an exploration into work- related road safety: a … · an exploration into work-related road...

AN EXPLORATION INTO WORK-RELATED ROAD SAFETY: A

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH

Bevan Rowland

B.FET, M. HlthSc (HSE), Grad.Cert. Road Safety

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety - Queensland

School of Psychology and Counselling

Faculty of Health

Queensland University of Technology

2018

i

Keywords

Work-related road safety, workplace safety, occupational light vehicles, driver

behaviour, safety culture, safety management systems, safety climate, vehicle

crashes, driver offences, intervention strategies, barriers and facilitators.

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Abstract

Work related vehicle crashes are widely identified as the primary cause of

occupational death and injury around the world (Boufous & Williamson, 2006;

Boufous & Williamson, 2009; DaCoTA, 2012; Lewis, Wishart & Rowland, 2012).

Subsequently, driving a vehicle for work purposes could be considered the most

hazardous operation undertaken by workers’ during their daily work activities

(Boufous & Williamson, 2009; Haworth, Tingvall & Kowadlo, 2000; Mitchell,

Friswell, & Mooren, 2012; Newnam, 2014; WHO, 2004; Wishart, Rowland,

Freeman, & Davey, 2011). Although work-related vehicle statistics in Australia

remain high, there has been limited change within industry and organisations have

failed to take a comprehensive risk management approach in regard to work-related

road safety (WRRS) improvement and proactive strategies aimed at reducing the risk

of work-related vehicle incidents (Lewis et al., 2012; Newton, Howard & Wishart,

2013).

Due to the exploratory nature of the research, a multi-faceted approach to

theory was adopted throughout this thesis, drawing on psycho-social and

organisational perspectives. In order to explore a holistic perspective of WRRS, a

theoretical concept of safety culture, the Reciprocal Safety Culture Model (Cooper,

2000), was utilised as a conceptual framework to guide the research and the

interpretation of results. Research indicates that safety culture is a multidimensional

concept that provides a holistic representation of safety within organisations (Parker,

Lawrie & Hudson, 2006). For this program of research, the word ‘holistic’ is

characterised by the belief that issues associated with WRRS are intimately

interconnected and form part of the whole WRRS issue. In addition, in relation to a

holistic approach to WRRS, treatment of all factors associated with WRRS is

required and not simply reacting to or addressing singular WRRS events/factors. The

purpose of this research was to enhance scientific knowledge on WRRS and provide

practical and contemporary information to assist organisations to improve WRRS

risk management and improvement strategies. This was achieved through three

studies and included a diversity of research methods, including focus groups, survey

questionnaire and case studies. All three studies involved three levels of participants

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(e.g., drivers/employees, supervisory staff and managers) from a number of

organisations operating light vehicle fleets. This program of research addresses

WRRS within organisations operating only light vehicle fleets. Light vehicle fleets

are defined as those vehicles in an organisation’s fleet that have a gross weight less

than 4.5 tonnes (Newnam & Watson, 2011).

Study One incorporated a mixed-method design including both qualitative

(Part A) and quantitative (Part B) techniques. The results in Study One, Part A

identified a diversity of individual driver and organisational factors that influenced

WRRS outcomes. The major factors of influence included organisational factors,

such as work pressure and management commitment, indicating that organisational

factors, as acknowledged by the study sample, considerably influenced WRRS. In

addition, a key finding of Study One, Part A was the level of variability in

participants’ perceptions of the factors influencing WRRS across different

departments or work groups within the same organisation. This result suggests that

there may be subcultures operating at different levels of safety within the same

organisation, especially where the level of management commitment diverges.

A consistent finding that emerged both in the qualitative and quantitative

components of Study One was the reported influence of driver distraction on both

WRRS outcomes and driver behaviours. This result has ramifications for not only

theory; highlighting that driver distraction and multi-tasking needs to be incorporated

within behavioural change models; but also, industry practice; including targeting the

causes of driver distraction within organisational safety and risk management

systems.

Utilising the same sample of participants from Study One, Part A, Study Two

involved a qualitative investigation into the barriers to and facilitators for WRRS

intervention strategy development and application. Similarly, the results of Study

Two identified a range of primarily individual driver and organisational factors as

both barriers and facilitators. Major organisational barriers to intervention strategy

development and application included a lack of organisational resources, priority of

production over safety and lack of WRRS knowledge and experience. Interestingly,

management commitment was perceived as a major barrier to and facilitator for

WRRS intervention strategy development and application.

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Given the results of the previous two studies highlighting the influence of

organisational factors, Study Three was designed to investigate the specific

characteristics of an organisations’ safety systems that manage and support WRRS.

This unique component involved a series of four case studies of organisations’

WRRS management systems. Study Three highlighted a lack of organisational

policy, procedures and practice associated with the management of WRRS, including

delineation in relation to the responsibility and accountability for WRRS.

Management commitment, a pervasive theme of the overall research, was also

perceived to be an important element in the level by which organisations address

WRRS within their safety management systems.

Overall, the findings of the research suggest that WRRS is not targeted or

adequately addressed within organisations. In addition, the evidence from all three

studies suggest that management commitment and support for WRRS and safety in

general can determine the level by which WRRS is addressed within organisations;

including WRRS risk management and inclusion of WRRS within occupational

health and safety management systems (incorporating the development and

application of appropriate intervention strategies). The current program of research

also suggests that WRRS is a complex issue requiring a multi-dimensional or holistic

approach to assess the multiple factors impacting on work-related driving and WRRS

culture. Furthermore, identified limitations associated with the current research

program methodology (e.g., survey questionnaire) highlighted the need for future

research to utilise alternative methods of data collection, especially quantitative data.

For instance, the use of data collected by In-Vehicle Monitoring Systems and other

technologies may provide alternative avenues for data collection and potentially may

be utilised as an intervention strategy to promote proactive and positive outcomes.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Keywords .................................................................................................................................. i

Abstract ................................................................................................................................... iii

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... vii

List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... xiii

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... xv

List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... xvii

Statement of Original Authorship ......................................................................................... xix

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... xxi Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis ............................................................... 1

Introductory Comments .................................................................................................. 1

Background to Work-related Road Safety ...................................................................... 2

Rationale for the Research .............................................................................................. 5

Demarcation of Scope .................................................................................................... 9

Research Airms and Objectives .................................................................................... 11

Thesis Outline ............................................................................................................... 12

Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 15 Chapter 2: The Work Related Road Safety Issue........................................... 16

Introductory Comments ................................................................................................ 16

The Work Related Road Safety Issue ........................................................................... 17 Work-related road statistics ................................................................................ 18 The direct and hidden costs of work-related road crashes/incidents .................. 20

Factors Influencing Safe Driving for Work .................................................................. 22 External Factors .................................................................................................. 26

Traffic Legislation ........................................................................................ 26 Work, Health and Safety Legislation and Law ............................................. 27 Risk Management Requirements .................................................................. 29 External Physical Work and Road Environment .......................................... 30

Organisational Factors ........................................................................................ 31 Work and Time Pressure .............................................................................. 32 Fatigue Management .................................................................................... 33 Vehicle Procurement and Maintenance ........................................................ 35 Safety Climate .............................................................................................. 36 Ocuppational Health and Safety Management Systems ............................... 37 Work-Related Road Safety Management System ......................................... 40

Individual Factors ............................................................................................... 41 Gender .......................................................................................................... 42 Age and Driving Experience ........................................................................ 43 Driving Exposure .......................................................................................... 43 Aggressive Driver Behaviour ....................................................................... 44 Speed ............................................................................................................ 45 Fatigue and Driving Tired ............................................................................ 46 Distraction and Inattention ........................................................................... 48 Alcohol and Other Drug Use ........................................................................ 50

Safety Improvement Strategies ..................................................................................... 51

Barriers to and Facilitators for WRRS Improvement ................................................... 53

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Individual/Personal Barriers .............................................................................. 53 Perception of Risk ........................................................................................ 54 Locus of Control ........................................................................................... 54 Optimism Bias .............................................................................................. 55

Organisational Barriers ...................................................................................... 55 External Barriers ................................................................................................ 57

Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 58

Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 60 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Research Design ............................ 61

Introductory Comments ............................................................................................... 61

Safety Culture .............................................................................................................. 61 Conceptual Development of Safety Culture ...................................................... 62 Behaviour change or culture change paradigm for safety management ............ 64 Organisational Safety Culture and Safety Climate ............................................ 65 Role of safety culture in WRRS: A conceivable concept .................................. 68

Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 70

Research Design ........................................................................................................... 72 Study One: Factors Influencing WRSS ............................................................. 73 Study Two: WRRS Intervention Barriers and Facilitators ................................ 74 Study Three: Organisational WRRS Management Systems .............................. 75 Ethical considerations ........................................................................................ 75

Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 77 Chapter 4: Study One Part A – Exploration of the factors that influence

WRRS ……………………………………………………………………..79

Introductory Comments ............................................................................................... 79

Study Objective ............................................................................................................ 80

Method ......................................................................................................................... 80 Participants ........................................................................................................ 81 Content ............................................................................................................... 83 Focus Group Procedure ..................................................................................... 85 Data Analysis ..................................................................................................... 86

Results .......................................................................................................................... 87 Time/Work Pressure .......................................................................................... 87 Fatigue and Driving Tired .................................................................................. 88 Distraction and Inattention ................................................................................. 89 Driving Aggressively ......................................................................................... 90 Alcohol and Other Drugs ................................................................................... 91 Management Commitment and Support ............................................................ 92 Speed…………………………………………………………….......................93 Driver Errors ...................................................................................................... 94 Other Road Users ............................................................................................... 94

Deliberate Driving Violations ............................................................................ 95 Vehicle-Related Risks ........................................................................................ 96 Organisational Safety Rules and procedures ..................................................... 97 External Factors ................................................................................................. 98 Exposure ............................................................................................................ 99

Discussion .................................................................................................................. 100 Support for Study Objective ............................................................................ 100

Organisational influences ........................................................................... 100

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Individual influences .................................................................................. 102 External influences ..................................................................................... 105

Implications for Study One Part B ................................................................... 106

Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................... 107 Chapter 5: Study One Part B – Quantitative Analysis of Work-Related

Road Safety Risk Factors.................................................................................. 108

Introductory Comments .............................................................................................. 108

Study Objectives ......................................................................................................... 108

Method ........................................................................................................................ 109 Participant sample ............................................................................................ 109 Content and materials ....................................................................................... 111

Demographics ............................................................................................. 112 Safety Climate Questionnaire – Modified for Drivers (SCQ-MD) ............. 113 Modified Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (MDBQ) ................................. 113 Driver Attitude Questionnaire (DAQ) ........................................................ 115

Procedure .......................................................................................................... 116

Results ........................................................................................................................ 116 Driver Behaviour .............................................................................................. 116

MDBQ Factor Structure ............................................................................. 116 MDBQ factor reliability and descriptive statistics ...................................... 122

Safety Climate .................................................................................................. 124 SCQ-MD factor structure ........................................................................... 124 SCQ-MD factor reliability and descriptive statistics .................................. 126

Driver Attitude ................................................................................................. 128 Bivariate Correlations ....................................................................................... 129 Additional Demographic and Environmental Factors ...................................... 132

Type of Vehicle .......................................................................................... 132 Driving Terrain ........................................................................................... 132

Prediction of WRRS Outcomes ........................................................................ 133 Work-Related Vehicle Crashes ................................................................... 133 Work-Related Driver Traffic Offences ....................................................... 135

Discussion ................................................................................................................... 137 Support for Study Objective ............................................................................. 137

Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................... 140 Chapter 6: Barriers to and Facilitators for Work-Related Road Safety

Intervention Application ................................................................................... 141

Introductory Comments .............................................................................................. 141

Research Objectives ................................................................................................... 142

Method ........................................................................................................................ 143 Content ............................................................................................................. 143

Results ........................................................................................................................ 145 Costs, time and resources ........................................................................... 145 Productivity versus safety ........................................................................... 146 Lack of management and organisational support and commitment ............ 147 Current organisational systems ................................................................... 148 Limited employee consultation and communication .................................. 149 Attitudes and beliefs towards work-related road safety interventions ........ 151 Lack of Work-Related Road Safety Knowledge, Experience and Training153 Government Influence ................................................................................ 153 Less Frequently Reported Issues ................................................................ 154

Perceived facilitators for work-related road safety interventions ..................... 156

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Need for interventions to be brief ............................................................... 156 Management commitment and support ...................................................... 157 Organisational change processes ................................................................ 157 Organisational systems and processes ........................................................ 158 Relationships .............................................................................................. 158 General road safety campaigns ................................................................... 159 Less frequently reported facilitators ........................................................... 160


Barriers ....................................................................................................... 161 Facilitators .................................................................................................. 163

Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 164 Chapter 7: Study Three – Analysis of Organisational Work-Related Road

Safety Systems and Processes ........................................................................... 166

Introductory Comments ............................................................................................. 166

Research Objectives ................................................................................................... 168

Method ....................................................................................................................... 168 The Case Study Approach ............................................................................... 168 Participating Organisations and Industry Context ........................................... 170 Content ............................................................................................................. 171 Study Procedure and Materials ........................................................................ 173

Review of Organisational Records, Documentation and Initiatives ........... 173 Organisational Staff Interviews/Focus Groups ........................................... 174 Site Inspection and Observations ............................................................... 178

Data Analysis ................................................................................................... 178

Results ........................................................................................................................ 179 Review of organisational records, documentation and initiatives ................... 179

WRRS Policy and Procedures .................................................................... 180 Work-Related Vehicle Incidents and Driver Infringements ....................... 181 WRRS Intervention Strategies and Improvement Initiatives ...................... 182

Organisational staff interviews/focus groups ................................................... 183 Limited WRRS policy and procedures ....................................................... 183 Inadequate WRRS system and processes ................................................... 184 Limited risk management strategies and processes .................................... 187 Limited management commitment and support ......................................... 188 Inadequate consultation and communication .............................................. 188 Responsibility, accountability and ownership of WRRS ............................ 190 Priority of productivity over safety ............................................................ 190 Limited WRRS intervention strategies or initi ........................................... 191 Lack of knowledge, experience and training related to WRRS .................. 191

Site inspections and observations of organisations’ WRRS ............................ 192 Site/Workplace inspections and observations ............................................ 194 Vehicle inspections ..................................................................................... 194 Driver/Organisation observations ............................................................... 195


Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 199 Chapter 8: Research Findings and Discussion .............................................. 201

Introductory Comments ............................................................................................. 201

Summary of Research Findings ................................................................................. 203

Strengths and Limitations of the Research ................................................................. 221

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Future Research Directions ......................................................................................... 225

Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................. 229 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………….231 Appendices …………………………………………………………………….254

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List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Occupational light vehicle use systems model 23

Figure 3.1 Reciprocal safety culture model (adapted from Cooper, 2000)

69

Figure 3.2 Outline of research program structure 72

Figure 7.1 Outline of organisational WRRS case study data collection methodology

169

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List of Tables

Table2.1 A summary of potential determinants of crash, injury and fatality in the systems model

24

Table 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 82

Table 5.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Survey Sample 110

Table 5.2 Exploratory factor structure of the modified DBQ 120

Table 5.3 MDBQ Scale Means and Standard Deviations 123

Table 5.4 Factor structure of the modified fleet safety climate questionnaire

125

Table 5.5 Modified FSCQ Scale Means and Standard Deviations 127

Table 5.6 Bivariate correlations between driver behaviour, fleet safety climate, key demographic, and road safety outcome variable

130

Table 5.7 Logistic Regression for Crashes 133

Table 5.8 Logistic Regression for Traffic Offences 134

Table 7.1 Proportion of participants from each organisation 173

Table 7.2 Outline of organisational WRRS-related documentation in use

176

Table 7.3 WRRS inspection and observations checklist 189

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List of Abbreviations

ACCI Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions

BBS Behavioural Based Safety

DBQ Driver Behaviour Questionnaire

HSE Health Safety Environment

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

OHSMS Occupational Health and Safety Management System

OHS Occupational Health and Safety

OLV Occupational Light Vehicle

QUT Queensland University of Technology

SMS Safety Management System

SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

WRRS Work-Related Road Safety

WHO World Health Organization

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Statement of Original Authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet

requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the

best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously

published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Signature: QUT Verified Signature

Date: June 2018

xxi

Acknowledgements

The program of research documented within this thesis was conducted over a

considerable timeframe and consequently there are a large number of people that

have assisted with not only the development and facilitation of the research but also

provided extensive support and encouragement during the research process and

writing of the thesis. While it is not possible to acknowledge the many people who

provided assistance, support and encouragement, I particularly would like to thank:

• My supervisors, Associate Professor James Freeman and Professor

Jeremy Davey, I would like to express my appreciation and unreserved

gratitude for their support, advice, and assistance throughout the

research program, without your guidance and encouragement the

completion of this thesis would not have been possible.

• Dr Darren Wishart, I will always be indebted to you for not only your

assistance in the process associated with the program of research

process, but also your encouragement and friendship over the years;

• Professor Herbert Biggs for your ongoing support and encouragement,

especially in the final stages of thesis writing and completion;

• The various industry partners, including the organisations, management

and staff that were involved and/or participated in the program of

research;

• Colleagues during my employment at CARRS-Q that offered

assistance, support and encouragement throughout the development and

completion of the thesis; and

• Finally, and most importantly, my wife Karri, your patience and

support during the long journey to thesis completion is very much

appreciated. Words don’t express my feeling of gratitude.

1

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

Tragically, since the first recorded automobile fatality on the 31st August 1869,

traffic related injuries and fatalities have become a prominent worldwide public

health risk. As a result of road traffic collisions, it has been estimated that 1.3 million

people die and as many as 20 - 50 million people are injured each year worldwide

(WHO, 2004). Tragically, the fatality rate represents more than 3000 deaths each

day. In addition, the World Health Organisation predicted that unless immediate and

effective action is taken, road traffic injuries will increase from its previous position

of 11th (WHO, 2004) to 5th in the near future, resulting in a significant increase to

approximately 2.4 million fatalities annually. Australia is not immune to this

problem. Over a ten-year period (2001-2010), Australian road casualty statistics

reported that 483 158 persons were injured in a road crash, an additional 203 527

suffered a serious injury and 14 267 people died (Austroads, 2015). The substantial

road-related trauma statistics suggest that driving a vehicle could be considered the

riskiest activity a person will perform on a daily basis. Unfortunately, road traffic

crashes have become such a common occurrence that they have seemingly lost their

newsworthiness and as such there exists a certain level of complacency within

society compared to other risks (Wishart, 2015). Subsequently, the media is more

likely to report less frequent incidents which have a lower level of risk that may

shock, incite passion, fear or outrage within the community. For example, recent

media attention has focussed on shark attacks, commercial aircraft crashes, snake

bites, skydiving, or any incident involving celebrities.

Driving a vehicle for the purpose of work is an activity undertaken by many

road users (Davey, Rowland & Freeman, 2010). Work-related drivers are commonly

defined as those who drive at least once per week for work-related purposes (Davey

et al., 2010; Haworth et al., 2000). For example, work-related drivers include sales

people, tradesmen, couriers, self-employed persons, persons who drive private

vehicles for work (e.g., grey fleet) and those who drive company vehicles. Work-

related drivers also include senior executives and managers provided with salary

sacrificed vehicles, those who drive work-related vehicles both for work and non-

2

work purposes, and those employed to drive fleet cars, vans and other specialist

vehicles (Dimmer & Parker, 1999). Subsequently, the safety of work-related road

users has become an increasing concern for governments, organisations and the

community (Lewis et al., 2012).

Work-related road safety (WRRS) has been classified as aspects of road safety

being applied within an occupational health and safety framework to organisations

(Banks, 2008; Haworth et al., 2000). Although considerable research has been

conducted examining work-related driver behaviours, work-related driving

incidents/statistics have seemingly remained consistently high, with 39% of all

worker fatalities over the past 13 years (2003-2015) resulting from vehicle collisions

(Safe Work Australia, 2016). Therefore, due to vehicle collisions consistently being

reported as the highest mechanism of incident in relation to worker fatalities (Safe

Work Australia, 2014), the statistics suggest that further research is required to

explore the contemporary risks associated with work-related driving and subsequent

development of effective strategies that improve work-related road safety

performance and overall system management within the light vehicle fleet area.

This chapter provides an overview of research undertaken to explore the

contemporary situation in relation to WRRS within light vehicle fleet settings.

Within the scope of this program of research, light vehicle fleet include employer

owned vehicles, employee owned vehicles used for the purpose of work, and

contractor vehicles operating within organisations’ sites. Firstly, a background to

work-related road safety is provided outlining the seriousness of the issue and

previous strategy aimed at improving work-related road safety. Following a rationale

for the program of research, demarcation of scope and research aim and objectives

are presented. Finally, an outline of the thesis is provided briefly describing the

contents of subsequent chapters.

It should be noted that throughout this thesis there are references cited to work

published by the author of this thesis. The references cited within this thesis do not

refer to studies which form part of this PhD thesis.

BACKGROUND TO WORK-RELATED ROAD SAFETY

Work related driving or driving for the purpose of work remains a serious

problem in Australia and overseas (Murray, Pratt & Dubens, 2009). Previously,

3

work-related vehicle incidents have been consistently identified as a major cause of

workplace fatalities, injuries and absence from work (Haworth, 2008; Haworth et al.,

2000; Murray, 2010; Murray, Watson, King, Pratt & Darby, 2014; Stuckey,

LaMontagne, Glass & Sim, 2010). Australian Occupational Health and Safety

statistics indicate that work-related vehicle incidents are a major issue with work-

related fatality figures indicating that in recent years, 59 percent of workers killed at

work resulted from motor vehicle-related incidents (Safe Work Australia, 2016).

Within the National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020 (Australian Transport Council,

2011) it was noted that work-related road incidents (including working, commuting

and bystander) accounted for approximately half of all work-related fatalities and

15% of national road deaths (Australian Transport Council, 2011; Newton et al.,

2013; Small, Bailey & Lydon, 2014). In addition, according to Safe Work Australia

(2016) occupational fatalities involving motor vehicle collisions as the primary

mechanism of injury clearly accounts for the highest proportion of fatalities (39%)

with the next highest mechanism of injury consisting of being hit by moving objects

(12%) and falls from heights (11%).

There has been little recent change in work-related vehicle fatalities compared

to previous years, with 49% in 1989-92 (NOHSC, 1998), 46% in 2003-10 (Safe

Work Australia, 2013) through to 59% of all fatalities in 2003-15 (Safe Work

Australia, 2016) resulting from incidents involving vehicles. Furthermore, recent

statistics show that during the 2003-15 period approximately 60% of bystander

fatalities were due to a work-related vehicle collision. Moreover, fatality statistics

reveal that 89% of all worker fatalities involving all types of vehicles during the

2003-2015 period occurred on public roads. Statistics reported above are based on

only accepted workers’ compensation claims and therefore may be an

underestimation of the scale of the WRRS issue.

Although work-related vehicle statistics in Australia remain high, there has

been limited change within industry and organisations have failed to take a

comprehensive approach in regard to intervention strategies aimed at reducing the

risk of work-related vehicle incidents (Lewis et al., 2012; Newton et al, 2013).

Historically, organisations have adopted a “silver or golden bullet” approach aimed

at developing and implementing a single strategy or countermeasure to encompass

and address all work-related road safety issues (Lewis et al., 2012; Newton et al.,

4

2013; Wishart & Davey, 2004). Typically, within industry organisations, the focus

has been from an asset management perspective where the emphasis has been on

counting crashes and repair costs, rather than identifying strategies to prevent

incidents/crashes occurring (Lewis et al., 2012; SafetyNet, 2009). Most

organisational intervention strategies have invariably been implemented in reaction

to an increase in numbers or severity of work-related vehicle crashes or incidents

(Lewis et al., 2012; Wishart & Davey, 2004) and fail to proactively address problems

or incidents before they occur. Traditionally, organisations have adopted a “one size

fits all” approach (Lewis et al., 2012) to intervention strategies that often involves an

overreliance on driver training, generally based on enhancing driver skills and not

targeting specific driver behaviours or organisational influences (Davey, Freeman,

Wishart & Rowland, 2008; Newton et al., 2013). However, there is research to

suggest that post-licence driver training programs provide limited effectiveness as a

work-related vehicle crash reduction initiative (Small et al., 2014). For example, skill

improvements related to driving a vehicle for work does not necessarily translate into

safer behaviours, especially if the underlying organisational and personal factors of

influence are not adequately addressed (Lewis et al., 2012; Newton et al., 2013). An

emphasis on strategies to improve the driving skills of drivers, exemplifies the

perceptions of organisational management that the driver, more specifically a lack of

driver skills and ability, is primarily to “blame” for work-related incidents/crashes

(Rowland, Wishart & Davey, 2005).

In contrast, occupational health and safety professionals and researchers have

advocated a more proactive and holistic approach to work-related road safety

intervention strategies, aimed at preventing incidents occurring (Davey et al., 2008;

Lewis et al., 2012; Rowland et al., 2005; Wishart & Davey, 2004). For example,

systematic identification and management of the risks associated with WRRS,

development of appropriate intervention/improvement strategies, and maintain

continuous monitoring and review of the risks and improvement strategies

implemented. Unfortunately, such proposals have yet to be robustly applied and

evaluated.

Accordingly, there is a need to not only understand the current scope and risks

associated with the safety hazard of driving for work but also utilise a holistic

approach to explore the magnitude of influences associated with WRRS performance

5

and outcomes. Consequently, there is a need to understand the origins of work-

related driver attitudes and behaviour (including the factors that influence driver

behaviour) and influences related to employee perceptions of safety associated with

driving for work purposes within organisations. In addition, little research has

examined the impact (whether positive or negative) of the organisational safety

management systems, processes and practices on WRRS within an organisational

setting. This program of research was undertaken to explore these issues. In order to

achieve this, the program of research utilise exploratory and comprehensive

approaches to assess the contemporary situation in relation to WRRS and associated

influences on WRRS intervention/improvement strategies. Examples of such

influences include individual, organisational and external characteristics and factors

influencing driver behaviour and drivers’ ability to drive safely for work, the factors

that promote or hinder WRRS intervention (improvement or change) strategies, and

the level of organisational processes, commitment and support for WRRS.

This program of research explores the concept of WRRS culture (e.g.,

behaviour, person, and situation) and potential influence on the operational use of

light vehicles within occupational organisations. The definition of safety culture

utilised in this program of research suggests: “Culture is the product of multiple

goal-directed interactions between people (psychological), jobs (behavioural), and

the organisational (situational); while safety culture is that observable degree of

effort by which all organisational members directs their attention and actions toward

improving safety on a daily basis” (Cooper, 2000). Rather than empirically

examining a safety culture model, this program of research utilises the reciprocal

safety culture model (Cooper, 2000) as a framework to explore contemporary

influences associated with WRRS. Safety culture and the safety culture model

utilised as a framework for this program of research is further discussed in Chapter 3

of this thesis. Next, this chapter outlines the rationale, scope, aims and objectives,

and structure of the research.

RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH

There are a number of possible reasons why WRRS statistics have not

considerably improved compared to other general occupational health and safety

areas or why previously developed intervention strategies have made limited

significant difference or improvement of organisational WRRS. Firstly, work-related

6

drivers are not necessarily a homogeneous group (Robb, Sultana, Ameratunga &

Jackson, 2008; SafetyNet, 2009), but rather, often consist of a wide variety of people

who are required to drive at or for work, at some stage, within their working careers.

Workers who are required to drive a vehicle for the purpose of work may include

those of various nationality, culture, socio-economic status, levels of health,

psychological status and education, and employed across many diverse industries and

work arrangements (e.g., employees, contract, casual, night/day shifts). In addition,

due to the diversity of industries and employment tasks, driving exposure may vary

considerably for those workers required to drive for work purposes (ABS, 2011).

Therefore, their driving behaviours, attitudes, beliefs, experience, skill and ability,

level of risk, and organisational support may vary considerably. Consequently, due to

the heterogeneity of the workforce the effectiveness of current WRRS intervention

strategies aiming to improve the safety of personnel driving for the purpose of work

may be limited. In addition, the heterogeneity of a continually changing workforce

and working environment creates a dilemma, whereby the use of a singular

intervention strategy may have limited effect (Lewis et al., 2012; SafetyNet, 2009).

Secondly, the majority of WRRS research involving light vehicle use to date

has primarily targeted two differing however important areas, including driver

behaviours and to a lesser extent organisational fleet safety climate. Traditionally, the

majority of WRRS research has focussed on attempting to identify what traditional

driver behaviours (e.g., particularly driving errors and violations) predict self-

reported outcomes, such as crashes and driving offences (Davey et al., 2008;

Rowland, Wishart & Davey, 2005; Wishart, 2015). However, research that primarily

focuses on self-report survey data has been shown to have limited predictive efficacy

for identifying at risk drivers (Wishart, 2015). In addition, previous research fails to

adequately explore the additional organisational or individual factors that may

influence work-related driving behaviour (Wishart, 2015). For example, the

influence of behaviours related to fatigue (Davey & Wishart, 2007; Mitchell, Driscoll

& Healey, 2004; Taylor & Dorn, 2006) and distraction (Broughton, Baughan, Pearce,

Smith & Buckle, 2003; Newnam & Von Schuckmann, 2012), as well as,

organisational factors including work/time pressures (Boufous & Williamson, 2009;

Newnam, Watson & Murray, 2003), organisational processes (Bottani, Monica &

Vignali, 2009; Kwon, 2006) and management commitment and support (Mooren,

7

Grzebieta, Williamson, Oliver & Friswell, 2014; Rowland & Wishart, 2014).

Subsequently, scant research has focussed on the origins of worker’s driving

behaviours therefore limiting knowledge that may better inform targeting and

application of intervention strategies.

Typically, organisations have addressed adverse WRRS outcomes by utilising

a micro-level approach targeting small pieces of the problem (or puzzle) relating to

driving for the purpose of work and not addressed adequately the macro-level

aspects, such as, characteristics related to or governing the overall issue (or larger

picture) (Lewis et al., 2012). For example, considerable attention has focussed on the

application of a single strategy aimed at encouraging safe driving behaviour and

improving light vehicle fleet WRRS performance (Banks, 2008; Lewis & Newnam,

2011; Newton et al., 2013; Wishart & Davey, 2004), with little consideration for the

dynamics associated with the governance or management of WRRS. For instance,

research has focussed predominantly on driver characteristics and perceptions but

neglected to identify and assess the current processes and systems in place to manage

and support organisational WRRS (Newton et al., 2013). Furthermore, previous

research has suggested that intervention strategies need to be proactive and multi-

dimensional and not solely focussed on single interventions directed toward the

driver (Lewis et al., 2012; Wishart & Davey, 2004). For example, strategies and

interventions aimed at reducing the incidence of drink driving (within the wider

community) often involve not only law enforcement and random breath testing, but

also incorporate advertising and awareness campaigns, rehabilitation programs, and

technological interventions such as alcohol interlock devices. A similar holistic

approach is needed to address the WRRS problem which is likely to be multi-faceted

in nature (Lewis et al., 2012). A systems approach views the road transport system

holistically and seeks to manage the interaction between road users, roads, travel

speeds and vehicles (ACRS, 2010). Likewise, a system approach is required to

address WRRS targeting the work-related driver, the organisation and the work

environment (e.g., road conditions, vehicle).

Thirdly, although intervention strategies have been introduced aiming to

improve WRRS (Davey et al., 2007; Haworth et al., 2000; Rowland et al., 2008;

Safety Net, 2009), WRRS statistics suggests that such strategies have had limited

impact. These interventions were generally not comprehensive nor systematically

8

applied, with many strategies implemented in reaction to a specific event or incident

(Davey et al., 2007; Rowland et al., 2008). Furthermore, the application of

intervention strategies is often met with resistance within organisations (Davey et al.,

2008). However, limited research has been reported examining the factors that either

promote or hinder intervention strategy development and/or application. One area

that has been omitted is workers’ willingness to embrace new safety initiatives

(Davey et al., 2008). However, for many workers their unwillingness to embrace new

initiatives may stem from lack of organisational support in place to effectively

manage the process. Understanding the barriers to and facilitators for the

introduction of WRRS intervention/improvement strategies perceived by

organisational staff prior to the planning stage could be beneficial to the development

and application of intervention strategies. For example, information may enable the

identification of mitigation strategies to alleviate adverse reaction to interventions or

highlight mechanisms that could be utilised to promote acceptance of improvement

strategies as well as maximise the initiatives through a targeted approach.

Consultation with and participation from staff on safety is an essential and legislative

requirement for organisations. In addition, an understanding of the barriers to and

facilitators for intervention strategy development and application may provide

valuable insight into the WRRS culture of an organisation. Interestingly, a significant

amount of research has demonstrated the importance of safety culture on

organisational safety performance (Antonsen, 2009; Cole, Stevens-Adams & Weiner,

2013; Ekelaert, Starren, van Scheppingen, Fox & Brück, 2013; Guldenmund, 2000;

Zohar, 2010), suggesting the need for integration into the broader OHS program.

Fourthly, little research has determined the capacity of organisations’ safety

systems and processes aimed toward the management of WRRS, reduction of risks

and support for intervention strategy development and application. Traditionally,

most intervention strategies or initiatives have focussed on the driver(s) and not

addressed sufficiently organisational issues and capability of organisational systems

and processes to adequately manage and address WRRS risks (e.g., adequate policy

and procedures, training and education, induction, risk management processes)

(Lewis et al., 2012; Newton et al., 2013; Rowland, Watson & Wishart, 2006;

Rowland & Wishart, 2014).

9

Consequently, there is a need for further research targeting a balance of

individual driver issues, as well as, the supporting mechanisms and safety promotion

activities of employer organisations. Research suggests that many organisations fail

to actively and holistically promote WRRS as an important safety concern (Lewis et

al., 2012). A holistic, all encapsulating approach is required that is grounded in a

deeper understanding of the WRRS culture of organisational light vehicle fleet

operations, including the key factors on influences to driving behaviour, employee

perceptions of organisations’ fleet safety climate and situational aspects associated

with organisational WRRS management processes or safety management system.

This program of research utilises the Reciprocal Model of Safety Culture (Cooper,

2000) as a framework to guide the program of research and explore the influences on

safety within the WRRS context. Cooper’s (2000) Reciprocal Model of Safety

Culture has been utilised effectively within the occupational health and safety setting

(Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Choudhry, Fang & Mohamed, 2007; Fernandez-Muniz et

al., 2007; Jebb, 2015). This holistic approach will increase understanding of the

WRRS context, as well as, further inform the development and application of

intervention strategies aiming to improve WRRS.

DEMARCATION OF SCOPE

Within the program of research there are important considerations in relation to

the demarcation of scope. There are two major types of vehicle fleets (e.g., heavy

and light) and each fleet type incurs varying degrees of attention by government

departments, employer organisations, industry groups and the media. For instance, a

crash involving a heavy vehicle has a greater potential to be catastrophic and

therefore promotes closer media attention and government scrutiny. Heavy vehicle

fleets, including both articulated and rigid trucks, are more readily identified and

only related to work. In addition, heavy vehicle operation in Australia is governed by

additional legislation, including Chain of Responsibility (Heavy Vehicle National

Law, 2017). In contrast, light vehicle fleets seemingly operate under the radar of both

government agencies, employer organisations and the media. This program of

research focusses primarily on WRRS within light vehicle fleet settings. Light

vehicle fleets consist of vehicles under 4.5 tonne and are utilised for work purposes

by organisations and their staff (Newnam & Watson, 2011). Although light vehicle

fleets are also governed by specific legislation across all Australian jurisdictions

10

(Model Work, Health and Safety Act, 2011; Occupational Health and Safety Act

2004 (Vic); Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984); factors such as the

commonality of light vehicles used for the purpose of work compared to those of the

general road user population, basic licensing requirements, under-reporting issues,

and lack of enforcement related to work-related light vehicle use compared to the

heavy vehicle industry; work-related light vehicle use is less scrutinised and targeted

(Rowland, Wishart, McKenzie & Watson, 2012).

This program of research utilises samples of Australian work-related drivers

and organisations operating within the Australian context. Within all jurisdictions in

Australia, a vehicle utilised for work purposes is considered a workplace under all

Australian Work Health and Safety Acts (Model Work Health and Safety Act, 2011;

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic); Occupational Safety and Health Act

1984). In addition, under the Work Health and Safety Act (2011) all organisations

are required to provide a safe place to work and safe systems of work for all

employees working at a workplace. Therefore, the scope of this program of research

focusses on the Australian context in relation to work-related driving. There are

many WRRS operational (e.g., OHS legislation, industrial relations, social issues)

and environmental (e.g., driving terrain, weather conditions, flora/fauna) aspects that

are unique to the Australian context. Likewise, there are potentially many operational

aspects that are relevant to those experienced within other countries.

Mentioned previously in Section 1.2, this program of research utilises a safety

culture model as a framework to explore the contemporary WRRS situation. The use

of an existing and validated safety culture model as a framework for the research,

rather than empirically evaluating a safety culture model or theory, is primarily to

explore the aspects associated with influences to WRRS. Within the general safety

area, there is still conjecture relating to a standard definition of safety culture and

research relating to safety culture models and the utility of theories is ongoing

(Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2010; Zohar, 2010). In addition, WRRS research to

date has focussed primarily on singular components related to the issue (e.g., driver

behaviour or an organisations’ safety climate) neglecting examination of a more

holistic representation of the issue. Therefore, the use of Cooper’s (2000) reciprocal

safety culture model provides a consolidated theoretical framework to inform the

research design and methodology of this program of research. For example, Cooper’s

11

model enables triangulation of results thereby providing a more holistic and

representative depiction of the issue. Based on Social Cognitive Theory, Cooper’s

reciprocal safety culture model portrays human behaviour as the result of the

reciprocal interaction between the internal psychological factors of the person, and

the external observation of the situation and behaviours (Ward, Linkenbach, Keller

& Otto, 2010, p. 12).

Also, out of the scope of this program of research is the development or

application of any intervention strategy aimed at improving WRRS. Rather the

current program of research intention is to explore the barriers to and facilitators for

WRRS intervention development and application, which is a topic that has been

almost totally neglected to date. Subsequently, it is envisaged that investigation of

the barriers and facilitators will provide valuable insight to assist with the

development and application of future intervention strategies for the improvement of

WRRS and reduce resistance toward intervention strategy application.

RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The overall aim of this program of research is to explore the individual,

organisational and external factors impacting upon WRRS in employer based light

vehicle fleets. This involves a holistic approach that focuses on employees (e.g.,

organisational drivers), supervisors/managers as well as the organisational

occupational health and safety management systems that have the potential to

influence safety outcomes. Based upon the considerations outlined within previous

sections of this chapter, to achieve the research aim there are three primary

objectives for this program of research.

The first objective of this research is to identify work drivers’ perceptions and

experiences related to personal, organisational and external factors that influence safe

driving behaviours and performance (Study One). This study incorporates a mixed

methods design, both qualitative and quantitative, exploring contemporary factors

that influence work-related driver safety, including factors beyond those that have

traditionally remained the focus of attention (e.g., DBQ driver errors and violations),

including distraction, fatigue, work pressures and management commitment.

The second objective is to conduct an exploration to identify the individual,

organisational and external factors that influence the development and application of

12

safety interventions aimed at improving WRRS (Study Two). This involves a multi-

level qualitative analysis of employees’, supervisors’ and managers’ perceptions

relating to the barriers to and facilitators for safety intervention strategy development

and application. For instance, potential barriers may include lack of resources to

develop and implement intervention strategies or existing robust WHS management

system which currently excludes OLV use. Whereas, facilitators may include

management commitment to improve WRRS and therefore the development and

application of WRRS intervention strategies or integration into existing OHS

management systems.

The third objective of the program of research is to utilise a case study method

approach to systematically investigate the extent, application and effect of

organisational policy, processes and safety practices in four organisations operating

light vehicle fleets. This will be undertaken to highlight key organisational safety

systems that impact upon the WRRS culture within the organisations and subsequent

safety performance, such as crash outcomes and infringement notices.

The program of research will achieve these objectives through three studies.

Each study sequentially addresses each of the research program’s three objectives,

with specific research questions provided at the end of Chapter Two following the

literature review.

THESIS OUTLINE

Chapter Two reviews the available literature related to the WRRS context and

utilises a modified version of the Occupational Light Vehicle Use Systems model

(Stuckey, La Montagne & Sim, 2007) as a framework to guide the literature review.

Chapter Two (section 2.3 Factors influencing Safe Driving For Work) describes the

rationale for the modification to the model from five major areas of influence (e.g.,

driver/passengers, vehicle, road environment, work arrangements and public policy)

to three broader areas of influence (e.g., individual, organisational and external). The

chapter highlights the organisational, individual and contextual/environmental

influences that impact on the safety of workers/drivers who drive for the purpose of

work. In addition, the chapter explores organisational directives and safety systems,

and their reported influence on occupational safety, including WRRS performance

and outcomes. Furthermore, the chapter will review the current literature regarding

13

the type and effectiveness of various intervention strategies and countermeasures.

Finally, the research questions will be identified and outlined in Chapter Two.

Initially, Chapter Three reviews the concept of safety culture and relevance to

the WRRS context. In addition, the chapter outlines the importance of safety culture

as a framework for this program of research. Furthermore, Chapter Three outlines the

methodological approach, including the rationale for and research design of each of

the three studies undertaken in this thesis.

Study One results are reported across two chapters with Chapter Four

pertaining to the qualitative component of the study and Chapter Five reporting on

quantitative survey data and analyses. Chapter Four explores participant perceptions

relating primarily to individual and organisational factors that influence drivers’

ability to drive safely for the purpose of work. In addition, results from Chapter Four

suggest the need to explore the influence of additional driver behaviour factors (e.g.,

fatigue and distraction) on driver performance and outcomes; rather than only

traditional survey DBQ factors (i.e., errors, highway-code violations and aggressive

violations).

Chapter Five analyses the results of a self-report survey focusing on individual,

organisational and demographic factors that influence or impact on WRRS. More

specifically, the survey focuses on driver behaviour as well as respondents’

perceptions relating to WRRS within their organisation. Chapters Four and Five

address the first three research questions:

1) What personal characteristics and individual driver issues influence driver

behaviour, work-related road safety outcomes and drivers’ ability to drive

safely for the purpose of work?

2) What organisational factors influence work-related road safety, such as

driver behaviour, driving safety performance and risk of work-related

driving offences and crashes?

3) Do external factors influence organisational management of WRRS or the

safe driving ability of drivers operating light vehicles for the purpose of

work?

Utilising the same sample of participants and qualitative method described in

Chapter Four, Chapter Six examines the barriers to and facilitators for the

development and application of strategies aimed at improving WRRS. This

14

qualitative study seeks to ascertain those major influences that have either hindered

or promoted the development and application of intervention strategies within

occupational organisations. In addition, to gain a more representative understanding

of the specific barriers and facilitators that impact on the development and

application of WRRS intervention strategies within organisations, Study Two utilises

the perspectives of three levels of staff, including employees, supervisors and

management. Chapter Six addresses the fourth and fifth research questions:

4) What personal, organisational, and external factors are barriers to the

development and application of work-related road safety intervention

strategies?

5) What personal, organisational and external factors are facilitators (or assist)

for the development and application of work-related road safety

intervention strategies?

Chapter Seven presents Study Three which involves an investigation of the

level by which WRRS is addressed within organisational OHSMS’s. This study

examines four differing organisations providing a cross section of results to ascertain

the capability of the organisations’ safety systems and processes to develop, foster

and support WRRS. Study Three utilises a case study methodology which focuses on

a contemporary phenomenon, namely organisational work-related road safety

systems, and explores the systems within their real-life context and associated

limitations. Subsequently, Study Three focussed on organisational safety

management systems and processes rather than simply examining individual or

driver related issues/influences. Case study research builds an in-depth, contextual

understanding of the case, relying on multiple data sources (Yin, 2003), including

review of organisational records, documentation, and initiatives as well as staff

interviews and discussions. Chapter Seven explores the sixth research question:

6) Do current organisational safety management systems, processes and

practice effectively target work-related road safety?

Chapter Eight provides a discussion and summary of the findings of the three

studies presented in Chapters Four to Seven. In addition, the strengths and limitations

of the research program as well as directions for potential future research will be

discussed.

15

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provided an overview of the program of research and outline of

the contents of each chapter of the thesis. In summary, while there has been

considerable research undertaken within the work-related road safety arena, previous

focus has been very narrow and not considered a range of cultural and organisational

factors that can influence work-related driving safety and performance, including

organisational processes for WRRS improvement and management practices. This

program of research endeavours to explore and identify the factors that influence

WRRS in contemporary organisational environments and impact on intervention

strategy development and application. Synthesis of results obtained from the studies

are reported in regard to the program of research aims and objectives. In addition, it

is envisaged that the implications and practical application of the findings may

provide additional guidance and assistance for light vehicle fleet managers,

occupational safety personnel and organisations to improve their work-related

driving safety and integrate WRRS within Occupational Health and Safety

Management Systems (OHSMS). The proceeding chapter provides a review of the

available literature in relation to the WRRS context, intervention strategies, barriers

to and facilitators for WRRS improvement, and organisational safety management

systems and processes.

16

Chapter 2: The Work-Related Road Safety Issue


The importance of occupational health and safety has been acknowledged for

as long as there have been structured work places or environments. For example,

Hippocrates (460-377 BC) wrote of the harmful effects of an unhealthy workplace on

slaves, and Caesar (100-40 BC) was reported to have had an officer in charge of the

safety of his legions (Pease, 1985; Weaver, 1980; Pettinger, 2000). Until the 1970’s,

health and safety in Australia and most of western society was based solely on the

specification of standards (Grammeno, 2006). These standards were not very reliable

in protecting workers’ health and safety and eventually this led to a new style of

legislation. Not until after the Robens Report was released in 1972 that the impetus

for a new style of legislation for workplace health and safety was developed. This

new approach was based on general duties of care and provisions for worker

participation, coupled with improved administration and inspection of health and

safety (Grammeno, 2006). This new approach provided the original basis for the

development of modern occupational health and safety legislation and practice.

Today, with the advent of mandatory occupational health and safety laws and

legislation within many countries, organisations are obligated or have a ‘duty of care’

to address the issue of safety for their employees and members of the public.

Subsequently, there have been substantial improvements to the health and safety of

workers across industry (Grammeno, 2006). However, while most organisations are

committed to maintaining the health and safety of employees within their workplace,

for many organisations, this does not necessarily extend to work-related road safety

and subsequent risk management processes within their own work-related vehicle

fleet (Wishart & Davey, 2004).

Despite the significant burden of work-related road crashes, relatively few

studies have investigated the combined characteristics, circumstances and risk factors

contributing to WRRS incidents (Boufous & Williamson, 2006). In addition, there is

limited information available relating to the effectiveness of intervention strategies

17

targeted toward improvement of WRRS (Husband, 2011), including the barriers and

facilitators associated with intervention development and application. Furthermore,

there is scant information available describing the capacity in which WRRS is

addressed within organisational safety systems, especially in relation to light vehicle

fleets. Previously the majority of WRRS research has focussed on specific driver-

related behaviours (e.g., errors and violations) and neglected more holistic influences

associated with the WRRS culture within organisations. For instance, there are many

and diverse factors that can influence WRRS, including those associated with the

individual, the organisation and external stakeholders and environments (Stuckey,

LaMonagne & Sim, 2007). Furthermore, WRRS is a legislated OHS issue and

therefore linked to organisational safety culture (Dorn, 2012). However, for many

organisations WRRS is not adequately addressed and included within organisations’

OHS programs (Lewis et al., 2012). Consequently, there is a lack of integration of

WRRS within the OHSMS of many workplaces.

Historically, there was a plethora of research relating to WRRS in the late

1990s to early 2000s with research targeting individual driver behaviours and

perceptions of organisational safety climate (Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Wishart,

2008a; Wishart, 2015). Although, the previous research literature provides valuable

reference to the development of theory, it provides limited information for successful

application of WRRS interventions. Therefore, this review of work-related road

safety research literature refers to some older literature which continues to be

relevant.

THE WORK-RELATED ROAD SAFETY ISSUE

Work related vehicle crashes are widely identified as the primary cause of

occupational death and injury around the world (Boufous & Williamson, 2006;

Boufous & Williamson, 2009; DaCoTA, 2012; Lewis et al., 2012). Subsequently,

driving a vehicle for work purposes is potentially one of the most hazardous

operations undertaken in workers’ daily work activities (Boufous & Williamson,

2009). Evidence of this risk is the over representation of work-related crashes and

injuries involving the operation of motor vehicles while performing work duties

(Mitchell et al., 2012; Newnam, 2014; WHO, 2004; Haworth et al., 2000; Wishart,

Rowland, Freeman, & Davey, 2011).

18

Although work-related road safety is a proportion of the overall road safety

arena, a considerable volume of vehicles on the road are utilised for work purposes.

For instance, within Australia approximately 75% of locally produced passenger

vehicles are purchased as organisational fleet vehicles and many other non-fleet

vehicles used for work purposes (AFMA, 2008; Rowland et al., 2012; Wishart,

Rowland, Freeman & Davey, 2011a). Work-related vehicles represent more than half

of all new vehicle registrations annually (AFMA, 2008; Rowland et al., 2012;

Worksafe Victoria, 2008). In addition, across the 18 countries within the European

Union there are approximately 11.6 million passenger vehicle registrations and over

50% are company car registrations; with the highest amount of company car

registrations being in Germany (60%) and the lowest in Greece (24%) (DaCoTA,

2012). Furthermore, previous research estimated that within Australia, approximately

a third of all travel is work-related (Murray et al., 2003; SafetyNet, 2009; Wheatley,

1997; Worksafe Victoria, 2008) and approximately two thirds of work-related travel

is performed by occupational light vehicles (ABS, 2016). Moreover, it has been

estimated that work-related vehicles travel about three times the distance of the

average private vehicle (Murray et al., 2003; Worksafe Victoria, 2008). Recently,

figures reported in the Australian National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020 indicate

that work-related road users’ (including both heavy and light vehicles) travel twice

the annual distance and have approximately 50% more crashes than drivers of private

vehicles (Australian Transport Council [ATC], 2011; Newton et al., 2013).

Work-related road statistics

Chapter one identified that work-related road crashes in Australia account for

about half of all occupational fatalities (ATC, 2011; Newton et al., 2013; Small,

Bailey & Lydon, 2014; Safe Work Australia, 2013) and 15% of all national road

deaths (ATC, 2011; Newton et al., 2013; Small et al., 2014). More specifically, 46%

of all work-related fatalities in Australia during the period of 2003-04 to 2009-10

involved motor vehicles (Safe Work Australia, 2013). Within the current context,

approximately 37% of all reported work-related road fatalities during the period

2004-2005 involved light vehicles, namely cars, station wagons, utilities and vans

(Australian Safety and Compensation Council, 2008). Previous research has also

revealed that work-related vehicles consistently have a higher rate of involvement in

crashes compared to non-work related vehicles (Symmons & Haworth, 2005). In

19

addition, previous research has indicated that employees driving company owned

vehicles for the purpose of work are generally considered to ‘blame’ for the majority

of collisions they are involved in (Clarke, Ward, Bartle & Truman, 2009). This

highlights the traditional belief that crash culpability rests primarily with the driver

and subsequently the focus of previous intervention strategies were targeted toward

work-related driver skills and behaviour (e.g., driver training) (Davey et al., 2008).

Furthermore, a report into Australian worker fatalities (i.e., from analysis of accepted

compensation claims data) reveal that vehicle incidents are the most common

mechanism of injury and are over four times higher than the next most common

mechanism of injury being hit by moving objects (Safe Work Australia, 2016).

The significance of the work-related driving problem is also revealed on a

global scale. Historically, international work related road traffic crashes for all

vehicle types have accounted for between 25% (Boufous & Williamson, 2005;

Toscano & Windau, 1994) and 33% (Moser, 2001) of work-related deaths in the

USA, 30% in Canada (Boufous & Williamson, 2005; Rossignol & Pineault, 1988),

60% in France (Boufous & Williamson, 2005; Charbotel, Chiron, Martin, &

Bergeret, 2001), between 25% (SafetyNet, 2009) and 33% in the United Kingdom

(Dykes, 2001), around 25% in Denmark and Sweden (Bibbings, 1997; The Danish

Working Environment Service, 1993), and between 38% and 63% in Finland

(Salminen & Lähdeniemi, 2002). It has also been suggested that while the overall

number and frequency of occupational fatalities have reported to be declining in the

USA, the number of occupational road fatalities has increased steadily over the same

period (National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety [NIOSH], 2004). More

recently, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013) in the USA reported that in 2012

approximately 36% of occupational fatalities were associated with work-related

motor vehicles. This recent statistic highlights an increase in occupational fatalities

associated work-related vehicle incidents compared to previous statistics identified in

the USA. Between 2003 and 2010, on average 1,275 workers died each year from

crashes on public highways, 311 workers died each year in crashes that occurred off

the highway or on industrial premises and 338 pedestrian workers died each year as a

result of being struck by a motor vehicle (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).

Additionally, within the European Union some member countries have reported

between 40-60% of all work-related fatalities resulted from vehicle-related crashes

20

while driving for the purpose of work and while commuting (DaCoTA, 2012;

Euorogip, 2009; ORSA, 2011). China has also reported high incidence of fatalities

involving commercial vehicles with 20,648 deaths in 2011, accounting for 33% of all

road fatalities (Wang & Pei, 2014). Furthermore, New Zealand statistics state that

approximately 30% of all workplace fatalities and 13% of all workplace injuries are

the result of work-related traffic incidents (Newton et al., 2013).

