an exploration of capital campaign team organization

Association of Fundraising Professionals

REPORTS ON FUNDRAISING AND PHILANTHROPY

2006

An Exploration of CapitalCampaign Team Organization,Functioning, and Fund RaisingSuccess William Preston Hicks

AN EXPLORATION OF CAPITAL CAMPAIGN TEAM ORGANIZATION,

FUNCTIONING, AND FUND RAISING SUCCESS

by

Preston William Hicks

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Education)

in The University of Michigan 2006

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Marvin W. Peterson, Chair Professor John C. Burkhardt Professor John E. Tropman Associate Professor Eric L. Dey

© Preston William Hicks All rights reserved

2006

ii

DEDICATION

To my wife Lisa and daughter Ashlyn

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank my dissertation team: Marvin Peterson, Eric Dey, John Tropman, and

John Burkhardt for challenging and supporting me. I thank Sylvia Hurtado and Mike

Nettles. I thank the study participants for sharing their stories. Foremost, thank God.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION.............................................................................................................. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................... iii LIST OF FIGURES..................................................................................................... vi LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................... vii LIST OF APPENDICES ..............................................................................................ix ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................x CHAPTER 1 ..................................................................................................................1

Introduction ...............................................................................................................1 Purpose...................................................................................................................6 Rationale ................................................................................................................6 Research Question .................................................................................................7 Organization of the Study......................................................................................8

CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................9 Literature Review ......................................................................................................9

Postsecondary Education Fund Raising Literature..............................................9 Organizational Behavior Literature ...................................................................19 Summary ..............................................................................................................27

CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................30 Heuristic Framework and Research Methods........................................................30

Heuristic Framework...........................................................................................30 Research Methods................................................................................................32

CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................43 Team Schism ............................................................................................................43

Case Background .................................................................................................43 Institution Overview ............................................................................................44 Case Study............................................................................................................47 Case Analysis .......................................................................................................78 Case Summary .....................................................................................................95 Interpretation.......................................................................................................97

CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................99 Team Franchise .......................................................................................................99

Case Background .................................................................................................99 Institution Overview ..........................................................................................100 Case Study..........................................................................................................102 Case Analysis .....................................................................................................125 Case Summary ...................................................................................................140 Interpretation.....................................................................................................141

CHAPTER 6 ..............................................................................................................143 Team Power Play ...................................................................................................143

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Case Background ...............................................................................................143 Institution Overview ..........................................................................................144 Case Study..........................................................................................................148 Case Analysis .....................................................................................................169 Case Summary ...................................................................................................186 Interpretation.....................................................................................................188

CHAPTER 7 ..............................................................................................................191 Comparative Analysis............................................................................................191

Orientation .........................................................................................................191 Objective 1: How do team members define success?........................................192 Objective 2: What is the nature of campaign team design? .............................195 Objective 4: What is the nature of team core processes and performance? ....199 Objective 5: What influences external to the institution affect campaign teams? In addition, how? ...............................................................................................201 Objective 6: What influences internal to the institution affect campaign teams? In addition, how? ...............................................................................................201 Objective 7: What is the nature of team relationship/social dynamics? ..........202 Main Research Question: How do leadership team dynamics affect success in capital campaign fund raising? .........................................................................203 Key Observations...............................................................................................203

CHAPTER 8 ..............................................................................................................208 Conclusions ............................................................................................................208

Review of Study..................................................................................................208 Review of Findings.............................................................................................211 Heuristic Framework Implications ...................................................................217 Implications for Theory .....................................................................................218 Implications for Practice ...................................................................................219 Implications for Future Research .....................................................................219 Reflections ..........................................................................................................220

APPENDICES ...........................................................................................................222 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................239

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Campaign phases ......................................................................................13 Figure 2.2: Two patterns of actual group performance .............................................22 Figure 3.1: Heuristic framework.................................................................................30 Figure 4.1: Campaign leadership team in 1995..........................................................47 Figure 4.2: Campaign leadership team in 1999..........................................................56 Figure 4.3: Campaign leadership team 2001-2005 .....................................................74 Figure 4.4: Heuristic framework.................................................................................79 Figure 4.5: Four relationship orientations.................................................................98 Figure 5.1: Team Franchise�s campaign phases, timeline, and gift revenue ...........101 Figure 5.2: Heuristic framework...............................................................................125 Figure 5.3: Team organization at campaign conclusion...........................................133 Figure 5.4: Campaign leadership team interpersonal relationship orientations.....136 Figure 6.1: Team Power Play�s campaign phases, stages, and timeline ..................146 Figure 6.2: Campaign leadership team.....................................................................149 Figure 6.3: Campaign leadership team.....................................................................156 Figure 6.4: Campaign team after the exit of Vice President Hague ........................162 Figure 6.5: Campaign leadership team.....................................................................164 Figure 6.6: Heuristic framework...............................................................................169 Figure 6.7: Vice President Adler, 1993-1997 ............................................................183 Figure 6.8: Vice President Hague, 1998-2002...........................................................184 Figure 6.9: Vice President Atwater, 2002-2004 ........................................................185 Figure 6.10: Vice President Slater, 2004-..................................................................186 Figure 8.1: Two patterns of actual group performance ..........................................213 Figure 8.2: Campaign team theoretical performance ..............................................214 Figure 8.3: Leadership teams considering selected characteristics of effective teams

............................................................................................................................215 Figure 8.4: Initial heuristic framework ....................................................................217 Figure 8.5: Revised heuristic framework..................................................................218

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Capital campaign dollar goal data 2000-2005.............................................4 Table 2.1: Summary of strength of fund raising success characteristics as rated by

study participants ................................................................................................16 Table 2.2: Nadler, et al. team building framework ...................................................24 Table 2.3: Characteristics of effective teams by selected authors..............................25 Table 3.1: Construct and elements of the heuristic framework.................................31 Table 3.2: Four tests to maximize case study quality (Yin, 1989)..............................41 Table 4.1: Team Schism�s campaign phases, stages, and timeline.............................45 Table 4.2: Donor/prospect management form with sample of data...........................71 Table 4.3: Campaign success construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

..............................................................................................................................80 Table 4.4: Campaign dollar goal adjustments............................................................81 Table 4.5: Alumni participation percentage...............................................................82 Table 4.6: Endowment per student, market value, and percentage change from

previous year........................................................................................................83 Table 4.7: Governing board participation..................................................................84 Table 4.8: Five-year annual total giving average .......................................................85 Table 4.9: Campaign team design construct, concepts, descriptions, and key

observations..........................................................................................................85 Table 4.10: Team organization at campaign conclusion ............................................88 Table 4.11: Campaign processes design factors: construct, concepts, and

descriptions and key observations.......................................................................89 Table 4.12: Campaign team core processes and performance construct, concepts,

and descriptions, and key observations...............................................................91 Table 5.1: Campaign success construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

............................................................................................................................127 Table 5.2: Campaign dollar goal adjustments..........................................................128 Table 5.3: Alumni participation percentage.............................................................129 Table 5.4: Endowment per student, market value, and percentage change from the

previous year......................................................................................................130 Table 5.5: Governing board financial contributions ................................................130 Table 5.6: Five-year annual giving total average .....................................................131 Table 5.7: Campaign team design construct, concepts, descriptions, and key

observations........................................................................................................131 Table 5.8: Campaign process design factors construct, concepts, descriptions, and

key observations.................................................................................................134 Table 5.9: Campaign team core processes and performance: construct, concepts,

descriptions, and key observations....................................................................135

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Table 6.1: Campaign success: construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations........................................................................................................170

