an examination of the iraq wmd failure
DESCRIPTION
A cursory review of existing literature regarding the Iraq WMD failure with a bit of personal commentary.TRANSCRIPT
An Examination of the Iraq WMD Failure
By Damian Niolet
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INTRODUCTION
Intelligence postmortems are critical analytic reviews, always conducted in hindsight, of
the intelligence timeline leading up to particular national or global security events turned
disastrous1. Examples through history of disastrous intelligence failures and subsequent
postmortems include: Pearl Harbor and the Pearl Harbor Postmortem, the 9/11 attacks and
the 9/11 Commission Report, and the 2002 Iraqi WMD estimate and The Senate
Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence. After the dust from calamities such as these settled,
officials were selected to conduct a thorough analysis of the intelligence timeline that existed just
prior to the events; that is, officials examined, as Richards J. Heuer, Jr explained it in the
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, a fundamental question: Given the information that
was available at the time, should analysts have been able to foresee what was going to happen?2
Reviews such as these are conducted in order that the Intelligence Community (IC), the various
organizations, departments, and agencies the world over, which are in the front lines of the war
for information supremacy, can learn from mistakes and chart a way ahead that is devoid of
disastrous events like those studied.
In this paper, I will review one of the more well-known intelligence failures of the US IC,
the failure to accurately describe the “quantity and quality” of Iraq’s WMD programs, via two of
the numerous postmortems conducted thereafter, measured against time and peer-tested
standards for intelligence analysis. In so doing, ultimately, I intend to emphasize what I think is
the primary failing that resulted in the overall failure, which for the most part will end up being
in alignment with the assertions originally made in the postmortems. Thereafter I will examine
correlations between the Iraqi WMD failure and the 9/11 failure; doing thus reveals whether the
1 Richards J Heuer, Jr, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1999) 166.
2 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 166.1
IC truly is learning from its mistakes. Finally, I will propose what further changes to the IC need
to be made if the US is to successfully avoid future intelligence failures and the disastrous events
that invariably follow.
“BODY” OF EVIDENCE
The official postmortem on the Iraqi WMD failure, The Senate Report on Iraqi
WMD Intelligence, asserts that eleven conclusions, or what I consider “findings that are
conclusive of analytic failure,” each relating a particular failing that contributed to the overall
failure, can be derived.3 The conclusions can be found in the introduction of the report. I do not
have definitive evidence to support the following claim (the report does not detail the
committee’s approach in reviewing the intelligence timeline), but I think the committee
responsible for conducting the Iraqi WMD postmortem decided that a finding warranted being
elevated to the level of “conclusive of analytic failure” based on either (1) the frequency and/or
consistency, or (2) the degree of severity and/or impact. In other words, if the committee was
discovering that the same analytic failings were at issue again and again, and/or the analytic
failings carried through for a substantial length of time, the failings were made conclusive of
analytic failure. If the committee discovered that an analytic failing had a significant degree of
severity and/or impact on the overall failure, even if only seen once throughout the timeline, that
failing was deemed conclusive of analytic failure.
By way of these same principles, in my estimation, conclusion three stands out as being
the most detrimental and therefore the failing that contributed most to the overall failure, because
it had both consistency throughout and impact. In fact, the failing to which conclusion three
points may be the epicenter for the overall failure. Conclusion three, edited for conciseness,
states, “The IC suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing WMD
3 A Senate Committee, The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence, 1-35.2
program. This presumption was so strong that formalized IC mechanisms established to
challenge assumptions and groupthink were not utilized.4”
Heuer might suggest that this presumption did not merely affect the analysis of the
collected intelligence surrounding Iraq’s WMD programs, but the initial perception of the raw
intelligence as well. The presumption exacerbated preexisting shortfalls inherent in the human
condition, namely, “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive.5” The presumption was
that Iraq’s WMD programs were substantial; therefore, any evidence remotely consistent with
this view was treated as fact, while any evidence that was not consistent with this view was not
even perceived. Few are likely to think to raise questions challenging something that is already
consistent with their prevailing mindset. Because this presumption was so pervasive, not just
vertically at all echelons within organizations, but laterally across the IC as well, few stopped to
critically analyze whether the judgments being made were appropriate despite mechanisms in
place to prevent instances of this egregious phenomena.
There is one point in the committee’s third conclusion that requires greater clarity. The
committee deemed that this particular conclusive failing was an instance of “groupthink.” The
definition of groupthink, as defined in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and
Innovations, is: a cloistered and likeminded small group that highly values consensus and
reinforces collective confidence6. By the definition alone we can see that groupthink cannot be
applied with any sense of justifiability to the Iraqi WMD failing being discussed (presumption)
because the IC is not a “cloistered and likeminded small group.” Further there were dissenting
voices coming from certain organizations, but those voices were not offering any viable
4 A Senate Committee, The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence, Postmortem (Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office (GPO), 2004) 18.
5 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 8.6 George, Roger Z, and James B Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and
Innovations (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008) 163.3
alternatives that the whole of the IC could accept and present to policymakers, as in, there were
none7. There are several other reasons why groupthink was not necessarily working in
conjunction with the IC’s presumption regarding Iraq’s WMD programs. One of those reasons
follows.