Some European countries have reported improvements in general workplace

safety, including a reduction in overall occupational injuries and fatalities in recent

years (Charbotel, Martina & Chirona, 2010). However, these reductions have not

necessarily transferred to the task of work-related driving (Charbotel et al., 2010;

Lopez-Ruiz, Martinez, Perez, Novoa, Tobias & Benavides, 2014). Spanish statistics

indicated that the number of general road traffic injuries decreased by 23% for non-

fatal and 63% for fatal injuries during 2001-2011 (Direccion General de Trafico,

2012). However, work-related traffic injuries remained consistently high in Spain,

with 10% (65446) of all occupational injuries and one in three fatal occupational

injuries in 2010 were reported as being traffic related (DeVicente, Zimmermann &

De la Orden, 2012).

Invariably societal and work-related changes have been attributed to a

proportion of the continued high proportion of work-related vehicle incidents. For

example, industry changes associated with the work environment such as increases in

part-time and casual work, proliferation in the use of a contractor workforce,

disparities in work shift times (including shifts greater than eight hours), and

commuting times to/from work, have influenced work-related driving and

commuting (Rowland et al., 2012). Collectively, these developments may influence

not only work-related driving risk exposure, but also may have an impact on driver

behaviour, organisational expectations, processes and practice, and external WRRS

surveillance (as many drivers are not compensated for work commuting travel

therefore not in compensation data statistics). Additionally, changes to the working

environment and conditions could be considered global issues. Although this

program of research utilises Australian study samples, similarities with overseas

work-related road safety issues supports the potential international applicability of

this research.

The direct and hidden costs of work-related road crashes/incidents

21

Due to the high incidence of work-related vehicle crashes, work-related road

safety poses a substantial physical, emotional, and economic cost to the community

(Wishart & Rowland, 2013). Direct costs of work-related crashes/incidents include

costs directly related to the crash event and generally covered by insurance, such as

property damage, medical/hospital expenses, and workers’ compensation and

rehabilitation. Whereas, hidden costs include additional costs incurred due to the

crash/incident event and are usually uninsured, including drop in production, work

rescheduling, time/resources for procurement of new vehicle/equipment, retraining

of staff, emotional and societal impacts. However, the majority of statistics relevant

to the direct and hidden costs associated with work-related vehicle incidents are

archaic. Previously in Australia, a conservative figure for an individual damage only

crash has been reported to cost at least $4000 (Stone, 1994). Approximately a decade

later, Davey and Banks (2005) calculated the average total insurance cost of a work-

related ‘fleet incident’ and found that the figure was approximately $28000. In

contrast, Toledo, Musicant and Lotan (2008) reported that the direct cost of a vehicle

crash in the USA was estimated to be US$14000, with a proportion, US$3600 stated

as the actual cost of damage to vehicles and other property.

While there are noticeable costs related to occupational crashes such as vehicle

and property repair costs, the available evidence appears to suggest that the direct

cost of work-related crashes is only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ (Murray et al., 2003).

Hitherto, estimates of the true cost for work-related crashes indicate that the hidden

costs may be somewhere between 8-36 (Murray et al., 2003), 4.1-14.5 (Davey &

Banks, 2005), or 3-5 (Mooren & Sochon, 2004) times vehicle repair/replacement

costs. Previous research has acknowledged the other organisational impacts

associated with the hidden costs to work-related vehicle incidents, including down

time, personal injury and rehabilitation, absence from work (Murray et al., 2003),

administration, loss of assets, and higher insurance premiums (Mooren & Sochon,

2004). In addition, more recent literature (Bidasca & Townsend, 2014, p. 12-13) has

identified the hidden costs of work-related vehicle incidents and potential benefits

associated with managing the WRRS problem and improving incident statistics, such

as:

• A reduction in days lost due to injury;

• Lower risk of work-related ill health;

22

• Reduced stress and improved morale;

• Reduction in the need for investigation and paperwork;

• Less lost time due to work rescheduling;

• Fewer vehicles off the road for repair;

• Reduced running costs through better driving standards;

• Fewer missed orders and business opportunities therefore increased customer

goodwill; and

• Less chance of key employees being banned from driving, as a result of loss

of points on their licences.

FACTORS INFLUENCING SAFE DRIVING FOR WORK

There are potentially a multitude of factors that influence safe driving for work.

Together with factors that influence the general road user population (e.g, distraction,

fatigue, etc), over representation or work-related crashes and injuries and the nature

of work and driving requirements (e.g., exposure, driving terrain, etc), driving for

work purposes could be considered as one of the riskiest activities undertaken during

the course of a person’s work (Mitchell et al., 2012; Wishart, Rowland, Freeman &

Davey, 2011). The Occupational Light Vehicle Use Systems model developed by

Stuckey et al (2007) outlines a multitude of potential determinants associated with

the context and antecedents of WRRS incorporating light vehicle use. Although not

empirically evaluated, the Occupational Light Vehicle Use Systems model (see

Figure 2.1) represents the major areas related to current WRRS practice, and factors

influencing company vehicle fleet operations. Previous research has argued that one

of the limitations of many theoretical models utilised within general road population

research is that they generally focus on driver behaviour and neglect other work-

related driver interactions with characteristics and situations associated with the road

environment and work context (Stuckey et al., 2007; Wishart, 2015). In addition, the

research emphasised the complex nature of WRRS due to the combination and often

contending requirements of workplace health and safety and general road safety.

Furthermore, Stuckey and colleagues (2007) suggest that traditional workplace

health and safety approaches in isolation do not take into consideration the additional

and diverse social, political, economic and cultural influences applicable and

23

pertinent to WRRS and light vehicle use. Rather, WRRS is acknowledged as a

complex combination of occupational safety and road safety factors (Wishart, 2015).

For example, although the work-related vehicle is considered a workplace and

therefore implicates organisations’ obligations to workplace health and safety,

individual workers are operating within a work setting influenced by both

occupational health and safety and road safety factors. Therefore, the work-related

driving task differs from the conventional work setting in that the work environment

is external to the traditional workplace and outside the direct control of the employer

(Stuckey et al., 2007).

Figure 2.1 Occupational light vehicle (OLV) use systems model (Stuckey, LaMonagne & Sim, 2007, p. 1008)

Basically, the Occupational Light Vehicle Use Systems model highlights the

WRRS issue as a complex process incorporating a multitude of factors that can

influence the ability to drive safely for work purposes. Additionally, Table 2.1

provides a further description and summary of the various determinants of WRRS

crashes, injuries and fatalities illustrated in Figure 2.1 above. Stuckey et al (2007)

hypothesise that there are multiple levels of influence on WRRS outcomes that

24

include crashes, injuries and fatalities. Table 2.1 identifies categories of potential

determinants of work-related driving crashes and injury at each level of the model.

25

Table 2.1 A summary of potential determinants of crash, injury and fatality in the systems model (Stuckey et al., 2007, p. 1008) Model level Potential determinants

Locus of injury Driver and passenger(s)

Age, gender, driving experience, number of users, etc.

Driving exposures – frequency, kilometres, hours, patterns, times of driving, day/night, trip length, occupation, industry, number of jobs, driving purpose, number of vehicles driven, income, work equipment, etc.

Driving behaviours, drug and alcohol consumption, driving demands, work fitness, sleep patterns, etc.

Physical work environments: immediate and external

Vehicle Ownership, purpose, usage, age, type, model, engine capacity, fuel type, mass, weight, size, occupant capacity, maintenance, condition, odometer reading, colour, load capacity, road worthiness, etc.

Road Environment Design – single, multiple lanes, divided, freeways, intersected, rural, urban, suburban, local, state, national, etc.

Organisational environment

Work arrangements Work patterns – management structures, production requirements, control, autonomy, etc.

Work arrangements – traditional work, contingent work, outsourcing, sub-contracting, etc.

Work design – shift work, safety policies, training, systems management and monitoring, driving activities, scheduling, work demands and pressures, in-vehicle communication systems, work equipment, etc.

Vehicle ownership, maintenances arrangements, turnover, management systems, etc.

Incident recording, data management systems.

External business demands and expectations, etc.

Policy environment: external influences: local, national and international

Public policy Road safety legislation.

Work safety legislation

Vehicle road worthiness standards and implementation processes.

Driving behaviour related legislation – phone use, seat belt use, violation management, etc.

OLV population surveillance – crash, injury and fatality data classification, collection, coordination and management.

Registration and insurance management.

OLV OHS enforcement systems.

Terminology – local, national, international, etc.

Although the Occupational Light Vehicle Use Systems model identifies five

major areas of influence (i.e., drivers and passengers, vehicle, road environment,

work arrangements and public policy), this literature review focusses on three

broader themes, including external, organisational and individual factors of

influence. For example, as a vehicle used for the purpose of work is generally

purchased, owned and maintained by an organisation, within this literature review

the vehicle will be included as an organisational factor. In addition, the road

environment is generally considered a factor outside the auspices of the employer

organisation or driver and is included as an external influencing factor. However, in

26

certain circumstances risks associated with road environment may be addressed by

organisations. For example, organisations could eliminate travel on more hazardous

routes and substitute vehicle-related driving with other modes of travel (e.g., air, bus

or train), if applicable.

Following is a review of the research relating to the major determinants of

work-related road crashes and injuries identified within the Occupational Light

Vehicle Use Systems Model (Stuckey et al., 2007) and further conceptualised into

three major elements: external, organisational and individual factors. Firstly, the

literature review focusses on the external factors encompassing primarily legislative

requirements of both employer organisations and individual drivers. Secondly,

organisational factors are discussed and include those factors where organisations

maintain direct control and/or those organisational procedures and processes that

influence WRRS. Finally, individual factors are identified relevant to driver

behaviour, attitudes, decision making and personal influences. It should be noted that

external factors are reviewed first due to the overarching influence of mandatory

legislation compliance requirements.

External Factors

An overview of the overarching legislation and external factors provides

insight into the multiple influences on WRRS stemming from government and

associated external stakeholders. Ultimately, both organisations and drivers are

obligated to comply with relevant legislation, such as work, health and safety and

transport (including roads maintained by relevant government departments)

(Worksafe Victoria, 2008). Therefore, an initial review of the external factors

provides common and baseline information relevant to the WRRS context for all

organisations and their employees/drivers.

Traffic Legislation

In relation to traffic legislation, the operation of vehicles on public roads is

governed by state government Acts, such as the Queensland Government’s Transport

Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995. In addition, all vehicle drivers are

required to follow the various Australian state government road rules and licensing

requirements associated with the classification of the vehicle being driven. For

example, Queensland light vehicle drivers are required to abide by and obey road

27

rules legislation which is officially known as the Transport Operations (Road Use

Management—Road Rules) Regulation 2009. Typically, failure to do so may result

in a fine for traffic offences and/or prosecution for more serious offences or repeat

offenders.

Work-related vehicle drivers are also required to follow the relevant road rules

within each state in Australia. In relation to traffic offences, organisations generally

require drivers of work vehicles to pay the fine (Newnam & Watson, 2011; Wishart

et al., 2011). However, notification of traffic infringements is generally only

provided to organisations through the identification of vehicle registration (e.g.,

running a red light, speeding infringements), with notification of police recorded

offences (e.g., driver stopped by police) commonly not provided to employer

organisations by drivers. Although offences due to the failure to obey road rules are a

breach of legislation, many organisations fail to address the breaches as a serious

OHS incident as long as any infringement or fine is paid by the driver (Wishart et al.,

2011; Wishart, 2015). Subsequently, data related to breaches of road rules are

generally not recorded or analysed by organisations.

Work, Health and Safety Legislation and Law

In recent years, arguably the most notable impact on WRRS in Australia from

an organisations’ perspective has been the increasing focus on the issue from a legal

perspective (Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Wishart, 2008a; Wishart et al., 2011).

Workplace health and safety legislation is enforced by relevant government

departments and requires both organisations and individuals to comply with

mandatory legislation. Legislation and associated by-laws can include acts,

regulations, codes of practice, national and/or international standards, guidance notes

and industry agreements (Hughes & Ferret, 2013).

As with all motor vehicle drivers in Australia, work-related vehicle drivers are

required to comply with road traffic laws. However, work-related motor vehicle

drivers, associated employer organisations and other stakeholders are additionally

required to comply with occupational health and safety legislation. Importantly the

definition of a workplace (across both the previous and current legislation) is very

broad and includes any location where an employee is undertaking a work-related

function. Hence, a vehicle used for the purpose of work is regarded as an extension

28

of the workplace. Subsequently, there is sufficient authority that an employer can be

held legally liable in respect of a vehicle because of a defective system of work

involving that vehicle (Supreme Court of Queensland, 2003 [Brew v. Workcover

Queensland 2003 1 Qd.R 621]). Therefore, organisations are required to address the

potential safety hazard and risks associated with driving for work purposes, as they

would for their normal (core) workplace functions. For example, employers and

persons in control of relevant work areas (e.g., principal contractors) must provide

safe and healthy workplaces and systems of work, employees must not wilfully place

themselves or others at risk and manufacturers, suppliers and designers must provide

safe products (Model Work Health and Safety Regulations, 2016). Consequently,

under the Workplace Health and Safety legislation employers have statutory

obligations to provide safe workplaces, safe plant and equipment, safe systems of

work and safety information, instruction, training, supervision, and risk management.

Employers who fail to take reasonable care to avoid exposing employees and others

(e.g., members of the public) to unnecessary risks of injury can face substantial fines

and even imprisonment (Model Work Health and Safety Act, 2011).

While Work Health and Safety legislation distinctly incorporates

work-related driving, there is no significant evidence that government regulators

target and practice regular enforcement in the WRRS setting (Rowland et al., 2012).

Together with a lack of adequate enforcement there is negligible supporting

information associated with the work-related driving hazard. For instance, there are

numerous Codes of Practice regarding general health and safety hazards (e.g.,

confined spaces, manual tasks, hazardous chemicals, etc), however, no code of

practice for WRRS. Although work-related road fatalities account for a considerable

proportion of all work-related fatalities (Safe Work Australia, 2012), driving for

work seemingly is not identified as an occupational safety priority by Australian

safety regulatory regimes (Lydon et al., 2015). In addition, although work-related

driving pertains to the majority of industries and indirectly to most types of work

tasks, it is not addressed adequately within Work Health and safety legislation,

including supporting documentation such as codes of practice and advisory

information. For example, the draft Australian Work Health and Safety Strategy

2012-22 does not recognise work-related road safety as a major issue or priority

29

(Lydon et al., 2015). However, in the event that no specific guidelines are provided

to minimise risk there is an obligation under the legislation to take reasonable

precautions and exercise proper diligence against the risk. Some Australian State

statutory authorities have produced guides (Worksafe Victoria, 2008) to assist

organisations manage the work-related driving risk. Nonetheless, a higher

fatality/injury reduction target could be achieved if work-related road safety was

given more attention given the proportion of fatalities and injuries related to vehicle

incidents (Rowland et al., 2012).Risk Management Requirements

A major legislated requirement in occupational health and safety is the

identification of safety hazards and subsequent management of associated safety

risks (Hopkins, 2011). The Australian Model Work, Health and Safety Regulation

(2014) clearly outlines organisational obligations for safety risk management and

associated workplace management processes and activities. The obligation to

manage risks to workers and members of the public underpins WHS legislation in all

Australian states and territories.

A vehicle used for work purposes is classified as a “workplace” under national

Work, Health and Safety Legislation (Safe Work Australia, 2011). Therefore, the

requirement to address risk management associated with driving for work is the same

for any other work-related activity. Previous research has identified that risk

management processes and practice relating to vehicle operation can have a

considerable influence on WRRS and an organisations/employees perceptions of the

risks associated with the work-related driving task (Kolman, 2010; Wishart, Rowland

& Davey, 2010). However, for many organisations, risk management practices are

often not undertaken for workplace processes outside their core business activities,

such as work-related driving. Organisations tend to focus safety risk management on

core business workplace tasks and do not sufficiently address risks associated with

work-related driving with the same proficiency (Wishart & Davey, 2004; Wishart et

al., 2011a). Historically, the focus on risk management linked with organisational

light vehicle fleets has been a result of an asset management approach rather than a

safety management approach (Haworth, Greig, Wishart, 2008; Wishart, 2015;

Wishart & Davey, 2004). Consequently, organisations have tended to focus

management on aspects associated with the asset, including the procurement,

maintenance and disposal of vehicles and not safety risk management.

30

Research has indicated that although there is legislation and guidance

documentation related to WRRS, many organisations fail to address the risks

associated with work-related driving and vehicle use the same as core workplace

activities (Stuckey, LaMontagne, Glass & Sim, 2010a; Wishart et al., 2011).

Similarly, WRRS case study research has revealed a lack of organisational safety

systems and processes associated with work-related vehicle use, including

inadequate or non-existent policy, procedures and improvement strategies (Rowland

& Wishart, 2014; Wishart & Rowland, 2010; 2012). Rather, many organisations

view work-related traffic crashes/incidents as “accidents” and outside their scope of

influence (Rowland et al., 2006). For instance, many organisations perceive vehicle

incidents as an individual driver issue (the driver is to blame) and lack the knowledge

and/or willingness to implement strategies to mitigate WRRS risk (Rowland &

Wishart, 2014; Rowland, Wishart & Davey, 2005; Wishart & Davey, 2004).

External Physical Work and Road Environment

Similar to the general driving population, work-related drivers may be required

to travel in a diversity of locations and settings (e.g., city, suburban, rural, and

remote areas / local, state or national), road environments (e.g., single or multiple

lanes, residential and highway/freeway roads), terrain (e.g., sealed and unsealed

roads), and weather conditions (e.g., wet/storms, overcast, dust, fog, wind, snow).

Traditionally, hazardous road environment factors have been reported as climatic

conditions, pedestrians and animals on the road (Stuckey et al., 2007). Limited

information related to the factors of influence associated with the interaction between

work-related driving and the road environment are available, with the majority of

literature addressing the general road population (Stuckey et al., 2007). However,

previous research has identified a lack of familiarity with road conditions or sudden

changes in road condition (e.g., from bitumen to gravel roads) as contributing factors

to work-related vehicle crashes (Rowland et al., 2006).

Recent research analysing road fatalities and serious injuries in Australia and

New Zealand during the period 2001-2010 (Austroads, 2015) found that for all

vehicle types an average of approximately 10 400 casualty crashes occurred each

year on Australian rural roads, and approximately 4700 on New Zealand rural roads.

Within the report the definition of a casualty crash is described as a crash where at

least one person is injured. Although the report indicated that only 5% of road

31

fatalities in Australia and New Zealand occurred on rural roads, many serious work-

related vehicle crashes transpired on rural roads. For example, serious injury crashes

comprised 51% of rural casualty crashes in Australia, and 23% in New Zealand

(Austroads, 2015). However, the Austroads (2015) report does not identify what

proportion of rural crashes are work-related or non-work related. In relation to

WRRS, previous research found that work-related drivers involved in crashes on

rural roads resulted in an increased risk of fatality or permanent disability (Boufous

& Williamson, 2009).

In relation to weather conditions, general driving population crash rates have

been found to increase during precipitation (Qiu & Nixon, 2008). In addition, light

conditions can influence driver visibility and consequently crash risk, with crash risk

reported as increasing during twilight and night, even when street lights are present

(Wanvik, 2009). Generally, a more accurate illustration of the prevalence of work-

related vehicle crash statistics associated with road and weather conditions is not

available, due primarily to limitations associated with reporting processes. For

example, work-related drivers operating light vehicles are generally not distinguished

from the general light vehicle driving population or the level of detail relating to road

terrain is limited. In addition, research exploring issues associated with influences

due to road and weather conditions on WRRS is scant. However, business

obligations may require work-related drivers to travel in all weather conditions to

complete daily work tasks. For example, emergency services may be required to

attend and assist in emergency situations during adverse weather conditions.

In summary, work-related drivers are required to operate in a diversity of

locations and settings, road environments, terrain, and weather conditions.

Consequently, work-related drivers are frequently subjected to risks associated with

the external physical work/road environment which are generally outside the control

of organisations operating light vehicle fleets. However, exposure to adverse road

environments and conditions may be better addressed through organisational risk

management processes. For example, application of the risk management process,

including relevant controls such as policy/procedure directives and journey

management processes (Worksafe Victoria, 2008). The following section outlines the

factors associated with organisational safety management and practice.

Organisational Factors

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Researchers have indicated that compliance with occupational health and

safety legislation alone is not sufficient to minimise the risk of adverse work-related

driving events (Didla, Mearns & Flin, 2010). Typically, there has been considerable

conjecture regarding responsibility and accountability for WRRS within

organisations. Often there is a gap between those responsible for fleet management

and those responsible for occupational health and safety within an organisation

(Rowland et al., 2006; SafetyNet, 2009). For example, fleet management perceive

WRRS as a safety issue and occupational health and safety management believe it is

a fleet issue hence WRRS is often not adequately addressed within such

organisations (Rowland et al., 2006; Wishart, 2015). Due to the lack of responsibility

and accountability associated with WRRS within organisations, this would create a

deficiency in the development and promotion of work-related driving risk

management. In addition, this may also convey to organisational personnel that

WRRS is not important. Following is a review of organisational factors that previous

research has identified as influencing WRRS.

Work and Time Pressure

Organisational issues, such as tight work schedules and productivity demands

placed on drivers, have been shown to increase the level of risk for work-related

drivers (Boufous & Williamson, 2009; Broughton, Baughan, Pearce, Smith, &

Buckle, 2003; Newnam, Watson & Murray, 2002; Rowland et al., 2006).

Traditionally, work and task allocation is usually undertaken by organisational

management which can result in employees perceiving a noticeable lack of control

over their work time and schedule, and potentially their ability to drive safely (Dorn

& Gandolfi, 2008). In addition, an increase in the perception of pressure by drivers

to meet organisational and productivity demands also revealed an increase in the

propensity for drivers to exhibit aberrant driving behaviours (Rowland et al., 2008a;

Wishart et al., 2011) and increased risk of vehicle incidents (Rowland et al., 2006).

For example, issues relating to time pressure can have negative consequences, such

as speeding (Adams-Guppy & Guppy, 1995; Newnam et al., 2002), aggressive

driving, close following and risky overtaking (Broughton et al., 2003), and increased

fatigue or stress (Rowland, Davey, Wishart & Freeman, 2007).

Although research identified work/time pressure as a major influence on

driving behaviour (including driver errors and violations), limited research has

33

explored the propensity for work/time pressure to influence other driver behaviours

(e.g., distraction/inattention). Consequently, work/time pressure should be further

investigated to address the gaps in the research associated with the contemporary

WRRS setting.

Fatigue Management

Although further discussed as an individual factor in section 2.3.3.6, driver

fatigue is considered a substantial WRRS risk for organisations (Darvell et al., 2014;

Rowland et al., 2006). Fatigue is a contributing factor in approximately 15-20% of

all road incidents/crashes (Dan, Hongting & Wenshu, 2012; Darvell, Filtness,

Rowland & Smith, 2014; Wang & Pei, 2014). Additionally, previous Australian

research into the effects of fatigue have suggested that a person awake for

approximately 17-19 hours has similar performance capabilities to those individuals

impaired by alcohol equivalent to a 0.05% blood alcohol level, the legal limit in

Australia for the majority of drivers (Dawson & Reid, 1997; Williamson, Feyer,

Friswell & Finley-Brown, 2000). However, fatigue remains a complicated factor in a

considerable proportion of road crashes/incidents, due to difficulty in its detection,

ability to quantify or prove as a culpable factor (Darvell et al., 2014). In addition, a

single universally accepted definition of fatigue does not exist (Darvell et al., 2014;

Phillips, 2015) nor does any definitive test for establishing what constitutes a

dangerous level of fatigue driving (Darvell et al., 2014). For example, fatigue has

been defined simply as “a biological drive for recuperative rest” (Williamson,

Lombardi, Folkard, Stutts, Courtney & Connor, 2011, p. 499). In contrast, a more

wide-ranging definition states that fatigue is “a suboptimal psychophysiological

condition caused by exertion. The degree and dimensional character of the condition

depends on the form, dynamics and context of exertion. The context of exertion is

described by the value and meaning of performance to the individual; rest and sleep

history; circadian effects; psychosocial factors spanning work and home life;

individual traits; diet; health, fitness and other individual states; and environmental

conditions. The fatigue condition results in changes in strategies or resource use

such that original levels of mental processing or physical activity are maintained or

reduced” (Phillips, 2015, p. 53).

Fatigue is considered a significant risk for work-related drivers with some

work involving prolonged driving conditions, long work hours and commuting time,

34

and inconsistent shift patterns (Darvell et al., 2014; Rowland et al., 2006).

Subsequently, organisations are obligated under Work, Health and Safety legislation

to understand and target fatigue for the purposes of safety, especially considering the

increasing demands placed on both organisations and drivers in a 24-hour society

(Dinges, 2011; Ho, Lee, Chen, Chen, Chang & Yeh, 2013; Phillips, 2015; Strober &

Deluca, 2013). Furthermore, a number of previous research studies have highlighted

the influence of fatigue on professional driver behaviour and crash risk (Broughton et

al., 2003; Horne & Reyner, 1998; Freeman, Davey & Wishart, 2007; Mitchell,

Driscoll, & Healey, 2004; Rowland et al., 2006; Salminen & Lähdeniemi, 2002;

Taylor & Dorn, 2006).

The influence of shiftwork, night work and long working hours have been

widely acknowledged as a detriment to workplace safety and an increased risk of

work-related vehicle crashes/incidents (Di Milia, Rogers & Akerstedt, 2012).

Recently, a study involving 649 highway road users (response rate of approximately

60%) found that night workers (n = 148) reported higher levels of sleepiness during

and at the end of the commute, less sleep during the previous week and commuted

greater distances compared to the no night work group (n = 501) (Di Milia et al.,

2012). Similar to previous research (Connor, Norton, Ameratunga & Robinson,

2002; Cummings, Kopesell, Moffst & Rivara, 2001), sleepiness was found to be the

strongest predictor of impaired driving performance (Di Milia et al., 2012). A

strength of the Di Milia et al. (2012) study is that it directly linked the temporal

relationship between the end of night shift work and driving performance. Although

the study incorporated self-reported responses, the researchers aimed to improve the

validity of the research by using established scales, good response rate and a short

time frame for completion of interviews to reduce recall bias. Even though there is a

plethora of research targeting shiftwork and the effects of sleepiness on

safety/driving performance, limited change within industry has failed to improve the

situation.

Compelling research evidence suggests that fatigue is a major factor

influencing vehicle driver performance and crash risk. Consequently, the

management of fatigue could be considered a priority for any industry organisation.

Therefore, perceptions around identifying risk factors and management of fatigue

35

and impact on crash events and outcomes should be incorporated into all research

exploring factors that influence WRRS performance and crash risk.

Vehicle Procurement and Maintenance

Within Stuckey et al. (2007) model vehicles are classified as the immediate

physical work environment. However, the procurement and maintenance of employer

owned fleet vehicles used for the purpose of work are generally provided or sourced

by the organisation. Traditionally, research has indicated that work-related

procurement of vehicles was based on the lowest cost and additional vehicle safety

features were generally not considered (Rowland et al., 2006). In contrast,

compliance with Model Work, Health and Safety Regulation (2016) requires

organisations to provide a safe place to work. Therefore, as vehicles used for the

purpose of work are classified as a workplace under Australian safety legislation,

organisations have a duty of care to provide safe and appropriately maintained

vehicles. Furthermore, vehicle procurement should be conducted in consultation with

employees to determine safety and vehicle type (e.g., four-wheel drive) requirements

appropriate to the type of work performed (Anderson & Plowman, 1999). This

process complies with risk management procedures and promotes proactive risk

management and encourages accountability and ownership of risk by employees

(AS/NZS ISO 31000, 2009; Wishart, 2015). Although many modern vehicles already

have many safety features fitted to vehicles, organisations should identify and ensure

minimum safety features, such as seatbelats, anti-lock brakes (ABS), airbags and

daytime running lights (AFMA, 2008; QFleet, 2010). Vehicle safety features are

described as being either active or passive (Coughlin, Reimer & Mehler, 2011).

Active safety features are always active and work to prevent the risk of a collision or

an accident (e.g., electronic stability control systems, brake assist systems, collision

warnings). Whereas, passive safety features are systems that are passive until called

into action (e.g., seat belts, airbags, tyres, strong body structure). They become active

during the accident and aim to help minimise the damage from the collision.

Vehicle maintenance is another risk management process required for safety

legislation compliance (Model Work, Health and Safety Act, 2011; Model Work

Health and safety Regulation, 2016). Organisations operating light vehicle fleets

have a responsibility for scheduled and periodic vehicle maintenance. However,

employees also have a legal obligation or their own duty of care to ensure the safe

36

condition and operation of a vehicle used for work (Model Work Health and safety

Regulation, 2016). For instance, between scheduled maintenance employees also

have a duty of care or responsibility to ensure vehicles are safe by undertaking

periodic maintence (often described as pre-start maintenance checks), such as tyre

pressures, fluid levels and lights/indicator operation. In addition, the employee is

responsible for notifying the organisation in relation to identification of any vehicle

faults. As a risk mitigation process, periodic maintenance prior to vehicle

operation/journey assists to ensure the vehicle is compliant with associated safety

and road worthy requirements (Wishart et al., 2010).

Consideration of safety during the process of vehicle procurement and

maintenance not only assists organisations to meet OHS compliance, but where

employees are involved in the process, may also encourage ownership and proactive

identification of the risk. Within OHS legislation, organisations have an obligation to

ensure that consultation within the workplace is conducted regarding safety,

including vehicles, plant, equipment and processes (Model Work Health and safety

Regulation, 2016). Limited research has been conducted assessing the value of

procurement and maintenance processes for WRRS. In addition, research has yet to

ascertain if proactive measures such as vehicle scheduled and periodic maintenance

can influence other factors related to driver behaviours. For example, does the

completion of periodic maintenance processes influence driver behaviours, such as

compliance with road rules? Recently, due to support for and promotion of 5 star

ANCAP rated vehicles (AFMA, 2008; QFleet, 2010), organisations have

increasingly targeted 5 star ANCAP rated vehicles in their vehicle procurement

process. The ANCAP 5 star rating system can be used to identify safer vehicles for

purchase, and therefore assist compliance with providing a safe place or tool for

work as required by WHS regulation (AFMA, 2008; QFleet, 2010).

Safety Climate

Traditionally, research has focussed on individual driver factors, including

behaviours, attitudes and motivations (Wishart et al., 2011). However, more recently

research has identified the need to investigate the organisational context and its

influence on WRRS, including workload, work pressure, organisational driving

culture, and management commitment (Wishart et al., 2011). While there is no

single, universally accepted definition of safety climate (e.g., Dedobbeleer & Beland,

37

1998; Dejoy et al., 2004; Flin et al., 2000; Glenden & Stanton, 2000; and Zohar,

1980), there is considerable consensus that “management support for safety and the

overall importance assigned to safety within the organisation are key aspects of

safety climate” (Dejoy et al., 2004, p.82).

Safety climate has been the focus of research involving the perceptions of

work-related drivers (Banks, 2008; Davey et al., 2010; Rowland et al., 2008a; Wills

et al., 2006). The safety climate research aimed to explore the influence of

organisational issues and context on driver behaviour, attitudes and outcomes. For

example, recent research investigating fleet safety climate, self-reported work-related

driving behaviour and driving outcomes (e.g., work-related crash and offence

history), revealed that a significant positive relationship was found between

perceptions of fleet safety climate and safe work-related driving behaviour (Freeman,

Davey, Wishart & Rowland, 2008; Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Wishart, 2009;

Rowland, Freeman, Davey, Wishart, 2007; Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2005). Safety

climate is further discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.3). However, despite the

growing body of evidence identifying organisational issues as important influences

on WRRS, organisations are still reluctant to acknowledge or address the

organisational aspects influencing driver safety (Freeman et al., 2008). Rather,

organisations maintain focus on introducing improvement strategies focussed on the

driver and not organisational influences (Rowland et al., 2006; Wishart et al., 2011).

Consequently, lack of focus on organisational influences may result in

employee/driver negative perceptions toward organisational safety climate associated

with WRRS.

In essence, safety climate represents worker perceptions associated with an

organisations’ occupational health and safety management system (OHSMS).

Although research has been conducted to examine safety climate, limited research

has investigated the level by which work-related driving is addressed within

organisational OHSMS, including existence, knowledge and communication of, as

well as compliance with current policy, procedures and processes.

Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems

Organisations are responsible and accountable for the management of their

light vehicle fleet operation and safety, including related risk management. Not only

38

is there a legislative and moral obligation to ensure the safety of staff when operating

a vehicle for the purpose of work, organisations are required to ensure they develop

and maintain safe systems of work (Model Work Health and Safety Regulation,

2016). For example, safe systems of work include appropriate hazard identification,

risk management and implementation of controls to mitigate any safety risk.

Therefore, to adequately meet all OHS legal obligations organisations require to

adopt a system (or holistic) approach to risk management where risks and subsequent

controls are identified, addressed and managed by organisational processes.

Following is a review of literature outlining occupational health and safety

management systems, OHSMS elements, and OHSMS associated with WRRS.

A system is defined as “a collection of individual component parts which

interact with each other to achieve a particular objective or move in a particular

direction” (Taylor, Easter & Hegney, 2004). An Occupational Health and Safety

Management System previously has been defined as “the part of the overall

management system which includes organisational structure; planning activities;

responsibilities; practices; procedures; processes; and resources for developing,

implementing, achieving, reviewing and maintaining the Occupational Health and

Safety Policy” (Dyck, 2007). An occupational health and safety management system

has also been defined as a system that comprises a set of policies and practices aimed

at positively impacting on the employees’ attitudes and behaviours with regards to

risk (Ferndez-Muniz, Montes-Peon & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007). An Occupational

Health and Safety (OHS) Policy is a statement of an organisation’s intentions and

principles relating to the organisations overall Occupational Health and Safety

performance (Dyck, 2007). Basically, it provides a framework for action and

development of its OHS objectives and targets. However, previous research has

suggested that the influence of the components of OHSMS’s (e.g., policy and

procedures, OHS program planning and implementation, risk management, and

intervention strategies) on safety performance have mostly been ignored (Cooper,

2000). Additionally, there is scant research addressing WRRS issues as elements of

OHSMS’s (Rowland et al., 2006).

Safety-related research has revealed that human factors and behaviour play a

fundamental role in the safety performance of an organisation (Attwood, Khan &

Veitch, 2006; Hughes & Kornowa-Weichel, 2004). However, research has also

39

shown that unsafe worker behaviour is regularly the outcome of latent failures in the

organisation and management systems that predispose workers to act or behave

unsafely (Bottani, Monica & Vignali, 2009; Hughes & Kornowa-Weichel, 2004;

Sonnemans & Korvers, 2006). For example, identification of the latent failures

include lack of instruction or appropriate training (Attwood et al., 2006; Hughes &

Kornowa-Weichel, 2004; Kwon, 2006), employee demotivation (Kletz, 1993), lack

of or unclear work procedures and tasks, lack of control and supervision, low

management commitment and support (Bottani et al., 2009; Rundmo, 1996), poor

leadership, consultation and management competence (Makin & Winder, 2008) and

inadequate safety measures and management systems (Kwon, 2006). In addition,

safety hazards may develop in response to the culture of an organisation, such as, if

incident reporting is discouraged or the degree at which safety is valued within an

organisation (Hopkins, 2000; Makin & Winder, 2008). The primary aim of a

OHSMS is to manage the operational processes that may create risks and cause

safety-related incidents, which requires identification and analysis of both latent and

visible hazards (Bottani et al., 2009). Research conducted into the performance

differences between adopters of OHSMS’s and non-adopters found that adopters

reported improved: attitudes toward safety goals and enhanced communication of the

goals to workers; attitude toward updating risk data; attitude to assess risks and

define corrective actions; and attention to implementation of employee training

programs (Bottani et al., 2009).

The identification of hazards and corresponding strategies to control or

minimise the risks associated with hazards provides the foundation for an

organisation’s safety program (Bluff, 2003; Makin & Winder, 2008). Subsequently,

this process determines the scope, content and complexity of an effective OHSMS

(Makin & Winder, 2008; Mearns & Flin, 1995). However, if these basic risk

management principles are performed ineffectively, the ability to maintain and

support health and safety processes and practice will be limited, and the OHSMS

may degenerate into a “paper system” (Makin & Winder, 2008; Rowland & Wishart,

2014). In addition, the level of commitment to safety by both management and

employees has a substantial bearing on the level in which safety issues are addressed

within the organisation (Bluff, 2003; Rowland & Wishart, 2014). For example, if the

direction of the organisation is to only uphold legislative compliance and not

40

proactively target hazards and risks, then the potential effectiveness of the OHSMS

in relation to reducing occupational incidents, injuries and fatalities is minimised.

Work-Related Road Safety Management System

Policy and procedure documentation outlines the basic requirements for safe

management and operation of the specific type of work being performed, such as

work-related driving (Rowland et al., 2006). Safety policy and procedures provide

the basic directions for workplace processes and practice, acknowledging the “rules

of the game” in relation to safety within the workplace (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera,

1997). However, research has indicated that policy and procedures related

specifically to WRRS is not evident within many employee organisations (Rowland

et al., 2006; Rowland & Wishart, 2014; Wishart & Rowland, 2010; 2012). In

Scotland, a WRRS survey of over 1000 organisations found that approximately two

thirds (64%) claimed to have a policy related to safe driving procedures for work

(SafetyNet, 2009). However, in most cases it was identified that the organisations

reported having a policy if they had a general workplace health and safety policy,

even though it may not have included information specific to WRRS. Research in

Australia has also indicated a dearth of documentation and processes related to

WRRS policy and procedures (Davey et al., 2009; Rowland et al., 2006; Rowland &

Wishart, 2014; Rowland & Wishart, 2015; Wishart & Rowland, 2010; Wishart &

Rowland, 2012; Wishart & Rowland, 2013; Wishart & Rowland, 2014).

Consequently, the lack of organisational documentation and processes related to

WRRS suggests that work-related driving is not adequately addressed at the

organisational level. Intrinsically, this lack of acknowledgement, responsibility and

accountability for WRRS at a management level may exacerbate a belief that

individuals such as vehicle drivers are to blame for work-related vehicle incidents

(Rowland et al., 2006). In addition, the perception of infrequent or irregular safety

inspections/audits and/or a lack of deterrence may lead to a relaxation of operational

safety procedures and precautions (Rowland & Wishart, 2014; Wishart & Rowland,

2010; 2012).

In summary, research indicates that an OHSMS can significantly influence

organisational safety performance (Bottani, Monica & Vignali, 2009; Hughes &

Kornowa-Weichel, 2004; Sonnemans & Korvers, 2006). In contrast, WRRS is poorly

addressed within organisations, including limited focus on incorporating WRRS

41

issues within organisations’ OHSMS. In addition, although research exists examining

employee/driver perceptions associated with organisational fleet safety climate (Cole

et al., 2013; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor & Bryden, 2000; Rowland & Wishart, 2014;

Wiegmann et al., 2002; Wills et al., 2006), little published literature is available that

examines actual organisational WRRS policy, procedures and practice. Therefore,

further research is required to explore how effectively WRRS is incorporated within

organisational OHSMS’s.

Although external and organisational influences have a significant influence on

WRRS performance and outcomes, there are additional individual vehicle driver

factors that impact on driver behaviour and safe vehicle operation. The following

section explores the available literature concerning the major individual factors that

influence WRRS.

Individual Factors

Traditionally, road safety campaigns have targeted many issues associated with

individual driver behavioural factors such as, speeding, drink driving and seat belt

use. For example, recently the Fatal Four of road safety (i.e., speeding, drink

driving, not wearing a seatbelt and driving while fatigued) increased to the Fatal

Five in Queensland (e.g., by the Queensland Police Service) after inattention was

officially added to the Christmas Road Safety Campaign in 2012 (Queensland

Government, 2013). Subsequently, various media campaigns have been introduced

and combined with heightened enforcement in an attempt to reduce the road toll.

Changes within the general road safety area have highlighted a requirement to

address road safety and driver behaviour in a changing and contemporary

environment, such as vehicle technology advances, societal and social changes, and

driving for work and leisure. Likewise, there is a growing need for work-related road

safety to continuously change and improve to meet this changing contemporary

environment. Similar to the general road user population, there are potentially many

individual driver characteristics and behaviours that influence safety for vehicle

drivers who drive for the purpose of work. In essence, many influences are similar

for both the general road user population and work-related drivers.

One explanation for the increased crash risk of work-related drivers is the

‘work driver effect’, which proposes that drivers are less safe and take more risks

when driving a work vehicle, resulting from attitudes and beliefs regarding who is

42

financially responsible for the vehicle and its safety (Downs, Keigan, Maycock &

Grayson, 1999). For example, some researchers have suggested that those who drive

regularly for work are more likely to take risks and to overestimate their own driving

skills (Murray et al., 2003; Newnam & Watson, 2011; Newnam et al., 2002). In

addition, the tendency for OLV drivers to believe that negative safety events are less

likely to happen to themselves compared to their peers is recognised as optimism

bias (Caponecchia, 2010). In relation to WRRS, vehicle drivers who exhibited

optimism bias were more likely to underestimate the risk and neglect precautionary

actions, such as speed limit compliance or following too closely (Caponecchia, 2010;

Job, Hamer & Walker, 1995). The influence of optimism bias could be compounded

by drivers’ crash free records over extended periods of time and observations of

frequent media reports detailing the many vehicle crashes. Thereby, reinforcing

drivers’ perception that vehicle incidents happen to other people and therefore will

not transpire to them because they have a good driving record.

In addition to those factors related to organisational, vehicle and

environmental, drivers who drive for work purposes may face many risks that may

directly, or indirectly, influence their own driving behaviour and ability to drive

safely (Broughton et al., 2003). The following sections further discuss major

individual influences on work-related driving safety identified within the literature.

Gender

Worldwide road crash statistics for all vehicles and drivers have indicated that

males are over represented in crash involvement compared to females (Tsai,

Anderson & Vaca, 2008). Research has suggested that males may be more prone to

undertake more risky driving activities (Wishart, 2015), including sensation seeking

and impulsivity (Boyce & Geller, 2002). In relation to the gender of work-related

vehicle drivers, male drivers were reported as being more likely to receive a

permanent disability injury or die as a result of vehicle crashes at work compared to

females (Boufous & Williamson, 2009; Charbotel et al., 2001; Salminen, 2003).

Approximately, one in six male drivers involved in work-related vehicle crashes

were speeding at the time of the incident compared to one in ten female drivers

(Boufous & Williamson, 2005). Similarly, male drivers are more likely to drive

while over the legal blood-alcohol limit and drive while fatigued (Boufous &

Williamson, 2005). It should be noted that the majority of WRRS research study

43

samples included primarily males, indicating a higher proportion of males compared

to females driving a vehicle for the purpose of work (Mitchell et al., 2012; Newnam

& Von Schuckmann, 2012; Oz, Ozkan & Lajunen, 2010; Rowland, Davey, Freeman

& Wishart, 2010). Consequently, the known high crash risk of male drivers within

the general road user population and the over representation of work-related male

drivers may provide additional evidence that work-related drivers are at an increased

risk of being involved in a crash (Wishart, 2015).

Age and Driving Experience

Road safety research suggests that younger road users are at a greater risk of

vehicle-related crashes (Elvik, 2010; Guo, Simons-Morton, Klauer, Ouimet, Dingus

& Lee, 2013) compared to drivers over the age of 25 years (Guo et al., 2013). This

increased crash risk can be apportioned to a lack of driving experience and at times

influenced by peer group pressure and other social influences (Sarma, Carey,

Kerrvick & Bimpeh, 2012). Occupational research into work-related traffic crashes

(period 1998 – 2002) in drivers that received a workers’ compensation claim found

that the highest number of driver casualties was among the 25-35 year age group. In

contrast, those drivers aged 65 years and older had the highest proportion of severe

work-related vehicle crashes causing disability or death, compared to younger aged

groups (Boufous & Williamson, 2009). In addition, research in the USA indicated

that older workers aged 65 years and above incurred the highest rate of work-related

road fatalities (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2003).

Although older drivers were more likely to drive at lower speeds and wear seatbelts

compared to younger and middle-aged drivers, they were more likely to die as a

result of a traffic crash (McGwin, Sims, Pulley & Roseman, 2000; Kent, Henary &

Matsuoka, 2005). Potentially, this result suggests that frailty and pre-existing health

conditions may contribute to the high proportion of severe work-related road crashes

in older drivers (Boufous & Williamson, 2009). Consequently, the age of work-

related drivers may be increasingly important with the ageing of the population in

Australia and workers remaining in the workforce until a later age (e.g., retirement

age increase) (Encel, 2003).

Driving Exposure

44

Driving exposure, such as greater time spent driving or large number of

kilometres travelled, has been reported as increasing the crash risk of drivers (Jun,

2006) compared to drivers experiencing a lower driving exposure. Driving exposure

can depend on the travel distance, frequency and regularity of driving performed, the

road environment, and driving patterns (Wishart, 2015).

Research indicates that work-related light vehicle drivers with high proportions

of work-related exposure (e.g., kilometres/mileage) have a 53% greater risk of being

involved in a crash compared to non-work drivers of similar age, sex, exposure and

roads travelled (Broughton et al., 2003; Husband, 2011; SafetyNet, 2009). In

addition, light vehicle drivers with a high proportion of driving exposure tend to have

an elevated crash risk where fatigue (e.g., driving long journeys after a full day’s

work), time pressure (to reach a destination – tendency to speed), and distraction

(including in vehicle tasks – mobile phone conversations, eating and drinking), were

all major contributing factors (Husband, 2011; SafetyNet, 2009). Furthermore,

previous WRRS research has identified that drivers travelling for greater periods of

time are an increased risk to incurring traffic infringements (Davey, Freeman &

Wishart, 2006). As driving exposure has been identified as associated with increased

crash risk for work-related drivers, driving exposure should be further investigated.

In addition, the literature indicates that driving exposure (i.e., hours spent driving or

number of kilometres travelled) should be considered when examining other factors

related to crash risk; including controlling for the effect of exposure.

Aggressive Driver Behaviour

The role of personality in crashes has been the source of a great deal of

research for many years. Tillman and Hobbs (1949) suggested that the way people

drove was simply an extension of their lifestyle behaviours, habits and personality. In

other words, “…a man drives as he lives” (p.329). Indeed, there is much research in

existence that supports the link between unsafe driving behaviour and certain

personality traits (Lajunen, 2001). While an investigation into the various types of

personality traits of individual is beyond the scope of this program of research, it is

noted that many of these personality traits underpin the constructs that relate

specifically to driver behaviours. However, one broad dimension of personality

namely aggression/hostility (Beirness, 1993) has been implicated in unsafe acts and

aggressive driving or road rage incidents are frequently reported within research and

45

the media (Hennessy & Wiesenthal, 2005; Parker, Lajunen & Summala, 2002). For

example, the aggressive driving literature reveals that this behaviour encompasses a

cluster of unsafe acts such as tailgating, excessive lane changing, failing to signal,

improper passing manoeuvres, forcing other drivers off the road, blocking or cutting

off other drivers and making rude gestures or being verbally abusive (Herrero-

Fernandez, 2013; Lajunen & Parker, 2001; Lowenstein, 1997; Underwood,

Chapman, Wright & Crundall, 1999). It is not difficult to see how these behaviours

can lead to crashes and/or road rage incidents that involve physical assault

(Deffenbacher, Lynch, Filetti, Dahlen & Oetting, 2003; Hemenway & Solnick,

1993).

Generally, aggressive driving can be linked to an emotional state associated

with anger and feelings of frustration (Gonzalez-Iglesias, Gomez-Fraguela &

Luengo-Martin, 2012). In addition, aggressive driving can result in a continuum of

behaviours and a range of outcomes from extreme acts, such as malicious assaults, to

less severe manifestations, including roadside arguments, gestures, speeding and

erratic driving (Beirness, Simpson, Mayhew & Pak, 2001; Vanlaar, Simpson,

Mayhew & Robertson, 2008). Several research studies suggest that younger males

are more likely to drive aggressively compared to females and other male age groups

(Gonzalez-Iglesias et al., 2012; Krahé & Fenske, 2002; Vanlaar, Simpson, Mayhew

& Robertson, 2008). In a study involving work-related drivers representing different

professional driver groups, results revealed that aggressive drivers were more likely

to engage in driving at higher speeds and were involved in more traffic crashes

compared to non-aggressive drivers (Oz, Ozkan & Lujunen, 2009). Therefore,

research involving the general road user population and also work-related drivers

suggests an association that aggression is a risk factor. A basic premise of OHSMSs

and OHS legislation is that drivers are “fit for task” (Model Work Health and Safety

Regulation, 2016) and therefore adverse individual behaviours (including driver

aggression) require to be addressed as per any other OHS risk. However, further

research is required investigating the determinants of work-related aggressive driving

as well as the influence of aggressive driver behaviour on WRRS outcomes and other

driver behaviours in the Australian setting.

Speed

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Speeding has remained one of the most consistent contributing factors of

vehicle crashes and a primary factor in crashes resulting in serious injuries or

fatalities. For instance, speeding has been identified as a contributor to approximately

30% of fatal crashes in Europe (European Road Safety Observatory, 2013). Within

Australia speed has also been a major contributing factor in road crashes, accounting

for approximately 34% of fatalities and 13% of serious injuries (Australian Transport

Council, 2011). The reported prevalence and potential seriousness of speeding

related vehicle crashes in Australia has gained considerable attention in recent years.

Subsequently, speeding related crashes has been acknowledged within the National

Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020 and recognised as a road safety priority (Australian

Transport Council, 2011).

Research has suggested that speeding related crashes while driving a motor

vehicle increased the likelihood of severe injury or fatality for road users (Fildes,

Langford, Andrea & Scully, 2005), as well as for work-related drivers while at work

and commuting (Boufous & Williams, 2009; SafetyNet, 2009). Although previous

research suggested that speed contributed to approximately one-fifth of all fatal

work-related road crashes on public roads in Australia (Mitchell et al., 2004),

research remains limited and varied for work-related vehicle drivers. For example,

previous research has suggested that work-related drivers have shown a propensity to

speed (Broughton et al., 2003), especially if these drivers become desensitised to the

potential hazards due to an over-familiarisation of the road environment and their

vehicle (Oz, Ozkan & Lajunen, 2009) or over-exaggeration in their driving ability. In

addition, an Australian study utilising a sample of taxi drivers found that the

participants considered speeding an acceptable behaviour while driving for work

Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Wishart, 2009). In contrast, research has also suggested

that work-related drivers were less likely to speed compared to the general driving

population (Symmons & Haworth, 2005) or when driving their own personal vehicle

(Newnam et al., 2002). While research has provided evidence identifying speed as a

high risk driving behaviour, especially in relation to road-related fatality and injury

statistics; research conducted in the WRRS area remains limited and in need of

further investigation. For example, further research is required to ascertain those

factors that influence speeding behaviour in a contemporary WRRS setting.

Fatigue and Driving Tired

47

Fatigue is an important issue for both organisations and individuals alike.

Previously, literature relating to fatigue management as an organisational issue was

provided in section 2.3.2.2 of this thesis. However, within the workplace fatigue is

also an individuals’ responsibility. Work-related vehicle drivers have an individual

duty of care to ensure they are not fatigued and are fit to drive a vehicle for work

purposes (Model Work Health and safety Regulation, 2016). The following outlines

literature associated with the influence of fatigue on individual work-related drivers.

Fatigue has been identified as a risk factor for drivers and can affect a driver’s

ability to control their vehicle by influencing certain factors associated with

attention, reaction, and vigilance therefore increasing the likelihood of road crash

occurrence (Wang & Pei, 2014). Fatigue significantly impairs the driving

performance of drivers, with drivers more prone to making constant errors while

driving tired (Lui, Hosking & Lenne, 2009). Changes in the driving environment,

road conditions or terrain have also been identified as reducing driver alertness and

contributing to the level of drowsiness or driving tired, such as monotonous roads

(Liu & Wu, 2009) and highways/freeways (Soufiane & Williamson, 2006). Whilst

organisations may address issues related to fatigue by ensuring appropriate work

schedules, work/shift times and adequate policy, procedures and processes, these

strategies cannot address individual’s behaviour, sleep regimes, social activity and

family commitments. In addition, an organisation can recommend within relevant

policy and procedures that drivers are to have regular breaks from the driving task;

however, compliance with any fatigue process cannot be guaranteed without

appropriate management practices in place. In essence, although individual drivers

have a responsibility to cease driving if they feel tired or fatigued, research suggests

that they do not (Dalziel & Job, 1997; Nabi et al., 2006). Therefore, both the

individual and organisation have a responsibility to address issues of fatigue and

prevent driving whilst fatigued.

The results of studies related to fatigue or sleep-related variables further

suggests the need to identify and assess controls and improvements to operational

functions, thereby aiming to minimise the adverse effect of sleepiness or fatigue on

safety/driving performance. Although organisations have a duty of care to ensure the

issue of fatigue is addressed in the workplace, the individual worker also has a

responsibility to ensure they do not work/drive a vehicle under the influence of

48

fatigue. Although fatigue has been thoroughly researched within the general

workplace area, there is limited research targeting the influence of fatigue or

determinants of fatigue behaviour within WRRS.