Table 6.2: Campaign dollar goal adjustments..........................................................171 Table 6.3: Alumni participation data........................................................................172 Table 6.4: Endowment per student, market value, and percentage change from

previous year......................................................................................................173 Table 6.5: Governing board participation................................................................173 Table 6.6: Five year annual giving total average......................................................174 Table 6.7: Campaign team design construct, concepts, descriptions, and key

observations........................................................................................................175 Table 6.8: Campaign processes design factors: construct, concepts, descriptions, and

key observations.................................................................................................177 Table 6.9: Campaign team core processes and performance construct, concepts,

descriptions, and key observations....................................................................179 Table 7.1: Campaign success definitions by team ....................................................193 Table 7.2: Comparison of campaign teams by success variables.............................194 Table 7.3: Comparison of campaign teams by campaign team design variables ....197 Table 7.4: Comparison of campaign teams by campaign process design variables 198 Table 7.5: Comparison of campaign teams by team core processes and performance

variables .............................................................................................................200 Table 7.6: Overall comparison of teams considering prevailing dynamics and key

success measures ................................................................................................206

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LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Representative Comprehensive Campaign Organization..................223 Appendix B: Sample Initial Recruitment Letter ......................................................224 Appendix C: Sample Follow-Up Letters to Institutions...........................................225 Appendix D: Consent Form ......................................................................................227 Appendix E: Interview Protocol ...............................................................................230 Appendix F: Team Schism�s Campaign Leadership Team Members 1995-2005 ...234 Appendix G: Team Franchise Campaign Leadership Team Members 1995-2005 .236 Appendix H: Team Power Play Campaign Leadership Team Members 1993-2004

............................................................................................................................238

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ABSTRACT

The most arduous and chronic challenges facing academic institutions tend to

involve resource development. One successful response to fund development challenges

has been the organization and conduct of comprehensive capital campaigns. These

programs boast the potential for an unparalleled return on investment of institutional

resources.

Success at fund raising is attributed to multiple factors. This research focused on

campaign team dynamics, particularly the interpersonal inner-workings of teams, and the

relationship between those dynamics and success at fund raising.

This comparative case study explored three similar institutions that had

historically different levels of success at fund raising. A heuristic framework developed

from fund raising literature, organizational behavior literature, and interviews with fund

raising professionals guided the exploration. Study participants included presidents, vice

presidents for advancement, directors, consultants, trustees, and others associated with

fund raising efforts.

Six key findings emerged: (1) Functional dysfunction: Participants perceived

positive relationships between team dynamics and success at fund raising. However,

amidst periods characterized by organizational and interpersonal dysfunction, each team

exceeded its overall dollar goal. Dysfunction appeared not so much to keep teams from

achieving campaign success inasmuch as it restrained optimal performance. (2) External

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to team orientation: Successful fund raising in the face of persistent team dysfunction was

attributed to actions of individual fund raisers operating as �independent representatives�

with strong external to the team relationships with donors. This was perceived as

essential to major gift fund raising. (3) Pursuit of an �A team:� Teams valued personal

attributes as much as technical skill when appointing team members. This increased

turnover and instability owing to ongoing culling of personnel in search of an �A team.�

(4) Longevity leverage: Participants attributed success to prevailing team dynamics

inasmuch as dynamics influenced employment length, which in turn influenced success at

major gift soliciting. (5) President�s mirror: Presidents modeled interactions and

assembled teams as extensions of themselves. Team dynamics mirrored presidents'

perceptions of the strength of the relationship between team dynamics and success. (6)

Management rules: While leadership set standards, the execution of management

functions guided interactions, out of which team dynamics emerged and teams reacted.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Staying in the vanguard of higher education is inherently expensive.

College president (Anonymous participant)

The most arduous and chronic challenges facing academic institutions tend to

involve resource development. Fund raising, an organizational response to the ever-

difficult challenge of resource development, is purportedly compelled by its �potential for

returning the highest rate of return on investment of any business enterprise within a

nonprofit institution� (Collier, 1994 p. 50). That potential, coupled with the astronomical

financial returns realized by an increasingly large number of academic institutions, tends

to increase sharply college and university fund raising efforts, and expectations.

In academic year 2002-2003, giving to higher education stabilized in comparison

to academic year 2001-2002, the first year charitable giving decreased since 1988

(Giving USA Foundation � American Association of Fundraising Counsel, AAFRC,

Trust for Philanthropy 2003).

2

In the 2003-2004 academic year higher education institutions, numbering more

than 3,6001 received an estimated $24.42 billion dollars, or 9.82 percent of the estimated

$248.52 billion dollars donated 3 (Giving USA Foundation � American Association of

Fundraising Counsel, 2004) to an estimated 1.6 million charitable organizations. Giving

in academic year 2003-2004 represented a 3.4 percent increase (0.7 percent increase

when adjusted for inflation). In 2005, voluntary giving to colleges and universities

reached an estimated $25.6 billion dollars, a 4.9 percent increase according to The

Council for Aid to Education (2006).4

In 2005, voluntary giving accounted for approximately 21.1 percent of overall

institution expenditures for many private, liberal arts institutions, and less than 4.3 on

average for public liberal arts and two-year institutions (Kaplan, Ann, personal

communication, February, 2006). While 21.1 percent and 4.3 percent respectively do not

address fully the financial challenges reported by many institutions, these dollars are

literally counted on toward balanced budgets.

1 According to The College Board. 2 This amount accounts for approximately 85% of he total dollars raised for higher education according to American Association of Fundraising Counsel�s 2004 report. 3 �Giving USA reports giving from four sources of contributions�individual (living) donors, bequests by deceased individuals, foundations, and corporations� Giving USA has tracked contributions to nonprofits in different sub sectors or categories of services. These sub sectors now include religious organizations, educational institutions, health charities, human services agencies, organizations that promote public or societal benefit (e.g., foundations), United Way, United Jewish Appeal, institutions in the arts, culture, or humanities, environment or animal welfare groups, and organizations engaged in international affairs or international aid�(Giving USA Foundation � American Association of Fundraising Counsel, 2004). 4 Analysis of broad charitable giving trends and influences upon donor behavior are beyond the scope of this research. The reader may consult The Giving USA Foundation � American Association of Fundraising Counsel, which has published estimates of giving since 1956. An alternative resource is the Council for Aide to Education (CAE). The CAE publishes an annual Voluntary Support to Education Survey that permits data mining and longitudinal study.

3

Fund raising strategies are multiple and results vary widely across

institutions and periods. Accordingly, Weinstein (1999) wrote, �When deciding

which fund raising strategies to undertake, first determine what will produce the

greatest payback for the time and resources spent� (p.22). The fund raising

program believed to produce the greatest payback is the capital campaign (Dove,

2000; Ketchum, 1968). A capital campaign5 is a limited time, intensive fund

raising effort geared toward raising a specified and substantial sum of money to

finance new construction, renovation, major program operations, and/or

endowment (Dove, 2000; Kihlstedt and Schwartz, 1997; Quigg, 1986).

Capital campaigns have proliferated. Moreover, campaigns have

increased in size, complexity, expense, dollar goals, and amount of dollars raised.

No reports estimate the number of colleges and universities in the midst of a

campaign at any given time. However, one may assert that rare is the academic

institution not presently engaged in or anticipating a fund raising campaign6.

The dollar goal of capital campaigns is staggering. For example, in the

year 2004, eight institutions publicly announced campaign goals of $1 billion

dollars or more. Four of those institutions announced $2.5 billion dollar

campaign goals. That same year, four other institutions publicly closed

campaigns that each raised from $1.04 billion dollars to $2.05 billion dollars. In

2003, ten institutions reported goals of approximately $1 billion dollars. Three

5 The term �capital campaign� is sometimes used interchangeably and improperly with the terms �comprehensive campaign,� �major campaign,� and �building campaign.� Campaigns have formal start and stop dates. However, fundraising often begins well prior to the formal start date and ends well after the formal stop date. 6 Based on information provided by representatives and documents from The Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE), Association of Fund Raising Professionals, practicing campaign consultants, and institution leaders.