Robert Jervis, in Why Intelligence Fails, discounts the groupthink claim, I believe
rightly so. In a nutshell, he suggests that the committee was using the term “groupthink” in a
more colloquial sense, and that the IC in fact had fallen victim to plausibility8. For instance,
looking at the situation just from the angle of Iraq’s leader, it was plausible to believe that
Saddam Hussein was bolstering Iraq’s WMD programs because of his actions in the past
(1990’s) and actions at that particular time (2002). The plausibility was so strong, partly because
it coalesced with the IC’s prevailing mindset (presumption), that the community failed to
consider any alternatives. Looking at the situation again from the angle of Iraq’s leader, but this
time applying an alternative assessment of his behavior (hindsight certainly helps here), one
might say that Saddam had lost any coherent WMD strategy except to make it appear to hostile
neighbors (Iran, Kuwait) as though Iraq’s strategy was still alive and well and aimed right at
them. Ultimately, Jervis is suggesting that no one was necessarily wrong in making the
presumption that Iraq’s WMD programs were substantial; they were wrong not to suggest
alternative hypotheses9.
COMPARISONS WITH 9/11
However, at this point in the IC’s history, members should have easily seen where
problems in their analysis resided either by (1) more ardently adhering to the precepts of their
7 Jervis, Robert, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010) 130-131.
8 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 129-131, 145-150.9 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 153.
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tradecraft (while intelligence analysis has yet to achieve the practiced precision of a field like
law or medicine, there are still long-established standards that should guide day-to-day
operations), (2) critiquing the end-product (again there are long-established standards for what
makes a well-crafted intelligence end-product), or (3) applying lessons learned from previous
postmortems. One such postmortem that should have been fresh on everyone’s mind is the 9/11
attacks postmortem.
The 9/11 Report is seminal as far as postmortems are concerned. It was written for the
American people, accessible and enlightening, so that they might easily understand the intricate
workings of the IC. How much easier might someone inside the IC comprehend it? I cannot cite
figures, but I would postulate that the 9/11 Report is required reading for IC members in
management positions and that a very high percentage of those members actually did read it,
along with many of the postmortems the preceded it. What should they have learned and passed
along to their subordinates, the frontline analysts?
The report stresses that there are 4 areas that deserved the greatest attention as they
concern reform in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Those areas were: imagination, policy,
capabilities, management10. The first and the last directly relate to the frontline analysts going
about their day-to-day responsibilities of analyzing intelligence, making judgments, and writing
reports. The imagination piece emphasizes the need for analysts to think “outside of the box” or
to think less linearly (which typically begins from their own preconceived and flawed notions),
toward a logical end (which generally is far removed from the actual end). The management
piece concerns the reapportionment of leadership mentality. The general atmosphere prior to
9/11 was one where those on the frontlines supported managers; managers drove the machine.
10 The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, Postmortem (Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office, 2004) 369-386.
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The report suggests that those on the frontlines should be supported by managers; those on the
frontlines should be the ones driving the machine.11 These findings are not far removed from the
findings from other postmortems.
Is the IC taking lessons from the postmortems seriously? Well, in the case of the 9/11
Report, the IC was not exactly able to. The official report was not released until 2004 and the
Iraqi WMD failure had occurred in 2003. That does not mean that there were not stirrings within
the IC to figure out their mistakes and some initial assessments of how to improve. With all the
eyes on the IC after the 9/11 attacks, one would think that there would be more careful, less
rushed, reports being disseminated. One would think that, despite the absence of the official
report, there was an obvious need to think “more imaginatively,” to not fence in intelligence
analysis (the fence was analysts presumtions), but apparently this need was neglected in the Iraqi
WMD estimate just as it has been for decades.
MY PERSONAL “WAY AHEAD” PLAN
My personal assessment concerning what further changes need to be enacted in order to
improve the IC focuses on individual mindsets. The assessment also comes from an idealist
point-of-view, which is replete with its own set of biases, primarily in regards to what many
would call my religion. I am a Buddhist, but it is not a religion to me so much as a mindset
and/or lifestyle. Nonetheless, many people would suspect that my ideas for creating a better IC
stem from the Buddhist religion, regardless of whether they know my inclinations toward
Buddhism, simply because of the nature of the ideas.
For instance, to make a better IC or a better intelligence analyst, I would recommend
right up front that everyone “disregard self.” This is one of the principle edicts of the Buddhist
religion. However, I am not asking analysts to disregard themselves in terms of meeting their
11 The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 369-386.6
basic needs such as sustenance. I am speaking of a complete disregard for who they believe
themselves to be. It is only when individuals first break apart the constricting walls of self that
they can cease filtering the world through “self” and instead see the world around them as it
really is. One of the walls of self is “experience;” once individuals realize that they are not
bound by their experiences, that at any point they can disregard their experiences and completely
change the course of their lives, they can begin to think more imaginatively about the world
around them. This is just one example of the type of suggestions I would make to the IC in order
to improve it. The suggestion does correlate with the suggested need for “imaginative” thinking
that has come out of many passed postmortems, but try to get anyone in the IC to accept it.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, postmortems of intelligence failures within the IC are a vital aspect to
winning the war for information supremacy, thereby decreasing the probability of disastrous
intelligence failures and the calamities they induce. Postmortems highlight for the IC those areas
that are in need of attention or reform. This paper further highlighted a failing within the Iraqi
WMD failure, which was the overwhelming presumption within the IC, by stating that it acted as
the failing that brought on all other failings. This assertion was corroborated by referencing the
works of Heuer and Jervis. A brief assessment of the effectiveness of postmortems was then
conducted by juxtaposing the WMD report with the 9/11 Report; the results were less than
encouraging. Finally, I proposed an idea for changing analysts’ mindsets, from my personal
point-of-view, meant to improve the IC in its quest to secure our nation and allies.
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