriously and each side has entered the talks with little public commitment to any fixed position. It is in the interest of both superpowers to negotiate arms limitations as both nations have foreign problems— the Soviets are troubled with China and Eastern Europe and the United States with Southeast Asia— and both realize the high finances and dangers involved in a continued arms race.

91The effect of the deployment of the Safeguard ABH is uncertain

Safeguard’s proponents argue that deployment of an ABM system "by the United States would strengthen its "bargaining position in any negotia­tions.. The reasoning is that the Soviet Union has already developed their Galosh ABM and there is no indication that the Soviets would abandon SALT because the United States is. deploying an ABM system.In fact, Secretary Laird stated that the deployment gives the Russians "an added incentive to negotiate a meaningful agreement on limitation both of offensive and defensive weapons." First, "the modified ABM program would show the Soviets that we are very serious about pro­tecting our deterrent forces— about assuring all enemies that they cannot achieve an effective, low-risk first strike against the United

2kStates." Second, "it would show the Soviets that we are not pre­paring for a low-risk attack on them and that it is worthwhile to

. 25 •negotiate limits on strategic arms." Laird added that:In terms of effect on the possibility of arms talks with

the Soviet Union, our decision on the Safeguard system must be judged in the context of the direction we are moving, for that is the context in which the world, including the Soviets, must, and would apparently, do evaluate our decision.

It is not as if we are starting anew on installing an ABM system. We are recommending that we change from what could be construed by many as a provocative deployment around our cities— the original Sentinel--to a defensive, and clearly

23U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,. 1969, p.179.

2i|"lbid.25Ibid.

; - ' ■ 92nonprovocative, phased deployment. Unlike the original Sentinel, and the Soviet ABM deployment--our direction with Safeguard is away from arms escalation. It under­scores with action our avowed desire for effective arms ■ ■limitation talks

Critics of the ABM take the opposite view, that the deployment of Safeguard may hamper arms negotiations with the Soviets. They cite unfavorable press reaction: (From the New York Times, March 13, 1969)"The Soviet Government Newspaper Izvestia suggested tonight that de­ployment of an American antimissile system might set back the chances

26for successful United States-Soviet talks on arms control." Criticsnote that the deployment of Safeguard might be misconstrued by theSoviet Union as a step-up in the arms race and a revival of the cold-war atmosphere. The Soviet news review Za Rubezhom stated that thedeployment of the ABM system on the part of the United States meantthat Americans are continuing to think in categories of cold war and

27policies "from a position of strength," The view is that the SALT talks might be hampered and an agreement difficult to reach because the United States is going ahead with a major spending program on new weaponry and the Russians may refuse to negotiate from a position of "weakness."

In conclusion, the relationship between the Safeguard Anti- Ballistic Missile System and these four selected policy areas— strategic stability, arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is not yet certain. However, both— i T ”

Ibid., p. 344.27Ibid., p. 345. '

' 93opponents and proponents of the ABM system believe that the introduc­tion of this weapon - system into the strategic equation will have sig­nificant effects on these policy areas.

CHAPTER 6

A PROPOSAL FOR THE 1970's: SABMIS

The purpose of Safeguard's Phase I is to protect the United States' retaliatory forces from nuclear attack and to deter nuclear war. Other alternatives, such as building new missile silos with in­creased "hardness" or protection, building more land-based missile sites (to increase•site dispersion), placing the land-based missiles on railroad cars or giant trucks, and building long-range bombers with "stand-off” missiles that can be air launched against enemy targets beyond the range of enemy ground defenses, have been suggest­ed as possible measures for increased protection of our Minuteman force. However,in light of the possible future deployment of tech­nologically advanced weapons systems such as MIRV and FOBS, and the recent buildup of the SS-9 force by the Soviet Union, the United States deterrent force is increasingly vulnerable to Soviet attack. (Also there is the necessity to deter Communist China from launching a nuclear attack.) Thus, many defense strategists hold that land- based missiles and bombers cannot much longer constitute a credible deterrent force. It has been suggested that a far-reaching overhaul of United States strategic forces is needed in the 1970's. The U.S. Havy's Office of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems under Rear Adm. George H. Miller has advocated such a plan for national ■

9!).