4

institutions reported goals of approximately $500 million dollars, and 30

institutions reported goals of approximately $100 million dollars. In a similar

striking fashion, the mean campaign dollar goals increases each year (see Table

1.1).

Table 1.1: Capital campaign dollar goal data 2000-2005

Year Mean Campaign Dollar Goal in Millions

Campaign Goal Percent

Increase 2000-2001 154 8.9% 2001-2002 174 7.5% 2002-2003 235 7.4% 2003-2004 249 9.4% 2004-2005 Unavailable Unavailable

Source: (Kaplan, Ann, personal communication, February 2006)

Capital campaigns are indeed big business. To manage the scope and

complexity of capital campaigns, college and university leaders assemble

campaign leadership teams. Membership of leadership teams tends to include an

institution�s president, vice president for advancement, development director,

board members, and a contracted fund raising consultant7. While campaign

leadership teams consist of few members, campaign organizations are huge. A

campaign organization chart representative of campaigns in this study is presented

in Appendix A.

Much as the potential to raise large sums of money compels the use of capital

campaigns, the potential of teams as a powerful management tool compel their use

toward success at campaign fund raising. The use of teams to address complex

7 Consultants may work as temporary but full time campaign managers, or advisors, or as a general counsel regarding various aspects of a campaign such as the development of a case statement.

5

organizational issues is widespread across sectors. The immense literature base on the

use of teams is another reflection of their popularity.

Broadly, the study of teams has increased understanding of team types and utility

(Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Nadler, 1997; Hackman, 1990) and characteristics of effective

teams (Larson and LaFasto, 1989; Nash, 1999; Mosley, 2001; McIntyre, 2003). Teams

are composed of individuals; therefore, in the face of guidance offered by a wealth of

literature on teams, team behavior from one organization to another and within

organizations is idiosyncratic, and the hoped-for theoretical (positive) performance of

teams is not always realized fully (Nadler & Spaulding, 1997).

The use of teams to manage fund raising is grounded in conventional wisdom and

research (Dove, 2000; Kihlstedt and Schwartz, 1997; Worth, 1993: 2002; Quigg 1986;

Rowland, 1997; Bornstein, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Cook and Lasher 1996; Willmer 1993;

Duronio and Loessin, 1991; Fisher, 1995; Fisher & Quehl, 1989). Grace (1991), for

example, referring to the development unit, wrote: �Of all the factors that contribute to

sustain[ed] success in fund raising, none may be more important than creating a cohesive

and effective development team. Sustaining such a team requires leadership, vision, and

a commitment to the values of team effort in achieving organizational goals� (p. 161).

Drawing from and extending Grace�s observation, this exploratory research assumed a

relationship between �cohesive and effective� campaign leadership teams and success at

fund raising. Despite the importance of teamwork to effective fund raising, little research

attends to the topic of leadership team dynamics and the relationship team dynamics have

to campaign success.

6

Purpose

The purpose of this research was to explore relationships between the dynamics of

campaign leadership teams and success at fund raising. To that end, this research

considered two interrelated processes (evolving events): (1) the emergence and

functioning of capital campaign leadership teams, and (2) the emergence and

management of capital campaigns in the context of team interpersonal dynamics.

To observe human interactions and outcomes within organizational settings of

colleges and universities, this study used organizational behavior literature and fund

raising literature as theoretical backdrops to explore the dynamics of capital campaign

leadership teams.

Rationale

Progressively, capital campaigns are an essential function for academic

institutions. Success at fund raising is imperative. Conventional wisdom girded by

scholarship attributes success at fund raising to strong presidential leadership,

management, and teamwork. The president�s role in fund raising is documented well.

However, the nature of capital campaign leadership team functioning is not as fully

understood.

The aim of this research was to explore systematically how team members relate

to one another to carry out comprehensive capital campaigns. The exploration of this

phenomenon is consequential to campaign fund raising theory and practice and may

inform theory and practice beyond the independent sector.

My interest in campaign team dynamics and success at fund raising emerged from

a related interest in the organizational processes believed to facilitate, or more

7

specifically direct voluntary giving. One observes that while many people within a

campaign organization solicit dollars and facilitate the processes that underlie solicitation

of dollars, success at fund raising appears to depend squarely upon behaviors of a relative

few people within the campaign organization. Thus, this interest in the dynamics of the

�relative few people� responsible for generating tens, even hundreds of million dollars--

the campaign leadership team.

Research Question

This is a comparative case study. The research questions that guided this

investigation were fashioned from a heuristic framework, which emerged from fund

raising literature, organizational behavior literature, and interviews of fund raising

professionals. The main question is:

How do leadership team dynamics affect success in capital campaign fund raising?

To address this main research question, seven sub questions were fashioned to permit

direct and indirect investigation of the phenomenon. The indirect questions explored the

technical dimensions of campaigning, team design, and functioning. The direct questions

explored specifically the nature of internal to team interpersonal relationships and success

at fund raising. The sub questions are enumerated below:

1. How do team members define success?

2. What is the nature of campaign team design?

3. What is the nature of campaign design?

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4. What is the nature of team core processes and performance?

5. What influences external to the institution affect campaign teams? In

addition, how?

6. What influences internal to the institution affect campaign teams? In addition,

how?

7. What is the nature of team relationships/social dynamics?

Organization of the Study

This study is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the research

topic, purpose, rationale, and main question. Chapter 2 is a review of relevant

educational fund raising literature and organizational behavior literature. Chapter 3

introduces: (A) the heuristic framework, and (B) the overview of the research methods.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide sections devoted to specific case background, institution

overview, case study, case analysis, case summary, and interpretation. Compared in

Chapter 7 are the three aforementioned cases. Chapter 8 summarizes the study and

considers its implications.

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CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

Two bodies of literature provide the foundation for this exploratory study. The

first body of literature describes educational fund raising. The second body of literature

describes organizational development. Within the educational fund raising literature, the

most useful research addressed campaign fund raising, fund raising management teams,

and factors associated with success in fund raising. Within the organizational literature,

the most relevant research addressed top management team effectiveness in

organizational settings. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the history of

capital campaigns in American higher education, followed by a review of selected

educational fund raising and organizational development literatures.

Postsecondary Education Fund Raising Literature

Capital Campaigns in American Higher Education

According to Dove (2001), early fund raising for colleges and universities was

sporadic, not systematized or conducted by a unit. Worth (1993) wrote, �Fund raising

before the twentieth century was generally amateur and personal, a transaction between

two individuals with no role for organization, strategy, or professional managers� (p.19).

10

Fundraising as a managed organizational function is a twentieth century

development (Worth, 2002; Kelley, 1999). Significant advances in collegiate fund

raising performance owe largely to the adoption of techniques developed outside of the

higher education sector. In 1902, Lyman Pierce enlisted Charles Summner Ward, a

fellow Young Men�s Club of America (YMCA) executive from Chicago to help enhance

a Washington D.C. YMCA campaign. This collaboration of Pierce and Ward yielded the

�Ward Method,� which is recognized as the precursor to the modern capital campaign

(Worth, 2002; Dove, 2001). The University of Pittsburgh hired Ward in 1914�thus the

first reported application of the �Ward Method� to higher education fund raising (Worth,

2002; Brittingham and Pezzullo, 1990). The capital campaign continues to be the

flagship activity of collegiate fund raising. The handling or management of capital

campaigns is widely agreed upon as having some relationship with fund raising

outcomes.

In 1957, the American College Public Relations Association and the American

Alumni Council, with support from the Ford Foundation, undertook the first major study

of the broadly defined development function. The study was entitled The Advancement

of Understanding and Support of Higher Education. This work led to the 1958

conference at the Greenbrier hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. The

Greenbrier conference is the earliest significant effort to understand systematically public

relations, fund raising, and alumni relations programs.