Distraction and Inattention

Driver distraction has been reported as having a considerable influence on

driving performance (Crundall, Van Loon & Underwood, 2006; Horberry, Anderson,

Regan, Triggs & Brown, 2006; McEvoy, Stevenson & Woodward, 2007). Inattention

while driving has been described as “whenever the operator of a vehicle diverts his

or her attention away from the driving task” (Hanowski, Perez & Dingus, 2005;

McEvoy et al., 2007). Whereas driver distraction has been defined as “a diversion of

attention away from activities critical for safe driving towards a competing activity”

(Lee, Young & Regan, 2008; Young & Lenné, 2010). Driver distraction and

inattention is increasingly becoming recognised as a significant road safety problem

worldwide (WHO, 2011). Within the USA in 2012, distraction was reported as the

primary contributing factor in 10% of fatal crashes, 18% of injury crashes, and 16%

of all motor vehicle traffic crashes (NHTSA, 2014). Whereas, results from

naturalistic driving studies have suggested that approximately 22% of car crashes and

near crashes (Klauer et al., 2006), as well as 71% of truck crashes (and 46% of near

crashes) (Olsen, Hanowski, Hickman & Bocanegra, 2009) involve distraction as the

primary contributing factor. Furthermore, the broader factor of inattention has been

estimated to be a contributing factor in 78% of vehicle crashes and 65% of near

crashes (Klauer et al., 2006).

In-vehicle driving distractions have become more prevalent in recent years due

to the prolific amount of technology utilised within vehicles (Nelson, Atchley &

Little, 2009; Nurullah, Thomas & Vakilian, 2013). For example, radios/CD’s,

bluetooth, global positioning systems, multi-media devices, and a multitude of in-

vehicle controls (e.g., air-conditioning, climate control, cruise control, etc). Previous

research has reported many types and circumstances of driver distraction including:

looking at or adjusting radio/CD or other in-vehicle device controls (Hanowski et al.,

2005; McEvoy, Stevenson & Woodward, 2006); using a hand held cellular phone or

hands-free device (McEvoy et al., 2006; NHTSA, 2013; 2014); eating or drinking

(Broughton et al., 2003); operation of cruise control (de Winter, Happee, Martens &

Stanton, 2014); looking at or reaching for something inside the vehicle cabin

49

(Hanowski et al., 2005; Young & Lenné, 2010); roadside signs or advertisements

(Crundall et al., 2006); other external environment, scenery, people (McEvoy et al.,

2006; Young & Lenné, 2010); conversing with vehicle passengers (McEvoy et al.,

2006); and sudden change in environment during monotonous and/or inattentive

driving (Hanowski et al., 2005). Additionally, direct influences of driver distraction

for work-related vehicle drivers include secondary tasks while driving, such as

aspects of multitasking, as many drivers are required to work away from their home

office or depot. For example, use of mobile phones while driving may be required or

encouraged (Broughton et al., 2003; Salminen and Lähdeniemi, 2002) or eating a

meal while driving in an attempt to make up time or increase work/job productivity

(Broughton et al., 2003).

Arguably, the technological device that is considered the most detrimental in

relation to driver distraction is the cellular phone (Nelson, Atchley & Little, 2009).

Mobile or cellular phones have become an important business tool and for many

work-related drivers who are time poor, there may be a propensity and/or perceived

pressure to use their mobile phone while driving. Recent research has indicated that

59% of vehicle drivers reported using their mobile phone while driving (including

31% while reading text messages and 14% sending text messages) (Petroulias, 2011).

In addition, research involving 800 Queensland drivers reported 77% of all types of

vehicle drivers used their mobile phone while driving and of these approximately

40% did so on a daily basis (White, Walsh, Hyde & Watson, 2010). Consequently,

using a cellular phone (e.g., mobile phones) while driving has become a growing

concern for modern society (Rosenbloom, 2006). The estimated risk of a vehicle

crash when using a mobile phone while driving is four times higher than when

mobile phones are not used (McEvoy et al., 2005). Although it is illegal to use a

hand-held mobile phone while driving in Australia (Pennay, 2008) and many

overseas countries, the use of a hands-free mobile phone device (e.g., bluetooth) is

currently legal for recipients of open class drivers licence. However, research has

found that there is little difference in crash risk for those drivers utilising a hands-

free device compared to utilising a hand-held mobile phone (McEvoy et al., 2005;

Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997).

Although it is acknowledged that driver distraction and inattention are

associated with vehicle crash risk, little research has been conducted to investigate

50

the influence of distraction/inattention in a work-related driving setting.

Consequently, further research is required to explore the impact of driver distraction

and inattention on work-related driver behaviour and safety outcomes.

Alcohol and Other Drug Use

Alcohol and other drug (AOD) use is highly prevalent within society and the

driving population (Austroads, 2000), with drug and alcohol impaired driving being

an issue of increasing international public and government concern (Ashbridge,

Hayden & Cartwright, 2012; Compton & Berning, 2015; Compton, Vegega &

Smither, 2009; ICADTS, 2007). The workplace is not impervious to alcohol and

other drug issues. For example, previous Australian research indicated alcohol and

drug use contributed to approximately one in ten fatalities of workers in motor

vehicles crashes (Mitchell et al., 2004). In addition, analysis of a National Drug

Strategy Household Survey revealed that 44% of Australian workers occasionally

participated in high-risk drinking (Berry, Pidd, Roche & Harrison, 2007). More

recently, a study involving 494 fly- in fly-out (FIFO) workers found that over 9

percent and 12 percent of participants had used cannabis and meth/amphetamine type

substances in the last year, respectively; indicating that around one in ten FIFO

employees engaged in illicit drug use (Williamson & Biggs, 2012). The

consequences of alcohol and other drug use consumption can contribute to the

impairment of driver performance, alertness and reaction times (Marowitz, 1995).

However, many drivers believe their level of driving skill and experience will

compensate for any possible drug effects on the driving task (Davey et al., 2005).

Similarly, many drivers under the influence of alcohol believe that they are fit to

drive even though they may recognise that they may be over the legal blood alcohol

limit (Davey et al., 2010; Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Williamson, 2010).

Furthermore, evidence suggests that at workplaces that permit or even encourage a

drinking culture as a form of social interaction (including drinking alcohol after work

at worksites), individuals may feel pressured to participate (Perring, Pham, Snow, &

Buys, 2014; Torkington, Larkins, & Gupta, 2011).

Rowland et al. (2010) utilised a sample of 51 work-related drivers (including

18 self-employed tradesmen) to identify the contributing factors of work-related low

speed and reversing type incidents, especially in relation to low speed vehicle run-

overs of young children. The study reported that drug/alcohol use was a common

51

contributing factor to many reversing vehicle incidents or near misses (Rowland et

al., 2010).

Evidence related to driving whilst under the influence of alcohol and other drug

use have indicated that these factors are a major concern for not only the general road

user population but also for WRRS. Therefore, the influence of alcohol and other

drugs should be included within any exploration of influences that impact on WRRS

and crash risk.

SAFETY IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES

In response to road trauma statistics, road safety authorities have adopted

various intervention strategies aimed at improving the road toll, including road safety

campaigns and advertising, as well as, increased police detection and deterrence

utilising penalties and convictions (Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional

Economics, 2014). However, research has suggested that intervention strategies

based on deterrence alone may not provide the necessary motivation for work-related

drivers to change their driving behaviour (Lopez-Ruiz et al., 2014). In addition,

work-related drivers have shown a willingness to frequently disobey road rules due

to professional (e.g., productivity demands and deadlines and meeting attendance)

and personal issues (e.g., attitude and behaviours) (Freeman et al., 2007; Rowland et

al., 2008).

Traditional ‘stand-alone’ or introduction of a singular intervention aimed at

improving safety has been reported as having limited effect (Lewis et al., 2012;

Newton et al., 2013; Wishart & Davey, 2004). Previously, a diversity of WRRS

initiatives have been implemented to reduce work-related driving risks. Traditionally,

strategies engaged by organisations to reduce crashes typically target WRRS policies

and procedures related to changing driver behaviour, such as driver training, driver

education and incentives (Haworth et al., 2000; Lancaster & Ward, 2000; Murray et

al., 2003).

Historically, organisations in Australia have applied road safety strategies or

interventions directed primarily toward driver behaviour (Davey, Wishart, Freeman

& Rowland, 2007; Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Wishart, 2008), including human

error and violations. In addition, traditional work-related driving intervention

strategies have incorporated some form of driver training, based primarily on

52

improving driver skills and failed to target driver behaviour (Davey et al., 2008).

However, previous research (Wishart & Davey, 2004) indicated that “skills-based

driver training”, especially when applied as a “one off or silver bullet” strategy, does

not effectively change the driving behaviour (Groeger & Banks, 2007) nor reduce

crash and offence involvement of professional drivers. In addition, previous research

suggested that where organisations have introduced some form of driver training in

an attempt to improve WRRS within their organisation, often no evidence of

improvement was recorded (Rowland et al., 2006; Safety Net, 2009). This is partly

due to the lack of data on which to compare WRRS before and after the training

intervention (Safety Net, 2009). Conversely, there is research to suggest that driver

training and education has been found to be associated with decreased crash risk

(Gregersen, Brehmer, & Moren, 1996), improved audit ratings of work-related traffic

risk management (Salminen, 2008) and enhanced overall driving ability (Llaneras et

al., 1998). Nonetheless, there is limited research ascertaining the continued

effectiveness or longevity of these driver training and education intervention

strategies.

There are a number of initiatives that have been developed in an attempt to

improve WRRS. These included: safety awareness and information campaigns

(Gregersen et al., 1996; Scheltema, Brost, Skager, & Roberts, 2002); group

discussions (Gregersen et al., 1996; Ludwig & Geller, 1991; Salminen, 2008); group

goal setting (Ludwig & Geller, 1997; Ludwig, Geller, & Clarke, 1999), performance

feedback (Ludwig, Biggs, Wagner, & Geller, 2001; Ludwig et al., 1999; Olson &

Austin, 2001), self-monitoring forms (Olson & Austin, 2001), safety pledge cards

(Ludwig & Geller, 1991; Scheltema et al., 2002), safety reminders (Ludwig &

Geller, 1991) and incentive schemes (Geller, Rudd, Kalsher, Streff & Lehman, 1987;

Gregersen et al., 1996; Skinner, 1974).

Scant research has been implemented to ascertain the longevity of interventions

to improve safety. It is evident from the literature review that many of the above-

mentioned intervention strategies were not sustainable due to poor organisational

acceptance or support or had limited long-term impact and therefore discontinued.

However, research has indicated that the organisational environment can influence

work-related driver behaviour and effectiveness of intervention strategies (Newnam

& Watson, 2011; Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2006; Wishart et al., 2010; Wishart &

53

Rowland, 2010). Further research is required to investigate the extent by which

WRRS is addressed within organisational OHSMS’s, specifically identifying those

processes that effect not only work-related driving safety but also support any

improvement strategies.

BARRIERS TO AND FACILITATORS FOR WRRS IMPROVEMENT

Within the broader occupational arena, there has been little research aimed at

evaluating the effectiveness of intervention strategies and initiatives (Verbeek, 2006)

and even less research aimed at identifying work-related barriers (Loisel et al., 2005).

For an intervention strategy, control or initiative to be deemed successful it must

effectively and efficiently progress through varying stages, including planning and

development, implementation, outcomes, and review and evaluation. At any stage in

this process, various barriers and facilitators can influence intervention strategy and

initiative effectiveness (Banks, 2008; Whysall, Haslam & Haslam, 2006). In

addition, the differences in outcomes related to similar intervention strategies across

different occupational organisations or industries may vary considerably (Karsh,

Moro & Smith, 2001; Whysall et al., 2006). Researchers have argued that due to the

complexity of phenomena in work-related intervention research, focus and future

efforts to examine the effectiveness of intervention strategies or initiatives should be

placed on the intervention implementation process and milieu, rather than outcomes

alone (Goldenhar & Schulte, 1994; HSE, 2002; Karsh et al., 2001; NIOSH, 1997;

Whysall et al., 2006). Following is a review of the available literature relating to the

barriers to and facilitators for WRRS improvement, including intervention strategy

development and application.

Individual/Personal Barriers

As previously stated, those workers who are required to drive a vehicle for the

purpose of work are not a homogeneous group. Therefore, work-related driver

individual factors that may hinder or promote the acceptance of and participation in

WRRS intervention strategies may vary considerably across the work-related driving

population. Individual factors may include personal beliefs or perceptions associated

with organisational processes or past experiences. The following sections review

additional individual factors related to the barriers to and facilitators for WRRS

improvement.

54

Perception of Risk

Risks associated with occupational road safety may be evident to researchers;

however, it is unclear whether work-related road users share this knowledge of the

contributing factors associated with occupational road incidents and crashes.

Consequently, knowledge of the contributing factors associated with occupational

road incidents and crashes alone may not be a sufficient precursor to road safety

behaviour change, as it is unlikely that work-related road users will adopt safer

driving practices if they do not identify their current driving actions as increasing

their crash risk. Similarly, research evidence suggests that an inaccurate perception

of risk can decrease the adoption of positive health (safety) behaviours (Kreuter &

Strecher, 1995). In addition, research related to risk perception indicate that

individuals typically attribute the greatest level of risk to uncommon or less well

known events (although frequently publicised in the media), such as shark attack,

floods, fires, or earthquakes, and categorise a lower level of risk to common events

such as road crashes (Barnes, 2002). Therefore, it could be surmised that a lack of

knowledge, erroneous knowledge, or frequent exposure to risks may decrease the

safe driving practices of occupational drivers. Furthermore, a lower perception of

risk in relation to work-related driving may also reduce a workers’ commitment to

partake in any work-related road safety intervention strategies or initiatives.

Locus of Control

A further barrier to the receptivity of intervention strategies is the

misperception by vehicle drivers that road crashes are due to external factors only,

rather than driver skill and behaviour. Locus of control is associated with the extent

to which people believe that significant life events are under their own control

(internal locus of control) or whether these events are caused by other factors

(external locus of control) (Ozkan & Lajunen, 2005; Rotter, 1966). Therefore,

individuals with an internal locus of control are more likely to seek information,

make personal changes and strive to overcome issues/problems (Sticher, 2009).

Whereas, individuals with an external locus of control are more likely to believe that

fate or the actions of others (other drivers) dictated their circumstances (Rotter, 1966;

Sticher, 2009); thereby preventing them to partake in any self-management

processes. Consequently, the locus of control exhibited by drivers, whether internal

55

or external, may influence drivers’ perception relating to their need to partake in any

intervention strategies.

Optimism Bias

Optimism bias has been defined as an individual’s belief that they are better

than others, have more desirable attributes than others, and are less likely to

experience a range of negative events than others (Dejoy, 1989; Weinstein & Klein,

1996). For example, if an individual believes that they are a competent and safe

driver, they would be unlikely to see change (in their driving practices/behaviour) as

necessary. The relationship between optimism bias and how individuals take

necessary precautions (Becker et al., 1977; Weinstein, 1988) is an important

consideration in occupational road safety and also mainstream occupational health

and safety (Caponecchia, 2010). For example, it has been established that optimism

bias is associated with reduced use of .

Previous road safety research identified those drivers who showed an increase

in optimism bias were more likely to report using less precautions toward negative

events than their peers (Job et al., 1995). In addition, optimism bias may partly

explain why individuals fail to comply with safety policy and procedures

(Caponecchia, 2010). Furthermore, work-related drivers may concede that

occupational driving has a high degree of crash risk, while asserting that their

personal risk level is low (it won’t happen to me). This belief may lead to a positive

perception of road safety interventions in general, however a low personal receptivity

that they should be involved.

Organisational Barriers

In attempting to improve safety-related behaviour, decrease work-related

driving incidents, and/or satisfy Work, Health and Safety legislative requirements,

organisations may plan the development of safety intervention strategies. However,

the reality within many organisations is that they often struggle to not only

implement such intervention strategies but also support their ongoing effectiveness

and longevity.

Historically, investigations into a series of catastrophes, including Challenger,

Piper Alpha, Hillsborough and Narita, found that managerial failures were identified

as major contributing factors (Salmon et al., 2010). Traditionally, health and safety

56

has been perceived by some organisation management as a “necessary evil” and

often viewed as a collection of government regulations that interfere with profits

(Goetsch, 2010). Hence, a lack of management commitment has proved to be a

significant barrier to the effectiveness of an organisation’s safety program (Hale,

Guldenmund, van Loenhout & Oh, 2010; Vredenburgh, 2002;). Although

perceptions relating to the value of occupational health and safety have improved in

recent years (Jilcha & Kitaw, 2016), within the modern and global competitive

workplace today some managers still maintain a belief of production over safety

(Goetsch, 2010). For example, for organisations to succeed, the modern industrial

organisation must continually improve its productivity, quality, costs, image,

response time, and service. Hence, this sometimes places persons responsible for or

reliant on health and safety (e.g., health and safety professionals, workers) at odds

with those responsible for productivity, quality, cost and response time (e.g.,

management, share owners, clients). Within the work-related road safety setting,

research has suggested that failure to effectively implement safety intervention

strategies and initiatives is often due to a lack of management commitment and

support, and general under resourcing (Davey et al., 2008; Davey & Wishart, 2004;

Rowland et al., 2006). Furthermore, Davey et al. (2008) suggest that there seems to

be considerable discrepancy between what organisations plan to do and what is

actually undertaken when addressing work related road safety risks and control

initiatives within organisations. In addition, research suggests there are a number of

organisation-related barriers or difficulties that influence the successful

implementation and completion of work-related road safety intervention strategies or

initiatives (Davey et al., 2008). These include:

• A propensity to focus on asset management such as the vehicle, rather than on

safety;

• Work-related road safety is seldom considered a core business issue;

• A lack of targeted resources allocated to work-related road safety;

• Occupational Health and Safety and Fleet Safety are traditionally viewed as

separate and often competing issues;

• Instant monetary return is not noticeable after implementation of work-related

road safety intervention strategies or initiatives;

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• Work-related road safety is often disregarded unless in reaction to vehicle

crashes; and

• Organisations rely heavily on inconclusive evidence based on insufficient and

poor crash data and analyses. (Davey et al., 2008, p. 6).

Although lack of management commitment has been primarily perceived as a

barrier to the improvement of health and safety within occupational organisations,

positive management commitment is viewed as a facilitator (Banks, 2008).

Management commitment for improved health and safety practices in relation to

work tasks can actually promote an increase in productivity over time (Goetsch,

2010). For example, health and safety incidents can cause considerable delays in

production and may also result in considerable costs, resources, and adverse

reputation for the organisation (Lamm, Massey, Perry, 2007; Yeow & Sen, 2003).

Despite the importance of WRRS improvement strategies, there is little

systematic research investigating the effectiveness or capacity for related

intervention strategies to be functional long-term. Furthermore, research has

identified some managers as well as work-related drivers and other related staff are

reluctant to implement and/or participate in any strategies, suggesting they have little

time to devote to safety measures (Davey et al., 2008). This belief of little time for

safety-related intervention strategies is augmented for non-core work activities such

as WRRS (Davey et al., 2008; Wishart, 2015). Organisations are generally

responsible and accountable for the implementation and ongoing support for

intervention strategies and initiatives within their organisation. Hence, the

development, application and ongoing effectiveness of any intervention strategy

could primarily be dependent on organisations’ OHSMS and extent in which WRRS

is addressed within the existing OHSMS.

External Barriers

Typically, governments provide various legislation and guidance material to

facilitate not only baseline safety compliance for maintaining minimum safety

standards but also to provide relative information for the development and

application of improvement strategies. Although the basis of WHS legislation is

compliance, government regulators rarely target enforcement within the WRRS area

(Rowland et al., 2012). Therefore, the lack of enforcement associated with WRRS

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compliance could be considered a barrier to WRRS improvement. For example, if

individuals and organisations identify a lack of enforcement for WRRS they may

focus on improving other safety aspects targeted by enforcement and not WRRS.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As noted throughout the literature review, there are important questions

relating to the influences on WRRS that remain insufficiently addressed or answered,

especially within the Australian context. Research questions were developed based

on the objectives of this program of research and designed to address the gaps within

the literature. The major research questions requiring further attention are identified

below.

1. What personal characteristics and individual driver issues influence driver

behaviour, work-related road safety outcomes and drivers’ ability to drive

safely for the purpose of work?

Although the literature identified many factors that influence driver behaviour,

road safety outcomes and driving safety performance, a considerable amount of the

previous literature focusses on the general road safety population. Hence, literature

relating primarily to work-related vehicle drivers is scant and diverse. Within the

WRRS setting there are many individual influences that can impact on work-related

driving. However, limited research has identified the predominant individual driver

factors that influence WRRS within the current contemporary and changing work

environment. Identification of the predominant factors would inform more cost and

resource effective improvement strategies to be directed toward more at-risk

individual drivers or groups.

2. What organisational factors influence work related driver safety, such as

driver behaviour, driving safety performance and risk of work-related

driving offences and crashes?

From an organisational perspective, there may be many factors that influence

WRRS, of which there is limited research. Of particular interest are the

organisational factors that influence driver behaviour and driving safety performance

outcomes. Identification of the predominant organisational factors that influence

WRRS would enable focus to be directed toward the major influencing factors and

inform effective strategies for improvement.

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3. Do external factors influence organisational management of WRRS or the

safe driving ability of drivers operating light vehicles for the purpose of

work?

To date, there is scant research relating to external factors that influence

WRRS for both the individual driver and organisation, including government

legislation and road environment. Compliance with a range of government legislation

is a requirement for any organisation, including Work, Health and Safety legislation.

Subsequently, organisations have a duty of care to provide safe systems of work and

a safe place to work. Knowledge of external factors would further inform risk

mitigation strategies associated with work-related driving.

4. What personal, organisational, and external factors are barriers to the


strategies?

Due to the complex nature of WRRS there are numerous factors that can

influence the development and application of WRRS intervention strategies.

However, limited research has been conducted to ascertain those barriers that hinder

improvement strategies in a WRRS setting. Therefore, further research is required to

determine the major barriers to WRRS intervention strategy development and

application. Knowledge obtained would enable stakeholders (e.g., organisations,

government) to develop research informed measures aimed at reducing the barriers

before developing or applying any WRRS intervention strategy.

5. What personal, organisational, and external factors are facilitators for (or

assist) the development and application of work-related road safety


Knowledge of the factors that assist the introduction of WRRS intervention

strategies could reduce the burden for organisations in relation to costs and resources

associated with development and application. For example, targeting and improving

facilitators for the development and application of intervention strategies could

promote increased acceptance of the strategies across the workforce. However,

research and literature relating to the facilitators for intervention strategy

development and application is limited. Further, research is required to determine

those factors that could assist and expedite the intervention strategy process.

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6. Do current organisational safety management systems, processes and


The majority of WRRS research has focussed on driver attributed factors, such

as driver attitude and behaviours that may influence driving safety performance and

outcomes. In addition, some research has explored driver perceptions related to

organisations’ safety climate. To date, within the WRRS setting there is limited

research examining organisational safety management systems, including policy,

procedures, processes and practice. Further research would enable identification of

those areas of an organisation’s safety management system that could be improved to

better target the issue of WRRS.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has summarised the current situation in relation to work-related

road safety primarily within the Australian context. The chapter also highlighted that

although there is an overrepresentation of work-related driving incidents/crashes and

associated trauma, there is limited research addressing identification of contemporary

workplace WRRS risks and factors associated for WRRS improvement. Typically,

previous emphasis has been on targeting primarily work-related vehicle drivers and

limited research has focussed on other potential factors that may influence WRRS,

such as organisational and external factors. The Occupational Light Vehicle Use

Systems Model (Stuckey et al., 2007) identified the diverse array of factors that

impact on WRRS which incorporated a diverse range of potential factors associated

with individual, organisational and external environments. Within this chapter the

Occupational Light Vehicle Use Systems Model (Stuckey et al., 2007) was utilised

as a framework to further discuss previous research and the diverse and numerous

factors that influence WRRS. The research literature provided support attesting to the

complex nature of the WRRS issue, highlighting the many risk factors that can

influence WRRS beyond those associated with only the driver. In addition, evidence

indicates that there is limited research exploring the potentially diverse relationships

and interaction of potential risk factors within the WRRS setting. Furthermore, there

is a lack of research addressing issues surrounding WRRS intervention strategy

development and application. The continued overrepresentation of crashes and

trauma associated with WRRS, as well as limited research in this area highlights a

need to further explore the issue of WRRS.

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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Research Design


This chapter describes the theoretical framework guiding the program of

research and the research design utilised to address the research questions proffered

in the literature review. Initially, this chapter introduces safety culture as the concept

informing the theoretical framework for this program of research. This chapter

provides a review of safety culture literature outlining the major underpinnings and

issues relevant to WRRS and development of this research framework. Subsequently,

a background relating to the identification and rationalisation of the theoretical

framework utilised for this research program is provided, followed by a description

of each component of the research framework. The research design is presented,

emphasising the methodological approach employed in each study of the research

program. Next, ethical considerations are discussed, highlighting issues surrounding

anonymity, confidentiality and research implications regarding participant

recruitment. Finally, the chapter concludes by providing a summary of the major

points.

SAFETY CULTURE

There are many potential direct and indirect factors that may influence

individual driver behaviour whilst driving for work purposes. In addition, the focus

on and perception of workplace safety and more specifically WRRS within an

organisation may influence work-related driving outcomes. As identified by Reason

(1990), there are multiple potential conditions that may increase the risk of incidents

occurring and potentially these extend beyond just driver error. Likewise, for an

incident to occur it is most likely that a series of latent failures such as, unsafe acts,

errors or conditions, may transpire simultaneously (Banks, 2008; Salmon et al.,

2010). Furthermore, there may be additional organisational or external influences

that could also impact on work-related driver safety including behaviour, safety

performance and safety outcomes. Therefore, implying that a macro-level or holistic

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approach is needed in order to target the potential multiple facets of a safety problem

and managing the risks associated with safety.

Safety culture is one such macro-level approach that provides an overarching

and holistic framework by which safety can be measured, managed and improved

across the wider organisation, taking into account the level of safety recognition,

understanding and performance by both the organisation (e.g., management) and

individual workers/employees. Safety culture is a useful concept for understanding

and manipulating safety processes within and organisation in an attempt to improve

overall safety performance and practice (Biggs, Banks, Davey & Freeman, 2013;

Dingsdag, Biggs & Sheahan, 2007; Eeckelaert et al., 2011). Furthermore, due to the

diversity of WRRS, a singular approach to improvement is unlikely to have any

significant effect, whereas WRRS would more likely be improved by the

introduction of integrated multi-dimensional strategies based on a strong safety

culture within an organisation (SafetyNet, 2009).

Conceptual Development of Safety Culture

Originally, the concept of culture was proposed by anthropologists to describe

and research societies, but the term is now widely used to describe organisations.

Culture represents the languages, values, attitudes, beliefs and customs of an

organisation (Muchinsky, 2003). In addition, the term culture represents a complex

pattern of variables that, when taken collectively, gives the organisation its unique

“flavour”. There are several definitions of organisational culture; however, arguably

the most uncomplicated was suggested by Deal and Kennedy (1982, p. 4) who

referred to safety culture as, “The way we do things around here”.

The concept of safety-culture emerged from the analysis of the 1986 Chernobyl

nuclear power plant accident (Cole, Stevens-Adams, & Wenner, 2013). Although

engineering design and operational equipment failures were the perceived causes of

the disaster, questions remained whether these causes were the root cause. This led to

a movement toward a more standard industrial practice of inquiring more deeply into

the root cause of accidents. Therefore, these changes initiated investigations that

required looking beyond immediate engineering and technical failures. The

Chernobyl event analysis applied this approach taking investigations beyond

engineering failures bringing into focus the performance of ‘the person’ managing,

designing, constructing or operating hazardous facilities. This embraced the

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psychology of why people behave as they do in the workplace and how they

interface with complex technology. Furthermore, social factors that shape people’s

beliefs and attitudes towards safety became important within the work context (Cox

& Cox, 1991; Grau, Martinez, Agut & Salanova, 2002). From the Chernobyl incident

investigation, the findings identified inadequate organisational safety culture as a

potential major contributor to the accident (Cole et al., 2013; Wiegmann, Zhamng,

von Thaden & Mitchell, 2002). Retrospectively, it was also considered a possible

contributor towards many historic accidents and disasters (e.g., London’s Kings

Cross underground fire in 1987 and ‘Piper Alpha’ North Sea oil platform fire in

1988) where the root cause was not necessarily due to less than optimum engineering

design or equipment failures, rather safety cultural aspects were identified as causal

factors (Antonsen, 2009; Eeckelaert et al., 2002). The inquiries suggested that the

designers and operators ‘good’ safety beliefs, attitudes and behaviours act as

additional accident barriers. The human performance element, safety-culture, in

accident causation cannot be ignored. Understanding of safety culture emerged from

the 1986 Chernobyl disaster experience as a complex, psychological, human

behavioural phenomenon that needed to be addressed (Eeckelaert et al., 2011).

Most researchers would agree that safety culture is an important concept. In

fact, there is a significant amount of literature on the subject (Cole et al., 2013;

Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 2010). However, a weakness of the safety culture concept

is that there remains no universally accepted definition of safety culture (Antonsen,

2009; Guldenmund, 2010; Wiegmann et al., 2002; Zohar, 2010) or assessment

methodology established (Cole et al., 2013). In addition, there is a plethora of safety

culture definitions that suggest the concept is based on psychological or belief

perspectives of individuals, indicating that the concept is something that an

organisation ‘is’ rather than something that an organisation ‘has’ (Cole et al., 2013).

Typically, safety culture is depicted separately and generally unconnected to other

organisational safety characteristics, such as business strategy, technology, work

schedules and finance decision making (Reiman & Oedewald, 2004). Furthermore,

research also suggests that improvement of safety culture would depend upon the

degree at which organisational management acknowledge and recognise the problem

as well as their willingness to provide resources and support (Mannion, Konteh &

Davies, 2009). Likewise, research has suggested other organisational factors that

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comprise an organisation’s safety culture, including organisational commitment,

management involvement, reward systems, employee empowerment, reporting

systems (Wiegmann, Zhamng, von Thaden & Mitchell, 2002; 2004), senior

management commitment, flexible and realistic practices for handling safety hazards,

continuous organisational learning and a universal care and concern for safety

hazards/risks shared across the entire workforce (Cole et al., 2013; Pidgeon, 1998).

Subsequently, a more inclusive definition of safety culture could be described as:

“the product of multiple goal-directed interactions between people (psychological),

jobs (behavioral), and the organizational (situational); while safety culture is that

observable degree of effort by which all organizational members directs their

attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis” (Cooper, 2000).

Behaviour change or culture change paradigm for safety management

Traditionally, two major and distinct approaches to managing safety in the

workplace have competed for attention and have generated a considerable amount of

debate and controversy (Dejoy, 2005). The two perspectives related to managing

safety reviewed in this chapter are behaviour change and culture change.

Historically, behaviour change proponents or within the safety fraternity, behaviour-

based safety management, is described as an extension of applied behaviour analysis

or behaviour modification and utilises principles of operant conditioning and

reinforcement theory (DeJoy, 2005). Typically, these principles were born through

application within laboratory experiments and clinical settings, initially utilising

animal experiments (Kazdin, 1973; Nemeroff & Karoly, 1991). Whereas, culture

change approaches to safety are a result of primarily management and organisational

behaviour theory and borrow both terminology and methodology from anthropology

and ethnography (DeJoy, 2005). Essentially, like groups of people, organisations

have cultures that broadly influence the behaviours and expectations of their

members (Schein, 1990).

In practice, behaviour-based safety management is fundamentally a “bottom-

up” approach with primary attention directed at specific safety behaviours of

frontline employees or workers (DeJoy, 2005; Krause, Hidley & Lareau, 1984). In

addition, it is primarily analytic or data driven through which critical safety

behaviours are identified and targeted for change. Interestingly, Dejoy (2005)

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suggests that each approach possess different strengths and weaknesses and that

often the strengths of one approach tend to present as a weakness in the other.

While some organisations still embrace the behaviour-based safety approach,

many researchers and practitioners have discounted this approach as being too

focussed on frontline employees (Taylor et al., 2004). In addition, it is suggested that

the behaviour –based safety approach introduced within an organisation as the only

method to improve safety, promotes increased alienation between workers,

employers and unions (Taylor et al., 2004). Therefore, while targeting behaviours is

important, it is acknowledged that addressing other influences, such as

organisational, environmental and external factors, are necessary to continually and

effectively minimise the occurrence of safety incidents (Taylor et al., 2004). For

example, the failure of a worker(s) to wear a form of mandatory personal protective

equipment (PPE) due to either inconvenience or comfort issue, in a behaviour-based

safety approach, the worker(s) behaviour would be addressed by targeting the

worker’s behaviour. Instead of blaming workers, using an organisational systems

approach to change the workplace culture and utilising the Hierarchy of Controls

prescribed within the Risk Management process, it may be possible to eliminate or

minimise the exposure to the risk at the source. In addition, research suggests that

organisational safety culture is often acknowledged as an important determinant of

safety behavioural change (Eeckelaert et al., 2011). Therefore, adopting a more

holistic approach, such as improving safety culture, rather than solely targeting safety

behaviour may provide the emphasis for a more comprehensive and effective

workplace safety program and increased safety performance (Antonsen, 2009;

Eeckelaert et al., 2011).

Organisational Safety Culture and Safety Climate

Along with the conjecture associated with a universally accepted definition of

safety culture, the safety construct is further confounded by the research on safety

climate (Cole et al., 2013). For instance, safety climate has been used

interchangeably with safety culture and in other circumstances is thought to be a

distinct construct (Cole et al., 2013; Eeckelaert et al., 2011). While safety culture is

believed to be a relatively stable phenomenon in an organisation, safety climate is

viewed as an unstable phenomenon representing the shared perceptions and

assumptions of employees at any given time (Cole et al., 2013; Flin, Mearns,

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O’Connor & Bryden, 2000; Wiegmann et al., 2002; Zohar, 1980). Safety climate is

described as a psychological phenomenon, dealing with individual perceptions and is

closely aligned with situational and environmental factors. Typically, safety climate

concerns employee’s perceptions of the value and importance of safety within an

organisation, normally reflected in policies, procedures and practices (Brondino,

Pasini, & Agostinho da Silva, 2013; Flin et al., 2000; Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Lee,

Garabeti & Murphy, 2012), and safe conduct while at work (Huang, Ho, Smith &

Chen, 2006; Zohar, 1980; 2000; 2002; 2003). Not surprisingly, these perceptions and

assumptions are assumed to determine the actual safety practices that are carried out

in the workplace on a daily basis (Glendon & Literland, 2001; Varonen & Mattila,

2000), and can be viewed as the organisation’s temporal “state of safety”, or

snapshot of the current state of safety in the organisation at a discrete point in time

(Brondino et al., 2013; Eeckelaert et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2006; Cheyne, Cox,

Oliver & Tomas, 1998; Mearns, Flin, Fleming & Gordon, 1997; Yule, Flin & Murdy,

2007). In addition, there seemingly is consensus that there is a link between safety

climate and safety outcomes and performance, such as occupational incidents

including behaviour, fatalities, injuries and other safety related events (Beus, Payne,

Bergman & Arthur, 2010; Brondino et al., 2013; Christian, Bradley, Wallace &

Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006; Clarke, 2010; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Meshkati,

1997; Yule et al., 2007; Zohar, 1980; 2000; 2003). However, it should be noted that

there may be considerable variation in the safety climate between different

departments within the same organisation (Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005).

A review of literature indicated that previous research identified a number of

recurring themes across safety climate dimensions, such as management commitment

(Beus et al., 2010; Clarke, 2010; Cole et al., 2013; Flin et al., 2000; Huang et al.,

2006; Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 2003), leadership (Zohar, 2010), staff and

supervisor competence (Flin et al., 2000), priority of safety over production

(Newnam, Griffin & Mason, 2005) and time/work pressure (Flin et al., 2000), work

task/work environment, personal involvement and responsibility, management

attitudes, safety management systems, management actions (Clarke, 2000; Cole et

al., 2013), workplace communication, and communication of safety information

(Katz-Navon, Naveh, & Stern, 2005). Management commitment has also been stated

as a critical factor in predicting the occurrence of self-reported safety incidents and

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injuries (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Huang et al., 2006; Zohar, 2000), safety compliance

(Mearns, Hope, Ford & Tetrick, 2010), and argued to be integral in the effectiveness

of all other safety climate factors (Huang et al., 2006). Safety climate has been

described as a valid and robust lead indicator of safety outcomes (Zohar, 2010), a

significant correlation has been found between safety climate and safety outcomes

(Christian et al., 2009), and elements of safety climate have been found to be

determinants of unsafe behaviours and accidents (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al.,

2009; Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 2003). Similar to safety culture

there are many definitions of safety climate. Taking into account the information

above, safety climate could be defined as: “safety climate is concerned with the

shared perceptions and beliefs that workers hold regarding safety in their work

place” (Cooper & Philips, 1994). Similarly, safety climate has also been defined as:

“the shared perceptions of employees about the value and importance of safety to the

organisation” (DeJoy et al., 2004).

Typically, major disasters, such as the Longford gas explosion in Australia and

Piper Alpha in the North Sea, have also increased awareness of the importance of

safety climate, and the long-term impact that these tragedies can have on

organisations and the communities in which these organisations are established (Neal

& Griffin, 2002; Reason, 1997). However, although there is considerable literature

relating to the effective and beneficial use of safety climate assessment scales, Gadd

and Collins (2002) has questioned the validity of safety climate assessment tools as

the majority of research has previously been conducted utilising self-reported data

and therefore may be subjected to social desirability biases. In addition, Silbey

(2009) stated that the majority of assessment techniques used to measure safety

culture are reliant on data collected through the use of survey instruments and,

therefore, may be actually measuring safety climate. Similarly, Guldenmund (2010)

has suggested that safety climate scales have been extensively utilised (or attempt to)

to measure safety culture. For example, interested in the safety culture within the

construction industry in China, Fang, Chen and Wong (2006) conducted a safety

climate questionnaire across a leading construction company and its contractors.

Regression analyses found significant relationships between safety climate factors

and personal characteristics (e.g., gender, marital status, and education), worker

safety knowledge, and direct employer and individual safety behaviour. However,

68

the research provided limited insight into the wider safety culture within the

organisation (Cole et al., 2013). In contrast, research has suggested that there are

apparent commonalities between safety climate and underlying concepts within the

wider framework of safety culture (Brondino et al., 2013; Strahan, Watson &

Lennon, 2008).

Safety culture and climate concepts have also been applied to the work-related

road safety setting and, although limited, are currently gaining momentum. For

example, Newnam et al. (2002) reported that employees who perceived their

organisation to possess higher quality work-related safety policies and procedures

were more likely to report safer driving behaviour in their work vehicles. Further

support for links between perceptions of safety climate and safe work-related driving

is also evidenced in the research conducted by Wills, Watson and Biggs (2004; 2005;

2006; 2009). In one study that investigated fleet safety climate, self-reported work-

related driving behaviour and past work-related crash and offence history, the

researchers found a significant positive relationship between fleet safety climate

perceptions and safe work-related driving behaviour (Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2005).

It is not surprising, therefore, that fleet safety practitioners and researchers are calling

for organisations to become more proactive with WRRS and apply the same

Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) principles used in other areas of the

organisation (Rowland & Wishart, 2014; Rowland, Wishart & Davey, 2005; Wishart

& Davey, 2004). The integration of driver safety under the precept of OHS would

also impact upon employee perceptions that work-related driving was being taken

seriously by management and was a valued aspect of the work environment.

Role of safety culture in WRRS: A conceivable concept

Although occupational safety incidents are known to be linked with culture,

limited information is available regarding how safety culture is linked to WRRS crashes

(Dorn, 2012). Traditionally, the majority of research in the work-related road safety

(specifically light vehicle fleets) arena has focussed on individual driver behaviour

influences, primarily driver errors and violations. However, although driver

behaviour research is considered valuable for the identification of important driver

behaviours, much of the WRRS research focussed primarily on driver

errors/mistakes and driving violations and rarely considered alternative behaviours or

organisational issues. For instance, within the industry setting the emphasis for

69

reporting behaviours has potentially enhanced management belief and promoted the

driver as the primary “blame” for poor driving safety performance and WRRS

outcomes (Rowland & Wishart, 2014; Rowland, Wishart & Davey, 2005; Wishart &

Davey, 2004). Alternatively, the attitude toward WRRS could be reflected in the

same attitude as to other OHS issues suggesting organisational deficits in safety

culture/climate.

In contrast, little research has been conducted to ascertain the influence of

organisational issues relating to work-related road safety and associated outcomes.

To date, the major approach to assessing organisational influences on driver

behaviour and safety outcomes has been the utilisation of safety climate

measurement tools modified for work-related motor vehicle drivers (Rowland et al.,

2008a; Rowland et al., 2007; Wills, Watson and Biggs, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2009).

However, stakeholders have increasingly viewed safety climate as only a part of the

broader safety culture of an organisation (Borys, 2014). Hence, it is suggested that

safety climate basically provides an insight into the psychological or driver

perceptual factors associated with WRRS within organisations.

Due to the diversity of driver groups, vehicles, industry, organisations, and

work environments, it is unlikely that risk factors for work-related crashes are

homogeneous and susceptible to a single intervention to improve WRRS (SafetyNet,

2009). Therefore, research suggests that WRRS would most likely be improved by

the introduction of integrated multi-dimensional strategies based on a strong safety

culture within an organisation (SafetyNet, 2009). This research program aims to

explore the diverse factors of influence associated with WRRS and associated impact

on intervention strategies aimed at improving WRRS within organisations.

Holistically, safety culture could be considered a useful concept for understanding

and manipulating safety processes within an organisation, through which

management influence operational staff and safety practice (Biggs, Banks, Davey &

Freeman, 2013; Dingsdag, Biggs & Sheahan, 2007). In contrast, research has

indicated the effectiveness of any safety improvement strategies or interventions are

reliant on workplace culture and interventions may fail if the workplace culture is not

conducive to change (Judd & Keleher, 2013; Oude Hengel, Joling, Bletter &

Bongers, 2010). All organisations have a safety culture, yet the degree in which a

safety culture is executed differs in maturity and effectiveness across organisations

70

(Biggs, Banks, Davey & Freeman, 2013). Safety culture in relation to WRRS

provides a concept whereby all facets of WRRS, including driver behaviours,

attitudes and beliefs, perceptions of safety such as safety climate, and organisational

policy, processes and practice, can be examined with a view to guiding the

improvement of safe driving performance. The following sections provide additional

theoretical content in relation to the use of a safety culture model as a framework to

guide the studies of this program of research.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Due to the exploratory nature of the research, a multi-faceted approach to

theory will be adopted throughout this thesis, drawing on psycho-social and

organisational perspectives relevant to the safety area. A theoretical concept of safety

culture will be utilised as a framework to guide the research and determination of

results. More specifically, the Reciprocal Safety Culture Model (Cooper, 2000) will

be utilised as the framework for this research program (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Reciprocal safety culture model (adapted from Cooper, 2000)

Cooper’s (2000) Reciprocal Safety Culture Model is closely based on

Bandura’s (1977a; 1977b; 1986) model of reciprocal determination and is similar to

Geller’s (1997) ‘Total Safety Culture’ model (e.g., involving and recognising the

interactive relationship between person, environment and behaviour factors),

primarily differing by the use of the term situation rather than environment. In

addition, Geller’s use of the environment facet is based on an engineering approach

PERSON Safety Climate:

Perceptual Audit

BEHAVIOUR Safety

Behaviour:

SITUATION Safety Management

System:

Internal Psychological Factors

External Observable FactorsCONTEXT

71

and is restricted to the localisation of factors present on the ‘shopfloor’ (e.g., tools,

equipment, machines, etc) and does not address the wider aspects of organisational

processes or practice (e.g., policies and procedures, systems and strategies) (Cooper,

2000). Ultimately, Cooper’s model provides an integrative framework for the

analysis of the safety culture construct (Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon & Vazquez-

Ordas, 2007). The model highlights the multiple elements that determine or impact

on safety culture within a specific context, including the integrative or reciprocal

relationships between subjective internal psychological factors, observable safety-

related behaviours and objective situational factors (Cooper & Phillips, 2004;

Choudhry et al., 2007; Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007; Jebb, 2015). Cooper maintains

that organisational culture is the product of multiple goal-directed interactions

between people (psychological), jobs (behavioural) and the organisation (situational)

(Cooper, 2000; Choudhry, Fang & Mohamed, 2007), with each component able to be

measured independently or in combination (Choudhry et al., 2007).

The model promotes the methodological use of triangulation, whereby within

the academic setting triangulation refers to the use of a combination of research

methods to gain a holistic understanding and to depict more accurately the

phenomenon being investigated (Rowland & Wishart, 2014). Basically, triangulation

utilises dissimilar but complementary methods of data collection to achieve

convergent validity (Eeckelaert et al., 2011; Guldenmund, 2010; Rowland &

Wishart, 2014; Wishart et al., 2011a). Similar to other researchers in the field (e.g.,

Guldenmund, 2000; 2010; Wishart et al., 2011a), the use of triangulation is

encouraged as it is argued to be critical in the investigation of multi-faceted

constructs, with each individual method potentially limited in relation to what is

revealed about each facet (Jebb, 2015). A triangulated methodology enables a multi-

level analysis of safety culture by conducting various methods, such as interviews,

surveys, audits and document analysis, etc (Choudhry et al., 2007; Glendon &

Stanton, 2000). Traditionally, organisational culture has been measured utilising

primarily the application of qualitative methods, such as interviews and observations

(Choudhry et al., 2007). However, the three elements (psychological, situational and

behavioural) of the Reciprocal Safety Culture Model can be measured through a

combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (Cooper, 2000). For example,

situational facets can be revealed in the structure of an organisation (e.g., policies,

72

procedures, safety management system audits/inspections, etc), behavioural facets

can be measured through peer observations, self-reporting and outcome measures,

and psychological facets are commonly examined through the use of safety climate

questionnaires measuring employees’ perceptions of safety (Cooper, 2000; Choudhry

et al., 2007). Furthermore, previous research has emphasised that no single approach

or technique is suitable for understanding or exploring safety culture. Rather,

multiple methods and a holistic approach should be utilised when researching safety

culture concepts (Antonsen, 2009; Eeckelaert et al., 2011; Grote, 2008; Haukelid,

2008; Guldenmund, 2007).

RESEARCH DESIGN

The structure outline of this thesis, as shown in Figure 3.2, represents the

specific tasks undertaken as part of this research. Utilisation of Cooper’s Reciprocal

Safety Culture Model provides a practical framework to guide this program of

research and explore the influences on safety within the WRRS context. The top

components of Figure 3.2 (e.g., behaviour, person and situation) are based on the

safety culture elements of Cooper’s (2000) Reciprocal Safety Culture Model. The

lower components summarise the three studies of this research program and

delineates which safety culture element is being explored.

The majority of the data collection for this thesis was part of larger research

projects. For example, data from both Study One (i.e., Parts A and B) and Study Two

were collected during the facilitation of industry WRRS workshops within

Queensland state government departments across city, urban and rural regions. The

qualitative and quantitative data identifying factors and issues influencing WRRS

were collected as baseline measures for a wider WRRS research project, being for

future intervention strategy evaluations. Study Three utilised data collected via a case

study methodology. Data collection involving the four organisations in Study Three

was completed independently and represented four separate research projects.

73

Figure 3.2: Outline of research program structure

The program of research utilised Cooper’s (2000) Reciprocal Safety Culture

Model to guide methodology development and data collection. This holistic approach

encapsulates the multiple-facets of safety culture and explores those factors that

influence WRRS.

Study One: Factors Influencing WRRS

Study One adopted a mixed-methods approach utilising both qualitative and

quantitative methods. The participant sample for Study One included Queensland

State Government employees who drive a vehicle (at least sometimes) for work

purposes. Study One (Part A) reported in Chapter 4 utilised focus groups to explore

the various individual, organisational and external influences on WRRS. Research

has indicated the importance of both management (Choudhry et al., 2007) and

supervisory (Biggs & Biggs, 2012; Lingard & Yesilyurt, 2003) staff levels in

influencing workers’ safety-related behaviours, attitudes and outcomes. Therefore,

WRRS Safety Culture

Framework

Person Safety Climate

Behaviour Safety Behaviour

Situation Safety Management

System

Study Two WRRS intervention

barriers and facilitators

Study One Factors influencing

WRRS Parts A & B

Study Three Impact of safety

management systems on WRRS

Aim: Explore the contemporary factors that impact on WRRS in light vehicle fleets

74

three levels of organisational hierarchy, management, supervisory and employee

levels, were requested to be involved within the focus groups. Focus group

discussions provided responses identifying the major influences relevant to

participants’ own hierarchal position within their organisation and work-related

driving operations as well as influencing factors contributed by other staff involved

in the WRRS context.

The quantitative method (Part B) adopted in Study One (Chapter 5) involved a

self-report survey questionnaire investigating work-related driver behaviour and

attitudes as well as participant perceptions associated with organisational fleet safety

climate. A hardcopy version of the survey questionnaire was administered to all

hierarchal levels of the workforce participating within the study. Results provided by

the study sample allowed the relationships between driver behaviours and aberrant

driving outcomes (e.g., crashes and infringement fines), and similarly between

organisational fleet safety related climate factors, to be investigated through

statistical analysis. In addition, group differences (e.g., ANOVAs) associated with

demographic variables such as type of vehicles driven, terrain driven and age groups,

were also explored on key constructs (e.g., fleet safety climate and driver

behaviours).

Study Two: WRRS Intervention Barriers and Facilitators

Although employees’ beliefs may facilitate or act as a barrier to the

development and application of intervention strategies (Matlow, Wray & Richardson,

2012; Weiner, Amick & Lee, 2008), positive attitudes directed toward an

intervention have been confirmed as increasing application (Celebri, 2015).

Furthermore, research has shown that institutional or organisational forces can

positively influence employees’ perceptions of intervention in the workplace

(Suskind et al., 2014).

Study Two (Chapter 6) adopted a qualitative approach, in order to investigate

the barriers to and facilitators for intervention development and application. The

study utilised the same sample of participants (e.g., employees in departments within

an Australian State Government) and focus group methodology as used within the

qualitative component of Study One (Part A). Previous research has failed to

investigate sufficiently the perceptions of staff toward the development and

application of intervention strategies and impact on the wider WRRS culture.

75

Intervention strategies aimed at improving WRRS are a major component of risk

management (e.g., safety controls) and positive organisational fleet safety culture.

Study Two provides data relevant to the three components of the theoretical

framework (see Figure 3.2), including driver safety behaviours (Behaviour) in

relation to individual perceptions related to WRRS improvement, perceptions

associated with organisations’ focus toward and commitment to WRRS improvement

(Person), and capability of OHSMSs to support and monitor ongoing WRRS

improvement strategies.

Study Three: Organisational WRRS Management Systems

Within occupational health and safety settings, it is widely acknowledged that

supportive and committed management is paramount (Borys, 2014), especially for

the ongoing improvement of safety systems, processes and practice. Management

commitment can be assessed through the efficacy of the organisation’s OHSMS and

subsequent safety performance and outcomes (Bottani et al., 2009; Makin & Winder,

2008). However, the existence or level of application of a OHSMS depends on the

priority of safety within an organisation (Bluff, 2003; Mannion et al., 2009). For

example, the level of application identifies the degree by which safety policy,

procedures and processes are applied to work-related operational settings and

practice. There is limited research and literature related to how the hazard of work-

related driving is recognised and addressed within organisational OHSMS’s.

Therefore, Study Three (Chapter 7) utilised a case study methodology to primarily

investigate the level at which WRRS is recognised and addressed within four diverse

organisations’ OHSMS’s participating within this program of research as well as the

capacity to support improvement strategies. Utilising a triangulation approach to

enhance validity and reliability, four studies on different organisations were

undertaken using the following strategies to explore the relevant organisational

culture being:

1) A review of organisational records, documentation and initiatives;

2) A number (n = 12) of organisational staff focus groups; and

3) Facilitation of organisational site inspections and observations.

Ethical considerations

76

Studies within this research program were provided with ethical clearance from

the Queensland University of Technology Ethics Committee. For instance, ethical

clearance for Study One (Part A) and Study Two was obtained and was specific to

this program of research (Ethics number: 0800000576). In addition, the survey

questionnaire used in Study One (Part B) and the case studies operationalised in

Study Three were part of other research and industry consultation programs and were

provided with additional industry organisational approval/consent. Furthermore, as

part of the ethics process Workplace Health and Safety risk assessments were

completed and approved by Queensland University of Technology Ethics Committee

for all research activities undertaken as part of this program of research.

There were a number of ethical concerns that were considered and addressed

within this program of research. Participants were not asked to provide detailed

information relating to their personal lives outside of work beyond their age, gender

and driving experience. However, participants were requested to volunteer

information associated with their work-related driving experiences, such as opinions

and perceptions related to organisational processes and practices as well as their own

driving safety behaviour. Although this may potentially cause a feeling of discomfort

for some participants, participants were informed of the voluntary nature of their

participation (e.g., both written and verbal) prior to providing consent. Information

sheets detailing the nature of the research, specific research details and assurance of

participant anonymity and confidentially were provided to all participants and

reiterated verbally prior to any data collection.

Another consideration was the anonymity and confidentiality of the

organisations that participated within this program of research. Potentially, results

publicised from the program of research may create additional risks to the

participating organisations, including public and legal liability, adverse publicity and

market confidence. Therefore, all organisations requested and were assured

anonymity and confidentiality with only their type of industry or sector outlined in

any documentation of results. Details of the research including anonymity and

confidentiality, specific to this program of research or as part of wider industry

research/consultation, were included and approved in relevant contractual

arrangements between QUT and the participating organisations. Research involving

industry organisations was also approved by the QUT Ethics Committee.