• ' 95ldefense. The proposal is to put at least 75 percent of our nuclear

striking power out to sea. Thus the United States, deterrent force will he moved from the homeland and away from the American popula­tion. ' Bombers would be dispersed on carriers, and the nuclear mis­siles in surface ships and submarines, all Invulnerable to enemy attack. The Navy calculates that with our missiles at sea, aboard widely dispersed, constantly moving ships, the United States would be in the strongest possible position to deter nuclear war. The Soviets would know that a nuclear attack upon the United States would result in.certain destruction of the Soviet Union because our ability to re­taliate would survive any first strike.

The main arguments for a maritime strategy are: (l) Missilesand bombers based inside the United States make the country itself anautomatic target for a devastating surprise attack. Both systems areinviting targets and are increasingly vulnerable to advanced Sovietweapons. (2) An expanded sea-based nuclear force cannot be easilydetected and eliminated. It would guarantee annihilation of theSoviet Union in a retaliatory strike and thus would be more likely todeter.an attack. (3) A sea-based deterrent is less expensive than aland-based force. It could be achieved with far fewer missiles and

2at no increase in up-keep.

1See John G. Hubbell, "A' Bold New Plan for National Defense," Reader's Digest, Vol. 95; October 1969, pp. 82-87.

^Newsweek, IZXX, April 13, 1970, p. 32.

Defense planners in the National Security Council are report­ed leaning toward acceptance of a maritime strategy for these reasons:

Soviet missiles have an easy target in the fixed- position missile and bomber bases in the UoSo . They can be pretargeted and wiped out in a surprise attack. - Such an assault would. destroy the UcS. at the same time *

It would take Soviet defense forces hours to detect, identify and begin attacks on any sizable portion of a missile force widely scattered on surface ships— ample time to set retaliatory forces in motion. As for the U.S. submarine forces, they are considered almost immune to de­tection. A cutback in land-based missile and bomber forces would also reduce the requirement for widespread deploy­ment of an ABM system for their protection. Since a sea- / based system would require fewer missiles, it would permit the U.S. to embark on a form of disarmament at no loss in deterrent power,

A maritime strategy would end the need to keep a land- based missile force on 15- minute alert, thus lessening the chances of an accidental launch in times of high internat­ional tension.3

Also, the Soviet Union is expected to have 420 of its SS-9 missilesdeployed by 1975* These missiles are capable of carrying three 5~megaton warheads, and may be designed to destroy Minuteman in theirsiloso By 1975; the Soviet Union is expected to possess a missile-armed submarine force capable of destroying U.S. bombers on the groundin a surprise attack. In testimony before Congressional committees,Defense Secretary Laird stated that the Soviets will be able to de-

4stroy 95 percent of America's land-based missile force by 1975*What implications does a maritime strategy hold for an anti-

ballistic missile system? It has been suggested, as an -alternative

3Ibid., pp. 32-33.hbid., p. 33.

97to the Safeguard ABM that the United States deploy a sea-based„anti- ballistic missile system. In this chapter I propose to outline the advantages of a maritime ABM system.

The concept of a sea force is not new. In 1890, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahn published his first book, The Influence of Sea ' Power Upon History 1660-17.83° It was Mahn' s thesis that sea power is an important factor in the greatness of any nation. Moreover, it was his hope that the United States would not neglect its natural heri­tage, sea power. More recently, Oskar Morgenstern, in The Question of National Defense, stated that the Oceanic System is the best form of invulnerability under the constraints of present technology. The rea­soning was that the technological developments of the last few years and the perfection in weapon delivery, by missiles fired either from the ground or from the air, make all fixed military installations of any size anywhere in the world obsolete. Morgenstern suggested that if both the superpowers developed an Oceanic System, each side would have an effective deterrent and both sides would gain together. The two forms of oceanic systems which he described were the ballistic- missile-firing nuclear submarine and'the bombing and missile-firing nuclear seaplane.

Advocates of the sea-based strategic systems (offensive and defensive) argue that a sea-based ABM system makes sense.

A forward, sea-based ABM system permits enemy missiles to be intercepted away from the U.S. and before the re­lease of multiple warheads.

A mobile ABM force at sea cannot be'pinpointed and targeted; hence such a system is less vulnerable to de­struction by an enemy.