The Greenbrier conference era marked the beginning of systematic fund raising

methods and the opportunity to enhance fund raising performance by studying the

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relationships between fund raising practices, institutional and program characteristics,

and fund raising outcomes.

According to Heneman (1969), the work of the Greenbrier conference made clear the

need for effective fund raising management:

The development activity appeared to have been given the organizational recognition needed to carry on the work effectively. However, it became clear that this initial study was but a first step in encouraging the creation of effective development staffs. It was apparent that� there were great disparities in performance and in the effectiveness of development offices. In some cases, the wide range and quality of performance could be explained by factors not easily controlled. These included adverse factors such as the hostility of state legislatures to fundraising by state institutions, and positive elements of strength such as strong tradition of alumni giving. There are, however, other factors effecting performance, which are subject to control through good management. These include sound versus unsound organization, a matching of staffing with workload, controls over staff time and effort, cost accounting, evaluation of programs, and a measurement of the results obtained for time and money expended (p.x).

Kelly (1999) distinguished fund raising prior to the year 1900, which P.D Hall

(1987) called �fund raising�like activities,� from systematic fund raising activities

observed today. Through a qualitative study, Kelly (1999) identified four fund raising

eras: 1900-1917 �nonspecialists,� 1919-1941 �fund raising consultants,� 1946-middle

1960�s �transition,� and 1965 to the present as the as the era of the �staff fund raiser.�

The eras reflect various political, economic, and social forces or pressures and the

reactions of colleges and universities to the changing landscape for fund raising.

Historically, one can view collegiate fund raising and advances in fund raising

technologies, namely the comprehensive capital campaign, as complex institutional

responses to pressures to generate ever-larger amounts of money in the face of narrowing

or threatened revenue streams and ever-intense competition for philanthropic support. At

different points in history, institutions adapted by adopting what was perceived the best

12

way to increase gift revenue, the comprehensive capital campaign. Historical

perspectives on collegiate fund raising were gained from the works of Brubacher (1958),

Rudolph, (1962), Hall (1987), Cutlip (1965), and Dove (2002).

Provided in this remainder of the review of selected educational fund raising

literature is an overview of capital campaign phases followed by an overview of key

determinants of fund raising effectiveness and success. The presentation of campaign

phases is two-fold in purpose; first, to orient the reader to the systematic movement or

flow of campaign activity. Second, to provide a coherent mechanism by way of time

lines and goals for exploring campaign team activity.

Capital campaigns are complex, and in light of that complexity, institutions

conduct campaigns in multiple phases and over an extended but definite period.

Characteristic of successful campaigns is the systematic execution of what appear to be

near immutable processes (Kihlsedt and Schwartz, 1997; Dove, 2001; Quigg, 1986;

Rosso, 2003). A review of this literature, girded by research and conventional wisdom

provided by fund raising professionals, suggests that campaigns have a �quiet phase�, and

a �public phase�. Presented in Figure 2.1 are the �quiet� and �public� phases, and the

processes that occur within and/or across the phases. The hypothetical campaign time

line in Figure 2.1 is based on a seven-year campaign.

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Figure 2.1: Campaign phases

C am paign planning Lead gifts K ick off M ajor gifts G eneral G ifts C elebration

Q uiet Phase Public Phase

Source: The Fund Raising School, 2002, Cam paign Phases

�96 �97 �98 �99 �00 �01 �02 �03

The elements of a quiet phase tend to consist of: (1) recruitment and orientation of

volunteers, (2) developing a needs statement, (3) conducting a feasibility study, (4) hiring

a consultant, and (5) soliciting lead gifts. The elements of a public phase tend to consist

of: (1) kick off, (2) sequential solicitation, (3) major gifts solicitation, (4) general gifts

solicitation, and (5) celebration.

Fund Raising Effectiveness

Duronio and Loessin (1991) observed, �The primary problem in studying fund

raising is defining effectiveness� (p. 4). Research on this problem is in its �infancy.

Administrators and fund raisers from different institutions have reached no consensus

about how to define fund raising effectiveness or success� (p. xiii).

14

Cook and Lasher (1996) differentiated fund raising performance from success.

They stated, �In our study, all institutions exhibited some measure of success in fund

raising. However, �effectiveness� differs from �success� since it includes capability and

potential as well as dollar totals� (p.37). Duronio and Loessin (1991) provided

conceptual and operational definitions of effectiveness:

Defined conceptually, fund raising effectiveness is raising the most money with the least amount of expenditures in a manner that enhance the likelihood that current donors will continue their support and that more new donors will contribute. It is enormously difficult to turn the definition into a formula that can be used to answer the question, is our program effective or not? (p.8)

The passage continued, An operational definition specifies what is used to measure the concept under consideration. The operational definition of fund raising effectiveness is a measure of how well an institution realizes its full potential in fund raising. Potential is an abstract concept, not well defined or easily measurable. Our definition of an effective fund raising program is one in which actual results exceed predicted results (p. 8).

Other conceptual and operational definitions exist in the literature. For example,

Bakrow (1961) used the effectiveness of solicitation rating (volume of solicitation), a

non-dollar basis for evaluating fund raising program effectiveness. Dunn (1986) used the

term �leveraging� as a �crude� index of how well an institution was doing for its size.

Glennon (1985) used the percentage of education and general expenses generated by fund

raising as a means to observe performance. Leslie (1969) asserted that total gift income

exclusive of deferred gifts was an appropriate index and criterion for effectiveness and

introduced the important concept of fund raising potential (p.33). Grunig (1995)

observed, �Development offices, unlike loosely-coupled educational organizations, are

profit-oriented organizations. There is a close correspondence between activities

(solicitation) and outputs (dollars raised). Success of development organizations is

judged by the amount of money raised� (p.687).

15

Some researchers evaluate effectiveness non-monetarily. Loessin (1997) for

example, asserted that effective fund raising is not that which necessarily generates the

most revenue, but that which advances the true mission of the institution. Taking a

similar position on capital campaign fund raising, Chindemi (2003) wrote:

Institutions of all types tend to focus on the dollar goals associated with a campaign--often to the detriment of other goals. Non monetary benefits of campaigns include improved perceptions of the institution, brand building, enhanced relationships, increased voluntarism, sharpened institutional priorities, sustained investments in communications, and the creation of a sense of forward progress (Council for the Advancement and Support of Education, 2002).

Determinants of Capital Campaign Success.

Multiple characteristics of institutions and programs are associated with success

at campaign fund raising. The most powerful factors included planning, feasibility study,

leadership, management, case statement, volunteer management, budget, and fund raising

programs array (Rosso, 1991; Kihlstedt and Schwartz, 1997; Dove, 2000).

Outlined below are three educational fund raising studies selected for relevance to

the research question and being representative of fund raising studies.

Duronio and Loessin (1991) conducted a qualitative study to explain further the

variation in gift income. Using a national sample, the researchers employed multiple-

regression procedures to predict the fund raising results of 575 institutions. From a group

of 100 institutions that exceeded their predicted gift income, ten representative

institutions were selected to participate in the study. The participants included presidents,

chief development officers, academic deans, other advancement administrators, and

professional fund raising staff. The framework for the interview questions was a

literature-based list of institution and program characteristics associated with successful

16

fund raising. The participants were asked to describe the role that the success variables

played in their institution�s success. Respondents reported use of �success variables� is

presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Summary of strength of fund raising success characteristics as rated by study participants

Strongest characteristics linked to fund raising success

Definition and communication of institutional niche and image Presidential leadership

Most common characteristics linked to fund raising success

Presidential leadership Institutional commitment to fund raising Chief development officer�s leadership and role in setting the institution�s mission Entrepreneurial fund raising

Least common characteristics linked to fund raising success

Trustee participation Volunteers� role Staff commitment to the institution Emphasis on constituent relations

Source: Duronio & Loessin (1991). Effective Fund Raising in Higher Education. Jossey

Bass. Pp. 197-221.