77

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Initially, this chapter implied that a holistic approach is required to target the

potential multiple facets of a safety problem and management of the risks associated

with safety; rather than simply introducing only micro-level initiatives directed

solely toward individuals. Safety culture represents a holistic approach, whereby the

multitude of safety-related influences and factors associated with WRRS can be

examined. This chapter provided insight into the theoretical framework utilised to

guide the research and overview of the design for the three studies undertaken within

this program of research. The theoretical framework highlights the multiple elements

that determine or impact upon safety culture, including the relationships between

psychological factors, safety-related behaviours and situational factors. Although not

specifically tested in this program of research, the theoretical framework or

Reciprocal Safety Culture Model (Cooper, 2000) provides a platform for the

exploration and identification of the multitude of factors that influence WRRS.

Accordingly, within the program of research, the design of studies used a

combination of research methods to triangulate and gain a holistic understanding of

the factors that influence WRRS. In addition, the three studies provide valuable data

associated with the major contemporary factors that influence WRRS in light vehicle

fleets.

The next chapter details the first study in the program of research that

qualitatively explored the contemporary factors that influence WRRS from the

perspective of the various levels of staff (e.g., employees, supervisory, management)

within the participating organisations.

79

Chapter 4: Study One Part A – Exploration of the factors that influence WRRS


Discussed in the introduction to the thesis (Chapter 1), the aim of this research

program was to employ an exploratory approach to investigate factors that influence

work-related road safety within a contemporary environment. The overall data

collection for Study One of this research program involves two parts (e.g., Parts A

and B). This study incorporates a mixed method design, both qualitative (e.g., focus

groups) and quantitative (e.g., survey) exploring contemporary factors that influence

work-related driver safety. The results for Study One are contained in two chapters

within this thesis. The qualitative research results for Study One Part A are contained

within this chapter (Chapter 4). Whereas, Study One Part B quantitative research

results are discussed in Chapter 5 of this research thesis.

As highlighted is Chapter 2, current knowledge has identified a wide array of

factors which potentially influence the safe operation of a motor vehicle. In addition,

previous WRRS research studies have purported a diversity of factors that may

influence driving behaviour (Freeman et al., 2007; Stuckey et al., 2007; Sullman et

al. 2002). The previous research also suggested that individuals driving a vehicle for

the purpose of work may experience additional or unique factors that influence their

driving behaviour compared to the general road user population. For example,

research has suggested that drivers are more likely to speed whilst driving for work

(Freeman et al., 2007; Sullman et al. 2002) and consider speeding as an acceptable

behaviour (Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Wishart, 2009). In addition, research

suggests that those drivers who travel greater distances or are driving for

considerable amounts of time are at greater risk of crash involvement (Broughton et

al., 2003; Husband, 2011; SafetyNet, 2009). However, there is limited research

identifying the predominant factors that influence WRRS within the contemporary

Australian work environment. More specifically, in addition to individual driver

issues/behaviour, scant research exists that identifies the influencing factors

associated with the organisation and external/environmental factors.

80

STUDY OBJECTIVE

The first objective of this research is to identify work driver’s perceptions and

experiences related to personal, organisational and external factors that influence

current safe work-related driving, driver behaviours and outcomes (Study One).

Utilising a holistic approach, this study aims to address the multiple-facets of WRRS

safety culture and identify the predominant factors that influence WRRS

performance and outcomes. Although considerable research has been previously

performed in the road safety area, none have undertaken a qualitative in-depth

examination into the factors that influence driving for work. Study One results and

discussion are covered across two chapters (i.e., Chapters 4 and 5) with the research

questions remaining the same for both. The research questions for Study One

include:

1. What personal characteristics and individual driver issues (i.e., driver

behaviour) influence work-related drivers’ ability to drive safely for the

purpose of work?

2. What organisational factors influence work-related driver safety, such as

driver behaviour and level of risk and propensity for work-related driving

offences and crashes?

3. Are there any external factors that influence the safe driving ability of

drivers operating light vehicles for the purpose of work?

Study One aims to explore the contemporary factors that influence work-

related road safety. In particular, Study One seeks to gain an understanding of the

psychological and behavioural factors associated with the WRRS safety culture

framework, as outlined within Chapter 3.

METHOD

Focus groups were conducted to explore the individual, organisational and

external influences on WRRS. The focus group method was chosen over other

qualitative methods due the considerable number of participants who volunteered to

be involved in the study. Focus group research is a practical method that provides an

opportunity to ascertain valuable insights into the perceptions and experiences of

participants, and deliver in-depth qualitative information (Nicolson & Anderson,

2003).

81

The qualitative research method encompassed semi-structured and open-ended

questions and aimed to explore participants’ perceptions and experiences in relation

to the factors that influence WRRS. An informal conversational approach was

utilised with additional probing questions employed to clarify and/or expand on

important experiences highlighted by participants during the focus groups. The study

used an inductive “open” coding technique developed by Strauss (1987) which

entailed re-reading transcripts, focusing on and coding the “conditions” and

“consequences” that emerge from the text (e.g., themes), and developing and revising

such codes. The study encompasses an open-ended enquiry method that identifies

patterns and key variables regarding the topics being investigated. This technique is

derived from grounded theory which facilitates the examination of major themes

arising from the experiential data such as participants’ responses (Corbin & Strauss,

1990; Yin, 1993).

Participants

In total, 217 work-related drivers provided data through 28 focus groups

conducted across three Queensland State Government departments. The majority of

focus groups were conducted in conjunction with work-related road safety

workshops facilitated across city and regional areas within Queensland. Focus groups

were undertaken with employees, ranging from field staff to management, in both

major urban metropolitan areas and provincial/regional centres. In addition, the

participants were not specifically targeted as high risk drivers from within their

organisation. Rather, a sample of work-related drivers was engaged representing

drivers from across organisations that drive within city, urban, rural and off road

situations. Recruitment of participants was facilitated at industry fleet safety

workshops held within the various city and regional areas. All workshop participants

were asked if they would like to participate and that participation was voluntary. In

relation to inclusion or exclusion criteria the only requirement was that participants

drove a work vehicle at least sometimes for the purpose of work. Although the

workshops were open to participation from all organisational levels (e.g.,

management, supervisory/team leaders, and employees/drivers) the majority of

management level participants were targeted within three focus groups (n = 17),

conducted separately from the workshop participants. The additional management

82

level focus groups were conducted to gain management perspectives in relation to

WRRS.

Table 4.1 illustrates the demographic characteristics of the focus group

participants. Participants ranged in age from 17 years to 65 years with an average of

41 years. The average age of participants is similar to previous research that also

identified a predominance of participant sample ages being within the early to mid-

forty year age groups (Mitchell et al., 2012; Newnam & Von Schuckmann, 2012; Oz

et al., 2010). In addition, the driving experience of participants ranged from 1 year to

23 years with an average of 23 years. Almost two thirds of participants were male (n

= 161, 74%) and approximately a quarter of participants were female (n = 56, 26%).

Although all the organisations employed both male and female staff, the majority of

operational and field staff/drivers were male with most female staff driving only

short distances (including hours driven) for the purpose of work. A majority of male

drivers within organisations, and especially trade type workers, is consistent with

previous work-related road safety research (Mitchell et al., 2012; Oz et al. 2010;

Rowland, Davey, Freeman & Wishart, 2010). The majority of drivers who

participated in the focus groups were organisational employees including a mix of

field type staff who drove considerable hours/distance for the purpose of work. In

addition, employees who performed primarily office/administrative type work (and

on occasions some field work) and drove at some time each week for work purposes,

were included in the focus groups. Encouragingly, many supervisors/team leaders (n

= 34, 16%) and management (n = 19, 9%) also participated within the focus group

discussions. Typically, the sample of organisational staff including many field

operators working across most regions within Queensland drove primarily either

passenger or four-wheel drive type vehicles. The considerable number of four-wheel

drive vehicles utilised indicated that many participants either drove at some stage in

country or off road conditions or just preferred to drive a four-wheel drive.

83

Table 4.1: Demographic Characteristics of the Sample (N = 217)

Age:

Driving Experience:

Vehicle Category:

Passenger (including sedan, hatchback, station wagon, utility)

Four Wheel Drive

Truck

Other

Hours Driven/Week:

None

1-10

11-20

21-30

31-40

Missing

17 – 65 yrs

M = 41

(SD = 12.06)

1-51 years

M = 23

(SD = 12.2)

92 (42.4%)

95 (43.8%)

7 (3.2%)

23 (10.6%)

13 (6%)

106 (48.8%)

66 (30.4%)

21 (9.7%)

10 (4.6%)

1

Gender: Male

Female

Level of Employment:

Employee/Driver

Supervisor/Team Leader

Management

Driving Terrain:

Mainly city, suburban roads

Both city/suburban and country roads

Mainly country roads

Mainly off road

Other

Kilometres per Year:

None

1-10 000

10 001-20 000

20 001-30 000

30 001-40 000

40 001-50 000

More than 50 001

161 (74%)

56 (26%)

164 (75%)

34 (16%)

19 (9%)

73 (33.6%)

91 (41.9%)

34 (15.7%)

16 (7.4%)

3 (1.4%)

2 (1%)

96 (44.2%)

44 (20.3%)

48 (22.1%)

12 (5.5%)

10 (4.6%)

5 (2.3%)

Content

The focus group questions (see Appendix A) for Study One were asked during

WRRS workshops conducted across Queensland. Focus group questions were

developed based on previous research obtained through the literature review and

were broadly designed to enable a diverse array of participant responses. Study One

focus group discussions attained data in relation to participant demographics and the

individual, organisational and external factors that influence WRRS.

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The purpose of this qualitative method, specifically focus group discussions,

was to obtain a ‘real world’ and authentic understanding of the perceptions of

organisational management, supervisory and operational employees regarding the

factors that influence safe work-related driving behaviour and driving safety

performance. The core focus group question for Study One “Are there any factors

that influence safe driving ability?” and it was purposely designed to be brief and

broad allowing the facilitator to further explore specific responses from participants.

To provide consistency, the same two facilitators (including the researcher of this

program of research) were used for all the focus groups. The utilisation of two

facilitators enabled one facilitator to ask questions while the second facilitator took

notes, and vice versa.

The focus group facilitator utilised additional questions to encourage further

participation and responses from study participants. Generally, the additional

questions were developed from review of the available literature, including research

and safety consultation reports. The additional questions were developed to gain a

greater insight into participant experiences and ascertain more in-depth responses to

what participants acknowledge as factors that influence safe driving behaviours,

driving safety performance and outcomes. For example, the major additional

prompting questions included:

Organisational factors

• What organisational factors influence driving behaviour and driving safety

performance?

Does any organisational policy, procedures or rules govern/influence

driving for work purposes?

Have any management directions or requests influenced driving

behaviour or driving safety performance?

How does your organisation address work-related road safety?

Do you have adequate time in your work day to drive safely?

Does the type of work or job quotas influence safe driving?

Individual/personal factors

• What personal or individual factors influence driving safety?

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What are the major factors that influence driving safety performance

(e.g., distraction, fatigue, etc)?

Have you experienced any family or relationship issues that

influenced driving for work?

Have any life issues (e.g., financial) impacted on your ability to drive

safely?

Do other road users and their actions/behaviours influence work-

related driving?

Do you have any additional beliefs, habits, values, etc related to

driving for work?

Have you ever made a mistake/error, including a near miss when

driving for work purposes?

Vehicle-related factors

• Are there any specific vehicle-related issues that impact on the ability to

drive safely?

Environmental factors

• Are there any aspects related to road condition or terrain that influence the

way you drive?

• Does weather or other environmental conditions impact on safe driving

ability?

External factors

• Do any laws or legislation influence work-related driving safety (e.g., road

rules, work, health and safety legislation, etc)?

• Do you always follow and comply with the road rules?

Focus Group Procedure

Before commencing the qualitative component of Study One, ethics and

workplace health and safety approvals (e.g., research risk assessment forms) were

obtained. Before undertaking Study One, a pilot focus group was conducted with a

sample of 14 drivers/employees from a department/organisation external to the

research organisations. The pilot sample was selected due to its similarity to the

larger research sample. This was undertaken to ensure questions could be

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understood, terminology was appropriate to the target organisations and duration of

the focus group was acceptable. No changes were deemed required after the

completion of the pilot focus group.

To increase the reliability of the participant responses, a standardised protocol

in relation to focus group questions and prompting questions was adopted

(Silverman, 1993). The researcher asked the same questions and in the same order

for all focus group sessions. However, in relation to questions aimed at prompting

further responses by participants, the prompting questions were supplied based on

the current conversation and not in any particular order. Samples of additional

prompting questions were included within Section 4.3.2. In addition, all participants

were encouraged to respond and provide additional information relevant to their own

work-related driving experiences and related to current topical discussions. For

example, for each identified influence on WRRS, participants were asked to provide

their own experiences (if any) related to that topic. Moreover, the researcher reread

the main points and example of participant responses before concluding each focus

group session. This procedure was used to reinforce the main points identified,

obtain a level of consensus within each focus group, identify additional influences on

WRRS not yet explored, and enable the quieter participants a chance to provide input

(e.g., those reluctant to provide input throughout the focus group). Data was

collected until saturation had been reached and no new information was introduced.

Data Analysis

Notes were taken on verbatim statements, as participants’ responses to open-

ended questions were recorded by the researcher during the focus groups. The major

points were read back to participants (e.g., after each question during the WRRS

workshops) and re-written as required incorporating any amendments. The “open”

coding technique (Strauss, 1987) encompassed repeatedly reading and categorising

participants’ responses, focusing on similar experiences and events, which facilitated

the development of themes and a coding manual that was utilised to analyse the text.

To increase the reliability of the coded schemes, a second researcher independently

identified themes and then coded responses corresponding to themes acquired from

participants’ responses. Following this process the researchers collaborated and

developed themes from the sample results. Subsequently, the reliability of the coding

between researchers resulted in a 91% level of accuracy concerning coding responses

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according to the themes identified. The degree of accuracy was determined by

calculating the total number of agreements of coded responses from both researchers

divided by the total number of agreements plus disagreements of both researchers

(Strauss, 1987). The next step involved making minor corrections to the coding

scheme and/or the coding of participants. Subsequently, the researcher re-read and

re-coded the transcripts in order to produce the necessary changes that resulted from

the coding exercise with the second researcher.

RESULTS

This section provides an overview of the major themes associated with

perceived influences to safe work-related driving as well as supporting evidence in

the form of participants’ responses. In addition, the thematic results are outlined in

descending order beginning with the theme representing the highest group consensus

to the least cited themes.

Time/Work Pressure

Interestingly, the highest level of group consensus acknowledged the theme

associated with time/work pressures as having a considerable influence on work-

related driving safety (n = 156, 72%). Within this theme, study participants stipulated

that productivity allegedly took precedence over safety related issues even though

management often implied that safety was a priority. For example, a male participant

stated “management tell us that safety is number one but then tell us to hurry to

another job that has become urgent ... like get there yesterday”. In addition, a female

participant suggested “although no person wants someone to have a crash there is

pressure to complete a certain number of jobs per day, especially if clients are

phoning them complaining of any delays, etc”. Although participants generally

acknowledged that no manager knowingly wanted drivers to perform any form of

illegal driving, drivers/workers often believed they were pressured to drive faster or

make up time while driving to meet productivity demands. For example, one male

participant commented “at one point in time we are told not to speed and at another

we are told to get to a customer as soon as possible ... I guess we feel pressured to

speed, take short cuts or bypass lunch and eat when driving to the next call or job. In

addition, a male participant indicated “even though we are told to drive safely, or the

organisation values our safety, we are constantly pressured to get to an urgent call

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out or job as quickly as possible”. Some managers/supervisors stated that due to

pressure placed upon them to meet productivity demands or customer/client demands

they may have inadvertently transferred a level of work pressure onto employees. For

example, one operational manager stated “As managers we are constantly reminded

of productivity requirements or demands by clients. Unfortunately, we may transfer

some of this pressure onto employees. However, we do not state or want them to

break any laws such as roads rules, we want them to drive safely”. Furthermore,

some participants suggested that work-related drivers may not be actually affected by

time/work pressure by organisational management; rather they “activate pressure on

themselves”. For example, a male participant stated “sometimes I do place pressure

on myself to get to a job, especially if I like the client and I want to look good to them

by getting there as soon as possible”.

Focus group respondents also implied differences across departments within

their organisation in relation to the degree of time/work pressure directed toward

staff. There were notable differences from those drivers who drove occasionally for

work purposes (e.g., administration/office, workshop employees) compared to

drivers who operated vehicles regularly during their daily work. For instance, a male

participant implied “when you are working in a trade-related position you are

driving a work vehicle every day, sometimes large distances, and you have a quota to

meet. Compared to those in administration and the workshop jobs our risk due to

exposure is considerably more … yes they may drive each day but they generally

only drive short distances to pick stuff up or deliver goods”.

Fatigue and Driving Tired

A major theme associated with fatigue and the effect of driving tired were

identified by a large number of participants (n = 137, 63%) as a condition that

influenced safe driving performance at work. For example, a male participant

explained “late nights, poor sleep, long days all contribute to fatigue, not to mention

the long distance driving we are required to do to get to the remote areas”.

Within this theme, responses related to fatigue or driving tired can be divided

into two primary areas. Firstly, many participants (n = 87, 40%) acknowledged that

starting the day tired or fatigued often influenced their safe driving ability.

Participants reported that starting the day tired was due to: a) a busy work day, the

day before; b) lifestyle issues, such as, late nights, etc; c) certain medications made

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them sleepy; d) family problems or issues (e.g., sick children); and e) erratic sleep

patterns due to work shift changes. One male manager summated “there are many

things or reasons why someone is tired or fatigued at work, for example lifestyle ...

it’s not just work-related”. Secondly, some participants (n = 47, 22%) suggested that

work-related factors do contribute to fatigue at work. For example, one male

participant stated that “working a ten hour day and having to drive one and a half to

two hours home is a fatigue issue and often rarely addressed”. Similarly, a female

participant stated “I often drive long hours to get to a work location, sometimes four

or so hours driving usually without a break, and often arriving tired ... feeling like I

have already done a full day and I haven’t even started”.

Distraction and Inattention

The theme of distraction and/or inattention was widely acknowledged by

participants (n = 118, 54%) as a major risk factor to work-related road safety. One

manager commented “obviously there are many factors related to distracted driving

... I know my organisation has reported accidents due to distraction or inattention,

such as, eating and drinking while driving, mobile phone use, work issues and

fatigue”. In addition, a male participant suggested “I think everyone has been

distracted from the road while driving by whatever means. However, the monotony

of long boring roads can have an adverse effect on driving vigilance”.

Typically, within this theme the primary issues identified included: a) thinking

about work issues and not the driving task (e.g., productivity, the next location,

work-related problems, personnel differences) (n = 98, 45%); b) inattention due to

fatigue (n = 83, 38%); c) distracted by in-vehicle devices (e.g., radio, vehicle

controls) (n = 66, 30%); d) distraction due to conversation with passenger(s) (n = 58,

27%); e) distraction due to mobile phone use (n = 57, 26%); f) inattention due to road

monotony (n = 42, 19%); g) distracted whilst eating a meal or doing paperwork while

driving (n = 37, 17%); h) distraction due to outside vehicle (e.g., road signage, other

vehicles/drivers) or environmental factors (e.g., weather, animals, road condition) (n

= 21, 10%); i) distraction/inattention due to personal issues (e.g., personal

relationships, marriage issues, medical condition) (n = 16, 7%); and j) inattention due

to drug use (including medications and illicit drug use) (n = 8, 4%). Following a

review of distraction and inattention issues identified by participants, a male

participant commented “I think everyone here has at least at some point been

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distracted from the road, but how can you prevent this ... you don’t want to be

distracted, it just happens”.

The increasing use of technology (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptop

computers, GPS navigation) by organisations to aid their business processes and

prompt completion of work tasks/reporting (e.g., online) was reported by participants

(n = 62, 29%) as being a considerable distraction while driving. For example,

answering mobile phone calls, completing online paperwork and checking job site

location while driving was becoming normal operations for many work-related

drivers. In addition, some drivers (n = 23, 11%) suggested that their organisations did

not address driver distraction within their organisational safety processes and

documentation (e.g., WHS Policy and Procedures).

Driving Aggressively

Participant responses (n = 112, 52%) within this theme noted that the number

of observed incidents of aggressive driving seemingly have recently increased,

especially on highways. One female participant commented “I travel the Bruce

Highway every day, sometimes many times a day, and I often observe people driving

aggressively in and out of traffic trying to get ahead of the traffic, presumably in a

hurry ... sometimes almost causing an accident”. A male participant further stated “I

also see people driving aggressively, quite a few in work vehicles, and on one

occasion a driver driving erratically clipped my front bumper trying to push into my

lane ... I can tell you I wasn’t happy”. In addition, some participants (n = 23, 11%)

stated that they drove sometimes in an aggressive manner, with one male participant

stating “it can be boring in traffic, I want to get where I’m going not sit in slow

moving traffic, so yes I do try and get ahead by moving between lanes and driving

quicker when safe to do so”. Furthermore, within this theme a number of participants

(n = 15, 7%) identified young male drivers as major instigators of aggressive driving.

For example, a male participant stated “almost all drivers I see driving aggressively

on the road, especially on highways are generally young male drivers. I hate being a

passenger in a vehicle with a young male driver at work ... they all seem to want to

get somewhere in a hurry”.

Also within the theme associated with aggressive driving, participants (n = 12,

5.5%) indicated that personal factors (e.g., argument with family

member/spouse/other worker, reprimand by supervisor/manager, medical condition,

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drug use, personality), at times, intensified their propensity for aggressive driving.

For example, one young male participant stated “Prior to leaving work…let me say I

had a heated argument with my ex-wife about my kids visiting me on the weekend. I

know I was driving erratically but I was so angry”. Another male driver said “I got

out of a meeting with my boss getting up me for not completing the job on time…I

was angry and this was evident in my driving directly after. I only calmed down

when my fellow worker stated he wanted out of the vehicle”. Participants also

commented on examples of other workers driving erratically and in an aggressive

manner, suggesting that drugs (illicit) and/or medication as the primary contributing

factor. For instance, one male participant stated “I was in a vehicle with a guy driving

aggressively… I asked him to stop and I drove the vehicle instead…he wasn’t too

happy but I had seniority. I found out a week later he was involved in an accident

and drug tested by the cops and he was found to be under the influence of drugs…not

sure what type”. A female participant also stated “some people don’t need a reason

to drive aggressively, they are just aggressive in nature, you know, they have an

aggressive personality”.

Alcohol and Other Drugs

The theme related to consumption of alcohol and other drugs were identified

by many participants (n = 111, 51%) as a major risk factor for both drivers and

members of the public. In essence, participants within this theme suggested that

work-related drivers driving under the influence of alcohol and/or either illicit or

prescription drugs are considerably at risk regarding vehicle crashes/incidents. For

example, in relation to alcohol consumption and driving at work, a male participant

stated “I know of many blokes who have a few beers at the pub during their lunch

break ... although not condoned by management, they do know it happens but don’t

do anything about it”. Interestingly, a number of participants (n = 49, 23%)

recognised illicit drugs use as a serious risk factor to safe work-related driving.

Within this theme many participants perceived illicit drugs as being widely

unreported or under acknowledged as a serious risk within most organisations. For

example, a female participant commented “I believe drug driving is probably a

larger problem than is reported in the media or via government agencies, etc ... we

know it occurs within the workforce but the extent or how widespread is generally

unknown”. In addition, a male participant stated “I know of some guys who partake in

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illicit drug use, even during work and they are often involved in vehicle accidents ...

usually they mistake distances, especially when reversing and hit something,

however it is probably only a matter of time for a serious crash to occur”.

Furthermore, some participants (n = 22, 10%) associated prescription drug use as a

concern regarding driving at work. A male supervisor commented “workers who

have been prescribed medication by their doctor for whatever reason very rarely let

their employer know, they feel OK and therefore don’t say anything for fear of

workmate comment or ridicule ... our organisation’s policy states that if under

prescribed medication with a label stating it may cause drowsiness, they are to

inform their supervisor or manager ... this doesn’t happen”.

Management Commitment and Support

Another major theme identified throughout the focus groups was the influence

of management commitment on WRRS. Participants (n = 96, 44%) commented that

management commitment and support impacted on driving safely for work purposes

within their respective organisations. For example, within this theme one male

participant noted that “there is seemingly no commitment or support for work-related

driving within our organisation ... it isn’t even acknowledged unless a serious

accident or a number of accidents have occurred and it’s affecting management’s

bottom dollar”. In addition, a male participant suggested “if management were

committed to driving safety wouldn’t you think that they would lead by example …

our manager doesn’t, he’s a maniac on the road”.

Within this theme, participants (n = 36, 17%) also suggested that work-related

driving was not acknowledged within their organisations or addressed within safety

documentation, processes or practice. One male participant commented “my

organisation does not target driving as a safety issue, we have no driving safety

policy or procedures ... it is expected that everyone knows how to drive safely and

does so at work”. In addition, a safety representative stated “my manager believes

that he has more problems to worry about than driving at work, for instance getting

people to complete the required job-related paperwork”. Further, a male participant

stated “if management don’t care about work driving safety, why should I care, I

might as well do what I need to do to make it easier on me. If I need to speed to get to

a job so I don’t get reprimanded for not doing enough, I will”.

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In contrast, within this theme there were differences in opinion between

managers and other staff in relation to the influence of management commitment and

support for WRRS, as most executive and operational managers (n = 16, 7%)

disagreed with the assumption that there is a lack of management commitment in

relation to WRRS. For example, a male executive manager stated “due to a high

work-related driving incident rate we conducted our own research of the available

literature in the area. What we found was a considerable amount of research

information in relation to driver behaviours and more specifically drivers

committing errors and illegal behaviours. Therefore, to us work-related driving was

a driver issue and we subsequently ensured our policy included statements relating

to compliance with the road rules and instigated a driver training program”. In

addition, managers suggested that current research in the area of work-related road

safety does not necessarily meet industry needs. For example, a male operational

manager indicated “we know there is a variety of issues facing drivers and their

ability to drive safely but no manager is going to risk wasting their budget to address

something or a driving risk that is suggested could be an issue … our data suggests it

is a driver issue and we treat it as such”.

Speed

Although speed is a relatively well known risk factor and contributing factor of

road-related incidents and crashes in Australia, this theme was only identified as a

major risk factor by approximately a third of study participants (n = 79, 36%).

However, most of those participants (n = 65, 30%) who acknowledged speed as a

risk factor also identified work or time pressure as a factor that contributed to

drivers’ propensity to speed. For example, a male participant commented “most

people speed to get somewhere in a hurry and in regards to work-related driving it is

usually because you’ve been told by management to get somewhere in a hurry ... so

drivers speed”. In addition, a female participant stated “we are always told we have

to increase our productivity, there is no over-time, so to make up time drivers see the

need to speed”. In contrast, within this theme a few participants indicated that some

drivers actually enjoyed speeding or they enjoyed the thrill of speeding. For instance,

a male participant suggested “I like to speed a little ... I’m a safe driver and I have

the skill to drive faster than the norm ... I get bored at the speed limit and let’s face it

everyone speeds a little sometimes, don’t they?”. In addition, a male manager stated

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“I travel across the rural areas of Queensland, I have a safe vehicle and I have an

impeccable driving record and don’t see why I can’t travel a little faster on rural

roads where there is little traffic”. When questioned regarding the speed the manager

travelled on rural roads, the manager stated “I can often cruise around 165

kilometres per hour on good roads”. Finally, a majority of participants also

acknowledged that there were no organisational consequences for drivers receiving a

speeding (or any driving violation) infringement whilst driving a work vehicle,

beyond having to pay the fine. For instance, a male driver stated “if we speed, yes we

may get caught but the company only gets us to pay the fine, maybe a little slap on

the wrist but nothing more than that”.

Driver Errors

A theme associated with making mistakes while driving and errors of

judgement (n = 61, 28%) were also identified as contributing factors of both work-

related vehicle incidents and near misses. For instance, a male participant stated “I

believe everyone makes mistakes when driving at work or at any time actually ... you

can’t be familiar with every road or area and there are many pressures or

distractions that create errors while driving”. The major driver mistakes/errors

identified within this theme included: a) following too closely to the vehicle in front

(n = 26, 12%) – “I had a rear end crash ... I don’t know why I was following the

vehicle too closely, I never usually drive that close to the vehicle in front ... I guess it

only takes once” (male participant); b) when reversing did not see an object or

misjudged the distance to an object while reversing (n = 19, 9%) – “I did not see a

small metal post when reversing, it wasn’t in the rear vision mirror” (male team

leader); c) changing lanes and did not see a vehicle in the other lane (n = 9, 4%) – “I

had a near miss just the other day when changing lanes, I did look but the vehicle

must have been in my blind spot, luckily the driver in the other car braked in time”

(female participant); d) failed to notice other

vehicles/motorcycles/bicycles/pedestrians (n =7, 3%) – “I stopped at an intersection,

looked and when I started to move I just missed hitting a bicycle rider ... I didn’t see

him till the last minute because of a number of parked vehicles, and he was moving

fast”.

Other Road Users

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Interestingly, almost a quarter of all study participants (n = 53, 24%) identified

other road users as an important theme associated with factors that influence drivers’

ability to drive safely for work including other motor vehicle drivers, motorcycles,

cyclists and pedestrians as having an impact on safe work-related driving. These

participants reported events additional to those who reported third party aggressive

driving acts reported previously in Section 4.4.2. For example, a male participant

stated “I am a good driver, but I often see other drivers driving poorly”. Likewise, a

female participant suggested “you have to have your wits about you when driving,

you may be a safe driver yourself but you have to be always on the lookout for other

drivers ... not everyone is a safe driver”. Similarly, within the theme some

participants identified motorcyclists ‘lane splitting’ or weaving around vehicles when

travelling towards intersections as a major concern. For example, a male manager

commented “I was about to change lanes to turn right at a set of traffic lights when a

motorcycle rider whizzed past me, a second later and I would have hit him ... this

happened even though I had indicated to change lanes seconds earlier ... I don’t

know where he came from”.

Deliberate Driving Violations

Another important theme indicated that participants (n = 38, 18%)

acknowledged deliberate driving violations as exposing drivers to additional risks.

For example, a male participant indicated “Our organisation has many recorded

work-related vehicle crashes involving our drivers not stopping at top signs and

failing to give way ... so there is a need for interventions or a hard stick to improve

things”. Although within this theme many deliberate violations (e.g., speed-related,

distraction-related breaches, etc) were addressed previously in this chapter, the

participant responses within this section primarily related to: a) failing to stop at

traffic lights (n = 19, 9%); b) failing to stop at stop or give way signs (n = 15, 7%);

and c) failing to wear seat belts (n = 4, 2%). For instance, a male participant stated

“sometimes I have attempted to run a yellow traffic light and it turned red just as I

have entered the intersection ... nothing happened”. Similarly, a male manager

indicated “in my organisation we have had a recent vehicle crash where one of our

drivers did not give way and was hit by another vehicle and the driver said he didn’t

see the vehicle ... we believe he probably intentionally didn’t give way because he

was busy”. In relation to failing to wear a seat belt, a male supervisor stated “we have

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told our field workers that they must wear a seat belt whenever they are driving a

vehicle, even when they are on private properties and stopping regularly to open

gates, etc, we know they still don’t ... then one day one of our vehicles was hit by a

farmer’s vehicle and our driver suffered head injuries because he wasn’t wearing a

seat belt and the impact saw him hit the windscreen”.

Interestingly, some participants within the theme (n = 12, 5.5%) acknowledged

that they often performed deliberate driving violations because of a personal need or

influence. For instance, a male participant identified “I get a thrill out of driving fast,

especially on the highway…its boring otherwise”. Similarly, a young male

participant stated “yeah…music makes me want to drive fast, I often look down at the

speedo and I am over limit, especially playing acca dacca (i.e., music group

ACDC)”.

Vehicle-Related Risks

Some participants (n = 32, 15%) commented that vehicle related risks

influenced WRRS. Participants within this theme identified maintenance issues (n =

12, 6%), lack of vehicle pre-start checks including accountability regarding

completion of checks (n = 10, 4%), vehicle fit for purpose (n = 6, 3%), additional

equipment fitted to vehicle including tool boxes, ladder racks and bull bars (n = 2,

1%), and poor loading of equipment and materials (n = 2, 1%). In relation to vehicle

maintenance issues, a male participant commented “in the remote areas where some

of us work, getting your vehicle serviced is difficult therefore you tend to leave it

until the last minute or you may travel kilometres over a scheduled service ...

sometimes this can result in a breakdown”. In addition, a male supervisor stated

“some guys really thrash their vehicles, especially if it is a make or model they don’t

like ... and sometimes scheduled maintenance doesn’t pick up on some problems as a

result”. Although vehicle pre-start checks were a requirement for most of the study

participants to complete before travel each day, a male participant stated “most guys

do their pre-start checks efficiently, but some cut corners and just tick the boxes as

done and don’t check anything”. Additionally, a male team leader commented

“unfortunately due to workload we don’t get a chance to regularly check that our

workforce are completing their pre-start checks ... sometimes this is detrimental to

both the drivers and company, such as a tyre blow out due to poor tyre inflation”.

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In this theme, only a few participants indicated work vehicles fit for purpose as

a risk factor. For example, one male participant stated “we do a lot of off road work,

at least once a month and the new four wheel drives we have are not as good or

rugged as the older Toyota Land Cruisers we used to have ... the new ones break

down all the time or just can’t take severe off road travel”. Furthermore, a male

participant indicated “sometimes we are provided with a vehicle that isn’t fit for the

purpose it is required to be used ... fleets often purchase vehicles under the cheapest

quote and the vehicles can’t handle the remote areas or all the equipment we need to

carry”. In contrast, a male participant stated “I don’t have a problem with the

vehicles we drive, yes they are not Land Cruisers but they get the job done”.

Interestingly, only two participants identified poor loading of equipment and extra

equipment fitted to vehicles as risk factors to work-related road safety. For example,

a male participant stated “we have new tool boxes fitted to the tray of our vehicles,

not only do they inhibit visibility but if they are not loaded correctly the equipment

moves around ... and with the extra weight of ladder racks, etc it makes the vehicle

unstable especially at higher speeds”.

Organisational Safety Rules and procedures

Participants (n = 30, 14%) acknowledged that a lack of organisational work-

related road safety rules and procedures contributed to the risk of work-related

vehicle incidents. Within this theme most participants suggested that their

organisation’s policy, rules and procedures did not adequately address all work-

related travel issues. For example, a female participant stated “my husband works for

a company that has strict and regulated vehicle use policy and procedures

documents and everyone is required to be aware of the contents ... my company has

none and therefore everyone does what they want, whether it is right or wrong”.

Furthermore, a male supervisor commented “every organisation should have a policy

and procedures for work-related driving, like they do for other work tasks, so that all

their staff are working to a common and safe standard when driving ... we don’t but

we should have one ... no one either wants to go there or they don’t have the

knowledge to develop one”.

Some participants also acknowledged in this theme that although their

organisation has numerous safety policy and procedures associated with specific

work tasks (e.g., use of chainsaws, plant and chemicals), their organisation did not

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have any policy or procedures related to WRRS. For example, a male participant

stated “our organisation has policy, procedures and risk assessments for just about

every work task but not work-related driving safety ... wouldn’t you think if work-

related road safety was such a big issue the organisation would have some form of

policy and procedures relating to safe driving”.

External Factors

Limited participant responses associated with external factors indicated that

factors such as environmental conditions, road conditions and external agencies (e.g.,

government, customers, society) were not seen as primary WRRS influences.

Although only extracting a relatively small percentage of participant responses, the

theme associated with external factors was included within these results to

demonstrate the level that external factors influenced WRRS (e.g., Research

Question 3). In addition, this theme primarily elicited participant responses

associated with road conditions and environmental factors.

Some participants (n =14, 6%) suggested that the condition of roads can

influence work-related road safety. For instance, a male participant suggested “most

of the roads in rural and remote Queensland are not of a good standard, to say the

least, I’m sure poor roads are also a contributing factor to some road accidents”.

The majority of participants (n =12) that identified road condition as a risk factor

indicated the condition of many rural and remote roads as the primary risk. For

example, a male participant stated “many of the roads we travel on for work in rural

areas, including property roads, are gravel and sometimes in an appalling condition

... especially just after rain”. However, two participants commented that sometimes

even bitumen roads are in poor condition, with one male manager commenting “even

highways have patches of poor road surfacing and pot holes, and if you are not alert

they can have an influence”.

Within this same theme, some participants (n = 8, 4%) also stated that various

environmental factors had an impact of WRRS. For instance, a male manager

suggested “what about issues of poor visibility due to driving or weather conditions

or kangaroos crossing the road ... I don’t believe it is always the fault of the driver

or the organisation”. Risk factors of influence included weather condition effect on

visibility and road surface, visibility due to sunlight, and animals crossing the road.

For example, a male participant stated “in heavy wet weather not only does it reduce

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your visibility but it also causes the road to be slippery, especially if it hasn’t rained

for a while and there is excess oil on the road”. Furthermore, a female team leader

suggested “travelling west in the afternoon causes problems related to visibility

because the sun is in your eyes, particularly late in the afternoon when the sun is

low”. Moreover, a male participant suggested that “animals crossing the road are a

risk, especially in the evening on rural roads where roos (i.e., reference to

kangaroos) are a problem”.

Exposure

Surprisingly, only a small number of participants (n =22, 10%) identified

driving exposure as a risk factor. Within this theme, driving exposure was reported as

both the number of kilometres travelled or the hours spent driving for work purposes.

Due to a high percentage of participants who only travelled within city and suburban

areas, the amount of time spent in work vehicles due to high traffic conditions (e.g.,

slow or stop/start traffic conditions) far outweighed actual kilometres travelled. For

example, a male participant indicated “if you travel in traffic for long periods of time,

eventually something will happen whether you are the cause or not”. In addition, a

male manager stated “because our staff travel a lot of kilometres during the year,

such as rural trips, the chance of an accident increases”. Similarly, a male

participant indicated “We travel considerable distances across the state ... with the

amount of kilometres some of our drivers are required to travel it is inevitable that

an incident will occur at some stage”. Interestingly, a male supervisor stated

“driving exposure is probably the one main cause or reason for our high number of

incidents… we have a lot of drivers who travel an enormous amount of kilometres

per year”.

Interestingly, within this same theme the majority participants (n = 161, 74%)

described their work-related driving exposure in hours driven per week rather than

the aggregate of kilometres driven. Most participants were unaware of even an

approximate value in relation to kilometres driven suggesting that they were either

not responsible for recording kilometres (e.g., no requirement to maintain log book

entries) or they drove multiple vehicles annually and were not familiar with the total

amount of kilometres driven in each vehicle.

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DISCUSSION

This section discusses the key findings from the focus groups conducted in

Study One, Part A. The results provided responses associated with participant

perceptions and experiences related to individual, organisational and external factors

that influence their ability to drive safely for work. The identification of

individual/personal, organisational and external/environmental influences on WRRS

by focus group participants acknowledge the diverse range of factors impacting on

drivers’ ability to drive safely for work purposes. In addition, in relation to the safety

culture model framework utilised within this program of research, Study One, Part A

provides results indicating WRRS influences across the three proposed areas of

safety culture, including psychological (organisational – safety climate), behavioural

(individual/personal – behaviours), and situational (external/environmental –

organisations’ systems, operating environment). Study One findings are discussed

with reference to previous research along with the impact of new/unique findings.

Support for Study Objective

The objective of Study One was to identify work driver’s perceptions and

experiences related to individual, organisational and contextual/environmental

factors that influence safe driving behaviours and driving safety performance. Major

areas of influence were acknowledged within the study results as being primarily

individual/personal related or organisational influences. Although external influences

(contextual/environmental factors) were identified by study participants the

responses were lower in number compared to the individual and organisation related

influences. Further discussion relating to the themes identified within Study One,

Part A of this program of research are included within the following sections:

Organisational, Individual and External influences.

Organisational influences

The predominant theme to emerge from the qualitative analysis was work/time

pressure. Similar to previous WRRS research, participants identified work/time

pressure as an organisational influence whereby participants perceived they were

pressured to increase productivity, meet deadlines or attend meetings/work ‘call outs’

in a timely manner (Boufous & Williamson, 2009). In addition, previous research

indicated that WRRS was not considered a priority compared to productivity

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(Newnam et al., 2005). Participants in this study also believed that productivity

allegedly took precedence over safety. Furthermore, within this theme some

managers/supervisors stipulated that they never suggested drivers disobey road rules

to make up time in an attempt to boost productivity (Wishart et al., 2011) or

conceded they may have inadvertently placed employees under work pressure.

However, the results within this theme also suggested differences between

management and other staff, with some managers suggesting that productivity was

paramount. Interestingly, although most participants believed the perceived pressure

was initiated by the organisation and respective management, some participants in

this study suggested that certain individuals placed themselves under time/work

pressure. For example, to be perceived as a model employee by management, some

individuals may deem it necessary to get to an important client’s call as soon as

possible or eating/drinking during driving between jobs to increase performance,

maximise work time and exceed required call/job rates. Uniquely, this finding

suggests that not all work/time pressure is an organisational influence. Rather, in

certain circumstances, could also be viewed as an individual influence, thereby

complicating the processes utilised for the development and application of suitable

intervention strategies. For instance, some individuals placed themselves under

pressure to complete as many job call outs as possible in an attempt to be viewed by

management as productive workers.

Similar to previous research, management commitment exhibits a major role in

the effectiveness of any safety-related program (Bluff, 2003; Hale et al., 2010;

Vredenburgh, 2002), including WRRS (Mooren et al., 2014; Rowland & Wishart,

2014). For example, employees working for a supervisor or manager who never

mentions safety, encourages safety or participates in any safety improvement strategy

may indicate to the employees that safety is not important in their workplace. Results

of this study indicated a lack of management commitment and support for work-

related driving issues. Rather, many participants believed management would only

address WRRS in reaction to a serious incident or high number of reported crashes

that may impact on organisational costs and resources. Similar to previous research

(Rowland et al., 2006), participants suggested that a considerable proportion of

managers perceived driving for work was not an organisational safety issue rather

they considered drivers were to blame for the occurrence of vehicle incidents and

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adverse driver behaviour. Alternatively, a lack of management commitment and

support, as well as a culture where the vehicle driver is seemingly seen as the blame

for work-related driving incidents may reduce drivers’ commitment to drive safely

(Newton et al., 2013; Rowland et al., 2005). For example, organisations exhibiting a

lack of commitment and support may result in a “do not care attitude” by drivers and

potentially promote adverse driving behaviours, whereby driving safety performance

is based on personal needs and not the requirements of the organisation. Taken

together, management commitment and support are critical for the development and

implementation of adequate WRRS management systems and driver performance,

hence an integral component for the improvement of WRRS culture. For instance,

failure by management to adequately address WRRS issues within organisations

would also hinder any approach or intervention strategy aimed at improving WRRS

performance and outcomes.

Organisational safety rules, such as policy and procedures outline the basic

requirements for safe management and operation of work (Rowland et al., 2006).

Essentially, organisational policy and procedures provide basic directions for

workplace processes and practice highlighting the “rules of the game” for safety

within the workplace (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997; Wishart et al., 2011).

Likewise, inclusion of WRRS within organisational safety management systems

stipulates basic requirements for the management and safe operation of work-related

vehicles. However, in contrast to general safety-related policy and procedures, study

participants identified a lack of organisational safety rules and procedures addressing

WRRS. This result proposes that WRRS is not addressed as or considered a priority

safety issue. This finding could also be an indicator of the lack of management

commitment for WRRS as a serious safety concern for organisations. However, this

result may also stem from a lack of understanding of WRRS and the financial and

safety benefits associated with addressing WRRS issues.

Individual influences

The results identified a number of themes associated with individual (or

personal) factors that influence WRRS. These themes are supported by previous

research. For example, the major themes identified within the results included:

driving aggressively (Deffenbacher et al., 2003; Gonzallez-Iglesias et al., 2012;

Herrero-Fernandez, 2013; Lajunen & Parker, 2001), fatigue and driving tired

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(Darvell et al., 2014; Di Milia et al., 2012; Liu & Wu, 2009; Soufine & Williamson,

2006), distraction and inattention (Crundall et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2008; McEvoy et

al., 2007; Nelson et al, 2009; Rosenbloom, 2006; WHO, 2011), alcohol and other

drugs (Biggs & Williamson, 2012; Davey et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2004; Rowland

et al., 2010), and speeding (Australian Transport Council, 2011; Boufous &

Williamson, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2004; Safety Net, 2009). Although the themes

identified in this study are acknowledged as important influences on WRRS

performance and outcomes, the diverse array of themes identified are similar to the

major influences that have been found to impact the general road safety population in

Australia and overseas. However, the results also suggest that some of the themes are

linked to organisational issues, such as a lack of organisational commitment for

WRRS or failure of organisational safety systems and processes to address WRRS

issues. These themes are further discussed below.

Interestingly, a major influence acknowledged by many participants was the

theme related to driving aggression. For a considerable proportion of study

participants, aggressive driving was influenced by work/time pressure. In addition,

similar to previous research (Newnam et al., 2002; Wishart et al., 2011), the themes

associated with speeding behaviour and breaches of road rules (e.g., driving

violations, including running yellow/red traffic lights or fail to give way) were also

linked to organisational work/time pressure for a proportion of study participants.

For example, to attend meetings/jobs on time or increase productivity, drivers may

drive more aggressively within traffic, speed and/or commit driving violations in

order to make up time. Furthermore, analogous to previous research (Rowland,

Davey, Freeman & Wishart, 2009), participants (including both managers and

employees) indicated that speeding was an acceptable behaviour whilst driving for

work. For example, supported by other research some participants believed it was

safe for them to speed due to an overconfidence in their own driving ability

(Caponecchia, 2010; Oz, Ozkan & Lajunen, 2009; Wishart, 2015), including:

optimism bias (e.g., belief that they are a better driver than other road users), and a

reduced perception of risk (acceptable to speed in low traffic conditions or on less

travelled roads). It is also noteworthy that there were limited organisational

consequences for drivers who incurred speeding infringements (e.g., speed camera)

whilst driving a work vehicle. Failure to address identified safety risks (e.g.,

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speeding infringements) could be considered a failure of organisational safety

systems (e.g., risk management) and processes (e.g., driver responsibilities within

policy and procedures).

Previous research has identified fatigue as a major influence on work-related

driver behaviour and crash risk (Broughton et al., 2003; Horne & Reyner, 1998;

Freeman et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2004; Rowland et al., 2006; Salminen &

Lähdeniemi, 2002; Taylor & Dorn, 2006; Wang & Pei, 2014). Likewise, study

participants acknowledged the theme associated with fatigue and driving tired as

major driving risk factor. For example, a considerable proportion of participant

responses suggested that they started the day tired, citing family and social factors, as

well as work-related scheduling and shift-work as adversely influencing their safe

driving ability. In addition, long working hours as well as extensive work-related

vehicle travel and commuting time were recognised as factors that influenced

drivers’ level of fatigue. Work scheduling such as shift-work, night work and long

working hours have been widely acknowledged as a detriment to workplace safety

and an increased risk of work-related vehicle crashes/incidents (Di Milia, Rogers &

Akerstedt, 2012). Within this theme, the results indicate a lack of organisational

processes (e.g., risk assessment, policy and procedures) established to mitigate

fatigue-related risks associated with the hazard of work-related driving; including

shift-work, daily work-related travel to/from work locations, long distance travel, and

time of travel.

Similar to the general road user population (Connor, Norton, Ameratunga &

Robinson, 2002; Cummings, Kopesell, Moffst & Rivara, 2001; WHO, 2011),

participants identified numerous forms of driver distraction and inattention; including

work-related use of technology, family and social issues, and environmental factors

that influenced WRRS at work. The changing demands of a modern workforce and

organisational requirements may result in workers utilising their work vehicle as a

mobile office (e.g., use of mobile phones and other technology, eating a meal while

driving, and completing paperwork). In addition, this study found that the use of

technological devices (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, lap top computers, GPS systems)

for work purposes is an increasing requirement for workers/drivers during their daily

work tasks. Therefore, the risk potential for distraction and inattention type

incidents/crashes whilst driving a vehicle at work are compounded. It is noteworthy

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that study participants also suggested that their organisations did not adequately

address the requirement to utilise technological devices for work as a WRRS

distraction risk. Furthermore, in response to work/time pressures to meet productivity

demands, study participants stated that they were influenced to partake in distractive

activities, such as eating a meal or using their mobile phone while driving.

In relation to vehicle-related risks, participants primarily identified a lack of

periodic maintenance checks (e.g., vehicle pre-start checks) and unsuitable fit-for-

purpose vehicles as potentially influencing WRRS. Study participants suggested that

although vehicle maintenance and especially vehicle pre-start checks are included

within the organisation’s safety processes, they are conducted in an ad hoc manner.

For example, due to inadequate supervision and little enforcement relating to the

completion of pre-start vehicle checks, many drivers fail to complete the checks prior

to operating vehicles. Vehicle pre-start checks are designed to ensure the vehicle is in

safe operating condition prior to use, such as checking vehicle fluid levels, tyre

pressures, and operation of indicators/lights (Wishart et al., 2010). Participants also

acknowledged vehicle fit for purpose (e.g., inadequate vehicle to suit conditions

travelled or work performed) and poor loading of equipment as influencing WRRS.

The identified vehicle-related influences suggest a lack of organisational policy and

procedures, as well as poor communication and consultation, supervision and

enforcement for vehicle-related processes.

External influences

Finally, study participants also identified external factors as influencing safe

driving performance. Albeit limited, the primary themes associated with external

factors included road conditions and environmental factors. Previous research has

suggested that road conditions, weather conditions and animals on/beside the road as

potential WRRS risks (Wishart & Davey, 2004; Wishart, 2015). However, the low

proportion of responses related to external factors suggests that these influences are

not considered major risks to WRRS for this study participant sample.

Interestingly, participants did not identify Work, Health and Safety legislation

or related enforcement as influencing WRRS. Previous literature suggested that there

is limited evidence that government regulators target and practice regular

enforcement in the area of WRRS (Rowland et al., 2012). Therefore, the lack of

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responses associated with safety legislation supports previous research suggesting

that government legislation and reduced likelihood of enforcement have limited

impact on WRRS, especially for work-related vehicle drivers. Alternatively, lack of

acknowledgement of WRRS as a WHS legislation issue could stem from exposure to

the legislation. For example, organisational management would have a higher

exposure to WHS legislation by ensuring the organisation meets its WHS legislative

requirements. However, a lack of WRRS enforcement by government regulators

(Rowland et al., 2012) and perception by organisational management that the driver

is to blame for most vehicle-related incidents, reduces management commitment for

WRRS and lowers management perception of WRRS as a serious concern.

Implications for Study One Part B

Responses received in Study One, Part A has identified a diverse range of

factors that influence contemporary WRRS. Consequently, the results obtained

support the requirement for a more exploratory approach in relation to the survey

questionnaire and utilisation of additional questionnaire sub-factors. For example,

study participants identified driver behaviours beyond those used in the Driver

Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ), such as, errors, highway-code violations and

aggressive violations. Although DBQ-related factors were acknowledged as

important by study participants, additional major influences related to driving

behaviour included time/work pressure, fatigue and inattention/distraction.

In relation to organisationally specific areas, participants identified work

pressures, management commitment and support, and organisational safety rules and

processes as influencing safe driving behaviour. Typically, these three key areas are

also represented within the Safety Climate Questionnaire – Modified for Fleet

Drivers utilised in Study One, Part B, namely work pressure, management

commitment and support, and adequacy of fleet safety rules. Perceived as important

influences by focus group participants, the safety climate scale utilised within Study

One Part B explores quantitatively the influence of safety climate factors on driver

behaviour and safety outcomes.

Albeit limited, focus group participant responses acknowledged driving

exposure as a potential influence on driving behaviours and driving safety

performance. In addition, participant demographics outlined in Table 5.1 revealed

considerable diversity in the amount of driving exposure (e.g., hours per week and

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kilometres per year) experienced by study participants. Similar to the results in this

study, high driving exposure has been reported as having a considerable influence on

adverse driver behaviour and WRRS outcomes (Rowland et al., 2006; Wishart,

2015). Therefore, the results provide additional support for exposure to be controlled

for within relevant data analysis conducted in Study One, Part B. Furthermore,

participants primarily described their driving exposure in terms of time (e.g., hours

per week) rather than number of kilometres. For example, many either were not

aware of how many kilometres they drove or they utilised multiple vehicles during

their work annually and were not aware of exact kilometres driven in each vehicle.

Therefore, the study findings support the argument that a variable representing

“hours per week” rather than “kilometres per year” would be a more reliable measure

of exposure for work-related vehicle drivers.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The results identified a multitude of themes related to individual, organisational and

external factors that potentially influence WRRS. Results suggest that WRRS is a

complex issue that is potentially compounded by the multi-directional effects of

some factors on driver performance. In relation to the Occupational Light Vehicle

(OLV) Use Systems Model (Stuckey et al., 2007), this research has also supported

the existence of a number of organisational, individual and external influences that

impact on WRRS. However, this study also identified multiple interactions between

different factors which impacted on WRRS performance and outcomes (e.g.,

perceived pressure influencing driver distraction). Although the OLV Use Systems

Model (Stuckey et al., 2007) comprehensively identifies multiple levels and the

range of factors that influence WRRS, a limitation of the model is that it does not

recognise the potential interactions between levels, factors or influences (e.g., multi-

directional effects). Subsequently, the results suggest that future WRRS research

may need to focus more attention toward the multi-directional effects and holistic

characteristics associated with WRRS culture.