The Navy had developed a Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System— SABMIS--which would give the United States a vital defense'against surprise nuclear attack. The basic unit of the SABMIS system is a ship approximately the size of a large cruiser, equipped with radars and computers capable of tracking simultaneously several attacking ICBMs. A number of ships would position themselves across the "window" or angle of approach of missiles launched against the United States from bases in Communist China or the Soviet Union. . Such a sea-based system would provide an outer line of defense and interception of enemy missiles could be made during their mid-course rather than terminal phase. These SABMIS"ships would be loaded with more than 60 intercept missiles mounted on Poseidon boosters. If the SABMIS ship were to miss on the first shot, it would have time to re­calculate and shoot again.

The merits of the SABMIS are many. First, such a system could increase the protection of the United States by stationing water-borne anti-missile platforms in international waters off Commu­nist China and the Soviet Union to get an early chance to intercept long-range missiles» Our defense planners are greatly concerned about the Communist development of MIRV. SABMIS could intercept the incoming missiles before they could deploy MIRV, decoys, and other penetration aids. This would greatly reduce the number of incoming.

5Ibid., p. 3^.

targets which must be handled by the terminal defenses, on land. Also, since interceptions would occur above the atmosphere and over water, the North American continent would; be spared a. great, deal of nuclear blast and direct radioactive fallout. Second, the SABMIS force would complicate an aggressor's strategy. To be certain that he had targeted a sufficient amount of nuclear power on important United States targets, he would have to knock out our ABM systems, which means that he would have to search out and destroy our SABMIS ships. This is not an easy task as the mobility of the SABMIS fleet makes it difficult to detect and destroy. Furthermore, SABMIS ships could cruise in coordination with fast,.strong escort ships, -if the threat warranted such a measure. Also, if the enemy attempted to close in . on our SABMIS fleet with his. own naval forces,, the President of the United States could alert our retaliatory forces. Third, the mobil­ity of the SABMIS force, would enable the United States to relocate it quickly in time of crisis. Proponents of this system say that in a crisis involving friendly nations, such as Japan, an anti-missile fleet could be placed in position between that nation and a potential aggressor to reduce or. even eliminate the threat of nuclear black­mail. Fourth, the SABMIS could measurably add to the effectiveness of the Non-proliferation Treaty. With such a defensive system avail­able to West Germany, Japan, Israel,: and India, these "almost-nuclear" nations might be persuaded not to construct their own nuclear arsenals. Fifth, defenses at sea are far less provocative of an arms race be­cause of their relative invulnerability. They do not themselves be­come the target of the first enemy offensive. With our firepower at

' ; 100sea, the Soviets, know that they cannot destroy, our nuclear forces with a surprise attack. Thus, the Soviets also know that our ability to . ; retaliate would survive any first strike. This mutual awareness is a basis for a true balance .of power. The climate for reduction of ten­sion and worth-while arms-control measures are measurably increased... Sixth, SABMIS offers the advantage-of providing our Commander-in-Chief with more time for decision-making in the event of a nuclear crisis, because it detects and intercepts enemy missiles far from-our nation’s shores. Thus, the President has added time to determine whether the. United States is under sustained all-out nuclear assault and to ascer­tain the source of the attack and decide on the appropriate response. Seventh, SABMIS is relatively cheap— less than eight-billion dollars for eight ships, their missiles and ten years of operations is the Eavy's estimate. And the system can be.built and deployed by the mid-1970's. If nuclear disarmament is achieved, the ships could still be used for conventional warfare missions.

The case for the seaborne ABM system is that it is mobile and located away from the homeland and is technologically advanced. Fur­thermore, since it is almost invulnerable, to countermeasures, it is a strategically important weapon system for a nation pledged never to launch a first-strike. Military strategists concur that this mari­time strategy cannot be adopted successfully by the Soviet Union due to geographical limitations. Access to the oceans for the Soviets is . through narrow straits, which makes their ships easily detected and tracked. ' The waters, on the other hand,, are the great natural de- , fenses of the United States.