The second study was that of Cook and Lasher (1996). The researchers

conducted a grounded theory study to enhance understanding of the president�s role in

fund raising. Selected from a national sample were 20 presidents and former presidents

from institutions that had recently conducted or were conducting comprehensive

campaigns of $100 million dollars or more who were also interviewed by the researchers.

The researchers found that: (a) fund raising was institution and context specific, (b) a

team effort, and (c) the president was the �central player� and should focus on

administrative leadership. In addition, the researchers identified four powerful forces that

17

influenced the president. The influences were: (1) personal, (2) institution, (3)

environment, and (4) role.

The third relevant body of research is a collection of case studies edited by

Rhodes (1997) that explored collegiate fundraising performance at 11 diverse and

�effective� fund raising institutions8. Former presidents, chief advancement officers, and

other advancement leaders authored the cases. Rhodes observed:

The development of a fund-raising program involves the continuing interaction and cooperation of four major participants -- the president; such campus leaders as the provost, deans, and faculty; the chief professional development officer (typically a vice president); and a committed group of volunteers -- alumni, parents, faculty, students, friends, and especially, trustees. The president must rally and sustain the enthusiasm and support of this diverse group, but can succeed in this only if he or she has a realistic plan that all can support. The development and articulation of this plan and the priorities it embodies form the foundation for successful fund-raising efforts. (p.xix)

Educational Fund Raising and Top Management Teams

College President:

Presidents are driving forces in fund raising (Fisher and Koch, 1996; Murphy,

1997; Worth, 2002:1993; Cook and Lasher, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Worth and Asp, 1994;

Drachman, 1983; Duronio and Loessin, 1991). However, the heroic leadership model

gives way to the primacy of teamwork. The balance of the capital campaign leadership

team includes: (1) the chief development or advancement officer, (2) trustees, and (3) and

fund raising counsel (Patton, 2002; Bornstein, 2000; Gearhart, 1995; Dove, 2002; Kilted

& Schwartz, 1997; Fisher, 1980; Murphy, 1997; Murray, 1985).

Fisher and Quehl (1989) observed the importance of relationships between the

president and the chief development officer, volunteers, and others, based on trust and

8 Rhodes did not define effectiveness.

18

confidence, which may at times �trump� technical knowledge (which can be �hired in�).

Bornstein (2000) observed that the three essential characteristics of successful

relationships between the presidents and advancement vice president are expertise,

loyalty, and reciprocity. Researchers have also identified several organizational

structures and their appropriate application.9

Development Officer:

Worth and Asp (1994) developed four models to explain the development

officer�s function and role. The four related roles are: (1) salesman, (2) catalyst, (3)

manager, and (4) leader10. It appears that fund raising success depends heavily upon the

fit between the practiced role of the chief development officer and the practiced role of

the chief executive officer (Fisher & Quehl, 1989; Fisher, 1980; Rhodes, 1997).

Trustees (Governing Board Members):

Working closely with the president and the chief development officer, the chair of

the board of trustees, the chair of the fund raising committee of the board of trustees,

and/or the campaign chair (typically a board member) have varying and integral roles in

the success of capital campaigns. Trustees may initiate and/or give approval for the 9 A centralized organizational structure appears most productive and most common. A centralized model is one in which the chief advancement (development) officer has managerial oversight for all advancement functions and personnel and reports directly to the president, and he or she directly to the Board. Subsequent studies have concluded that particular organizational models (i.e., centralized, decentralized or �hybrid�) are preferred because of their perceived effect on fund raising performance. Fisher and Quehl (1989), Leslie (1969), Grunig (1995), Sandberg (1985) and Sabo (1994). 10 Characterizing the salesman is an external to the institution orientation. These development personnel emphasize building relationships with prospects and directly soliciting gifts. The catalyst, unlike the salesman works in the background and �keeps an arm�s distance� from gift solicitation. This role requires that the development officer demonstrate effectiveness at motivating and positioning others such the president, board members, alumni, students, and faculty to solicit gifts. Characterizing the manager role is the conduct and oversight of technical and operational matters on and around the development program in support of fund raising. The leader is characterized by a high level of interaction with other institution leaders, professionalism, and involvement in broad institutional matters.

19

conduct of capital campaigns. Trustees approve the campaign planning, dollar goals,

campaign duration, and campaign funding priorities. Trustees also hire and supervise

presidents. Moreover, trustees tend to provide leadership gifts to campaigns and serve as

resources in the identification and solicitation of prospective donors (Dove, 2000, 1986,

1988; Worth, 1993; Quigg, 1986; Carver, 1997; Weisman 1998; Howe, 1991; Smith,

1986; Kihlstedt and Schwartz, 1997).

Fund Raising Counsel:

Working closely with the chief advancement officer or chief development officer

and the president, the fund raising counsel(s) or consultant(s) have an integral role in the

success of most capital campaigns. Fund raising counsel is a hired full time temporary

employee who guides the entire campaign process or specific aspects of capital

campaigns. An integral role of the fund raising counsel is facilitating planning processes,

conducting one or several campaign feasibility studies (audits of institution and

environment readiness), development of the case statement (rationale for support),

determination of campaign goals, campaign timing, and campaign strategy (Dove, 1986,

1988, 2000;Worth, 1993; Quigg, 1986; Smith, 1986; Kihlstedt and Schwartz, 1997;

Fisher and Quehl, 1989). Campaign consultants may also assume the role of campaign

manager.

Organizational Behavior Literature

Team Defined

A team is a management tool (Erb, 2001; Hart, 1996). Parker (2003) described a

team as �a group of people with a high degree of interdependence, geared toward the

achievement of a goal or the completion of a task� (p. 2). Hackman (1990) defined a

20

team as a collection of individuals who operate in an organizational context, are

interdependent in their tasks, share responsibility for outcomes, and who perceive

themselves and are perceived by others as an intact social entity embedded in one or

more larger social systems (p 4-5).

Types of Teams

Teams are multiple in types and vary in degree of suitability for organizational

tasks. Several researchers similarly identify teams by type and applications (Hackman,

1990; Larson & La Fasto 1989). For example, Cohen and Bailey (1997) identified four

types of teams from an extensive review of literature: (1) work teams, (2) parallel teams,

(3) project teams, and (4) management teams11. As this study is exploratory, and the

researcher does not know with certainty which type of team or hybrid thereof best

describes capital campaign teams, presented is a brief description of each team type

identified by Cohen et al (1997).

Work Teams:

Directed by supervisors, �work teams are continuing work units responsible for

producing goods or providing services. Their membership is typically stable, usually

full-time, and well-defined.� An alternative to the work team is the self-directed or self-

managing team in which team members are cross-trained. The benefits of self-managing

teams are reductions in costs, improved productivity, and improved quality (Cohen et al

1997).

11 Hackman (1990) identified seven types of teams that operated within organizational contexts: (1) top management teams, (2) task forces, (3) professional support groups, (4) performing groups, (5) human service teams, (6) customer service teams, and (6) production teams. P. xviii-xx.

21

Parallel Teams:

Coexisting alongside the formal organizational structure, parallel teams are

composed of people from different work units or jobs. Parallel teams carry out

�problem-solving and improvement-oriented functions� that the �regular organization� is

not equipped to handle. These teams tend to have limited authority and pass

recommendations up the organization�s hierarchy (Cohen et al, 1997).

Cross-Functional Teams/Project Teams:

Cross-functional teams are often temporary. They produce one-time outputs, such

as a new product or service. The tasks of a project team are �non-repetitive in nature and

involve considerable application of knowledge, judgment, and expertise. Project teams

draw their members from different disciplines and functional units, so that specialized

expertise can be applied to the project at hand.� A strength of project teams is the

�capacity to do multiple activities simultaneously, rather than sequentially which saves

time�. Upon the completion of the project, the members move on to another project or

return to their functional units (Cohen et al 1997).