Finally, the diversity of responses within this qualitative study suggest that

WRRS culture is a multi-dimensional issue that can impact not only safety but also

the potential business effectiveness of organisations. A broad array of factors

identified through this exploratory analysis were next examined quantitatively within

the proceeding chapter (Chapter 5 – Study One, Part B)

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Chapter 5: Study One Part B – Quantitative Analysis of Work-Related Road Safety Risk Factors


It has been recommended that the management and prevention of occupational

fatalities and injuries should combine both workplace improvements, such as

workplace design, new and safe equipment, and staff management, with safety

promotion activities aimed at improving or modifying behaviour (WHO, 2004).

Traditionally, within the general health and safety area, the focus has been primarily

on the physical aspects of the work environment (Whysall, Haslam & Haslam, 2004),

and tend to neglect the more psychosocial aspects of the integration between the

worker, type of work and work environment (Whysall et al., 2006).

The exploratory qualitative analysis reported in Study One, Part A (Chapter 4)

identified a broad range of factors that influence WRRS performance and outcomes.

Therefore, the objective of this chapter (Study One, Part B) is to quantify the

relationship between a range of driver behaviours and organisational factors (e.g.,

safety climate) on WRRS outcomes.

STUDY OBJECTIVES

As previously stated, Study One is divided into two parts across two chapters,

including a qualitative exploration across three tiers of staff including management,

supervisory and employees/drivers (Chapter 4) and a quantitative component (this

chapter) to examine the strength of relationships between factors and WRRS

outcomes. Utilising quantitative self-report survey data, this study aims to further

investigate the multiple-facets of WRRS safety culture and identify the predominant

factors that influence WRRS performance and outcomes. Specifically, the research

questions for Study One include:

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7. What personal characteristics and individual driver issues (i.e., driver

behaviour) influence work-related drivers’ ability to drive safely for the

purpose of work?

8. What organisational factors influence work-related driver safety, such as

driver behaviour and level of risk and propensity for work-related driving

offences and crashes?

9. Are there any external factors that influence the safe driving ability of drivers

operating light vehicles for the purpose of work?

METHOD

Factors that influence work-related driver safety are often researched by

utilising surveys and questionnaires based on self-reported data. Survey

questionnaire research studies have a number of advantages compared to other

methods, such as large amounts of data can be collected and analysed in a brief

period of time with low costs (Lajunen & Summala, 2003). The efficiency and low

costs of conducting self-report work-related driver surveys enables large national and

even international research to be implemented. In addition, survey questionnaires

provide a process for researching driving behaviours and attitudes, which may be

difficult to study by utilising other approaches such as observations, interviews and

analysing crash statistics (Lajunen & Summala, 2003). Furthermore, a variety of

information regarding the driver can be collected on the one survey. Therefore, the

self-report survey method can provide an in-depth examination of the antecedents of

specific driving behaviours, attitude and driver perception associated with

organisational processes and practice. This study also examines the link between

both driver behaviour and organisational factors (e.g., safety climate) and WRRS

outcomes, including work-related vehicle crashes and offences (e.g., driving

infringements/fines).

Participant sample

A total of 444 work-related drivers volunteered to be involved in the study and

were all employees of Queensland state government departments and attended

WRRS workshops across Queensland. All workshop participants were asked if they

would like to participate and that participation was voluntary. Same as for Study One

Part A, the only requirement in relation to inclusion or exclusion criteria was that

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participants drove a work vehicle at least sometimes for the purpose of work. The

sample comprised a mix of city, suburban, rural and remote drivers. There were 307

(69%) males and 136 (31%) females (gender not stated for one respondent). The

average age of the sample was 42 years (range 17 – 68 yrs). In addition, the driving

experience of participants ranged from 1 – 51 years (time licence held) with an

average of 24 years driving experience. Although utilising a larger sample (N = 444)

compared to Part A (N = 217), the demographic variables identified above were

similar to those reported in Study One, Part A (Chapter 4). In addition, the 217

participants who participated within the qualitative component of this study also

completed the quantitative component (e.g., survey).

A copy of the survey questionnaire utilised within this study can be viewed in

Appendix B. Table 5.1 further illustrates the demographic characteristics relating to

the study participant sample.

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Table 5.1: Demographic Characteristics of the Survey Sample (N = 444) Age: Time Licence Held: Vehicle Category: Passenger (including sedan, hatchback, station wagon)

Four Wheel Drive

Truck

Other

Hours Driven per Week: None

1-10

11-20

21-30

31-40

Missing

17-68 years M = 42 (SD = 11.75) 1-51 years M = 24 (SD = 11.91) 248 (55.9%)

144 (32.4%)

12 (2.7%)

40 (9.0%)

20 (4.5%)232

(52.3%)

127 (28.6%)

44 (9.9%)

19 (4.3%)

1 (0.2%)

Gender: Male Female Type of Work: Field Work

Office work

Equal field/office

Driving Terrain: Mainly city, suburban roads

Both city/suburban and country roads

Mainly country roads

Mainly off road

Other Kilometres per Year: None

1-10 000

10 001-20 000

20 001-30 000

30 001-40 000

40 001-50 000

More than 50 001

69% (n = 307) 31% (n = 136) 146 (33%)

180 (40%)

118 (27%)

195 (43.9%) 172 (38.7%)

54 (12.2%)

17 (3.8%)

6 (1.4%) 7 (1.6%)

197 (44.4%)

100 (22.5%)

88 (19.8%)

29 (6.5%)

17 (3.8%)

6 (1.4%)

Content and materials

In addition to the demographic variables, various questionnaires related to

safety climate, behaviours, attitude and outcome measures were used in the survey. A

description of the information requested and questionnaires utilised within this

survey is provided below.

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Demographics

Participant socio-demographic information (see also Table 5.1) was collected

and included: age; gender; and driving experience. Items were also included to

explore participant work-related driving operational demographics including: the

category of vehicle mostly driven; the type of road registered motor vehicle driven

most often; driving terrain; hours per week driving for work; and kilometres per year

driven each year. The standardised demographic variables were developed based on

previous WRRS research (Davey et al., 2006; Freeman et al. 2008, Rowland et al.,

2008) and provided data in relation to OLV operation, including the vehicle, driving

exposure and the road environment.

Furthermore, items were included to explore participants’ previous

involvement in work-related driving outcomes including crashes and offences as well

as crashes and offences incurred outside of driving for work (i.e., in the drivers’ own

time). For example, survey participants were requested to indicate how many

occasions during the past 12 months they had been involved in crash while driving

for work as well as outside of work or in their own time. A crash was defined as any

incident involving a motor vehicle that resulted in any damage to a vehicle or other

property, or injury. Similar to work-related vehicle crashes, survey participants were

requested to indicate how many occasions during the past 12 months they had

incurred a driving offence while driving for work and also outside of work (or in

their own time). A traffic offence was defined as any incident for which the driver

was fined or incurred a loss of demerit points (excluding parking offences).

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Safety Climate Questionnaire – Modified for Drivers (SCQ-MD)

The safety climate questionnaire (Glendon & Litherland, 2001) originally

included six factors which measure perceptions about management commitment to

fleet safety, fleet safety rules, driver training practices, work pressures, work

relationships and organisational communication. Previous research (Wills, Watson &

Biggs, 2004; 2005; 2006) utilising the SCQ-MD has found, among other things, a

relationship between organisational safety climate perceptions in workers and work-

related driving behaviour. Organisational safety climate appears, therefore, to be an

important concept in the study of work-related driving behaviour. However,

somewhat similar to the original safety climate questionnaire the questionnaire

utilised within this study is based on previous Australian work-related road safety

research (Davey et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2008a; Wills et

al., 2004; 2005; 2006) and includes five factors. Similarly, an abbreviated version of

the SCQ-MD was utilised for this research which included the following factors:

fleet safety rules, management commitment, communication and support, adequacy

of fleet safety procedures and work pressures. Due to participating organisations’

request that the survey length to be as concise as possible, an abbreviated version of

the SCQ-MD was deemed appropriate and subsequently developed for this study.

Justification for determining SCQ-MD items to be included was based on relevant

previous research and the ability of the items to reliably assess the influence of

organisational safety climate on work-related driving behaviour (Davey et al., 2006;

Freeman et al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2008a). Accordingly, the abbreviated version of

the SCQ-MD has also been previously utilised in WRRS research (Horsey, Wishart

& Rowland, 2012; Wishart et al., 2010). Similar to previous research utilising a fleet

safety climate scale (Wills et al., 2004; 2005; 2006), items were modified to reflect

Australian WRRS terminology, such as policies and procedures and work pressure.

In relation to this program of research, ten questions associated with the SCQ-MD

were utilised to explore the influence of current organisational factors on work-

related driving behaviour and driving safety performance outcomes.

Modified Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (MDBQ)

Since its inception, the Manchester Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ) has

become one of the most prominent and widely utilised measurement scales to

examine self-reported driving behaviour (Lajunen & Summala, 2003; Wishart et al.,

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2014). Previous research has demonstrated consistency of the scale across different

countries including, Britain (Parker, Reason, Manstead & Stradling, 1995; Reason,

Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, & Campbell, 1990), China (Stradling, Parker, Lajunen,

Meadows & Xie, 1998), Sweden (Åberg & Rimmö, 1998), Finland (Bianchi &

Summala, 2004; Mesken, Lajunen & Summala, 2002; Özkan, Lajunen & Summala,

2006), Spain (Gras, Sullman, Cunill, Planes, Aymerich & Font-Mayolas, 2006),

Greece (Kontogiannis, Kossiavelou & Marmaras, 2002), Turkey (Sümer, Lajunen, &

Özkan, 2002) and Australia (Blockey & Hartley, 1995; Dobson, Brown, Ball, Powers

& McFadden, 1999; Freeman et al., 2007; Newnam, Watson & Murray, 2003;

Rowland et al., 2008a). In addition, the versatility of the DBQ has been

demonstrated in the utilisation of the measurement tool across a range of road safety

research, including: cross cultural studies (Lajunen, Parker & Summala, 2003), the

genetics of driving behaviour (Bianchi & Summala, 2004), age differences in driving

behaviour (Dobson et al., 1999), contributing factors to accident involvement

(Dobson et al., 1999; Parker et al., 1995) and factors associated with demerit point

loss (Davey et al., 2007) within a fleet setting.

The DBQ is based upon Reason’s (1990) Generic Error Modelling System

(GEMS), which proposes that unsafe behaviour can be divided into two broad

categories (i.e., errors and violations). The DBQ was developed from a series of

studies (Parker et al., 1995; Reason et al., 1990) and was further developed into three

different types of aberrant driving behaviour – errors, lapses and violations.

Subsequently, further research resulted in additional modifications to the DBQ

(Lawton, Parker, Stradling & Manstead, 1997), which found two classes of violations

including highway-code violations and aggressive violations. Previous Australian

WRRS research utilising a modified version of the DBQ also identified a three-factor

solution, including errors, highway-code violations and aggressive violations (Davey

et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2009). However, in both previous studies a number of

traditional highway-code violations were found to be associated with aggressive

driving acts.

The driver behaviour questionnaire utilised in this research contained 44 items

including traditional DBQ factors (Davey et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2009): errors

(8 items), highway-code violations (8 items) and aggressive violations (4 items) as

well as an additional 24 items aimed at examining the influence of more

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contemporary risky behaviours (e.g., fatigue, distraction, work pressure and multi-

tasking, etc) (Freeman et al., 2007; Banks, 2008). Additional support for the

inclusion of the 24 non-traditional DBQ items was because many of the additional

items were highlighted as major themes within the results obtained in Study One,

Part A of this program of research. Additional speeding-related items were included

because previous research has suggested that all speeding related behaviour may not

be intentional. For example, previous research has suggested that drivers of larger,

heavier, increased comfort, quiet, or unfamiliar type vehicles often tend to

underestimate their driving speed and inadvertently exceed the speed limit without

realising that they are doing so (Corbett, 2001; Corbett & Simon, 1992; Corbett &

Simon, 1999; Horswill & McKenna, 2004; Matthews & Cousins, 1980).

Driver Attitude Questionnaire (DAQ)

The DAQ (Parker, Stradling & Manstead, 1996) is based on the Theory of

Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) which suggests that human action is guided

by three kinds of considerations:

• beliefs about the probable outcomes of the behaviour and the evaluations of

these outcomes (behavioural beliefs);

• beliefs about the normative expectations of others and motivation to comply

with these expectations (normative beliefs); and

• beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or impede

performance of the behaviour and the perceived power of these factors

(control beliefs).

The DAQ (Parker et al., 1996) assesses attitudes towards four common traffic

violations including drinking and driving, close following (tailgating), risky

overtaking and speeding. Research studies involving the DAQ and work-related

populations have been conducted with varying results in Australia (Banks, 2008;

Freeman et al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2008). However, due to results identifying

driver attitudes within the themes identified in Part A of this study, inclusion of the

DAQ within the survey was to further quantitatively explore driver attitudes.

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Procedure

Similar to Study One Part A, recruitment of participants utilised a convenience

sample, with all recruitment facilitated at industry fleet safety workshops held within

various Queensland city and regional areas. The only requirement in relation to

inclusion or exclusion criteria was that participants drove a work vehicle at least

sometimes for the purpose of work”. As stated previously, Study One research was

conducted as part of a larger industry research program. The survey questionnaire

was provided to all participants of the industry workshops and participants were

informed regarding confidentiality of participation, as well as, the voluntary nature of

involvement. The sample of participants from the qualitative component of Study

One (Part A: N = 217) also completed the quantitative component (Part B: N = 444).

Within the larger research project, the survey questionnaires were designed and

aimed toward providing baseline quantitative data prior to the implementation of a

work-related driving intervention strategy. Before the facilitation of the workshop,

each participant was provided with a paper version of the survey questionnaire and

once completed the surveys were returned directly to the researcher. Any questions

related to the completion of the survey were answered by the researcher on an as

required basis. However, within this program of research the survey questionnaire

was utilised to quantitatively explore the contemporary influences on WRRS and

driver performance issues.

RESULTS

The structure of the results section involves identifying the factor structure and

reliability of the survey questionnaires, descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations,

and prediction of outcome measures (e.g., work-related vehicle crashes and driver

offences (e.g., infringements/fines).

Driver Behaviour

MDBQ Factor Structure

An exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 44 item modified driver

behaviour questionnaire (MDBQ). Table 5.2 Exploratory factor structure of the

modified DBQ illustrates the factor loadings for each of the MDBQ factors

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determined by the factor analysis. Following is a description of the MDBQ factor

analysis.

The 44 items were subjected to principal components analysis (PCA) using

SPSS Version 23. Prior to performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor analysis

was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many

coefficients of .3 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .94, exceeding the

recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970; 1974) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity

(Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance (p<.001), supporting the factorability

of the correlation matrix. Principal components analysis with oblimin rotation

revealed seven factors exceeding Kaiser’s criterion of eigenvalues > 1. Due to the

exploratory nature of the research, it was decided to maintain the seven factors with

eigenvalues >1 for further analysis (Tabernack & Fidell, 2001). The first factor

accounted for approximately 33% of the total variance and contained 10 items. The

majority of items included the traditional error items developed by Reason et al.

(1990) and also utilised in work-related road safety research (Freeman et al., 2007;

Rowland et al., 2009). For example, traditional error items included ‘fail to notice

pedestrians crossing in your path of traffic’ and underestimate the speed of an

oncoming vehicle while overtaking’. In addition, along with seven traditional DBQ

Error items, one traditional highway-code violation ‘Cross a junction even though

traffic lights have changed against you’, and one traditional aggressive violation item

‘pull out of a junction so far that you disrupt traffic’, also loaded onto this factor.

Furthermore, an additional driver behaviour item (e.g., hit/bump/scrape something

while manoeuvring) relating to driver error of judgement loaded on this factor. The

combination of primarily traditional error items and violations-type items on factor

one is similar to the Error factor in previous work-related driver behaviour research

(Banks, 2008; Freeman et al., 2007; Rowland et al., 2009). Human error has been

consistently implicated in a high proportion of safety-related incidents, including

road crashes (Salmon, Regan & Johnstone, 2005). Previous research has suggested

that 75% of all road crashes can be contributed to human error (Medina, Lee,

Wierwille & Hanowski, 2004).

The second factor accounted for approximately 8% of the total variance and

contained seven items primarily relating to fatigue (5 items), and single items

relating to distraction (i.e., find your intention being distracted from the road) and

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time pressure (i.e., drive while under time pressure). Previous road safety research

has found that driver inattention and distraction have been acerbated by driver

tiredness or fatigue (Wang & Pei, 2014). In regard to the links between the two

concepts, it is noteworthy that the results from Study One Part A indicated that issues

related to work (time) pressure and driver inattention/distraction were associated

with work-related driver fatigue (see sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5). Fatigue items

including ‘drive while tired’ and difficulty driving because of tiredness and fatigue’

were the strongest contributors to the factor. It is noteworthy that no traditional DBQ

items loaded on factor two.

The third factor accounted for approximately 6% of the total variance and

contained five items. Most of the items that loaded on factor three included

traditional highway-code violations (e.g., speeding). For example, traditional

highway-code violation items included ‘exceed the speed limit on a

highway/freeway’, ‘disregard the speed limit on a residential road’ and ‘race away

from traffic lights to beat car next to you’. However, two additional speeding items

‘exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway without realising’ and ‘exceed the

speed limit on a residential road without realising’ also loaded on this factor.

Although the additional items represent exceeding the speed limit unintentionally,

the items could still be characterised to directly relate to speeding. Furthermore, the

traditional highway-code violation item ‘race away from traffic lights to beat car next

to you’ can also be considered analogous to speed-related behaviour.

Factor four included two items related to vehicle maintenance and accounted

for approximately 4.5% of the total variance. Similar to previous research related to

Fleet Safety Climate (Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2006), two items associated with

vehicle pre-trip maintenance loaded onto a separate factor (2 items). Both variables

exhibited relatively strong factor loadings, including ‘check the tyre pressure and

fluid levels of your work vehicle’ (.89) and ‘conduct pre-trip vehicle inspections’

(.88). Although vehicle maintenance may not be directly related to the ‘driving task’

or driver behaviour, it is an important aspect of fleet safety and a work, health and

safety legislative requirement (Wishart et al., 2010; Model Work, Health and Safety

Act, 2011). However, pre-trip maintenance does have an indirect consequence

toward safety by preventing or reducing the incidence of vehicle-related problems

occurring during travel.

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Factor five accounted for 4.5% of the total variance and contained six items.

The items that loaded onto the factor comprised of four additional or new items, one

traditional DBQ Highway-Code Violation ‘drive while over the legal blood-alcohol

limit’ and one DBQ Aggressive Violation ‘become angered by another driver and

give chase’. The six items represent four aspects of potential driver “Illegal

Behaviour”, namely drink driving, seat belt use, road rage and hand held mobile

phone use while driving. Although the item ‘drive while using a hand held mobile

phone’ also loaded onto Factor two (.32), this item did have a more dominant factor

loading on Factor five (.48). In addition, the item relating to mobile phone use while

driving is more representative of an illegal behaviour that is subject to increasing

attention by law enforcement agencies.

The sixth factor accounted for 4.5% of the total variance and contained four

items. The items included four new or additional behavioural items predominantly

denoting characteristics of driver distraction. Comparable to previous work-related

road safety research (Wills et al., 2006), an item associated with time pressure loaded

onto a factor primarily containing items largely indicating driver distraction. It could

be surmised that drivers under time pressure may be more focussed on getting to the

next destination and not on the actual driving task; hence distracted from driving.

Factor seven accounted for approximately 4% of the total variance and

contained five items. The factor comprised of a mixture of traditional DBQ items

including three highway-code violations and two aggressive violations. Together the

items characterised issues associated with acts of aggressive driving. For example,

the DBQ highway-code violations that loaded onto factor seven; encompassing

‘drive close to car in front to signal driver to drive faster’, ‘become impatient with

slow driver and overtake on the inside’ and ‘stay in closing lane and force your way

into another’; are all synonymous with aggressive driving acts. Interestingly,

aggressive driving has been perceived by many road users as one of the most

significant problems of modern day driving (NHTSA, 1998; Shinar & Compton,

2004).

Table 5.2 shows the factor loading of greater than .3 for the modified driver

behaviour questionnaire utilised within this research. Illustrated in the table, three

items cross loaded on more than one factor, however these three items did have a

more dominant factor loading. Additionally, it is important to note that five items

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were excluded from further analyses due to unsatisfactory factor loadings (<.3). For

example, these items included one traditional DBQ Error item: ‘Skid while braking

or cornering on a slippery road’, and four additional behavioural items: ‘intentionally

disobey a stop or give-way sign’, ‘Drive home from work after a long day (after

working 12 hours or more)’, ‘physically check behind the vehicle for objects before

reversing’ and ‘pullover before answering/making mobile phone calls’.

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Table 5.2 Exploratory factor structure of the modified DBQ Description F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7

Fail to notice pedestrians crossing in your path of traffic

.76

Nearly hit another car while queuing to enter a main road

.68

Whilst turning nearly hit a cyclist on the inside .65

Pull out of a junction so far that you disrupt traffic .65

Underestimate the speed of an oncoming vehicle while overtaking

.58

Fail to check rear-view mirror before pulling out/changing lanes

.55 .35

Attempt to overtake someone you hadn’t noticed turning

.52

Hit/bump/scrape something while manoeuvring .52

Miss stop or give way sign .46

Cross a junction even though traffic lights have changed against you

.44

Drive while tired .84

Difficulty driving because of tiredness or fatigue .77

Find yourself driving on autopilot on the way home .73

Lose concentration while driving .70

Find your attention being distracted from the road .68

Drive while under time pressure .61

Find yourself nodding off while driving for work .50 .36

Exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway .86

Exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway without realising

.84

Race away from traffic lights to beat car next to you .50

Disregard the speed limit on a residential road .47

Exceed the speed limit on a residential road without realising

.39

Check the tyre pressure and fluid levels of your work vehicle

.89

Conduct pre-trip vehicle inspections .88

Have one or two alcoholic drinks before driving .86

Remove your seatbelt for some reason while driving .74

Not wear your seatbelt .63

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Drive while over the legal blood-alcohol limit .62

Become angered by another driver and give chase .57

Drive while using a hand held mobile phone .32 .48

Drive while using a hands free mobile phone .77

Do paperwork or other admin while driving .60

Eat a meal while driving for work .38 .51

Save time by driving quicker between jobs .34 .46

Drive close to car in front to signal driver to drive faster

-.57

Sound horn to indicate your annoyance at another driver

-.57

Become angered by other driver and indicate hostility -.43

Become impatient with slow driver and overtake on the inside

-.41

Stay in closing lane and force your way into another -.38

MDBQ factor reliability and descriptive statistics

Table 5.3 reports the results of the reliability analyses for the total MDBQ and

each of the seven factors. The reliability analysis revealed that the overall modified

DBQ had a high internal reliability of .93. High internal consistency was also

observed for the first three factors, with coefficient alpha values for Factor One .88

(errors), Factor Two .88 (fatigue) and Factor Three .83 (Speed). In addition, Factor

Four .76 (vehicle maintenance), Factor Five .80 (illegal behaviour), Factor Six .78

(distraction) and Factor Seven .77 (aggression) were above the acceptable reliability

coefficient level of .70 (De Vaus, 2002).

Table 5.3 also reports the mean and standard deviations for the 39 item MDBQ

and each of the seven factors utilised in this study. For all MDBQ factors, potential

responses ranged from one to seven, with higher scores indicating less safe work-

related driver behaviours. Although the majority of factors remained relatively

consistent, two factors were considerably above or below the mean overall MDBQ

score (M = 2.20, SD = .60). For instance, the Maintenance factor mean score (M =

5.13, SD = 1.51) was considerably higher than the other MDBQ factors indicating

that drivers are less likely to conduct vehicle maintenance checks prior to vehicle

operation. In addition, the Illegal Behaviour factor (M = 1.43, SD = .63) was lower

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than the majority of factors suggesting the study sample of drivers were less likely to

partake in illegal behaviours when driving for work purposes.

The six highest ranked items revealing the least safe items as reported by the

survey participants. The first (conduct pre-trip vehicle inspections; (M = 5.14, SD =

1.70) and second (check the tyre pressure and fluid levels of your work vehicle; M =

5.12, SD = 1.66) least safe items comprise the overall Maintenance factor (2 items).

Therefore, as indicated previously, drivers are less likely to exhibit behaviours

related to conducting vehicle maintenance checks prior to vehicle operation. In

relation to the qualitative analysis (Chapter 4), participants acknowledged that failure

to conduct pre-start vehicle checks was also a considerable WRRS concern.

Although the third least safe item (drive while under time pressure; M = 3.15, SD =

1.35) loaded onto the Fatigue factor, the item mean represents a moderate level of

time pressure exhibited by study participants. Similarly, the qualitative analysis

indicated work pressure as a major influence on WRRS performance and outcomes.

The fourth (exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway without realising; M = 2.97,

SD = 1.20) and fifth (exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway; M = 2.96, SD =

1.33) least safe items suggest that work-related speeding behaviour for this sample is

a concern however not as common as determined by previous research associated

with professional drivers (Newnam et al., 2004; Sullman et al., 2002). Finally, the

sixth least safe item (drive while tired; M = 2.94, SD = 1.25) is also an item on the

Fatigue factor suggesting that for some drivers, behaviours associated with fatigue is

also an influence on drivers’ safety performance.

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Table 5.3 MDBQ Scale Means and Standard Deviations

Scale Alpha Mean Std. Dev.

39-item MDBQ .93 2.20 .60

Maintenance .76 5.13 1.51

Fatigue .88 2.58 .91

Speed .83 2.54 .94

Distraction .78 2.21 1.12

Aggression .77 1.96 .78

Errors .88 1.75 .61

Illegal Behaviour .80 1.43 .63

Least Safe Items

Conduct pre-trip vehicle inspections 5.14 1.70

Check the tyre pressure and fluid levels of your work vehicle

5.12 1.66

Drive while under time pressure 3.15 1.35

Exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway without realising

2.97 1.20

Exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway 2.96 1.33

Drive while tired 2.94 1.25

Safety Climate

SCQ-MD factor structure

Utilising the responses from questionnaire participants, a factor analysis was

conducted on the 10 item abbreviated SCQ – MD to assess whether items loaded

onto factors comparable to traditional fleet safety climate questionnaires. The 10

items were subjected to principal components analysis with oblimin rotation using

SPSS Version 21. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed that all coefficients

were of .3 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .87, exceeding the

recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970; 1974) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity

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(Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance (p<.001), supporting the factorability

of the correlation matrix. Similar to more traditional versions of the modified fleet

safety climate questionnaire five factors were selected for extraction. The five-factor

solution accounted for 86.7% of the total variance with all factors appearing to be

moderately correlated. For example, factor correlations ranged from r = -.59 for

factors one and five to r = .26 for factors two and four.

Although each of the five factors only contained two variables, due to the

exploratory nature of this study it was deemed important to explore the influence of

each of the safety climate factors. However, due to the conditions associated with the

larger industry research program (e.g., reduced survey length size), of which this

study was part, the number of variables in the safety climate scale was limited. This

identified research limitation is further discussed within Chapter 8 (Section 8.3

Strengths and Limitations of the Research).

The 10 items loaded onto five factors (see Table 5.4) with two items loading

onto each factor. The first factor accounted for approximately 54% of the total

variance and represented items related to the adequacy of fleet safety rules. The

second factor accounted for approximately 13% of the total variance and represented

issues related to time pressure associated with meeting work obligations. Factor three

items characterise issues relating to fleet safety rules and accounted for

approximately 7% of the variance. In addition, factor four accounted for 6.5% of the

total variance and represented items related to communication and support. Finally,

factor five accounted for approximately 6% of the total variance and symbolised

issues related to management commitment. Illustrated in the table, one item ‘Safety

policies relating to the use of motor vehicles are effectively communicated to

workers’ cross loaded on more than one factor, however this item did have a more

dominant factor loading.

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Table 5.4 Factor structure of the modified fleet safety climate questionnaire Description F1 F2 F3 F4 F5

Our organisation ensures that safety procedures and rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are available to employees

.89

Safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles are complete and comprehensive

.87

There is sufficient time to enable employees to drive safely for work

.88

Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic .85

Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are followed even when a job is rushed

.89

Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles can be followed without conflicting with work practices

.80

Fleet safety problems are openly discussed between employees and managers/supervisors

.94

Safety policies relating to the use of motor vehicles are effectively communicated to workers

.37 .64

Management expectations encourage safe driving -.90

Driver safety is central to management’s values and philosophies

-.89

SCQ-MD factor reliability and descriptive statistics

Table 5.5 reports the results of the reliability analyses for the total SCQ-MD

and each of the five factors. Reliability analyses revealed that the overall modified

and abbreviated SCQ-MD had a high internal reliability of .91. High internal

consistency was also observed for four factors, with coefficient alpha values for

Factor One .89 (adequacy of fleet safety rules), Factor Two .83 (work pressure),

Factor Four .81 (communication and support) and Factor Five .87 (management

commitment). In addition, Factor Three .75 (fleet safety rules) was above the

acceptable reliability coefficient level of .70 (De Vaus, 2002).

Table 5.5 reports the mean and standard deviations for the 10 item SCQ-MD

and each of the five factors utilised in this study. For all SCQ-MD factors, potential

responses ranged from one to seven, with higher scores indicating safer employee

perceptions related to fleet safety climate within their organisation. Mean scores

remained relatively consistent across the five factors. Overall, the means reported for

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the SCQ-MD factors suggest that the study participants perceived a moderate level of

organisational support for WRRS. For instance, participants were asked their

perceptions in relation to how WRRS practices (e.g., safety climate variables) apply

to their organisation. The mean score results indicate that participants scored

between “undecided” and “agree somewhat”. The mean scores identified within this

Study are similar to results found in previous WRRS research utilising a safety

climate scale (modified for drivers) with the same factors (Freeman et al., 2008;

Wills et al., 2006). However, it should be noted that the previous research utilised

primarily a 5 point likert scale (e.g., instead of seven utilised within this study) and

each of the factors contained more items. Therefore, the results should be viewed

taking into account the scale differences when comparing results from previous SCQ

research.

Table 5.5 also reported the four lowest ranked items revealing the least safe

items as reported by survey participants. The two least safe reported items safety

policies relating to the use of motor vehicles are effectively communicated to workers

(M = 4.07, SD = 1.67) and fleet safety problems are openly discussed between

employees and managers/supervisors (M = 4.17, SD = 1.72) comprise the two items

related to the Communication and Support factor. Therefore, similar to the

qualitative findings (e.g., Study One, Part A), this sample of participants perceived

limited communication of and support for WRRS issues within their organisations.

In addition, the third (safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles are

complete and comprehensive; M = 4.27, SD = 1.52) and fourth (driver safety is

central to management’s values and philosophies; M = 4.34, SD = 1.63) least safe

items represent variables within the Adequacy of Fleet Safety Rules and

Management Commitment factors, respectively. Likewise, the qualitative study

analysis (Chapter 4) also indicated inadequate WRRS documentation and processes,

as well as, limited communication and support, as considerable influences associated

with the management of WRRS. In addition, a lack of management commitment and

support was identified as a major influence on WRRS performance and outcomes

within the qualitative findings.

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Table 5.5 Modified FSCQ Scale Means and Standard Deviations

Scale R Mean Std. Dev.

10-item modified FSCQ .91 4.60 1.16

Fleet Safety Rules .75 4.99 1.37

Work Pressure .83 4.86 1.43

Management Commitment .87 4.57 1.50

Adequacy of Fleet Safety Rules .89 4.48 1.46

Communication and Support .81 4.12 1.56

Least Safe Items


4.07 1.67


4.17 1.72


4.27 1.52

Driver safety is central to management’s values and philosophies

4.34 1.63

Driver Attitude

Generally, the Driver Attitude Questionnaire includes four subscales: alcohol

use, risky driving, close following and speeding related attitudes. Although reliability

analysis of all items within the DAQ together revealed moderate internal consistency

(.80), the coefficient alpha values for the four sub-factors revealed relatively low

internal consistency with all sub-factors, except risky driving attitudes (.72),

reporting coefficient alpha values less than the acceptable reliability coefficient level

of .70 (De Vaus, 2002). For example, the coefficient alpha values for the remaining

DAQ sub-factors included: alcohol use (.55); close following (.60); and speeding

(.62). Therefore, due to the poor reliability of the DAQ sub-factors the DAQ was not

utilised further within these analyses.

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Bivariate Correlations

An inspection of the inter-correlations (Pearson) between variables (see Table

5.6) revealed many statistically significant relationships. While the predictive

relationships between participants self-reported driving behaviours, driving outcomes

and perceptions related to fleet safety climate will be examined through multivariate

analyses in following sections, some noteworthy bivariate relationships are reported

at this stage.

Drivers’ age had a significant negative relationship with all the driver

behaviour factors and only a weak relationship with both work crashes and work

offences. Similar to recent work-related road safety research, the negative

relationships between age and the driver behaviour factors indicate as drivers gain

more experience they are less likely to engage in aberrant driving behaviours

(Freeman, Barraclough, Wishart & Rowland, 2014). However, it should be noted that

these relationships were not large, with the strongest relationships with age reported

together with fatigue (r = -.27) and speed (r = -.27). Small significant relationships

were reported between driving exposure (e.g., hours driven per week) and the driver

behaviour factors. This small relationship is similar to the findings within the

qualitative component of Study One, which reported that driving exposure for that

sample was not a strong influencing factor on WRRS performance and outcomes.

However, a moderate relationship was reported between driving exposure and

distraction (r = .39). The moderate correlation between driving exposure and

distraction suggests that as drivers spend increased time driving a work vehicle they

are more prone to be distracted from the driving task.

With the exception of the Maintenance factor, the majority of correlations

between MDBQ factors ranged from moderate to strong (r = .42 to .67). In addition,

the majority of MDBQ factor correlation statistics reported moderate relationships

with both work crashes and work offences. The statistically significant bivariate

correlation between the Distraction factor and both Work Crashes (r = .36) and Work

Offences (r = .41) was reported as having the strongest relationship compared to

other factors. These relationships propose that distraction may have a considerable

influence on safe driving outcomes within the contemporary WRRS setting.

The results observed from Table 5.6 indicated moderate to strong correlations

between all of the abbreviated SCQ-MD factors (r = .40 to .66). However,

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relationships between SCQ-MD factors and both Work Crashes and Work Offences,

although significant were relatively small. This result is in contrast to the qualitative

findings that indicated organisational issues (e.g., work pressure, lack of

management commitment and limited organisational rules and processes) did

influence WRRS outcomes. Similarly, only weak to moderate relationships were

reported between the SCQ-MD factors and the MDBQ factors. The strongest

relationship was reported between the SCQ-MD work pressure factor and MDBQ

distraction factor (r = .38), suggesting that organisational work pressure may

influence work-related driver behaviour associated distraction and inattention.

However, the weak to moderate relationships between the SCQ-MD and MDBQ

factors do not fully support the findings reported in the qualitative analysis (Study

One, Part A), which suggested that organisational factors have a major influence on

driver safety performance and behaviour.

Finally, the low proportion of work-related crash (18%) and offence (17%)

involvement reported by participants, should be taken into consideration when

assessing the relationships between factors and work-related outcomes (e.g., work-

related crashes and offences).

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Table 5.6: Bivariate correlations between driver behaviour, fleet safety climate, key demographic, and road safety outcome variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

1. Age 1 -.00 -.28** -.12* -.27** -.27** -.15** -.17** -.20** -.25** .03 .03 .12* .09 -.12* .03 -.09* -.13**

2. Hours driven per week 1 .25** .19** .18** .20** -.13** .13** .39** .22** -.10* -.02 -.16** -.09 -.05 -.08 .26** .25**

3. Overall driver behaviour

1 .82** .80** .82** .13** .72** .75** .74** -.42** -.30** -.39** -.38** -.23** -.27** .35** .39**

4. Errors 1 .50** .60** -.03 .65** .47** .66** -.35** -.27** -.29** -.33** -.22** -.30 .32** .32**

5. Fatigue 1 .58** .06 .47** .67** .42** -.30** -.22** -.33** -.28** -.11* -.28** .25** .28**

6. Speed 1 .08 .49** .54** .64** -.31** -.23** -.24** -.27** -.19** -.28** .28** .31**

7. Maintenance 1 -.11* -.03 -.01 -.22** -.16** -.16** -.15** -.23** -.18** .05 .00

8. Illegal behaviour 1 .47** .53** -.27** -.18** -.27** -.30** -.10* -.22** .19** .33**

9. Distraction 1 .41** -.32** -.19** -.38** -.27** -.15** -.29** .36** .41**

10. Aggression 1 -.27** -.18** -.26** -.24** -.16** -.24** .22** .22**

11. Overall FSC 1 .82** .75** .76** .79** .84** -.25** -.25**

12. Adequacy of FS Procedures

1 .48** .45** .64** .66** -.19** -.17**

13. Work Pressures 1 .60** .40** .53** -.23** -.26**

14. FS Rules 1 .45** .55** -.22** -.25**

15. Communication and Support

1 .60** -.15** -.15**

16. Management Commitment

1 -.20** -.16**

17. Work Crashes 1 .38**

18. Work Offences 1

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Additional Demographic and Environmental Factors

Additional categorical demographic factors were also examined. However, as

stated previously, the facilitation of the survey was part of an existing research

program aimed primarily at examining driver behaviour and fleet safety climate.

Subsequently, limited items were included relating to issues other than personal and

organisational-related factors that may influence WRRS. These limitations are

further discussed in Chapter 8. However, the results of the analyses associated with

the variables, type of work-related vehicle driven and type of driving terrain (e.g.,

environmental/external factor) are provided below. Demographic variable totals are

also provided in Table 5.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Survey Sample.

Type of Vehicle

Due to the considerably uneven sample sizes associated with the type of

vehicles utilised by the participant sample, the type of vehicle categories were

collapsed into two categories: passengers vehicles, including sedans, hatchbacks,

station wagons, and utilities (n = 248) and other vehicles, such as four wheel drives,

trucks and other vehicles (n = 196). Independent t-tests were performed to evaluate if

driving a particular category of vehicle influences driver behaviour (overall MDBQ)

or perceptions related to fleet safety climate (overall SCQ-MD). However, the results

revealed no significant relationships. Similarly, logistic regressions were performed

to attest if the type of vehicle driven influences crash involvement or committing

traffic offences. Likewise, quantitative analysis associated with type of vehicle

revealed no significant results.

Driving Terrain

Again, due to the considerably uneven sample sizes associated with the driving

terrain travelled by the participant sample, the driving terrain categories were

collapsed into three categories: mainly city and suburban roads (n = 195), a

combination of city, suburban and country (n = 172), and other roads primarily

country roads and off road (r = 77). One-way between-groups analysis of variance

(ANOVA) were conducted to explore if driving terrain impacts on driver behaviour

(overall MDBQ) or perceptions related to fleet safety climate (overall SCQ-MD).

However, the results revealed no significant differences. Similarly, logistic

regressions were performed to attest if the driving terrain mostly travelled by the

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sample of work-related drivers, influences crash involvement or committing traffic

offences. Likewise, the quantitative analysis associated with driving terrain revealed

no significant results.

Prediction of WRRS Outcomes

Prediction of WRRS outcomes was assessed by utilising participant self-

reported crashes and offences (driving infringements).

Work-Related Vehicle Crashes

Driver Behaviour

Due to the limited number of drivers who reported a being involved in a crash

over the past 12 months, drivers were classified into two groups, those who were

involved in at least one or more crashes (n = 81, 18%) and those drivers who were

not involved in any work-related crash (n = 363, 82%). Therefore, with crashes as

the dichotomous dependent variable a series of logistic regression analyses was

conducted to determine what factors influence work-related crash causation.

Age and the number of hours per week driven were entered into the first step to

examine, as well as control for, their influence before inclusion of the MDBQ

factors. Gender was not included because between-group analysis revealed no

differences between gender and negative driving outcomes. The model at step one

was significant [χ2(2) = 33.39, p < .001], with the estimated total variance being

11.9%. Although 97.5% of the sample who were not involved in a crash were

correctly classified, only 2.5% (n = 2) of those drivers who reported involvement in a

crash were correctly identified. The seven MDBQ factors were entered at step two

with the additional block proving also to be significant [χ2(7) = 45.55, p < .001],

accounting for an additional 14.8% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the total estimated

variance. The overall model was also found to be significant [χ2(9) = 78.94, p <

.001], with the model accounting for a total of 26.7% of the total estimated variance.

Three items were found to be significantly predictive of work crashes in the past

twelve months: hours driven per week (Wald = 9.69, p < .01), driver errors (Wald =

10.33, p < .001), and driver distraction (Wald = 8.36, p < .01). The results revealed

that 97.8% of the sample who did not have a crash were correctly classified, with

31% (n = 25) of those drivers who reported being involved in a work crash (n = 81)

were correctly identified.

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Table 5.7 Logistic Regression for Crashes Variables B SE Wald p Odds

ratio 95% CI

Lower Upper

Step 1

Age

Hours per week

-.03

.70

.01

.13

4.76

28.57

.029

.000

.98

2.02

.95

1.56

1.00

2.61

Model Chi-Square 33.39*** (df = 2)

Step 2

Age

Hours per week

Errors

Fatigue

Speed

-.01

.48

1.04

-.18

.22

.01

.15

.32

.23

.20

.57

9.69

10.33

.64

1.14

.452

.002

.001

.425

.287

.99

1.62

2.83

.84

1.24

.97

1.20

1.50

.54

.83

1.02

2.19

5.34

1.30

1.85

Maintenance .15 .11 1.95 .163 1.16 .94 1.42

Illegal Behaviours -.34 .27 1.60 .206 .71 .42 1.21

Distraction .51 .18 8.36 .004 1.66 1.18 2.34

Aggression -.18 .24 .53 .468 .84 .52 1.35


Block Chi-Square 45.55*** (df = 7)

***p < .001

Work-Related Driver Traffic Offences

Due to the limited number of drivers who reported incurring a work-related

driving offence (e.g., driving infringement/fine) over the past 12 months, drivers

were classified into two groups, those who were incurred at least one or more

offences (n = 77, 17%) and those drivers who did not incur any offences (n = 367,

83%). Therefore, with work-related driver traffic offences as the dichotomous

dependent variable a series of logistic regression analyses was conducted to

determine what factors influence work-related offence causation.

Similar to the analysis related to work crashes in the previous section, age and

the number of hours per week driven were entered into the first step to examine, as

well as control for, their influence before inclusion of the MDBQ factors. Gender

was not included because between group analysis revealed no differences between

gender and negative driving outcomes. The model at step one was a significant

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predictor of work offences [χ2(2) = 29.74, p < .001], with the estimated total variance

being 10.8%. Although 98.4% of the sample who did not incur a traffic offence were

correctly classified, only 3.9% (n = 3) of those drivers who reported incurring a

traffic offence were correctly identified. Both demographic variables driver age (OR

= .98, p < .05) and driving exposure represented by hours driven per week (OR =

1.97, p < .001) were predictors of work-related vehicle offences. The seven MDBQ

factors were entered at step two with the additional block proving also to be

significant [χ2(7) = 60.31, p < .001], accounting for an additional 19.8% (Nagelkerke

R squared) of the total estimated variance. The overall model was also found to be

significant [χ2(9) = 90.05, p < .001], with the model accounting for a total of 30.6%

of the total estimated variance. Three items were found to be significantly predictive

of work offences (e.g., driver infringements/fines) in the past twelve months: hours

driven per week (Wald = 7.79, p < .01), illegal behaviours (Wald = 4.53, p < .05),

and driver distraction (Wald = 11.14, p < .001). The results revealed that 97.5% of

the sample who did not incur a traffic offence were correctly classified, with 32.5%

(n = 25) of those drivers who reported incurring a work driving traffic offence were

correctly identified.

Table 5.8 Logistic Regression for Traffic Offences Variables B SE Wald p Odds

ratio 95% CI

Lower Upper

Step 1

Age

Hours per week

-.02

.68

.01

.13

3.84

26.09

.05

.000

.98

1.97

.96

1.52

1.00

2.55


Step 2

Age

Hours per week

Errors

Fatigue

Speed

-.00

.45

.43

-.25

.40

.01

.16

.33

.23

.21

.00

7.79

1.70

1.18

3.58

.959

.005

.192

.276

.059

.99

1.57

1.54

.78

1.49

.97

1.14

.81

.49

.99

1.03

2.14

2.94

1.23

2.26

Maintenance .09 .11 .76 .382 1.10 .89 1.35

Illegal Behaviours .58 .27 4.53 .033 1.78 1.05 3.03

Distraction .60 .18 11.14 .001 1.82 1.28 2.59

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Aggression -.42 .26 2.57 .109 .66 .39 1.10


Block Chi-Square 60.31*** (df = 7)

***p < .001

Fleet Safety Climate

Logistic regression analyses were also performed to examine the propensity for

the SCQ-MD factors to predict both work-related crashes and work-related driving

offences (e.g., driving infringements/fines). The results revealed that none of the five

SCQ-MD factors significantly predicted work-related driving offences.

Consequently, no further analysis relating to the ability of the SCQ-MD scale to

predict work crashes and offences are provided. These results are in contrast to the

qualitative analysis which suggested that organisational factors, including factors

similar to the SCQ-MD (e.g., work pressure, management commitment), did

influence WRRS outcomes.

DISCUSSION

The first objective of this program of research was to identify work drivers’

perceptions and experiences related to the diverse range of factors that influence

WRRS, driver behaviours and outcomes. This chapter reported the results of Study

One Part B which involved a quantitative (i.e., self-report survey) exploration of the

issues and influences associated with WRRS. Following Study One Part A (Chapter

4), this chapter further investigated the predominant factors that influence WRRS

performance and outcomes, as well as gaining further understanding of the

organisational (e.g., psychological) and behavioural factors associated with WRRS

culture (as outlined within the research theoretical framework in Chapter 3).


In contrast to the qualitative findings (Study One, Part A), the quantitative

analysis revealed limited meaningful results. For instance, analysis associated with

predicting WRRS outcomes (e.g., crashes and offences) did indicate significance,

however the results represented only a small proportion of those drivers that were

involved in a work-related vehicle incident or incurred a driving offence (e.g.,

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driving infringement/fine). Therefore, any findings identified below should be

viewed in accordance with this limitation. However, there were some findings that

are considered noteworthy.

The influence of driver distraction on WRRS was a key finding of this

quantitative study. For example, along with driving exposure (hours per week –

discussed below), driver distraction was identified as the only predictor of both

WRRS outcomes (e.g., work-related vehicle crashes and driver

offences/infringements). In addition, a moderate relationship was reported between

the exposure variable (e.g., hours per week) and the distraction factor (r = .39)

suggesting that increased driving exposure, especially increased periods of time

driving, may increase driver distraction. Similar to previous research (Wills et al.,

2006), this study also found a moderate relationship between driver distraction and

work pressure (r = -.38, p < .001) indicating drivers concerned with work

productivity are potentially more likely to exhibit adverse driver behaviours

associated with distraction and inattention (e.g., eating a meal, using a mobile phone

or doing paperwork while driving to save time). Furthermore, the results indicated

strong relationships between distraction and other behavioural factors, including

fatigue (r = .67) speed (r = .54), errors (r = .47), and illegal behaviours (r = .47).

Similar to previous road safety research (Wang & Pei, 2014), the findings suggest

that those drivers who are tired or operating a vehicle while fatigued are more likely

to be distracted from the driving task. Likewise, driver distraction in this study was

also linked to having a considerable influence on driving safety performance,

including driver errors, speeding (e.g., potentially without realising), and illegal

behaviours. Taken together, the findings reported in this study propose that driver

distraction is a considerable risk within the contemporary WRRS setting.

Subsequently, pressures associated business competition and competing workplace

demands, as well as, the availability and application (e.g., use while driving) of

multitude information and communication devices (e.g., smart phones, tablets),

increases the likelihood of driver distraction. Therefore, the risk of driver distraction

and inattention is substantially increased, potentially compounding adverse WRRS

behaviours and outcomes.

Driving exposure was also found to be a significant predictor of both work-

related crashes (p = .002) and traffic offences (p = .005). In contrast to the findings

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outlined within the qualitative analysis, the quantitative findings suggest that driving

exposure, measured by hours spent driving a work-related vehicle, is a considerable

influence on WRRS. Similar to previous WRRS research, the results propose that

drivers who spend a considerable proportion of time driving a vehicle for work

purposes are more susceptible to engage in aberrant driving behaviours and as such

are a greater risk of being involved in adverse driving outcomes (Rowland et al.,

2006; Wishart, 2015). Uniquely, this research program proposes that “hours per

week” rather than “kilometres driven per year” is a superior measure of exposure for

the contemporary WRRS setting. Firstly, supported also within the qualitative

analyses, drivers in city/suburban areas may drive limited kilometres though may be

delayed in slow traffic situations, thereby increasing the time (e.g., exposure)

associated with work-related vehicle travel. Consequently, extended periods of time

driving may increase driver frustration and inattention, thereby increasing the risk of

adverse driver behaviours; including aggressive driving and road rage incidents

(Hennessy & Wiesenthal, 2005), making errors and committing violations (Herrero-

Fernandez, 2013), and driver distraction (Hanowski et al., 2005), vehicle crashes

(Husband, 2011; Jun, 2006; Safety Net, 2009) and incurring driver

infringements/offences (Davey et al., 2006). Secondly, in relation to completing

survey questionnaires, drivers are potentially able to accurately identify how many

hours they drove a work vehicle in a week compared to how many kilometres driven

per year. Therefore, this program of research suggests that “hours driven per week”

would be a better option when controlling for exposure within quantitative analyses.

Another issue of interest is the mixed results in relation to the Maintenance

factor. Within the descriptive analysis, the two Maintenance factor items represented

the least safe behaviours. This result indicates that drivers perceive vehicle

maintenance checks as potentially not important and therefore a considerable

proportion of the sample did not complete the checks effectively. Similar to previous

WRRS research (Wills et al., 2006), the strongest significant relationship with

vehicle maintenance behaviours was the SCQ-MD factor Communication and

Support (r = -.23, p <.001). Practically, this result suggests that increasing both

formal and informal lines of communication relating to organisational rules and

expectations associated with vehicle maintenance checks would be beneficial.

However, the Maintenance factor was not a predictor of WRRS outcomes, such as

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crashes or traffic infringements. Although not representing a risk to WRRS

outcomes, for this sample, the results indicate that the practice of vehicle checks

before work-related travel is not adequately performed, nor are there sufficient

organisational factors communicating and supporting the practice.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Along with Study One Part A, Study One Part B aimed to address the first

objective of this program of research by exploring participants’ perceptions and

experiences related to individual, organisational and external factors that influence

their ability to drive safely for work. Similar to previous research (Wishart, 2015),

the results of Study One, Part B indicates that quantitative self-report data does not

shed much light on the origins of risky driving within the WRRS context. However,

the analyses did suggest that driver distraction should be considered a major

influence within the contemporary WRRS environment. For instance, only driving

exposure (e.g., hours driven per week) and driver distraction predicted both work-

related crashes and driver offences (e.g., driver infringements/fines). Consequently, it

is proposed that that research look beyond the use of quantitative self-report surveys

assessing the multitude of factors that impact WRRS. Rather, research should

consider how WRRS can be improved, such as, investigating the barriers to and

facilitators for WRRS intervention strategies.

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Chapter 6: Barriers to and Facilitators for Work-Related Road Safety Intervention Application


This chapter documents the second study undertaken as part of this program of

research. Traditionally, intervention strategies aimed at improving WRRS have

resulted in limited change (Davey et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2012; Wishart & Davey,

2004). The implementation of singular strategies (e.g., driver training) aimed at

improving WRRS often result in limited long-term success (Lewis et al., 2012;

Newton et al., 2013; Wishart & Davey, 2004) indicating a need for a systems

approach directed towards addressing the whole WRRS problem. For instance,

improvement strategies should address the components of WRRS culture (e.g.,

Behaviour, Person and Situation as per theoretical framework depicted in Figure 3.2

Outline of research program structure) rather than singular issues related to driver

behaviour. Similar research utilising a qualitative interview method was conducted to

explore the facilitators and barriers to implementing WRRS initiatives (Banks,

2008). The Banks (2008) study was one of the first studies to ever consider

investigating the barriers to and facilitators for WRRS intervention strategies. The

study identified a number of barriers to intervention strategy development and

application, including: prioritisation of productivity over safety, complacency

towards work-related road risks, insufficient resources, diversity, limited employee

input in safety decisions, and perception that road safety initiatives were an

unnecessary burden. In addition, the study also acknowledged management

commitment, presence of systems for supporting WRRS initiatives and supportive

relationships as major facilitators of intervention strategies. However, the Banks

(2008) study identified a small sample (n = 24) as a limitation of the research and

suggested that future studies in the area should adopt a larger and more diverse

sample. Therefore, expanding upon this preliminary research, Study Two

endeavoured to utilise a larger and more diverse sample to determine if results were

conversant with the Banks (2008) study relating to the barriers to and facilitators for

WRRS intervention strategy application.