•. 101The SABMIS concept has been presented, .as an alternative to

the Safeguard system. George E. Lowe, in his article, "The•Case for6Oceanic Strategy," calls SABMIS an unused or largely overlooked op­

tion that changes the rules of the nuclear game and makes defense of the homeland feasible without massive dislocation of our democratic- republican form of government implicit in the Nike-X (a predecessor of the Safeguard system) anti-ballistic missile system. Representa­tive William Anderson (Democrat of Tenn.), in his article "Let's Send

7SABMIS to Sea Now," offers SABMIS as a vital, relatively inexpensive defense system. The problem, however, is that the United States is not a sea-oriented nation. The Defense Department has not adequately funded the SABMIS program. In the current fiscal year the Navy re- ' quested 55 million dollars for their research and development of the SABMIS system. When the Department of Defense refused their request, the Navy reduced its request to 10 million dollars. The Defense De­partment granted it three million dollars. Furthermore, there has been some misconceptions about the SABMIS system. During the ABM hearings. Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard stated that he had been informed that the technology was so uncertain that the SABMIS system could be developed only long after Safeguard. Representative Anderson refutes this argument by noting that SABMIS is based on ■

George E. Lowe, "The Case for Oceanic Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,. June 1968, Vol. $4; PP» 28-34.

7Representative William R. Anderson, "Let's Send SABMIS to Sea Now," Reader's Digest, February, 1970, Vol. 96, pp. 102-106.

102 ..current technologies, and could be operational within the same time span as, and perhaps even sooner than. Safeguard.

It is clear that far-reaching technological and political changes require hard scrutiny of our national security policies. One's range of options cannot be limited to. the land frontiers. One should consider an oceanic strategy because the 1970's increasingly looks like the era of the Wavy.'

CHAPTER' 7

CONCLUSIONS

There has been much controversy over the deployment of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System. This thesis has presented both the affirmative and negative positions on: (l) the perceived na­ture of the threat to which the ABM is a possible response--the intent and capability of the Soviet Union and the vulnerability/invulnerabil­ity of the United States Polaris Force; (2) thie technical feasibility of the Safeguard ABM system— "Does the system 'work’?." "Can the sys­tem be overwhelmed and exhausted by relatively easy-to-achieve coun­termeasures?"; (3) the economic issues--"Is the possible gain achieved by the deployment of Safeguard worth the estimated cost or can the money be better spent on domestic needs?"; and (4) the political is­sues --"What political ramifications will the deployment of this wea­pon system have on other nations such as Western Europe, Asia,Communist China and neutral nations?" Also, I discussed the probable implications of an ABM system on selected policy areas such as inter­national stability, arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

After studying these significant policy issues in the ballis­tic missile defense controversy, I strongly conclude that the Safeguard- ABM should not be deployed. First, there is a strong technical case

103

made against the ABM system: the Safeguard system is not "reliable;"there has been no adequate testing (in my view) of the Safeguard sys- tern and its components; the system's radars are highly vulnerable to enemy attack; the interceptor missiles are of questionalbe dependabil­ity; and the successful functioning of the- computer system is a doubt­ful matter during times of maximum load. Moreover, the system is vulnerable to penetration aids such as decoys, chaff, balloons, elec­tronic devices and radar blackout. Second, the Safeguard system, at best, offers only "marginal value" and in light of its escalating cost, it is questionable whether the possible marginal gain is worth the money, especially.at a time when there are urgent domestic needs.Third, the political ramifications of the Safeguard system on other nations such as Western Europe, Asia, Communist China and neutral na­tions may be adverse to American interests. For example, an American ABM may encourage an atmosphere of no-confidence in Western Europe and Asia and promote nuclear proliferation, and may be interpreted as further evidence of United States hostility vis-a-vis Communist China. Fourth, the Safeguard ABM would have destabilizing effects on US-USSR relations. It would increase tensions and decrease security, set off a new and upward spiral in the arms race, and may hamper negotiations in the SALT talks. For these reasons, and the fact that a land-based ABM system is increasingly vulnerable to Soviet and Communist Chinese attack, I have proposed that the United States seriously consider as a real alternative to the Safeguard ABM, the deployment of SABMIS—Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System.

105SABMIS offers many advantages, which a land-based ABM system

does not possess, such as invulnerability and mobility. A mobile ABM force at sea cannot be easily detected, identified and targeted.Hence, such a system is less vulnerable to destruction by an enemy at­tack. Furthermore, a sea-based ABM permits the interception of enemy missiles away from the United States and its areas of population and before the release of MIRVs, decoys, chaff and other penetration aids. A sea-based ABM is cheaper than one that is land-based and it can be achieved with far less missiles and at no increase in up-keep. And since SABMIS would require fewer missiles, it would permit the United States to embark on a form of disarmament at no loss in deterrent power. Also, with such a defensive system available to such countries as West Germany, Israel, Japan and India, they might be persuaded not to %o nuclear." SABMIS can be built and deployed by the mid-1970's.