Management Teams:

Management teams are composed of the managers responsible for an

organizational sub unit. These teams set strategic direction and manage performance.

�Management teams coordinate, integrate, and direct work across interdependent work

units and are responsible for overall performance. Management teams, because of the

22

members� hierarchical rank and expertise, are positioned to integrate disparate efforts and

share responsibility for the success of the firm� (Cohen et al 1997).

Basis for Teams

Theoretically, a basis for establishing a team is the potential that individuals

working collectively will achieve in aggregate more than individuals working

independently. In other words, with teams, there is a potential for a multiplying effect or

synergy of skills and talents resulting in increased effectiveness. There are, in addition to

the theoretical increase in productivity, two levels of actual team performance (see Figure

2-2). One level of productivity is �assembly bonus,� a level of performance that exceeds

the theoretical level. The second level of performance is �process loss,� or productivity

below the theoretical level (Nadler, 1997). Nadler�s team model depicts three levels of

team performance with output observed as a function of numbers of people engaged in

the task (see Figure 2.2 below).

Figure 2.2: Two patterns of actual group performance

Source: David Nadler and Janet Spaulding and Associates, 1997. (P.7)

Number of People

Units of Output

Theoretical Performance

Assembly Bonus

Process Loss

Actual Performance

Actual Performance

23

Capital campaign teams appear to be top management teams. Top management

teams are composed of an organization�s �power elite� (Kelly, 1999). Such teams are

susceptible to �process loss�. Often, executive level personnel are accustomed to

exercising power, authority, independence, autonomy, control, and the directing of

others. These characteristics are not compatible with teamwork principles (Hackman,

1990).

Team Effectiveness

Team effectiveness defined broadly is the degree to which desired outcomes are

achieved in the context of environmental restraints. Two models for analyzing team

effectiveness were selected for relevance to the research question. Cohen and Bailey

(1997) present the first model, and Hackman (1990) presents the second model.

Both models depart from conventional team models, designed around inputs,

transformation, and outputs.

According to Cohen and Bailey (1997), team outcomes occur at four levels: 1)

individual, 2) group, 3) business unit, and 4) organization. In their meta-analysis of

research on group effectiveness, they found that team effectiveness was a function of (1)

task, (2) group, (3) organization design factors, (4) environmental factors, (5) internal

processes, (6) external processes, and (7) group psychosocial traits (p. 1). From these

observations, the researchers developed a heuristic model for the analysis of teams.

Within this model, effectiveness was a function of �(1) environmental factors, (2) design

factors, (3) group processes, and (4) group psychosocial traits� (p.5). Examples of

environmental factors include the economy and legislation. Design factors are under the

24

control of managers. Examples of design are team composition, team size, diversity,

task, organizational structure, supervision, and rewards. Examples of group processes are

communication and conflict. Examples of psychosocial traits are group effect, shared

beliefs, shared understandings, and shared expectations.

Nadler et al�s (1997) team building framework attends to team design,

core processes, and performance. The framework reflects team member

interactions and relationship management. The model allows a penetrating

exploration of group social dynamics (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Nadler, et al. team building framework

Constructs Concepts Description

Composition Mix of skills and experiences, values perspectives, and other characteristics

Structure Includes the size of the team, membership, the boundaries (who is in and out, the specific formal roles, the nature of team and individual roles)

Team Design

Succession Team members� perceptions and expectations of how their performance and behavior affects their succession

Work Management

How the team organizes and manages itself to perform work

Relationship Management

How the team manages the nature and quality of relationships among its members

Core Processes

External Boundary Management

How the team deals with elements outside the team and beyond the organization

Production of Results

The team�s ability to consistently meet the performance demands on it

Team Performance

Maintenance of Effectiveness

The team�s ability to meet members� needs and for members to work together over time

Source: David Nadler (1997, p.23-25: p 182)

25

Characteristics of Effective Teams

Multiple authors have identified characteristics associated with top management

team effectiveness (see Table 2.3) (McIntyre, 2003; Parker, 2003; Mosley, 2001; Nash,

1999; Nadler, et al 1997; Larson and La Fasto, 1989). Effective teams, according to Herb

et al (2001),

� require a common direction: a shared understanding of goals and values. Second, skills of interaction are crucial if the team is to go beyond individual expertise to solve complex problems and, equally, if it is to withstand the scrutiny of the rest of the organization, for people usually take their cues from the top. Finally, top teams must always be able to renew themselves--to expand their capabilities in response to change. One reason for the difficulty of improving a team's performance is that interaction, direction, and renewal are interdependent--teams need to go forward simultaneously on all three fronts to make real progress (Herb et al., 2001. p. 11).

Table 2.3: Characteristics of effective teams by selected authors

Nash (1999) Mosley (2001) McIntyre (2003)

Larson and La Fasto (1989)

Strategic Goals, Clear Roles and Responsibilities Open Communication, Rapid Response, and Effective Leadership

Clear purpose, informality, participation, listening, civilized disagreement, consensus decisions, open communications, clear roles, and work assignments. Shared leadership, external relationships, style diversity, and self-assessment.

Strategic goals, networking, information, team interaction.

Collaborative relationships

Information processing focused action feedback

A clear, elevating goal

A results driven structure

Competent team members

Unified commitment

A collaborative climate

Standards of excellence

External support and recognition

Principled leadership

26

Snee et al (1998) observed, �Effective teams depend on a delicate balance of

management, team, and individual commitment, plus a combination of knowledge, skills,

and methods that allow team members to accomplish their work.� Hart (1996) likened

top management teams to learning groups. She posits that teams are dynamic, social, and

cognitive. Teams learn how to become effective. They become �smart.� Team learning

fuels effectiveness and is enhanced when team members �recognize,� �characterize,� and

�exorcize� barriers to learning. Learning barriers include uncommon language, failure to

focus on strategic thinking, unproductive meetings, incremental rather than break through

thinking, the paradox of not designing work as to make the team obsolete, failure to share

information to those of lower status, and member isolation. Teams tend to fail not

because of a lack of talent and skills, but �team member inability to use those skills to the

best of their advantage within the group dynamic� (p. 45).

Team Social Dynamics

According to Nadler (1982), �The nature of relationships and the patterns of

behavior that emerge over time in groups�both among group members and between

group members and leaders�have an effect on the work performance of the group. Thus

these relationships affect group and organizational performance� (p. 184-185).

Relationships are qualitative in nature and are the result of interactions and

exchanges (Nadler, 1997; McIntyre, 2003; Parker, 2003; Mosley 2001). The relationship

phenomenon is conceptualized as �working well together� and is defined as

�collaborative relationships� (McIntyre 2003), and as �open communication� (Nash,

1999; Mosley, 2001; Fisher, 1995). Nadler (1997) and Cohen et al (1997) affirmed the

importance of �relationship management� and identified it as a core function of effective

27

teams. Caplow (1964) used the term �valence� to describe the importance of team

cohesion, team member �sentiment,� and �friendliness� toward one another and the

achievement of team goals or tasks. Valence is the capacity to unite, react, or interact.

Nash (1999) presented a team model based on individual and aggregate team

member temperaments as identified by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator®. Identified in

her study was the importance of values, which shape culture and the nature of team

member interaction. Lewin�s theory on group dynamics identified the importance of

group members forming �linkages� or cohesive relationships with each other and to the

larger group.

Joyaux (2002) affirmed that the �the degree to which members are linked defines

group health.� Joyaux describes linking forces (2001, p.16)) as:

• Member satisfaction

• Degree of closeness and warmth felt between members and groups

• Pride of membership in the group

• Ability of members to address crises that face the group

• Degree to which members of the group express their ideas and feelings

honestly

Summary This summary provides a review of key points from selected fund raising and

organizational behavior literature.