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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Study Two aimed to explore the potential barriers to, and facilitators for

WRRS intervention strategy application within industry organisations. Potentially,

there are a wide variety of circumstances and conditions that may hinder or prevent,

or even facilitate, effective intervention strategy application. However, there is

limited research investigating the barriers to or facilitators for intervention strategy

development and application, rather organisations have traditionally only

implemented singular interventions in reaction to work-related vehicle incidents

(Lewis et al., 2012; Wishart & Davey, 2004), with limited reported results in relation

to outcomes and intervention longevity. Therefore, before the design and planning

stage of intervention development, it is proposed that both occupational safety and

road safety practitioners understand the important barriers to, and facilitators for

successful work-related road safety interventions. Understanding and

acknowledgement of the barriers and facilitators may enable organisations to adopt

more appropriate interventions and apply more tailored and effective approaches to

reduce management/employee resistance to intervention application (Whysall et al.,

2006). In addition, work-related driver perceptions related to the barriers to and

facilitators for intervention development and application may provide an insight into

the behavioural, perceptual and situational factors relating to WRRS improvement,

which is also indicative of a wider WRRS culture.

Therefore, the primary objective of Study Two was to obtain data related to

perceptions of organisational staff (e.g., management, supervisory and employees) in

relation to those factors that hinder or promote the development and application of

WRRS intervention strategies. More specifically, the study examined research

questions four and five outlined in Chapter 2:

4. What personal, organisational, and external factors are barriers to the


strategies?

5. What personal organisational and external factors are facilitators for

(or assist) the development and application of work-related road safety


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METHOD

Focus groups (N = 28) ranging from 4 to 16 participants in each group were

conducted to investigate the barriers to and facilitators for application of WRRS

intervention strategies by organisational staff driving vehicles for the purpose of

work. Due to the increased sample size, focus group discussions were deemed more

appropriate and utilised rather than individual interviews (n = 24) utilised in the

Banks (2008) study. The participant sample involved the same 217 participants that

were utilised in Study One, Part A. Therefore, for Study Two, participant

demographics, sample characteristics, study procedure and analysis were analogous

to that described in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3). For instance, participant recruitment and

selection process were facilitated the same as Study One Part A. In addition, the

number of focus groups, participants, content, procedure (including focus group

facilitators) and data analysis was the same as Study One Part A. Data was collected

until saturation had been reached and no new information was introduced.

Content

The focus group questions (see Appendix A) for Study Two were administered

concurrently with the questions outlined in Study One, Part A. Similarly, the purpose

of this qualitative study, specifically focus group discussions, was to obtain a ‘real

world’ and authentic understanding of the perceptions of organisational management

and employees regarding the barriers to and facilitators for WRRS intervention

application. Analogous to Study One, Part A, a semi-structured format involving

open-ended questions was used to encourage participation, authenticity, and acquire

a broad spectrum of responses (Seale & Silverman, 1997). Questions were developed

based on similar research identified within the literature review. Likewise, the core

focus group questions for Study Two were designed to be brief and broad allowing

the facilitator to further explore specific responses from participants and utilise

prompting questions to further explore participant responses. Generally, the

additional prompting questions were developed from review of the available

literature and previous research conducted into the barriers to and facilitators for

intervention strategies. In relation to the core focus group question enquiring “What

barriers prevent participants from participating in or completing work-related road

safety interventions or countermeasures?” further prompting questions included:

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• Do you have any personal issues, beliefs or perceptions associated with

intervention strategy application within your organisation?

Do you think intervention strategies aimed at improving work-related

road safety is important?

Do you feel motivated to participate in intervention strategies or do

you participate because you are required to?

• Are there any family, relationship or other life issues that prevent

participation in intervention strategies?

• What organisational factors hinder work-related road safety intervention

strategy application?

Are there any organisational issues, processes or practices that

prevent you from adequately participating in any intervention strategy

aimed at improving work-related road safety?

Is there adequate time and resources for the application of


Is there adequate internal organisation support and commitment for

you to partake in intervention strategies?

• Are there any barriers, external to your organisation, which may prevent

intervention strategy application?

Does any government department (e.g., local, state or federal) hinder

intervention application?

Do work processes involving other stakeholders, such as

customers/clients, hinder intervention strategy application?

Similarly, further prompting questions were developed to ascertain more in-

depth responses to what participants perceive could be done to improve work related

driving safety intervention strategies including the facilitators or aspects that could

help improve the application of work-related road safety intervention strategies or

initiatives. For example, the major additional prompting questions included:

• In relation to intervention strategies, what could be done to increase

participation?

• Are there any organisational factors that may improve intervention strategy

application?

• Are there any external influences that may assist intervention application?

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RESULTS

The following sections outline the results of Study Two highlighting the

predominant themes that hinder or assist the application of WRRS improvement

strategies. The results are presented highlighting those themes with the highest group

consensus through to factors indicating lower group consensus.

Costs, time and resources

The theme associated with costs, time and resources recorded the highest level

of group consensus (n = 196, 90%). The majority of operational field type staff

suggested that any countermeasures or interventions strategies would need to be both

time and cost effective or they would not be implemented by organisational

management. For example, a male participant stated “If it takes too long to do or it

costs too much, management won’t run with it.” Similarly, a male supervisor

indicated “We have a specified budget and timeframe for completion of work tasks,

we cannot afford staff to be away from the workplace for any period of time or spend

excessive time on intervention processes which takes valuable time from their usual

work activities.” Encouragingly, in relation to intervention application, 79% of

managerial staff (n = 15) believed some form of countermeasure or intervention was

urgently required for improving work-related driving safety within their respective

organisations. However, management also had initial concerns regarding the cost and

time needed to develop and implement specific road/driver safety interventions or

initiatives within their organisation. For example, a senior operational manager stated

“with budgets so tight these days we don’t have any room to manoeuvre to implement

any safety related programs, especially if it is additional to what is required to reach

safety compliance.” Likewise, management relayed additional concerns related to

budgeting for and time required to cover staff while engaged in intervention

implementation and not spent on core work task duties. A female Health, Safety and

Environment Manager indicated “we operate these days with minimum staffing levels

but are still required to meet customer expectations, therefore we cannot have staff

out of service for long periods of time.” Furthermore, there were indications by some

participants (n = 19) that resources, time and finances were wasted on unsuccessful

or poorly implemented work-related road safety intervention strategies or initiatives.

For example, a male field employee stated “my organisation put in place things to

improve road safety in the past, for example, driver training, but have not followed

146

through with it …I wasn’t asked to take part in the driver training only some staff

completed the course”.

The theme also identified that field staff and operational vehicle drivers stated

concerns relating to the effect of excessive time and resources required by individual

staff members to undertake any work-related road safety intervention strategy. For

example, a male driver stated “I am willing to try any safety measure as long as it

doesn’t mean more paperwork for me” and another male field worker/driver

interjected stating “I’m sick and tired of doing more paperwork … we never used to

have to do as much as we are doing these days... we seem to be doing more

paperwork than work”. Participants further indicated that an increase in time and

resources outside of those required to complete normal core work-related tasks

would result in more work-related stress or pressure on individuals. In essence,

participants suggested that the loss of time due to attending/completing intervention

strategies or initiatives may influence staff/drivers to “make up time” while driving.

A male Team Leader suggested that the influence of additional time/work pressure

due to the implementation of intervention strategies “may further increase driver

intentions to speed, eat lunch while driving and drive aggressively through slow

traffic situations”.

Productivity versus safety

Productivity versus safety was also identified as a major theme by focus group

participants. In principle, both productivity and safety could be considered as

integral for the ongoing success of any company or organisation. However, many

focus group participants (n = 138, 64%) indicated that productivity often took

precedence over safety related issues. For example, within this theme one male

participant commented “there is always pressure to complete jobs ... as long as no

one has a crash or gets injured the company doesn’t care what you do when driving,

so why would they implement a driving safety intervention”. In addition, a male

driver stated “completing jobs and on time is priority over any safety related

initiative”.

Within this theme, participants also indicated that although most management

value the safety of employees, when they are under pressure regarding increasing

productivity, especially in short timeframes, productivity often becomes priority. For

147

example, one male participant stated “managers may say that safety is priority but

when they are under pressure from the execs (reference to Executive Management)

and customers, getting the jobs done becomes priority”. Many participants (n = 66,

30%) commented on their own personal frustration towards meeting high production

targets whilst achieving and maintaining high safety-related goals and outcomes. For

example, a male supervisor stated “on one hand management tell us to meet ever-

increasing work targets but don’t provide us with enough time, personnel or

resources to get the work completed in the required timeframe ...basically complete

the work any way possible. On the other hand management take ‘the stick’ to people

who don’t live up to the high safety goals of the organisation, such as speeding fines

obtained by drivers trying to make up time”.

A sub-theme which emerged from within the focus group discussions was a

form of self-introduced work/time pressure. Participants (n = 27, 12%) identified that

they were so committed to meeting production-related targets that they often engaged

in risky driving practices. This was especially evident in organisations that

implemented some form of awards-based system designed to award high achieving

employees and inadvertently encouraging employees take safety-related risks. For

example, a male participant commented “as long as the work/production target

awards program are in operation, I will take safety risks, you can save a lot of time

driving between jobs and there are personal financial benefits”.

Lack of management and organisational support and commitment

A lack of management and organisational support and commitment was

recognised by both management and organisational staff as a major theme.

Interestingly, responses by some management and/or supervisors (n = 17, 8%),

particularly executive management, revealed a reluctance to consider work-related

driving as an organisational issue. For instance, a male manager suggested that “it’s

the drivers who are not doing the right thing, it’s not an organisational problem.”

Rather, it was indicated by management that driving incidents/crashes were primarily

a result of either a lack of driver skills/ability or the driver/worker was not following

the road rules. A male operations manager commented “if the staff driving vehicles

followed company policy and the road rules we would not have a problem, maybe

they need driver training?” Therefore, perceptions of management were that any

work-related road safety intervention strategy or initiative would need to target the

148

driver. When management were questioned regarding their respective organisations’

work-related road safety policy and procedures, most (n = 18, 8% [95% of

management]) stated that they don’t have a specific work-related road safety policy

and procedures. Rather, management indicated having a vehicle operation policy and

procedures with following road rules and vehicle maintenance as the only safety-

related procedures contained within the documents. One male manager stated

“driving is common sense, most of us have been driving since we were teenagers, we

don’t need a policy and procedures to inform us how to be a safe driver”. In

addition, managers generally had reservations regarding whether all staff would

attempt or subsequently complete any intervention, with one male manager

commenting “I know the staff … if you don’t make them do it (reference to safety

interventions) they won’t bother”.

In contrast, within this theme, staff/drivers (n = 137, 63%) indicated that a lack

of management commitment was why work-related road safety intervention

strategies and initiatives were not developed or implemented within their

organisation. For example, within this theme a male participant commented “there is

no commitment by management to do anything regarding driving safety ... it would

cut into their bottom dollar, they don’t budget for it”. In addition, participants (n =

45, 21%) also indicated that some management although verbally relaying

commitment to safety actually would not implement any work-related road safety

intervention strategies or initiatives unless a serious incident occurred or there was a

dramatic increase in the number of vehicle-related incidents. For example, one male

participant commented “managers say they care and promote driving safety, but as

long as nothing goes wrong they really don’t keep track of what staff do while

driving”. Similarly, some participants (n = 27, 12%) identified that their organisation

had implemented work-related road safety initiatives previously but these initiatives

were not continued nor were any of the participants aware if the initiatives had

improved safety. For instance, a female participant explained “a few years ago we

had a lot of crashes recorded in one month so they put everyone through driver

training and then nothing since, so why bother now”.

Current organisational systems

Within this theme, a common problem acknowledged by many organisational

management and supervisory staff (n = 43, 20%) was who should have responsibility

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and accountability for work-related road safety. For example, a fleet manager stated

“I’m a fleet manager and my primary role is the vehicles, for example acquisition,

maintenance, etc, not safety ... that is a Workplace Health and Safety issue”. In

contrast, a male Occupational Health and Safety Officer suggested that “Fleets and

driving is the responsibility of the Fleet Manager and/or Operational Managers ...

we are too busy with general safety to be involved with fleet-related programs”.

Furthermore, a male supervisor commented “regarding health and safety we are

busy with general issues relating to our work, I know driving is a workplace safety

issue but it is difficult to control what the drivers do when they are in the field”.

Some participants within this theme (n = 31, 14%) identified that although

general health and safety is targeted and addressed comprehensively within their

respective organisations, work-related road safety is either not seen as a ‘health and

safety issue’ or work-related driving safety is something that management has not

even considered. For example, a male participant stated “I believe the company does

value the safety of its employees however I don’t think road safety is even on the

radar”. Participants also noted discrepancies in the types of systems utilised or

supporting work-related road safety within their own respective organisations. The

majority of participants (n = 189, 87%) were not aware of any work-related road

safety systems or processes within their organisations, such as, policy/procedures,

risk management, and intervention strategies or initiatives. Rather, as one male

participant commented “what driving safety systems ... driving safety isn’t an issue

the organisation targets unless it means getting the job done quicker”, indicating a

lack of integration of WRRS into the organisations’ OHSMS.

Limited employee consultation and communication

Within the work, health and safety context employee consultation and

communication are not only a legislative requirement but they are also integral

components for effective risk management (Standards Australia, 2004). Limited

employee consultation and communication regarding WRRS issues and intervention

strategies was also identified as a major theme in this study. A considerable number

of employees/drivers and supervisors/team leaders (n = 174, 80%) indicated that they

were not consulted regarding any work-related road safety issues or initiatives. For

example, one male participant stated “No one discusses with us about any journey

management issues ... usually we hear about it when management decide they are

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doing something ... usually following a large number of crashes”. In addition, some

participants (n = 23, 11%) indicated that intervention strategies or initiatives were

based on, or in reaction to, specific events noted within the media or information

obtained from other sources. For example, a male participant stated “any safety

initiatives are based on the flavour of the moment, for example in response to an

event seen within the media or someone in management who thinks the initiative

would be a good thing to improve safety”. The participant also commented that

“sometimes I think management do not think about additional problems associated

with implementing an initiative to improve safety ... often the initiative or

intervention will create other safety issues or a lack of productivity, which they

would not accept anyway and the initiative will die a slow death”. These and other

comments indicated that some intervention strategies or initiatives were implemented

without prior comprehensive planning, consultation or utilising basic risk

management principles.

Notifying the workforce regarding any safety risks, incidents or problems, or

even the implementation of any intervention strategies or initiatives enables

organisations to keep employees informed and aware of organisational aspects

related to safety. Encouragingly, some participants (n = 37, 17%) acknowledged that

their respective organisations did communicate work-related road safety related

awareness strategies to staff. For example, a male participant commented “any

serious crashes or injuries related to driving are communicated to staff in the form of

an email alert ... but that’s probably the only work-related road safety strategy we

currently do” and another male participant stated “my organisation sends email

alerts regarding any work-related road safety incidents, risks, road conditions and

maintenance issues, etc”. In contrast, approximately a third of participants (n = 72,

33%) identified that although a considerable amount of general safety issues were

communicated to staff via various modes, issues regarding work-related road safety

were not communicated to staff. For example, one female participant suggested “we

do have tool box talks related to safety issues but have not had any relating to safe

driving”. In addition, a few participants (n =16, 7%) noted that issues relating to

work-related road safety were not communicated to staff because vehicle/driver

safety was not targeted by their organisations. For example, a male participant stated

“in relation to work-related road safety there is nothing to communicate because my

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organisation does not see, I believe, driving for work as a safety issue for the

organisation to address”.

Attitudes and beliefs towards work-related road safety interventions

Within this theme there were a diversity of responses associated with attitudes

and beliefs regarding WRRS intervention strategies. Generally, operational field-type

drivers (n = 136, 63%) viewed work-related driving as a Workplace Health and

Safety issue and welcomed any countermeasure to improve safety. In contrast, there

were participants that suggested that WRRS was not an issue that should be

addressed by the OHS department within the organisation, rather it was a fleet

department responsibility. For instance, a male participant stated “driving a work

vehicle isn’t really an OHS problem it’s a problem for the fleet department”. In

addition, many participants (n = 77, 35%) were concerned regarding the amount of

time required to participate in any work-related road safety intervention strategy or

initiative. Most stated they would attempt any intervention as long as it did not mean

extra work for them, with a male participant stating “I am willing to try any safety

measure as long as it doesn’t mean too much additional work for me ... we have

trouble completing the required work now and in the required timeframe let alone

attend some intervention program, or the like as well”. Likewise, drivers stated that

there was not enough time in the day to complete their work tasks as well as the

required daily paperwork. For example, two male participants commented “We have

too much paperwork already … no time to do work” and “I’m sick and tired of doing

more paperwork … we never used to have to do as much as we are doing these

days”. Due to revised systems within the organisation, the amount of paperwork has

increased compared to previous years. Additional, paperwork (e.g. job completion

worksheet, incident reports, etc) were introduced throughout the organisation as a

requirement of Quality Assurance, Workplace Health and Safety legislation and

Environmental legislation, etc.

In relation to individual driver beliefs in this theme, participants (n = 19, 9%)

acknowledged that they believed any work-related road safety intervention strategy

or initiative would be ineffective because driving safety is an individual driver issue.

For example, some participants suggested that all drivers or individuals are different

and specific or generic interventions may not be effective for all drivers, as one male

participant explained “people are individuals, what works for one person may not be

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effective for another”. In essence, many participants identified work-related road

safety interventions and initiatives primarily as a type of driver training program or

driver assessment, as one male participant suggested “we are looking at driver

training as an intervention, aren’t we? ...what else is there?”.

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Lack of Work-Related Road Safety Knowledge, Experience and

Training

This theme reported that some participants (n =32, 15%), primarily

supervisors, team leaders and managers indicated concerns regarding any required

knowledge of work-related road safety issues in relation to implementing

intervention strategies or initiatives. For example, a male manager suggested “I don’t

believe any staff don’t have the necessary knowledge, training and experience to

implement or support any work-related road safety intervention program”. Most

participants within this theme identified their reluctance to implement any

intervention strategies or initiatives due to a lack of experience and knowledge of

work-related road safety issues, training, intervention processes and facilitation

regarding intervention strategy or initiative implementation. For example, a male

supervisor stated “I don’t know anything about road safety interventions let alone be

expected to run or manage any safety programs ... plus I’m too busy already”.

Similarly, a male team leader commented “implementing any work-related road

safety interventions should be the responsibility of the fleet department, they’re the

experts ... it’s not part of my position description”. In addition, a male manager stated

“if any staff member is expected to be involved in implementing any intervention

program then they should be given appropriate training first and ongoing support”.

Government Influence

Australian Federal, State and Local Government elections and subsequent

government changes, can result in potential additional barriers to the introduction of

intervention strategies and associated safety programs. Therefore, this theme reports

on the potential Government influences associated with WRRS intervention strategy

development and application. It should be noted that during the facilitation of the

focus groups for Study Two there were significant Queensland Government cutbacks

to the public service. For example, a male manager stated “Governments have a huge

bearing or influence on safety ... generally if cuts are needed, safety-related

programs are the first to go ... then we are back to compliance only and not

proactively looking at safety improvement”. Consequently, government funding cuts

generally result in some department non-core tasks being cancelled, not continued or

severely reduced. Participants (n = 18, 8%) within this theme indicated that recent

changes in government after elections (e.g., 2011) resulted in a widespread reduction

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in safety funding beyond legislative compliance. An indication of these wholesale

changes was provided by a local government fleet manager who was involved in a

work-related road safety research program, “it’s your safety program or tyres for my

vehicles, and I need to replace tyres as required for safety reasons”. In addition, a

government safety manager stated “we cannot renew your program, all programs or

projects that are not required to meet basic OHS regulation compliance will not be

continued”.

Changes in government have also had a trickle effect across privately run

organisations due potentially to a loss of government contracts and associated

business. Therefore, the loss of traditional business links with government and

additional concerns relating to the future business climate has resulted in some

private industry organisations reducing their non-core activities. Subsequently,

organisations have reduced their involvement in proactive safety programs,

intervention development and implementation, and funding. For example, a safety

manager in the private sector stated “some of our government business was cut

overnight, we don’t have the resources to target driver safety beyond basic OHS

requirements ... I know we are not the only company in this situation”.

Less Frequently Reported Issues

Although cited less frequently, there were a number of participant responses

that highlighted additional individual driver issues, attitudes and behaviour that may

hinder participation in any WRRS intervention strategy or initiative. Although the

number of participant responses were limited (and could not be classified as a

theme), it is proposed that the influences below may be indicative of responses by

high risk drivers and therefore important to mention. For example, issues identified

included participant responses related to drivers’ resistance to change, risk

perception, individual locus of control, and optimism bias.

Some participants (n = 11, 5%) had strong beliefs regarding the need to change

their individual driving habits or behaviour. For example, one male participant

vehemently stated “I don’t see why I have to partake in any driving safety

intervention strategy ... I have an impeccable driving history, so why do I need to

participate in any initiative”. In addition, perceptions relating to resistance to change

were primarily obtained from more experienced staff, with an older company vehicle

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driver commenting “If I have to participate in any intervention, I will, but I won’t

change the way I drive ... I am now in my sixties and I have been driving since I was

seventeen, so why change now”.

A small number of drivers (n = 13, 5%) indicated that they did not believe they

were required to complete a driving safety countermeasure or intervention. This was

primarily due to their perception of their own past safe driving history. For example,

drivers suggested that they either could not be bothered or should not be required to

participate in a work-related road safety intervention program because they did not

have a problem (in relation to work-related driving). For example, one male

participant stated “I couldn’t be bothered … I don’t have a driving problem, I’ve

never had an accident” (male driver). Similarly, some managerial staff (n = 6, 2%)

believed that they should not be required to participate in any work-related road

safety intervention because they believed that they were safe drivers and that the

intervention should be directed toward staff. For example, “I have an impeccable

driving history …I don’t need to undertake a program” (female manager) and “I

have been known to speed a little but I do it when it is safe to do so… I know when it

is risky …the intervention should be targeted to the field staff” (male manager).

Although similar to the above, some participants (n = 15, 7%) suggested that

that their own driving behaviour was not the issue. Rather, participants stated that

intervention strategies and initiatives should be directed towards members of the

public (e.g., other drivers) (n = 7), their own organisations’ processes (n = 3), the

road network (n = 3) and governments (n = 2). For example, a male participant

commented “I believe I am a safe driver and most of the guys I work with, I think,

are safe drivers also ... I believe it is other drivers on the road that create most of the

problems”. In contrast, a male driver stated “the roads we drive on are crap, they’re

full of pot holes, slippery when wet, uneven surfaces ... the government should fix the

road network problem first and not expect drivers to alleviate the problem, I don’t

believe I need to undertake an intervention program, my driving is not the problem”.

Similarly, a female participant suggested “an organisation’s processes are the blame

for most incidents, not the driver on most occasions and definitely not me ... if

management continue to get away with placing pressure on drivers to increase

productivity then we will continue to have accidents ... why should I do an

intervention strategy I have a safe driving record, maybe management should”.

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Interestingly, some participants (n = 14, 6%) did not perceive that driving at

work posed any risks. Rather, these participants generally suggested that they were

more at risk to injury from their normal core work duties compared to driving for

work which they perceived as low risk. For example, one male participant

commented “driving a motor vehicle is second nature and common sense, is driving

for work really as big a problem as many make out... I’m more likely to have an

accident by stabbing myself with my screwdriver not driving a vehicle”.

Consequently, a male participant added “let’s say that driving for work isn’t as big a

problem as people make out, then why would we need to participate in any

intervention ... I speed, sometimes considerably, I have never had an accident, I am

not a risky driver, so why should I be required to partake in any intervention or safe

driving program”.

Perceived facilitators for work-related road safety interventions

Similar to the barriers, the results related to the facilitators for intervention

strategy and initiative development, implementation and completion include

responses related to both individual and organisational factors. The results associated

with the facilitators for WRRS interventions are presented highlighting those factors

with the highest group consensus through to factors indicating lower group

consensus.

Need for interventions to be brief

This theme represents a considerable proportion of participants (n = 186, 86%)

agreed that any work-related road safety intervention strategy or initiative would

need to be brief before their respective organisations would consider implementing

them. For example, one male supervisor stated “we have to meet deadlines so any

intervention should not take a lot of time, especially time for staff to be away from

their normal work duties”. Whereas, a male participant commented that “any work-

related road safety initiative would need to be brief, cost little and not hinder day to

day operations, otherwise it won’t be even considered”. In addition, a male

participant suggested “the company is currently reducing staff if I don’t get the work

done then I might be one of those cut. I for one don’t want to participate in any

intervention if it means I cannot complete the work”. In contrast, a female participant

stated “I believe organisations generally value safety for their staff, but

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organisations need to be productive as well, so production needs to be also

considered when designing and implementing any work-related road safety

intervention”.

Management commitment and support

Within this theme, a quarter of participants (n = 55, 25%) cited management

commitment and support as a facilitator in the process for the development and

application of any WRRS intervention strategy or initiative. For example, a male

participant stated “for work-related road safety to improve you would need full

management commitment and support, which we don’t have”. In contrast, a male

participant within the same organisation however different department suggested

“management within my organisation are very safety oriented and give full

commitment to any safety intervention or initiative, I guess that’s part of the reason

why we have few safety accidents”. Similarly, a male manager stated “if executive

management are on board and committed, you have a better chance of ongoing

support across the term of intervention implementation”. In addition, a male team

leader summated many participant responses by commenting “if the CEO has

officially and publicly given commitment to an intervention strategy or initiative, you

know it will be supported across the organisation, especially if he is one of the first

to undertake or participate within the strategy or initiative”.

Organisational change processes

A variety of responses were obtained that particularly related to the theme

identifying organisational change processes (n = 47, 22%) as a potential facilitator.

Participants suggested that the “mindset” relating to WRRS and associated

intervention strategies or initiatives would need to change at both the organisational

and individual levels. For example, in relation to organisational change processes,

one female participant stated “the level of accountability and responsibility relating

to work-related road safety at the organisational level needs to change. With greater

responsibility and accountability for driving for work, along with modified systems

and processes to accommodate and target work-related road safety, incidents while

driving a work vehicle would decrease’. In addition, a male participant added ‘this

process would be more beneficial if you had someone in the organisation who was

responsible for work-related road safety or someone who could champion the

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cause”. Furthermore, a male manager stated “I believe organisations won’t change

their processes on mass until the government changes how they view work-related

road safety and increase their requirement for greater safety compliance... at the

moment most jurisdictions don’t even target work-related road safety as a general

safety issue”.

At an individual driver level, some participants (n = 11, 5%) suggested that

organisations tend to blame their staff (e.g., drivers) for all vehicle-related incidents.

For example, a male participant stated “organisational processes are never to blame

for road accidents, it is always the driver” and another added “we are sick of the

blame game”. A male team leader suggested that “before we change organisational

processes relating to work-related road safety, management would need to change

their own personal perceptions”. Within this theme, participants generally agreed

that for organisations to effectively develop and implement work-related road safety

intervention strategies or initiatives, both organisations and individuals would need

to change. In addition, an open attitude toward change would substantially assist the

implementation and ongoing effectiveness of work-related road safety intervention

strategies or initiatives.

Organisational systems and processes

The existing systems, especially safety systems, within an organisation were

recognised by participants (n = 38, 18%) as a facilitator for WRRS improvement. For

example, one male manager commented “if work-related road safety was integrated

within our current safety systems, such as, risk management processes, policy and

procedures, investigation processes, etc, this probably would increase safety in

relation to driving for work ... basically because it would be addressed as a matter of

course”. Likewise, participants (n = 16, 7%) also stated that if work-related road

safety was addressed and targeted within existing safety systems, organisations’ may

not be required to implement dedicated work-related road safety intervention

strategies or initiatives. For instance, a male supervisor suggested “I believe if our

organisational safety systems, such as policy, procedures and processes, etc included

work-related road safety so it was addressed as part of the daily work routine then

we probably would not need specific work-related road safety interventions”.

Relationships

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This theme reported that both personal and work relationships had an influence

on intervention strategy or initiative participation and also their ability to drive safely

while at work (n = 24, 9%). For example, one male participant commented “when

your home environment is a happy place then you are more likely to participate

positively in interventions and generally drive more safely, whereas if you just had a

fight with your wife you probably drive more aggressively or you couldn’t give a

stuff about any road safety interventions”. Similarly, participants noted that an

organisation that has a positive safety culture is more likely to facilitate an

environment conducive to effective implementation and provide ongoing support for

any work-related road safety intervention strategy or initiative. One male participant

indicated “my organisation has a safety first culture, we all look out for each other.

Therefore, participation in any intervention strategy would be positive”. In addition,

a male participant stated “our health and safety person shows an interest in

improving work driving in our company … he is more like a mentor who has a

particular interest in our safety when driving company vehicles”. Furthermore, a

female participant suggested “if you can talk to your supervisor or manager about

issues surrounding safety, you have half a chance to improve safety”. This theme

suggested that if work-related drivers are involved in positive relationships, whether

at work (e.g., positive safety culture) or personal (e.g., positive family environment),

they may be more conducive to partaking in intervention strategies.

General road safety campaigns

A small number of participants (n = 21, 10%) indicated that the theme

associated with general road safety campaigns, such as, television advertisements,

facilitated driver behaviour change and created greater awareness of road safety

issues. In essence, participants suggested that public road safety campaigns provide

drivers with an increased awareness of the various road safety risks. Within this

theme, participants suggested that awareness of road safety risks and messages also

filtered down to work-related road users and often motivated discussion regarding

the specific road safety message/risk. For example, one male participant stated

“sometimes you see a road safety ad on television and you always seem to talk about

it at work the next day, especially if it confronts the way you drive while at work”. In

addition, a male participant suggested that “when a new and thought provoking ad

comes on television relating to road safety everybody talks about it at work, most

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become more aware of the issue and drive safer”. Some participants (n = 12, 6%)

also suggested that public road safety campaigns could be effectively utilised to

support work-related road safety. For example, a male Work, Health and Safety

Advisor commented “if say for example the public road safety message was fatigue,

within the workplace you could target driving while fatigued for the month thereby

utilising the additional public media as a foundation and combined with targeted

work-related road safety intervention strategies or initiatives instil greater

awareness and within the workplace”.

Less frequently reported facilitators

There was a number of additional facilitators related to employee participation

in WRRS interventions or initiatives. For instance, a readiness or openness to change

by both the organisation and individual drivers was identified by participants (n = 11,

5%) as a facilitator, with a male participant stating “when an organisation isn’t ready

to make changes to improve work-related road safety within the organisation then

nothing changes ... this works both ways as well, staff also need to be open to any

changes and not hinder any processes ... if both parties are open to change then

that’s a positive step”. In addition, a male participant suggested “consultation with

and communication to workers on changes or improvement to work driving is the key

to get worker buy in”. Similarly, some participants (n = 8, 4%) suggested that if

relevant staff, specifically management and supervisory staff, are responsible or

accountable for work-related road safety within the organisation then positive

outcomes would be more forthcoming. For example, one male participant

commented “for any process to improve or you want staff to participate in any

interventions then someone has to be accountable and responsible for it. Someone

has to be the driving force behind it ... management should lead by example”.

Likewise, a male manager suggested that “every organisation should have a

champion who has an interest in road safety to coordinate and encourage

participation in the intervention programs ... however they should also be given the

right support, commitment and resources to facilitate outcomes”.

DISCUSSION

The following section summarises the key findings from the focus group

discussions conducted in Study Two. The results provided qualitative responses

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associated with participant perceptions related to the primary barriers to and

facilitators for intervention strategy development and application.


The objective of Study Two was to explore perceptions of organisational staff

in relation to those factors that may hinder or facilitate the development and

application of WRRS intervention strategies. Study Two attempted to answer

research questions four and five:

4) What personal, organisational, and external factors are barriers to

the development and application of work-related road safety


5) What personal, organisational, and external factors are facilitators

for (or assist) the development and application of work-related road

safety intervention strategies?

Barriers

Study Two identified a number of barriers that hinder the development and

application of WRRS intervention strategies. Further, the results indicated that

themes associated with organisational issues were proposed as major barriers,

including costs, time and resources; priority of production over safety; lack of

management commitment and support, current organisational systems, and limited

employee consultation and communication. There is a plethora of research that

recognised organisational issues; such as, a lack of resources (including time

allocation and finances/budget) (e.g., Bas et al., 2007; Blake et al., 2006; Whysall et

al., 2006), priority of production over safety (e.g., Whysall et al., 2006; Clarke, 2006;

ASCC, 2006) and management commitment (e.g., Hale et al., 2010; Vredenburgh,

2002); as major barriers to implementing a range of general occupational health and

safety initiatives. Although, WRRS research (Haworth et al., 2008; Husband, 2011;

Wishart et al., 2011; Mooren et al., 2014) have proposed that organisational barriers

do hinder the management of WRRS, limited research has reported on these

influences on WRRS intervention strategy development and application (Husband,

2011). However, it is noteworthy that organisational management would have a

considerable influence on the allocation of resources and budgets, priority and

management of safety, and development of safety systems. Therefore, the level of

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management commitment and support would have a significant influence on not only

the management of WRRS (Mooren et al., 2014), but also linked to the mitigation of

the major barriers to WRRS intervention strategy development and application.

Compounding organisational and management limitations is the

acknowledgement by organisational leaders (e.g., management, supervisory and team

leaders) of a lack of knowledge and experience in relation to WRRS, including the

delineation of responsibility and accountability for WRRS. Hence, management

indicated a reluctance to develop or implement any WRRS intervention strategies

targeting WRRS. For instance, a lack of acknowledgement of WRRS as an

organisational issue can reduce management focus and support for developing and

communicating appropriate policy, procedures and initiatives relevant to proactively

addressing work-related driving activities (Rowland et al., 2006; Wishart & Davey,

2004). Furthermore, failing to consult with staff relating to issues associated with

WRRS risk management at the operational level is a breach of OHS legal

obligations. Furthermore, lack of consultation with staff reduces the capacity for

organisations to utilise practical experience and knowledge associated with the work-

related driving context. This finding suggests that traditional approaches that

primarily target work-related drivers may have limited effect on WRRS

improvement. In addition, the results obtained from this study may, in part, explain

the limitations of previous intervention strategies to improve WRRS which did not

use an integrated systems approach (e.g., targeting primarily the driver and not

organisational issues). Therefore, intervention strategies directed towards developing

organisational WRRS systems and encouraging management commitment for WRRS

may have a more beneficial effect. Practically, approaches that target organisational

systems and management commitment would (at least) provide direction for WRRS

and also delineate responsibility and accountability for WRRS; which are basic

‘building blocks’ for any safety management system and integration into existing

OHSMS.

A unique finding from Study Two was the influence of an external factor (e.g.,

government influence) on WRRS intervention strategy development and application

within organisations. Study participants suggested changes in government influenced

not only WRRS intervention development and application (e.g., external barrier) but

also a primary reason for addressing all safety related risks at a compliance only

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level (e.g., compliance with Work, Health and Safety Act, 2011). For example, a

change of government may alter the funding proportion for some organisations.

Although this would not change the legal safety obligations, for those organisations

that rely totally (or in part) on government funding, focus would potentially be

directed to core organisational work or business activities. Therefore, organisational

focus, resources, and management commitment and support for any proactive safety

programs and WRRS would potentially be reduced. Rather, OHS would be addressed

using a compliance only approach (e.g., meeting legislation requirements). Road

safety is everyone’s concern, including governments. Greater government regulation

of WRRS issues and where applicable enforcement, may provide the impetus for

organisations to address WRRS as a serious safety concern.

Facilitators

Likewise, organisational related themes were proposed as major facilitators to

WRRS intervention strategy development and application; including requirement for

brief interventions (e.g., limited use of costs, time and resources), management

commitment and support, organisational change processes (e.g., how WRRS is

perceived and addressed), organisational systems and processes, and organisational

relationships. Interestingly, the major facilitators could be considered as opposites to

the barriers proposed previously. However, the predominance of organisational

factors as facilitators to WRRS intervention strategy development and application

further propose that organisational issues are a major WRRS influence. In addition,

these results suggest that WRRS intervention strategies should address components

associated with the organisation, organisational systems and management

commitment and support, rather than focussing solely on the driver (Newnam &

Watson, 2011) as per implementation of any OHS strategies.

Uniquely, external factors such as general road safety campaigns and events

reported within news and current affairs programs were identified as influencing

WRRS. Although this them was only identified by a small number of participants,

the results suggest external factors or strategies may influence driving safety within

the work driving context. For instance, external strategies may directly influence

individual drivers or indirectly by promoting further discussion of issues within the

workplace. Therefore, general road safety campaigns may provide organisations with

the capability to coincide WRRS intervention strategies focussing on the same topic

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as those strategies implemented within the general road safety arena. For example,

focussing on communicating or addressing WRRS topics similar to those road safety

topics reported or advertised within the media may have added benefits to

organisations, including currency of issues, relevance and validity of the issue.

Hence, the synthesis of external and work-related strategies may promote a greater

awareness and sense of relativity of WRRS issues within the workforce. In addition,

use of public health strategies and messages may promote community safety issues

as workplace issues and vice versa.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The results identified a diverse range of factors that were barriers to and

facilitators for the development and application of WRRS intervention strategies.

Similar to Study One (Part A), Study Two identified the predominance of

organisational factors that influenced WRRS, especially WRRS intervention strategy

development and application. Typically, the results suggest reluctance by

organisations to address organisational deficiencies associated with WRRS

improvement (Newnam & Watson, 2011; Wishart & Rowland, 2010; Rowland &

Wishart, 2014). However, the limited focus on WRRS improvement may stem from

a lack of understanding and/or knowledge of WRRS, the benefits associated with

WRRS improvement (e.g., including financial benefits) or increased pressure to meet

demands associated with productivity.

Safety culture is considered a complex issue, hence WRRS could equally be

considered complex. Although safety culture may require multi-dimensional

intervention strategies to improve the safety culture within organisations, this does

not mean that intervention strategies are also required to be complex. Rather, this

study suggests that a change in direction is required in relation to WRRS

improvement strategies, from traditional intervention strategies that target solely the

driver to focussing on addressing limitations associated with organisational systems

and management. In addition, brief interventions may provide time and resource

effective benefits. For example, coinciding workplace interventions (such as: “tool

box talks”, safety meeting discussions, safety alerts/memos) with road safety topics

reported in the media (e.g., serious incidents, government campaigns). These

interventions are not only time and resource effective but also provide relevance for

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workers/drivers concerning the seriousness of road safety, including the potential

impact on personal health and safety, social frameworks and family.

Taken together, the results suggest that management commitment and support

is a major influencing factor for adequately addressing, directing and improving

WRRS, as well as initiating change within organisations to increase the focus on

WRRS as a serious safety concern. Consequently, to achieve management

commitment and support for WRRS, future intervention strategies may need to focus

on assisting management to understand the benefits associated with improving

WRRS (e.g., developing a business case/cost benefit analysis for improving WRRS)

and providing knowledge and support for organisational change processes.

Finally, although Studies One and Two have highlighted the predominance of

organisational factors as influencing WRRS and WRRS intervention strategy

development and application, scant research has examined how WRRS is actually

addressed within organisational safety management systems. Study Three aims to

address this limitation by investigating the level in which WRRS is recognised and

addressed within the safety management systems of four diverse organisations.

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Chapter 7: Study Three – Analysis of Organisational Work-Related Road Safety Systems and Processes


Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (OHSMS) are common

in workplaces across Australia and other developed countries. A OHSMS can be

defined as “a combination of the planning and review, the management

organisational arrangements, the consultative arrangements, and the specific

program elements that work together in an integrated way to improve health and

safety performance” (Gallagher, 2000, p.1). Guidance for the development of

OHSMS’s in Australia are provided within two linked and complementary standards,

including AS/NZS 4804:2001 Occupational health and safety management systems -

General guidelines on principles, systems and supporting techniques (Standards

Australia, 2001) and AS/NZS 4801:2001 Occupational health and safety management

systems - Specification with guidance for use (Standards Australia, 2001). More

recently, the International Standard ISO 390001: 2012 Road traffic safety

management systems – Requirements with guidance for use (2012) was released

outlining the requirements and responsibilities associated with the effective

management of road traffic safety within organisations. The major elements of a

OHSMS, as outlined within the Standards referred to above, include:

1. General requirements;

2. OHS Policy;

3. Planning;

4. Implementation;

5. Consultation, communication and reporting;

6. Documentation, document and data control;

7. Risk identification, assessment and control;

8. Measurement and evaluation; and

9. Management review.

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Together these elements comprise a process designed to enable organisations to

more effectively target risk management and reduce workplace injury and illness, as

well as, minimise the costs associated with workplace incidents (Grammeno, 2006).

Bottani et al. (2009) further state that “SMS’s may improve the safety standards of

operations, enhancing communication, morale and productivity, thus helping

companies in meeting legal responsibilities in managing safety”. Although an

OHSMS is not a legislative requirement, elements of the system are mandatory OHS

compliance requirements for all employer organisations, such as, policy and

procedures, risk management and consultative processes. Previous research also

suggests that an OHSMS should demonstrate a complete understanding of the

organisation’s hazard profile and utilisation of the three control strategy approaches;

safe place, safe person, and safe system; across all elements of an OHSMS (Makin &

Winder, 2008). In addition, recurring findings within the research literature suggest

common fundamental requirements for effective OHSMS’s. Critical requirements

include senior management commitment and support, effective communication, and

employee involvement and consultation (Gallagher, Underhill & Rimmer, 2001).

Gallagher et al. (2001) further state that there are three primary kinds of

barriers to effective OHSMS implementation. Firstly, organisations may fail to meet

basic necessary conditions for effective OHSMS’s, including not customising

systems to organisational needs, undergoing compliance without consultation, poor

employee involvement and ineffective management commitment and support.

Secondly, the inappropriate use of OHSMS audit tools where the audit tool becomes

an “end to themselves” (Gallagher et al., 2001) or simply may become only a paper

based system (Makin & Winder, 2008; Rowland & Wishart, 2014). In addition,

audits may be completed based on misplaced management objectives and conducted

without sound auditor knowledge, skills, standards and criteria. For example,

organisational self-assessment audits and associated audit tools are commonly

completed by organisational staff without relevant experience and knowledge of

OHSMS’s (ATSB, 2012), and may be subject to self-report bias (Mitchell et al.,

2012). Finally, the effectiveness of OHSMS’s could be reduced if applied in hostile

contexts (e.g., small business, contractors or labour hire companies) or within

organisations lacking comprehensive management and/or employee commitment to

Work, Health and Safety.

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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Results from the previous two studies and review of the literature suggest that

organisational processes and the safety culture within organisations play an

important role in determining the level of work-related road safety within

organisations. In addition, there is limited research relating to the potential ability of

organisational WRRS management systems to effectively manage WRRS risk factors

and support the development, application and long-term effectiveness of intervention

strategies and initiatives. Therefore, Study Three investigates the extent, application

and effect of organisational safety management systems (including policy,

procedures and safety practices) to manage WRRS within organisations operating

light vehicle fleets.

In relation to the research program structure outlined in Chapter 3, Study Three

addresses primarily the third or “situational” element of safety culture. More

specifically, the primary objective of Study Three is to systematically investigate the

extent, application and effect of organisational policy, processes and practice

associated with WRRS. In essence, research will highlight key organisational

systems that impact upon WRRS, including safety performance and outcomes. Study

Three will examine research question six outlined in Chapter 2:

6. Do current organisational safety management systems, processes and


METHOD

The following sections provide an outline of the methodology utilised in Study

Three.

The Case Study Approach

The case study approach is a familiar method to social scientists because of its

popularity and varied use in psychology, medicine (case studies of a problem), law

(case law), and political science (case reports) (Hamel, Dufour, and Fortin, 1993). In

addition, case study research has a long, distinguished history across many

disciplines. For example, Hamel et al. (1993) traced the origin of modern social

science case studies through anthropology and sociology.

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Case study research may seem similar to narrative research, especially when

the case chosen is a single individual, but significant distinctions exist (Yin, 2003).

Many case studies focus on an issue with the case (individual, multiple individuals,

program or activity) selected to provide insight into the issue (Stake, 2005; Yin,

2003). Thus, the focus in case study research is not predominantly on the individual

(and their stories) as in narrative research but on the issue with the individual case

selected to understand the issue. Also, in case study research, the analytic approach

involves a detailed description of the case, and the setting of the case within

contextual conditions (Yin, 2003).

Yin (2003, p.13) suggests that “case study research builds an in-depth,

contextual understanding of the case, relying on multiple data sources rather than

only individual stories as in narrative research”. In addition, Yin (2003) stated “you

would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover

contextual conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to your

phenomenon of study” (p. 13). Thus, case study research studies an issue explored

through one or more cases within a bounded system (i.e., a setting or context). This

study utilises organisational case studies within the WRRS context. Although Stake

(2005) stated that case study research is not a methodology but a choice of what is to

be studied (i.e., a case within a bounded system), others present it as an inquiry

strategy, a methodology, or a comprehensive research strategy (Denzin & Lincoln,

2005; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003). Case study research is a qualitative approach in

which the researcher examines a “bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded

systems (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving

multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audio-visual material,

and documents and reports) and reports a case description and case-based themes”

(Creswell, 2013, p. 97).

Stake (2005; 2010) delineates between three forms of case studies: 1) intrinsic

case studies, in which a single case is selected due to its intrinsic interest; 2)

instrumental case studies, in which a single case is selected to demonstrate, or

provide insight regarding, an external broader theme; and 3) multiple or collective

case studies, in which a selection of cases are chosen, as it is expected that exploring

the case studies will lead to greater knowledge of a broader selection of cases. Case

studies for this project can therefore be best described as collective. The

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organisations chosen for the case studies were selected due to their diversity and

potential value in developing an understanding of WRRS across a broader sub-

section of industry.

Case study research has been effectively used to examine contemporary and

complex factors impacting safety performance and outcomes. For example, OHS

case study research has been performed to research under-reporting of work-related

disorders in the workplace (Pransky, Snyder, Dembe & Himmelstein, 1999; 2010),

flexible work practices and occupational safety (Brenner, Fairris & Ruser, 2004).

Although limited, case study research has also been conducted within the WRRS

context, investigating safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry (Edwards,

2014) and examining the influences associated with WRRS within organisations

operating light vehicle fleets (Newnam et al., 2005; Rowland & Wishart, 2014;

Wishart & Rowland, 2011).

Participating Organisations and Industry Context

The aim of Study Three was to gain a cross-section of data and information

from differing and diverse organisations in relation to organisational work-related

road safety systems. Therefore, the four organisations approached for this research

program included industries related to gas exploration and mining, state government,

local government, and not for profit/philanthropy. In addition, the industry, business

and operational diversity of the four organisations provides a good

spread/representation of the Australian fleet driving context. All organisations were

already participants of other QUT (Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety –

Queensland) WRRS research programs. All organisations were asked if they would

like to participate and that participation was voluntary. In relation to inclusion or

exclusion criteria the only requirement was that the organisations’ operated a OLV

fleet. None of the four organisations who participated in Study Three were involved

in Studies One and Two. Although all organisations stated that they wanted their

organisation name and specific area of operations to remain confidential, the

following details provide a concise description on the type of industry and operating

environments for each organisation:

• Organisation A – Liquid natural gas exploration and mining company.

Organisation A operates primarily in Queensland in rural and remote areas.

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The organisation manages a considerable contractor workforce including

their own company employees;

• Organisation B – State government owned corporation. Organisation B

provides management, operation, maintenance and services relating to

natural resource provision;

• Organisation C – Local government council. Organisation C operates

provides local government services within the south-east Queensland region;

and

• Organisation D - Not for profit organisation providing a number of

philanthropy and voluntary services. Organisation D has a considerable

volunteer worker/driver workforce.

Content

Study Three data collection employs suitable case study practices from

multiple information sources; including documents, archival records, interviews,

direct observations, participant observations, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003).

Figure 7.1 provides an outline of the case study methodology and data collected from

each participating organisation. Information was obtained during three stages of data

collection, namely:

1. Review of organisational records, documentation and initiatives;

2. Organisational staff focus groups; and

3. Site inspections and observations.

In essence, the collection of data via the three sources promotes the

methodological use of triangulation (described in Chapter Three), whereby

triangulation refers to the use of a combination of research methods to gain a holistic

understanding and to depict more accurately the phenomenon being investigated

(Rowland & Wishart, 2014).

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(based on and adapted from the method used by Rowland & Wishart, 2014)

Figure 7.1 Outline of organisational WRRS case study data collection methodology

The three stages of each organisational case study aim to provide data that

holistically examines current systems, staff knowledge, and application of and

compliance with safety requirements. Stage One reviews current safety systems

including documentary evidence associated with WRRS policy and procedures. This

stage aims to identify the extent in which WRRS is integrated (or not) and addressed

within organisational documentation (e.g., policy and procedures). Whereas, Stage

Two utilises interviews/focus groups to ascertain staff knowledge and understanding

Case Study of WRRS Systems & Processes

1. Review of Organisational Records, Documentation &

Initiatives

2. Organisational Staff Focus Groups

3. Site Inspections and Observations

Operational WRRS Process Observations

Site Inspections

Vehicle Inspections

Policy & Procedure Documentation

WRRS forms & records

Intervention Strategy Evaluations

Management, supervisors &

employees/drivers

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of organisational WRRS system elements. Stage Two identifies whether

organisational staff are conversant with their respective organisations’ WRRS related

policy and procedures and also if these processes are followed in practice. Stage

Three involves site inspections and observations to assess staff compliance with

organisational WRRS processes (e.g., policy and procedures). Through researcher

lead site inspections and observations, Stage Three provides evidence attesting

whether compliance to WRRS processes (including policy and procedure directives)

are actively adhered to in the field (e.g., driving a work vehicle). Together these three

stages provide information on how and to what extent is WRRS integrated within

each organisation’s OHSMS.

Study Procedure and Materials

The following sections provide an outline of the study procedure and materials

for each of the three stages of data collection.

Review of Organisational Records, Documentation and Initiatives

Stage One included a review of all current organisational documentation, data

and documentary evidence related to WRRS from each organisation. For example,

information requested included:

• policy and procedures;

• risk assessments;

• crash data records/databases;

• driver infringement records;

• complaints reports/records;

• investigation reports;

• crash/incident report forms;

• pre-trip inspection forms/checklists;

• maintenance data;

• intervention or initiative details and evaluations (if applicable);

• training and education plans/schedules and completion;

• driver competency and assessments;

• safety meeting minutes;

• vehicle suitability and selection processes;

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• driver history check processes;

• site and vehicle safety inspection reports; and

• any other WRRS relevant documentation or information related to the

organisation’s work-related driving.

The above information was requested prior to attendance at any organisation’s

site or facilitation of focus groups. Subsequently, information was provided via email

or alternatively as previously discussed with contacts from each of the four

organisations. In addition, any additional organisational records and documentation

identified during the organisational staff focus groups were recorded and requested

from the organisational contacts. The process of review of the organisational

documentation was performed by comparing the documentation to best practice

guidelines, including the Queensland government fleet publication (QFleet, 2010),

publication involving local government fleets (Horsey et al., 2012) and industry

consultancy reports involving light vehicle fleets (Davey, Wishart, Rowland,

Freeman & Banks, 2008; Wishart et al., 2011, Wishart & Rowland, 2010; Wishart &

Rowland, 2012; Wishart & Rowland, 2014). Results of this stage were reported

utilising a checklist developed and based on previous published (Rowland &

Wishart, 2014) and unpublished (Davey et al., 2009; Wishart & Rowland, 2012;

Wishart & Rowland, 2014; Rowland & Wishart, 2015) industry case studies utilising

a similar methodology. All organisational documentation remained confidential with

only the researcher reviewing the document content. Hard copies were kept in a

locked filing cabinet and electronic copies kept on a secure password protect QUT

server file. In addition, by request of the researcher, data bases (e.g., vehicle crash

data) were provided with deidentified information. For example, drivers/staff names

were omitted from all data provided.

Organisational documentation (e.g., policy and procedures) are basic

requirements of any OHSMS. The rationale for reviewing organisational

documentation in this study was to identify if and to what degree WRRS is integrated

within the organisations’ OHSMS. The review of documentation provided

information on how WRRS processes and practice are addressed within

organisations and the degree of importance placed on WRRS as a safety issue.

Organisational Staff Interviews/Focus Groups

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Stage Two of the case study approach utilised a combination of key informant

interviews and semi-structured focus groups to obtain participant knowledge and

information relating to:

1) Existence and operational effectiveness of organisational systems

including policy, procedures, processes and practice related to the

organisation’s work-related road safety;

2) Application of risk management strategies and controls for WRRS;

3) WRRS management practices including management commitment and

support; and

4) Type and influence of intervention strategies and/or initiatives, previous

and current, utilised within each organisation.

After the analysis of results from Stage One of this study, interviews/focus

groups were facilitated at sites within each of the four organisations’ area of

operations (including head/administration offices). Analysis of the results from Stage

One provided the researcher with further background knowledge of current

organisational systems, thereby enabling assessment of participant knowledge and

understanding of each organisation’s policy and procedures related to WRRS. All

participants were employees of the organisations taking part in Study Three.

Recruitment of participants and facilitation of focus groups were conducted at the

various organisational sites. All potential participants were asked if they would like

to participate and that participation was voluntary. In relation to inclusion or

exclusion criteria the only requirement was that participants drove a work vehicle at

least sometimes for the purpose of work. A total of 112 participants from all four

organisations participated within Stage Two, including executive and operational

management, supervisory staff and team leaders, and operational staff/employees.