In conclusion, there have been strong arguments made against the deployment of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System. During this period of increasing world tensions and when America is sorely tested at home and abroad, national security policies and strategies must be- scrutinized as to.its continued relevance in this new decade.I believe that the 1970's. require a new plan for national defense-- SABMIS.'

REFERENCES

BooksBarmby, C. F. and A. Boserup (eds.). Implications of Anti-

Ballistic Missile Systems. Pugwash Monograph II. New York Humanities Press’/ I969I

Chayes, Abram and Jerome' Wiesner (eds.). ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System. New York: Harper and*'Row,. I969.

Dougherty, James E. and J. F. Lehman, Jr. (eds.). Arms Control for the Late Sixties. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, I967

Holst, Johan and William Schneider, Jr. (eds.). Why ABM? New York Pergamon Press, 1969.

Morgenstern, Oskar. The Question of National Defense. New York: Random House, 1959• •

ArticlesAdams, Benson D. "McNamara's ABM Policy, 1961-67," Orbis, XII

(Spring, 1968), 200-225.Anderson, William R. "Let's Send SABMIS to Sea Now," Reader's

Digest, 96 (February, .1970), 102-106.Barnett, A. Doak. "A Nuclear China and U.S. Arms Policy," Foreign

Affairs, 48 (April, 1970), 427-442.Bartley, Robert. L. "ABM Debate: Watch Out for the Chaff," Wall

Street Journal, 174 (July 9, 1969), l8l.Bartley, Robert L. "Missile Debate: The Real Villain is MIRV,"

Wall Street Journal, 174 (June 18, 1969),. 22,Bethe, Hans A. "The ABM, China.and the Arms Race," Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists,. 25 (May, 1969), 41-44.Brown, Harold. "Security Through Limitations," Foreign Affairs, 47

(April, 1969), 422-432,

106

- ' . . . ; . • . 107Garwin, Richard L. and Hans A« Bethe’. "Anti—Ballistic Missile Sys­

tems," Scientific American, 218 (March, 1968),. 21-31.Kahn, Herman.' "Why We Should Go Ahead with an ABM," Fortune, LXXIX

. (June, 1969), 120-1, 212, 216.Lowe, George E. "The Case for Oceanic Strategy," U.S. .Naval Insti­

tute Proceedings, 9 (June, 1968), 28-34.McGovern, George S. "The ABM: Unsafe at any Price," Progressive, 33

(February, 1969), 21-24.Wildavsky, Aaron. "The Politics of ABM," Commentary, 48 (Wovember,

1969), 55-63. '

ReportsFoster, Richard B. The Safeguard■Ballistic Missile Defense Proposal

and Arms Control Prospects for the 1970's. " Stanford Research Institute Report. Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, June, 1969. ■ .

Public DocumentsCongressional Quarterly Weekly Report. XXVI (December 13, 1968) 3275•U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations. Hearings on the Safeguard.Anti-Ballistic Missile System. 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969. '

U.S. Senate, Committee.on Armed Services. Hearings on Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal. Year 1970 and Reserve Strength. 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969.

U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarma­ment Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems. 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. V (March 17, 1969), 40, _ 406-408. ~

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. VI (February 2,. 1970). . — r— .

108NewspapersHew York Times. November 27/ 1955> Sec. IV,. 6.

June 21, 1959, 7. ■ : .February 5} 1969, 18=February 9, 1969, 1*

; February .13 1969, !•February 14, 1969, 1.February .'lb, 1969, Sec. IV, 1. March 15, 1969, 17.March 16, 1969, 1.

. March 22, 1969,. 17.March 2k, 1969, 30.April 9, 1969, 1®May 3, 1969, 16.May 26, 1969, 13®July.8, 1969, 12..January 30, 1970, 12.February 1, 1970, 1.February 25, 1970, 1.March 1, 1970, Sec. IV, 3®

New York Times Magazine.' May 4, 1969, 32. 'Wall Street Journal. January 28, 1969/71®

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