Educational Fund Raising: Capital Campaigns Successful campaign fund raising requires a team effort wherein all management

functions are engaged (planning, organizing, coordinating, staffing, directing, reporting,

28

and evaluating). Success is attributed to multiple factors and none is given as much

attribution as presidential leadership.

Capital campaigns transpire in predictable patterns, typically organized by phases

(i.e., silent phase, public phase), and within those phases there are multiple processes,

which take on varying levels of sophistication and complexity. Effectiveness in fund

raising is evaluated in monetary and non-monetary terms. However, a popular indicator

of success is dollar return on investment. Success at fund raising is attributed to multiple

determinants.

Organizational Behavior: Top Management Teams

Foremost, teams are management tools. Teams are embedded, dynamic, social

systems that evolve in predictable patterns in response to and/or interaction with

changing environmental and institutional factors.

Teams are multiple in type and in measures of effectiveness. Top management

teams are deployed to address complex organizational challenges. While having the

capacity to advance organizations, these teams are predisposed to process loss. Team

success is facilitated when: 1) the task matches the team type and 2) team members work

effectively together. Team performance, effectiveness, and success are difficult to assess

or to ascribe determinants. However, certain characteristics appear present with teams

perceived as effective.

Fund raising and organizational literature provided theoretical perspectives and

concepts that facilitate exploration of the relationship between capital campaign, team

dynamics, and success in campaign fund raising. Discussed thus far have been

characteristics of productive teams and productive fund raising programs. This study

29

focuses on the intersection of these characteristics. Presented in the next chapter is the

heuristic framework influenced by fund raising and organizational literature and

interviews with fund raising professionals. Following the presentation of the heuristic

framework are the main research question and research sub questions.

30

CHAPTER 3

Heuristic Framework and Research Methods

Heuristic Framework

This study is exploratory and guided loosely by a heuristic framework. The

heuristic framework (Figure 3-1) provided context for the research questions, interview

protocols, case selection, and a cross case analysis. The framework was composed of

seven elements gleaned from the research of Nadler et al (1997), Cohen and Bailey

(1997), and Hackman (1990). The framework was enhanced by interviews of several

educational fund raising professionals prior to the start of this study.

Figure 3.1: Heuristic framework

Campaign Success

Team Core Processes & Performance

Team Dynamics

Influences External to Institution

Campaign Design Factors

Team Design Factors

Influences Internal to Institution

31

The dependent variable is the construct identified as capital campaign success.

The main independent variable is the construct identified as campaign team dynamics.

The capital campaign team dynamic construct represents a confluence of multiple and

interrelated factors (concepts) identified as: (1) campaign team design factors, (2)

campaign design factors, and (3) campaign team core processes and performance. The

three design factors are in turn impacted by influences that are external to the institution

and influences that are internal to the institution. Each of the seven constructs, which

compose the heuristic framework, is described in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Construct and elements of the heuristic framework

Construct Elements

Campaign Success

! Adjustments to initial campaign dollar goal ! Campaign revenue to expense ratio ! Percentage of priority projects fully funded by

campaign dollars ! Percentage of alumni participating in the campaign ! Change in endowment value over the course of the

campaign ! Trustee financial contributions to the campaign ! Five-year annual total giving average12

Campaign Team Dynamics ! Confluence of all constructs in the heuristic framework Campaign Team Design Factors

! Team composition and size, ! Diversity of talents, skills, background and

experiences, ! Work tasks, activities and functions, and ! Organizational structure.


! Campaign initiation ! Planning and phases ! Campaign complexity.

12 The average is calculated by taking the year considered and the four years preceding and dividing by five

32

Construct Elements

Team Core Processes and Performance

! Work management ! Relationship management and conflict management ! External boundary management ! Production of results ! Evaluation ! Maintenance of effectiveness

Influences External to The Institution

! Legislated standards ! Professional standards, codes, and guidelines ! Prevailing economy ! Public perception of institution

Influences Internal to The Institution

! Campaign budget ! Institution ethos ! Institution policy

Research Methods

The heuristic framework loosely guided this investigation of how campaign

leadership team dynamics relate to campaign success. The main research question and

sub questions reflect: (1) my interpretation of the treatments and views of capital

campaign teams and fund raising success in extant literature, and (2) amplifications of

relevant extant literature and concepts that emerged from interviews of fund raising

counsel and institution-based campaign managers conducted prior to the case studies.

Research Questions

The research sub questions are arranged to address the dependent variable--

campaign success and factors believed to impact upon the independent variable--

campaign team dynamics. The main research question explores the relationship between

the dependent variable and the independent variables.

33

Main Research Question

How do leadership team dynamics affect success in capital campaign fund

raising?

Research Sub Questions (Objectives)





5. What influences, external to the institution affect campaign teams? In

addition, how?

6. What influences, internal to the institution affect campaign teams? In

addition, how?

7. What is the nature of team relationship/social dynamics?

The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following manner: (1)

comparative case study approach, (2) context, (3) sample selection, (4) definitions, (5)

data collection, (6) data analysis, and (7) methodological limitations.

Study Design

The study design is qualitative and conducted in the tradition of a comparative

case study. Creswell (1985) defined the qualitative paradigm as an �inquiry process

through which understanding of social or human problems is based on building a

complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and

34

conducted in a natural setting� (P. 1-2). Qualitative research is exploratory, interpretive,

deductive, and descriptive (Creswell, 1994; Stake, 1994, 1995).

The comparative case study is appropriate when seeking to work in the tradition

of a qualitative paradigm and has the benefit of enabling data analysis across distinct yet

bounded studies. The intent of a comparative case study is similar to that of a single case

in that the intention is to understand �why� and/ or �how� a phenomenon exists.

Generalization is not an end goal nor is the confirmation of causality (Stake, 1994, 1995;

Creswell, 1994).

Population/Context:

The population of the study was private liberal arts colleges and universities.

Among higher education institutions, these institutions are the oldest and therefore tend

to have the longest fund raising traditions and the greatest dependence upon voluntary

support as a percentage of overall institution expenditures. The institution type was also

familiar to the researcher.

Sample:

The sample selection process was deliberate, systematic, and non-probabilistic.

Given the nature of the research question and the focus on team dynamics, the names of

the purposively selected institutions are confidential per the request of participants. The

three campaign teams selected for inclusion in this independent case study emerged

through a process that considered: (1) particular consortium membership (2) campaign

35

completion dates, (3) institutional success at fund raising, and (4) availability and

accessibility of campaign team members and documents.

Consortium Membership:

Colleges and universities in the study were member institutions of the same

consortium. The sharing of interests, priorities, and aspirations increased the likelihood

of similarity in commitment to fund raising and not necessarily their success at fund

raising.

Campaign Dates:

The institutions selected for case study had completed or neared completion of a

campaign within the past three years13. The basis for the parameter was the high mobility

of fund raising professionals, which makes the study of intact teams increasingly difficult

with the passage of time.

Data used to identify campaign dates was found in campaign publications,

including newsletters, and case statements available on the institution�s web sites. As

needed, telephone calls were made to offices of institutional advancement and/or

development to verify campaign document information (see Appendix B). Upon review

of the aforementioned information, six of the member institutions fit the three-year

parameter.

13 Three yeas prior to year 2005, the year this study began.

36

Success at Fund Raising:

The dependent variable in this study is campaign success. Therefore, it was

important to study institutions that had different types and/or levels of success at fund

raising. To observe levels of success, an evaluation framework was developed. The

evaluation framework was based on (1) the scholarship of Rowland (1986), Greenfield

(1999), Dove (2000), and Cook and Lasher (1996), (2) pre-study interviews with fund

raising consultants and institution based capital campaign managers, and (3) data from

the 2004 Council for Aid to Education, Voluntary Support of Education Survey Database

(see again success concept in Table 3-1). From among the six eligible institutions, four

were suitable for further study. Of the two unsuitable institutions, one tacitly denied

access, and the other was removed from consideration for reasons personal to the

researcher.