Three levels of staff were utilised to provide a cross-section of all potential

participants from each organisation with responses providing perceptions of WRRS

across all staffing levels of the organisation. The rationale for this process was to

gain insight into any differences in perception relating to WRRS operational

processes (e.g., policy and procedures) across the three staffing levels. Table 7.1

illustrates the proportion of participants from each organisation. While interviews

with management were conducted primarily on a one-to-one basis, focus group

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discussions (n = 12) were used as the primary data collection method and were

facilitated with groups of 5-10 participants.

Table 7.1 Proportion of participants from each organisation

Organisational Staff Levels Org. A Org. B Org. C Org. D

Executive and operational management 5 2 3 2

Supervisors and team leaders 9 6 8 4

Employees 26 16 19 12

Total 40 24 30 18

The questions used within the semi-structured interviews and focus groups

were developed and based on previous research and customised to current

organisations’ (i.e., Study Three participating organisations) WRRS documentation

(e.g., WRRS policy and procedures) (Davey et al., 2008; 2009; Horsey et al., 2012;

Wishart et al., 2011, Wishart & Rowland, 2010; 2012; 2014). The types of questions

included:

Policy and Procedures

• Does your organisation have work-related road safety policy/procedures

or vehicle use guidelines?

• What areas/topics are covered in the policy/procedures?

• What are the organisation’s policy/procedures relating to vehicle loads

and load restraint?

WRRS Education and Awareness

• What educational or communication mechanisms are in place to ensure

that employees are aware of the organisation’s WRRS procedures?

• Are new employees inducted in safe vehicle use? How?

• What WRRS training and education is undertaken? Are any training

needs analysis conducted? Any specific target groups?

Responsibility and Accountability for WRRS

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• Who is responsible and accountable for WRRS within the organisation?

• Who is responsible for the training/education?

WRRS Communication and Consultation

• Does the organisation consult with employees/stakeholders regarding

WRRS issues or vehicle selection?

Processes Related to Vehicle Incidents and Driver Infringements

• What organisational processes are in place relating to vehicle

incident/crash reporting, recording, investigations and crash data

analysis?

• Are traffic infringements or complaints monitored? How are they

addressed within the organisation?

• What process is undertaken in relation to multiple

infringements/incidents (i.e., repeat offender)?

Vehicle Maintenance

• What vehicle maintenance procedures are in place within the

organisation?

WRRS Risk Management processes

• Are WRRS risk management processes undertaken by the organisation?

• What journey planning processes are undertaken to ensure employee

safety is considered?

• What fatigue management processes are utilised for WRRS within the

organisation?

WRRS Intervention Strategies

• Has your organisation initiated any intervention strategies or initiatives aimed

at improving WRRS?

Stage Two Analysis

Notes were taken on verbatim statements, with participant responses to the

open-ended questions jotted down by the researcher during the facilitation of the

focus groups/interviews. The major points were read back to participants by the

researcher and rewritten if required. Researcher bias was managed by taking notes

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verbatim and rereading information and quotes back to participants to ensure

accuracy of data. Similar to Studies One and Two, the reliability of the coded

schemes and potential bias was addressed by having a second researcher

independently identify the themes and then code responses accordingly.

Site Inspection and Observations

Site inspections and observations were generally conducted simultaneously or

in conjunction with visits to the various organisational locations for the purpose of

interviews/focus group discussions. During site/location visits, inspections of

organisational vehicles (N = 72) and onsite vehicle operation were conducted.

Observations were conducted to ascertain the level of compliance by the

organisations’ staff/drivers with the various operational WRRS policy and

procedures developed by their respective organisations. During the site inspections

and observations, a checklist was completed, with any additional previously

unidentified observations recorded. The checklist was developed and based on

previous unpublished industry case studies utilising a similar methodology (Davey et

al., 2009; Wishart & Rowland, 2012; Rowland & Wishart, 2015).

Data Analysis

Data collected from the four case studies were collated and examined, with

results used to develop a case description of each organisation’s WRRS management

system. The data analysis was organised on the basis of a description of the general

WRRS characteristics and relevant organisational management factors relating to

each organisation’s work-related driving operations and environment. Subsequently,

the results obtained from each of the four case studies are explored by comparing the

results between the four cases. Comparison data is explored by the use of pattern

matching where similar characteristics are compared to ascertain the level of

similarity or difference in the safety management system elements related to work-

related vehicle use. The results from the data analysis are discussed by comparing the

four case study results with previous research and prior industry “best practice”

guidelines and knowledge (Rowland & Wishart, 2014).

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RESULTS

The results from Study Three are divided into three major stages, including 1)

Review of organisational records, documentation and initiatives; 2) Organisational

staff focus groups; and 3) Site inspections and observations.

Review of organisational records, documentation and initiatives

Stage One of Study Three included a review of all current organisational

documentation, data and evidence related to work-related road safety from each of

the four organisations. Table 7.2 illustrates the various WRRS documentation or

records provided from each organisation.

Table 7.2 Outline of organisational WRRS-related documentation in use

Documentation/Data/Information A B C D

Policy and Procedure

Vehicle Use Guidelines

Driver safety/behaviour policy and procedures

x x x x

Vehicle loads/load restraint x x

Responsibility and accountability x x x x

Consultation and communication processes

x x x x

Induction processes x x x

WRRS Risk management processes x x x x

WRRS Fatigue management x x x x

Journey management x x x

Vehicle crash/incident reporting

Vehicle crash/incident recording and analysis

x

Incident investigation process x x x

Infringement monitoring x x x

Repeat offender processes x x x x

Vehicle maintenance procedures x

WRRS training and education x x x

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Reports

Incident/crash reporting forms

Pre-Start vehicle checklists x

Journey management/travel forms x x x x

Schedules/Plans

Training and education plans x x x

Vehicle maintenance x x

Data

Crash/incident data x

Infringement/offence data x x x x

Complaints data x x x

= Documentation developed

x = Documentation not developed

WRRS Policy and Procedures

Table 7.2 “Outline of organisational WRRS-related documentation in use”

demonstrates that the majority of participating organisations did not adopt or develop

documentation related to the diverse array of factors associated with WRRS. For

instance, even though all organisations utilised “Vehicle Use Guidelines” these

documents only covered basic guidelines related to vehicle operation (e.g.,

responsibility to keep the vehicle clean, no smoking in vehicle, fuel, and driver to

follow road rules). The “Vehicle Use Guidelines” documents lacked comprehensive

procedures specifically related to driving safety. In addition, none of the

organisations had developed any stand-alone driving safety policy and procedures.

Organisations B, C and D developed documentation addressing primarily

administration of WRRS and collection of reactive data (e.g., incident reports) rather

than targeting proactive areas relevant to improving WRRS or preventing work-

related vehicle incidents occurring. In addition, for all organisations the majority of

safety related documentation focussed on general workplace health and safety and

did not adequately address specific issues related to WRRS operation. For example,

all organisations developed basic work-related fatigue management policy and

procedures, however the documentation failed to provide any guidelines associated

with fatigue and work-related driving; such as timing for breaks during driving,

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maximum driving times, and consideration for travel after long work days.

Furthermore, documentation associated with responsibility and accountability for

safe vehicle use and communication and employee consultation regarding WRRS

was lacking across all organisations.

In contrast, Organisation A had developed and implemented a wider array of

policy and procedures and associated documentation related to WRRS. Natural

resource extraction organisations (e.g., mining and natural gas exploration) are

considered high risk industries and therefore are subject to greater scrutiny in relation

to occupational health and safety. Therefore, organisations operating within the

natural resource extraction industry generally have in place more comprehensive

occupational health and safety policy, procedures and processes. For example,

driving safety was incorporated into all new employee induction documentation with

a brief online video developed to inform new employees of the organisation’s

requirements in relation to safe vehicle use. However, WRRS documentation

developed by Organisation A lacked comprehensive detail and did not cover all

issues and influencing factors associated with driving safely for work. In addition,

none of the four participating organisations were AS/ISO (e.g., AS/NZS 4801:2001 –

Occupational health and safety management systems) audited or previously received

accreditation for their OHSMS.

Work-Related Vehicle Incidents and Driver Infringements

All organisations exhibited considerable discrepancy associated with the type

and extensiveness of data recorded for work-related vehicle incidents. For example,

Organisation C did not record vehicle incidents in a stand-alone repository (e.g.,

database) rather only kept completed incident forms. Although the other

organisations did record vehicle incidents, the level of detail pertaining to vehicle

incidents varied across organisations. For instance, the majority of incident data

recorded focussed on reactive data related to damage to the asset (e.g., vehicle) and

did not provide proactive data to ascertain the potential factors that influenced

vehicle incident causation. Subsequently, the lack of viable and relevant vehicle

crash-related data by all organisations reduced any ability to determine vehicle

incident/crash contributing factors. Therefore, the crash data collected failed to

produce any meaningful comparison of incidents/trends across the four

organisations. Alternatively, this process highlighted deficiencies in data collection

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and recording for all organisations involved. Furthermore, none of the four

organisations collected data pertaining to traffic infringements or offences nor did

they have a documented process for addressing repeat offenders. Rather, offending

drivers were requested to simply pay the fine with no additional deterrence processes

evident. Organisation C did collect complaints data reported by members of the

public identifying driver adverse behaviours and failure to follow road rules.

However, the organisation’s process for dealing with complaints is left up to the

discrepancy of respective departmental supervisors; resulting in usually a one on one

discussion between the supervisor and driver.

WRRS Intervention Strategies and Improvement Initiatives

In relation to previous and current WRRS intervention strategies or initiatives

implemented by the participating organisations, only Organisation A produced

records related to development and implementation. For example, Organisation A

implemented mandatory training programs for all organisational vehicle drivers

relating to general driving safety and four-wheel drive safety specific training.

Potential vehicle drivers are not permitted to drive a company vehicle without first

completing the relevant driver training program(s). However, no records regarding

evaluation or effectiveness of programs were reported or recorded beyond

driver/employee attendance and level of competence (i.e., competent or not yet

competent). In addition, Organisation A recently introduced In-Vehicle Monitoring

Systems (IVMS) into all of their vehicles used for the purpose of work. Information

associated with IVMS operation is documented within all new employee induction

processes and also within the “Vehicle Use Guidelines” document. Each driver has

their own unique and identifiable key which initiates the system (vehicle cannot

operate without key inserted) and records any adverse driving (as determined by

IVMS inputted parameters) by the driver. The items measured by the IVMS included

speeding, sharp braking and maximum time driving (i.e., two hours maximum

without a break), with any breach of the designated parameters recorded and an

audible alarm signalling the driver. Although in the early stages of implementation,

anecdotal evidence supplied by organisational management suggested that the IVMS

has reduced the incidence of adverse driver behaviour and vehicle incidents. The

IVMS system is owned and operated by a third party responsible for the installation

and maintenance of the systems, as well as providing the organisation with

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comprehensive reports outlining breaches in safe driving behaviour by identified

vehicle drivers. Drivers reported as not complying with IVMS parameters are

addressed by first discussing the breach with their manager; with multiple or more

serious breaches dealt with more severely. However, the organisation did not have

any documentation outlining this process with penalties, if any, are based primarily

on the managers discrepancy.

Organisational staff interviews/focus groups

Stage Two of the case study used organisational staff interviews/focus group

discussions to ascertain the existence and effectiveness of WRRS elements within

each organisations OHSMS. The following sections outline the major themes

associated with the sample participants’ perceptions and beliefs relating to the

comprehensiveness and effectiveness of WRRS processes and practice within the

participating organisations.

Limited WRRS policy and procedures

Although all organisations had not developed any policy and procedures

related specifically to driving safety, the majority of the interview/focus group

participants within this theme acknowledged their respective organisation’s “Vehicle

Use Guidelines” as the primary document related to WRRS. For example, a male

field worker (Organisation A) indicated “I believe my company does not have a

designated policy and procedures related specifically to work-related driving safety.

However, the company does utilise the Vehicle Use Guidelines document to address

issues associated with vehicle operation, including some safety related info such as

following the road rules and not consuming alcohol and driving”. Also within this

theme, some study participants identified that many issues associated with work-

related driving safety within their respective organisations are contained within their

general workplace safety policy and procedures. For instance, a male supervisor

(Organisation C) stated “Our organisation has many safety policy and procedures

which are relevant to and cover elements associated with work-related driving

safety, including fatigue management, code of conduct and limitations regarding

alcohol use in the workplace, to name a few”. Similar to the results in section 7.5.1,

it was also noted that those general safety policy and procedures did not contain

information specific to WRRS.

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Participants from all four organisations acknowledged limitations associated

with documentation related to WRRS in this theme, including policy and procedures.

However, additional WRRS related documentation identified included vehicle

loading and load restraint and vehicle maintenance processes. Within this theme,

focus group respondents also noted forms associated with WRRS, including vehicle

incident/crash form and pre-start checklist form (results discussed in section 7.5.2.2).

Participants from only Organisations A and C acknowledged the existence of policy

and procedures related to vehicle loading and load restraint. One male manager

(Organisation C) stated “We have introduced recently comprehensive procedures

associated with vehicle loading and load restraint. This was borne from a recent

incident where some unrestrained equipment fell off the back of a utility and hit a

following car causing a pretty serious crash”. Furthermore, a supervisor from

Organisation A indicated “Our organisation has always had procedures related to

vehicle loading and load restraint. As far as I can recall it has always been an

industry requirement … it is basic risk management. Plus, most of our drivers drive

on unsealed roads with some road in pretty bad shape, so if you don’t restrain your

load on the vehicle you would probably lose it”.

This theme also reported issues associated with vehicle maintenance.

Participants from Organisations A, B and C all identified the presence of vehicle

maintenance procedures within their respective organisations. However, the majority

of information documented within the procedures primarily contained basic

information related to the requirements and timing of maintenance and also the

procedure for booking vehicle maintenance and/or repair. For instance, a male field

worker (Organisation B) indicated “The department has maintenance procedures but

it only states what to do when your vehicle is due for a service, it doesn’t contain

much related specifically to driving safety. Just the importance of regular vehicle

maintenance, I suppose if your vehicle is well maintained you probably won’t

breakdown”. Interestingly, the majority of participants from Organisation D stated

that as volunteers in the organisation they were responsible for the maintenance and

safety associated with their own vehicle (privately owned vehicle).

Inadequate WRRS system and processes

This theme comprises those aspects identified by participants related to the

organisations’ processes that are associated with WRRS. For example, the range of

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processes identified by participants included: employee inductions; training and

education; pre-start checklist process; and vehicle incident/crash reporting, recording

and investigation.

Although all participants within this theme acknowledged that all new

employees are required to complete an induction process, only participants from

Organisation A indicated that their induction process encompassed a substantial

WRRS component. For instance, a male employee (Organisation C) stated “We do

have new employee inductions but there is no specific work-related driving safety

component apart from reading the Vehicle Use Guidelines”. In contrast, a team

leader (Organisation A) informed “In our organisation we have a work-related

driving safety component which is covered in all new employee inductions. It

includes a short online video explaining the company rules and requires relating to

safe vehicle use, specific site road rules, safe driver behaviour and operation of the

In-Vehicle Monitoring System”.

Similar to the results relating to employee inductions, within this theme the

majority of participants from Organisations B, C and D stated that they had not

received any training and education related to WRRS. For example, a female

volunteer worker (Organisation D) stated “I have never received any training or

education related to driving a car, the only really I have received is training related

to my job tasks. As a volunteer we drive our own vehicles and as such are expected

to be self-sufficient”. However, a few participants from Organisation B did stipulate

that they had received some basic driver training from a third party (Driver Training

Instructor) at their regional depot. For instance, a male field worker (Organisation B)

mentioned “Some of us in our regional area have undergone driver training by a

local driving instructor. This was introduced by management because of a spate of

vehicle crashes during the previous three months. There was no follow up and

because we had training that was supposed to fix the problem. It didn’t and we still

got blamed”. Conversely, as stated previously, Organisation A had introduced

mandatory driver safety training (provided by a certified driving instructor) for all

employees that are required to drive company vehicles. In addition, any employee

required to drive four wheel drives are also required to complete a specific course of

instruction before driving an off-road vehicle. For example, a male field worker

(Organisation A) stated “Because I need to operate a four wheel drive I am required

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to complete both driver training programs before I am allowed to get behind the

wheel of a company vehicle. We are also required to complete refresher training

every twelve months”. In relation to driver training at Organisation A attendance

sheets are completed, competence recorded in a database, and approximately twelve

months after completing training the organisation’s online system notifies area

managers which employees are due for refresher training.

This theme also acknowledged that a daily process for most participating

organisations (except Organisation D) is the requirement for completion of vehicle

pre-start checks before operating a vehicle. This is usually completed using a

provided form or checklist (e.g., completed, signed and dated) requiring drivers to

check vehicle items such as: tyre pressures, fluid levels, horn, indicating lights,

headlights, and record any damage or faults. Operators are also required to report any

faults immediately and ensure faults are repaired before operating the vehicle. For

instance, a male employee (Organisation A) stated “We are all required to complete

the daily vehicle pre-start checklists before taking out any vehicle. Most people do

the right thing and fully complete the checks as required but I know some who just

breeze over it just to get going”. Interestingly, although completed forms are

checked by supervisors or administrative officers to ensure all forms are completed

for vehicles in operation, there is generally no supervision to ensure if the process is

completed adequately. For example, a male employee (Organisation C) indicated

“Some guys don’t do all the checks because they know no one is watching, they just

want to get an early start”.

Within this theme, all organisations’ participants reported a process for

reporting vehicle incidents or crashes. In addition, participants identified that most

organisations (except Organisation C) also recorded vehicle incidents/crashes within

a database and, at least, completed basic analysis. For example, a female

administrative manager (Organisation D) indicated “We input all the data from the

vehicle incident form onto a database and then do an analysis to provide a summary

of basic information relative to the crashes to all line managers. For example, type

of crashes, location, any emergency services in attendance, any injuries suffered, and

cost of repairs, etc”. Unfortunately, Organisation C only collected vehicle incident

forms and any summary was obtained, if required, from the insurance provider.

However, a male manager (Organisation C) stated “We don’t do any analysis

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ourselves however we can get data from the insurance provider. Usually this is only

the cost of repairs or just the excess … what we have to pay”. Furthermore, in

relation vehicle crash investigations only Organisation A completed any crash

investigation post incident. Unless the incident was considered serious, Organisations

B, C and D only required drivers to discuss the incident with their immediate

manager. Serious incidents would be investigated by the respective organisations’

Work, Health and Safety personnel as per government regulator notification

requirements. However, a safety manager (Organisation A) stated “We conduct

investigations for all vehicle incidents. Usually this is performed by the area Work,

Health and Safety Advisor or if the incident is serious, such as an injury is sustained

or a vehicle is a write off, then an assigned panel of personnel including safety,

supervisory and/or management personnel would investigate”.

Interestingly, the majority of participants who provided responses associated

with this theme stated that if a driver does incur a traffic infringement or offence they

would only be required to pay the fine. Similarly, the organisations also did not have

a documented policy in relation to repeat offenders for either infringements or

incidents/crashes. However, a male manager (Organisation A) conferred “If an

employee is a repeat offender then he is a risk, we would offer additional training,

etc and if he/she reoffends we would terminate his employment. But no, we don’t

have any documented procedure.

Limited risk management strategies and processes

This theme groups participant response associated with WRRS risk

management. Generally, work-related travel was not specifically included within any

work task risk assessments for all participating organisations. Although Organisation

A had introduced a variety of strategies to mitigate work-related driving risks (e.g.,

training and education), work-related travel was not incorporated into any risk

assessment process. For example, a male supervisor (Organisation A) stated “We

don’t include travel on risk assessments or work method statements because it is not

really related to the specific job task. Anyway, driving is something we all do every

day, if we had to have a risk assessment for all driving tasks then I would not get

anything else done”. Similarly, within this theme a majority of participants from the

other participating organisations also acknowledged that they perceived work-related

driving as an everyday occurrence and did not warrant additional risk management.

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For example, a male manager (Organisation B) suggested “If the drivers just did the

right thing and followed the road rules, then we would not have an issue”.

Correspondingly, in relation to journey planning or management processes only

Organisation A had initiated development. Although only developed and at the stage

of the interviews had not been implemented across the organisation, the journey

planning process was only planned for drivers travelling to remote areas. Moreover,

the majority of participants from Organisation A were not aware of the procedures

contained within the journey planning process.

Limited management commitment and support

Although the majority of participants indicated that management commitment

and support for safety within their respective organisations was effective, some

participants suggested that this was not the case for WRRS. For example, within this

theme a male field employee (Organisation B) stated “although managers value the

safety of all workers, when it comes to vehicle driving safety I don’t see much

happening, in actual fact I don’t believe management think driving a vehicle for

work is a company safety issue. Yes, they want us to comply with the guidelines but

that’s about it”. Similarly, a male employee (Organisation C) suggested “I don’t

think management perceive driving a vehicle as a workplace safety issue, most of us

drive a vehicle and have a licence therefore we should be competent”. Likewise, this

theme reported that most managers suggested they are fully committed to safety

including driving a vehicle for the purpose of work. However, a small proportion of

managers did believe that if drivers followed the road rules then the number of

problems and incidents associated with WRRS would be considerably reduced. For

example, a female manager stated “Anyone driving a vehicle should have a driver’s

licence and are deemed competent to drive a vehicle by legislation, therefore as long

as we provide safe and maintained vehicles and drivers follow the road rules we

should not have too many issues”.

Inadequate consultation and communication

A primary element of any risk management process and subsequently a

OHSMS (ISO 390001, 2012) are consultation with staff relating to safety issues and

communication of safety processes and issues including any changes that may impact

on safety. Within this theme, a majority of participants (primarily from Organisations

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B, C and D) identified that although they receive communication relating to

occupational health and safety associated with core work tasks, most could not affirm

whether they had received any communication relating to WRRS. Typically, a male

field employee (Organisation C) indicated “We get updates all the time regarding

occupational health and safety issues, usually either on the intranet, emails or our

weekly tool box talks but I can’t remember ever receiving anything relating to work-

related driving safety”.

In contrast, this theme indicated that many participants from Organisation A

suggested that they received updates or information about WRRS issues regularly.

Participants stated that they receive email alerts and/or notification at their daily pre-

start meetings prior to commencing work relating to any WRRS issues, such as road

closures, potential issues with certain vehicles or general driving safety. One female

field operator (Organisation A) suggested “We are provided with information all the

time relating to work driving safety issues or problems, usually at our pre-start

meetings or by email alert”. In addition, most acknowledged that they are provided

with a review or summary of IVMS reports at safety/works meetings outlining the

number and seriousness of non-compliance incidents. Usually facilitated by a

supervisor or team leader any IVMS non-compliance are discussed with the

supervisor/team leader emphasising the organisations requirements related to work-

related driving safety. For example, a male field operator stated “We get regular

updates, usually at our work meetings or safety meetings relating to IVMS

compliance issues. Usually, we told about non-compliance occurrences and are

reminded to follow the guidelines, such as not speeding, no harsh breaking and

taking a break at least every couple of hours”.

In relation to consultation about WRRS issues and/or vehicle fit for purpose

within this theme, almost all participants suggested that they have never been

consulted regarding any safety issues, including WRRS. For instance, a male

participant (Organisation C) implied “I have never been consulted about safety or

driving related issues and I don’t think anyone else has as well”. Furthermore,

participants from Organisation A acknowledged that although communication was

facilitated effectively, consultation relating to safety issues could be vastly improved.

For example, a female team leader (Organisation A) suggested “Most people in our

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organisation are not consulted at all regarding safety issues or changes … we are

expected to just follow instructions provided or use vehicle assigned”.

Responsibility, accountability and ownership of WRRS

This theme details participant responses in relation to primarily who or which

department they perceived were responsible and accountable for WRRS. The

majority of participants from Organisations B, C and D could not identify who in

their respective organisations were responsible or accountable for WRRS. However,

those that did provide a response signified considerable diversity in perceptions

related to responsibility, accountability or ownership of WRRS. For example, most

responses either identified the Work, Health and Safety department or Fleet

department as having ownership of WRRS. For example, one male team leader

(Organisation B) suggested “The problem with work-related driving safety is that no

one takes ownership … fleet believe it is a workplace safety issue whereas the Work,

Health and Safety department believe it is the Fleet department’s domain”.

However, although not documented Organisation A did designate responsibility and

accountability for WRRS between both Work Health and Safety and Fleet

departments. Generally, the Work Health and Safety department was responsible for

safety-related issues and the Fleet department for the asset or vehicle (e.g.,

maintenance). Nevertheless, there were considerable inter-departmental discrepancy

or criticism associated with the delineation or amount of responsibility or

accountability for WRRS from each department.

Priority of productivity over safety

Similar to responses in studies one and two, participants within this theme

perceived that on occasions their organisations placed an importance of productivity

over safety. Although participants acknowledged that they believed management

generally promoted and supported a safe workplace, they perceived WRRS did not

receive the same attention. For example, a male employee (Organisation C) stated

“Management say they value our safety but they still push us to get to jobs as soon as

possible. I know they are under pressure from Head Office and customers but they

also want us to follow the road rules … the only way we can make up time is during

driving”. In addition, a male field worker (Organisation B) stipulated “We have a lot

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in place relating to general safety, but not much related to safety while driving for

work”.

Limited WRRS intervention strategies or initiatives

Apart from those strategies previously identified (primarily Organisation A),

this theme indicated that the majority of participants could not recall any WRRS

intervention strategies or initiatives development or implemented within their

respective organisations. Though as noted previously in section 7.5.2.2, a few

participants from Organisation B did suggest that they had received some basic

driver training at one of their regional depots in reaction to an increase in vehicle-

related incidents. However, this driver training was instigated by the regional depot

management and was not sanctioned by the organisation’s executive management.

Subsequently, within this theme participants suggested that no records were kept

regarding the success or effectiveness of the driver training nor were any noticeable

improvements evident in relation to the organisation’s work-related vehicle crash

rates in following years. The quote by the male field worker (Organisation C)

highlighted in Table 7.3 summarises the majority of participant perceptions related to

existence of WRRS intervention strategies or initiatives, “I’ve been with the

company for nearly 20 years and I cannot remember the organisation ever

introducing any work-related road safety interventions or initiatives”.

Lack of knowledge, experience and training related to WRRS

As indicated previously in section 7.5.2.4, participants identified limited

management commitment to WRRS and further indicated that some management

blame drivers for the majority of work-related vehicle incidents. However, within

this theme participants indicated that this result may be acerbated by a lack of

knowledge of the specific risks associated with work-related driving, including a lack

of personnel with the relevant experience to address WRRS risks. For example, a

male manager suggested “I believe the problem with the work-related driving

situation is that no one has any real knowledge of or experience in that area. We

might think we are doing the right thing, but are we”. In addition, participants

suggested that a lack of attention toward WRRS issues may also stem from

productivity demands and level of resources allocated for WRRS. For instance, a line

manager (Organisation D) indicated “I know many of our drivers attempt to make up

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time when driving from one job to the next, they know it is unsafe, we have told them

to follow the road rules, but they have a strong commitment to their clients”.

Site inspections and observations of organisations’ WRRS

Through the use of site inspections and observations, Stage Three investigated

the physical characteristics of each organisation’s WRRS system, including site and

vehicle inspections. In addition, observations were conducted to assess staff/driver

compliance with their respective organisations’ WRRS policy and procedures, as

well as, occupational health and safety and traffic management (e.g., road rules)

legislation. However, due to the lack of WRRS related policy and procedures and

associated documentation developed by the majority of participating organisations

the results in relation to observations of staff/driver compliance are limited. Table 7.4

shows a summary of the results of site/workplace and vehicle inspections, as well as

observations of driver compliance with organisational (e.g., policy and procedures)

and external requirements (e.g., government legislation).

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Table 7.3 WRRS inspection and observations checklist

Organisation

A B C D

Site/Workplace

Inductions – WRRS component x x x

Site road rules/signage x x

Site road conditions

Site parking x x

Accessibility of WRRS policy and procedures

x

Incident reporting process

Infringement reporting process x x x x

Works/safety meetings – WRRS Component

x x x

Vehicle

Vehicle condition

Vehicle tyre pressure/condition x x

Vehicle loads/equipment x x x x

Loose items inside cabin x x x x

Vehicle fit for purpose

Glove Box Kits (e.g., details in case of incident/crash)

x x x x

Vehicle maintenance logbooks x

Driver/Organisation

Safe vehicle operation on site x x x x

Vehicle parking/reversing x x x x

Pre-trip vehicle inspections completed x

Pre-start vehicle checks supervision/checked

x x x x

Loads weighed and restrained x x x x

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Site/Workplace inspections and observations

Inspections across organisations’ sites/workplaces revealed that site safety

signage, speed limits, directional signage and parking area delineation and signage

differed considerably between each of the organisations. Only the sites associated

with Organisation A provided comprehensive and adequate signage related

specifically to site maximum speeds and directional signage. In relation to

accessibility of WRRS policy and procedures, although limited, most organisations

sites could locate on their intranet documentation relating to work-related driving

(e.g., Vehicle Use Guidelines and Incident Report forms). However, although

Organisation B staff acknowledged the existence of WRRS documentation on their

intranet site many site personnel could not locate the relevant documentation.

Furthermore, observations conducted during organisations’ site safety and/or works

meetings found that only Organisation A included a work-related driving safety

component. As mentioned previously, the work-related driving safety component

included a brief overview of vehicle incident occurrence and IVMS noncompliance.

Vehicle inspections

Across all organisations vehicles (N = 72) were generally maintained in good

order with most vehicles inspected showing regular periodic maintenance within

vehicle log books. However, inspection of inside and outside vehicle cabins across

all organisations found that the storage of equipment failed to meet organisational

policy and procedures or Work, Health and Safety risk management requirements.

For instance, inside the cabin of many vehicles a number of loose items were

identified (e.g., positioned on seats, in vehicle centre console or on the dashboard)

which in the event of a crash may become missiles resulting in potential serious

injuries. Furthermore, stowage of tools and equipment on the rear of some utility

vehicles and trucks were unsecured, and in certain instances heavy loads were

positioned on one side resulting in the vehicle being visibly unstable (i.e., leaning to

one side).

Previous results identified that vehicle maintenance was undertaken

adequately. However, vehicle tyre pressures on many vehicles (across all

organisations) were not inflated to correct manufacturer specifications, with some

vehicle tyres underinflated and a smaller proportion grossly overinflated. This issue

highlights the importance of vehicle pre-start checks and further establishes that

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these checks are either not performed or are performed inadequately. In addition,

observations revealed that vehicle pre-start checklist procedures were completed on

an ‘ad hoc’ basis across all organisations. For instance, although most drivers

completed all the required checks, some drivers completed the vehicle pre-start

checklist forms without undertaking any of the specified vehicle checks.

Furthermore, there was limited supervision or assessment by management or

supervisory staff to determine if vehicle pre-start checks were undertaken effectively.

Driver/Organisation observations

Observations related to compliance with organisational policy and procedures

were restricted due to limited development of policy and procedures relating

specifically to WRRS practice. Although compliance with the road rules (traffic

legislation) is stated within all organisations’ “Vehicle Use Guidelines”

documentation, a small proportion of drivers from all organisations were observed

travelling noticeably above the speed limit at organisational sites. In addition, some

drivers were observed “failing to indicate” when entering/exiting public roads

from/to organisations’ sites and workplaces. Although limited, observations

conducted at organisations’ sites and workplaces suggest inconsistency associated

with driver compliance with both organisational policy and procedures and road

traffic laws.

Attendance at Organisations B, C and D safety and/or works meetings

indicated that WRRS was generally not discussed nor was communication of work-

related driving safety issues conveyed to staff. In contrast, Organisation A did

communicate to staff details regarding any serious WRRS vehicle crashes and also

compliance issues associated with their IVMS. However, the majority of information

communicated to staff was in reaction to WRRS events and limited proactive safety

information was provided.

DISCUSSION

The objective of Study Three was to investigate the extent, application and

adequacy of organisational policy, processes and safety practices in organisations

(e.g., OHSMS) operating light vehicle fleets. This research was undertaken to

highlight key organisational systems that influence WRRS culture within

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organisations and safety performance. Study Three aimed to answer research

question six:

6) Do current organisational safety management systems, processes and

practice adequately target work-related road safety?

Following is a discussion of the results obtained from the four organisational

case studies.


The results obtained from case studies of the four organisations provided an

insight into the WRRS systems of each organisation. In addition, in relation to the

theoretical framework utilised within this program of research, Study Three

incorporated results pertaining to primarily the “situation” component (e.g., safety

management system) of organisational WRRS culture, as well as responses related to

the “person” or perceptions of organisational staff associated with the safety climate

of the respective organisations.

Analysis of the four case studies highlighted that limited documentation

currently exists related to organisational WRRS policy, procedures, processes and

practice. Previous research has indicated that policy and procedures related to WRRS

was inadequate (SafetyNet, 2009; Wishart & Rowland, 2010; 2012). Unfortunately,

Stage One results indicated that none of the four participating organisations had

developed any stand-alone work-related driving safety policy and procedures. Failing

to provide relevant OHS guidance documentation (e.g., policy and procedures) has

legal and operational implications for organisations. Organisations are legally

obligated (Model Work Health and safety Act, 2011) to provide safety procedures for

all work-related tasks (including work-related vehicle driving) that an organisation

performs within its operations, including communication and training of the

documentation provided to all staff. Also, a lack of WRRS policy and procedures

fails to provide drivers with consistent operational rules or directives, whereby

employees are all following the same rules that are aligned with the business and

safety requirements of organisations. .In addition, the majority of documentation

developed and data collected (e.g., incident/crash reporting) was reactive in nature

(Lewis et al, 2012; Wishart & Davey, 2004) rather than proactively utilised to

promote safe driving processes and practice. Furthermore, the results identified a

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lack of assigned responsibility and accountability for WRRS across all organisations,

including communication of safe driving processes and employee consultation.

Interestingly, responsibility and accountability as well as communication and

consultation are major elements of an OHSMS, and basis for safety risk management

and compliance with Work, Health and Safety legislation.

The results from the four case studies also highlighted that organisations are

operating at different levels of maturity (Biggs, Banks, Davey & Freeman, 2013) in

relation to addressing WRRS within their OHSMS’s and subsequently WRRS

culture. Safety culture research has described the diverse differences across

organisations, particularly workplace safety, as evolutionary steps or stages of safety

culture development (Foster & Hoult, 2013). For instance, one organisation

(Organisation A) had developed more WRRS documentation compared to the other

three participating organisations. However, Table 7.2 illustrates that documentation

developed by Organisation A does not adequately target all the major issues

associated with WRRS practice. Furthermore, the requirement to address WRRS in

more detail is possibly connected with the requirements of a high-risk industry and

the hazardous operations regarding remote area work and not potentially associated

with the perception that daily work-related driving is a high-risk activity. In addition,

only Organisation A provided documentation related to either previous or current

WRRS intervention strategies. For example, drivers of company vehicles are

required to complete mandatory driver training and all vehicles are fitted with an In-

Vehicle Monitoring System (IVMS) that monitors safe driving performance. The

intervention strategies are supported by additional supporting systems, basically to

ensure efficient completion of training and refresher training for all relevant staff and

that IVMS performance results are recorded with any non-compliance addressed and

communicated to staff. However, these intervention strategies focus primarily on the

driver and do not address additional issues associated with WRRS, such as

organisational influences. Moreover, no formal review or evaluations are conducted

regarding the usefulness or effectiveness of the intervention strategies.

Similar to Stage One, the findings reported in Stage Two highlighted

limitations associated with the fundamental elements of an effective OHSMS

(Bottani et al., 2009; Standards Australia, 2001). In addition, the results of Stage

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Two suggest that there are considerable limitations associated with the identification,

assessment and control of WRRS issues and influences within organisational

OHSMS. Furthermore, there was a reported lack of acknowledgement and support

for WRRS as a specific organisational safety issue. These results indicate that WRRS

is not addressed adequately within the organisations’ OHSMS’s. The findings further

suggest that there is limited WRRS knowledge and understanding within the

organisations and a lack of management commitment and support for WRRS

(Mooren et al., 2014). The findings propose that without including WRRS within the

fundamental elements of an organisations OHSMS, there would be no baseline

measures for accountability and therefore no commitment for WRRS and WRRS

improvement. Rather, the perception directed toward WRRS problems and work-

related driving performance will remain a driver issue (e.g., the driver is to blame).

Stage Three involved a number of site inspections and observations associated

with examining the operational aspects of WRRS within the four participating

organisations. Similar to the previous two stages the results of Stage Three identified

that although limited, processes and practice associated with WRRS failed to comply

adequately with the respective organisations’ policy and procedures. For instance,

the ad hoc completion of pre-start vehicle checks and lack of supervision or checks

to ensure this process is adequately accomplished. Further evidence associated with

the lack of consideration toward safe work-related driving was limited attention

toward vehicle tyre pressures (e.g., instances of over and under inflation of tyres,

with two tyres on one vehicle reading only 18 psi), safe vehicle load placement and

restraint, and loose items observed in vehicles that in the event of a crash may

become missiles contributing to potentially serious injuries (Rowland & Wishart,

2014). Stage Three substantiates the limitations identified within the findings of

Stages One and Two, highlighting a lack of focus for WRRS issues and adequate

inclusion of specific WRRS components within the organisations’ respective

OHSMS’s.

Taken together, all three stages of Study Three reveal that WRRS is not

adequately addressed within the safety management systems of the participating

organisations. Therefore, in relation to Research Question 6 - Do current

organisational safety management systems, processes and practice adequately target

work-related road safety, Study Three results indicate that current organisational

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safety management systems, processes and practice do not adequately target WRRS.

For instance, Study Three findings support previous research indicating that WRRS

risk management processes are limited compared to organisational risk management

of general core work-related tasks (Wishart & Rowland, 2010; Wishart et al., 2010).

In addition, the lack of risk management strategies targeting WRRS can have severe

consequences for organisational safe work-related driving practices and potentially

increase risk, including severity and frequency of work-related vehicle crashes

(Stuckey et al., 2010; Wishart, 2015). Similar to the results outlined in Studies One

and Two and previous research, results of Study Three also suggest that drivers are

generally considered to blame for the majority of work-related vehicle incidents

(Rowland et al., 2006; Rowland & Wishart, 2014, Wishart & Davey, 2004). This

result is further supported by the lack of organisational documentation, processes and

proactive intervention strategies directed toward the WRRS issue (Haworth et al.,

2008). Although Organisation A had developed and implemented more WRRS

components within their OHSMS, Study Three identified that WRRS could be

further targeted for improvement. However, this result also highlights the differences

between organisations in relation to the degree or level of attention toward

addressing the WRRS problem (Davey et al., 2008; Rowland & Wishart, 2014;

Wishart & Rowland, 2012; Wishart & Rowland, 2013).

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Study Three aimed to address the third objective of this program of research by

investigating the extent, application and adequacy of organisational policy, processes

and safety practices within organisations operating light vehicle fleets. The research

was undertaken to highlight the key organisational systems targeting safe vehicle

operation and driver performance. Although Study Three provided further insight

into drivers/workers perceptions regarding WRRS, the study identified key findings

associated with organisational OHSMSs (e.g., “situational” element of the

Reciprocal Safety Culture Model) and the capacity of those systems to adequately

address WRRS issues/risks, manage work-related driving, and support WRRS

improvement. Consequently, the limitations of organisational OHSMSs to

adequately address elements of WRRS could be considered a further indication of an

inadequate or ‘poor’ safety culture in relation to work-related driving.

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In summary, the results revealed that across all participating organisations’

safety management systems, there was limited recognition and prioritisation of the

dangers and risks associated with work-related driving with potentially the same

consideration and diligence as other workplace hazards. Additionally, organisations

failed to adequately allocate effective ownership, responsibility and accountability

for WRRS operations, with many in management neglecting commitment and

support for fundamental aspects of their respective WRRS management systems.

However, results also acknowledged that limited organisational personnel

experience, knowledge and understanding of the issues and influences associated

with WRRS contributed to a lack of attention and prioritisation of WRRS within

OHSMSs. In essence, the findings of Study Three suggest that current organisational

OHSMSs, processes and practice do not effectively target WRRS. This has potential

legal (e.g., OHS legislation), and operational (e.g., impact on productivity and safety

processes) implications. Furthermore, due to the diversity in WRRS management

systems, the study provided evidence to suggest that the WRRS culture across

organisations are at varying stages in maturity or evolution. Similar to previous

safety research (Foster & Hoult, 2013), this result suggests that organisations

operating in the early stages of WRRS culture maturity would be less likely to

develop and implement intervention strategies, as well as provide ongoing support

for the longevity of initiatives.

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Chapter 8: Research Findings and Discussion


Work related vehicle crashes have been widely identified as the major cause of

work-related death and injury both in Australia and other countries around the world

(Boufous & Williamson, 2006; Boufous & Williamson, 2009; DaCoTA, 2012;

Haworth et al., 2000; Lewis et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2012; Newnam, 2014).

Consequently, driving a vehicle could be considered one of the most hazardous

operations undertaken by workers during their daily work activities (Boufous &

Williamson, 2009; Wishart, 2015). Although Work, Health and Safety legislation

exists in Australia outlining the requirements for organisations to mitigate WRRS

risks (Work, Health and Safety Act, 2011), the number of claims related to work-

related vehicle crashes and injuries remain high (Safe Work Australia, 2014).

Compounding this issue, organisations are failing to take a comprehensive approach

in relation to the application of intervention strategies aimed at reducing the risk of

work-related vehicle incidents (Lewis et al., 2012; Newton et al., 2013). Many

organisations have implemented intervention strategies, albeit inadequate, in reaction

to increases in the number or severity of work-related vehicle crashes/incidents

(Lewis et al., 2012; Wishart & Davey, 2004) and subsequently failed to proactively

address problems or incidents before they occur. Consequently, these organisations

have failed to meet basic safety compliance and risk management standards,

including maintaining safe systems of work and a safe place to work.

Current crash/injury statistics combined with the limited focus towards

addressing WRRS suggests that organisations may not consider it a serious concern

or lack the necessary knowledge (and skills) to adequately address the issue. This

indicates that there is a need to not only understand the current scope and risks

associated with the safety hazard of driving for work, but also utilise a holistic

approach to explore the magnitude of influences associated with WRRS performance

and intervention strategy application (Husband, 2011; Lewis et al., 2012). Therefore,

the aim of this program of research was to explore the contemporary factors that

impact on WRRS in light vehicle fleets.

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The program of research utilised an exploratory approach to identify and assess

the contemporary situation in relation to WRRS and associated influences on

intervention strategy application. In addition, the program of research utilised a

safety culture model (Cooper, 2000) as an integrative framework to enable the

development of a holistic understanding of the WRRS context and further inform

improvement strategies. Consequently, the theoretical framework utilised within this

program of research was based upon Cooper’s (2000) Reciprocal Safety Culture


encapsulated the multiple-facets of safety culture and explored the factors that can

potentially influence WRRS. Similar to previous safety culture research within the

general occupational safety setting (Cooper, 2000; Choudhry et al., 2007), the

findings from this program of research indicate that WRRS culture is also the

product of multiple goal-directed interactions between people (e.g., psychological),

jobs (e.g., behavioural) and the organisation (e.g., situational).

Safety culture is best considered a multi-dimensional concept that provides a

holistic representation of safety within organisations (Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson,

2006). In essence, the holistic approach utilised within this program of research

provided a grounded and deeper understanding of the WRRS culture of organisations

operating light vehicle fleets. In order to achieve the overall aim, this research firstly

identified work-related drivers’ self-reported perceptions and experiences associated

with the personal, organisational and external factors that influence safe work-related

driving behaviours and driving safety performance. Secondly, this research explored

the multitude of factors that facilitated or hindered the application of intervention

strategies aimed at improving WRRS. Thirdly, the research investigated the ability of

current organisational safety systems, including policy, procedures and practices, to

adequately manage and support WRRS within organisations operating light vehicle

fleets. As a result, this program of research has contributed to enhancing knowledge

into identifying the contemporary factors that not only influence WRRS performance

but also the application of suitable intervention strategies.

This final chapter summarises and discusses the key findings from each of the

three research studies incorporated within this program of research. Interpretation of

results associated with the three studies is reviewed in relation to the overall aim and

objectives, incorporating the specific research questions underpinning this program

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of research. The strengths and limitations of the research will be discussed along

with future research directions. Finally, the chapter will provide some concluding

remarks highlighting the key outcomes of this doctoral thesis.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Objective 1: Identify work-related drivers’ perceptions and experiences related

to personal, organisational and external factors that influence safe driving

behaviours, driving safety performance and outcomes.

Incorporating a mixed method design, both qualitative and quantitative, the

findings of Study One are contained within Chapter 4 (Part A - Qualitative) and

Chapter 5 (Part B - Quantitative). The focus of Study One was to explore the

contemporary factors that influence WRRS, including factors beyond those that have

traditionally been the focus of attention within previous WRRS research (e.g., DBQ

driver errors and violations) (Davey et al., 2006; Davey et al., 2007; Freeman et al.,

2007; Freeman et al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2007, Wishart et al., 2014). For instance,

additional driver behavioural influences including distraction, fatigue, maintenance

checks, as well as, influences associated with safety climate. Subsequently, Study

One addressed the first, second and third research questions.

Research Question 1 - What personal characteristics and individual driver issues

influence driver behaviour, WRRS outcomes and drivers’ ability to drive safely for

the purpose of work?

Study One analyses revealed a myriad of factors that potentially influence

driver behaviour and driving safety performance, as well as WRRS outcomes.

Participant responses consistently revealed that engagement in aberrant driving

behaviours were fuelled by the need to mitigate organisational productivity demands

or pressure from clients. For example, speeding and driving aggressively to reach

work/job quotas and/or attending schedules/jobs in a timely manner. However, work

pressure is considered primarily an organisational issue and is further discussed in

the following section (Research Question 2).

A consistent finding that emerged both in the qualitative and quantitative

components of Study One was the reported influence of driver distraction on both

WRRS outcomes and driver behaviours. Although the results associated with driver

distraction coincides with recent general road safety focus on distraction as a major

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issue (Klauer et al., 2014; Roads & Maritime Services, 2017), the results outlined

within this program of research suggests that a number of influences more specific to

the WRRS setting were also identified. For example, the changing demands of a

modern workforce and organisational priorities related to productivity directly

increases the propensity for work-related drivers to utilise their work vehicle as a

mobile office while driving (e.g., use of mobile phones, tablets and other technology,

eating a meal, and completing paperwork). Therefore, the level of risk associated

with driver distraction and inattention type incidents/crashes substantially increases.

This result has ramifications for not only theory (e.g., highlighting that driver

distraction and multi-tasking needs to be incorporated within behavioural change

models) but also industry practice. For instance, future intervention strategies should

target driver distraction through organisational policy and procedures, as well as

communication initiatives directed toward staff.

There is also the need to explore what technological advances could reduce the

risk of driver distraction, such as devices that incapacitate mobile phones while

employees are driving. In addition, the results of the focus groups (Chapter 4)

suggest that organisations currently do not target driver distraction as a major WRRS

influence. This is a significant insight given that driver distraction is consistently

demonstrated to be one of the primary contributors to rear-end crashes in Queensland

(Debnath, Blackman & Haworth, 2013; Department of Natural Resources and Mines

Qld, 2013). Strategies should target the determinants of distraction including fatigue,

aberrant driving behaviours and work pressure, and addressed through not only

organisational documentation but also facilitated by management commitment and

support for increased WRRS risk management. As an identified major road safety

and WRRS risk, distraction/inattention is required to be addressed as per any other

safety-related risk (Model Work Health and Safety Regulations, 2016). Controls or

intervention strategies should target driver distraction holistically including

integration of suitable improvement strategies and operational requirements within

OHSMSs (e.g., policy and procedures). In addition, further research and action

directed toward reducing the impact of driver distraction is required, including

identification and strategies aimed at the contributing factors of driver distraction,

communication of processes and strategies aimed at mitigating risks associated with

driver distraction (e.g., training, tool box talk discussions, safety meetings).

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As expected, the findings from Study One identified many and diverse

individual factors that influenced driver behaviour, WRRS outcomes, and drivers’

ability to drive safely for the purpose of work. This finding further reinforces that a

holistic approach is needed to address the complex problem associated with aberrant

work-related driver performance and outcomes. Furthermore, lack of attention

toward work-related driving risks increases crash risk and organisations could also be

held legally liable where risks are not addressed adequately under OHS legislation

(e.g., risk management requirements).

Research Question 2 - What organisational factors influence work-related driver

safety, such as driver behaviour, driving safety performance and risk of work-

related driving offences and crashes?

Importantly, Study One also revealed a number of organisational factors that

potentially influence driver behaviour and driving safety performance, as well as

WRRS outcomes. For example, results identified organisational influences

associated with: work/time pressure, priority of productivity versus safety,

management commitment and support lack of organisational safety rules and

procedures, vehicle related risks, and driving exposure related to travel for work

purposes.

A key finding within the qualitative analysis was that work/time pressure was

identified as a major organisational factor influencing driver safety performance.

Similarly, this result is consistent with previous research that has revealed that

productivity demands and tight schedules placed on drivers, have been shown to

increase the level of risk for work-related drivers (Boufous & Williamson, 2009;

Broughton et al., 2003; Newnam et al., 2002; Rowland et al., 2006; Wishart et al.,

2011). Likewise, within the results a considerable proportion of participants

perceived that productivity took precedence over safety. This result extends past

previous research that indicated that WRRS was not considered a priority for many

industry organisations (Newnam et al., 2005). In addition, results suggested that the

strong focus by management on meeting productivity and client/customer demands

also contributed to work/time pressure, which subsequently influenced driver safety

performance and increased the propensity for risk taking behaviour. This has

implications for organisations whereby the increased risks to driver safety fails to

comply with OHS legislation (Model Work Health and Safety Act, 2011) and

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therefore are legally liable under the legislation. In addition, adverse driver behaviour

(e.g., aggressive driving) may result in adverse publicity from members of the public

and media, especially those incidences where the work-related driver is operating a

vehicle that has the company logo on the vehicle. Organisations should consider

incorporating travel time within all work schedules ensuring employees/drivers have

adequate time to travel between work locations thereby placing no adverse pressure

on drivers. This is a basic control requirement under risk management principles and

OHS legislation (Model Work Health and Safety Act, 2011; Model Work Health and

Safety Regulations, 2016).

A key finding of this research was the level of variability in participants’

perceptions across different departments or work groups associated with the level

work/time pressure. For example, the results indicated that influences associated with

work/time pressure and WRRS are addressed differently across departments/work

groups. Those managers who were committed to worker safety were less likely to

place any undue work pressure onto workers. This result is consistent with research

involving safety within the construction industry (Biggs & Banks, 2012), suggesting

that there may be subcultures operating at differing levels of safety within the same

organisation. Although there is scant research investigating safety subcultures

(Mearns, Flin & O’Connor, 2001; Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005), the findings

suggest that this effect may be more universal in nature. For example, some

departmental managers/supervisors may be more committed to safety than others.

This result suggests WRRS may be inconsistently addressed within organisations,

highlighting potentially insufficient safety management systems and internal safety

consultation and communication between departments. This can subsequently have a

profound effect on safety, as a lack of communication and misunderstandings

between individuals and teams can lead to workplace incidents (Mearns et al., 2001).

Therefore, given the link between safety culture and work-related incidents

(Antonsen, 2009; Cole et al., 2013; Eeckelaert et al., 2011; Wiegmann et al., 2002),

the identification of these subcultures or different layers of WRRS safety culture

across a single organisation is significant in nature. Further research is required to

assess the differences in safety perceptions and attitudes within subcultures across

organisations (Findley, Smith, Gorski, & O'Neil, 2007) and also provide a better

understanding of how these group differences could be utilised to facilitate the

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implementation of effective culture change processes. Given the potential

implications due to the differences between organisational subcultures, further

research is required. Safety communication and worker consultation is an integral

component of Risk Management Codes of Practice and Work, Health and Safety

legislation in Australia (Work Health & Safety Act, 2011). Taken together, this

finding suggests inconsistent WRRS management responses (or commitment to

safety culture) may exist within organisations, thereby: a) possibly reducing the

overall efficiency of safety culture to produce a positive outcome, and b) exposing

the organisation to potential legal liability if a serious work-related vehicle incident

occurs.

Management commitment and support has been previously identified as a

major factor in the effectiveness of any safety-related program or safety management

system (Bluff, 2003; Hale et al., 2010; Mooren et al., 2014; Rowland & Wishart,

2014; Vredenburgh, 2002). Despite this, results provided by this study indicated an

actual lack of management commitment and support for work-related driving issues

among the sample group. Likewise, the results suggest that management only

addressed WRRS issues in reaction to a serious incident or high number of reported

crashes, despite a growing body of research that indicates there is a need for

proactive approaches (Groeger & Banks, 2007; Lewis, Rowland & Wishart, 2012;

Newton et al., 2013; Wishart & Davey, 2004). This study indicated that

organisational managers did not perceive driving for work purposes as an

organisational safety issue rather a majority considered drivers were culpable for

vehicle incidents and adverse driver behaviour. Consequently, a lack of management

commitment and support, as well as a culture where the vehicle driver is seemingly

seen as the cause of work-related driving incidents, may have additional negative

ramifications associated with driver attitude. For example, drivers may display a “do

not care attitude” or perceive driving performance is beyond their immediate control,

which may subsequently increase the risk of engagement in aberrant driver

behaviours. This issue warrants further exploration, particularly work-related drivers’

responses to a perceived lack of managerial commitment and support and its effect

on the wider WRRS culture. A major implication of a lack of management

commitment and support for WRRS is that nothing will change across organisations

in relation to addressing WRRS risks. For instance, a lack of management

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commitment and support would hinder any strategies aimed at WRRS improvement

and actions directed at mitigating WRRS risk.

Organisational safety rules, such as policy and procedures outline the basic

requirements for safe management and operation of work (Bottani et al., 2009;

Rowland et al., 2006). However, another finding of this study was an identified lack

of organisational safety rules and procedures addressing WRRS. This is a critical

issue given that policy and procedures are an extremely important and essential

component of an organisation’s safety management system and creates the

foundation for basic operational requirements (Davey et al., 2009; Rowland et al.,

2006; Rowland & Wishart, 2014; 2015; Wishart & Rowland, 2010; 2012; 2013;

2014). In contrast, participant responses indicated that their respective organisations

have policy and procedures addressing general safety issues (e.g., electrical, manual

handling, use of power equipment) but lack adequate policy and procedures related

to WRRS. Consequently, this result reinforces previous findings within Study One

that suggested WRRS is not adequately addressed as a safety priority by

organisations and is consistent with the wider scientific literature in the area (Davey

et al., 2009; Rowland & Wishart, 2014; SafetyNet, 2009; Wishart & Davey, 2004).

Without WRRS policy and procedures, organisations are operating within a safety

culture where work-related driving would be performed on an individual driver basis

(e.g., driving based on previous experience, beliefs and attitude) and not complying

with the same standard organisational procedures. Consequently, this has

considerable implications for organisations whereby differences in driver

perceptions, skills and abilities may exacerbate or increase propensity for and

seriousness of WRRS risk.

Taken together, the findings from Study One identified a number of key

organisational factors that influenced WRRS, including safety outcomes (e.g.,

vehicle crashes and driver offences/infringements) and driver behaviour.

Research Question 3 - Do external factors influence organisational management

of WRRS or the safe driving ability of drivers operating light vehicles for the

purpose of work?

The results associated with Study One indicated limited influence by external

factors on organisational management of WRRS and driver performance. For

example, although factors such as road conditions, animal obstructions and

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environmental (e.g., weather) factors have been reported to influence safe driving

ability and WRRS outcomes (Wishart & Davey, 2004; Wishart, 2015), self-reported

responses within this Study suggests that external factors were not a major issue (but

rather management commitment to WRRS culture change). Therefore, the limited

findings suggest that external factors are not a major influence on the management of

WRRS within organisations or safe driving performance and may not need to be a

significant focus of future research, particularly given the ever-increasing

technological advances of vehicle designs that can mitigate such risks (e.g.,

electronic stability control, crash avoidance systems, in-vehicle navigation; to name a

few).

Objective 2: Explore the individual, organisational and external factors that

influence the application of safety interventions aimed at improving WRRS.

The results obtained from Study One identified a diverse array of factors that

influence WRRS. Given those results, Study Two was designed to investigate the

factors that influence the actual application of intervention strategies aimed at

improving WRRS.

This study is unique due to limited previous research examining the barriers to,

and facilitators for, WRRS intervention strategy application, especially using a

considerable participant sample size. Furthermore, the participant sample for this

study incorporated three major staffing levels consistent within most organisational

structures including management, supervisors/team leaders, and employees/vehicle

drivers. The focus groups utilised in Study Two elicited participant responses

answering the fourth and fifth research questions.

Research Question 4 - What personal, organisational, and external factors are

barriers to the application of WRRS intervention strategies?

Study Two identified a diverse range of factors that potentially hinder the

application of WRRS intervention strategies. Qualitative analysis outlined in Chapter

6 identified participants’ perceptions associated with the personal, organisational and

external barriers to intervention strategy development and application. Although

personal and external factors were also identified as barriers to intervention strategy

development and application, their perceived influence was considered quite limited.

Rather (and consistent with the results in Study One), results suggested that

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organisational factors were the major barriers to WRRS intervention strategy

development and application.

The theme associated with perceived limited organisational financial costs,

time and resources was identified as a major barrier to the development and

application of intervention strategies. This finding is analogous to previous research

that recognised a lack of resources (including time allocation and finances/budget) as

a major barrier to implementing a range of occupational health and safety initiatives

(Bas et al., 2007; Blake et al., 2006; Whysall et al., 2006) and also WRRS initiatives

(Banks, 2008; Haworth et al., 2008). Typically, all levels of staff (e.g., management,

supervisory staff and employees/drivers) acknowledged that if costs and

organisational resources associated with intervention strategy application were

substantial; and/or considerable time was required to partake in any intervention

strategy, including exclusion of employees from their normal work-related duties;

then the application of intervention strategies would not be initiated. This finding

implies that the application of safety interventions is heavily dependent upon

organisational resources, irrespective of the potential seriousness of work-related

driving incidents. In addition, the research findings indicated that a lack of

acknowledgement by management of the importance of WRRS hinders any attempts

to introduce intervention strategies. Likewise, Study Two identified the importance

of management commitment for both the development and application of WRRS

intervention strategies. This result suggests that intervention strategies should also be

directed toward the organisation and specifically organisational management; not

solely toward the organisation’s work-related drivers. Research by Stuckey et al.

(2007, p. 1012) suggest that without interventions aimed at occupational light vehicle

use, safety within light vehicle fleets is “likely to continue unchecked as the leading

cause of work-related traumatic injury and death in industrialised countries”. The

findings of this research further indicate that without management commitment and

support for WRRS, future development and implementation of intervention strategies

is also unlikely.

A number of additional organisational factors were identified as hindering the

development and application of intervention strategies, including a lack of

management commitment and support (which is a pervasive them of the overall

program of research), prioritisation of production over safety, lack of current

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organisational systems, and limited employee consultation and communication.

Limitations associated with management commitment and support has also been

previously recognised as a major barrier to the development and application of

WRRS intervention strategies (Banks, 2008; Husband, 2011). A key finding of this

program of research suggested that limited management commitment and support for

improving WRRS is also intrinsically linked to a perceived lack of resources

allocated towards intervention strategies and an increased focus on production over

more proactive safety measures. In addition, a lack of management commitment was

reported as a major barrier to the development of organisational systems and

processes, as well as adequate communication and consultation relevant to WRRS

issues. Further compounding this barrier are perceived limitations associated with

management knowledge and experience in relation to WRRS issues. For instance,

failure to consult and communicate with staff relating to issues associated with work-

related driving risk management at the operational level reduces the capacity for

organisations to utilise this practical experience and knowledge for not only the

development and application of suitable intervention strategies but also WRRS risk

management.

Previous research has also indicated that responsibility and accountability for

WRRS should be defined and addressed within the appropriate policy and

procedures, to ensure all staff are aware of what is required (Rowland et al., 2006;

Wishart & Davey, 2004). A finding of this study identified the delineation of

responsibility and accountability for WRRS as hindering the application of

intervention strategies. A potential dilemma for organisations are that neither fleet or

workplace health and safety departments acknowledge complete responsibility or

ownership for WRRS. This study finding emphasises the need to develop appropriate

organisational systems, including policy and procedures, including designating

responsibility and accountability for WRRS. Subsequently, without appropriate

responsibility and accountability for WRRS within organisations (e.g., an individual

or department championing WRRS improvement), the likelihood of improvement is

limited.

Research Question 5 - What personal, organisational, and external factors are

facilitators for (or assist) the application of WRRS intervention strategies?

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The results from the qualitative analysis contained within Chapter 6 also

identified a range of personal, organisational and external factors that facilitate the

development and application of WRRS intervention strategies (which was

complimentary to the examination of the factors that influence actual driving safety

performance). However, similar to barriers, the primary facilitators to intervention

development and application included organisational factors, such as management

commitment.

As stated previously, the theme associated with “costs, time and resources”

was identified as a major barrier to WRRS intervention strategy application.

Subsequently, research contained within Study Two acknowledged that intervention

strategies need to be brief and should not take considerable time to complete or

remove staff from their core work tasks for substantial periods of time. It is important

to note that brief interventions consistently have been found to be effective in

reducing a number of high risk health-related behaviours; including smoking

(McBride et al., 2003), alcohol abuse (Smith et al., 2003), drug use (Ondersma et al.,

2005) and adolescent risk taking (D’Amico & Fromme, 2002). In the road safety

domain, preliminary research has also indicated brief interventions can promote

positive road safety behaviour such as seat belt use (Fernandez et al., 2008). A

finding of this research indicates that the identification for interventions to be brief

potentially stems from concerns related to work and time pressure from all levels of

organisational staff. In addition, study findings suggested that intervention strategies

that involve removing workers/drivers from work tasks for considerable periods of

time would result in reluctance to partake in any intervention strategies and

potentially even promote aggressive driving behaviour. Subsequently, intervention

strategies related to WRRS may be perceived as a “waste of time” and therefore may

not have the required positive influence on work-related drivers. Consequently, the

need to develop brief interventions is vital and this type of approach may alleviate

some of the barriers associated with costs, time and resource limitations that

fundamentally plague the development and application of effective WRRS

intervention strategies.

Similar to the results reported above that identified the impact of organisational

factors as barriers to intervention strategy development and application, a number of

organisational factors were also recognised as facilitators. For example, although

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management commitment was identified as a major barrier, it was also reported to be

a major facilitator for the application of intervention strategies. For example, a lack

of management commitment would hinder intervention strategy development and

application, whereas management commitment for improving WRRS may increase

the likelihood for the development and application of intervention strategies. Taken

together, management commitment to address and improve safety is a foundational

force in addressing the issue of WRRS risk management and assisting the

development and application of intervention strategies (Banks, 2008; Blake et al.,

2006; Whysall et al., 2006). In essence, management commitment is the catalyst to

create change within organisations, it is pervasive in nature and can permeate all

aspects of an organisation, the same way safety culture is multi-dimensional in

nature.

Other organisational factors, such as organisational change processes (e.g.,

attitudes and beliefs associated with change – why should we change?) and

organisational systems and processes (e.g., policy and procedures) were also

identified as facilitators. Importantly, the core value of policy and procedures creates

a strong framework necessary to a) implement change; b) evaluate the effectiveness

of interventions; and c) provide directions for future growth. In addition, it is

imperative to gain management commitment and support for WRRS, the

development of policy and procedures and intervention strategies. The development

of a business case identifying the potential financial and production value, as well as

safety for improving WRRS within organisations (Bidasca & Townsend, 2014)

warrants further exploration. A substantial business case for addressing WRRS

issues; such as reduced costs due to vehicle and property damage, vehicle

replacement, insurance premiums, employee injuries and rehabilitation, and loss of

productivity (HSE, 2014; Mooren & Sochon, 2004; Murray et al., 2003); may

influence management to provide increased commitment and support for WRRS

change within their respective organisations.

Similar to barriers, organisational factors were identified as the major

facilitators for WRRS intervention strategy development and application. Flowing on

from Study One, the results of Study Two confirm that organisational factors have

the potential to greatly influence a range of WRRS issues, specifically the

development and application of WRRS intervention strategies.

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Objective 3: Investigate the extent, application and effect of current

organisational safety systems, including policy, procedures and practices, to

effectively manage and support WRRS within organisations operating light

vehicle fleets.

Given the results from the previous two studies reporting the considerable

influence of organisational factors on work-related driving behaviour, driving safety

performance and outcomes, as well as the development and application of

intervention strategies, Study Three was designed to investigate the specific

characteristics of an organisation’s safety systems to manage and support WRRS.

This unique component involved a series of four case studies investigating the extent,

application and effect of organisational safety systems to effectively manage and

support WRRS. Furthermore, this program of research not only utilised self-report

data, but also involved a more objective examination via organisational document

review and analysis. Coinciding with achieving objective three, this study was

designed to address the sixth research question underpinning this program of

research.

Research Question 6 - Do current organisational safety management systems,

processes and practice effectively target WRRS?

Previous research has focussed predominantly on driver influences and

perceptions while neglecting to identify and assess the current processes and systems

in place to manage and support organisational WRRS (Newton et al., 2013). In

addition, this study is unique in that it investigated the influence of organisational

safety management systems, processes and practices on actual WRRS operation

within an organisational context.

The results obtained from case studies of the four organisations provided

information associated with WRRS elements contained within organisational safety

systems. The results of Study Three highlighted limitations associated with

organisational documentation addressing organisational WRRS policy, procedures,

processes and practice. Traditionally, safety-related policy and procedures state the

organisational compliance requirements thereby ensuring all staff are operating under

the same guidelines and conditions (Isla Díaz & Díaz Cabrera, 1997; Rowland &

Wishart, 2014), as well as, providing a uniformed framework associated with

organisational efficiency and reducing safety risk. Unfortunately, Stage One of Study

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Three results indicated that across the four participating organisations limited

adequate WRRS documentation was developed, with current documentation and

initiatives primarily being reactive in nature rather than designed to proactively

promote safe driving processes and practice. The limited development of WRRS

documentation further indicates a potential lack of organisational knowledge,

understanding and/or management commitment for WRRS. This finding potentially

stems from a perception that work-related driving is not considered an organisational

safety issue or priority (rather it is an individual driver issue) (Rowland et al., 2006),

which further illustrates that management commitment to WRRS may be limited (or

at the very least diluted). Alternatively, a lack of delineation in relation to who/what

department (e.g., safety or fleet) is responsible and accountable for WRRS may also

limit the development of documentation and improvement initiatives. This latter

issue warrants further investigation, particularly the aetiology of the effective

formulation and enactment of policy.

Stage Two findings highlighted limitations associated with the fundamental

elements of an effective WRRS management system, such as confirming a lack of

comprehensive documentation (e.g., policy and procedures); limited safe system

processes including knowledge and experience related to driver safety and safe

vehicle operation; inadequate risk management processes including effective

identification of work-related driving risks; failure to identify ownership of WRRS

(i.e., responsibility and accountability); failure to implement appropriate control

measures (e.g., intervention strategies and supportive organisational systems); and

ineffective staff consultation and communication regarding WRRS issues. In

addition, previously identified organisational factors that influenced implementation

of and support for WRRS were reiterated, including a lack of management

commitment and support and the negative influence of work pressure (i.e., priority of

productivity over safety) on safe driving performance. Taken together, the findings

suggest that there are considerable limitations associated with the identification,

assessment and control of WRRS risks and influences within organisational safety

management systems. In addition, there was a reported lack of acknowledgement and

support for WRRS as a specific organisational safety issue.

The results from Stage Three further confirmed the procedural and operational

inadequacies identified within the findings of Stages One and Two, confirming a lack

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of focus for WRRS issues and adequate inclusion of specific WRRS components

within the organisations’ respective safety management systems and work-related

vehicle operations. Unfortunately, without appropriate and effective WRRS

management systems and processes (e.g., policy and procedures), work-related

drivers are operating as individuals and not directed by common organisational

directives. A lack of appropriate WRRS systems and processes may not only increase

the risk of aberrant driver behaviour, but also the risk of legal liability for the

organisation if a serious incident were to occur (e.g., Work, Health and Safety Act,

2011).

Study Three results suggest that current organisational safety management

systems, processes and practice do not effectively target WRRS. The findings

support previous research indicating that WRRS risk management processes are

limited compared to organisational risk management of general core work-related

tasks (Wishart & Rowland, 2010; Wishart et al., 2010). In addition, a lack of risk

management strategies can have severe consequences for safe organisational work-

related driving practices and potentially increase risk, including severity and

frequency of work-related vehicle crashes. Study Three findings also highlight the

differences between organisations in relation to the degree or level of attention

toward addressing the WRRS problem. Therefore, further indicating that

organisations are potentially functioning or operating at varying levels in relation to

WRRS culture. Finally, management commitment and support have been identified

as critical elements to effective safety outcomes (Mooren, Grzebieta, Williamson,

Oliver & Friswell, 2014). Likewise, without management commitment and support

for WRRS, it is foreseeable that the focus for developing effective WRRS

management systems and integration of WRRS within OHSMSs would be limited, or

at the very least does not capitalise on the necessary forces to promote effective

WRRS operational processes and practice.

Overall Aim: Explore the contemporary factors that impact on WRRS in light

vehicle fleets

Although broad, the overall aim of this program of research was designed not

to be narrowly focussed on a specific area, but to explore holistically those factors

that impact on WRRS within the contemporary work environment. This program of

research is unique in that it utilises a safety culture framework to explore the multiple

217

elements that can impact on WRRS. The theoretical framework utilised within this

program of research was based upon Cooper’s (2000) Reciprocal Safety Culture


encapsulated the multiple-facets of safety culture and explored the factors that

influence WRRS. Similar to previous safety culture research within the general

occupational safety setting (Cooper, 2000; Choudhry et al., 2007), the findings from

this program of research indicated that WRRS culture is also the product of multiple

goal-directed interactions between people (e.g., psychological), jobs (e.g.,

behavioural) and the organisation (e.g., situational). The diversity of the results

further indicates that WRRS culture is a complex and multi-faceted issue.

Consequently, this program of research confirms past suggestions that future models

relating to WRRS need to be multi-faceted in nature (Guldenmund 2010). The

research also highlighted the complex interactions and link between person,

behaviour and work environment. While the work environment; such as, influence of

management commitment and lack of safety systems in place to adequately manage

WRRS risk; was not predictive of WRRS outcomes in this program of research, the

extent of influence should not be ignored. For instance, it could be argued that

management commitment can create a different sort of environment (e.g., positive or

negative) that is pervasive in nature. While management commitment might not be

panacea, it should form a central component of future theoretical and organisational

OHSMS development.

The Occupational Light Vehicle (OLV) Use Systems Model (Stuckey et al.,

2007), utilised in this program of research as a theoretical framework to explore the

determinants of WRRS also supported the existence of numerous organisational,

individual and external influences that impact on WRRS. However, this program of

research also identified multiple interactions between different factors which

impacted on WRRS performance and outcomes (e.g., perceived pressure influencing

driver distraction). Although the OLV Use Systems Model (Stuckey et al., 2007)

comprehensively identifies multiple levels and the range of factors that influence

WRRS, a limitation of the model is that it does not recognise the potential

interactions between levels, factors or influences (e.g., multi-directional effects).

Subsequently, the results suggest that future WRRS research may need to focus more

218

attention toward the multi-directional effects and holistic characteristics associated

with WRRS culture.

The current findings suggest that WRRS would most likely be improved by the

introduction of integrated multi-dimensional strategies based on a strong safety

culture within an organisation. This program of research identified considerable

WRRS differences and safety culture diversity across organisations and even

between departments/sections within organisations. In addition, the multitude of

responses within this program of research signify that WRRS culture is a multi-

dimensional issue that can impact not only safety but also the potential business

effectiveness of organisations. Similar safety-related research has acknowledged the

multicomponent and complex nature of safety culture (Eeckelaert et al., 2011;

Guldenmund, 2000).

The complex nature of the WRRS issue is compounded by the relationships

between factors, such as organisational influence on driver behaviour. Previous

research has acknowledged the complexity of the influences on drivers by suggesting

that some factors may have a “bidirectional effect” on driver behaviour (Wishart,

2015). Uniquely, the results of this study further implicate the complexity of the

WRRS issue indicating certain factors may have potential multi-directional effects

on driver behaviour. For example, the results suggested that work/time pressure can

increase instances of aggressive driving and speeding behaviour (e.g., in order to

increase work productivity) and also influence driver distraction /inattention (e.g.,

eating a meal while driving to make up time or thinking of work tasks and not on

driving safely). Similarly, a lack of management commitment for WRRS, inadequate

organisational WRRS rules and procedures, and focus on productivity over safety,

together can potentially influence the degree of work/time pressure directed towards

work-related drivers. Consequently, the complex nature of WRRS may pose

additional problems associated with not only management of WRRS but also the

development and application of suitable intervention strategies aiming to improve

WRRS. The findings suggest that intervention strategies should not solely address

issues related to driver skills and behaviour (e.g., driver training) (Davey et al., 2007;

Rowland et al., 2008; Wishart & Davey, 2004), but rather, should also target a

holistic array of factors, including organisational factors.

219

The findings within this program of research indicate that although multi-

dimensional intervention strategies maybe required to improve the safety culture

within organisations, this does not suggest that intervention strategies also require to

be complex. Brief interventions are generally time and resource effective strategies

and may assist in the improvement of WRRS culture by addressing smaller elements

of the broader WRRS culture. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, coinciding

workplace interventions (such as: “tool box talks”, safety meeting discussions, safety

alerts/memos) with road safety topics reported in the media/television (e.g., serious

incidents, government campaigns). These interventions are not only time and

resource effective but also provide relevance for workers/drivers concerning the

seriousness of road safety, including the potential impact on health and safety, family

and society. Furthermore, regular implementation of brief interventions may have a

wider and more positive effect by increasing the exposure of workers/drivers to

WRRS issues/risks.

A common and key finding across all three studies within this program of

research was the influence of organisational factors and, more specifically,

management commitment and support. The research suggests that without effective

management commitment and support, the integral WRRS safety elements within

organisations; including safety risk management (e.g., risk identification, assessment

and control), improvement initiatives and change processes (e.g., intervention

strategy develop and application), and development of appropriate management

system elements (e.g., policy and procedures, responsibility and accountability);

would be considerably impeded or diluted. Similarly, previous occupational safety

research has also identified a lack of management commitment as a barrier to the

effectiveness of an organisation’s safety program (Hale et al., 2010; Vredenburgh,

2002) and safety intervention strategies and initiatives (Davey et al., 2008; Davey &

Wishart, 2004). In addition, previous research suggests that it is a common tendency

for drivers to be solely considered the blame for adverse driver behaviours and work-

related vehicle incident occurrences (Clarke, Ward, Bartle & Truman, 2009); with

many organisations failing to actively and holistically promote WRRS as an

important safety concern (Lewis et al., 2012). This program of research indicates

limited change in this area, with drivers still held primarily responsible for poor

WRRS performance and vehicle incidents. Therefore, strategies aimed at increasing

220

management commitment and support for WRRS are required to initiate change and

improve WRRS within the workplace. An important issue that remains relatively

overlooked is that unlike general occupational safety, WRRS is not adequately

scrutinised by government regulators (e.g., Work, Health and Safety act, 2011) and a

lack of prosecutions are reported for breaches associated with WRRS (Rowland et

al., 2012). Although reactive, more effective and ongoing WRRS serious incident

investigations and potential prosecutions by government regulators may change

management commitment towards proactively addressing the WRRS situation within

their own respective organisations. Alternatively, providing a business case or cost

benefit analysis for the improvement of WRRS may instigate more management

commitment and support for improving WRRS. Without management commitment

and support for WRRS there is no impetus for changing the status quo in relation to

WRRS culture. Future intervention strategies aimed at the organisational or

management level (rather than solely targeting individual driver behaviour) are

needed to instigate and nurture change down and across all levels within

organisations. Without management commitment and ongoing support, it is unlikely

that current WRRS culture and trauma statistics will change in future years.

A further key finding to emerge from this program of research is that

organisations may be functioning at differing levels in regard to the identification of

(and appropriate response to) core WRRS issues. For instance, recent research has

suggested that all organisations have a safety culture, yet the degree in which a safety

culture is executed differs in maturity and effectiveness across organisations (Biggs,

Banks, Davey & Freeman, 2013). The findings of this program of research indicated

that the diversity of WRRS culture across departments within organisations was

dependant on the WRRS knowledge, commitment and support for safety by

individual managers. For instance, the level of WRRS performance and culture

across departments was comparative to the level of attention and commitment

demonstrated by managers within each of the departments. Furthermore, research has

attempted to explain the diverse differences across organisations, particularly

workplace safety, as evolutionary steps or stages of safety culture development

(Foster & Hoult, 2013). For example, organisations/departments operating in the

early stages of safety culture development are generally reactive in nature and may

not be acquiescent to any strategy aimed at proactively improving safety. However,

221

organisations/departments operating in the later stages of safety culture development

are more proactive and amenable to initiatives to improve their safety culture (Foster

& Hoult, 2013). Findings from this program of research propose that the WRRS

culture across each of the study organisations are at varying stages in maturity or

evolution, although further research is required to determine the aetiology of such

evolutionary differences. Organisations operating in the early stages of WRRS

culture maturity may be less likely to develop and implement intervention strategies

aimed at improving WRRS. This finding is highlighted within the data, such as a

lack of documentation and focus related to WRRS issues, lack of management

commitment and integral relationships associated with WRRS, limited understanding

and knowledge of core WRRS issues, and varying levels of compliance with

organisational procedures and government legislation. Consequently, strategies

aimed at improving organisations’ baseline WRRS elements (e.g., organisational

policy and procedures, risk management elements, responsibility and accountability)

and integration within organisational OHSMSs should be initial steps. However, due

to a noted lack of industry knowledge and understanding of the WRRS issue,

assistance may be needed to development further the WRRS management systems

within organisations. Subsequently, these safety systems should be developed with

an aim of moving the organisation from a reactive stage towards influencing WRRS

more proactively.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The program of research design utilised a mixed method holistic approach to

explore and encapsulate a comprehensive interpretation of the major self-reported

contemporary influences that impact on WRRS. The strengths associated with this

program of research are in the research design. Firstly, a theoretical framework based

on an established and well-supported safety culture model (Cooper, 2000) was used

to guide the research and development of study methodologies. Secondly, this

program of research used multiple methods and multiple workforce/organisation

participant samples providing a more comprehensive exploration of WRRS issues,

which increases the representativeness of the findings. For example, participants

were from multiple differing organisational departments providing services across a

range of areas, work tasks and demographics. Participants’ occupations also ranged

from management, supervisory, office and field/operational staff and the driving

222

exposure varied considerably across the sample. In addition, participants were from

city, suburban, rural and remote areas of the state, thereby providing a cross-section

of drivers from various demographics and terrain. The use of multiple research

methods and sampling enabled the triangulation of results. Previous research

recommends the use of triangulation when assessing or exploring a multi-faceted or

holistic construct (Choudhry et al., 2007; Cooper, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000;

Guldenmund, 2000) and attaining convergent validity (Eeckelaert et al., 2011;

Guldenmund, 2010; Rowland & Wishart, 2014; Wishart et al., 2011a). Thirdly,

consistent with previous recommendations (Guldenmund, 2010), the research

presented in this thesis adopted a holistic approach to exploring WRRS, utilising a

combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. For instance, qualitative

analysis provides a unique perspective and insight into the perceptions and beliefs of

work-related drivers associated with the factors that influence their own driving

behaviour (Wishart, 2015). Finally, in response to previous research calling for the

utilisation of larger participant samples in qualitative research (Banks, 2008),

qualitative studies (i.e., Studies One Part A and Study Two) within this program of

research used relatively large participant samples (n = 217). The substantial

participant sample is indicative of the enormity of the WRRS issue, where data was

collected until saturation had been reached and no new information was introduced.

Furthermore, a major strength of Study Three is the use of multiple information

sources and methods for the collection of data (e.g., three data collection stages)

enabling the further triangulation of results (Eeckelaert et al., 2011; Guldenmund,

2010; Rowland & Wishart, 2014; Wishart et al., 2011a) and generalisability of the

research. Due to the diverse industries, relative to the four participating

organisations, including operational conditions and requirements, it is envisaged that

the results would have increased representativeness of a considerable proportion of

the work-related driving population.

Some limitations should also be noted. Self-report measures are a valuable tool

used frequently in research methodology and regularly provide access to data that is

unobtainable by others means (Corbett, 2001). However, there are a number of

limitations that should be taken into account when interpreting the results associated

with the use of self-report data. For example, previous research has highlighted

concerns regarding the reliability of self-reported data, such as common method

223

variance (af Wåhlberg, 2009), memory recall bias, social desirability responding and

other method effects (af Wåhlberg, Dorn & Kline, 2010; Freeman et al., 2014;

Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). While attempts were made to

reduce socially desirable responses; including emphasising the confidential and

voluntary nature of the research (Wills et al., 2006); the potential for socially

desirable responses still exist, particularly given the sample involved employees who

were responding to questions about their working environment. In addition, potential

confounding influences were not statistically controlled for within the quantitative

analysis component of Study One. Not all factors that theoretically can influence

WRRS were included within the study, for reasons of parsimony. It is also possible

that some participants interpreted different factors as the same (e.g., speed and

aggression) and therefore may have influenced the consistency and self-selection

principles on the results. Similarly, previous work-related driving research has found

a considerable overlap between speeding and aggressive behaviour (Davey et al.,

2007). Future research should consider utilising other methodologies that counter the

impact of potentially confounding effects.

Previous research utilising a similar participant sample and data collection

method suggested there may be evidence of some minor treatment effect, with the

majority of participants across Studies One and Two providing self-report data (e.g.,

focus groups and survey questionnaire) prior to or during participation within a

WRRS workshop (Freeman et al., 2014). In addition, there were limitations

associated with the participant sample that may not be characteristic of other work-

related driving populations. For instance, a sizeable proportion of participants in

Studies One and Two drove less than ten hours per week (e.g., approximately 50%)

or less than 10 000 kilometres per year (e.g., approximately 40%). Furthermore,

Studies One and Two incorporated a participant sample obtained primarily from

Queensland state government departments. The study sample predominantly

consisted of male participants. Although this result reflects the industry and the

sample in relation to the representativeness of the population is consistent with

previous research into WRRS (Freeman et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2009; Rowland

et al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2007; Wills et al., 2006), care is required when

generalising the results and outcomes to other industry organisations and cultural

contexts that may have a more consistent spread of gender distribution.

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With particular reference to the quantitative results contained in Study One

Part B, limitations were identified with utilising the abbreviated SCQ-MD

questionnaire. A constraint related to the utilisation of the abbreviated SCQ-MD was

that the survey was incorporated within a wider industry research program. Results

associated with the abbreviated version of the SCQ-MD may exhibit issues

associated with generalisability of results compared with previous fleet safety

climate research (Banks, 2008; Wills et al., 2005; 2006). Similarly, previous research

suggests that the use of self-report surveys, such as the DBQ and associated scales,

have not been found to be particularly predictive of crash involvement (af

Wåhlberg, Barraclough, & Freeman, 2015). Therefore, results relating to fleet safety

climate in this study may not be a true representation of the actual safety climate

within organisations operating light vehicle fleets. Furthermore, in relation to the

contents of the survey, items related to external or environmental factors were

limited, resulting in few meaningful findings for research question three. Further

consideration should be given towards the inclusion of additional items related to

external/environmental issues relevant to the WRRS setting. Moreover, within the

survey participants were requested to indicate crash and traffic offence involvement

in the previous twelve months, which limited the reported number of crashes and

offences. Therefore, limiting results associated with the determinants and culpability

of work-related vehicle crashes and traffic offences. Further consideration should be

given for the use of longer timeframes relating to reported work-related vehicle

crashes and traffic offences in future research. However, as reported previously

questions remain concerning the optimal time periods related to a persons’ ability to

recall accurately work-related crashes and traffic offences (Wishart, 2015).

In contrast to Studies One and Two, Study Three involved case studies of four

organisations’ WRRS management systems. Unfortunately, the organisations who

participated within Studies One and Two, due to internal and organisational

resourcing issues, did not participate within Study Three. However, the diversity of

organisations who participated in Study Three may be more representative of the

wider work-related driving populations. For example, the study involved four

organisations operating with medium to large vehicle fleets and represented a

diversity of industries, including a private company in the natural resources sector, a

not for profit organisation, local government authority and a state government

225

department. The organisations that participated in Study Three operated light vehicle

fleets in a diversity of road terrain and conditions, city/suburban/rural/remote

locations, diversity in types of vehicles and type of work performed.

A limitation of Study Three (Stage One) was the acquisition process of

organisations’ documentation related to WRRS. For example, documents were

provided by personnel from each of the four organisations, thereby the type and

extensiveness of documentation provided was reliant on the organisational contacts

and what they chose to supply. However, to alleviate the influence of this potential

limitation, organisational contacts were provided with a list of potential WRRS

documentation and information. This list was developed based upon previous

research and industry consultation. In addition, during Stage Two (e.g., focus groups)

participants were consulted regarding awareness of their respective organisations’

documentation and initiatives. Subsequently, any additional WRRS documents

identified were again requested from organisational contacts. In addition, Stage

Three observations of drivers travelling on public roads were not conducted due to

the researcher failing to obtain permission from two of the organisations to travel

with drivers and conduct driver behaviour observations. Therefore, Study Three

(Stage Three) results included site inspections and observations of work-related

vehicle use whilst on organisations’ sites.

An overarching limitation of the program of research was that data collection

was cross-sectional in nature and did not incorporate any longitudinal elements.

Therefore, causality related to work-related driving safety risks/influences on WRRS

performance or outcomes could not be directly assessed.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Exploratory research enables researchers to seek to understand more about a

topic or context and typically the results lay the groundwork for future studies

(Shields & Rangarjan, 2013). Future research should endeavour to utilise other and

more diverse industry organisations. For instance, the studies utilised within this

program of research could be replicated across other government authorities (e.g.,

local and federal), private industry, not for profit fleets, construction, natural resource

extraction companies and professional driver fleets (and appropriate between groups

analysis undertaken to determine if differences exist between such sectors).

226

Subsequently, future research should aim to ascertain if the contemporary WRRS

issues and influences obtained from the qualitative studies of this program of

research are pertinent to other organisations, industries, and cultures.

Although the qualitative data analyses identified considerable factors that

impact on WRRS, the quantitative analysis (Study One, Part B) revealed few

meaningful results. However, study findings do indicate that traditional DBQ

(Reason et al., 1990) factors (e.g., errors, highway-code violations and aggressive

violations) may not be an effective scale to measure work-related driver behaviours

in the contemporary work environment. For example, the traditional DBQ factors

provided limited significant results. Rather, the inclusion of additional driver

behaviour questions, reflective of the contemporary work-related driving context

(e.g., distraction/inattention, fatigue, multi-tasking, and pressure), provided

significant results suggesting the need for further research to explore additional

driver behavioural items/questions that measure the influence of contemporary work-

related driver behaviour. In addition, this program of research used a brief version of

the fleet safety climate questionnaire which revealed limited meaningful results. Due

to perceived staff, time and resource issues organisations are reluctant to allow

employees to complete survey questionnaires. Where possible, the survey

questionnaire was reduced in length to alleviate industry concerns regarding time

required to complete the survey. Therefore, this study utilised a brief version of the

Safety Climate Questionnaire utilised previously in WRRS research (Horsey et al.,

2012; Wishart et al., 2010). Future research should further examine the effectiveness

of the brief version of the SCQ-MD and whether future research findings are

comparable to results found utilising the traditional version of the Safety Climate

Questionnaire.

Along with the identified limitations associated with the survey utilised within

this program of research, previous research has also been critical of self-reported

survey data within the road safety arena, and more particularly the Driver Behaviour

Questionnaire (af Wåhlberg, et al., 2011; af Wåhlberg, 2010; 2011). Consequently,

future research should aim to identify and utilise alternative quantitative methods of

data collection. For example, the recent application by some industry organisations

of In-Vehicle Monitoring Systems (IVMS) have provided additional avenues for

potential quantitative data collection. In-vehicle monitoring technology has the

227

capability to record safety related information including indicators of driving

behaviour (Toledo, Musicant & Lotan, 2008). In addition, in-vehicle monitoring

systems provide the opportunity to download data to review or assist in

incident/crash investigations and other aberrant driving events, such as reported

instances of harsh braking or excessive speeding (Horrey, Lesch, Dainoff, Robertson

& Noy, 2012). In the case of vehicle crashes, in-vehicle monitoring technology can

provide valuable information related to vehicle use and driver behaviour prior to the

incident. The use of in-vehicle monitoring technology provides quantitative data

representing real driving situations and results are not reliant on self-reported

information.

In-vehicle monitoring systems also have the capacity to be introduced as a

possible WRRS intervention strategy. Most systems provide audible alarms warning

drivers when they exceed the designated system parameters, such as exceeding the

speed limit, harsh braking and failing to take breaks during long driving trips.

Furthermore, in-vehicle monitoring systems enable organisational management to

provide constructive feedback to drivers concerning their driving behaviour,

including the provision of evidence associated with repeated aberrant driving

behaviour. However, previous research suggests that although in-vehicle monitoring

and associated feedback can lead to initial improvement in driver behaviour, the

improvement is often not sustained over any significant period of time (Toledo &

Lotan, 2006). Correspondingly, there are limitations regarding the use of in-vehicle

monitoring systems. The effectiveness of feedback is subject to a number of

influences such as managerial processes and biases, organisational culture, safety

climate and disciplinary procedures (Horrey et al., 2012). In addition, the

predetermined threshold limits of in-vehicle monitoring systems do not distinguish

between events associated with aberrant driving behaviour or instances where the

driver is avoiding a potential vehicle crash situation where he/she is not at fault. For

example, harsh braking because a driver is following too closely compared to a

driver braking to avoid a collision due to a third-party driver failing to stop or give

right of way. Given the advantages and limitations of in-vehicle monitoring system

technology future research is required to determine:

228

a) the impact of technology on safety culture within organisations and

whether it continues to influence work-related driver behaviour over extended

periods of time;

b) appropriate management processes including proactive and constructive

feedback and also disciplinary procedures concerning IVMS reports related to work-

related vehicle drivers;

c) whether feedback should be delayed (e.g., during meetings with manager)

or in real time (e.g., alarm sounds when over speed is detected). Alarms or other

sounds may be distractive and hence create additional driving risks; and

d) whether behaviour modification should focus on rewards (e.g., monetary

or other rewards) or punishment (e.g., termination of contract for serious or repeat

offender breaches).

This program of research highlighted a number of organisational influences

and subsequent lack of organisational risk management processes related to WRRS.

In addition, similar to previous research (Rowland & Wishart, 2014; Wishart &

Rowland, 2011) the results of this program of research also highlighted a lack of

organisational WRRS documentation and processes within organisations’ safety

management systems. An integral element of an organisation’s safety culture is its

safety management system and capacity of the system components to manage

workplace safety (Cooper, 2000). Consequently, due to the lack of research

examining how WRRS is addressed within organisational safety management

systems, further research is required utilising more diverse organisational samples.

For example, future research should endeavour to further investigate WRRS

management system elements associated with industry occupational health and safety

‘best practice’, as well as safety system processes that encourage and promote

WRRS improvement.

Finally, a key finding of this program of research indicated that organisations

are functioning at differing levels in relation to addressing core WRRS issues.

Previous research described the differing levels by which workplace safety is

addressed within organisations, as evolutionary steps or stages of safety culture

development (Foster & Hoult, 2013). For instance, organisations operating in the

early stages are generally not acquiescent to any strategy aimed at proactively

229

improving safety. Similarly, in relation to WRRS this program of research indicated

that organisations in the early stages of WRRS culture maturity would be less likely

to develop and implement intervention strategies aimed at improving work-related

driving safety. Therefore, further research is needed to explore the concept of “safety

culture maturity” within the WRRS setting, including the impact on intervention

strategy application as well as how it can be fostered and developed to create a

meaningful impact. Future research should explore methodologies aimed at assessing

the level of WRRS culture maturity within organisations and investigate suitable

change management processes to enable organisations to move effectively to a more

proactive stage of WRRS culture maturity.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This program of research highlighted a diversity of factors that influence not

only WRRS behaviour and safe driving performance but also intervention strategy

application. Traditionally, industry strategy aimed at the WRRS issue included a

process where management attributed culpability to drivers and driver behaviour and

therefore targeted the majority of intervention strategies targeted work-related

drivers, such as driver skills-based training. However, this program of research

identified numerous organisational factors that can also influence WRRS and

potentially have a direct impact upon safety outcomes. The research proposed that a

lack of management commitment and support for WRRS and subsequent limited

organisational processes addressing WRRS, as major factors impacting on driver

performance and behaviour. This result suggests that strategies aimed at improving

WRRS should address the overall WRRS culture within organisations and not rely

on interventions targeting work-related vehicle drivers alone. In essence, WRRS

intervention strategies should be multi-dimensional and holistically address all

elements of WRRS culture, including organisational systems. The findings also

suggest that brief interventions can play a vital role in alerting and informing drivers

and managers about the risks associated with work-related driving. These

intervention strategies could also provide the stimulus to assist WRRS culture

change.

All organisations have cultures, whether they acknowledge it or not. In

addition, some cultures are supportive and others are not, with supportive and non-

supportive cultures impacting on an organisation’s achievement of business goals,

230

either positively or negatively (Dyck, 2007). In essence, culture has the ability to

either facilitate or limit business strategy (and associated efficiency) hence safety

culture can also drive or drag safety performance. This program of research

identified WRRS as a complex issue that comprises frequent interactions between

drivers, vehicles, the environment and the organisational context. Therefore,

indicating that intervention strategies targeting drivers alone would have limited long

term benefits.

Finally, in order to improve WRRS culture within industry organisations, this

program of research highlighted the importance of organisational factors, primarily

management commitment and support. This research program identified

management commitment as a critical element to driving safety performance and

outcomes, as well as integral to ensuring WRRS receives the appropriate level of

attention. Basically, without management commitment and support for the processes

and practices associated with WRRS risk management and improvement strategies,

the effectiveness of any WRRS program and subsequently WRRS performance and

outcomes could be severely limited.

231

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Zuckerman, M. (1979). Sensation seeking: Beyond the optimal level of arousal, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawerence Erlbaum.

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Appendices

Appendix A

PhD Focus Group Questions

1) Are there any factors that influence your safe driving ability? Prompt Examples:

• Family/relationships; • Work, e.g. processes, management direction, pressures, job quotas; • Road rules; • Law/legislation; • Life issues; and • Distractions – mobile phones, street directory, etc.

2) What personal factors or actions influence your driving safety? (Maybe included as part of Question 1) Prompt Examples:

• Behaviours and attitudes; and • Beliefs and values.

3) What do you think could be done to improve work-related driving safety? Prompt Examples:

• Organisationally; • Personally; and • Vehicle wise, e.g. job quotas, engineering.

4) Are there any barriers that prevent you from participating in or completing

work-related road safety interventions or countermeasures? Prompt Examples:

• Family/relationships; • Work, e.g. processes, management direction, time pressures, job quotas; • Life issues; • Beliefs and values; and • Motivation.

Appendix B

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Organisational Safety and Work-Related Driving

The Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety Queensland (CARRS-Q) at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) are undertaking a comprehensive research program to address vehicle safety issues in industry vehicle fleets. A major component of this program is gathering vital information from employees who drive a fleet car to better understand the issues involved in vehicle fleet safety. The questionnaire is strictly confidential and anonymous and you need not answer a question if you consider it too personal. The questionnaire should take about 20 minutes to complete. Please take the time to complete this questionnaire and return it as soon as you have finished it. To ensure your confidentiality and anonymity please do not put your name on the questionnaire.

INSTRUCTIONS For each of the following questions please select the answer which best reflects your views and/or experiences. Please indicate your answer by circling the number that corresponds most closely to your opinion or by writing your answer in the space provided.

Queensland University of Technology 130 Victoria Park Road, Kelvin Grove, Queensland 4059 Australia

Tel +61 7 31384623 Fax +61 7 31384907 Produced by the CARRS-Q Fleet Safety Team

Email [email protected] Web www.carrsq.qut.edu.au CRICOS No. 00213J

Thank you for your assistance

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FLEET DRIVER SAFETY QUESTIONNAIRE

Firstly please read the following

We would like to be able to match this questionnaire with another one at a later date. However, we do not want to be able to identify you. One way for us to do this is to collect some information from you that will not mean anything to us, but will allow us to match your information at a later date. Please complete this information.

First 3 letters of your Mother’s Maiden name:

Your month of birth: ________________

(PLEASE NOTE: ‘Driving for work’ includes driving for the

purposes of work-related tasks and includes driving between work and

home

(Please circle the number that corresponds to your answer or write your answer in the space provided)

1.) Information about you

What is your age?

_________ YEARS

How long has it been since you first obtained a driver’s licence?

_________ YEARS

Are you: Male……………………………………………………

Female…………………………………………………

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2.) Information about your work vehicle and work-related driving

What category of vehicle do you drive most often for work? REMEMBER - Driving for work includes driving a road registered vehicle for the purposes of work related tasks and includes driving between work and home

Operational Vehicle ……………………………….......

Salary Sacrificed ….…………………………………...

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What type of road registered motor vehicle do you drive most often for work?

Passenger Vehicle…………………………………….. (e.g. sedan, hatchback, station wagon, utility)

Four Wheel Drive (4WD)………………………………

Truck ……………………………………………………

Other (please specify)_______________________

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When driving for work, where do you do most of this driving?

Mainly city/suburban roads ………………………….

Both city/suburban and country roads …….……….

Mainly country roads …………………………………

Mainly off road ………………………………………..

Other (please specify) _______________________

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Approximately how many hours per week do you normally drive for work?

None ……………………………………………………

1-10 hours …………………………………………….. 11-20 hours ……………………………………………

21-30 hours ……………………………………………

31-40 hours….…………………………………………

More than 41 hours …………………………………...

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Approximately how many kilometres do you drive each year for work?

None ..............…………………………………………

1 – 10 000 kms………………………………………...

10 001 - 20 000 kms ………………………………....

20 001 – 30 000 kms ………………………………...

30 001 – 40 000 kms …………………………………

40 001 – 50 000 kms …………………………………

More than 50 000 kms………………………………

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3.) Information about your work-related driving risk exposure BEFORE ANSWERING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PLEASE READ THESE DEFINITIONS: ‘Crashes’ - any incident involving a motor vehicle that resulted in damage to a vehicle or other property, or injury. ‘Offences’ - any incident for which you were fined or incurred a loss of demerit points. This excludes parking offences. ‘Driving for work’ includes driving for the purposes of work related tasks and includes driving between work and home.

During the past 12 months how many crashes have you been involved in while driving for work?

Please circle one number

None …………………… One crash ……………… Two crashes …………... Three or more crashes ..

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During the past 12 months how many crashes have you been involved in while driving outside of work (in your own time)?


None …………………… One crash ……………… Two crashes …………... Three or more crashes ..

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During the past 12 months on how many occasions have you lost any demerit points or been fined for any traffic offences while driving for work (REMEMBER – this excludes parking offences)?


None …………………… One offence …………… Two offences ………….. Three or more offences .

0 1 2 3

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During the past 12 months on how many occasions have you lost any demerit points or been fined for any traffic offences while driving outside of work (in your own time) (REMEMBER – this excludes parking offences)?


None …………………… One offence …………… Two offences ………….. Three or more offences .

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4.) Information about your work

What is the postcode of your workplace (such as your home station/depot)?

What type of work do you do primarily? Field work ………………………………………………

Office work ……………………………………………..

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Equal Field and Office work ………………………….

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5.) Information about your work vehicle usage (Please circle one number from 1 = ‘Never’ to 7 = ‘Always’ for each item)

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When driving a vehicle for work, how often in the last 6 months have you…

Driven more than 4 hours in any one day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Driven more than 2 hours without a break 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Driven more than 2 hours at the end of a work day (after work) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6.) How much do you think the following practices apply to your organisation? (Please circle one number from 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’ to 7 = ‘Strongly ‘Agree’ for each item)

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Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are followed even when a job is rushed

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles can be followed without conflicting with work practices

1 2 3 4 5 6 7


1 2 3 4 5 6 7


1 2 3 4 5 6 7

There is sufficient time to enable employees to drive safely for work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Our organisation ensures that safety procedures and rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are available to employees

1 2 3 4 5 6 7


1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Driver safety is central to management’s values and philosophies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Management expectations encourage safe driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Enough time is allocated in the day to allow employees to drive between jobs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Driver safety is compromised by work needs and requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7.) For each statement below, how often has this kind of thing happened to you while driving for work over the past 6 months? Remember: ‘Driving for work’ refers to driving for the purposes of completing work-related tasks and includes driving between work and home

No one is perfect. Even the best drivers make mistakes, do foolish things, or bend the rules at some time or another. Some of these behaviours are trivial, but some are potentially dangerous. For each item below you are asked to indicate HOW OFTEN, if at all, this kind of thing has happened to you. Base your judgements on what you remember of your driving over the last six months. (Please circle one number from 1 = ‘Never’ to 7 = ‘Always’ for each item)

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Attempt to overtake someone that you hadn’t noticed to be turning in front of you

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Stay in a lane that you know will be closed ahead until the last minute 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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before forcing your way into another lane

Miss ‘Stop’ or ‘Give Way’ signs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Intentionally disobey a ‘Stop’ or ‘Give Way’ sign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Pull out of a junction so far that you disrupt the flow of traffic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Fail to notice that pedestrians are crossing in your path of traffic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive especially close to the car in front as a signal to its driver to go faster or get out of the way

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Sound your horn to indicate your annoyance to another driver 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Queuing to enter a main road, you pay such close attention to the main stream of traffic that you nearly hit the car in front

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Cross a junction knowing that the traffic lights have already turned against you

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Whilst turning nearly hit a cyclist who has come up on your inside 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Exceed the speed limit on a highway/freeway without realising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Fail to check your rear-view mirror before pulling out or changing lanes, etc

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Become angered by a certain type of driver and indicate your hostility by whatever means you can

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Become impatient with a slow driver ahead and overtake on the inside

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

When overtaking underestimate the speed of an oncoming vehicle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Race away from the traffic lights with the intention of beating the driver next to you

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Skid while braking or cornering on a slippery road 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive even though you suspect you may be over the legal blood-alcohol limit

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Disregard the speed limit on a residential road 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

… continued from previous page Remember, base your judgements on what you remember of your driving over the last six months. (Please circle one number from 1 = ‘Never’ to 7 = ‘Always’ for each item)

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Exceed the speed limit on a residential road without realising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Become angered by another driver and give chase 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive while under time pressure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Find your attention being distracted from the road 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Hit/bump/scrape something while manoeuvring (including parking and reversing)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive while tired 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Save time during the day by driving quicker between jobs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Have difficulty driving because of tiredness or fatigue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Not wear your seatbelt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Find yourself nodding off while driving for work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Have one or two alcoholic drinks before driving for work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Lose concentration while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Check the tyre pressure and fluid levels of your work vehicle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Do paperwork or other admin while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Remove your seatbelt for some reason while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Eat a meal while driving for work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Physically check behind the vehicle for objects before reversing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Find yourself driving on “autopilot” on the way home from work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive home from work after a long day (after working 12 hours or more)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Conduct pre-trip vehicle inspections 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive while using a “hand-held” mobile phone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive while using a ”hands-free” mobile phone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Pullover before answering/making mobile phone calls 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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8.) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one number from 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’ to 7 = ‘Strongly ‘Agree’ for each item)

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Some people can drive perfectly safely after drinking three or more pots of beer in an hour

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

People stopped by the police for following too closely are unlucky because lots of people do it

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

It is quite acceptable to take a slight risk when overtaking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Close following isn't really a serious road safety problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I know exactly how fast I can drive and still drive safely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Some people can drive perfectly safely even when they only leave a small gap behind the vehicle in front

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Some drivers can be perfectly safe overtaking in situations which would be risky for others

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drink driving isn’t really a serious road safety problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

It’s OK to have a few alcoholic drinks before driving home after work at the end of the week

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The main aim of speeding fines is revenue raising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I think it is OK to overtake in risky circumstances as long as you drive within your own capabilities

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Speed limits are often set too low, with the result that many drivers ignore them

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9.) Please answer the following questions on the basis of your perceptions and feelings about your work driving and your readiness to change risky driving behaviour (Please circle one number from 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’ to 7 = ‘Strongly Agree’ for each item S

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I would like to risk my life as a racing driver 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I sometimes like to frighten myself a little while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I get a real thrill out of driving fast 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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I enjoy listening to loud exciting music while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I like to raise my adrenaline levels while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I would enjoy driving a sports car on a road with no speed limit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I enjoy the sensation of accelerating rapidly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I enjoy cornering at high speed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10.) How often do you intend to do each of the following when driving for work over the next 6 months?

Please note: This refers to how much you plan to do these kinds of things when driving for work in the future.

(Please circle one number from 1 = ‘Never’ to 7 = ‘Always’ for each item)

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Drive at or below the speed limit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Drive while tired 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Use a ‘hand-held’ mobile phone while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Wear your seatbelt while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Drive without fully concentrating on the road 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Conduct regular pre-trip safety checks of your vehicle - tyres, oil, and water

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Drive while over the legal blood alcohol limit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Show aggression towards other drivers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Exceed the speed limit when overtaking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Speed when driving between jobs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Ensure that you do not drive for work if tired or fatigued 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Use a ‘hands-free’ mobile phone while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Fail to wear your seatbelt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Do paperwork or administration while driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Have one or two alcoholic drinks before driving for work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Indicate your annoyance with other drivers (e.g. sound horn, gesture) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Eat a meal while driving for work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Tailgate other vehicles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Overtake against double lines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Ensure that there is at least a 2 second gap between your vehicle and the one in front

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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Cross a junction even though the lights have turned against you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

11.) From the options below, please select the description that best describes you and your work environment. (Please circle one number)

How would you describe your approach to work- related road risks?

I’m not exposed to risk and I’m not considering changing my driving behaviour

I’m planning to take action to reduce my risk in the next 6 months

I have definite plans to reduce my risk in the next month

I have already taken actions to reduce my risk

I’m continuing to take actions to reduce my risk

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From what you’ve experienced, how would you describe your organisations approach to work- related road risks?

They aren’t considering changing or reducing exposure to risks

They are planning to take action to reduce risk in the next 6 months

They have definite plans to reduce risk in the next month

They have already taken actions to reduce our risk

They are continuing to take actions to reduce our risk

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Thank you for your participation If you would like any feedback upon completion of the study or have any queries about your participation, please contact Dr Jeremy Davey or Mr Bevan Rowland at (CARRS-Q), QUT on phone 07 3138 4574 or email [email protected] or [email protected].

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