Based on analysis of fund raising data, the four eligible institutions were

categorized: (1) most superior, (2) less superior, and (3) least superior, among the eligible

institutions from the sample, at fund raising, considering the elements of the model.

Three of the four institutions perceived to represent the widest range of success within the

sample were contacted and permission was gained to conduct case studies.

Confidentiality:

A pseudonym was assigned to each team after the completion of data analysis for

the case. The pseudonyms reflected prevailing team characteristics. In addition,

campaign dates, and selected financial data was altered uniformly. In some instances,

informants were referred to as �participant.�

37

Data Collection:

The cases or units of analysis were comprehensive, capital campaign leadership

teams. Within the team, each member or study participant was interviewed at least once,

and in several instances there were multiple follow-up interviews. The data collection

was carried out in two phases: a) independent case studies of three purposively selected

capital campaign teams, and b) comparison of selected data from each of the three

independent cases.

Recruitment of Independent Cases:

Telephone calls were made to advancement team or development team �gate

keepers� including executive assistants, administrative assistants, and development

directors. A cover letter and study overview were then mailed (electronic) to

�gatekeepers.� Rapport was established and counsel sought on how to gain support for

this study from vice presidents for advancement or development.

Availability and Accessibility of Campaign Team Members:

Each of the three institutions had campaign team members who were available

and accessible by telephone and/or personal visit. Vice presidents were asked to make

the initial contact with the prospective participants, gaining their permission for my

contact.

The vice presidents were mailed (electronic) a formal recruitment letter and study

overview. Copies of these materials were sent to presidents (see Appendices B, and C).

When needed, letters were followed by no more than three electronic communications

38

and/or telephone calls. After confirming participation, interviews were scheduled, again

with the support and assistance of the vice president for advancement or development.

Each participant received by electronic mail a consent form that was signed and

returned prior to interviews (see Appendix D). In some cases (telephone interviews)

participants requested permission to return a proxy document. In several instances,

participants requested the interview questions prior to the interview session. Those

requests were honored.

Case studies require the collection of data from multiple sources, which may

include interviews, archival records, direct observation, audio and visual materials,

physical artifacts, and documents (Creswell, 1994; Stake, 1995). The systematic

collection of data from multiple data points permitted validation by triangulation (i.e.,

comparing the content of interviews with written documents). Collected for this study

were data from two primary sources: campaign related documents, both archival and

current, and interviews of campaign team members. While not the intent of this study,

the systematic collection of data using an interview protocol and processing data with the

aid of qualitative research program increased study reliability.

Campaign Related Documents:

The collected and analyzed documents consisted of campaign case statements,

brochures, organizational charts, campaign newsletters (print and electronic), planning

documents, management reports, academic catalogs, and The Council for Aide to

Education Annual Voluntary Support of Education Survey. These materials were each

cross-referenced with interview data.

39

Interviews:

Twenty-two initial, and thirty-one follow-up interviews were conducted. All but

five of the initial interviews were conducted face-to-face. The interview protocol is

located in Appendix E. Prior to using protocol, fund raising consultants and on-campus

campaign team members with executive level responsibility for capital campaigns

reviewed the interview questions and the research framework and provided feedback.

Prior to conducting interviews, communications were established with

participants for building rapport. Participants received an overview of the study prior to

their interview.

All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The researcher transcribed each of

the eighteen interviews from the first case and three of the eight interviews from the

second case. On the one hand, exposure to interview data made for rich insight that only

immersion in data can provide. On the other hand, the approach proved time and cost

prohibitive and was not continued. Transcribers typed the balance of the recordings.

They each agreed to confidentiality. Thereafter, all audio recordings were returned and

maintained securely.

Study participants included top management team members deemed by

presidents, vice presidents, and others to have had significant responsibility for the

success of capital campaigns. In addition, the list of leadership team members was

informed by a review of literature. Study participant titles included:

! presidents

! vice presidents for development

! vice presidents for advancement

! campaign directors

40

! development directors

! executive directors of development

! major gift officers

! fund raising counsels

! trustees actively engaged in the campaign.

! chief financial officers

! others

Data Analysis:

All interview data were transcribed. The text was entered into Atlas.TI, a

qualitative data management program. Member checks were conducted if possible, given

restrictions posed by maintaining confidentiality across and within teams.

Comparative Case Analysis:

Following an analysis of each distinct case, a cross case analysis of selected

constructs was conducted.

Research Design Quality:

According to Yin (1989), �four tests may be considered relevant in judging the

quality of [qualitative] research design:� (1) construct validity, (2) internal validity, (3)

external validity, and (4) reliability (see Table 3.2). Applied to this exploratory study

were three of the four �tests�: (1) construct validity, (2) external validity, and (3)

reliability.

41

Table 3.2: Four tests to maximize case study quality (Yin, 1989)

Test Method Construct Validity • Multiple sources of evidence

• Evidence chain establish • Key informants review reports

Internal Validity • Pattern matching • Explanation building

External Validity • Replication • Logic in multiple case studies

Reliability • Use case study protocol • Develop case study database

Methodological limitations

This research is limited to private liberal arts colleges and universities having

membership in a consortium. In keeping with the qualitative paradigm, this exploratory

research does not assume generalization to any other institutions. The focus of the

research was capital campaigns, capital campaign teams, and the relationship that the

campaign team dynamic purportedly has with fund raising success.

This study did not intentionally explore the broad area of institutional

advancement or development. This study does not claim to explore the full range of

variables effecting capital campaign outcomes nor all of the possible outcomes of capital

campaigns.

The difficulty of discussing campaign leadership team dynamics and success

pertaining to the teams studied is in one's not knowing how successful the teams might

have been if given different dynamics. In addition, one does not know with certainty the

teams� fund raising potential.

42

Key Definitions

Annual fund: An annual fund is a series of fund raising activities typically conducted

each year to generate gift revenue for ongoing program and operational expenses.

Comprehensive Capital Campaign: A comprehensive capital campaign is a capital

campaign that includes in addition to �bricks and mortar� projects, other essential

ongoing program and operational expenses.

43

CHAPTER 4

Team Schism

Case Background

Team Schism (pseudonym), a capital campaign leadership team, raised

approximately $141 million dollars in the face of multiple and often sweeping

modifications to the campaign and campaign leadership team. What is more, Team

Schism contended with persistent interpersonal conflicts and disobliging economic and

political climates. Over the eight year span of the campaign, Team Schism changed

markedly in composition, cohesiveness, and -purportedly- effectiveness at fund raising.

The team experienced the challenges and opportunities of being led and managed by two

presidents, three vice presidents for advancement, two campaign consultants, two

directors of development, and multiple unsuccessful internal appointments (see Appendix

F).

This account of Team Schism is conveyed in five sections: (1) Institution

overview, (2) Case narrative, (3) Case analysis, (4) Case summary, and (5)

Interpretations.

44

Institution Overview

Founded in the 1850�s, the College has a steadfast commitment to providing a

�liberal education with Christian character.� The Institution has multiple accreditations,

enrolls 3,000 students from 47 states and 37 countries, and has a student-to-faculty ratio

of 13:1. The College offers 56 majors and is a top ranked source of future Ph.D.

recipients in the sciences.

In 2004, the College had an annual operating budget of $64 million dollars, an

endowment valued at approximately $110 million dollars, and a per student endowment

of $38,504 dollars. Considering each of the above cited indicators of financial health, the

College�s rank was in the lowest quartile among peer institutions.

The College subscribed to the Council for the Advancement and Support of

Education�s �Management and Reporting Standards� (2005). In 2005, the institution

ranked in the top 20 of all colleges and universities in the Country by Charity Navigator,

and was awarded a four star rating for reporting administrative costs of less than $0.10

cents to raise one dollar.14

Context for the Case Narrative

This account covers the activities of Team Schism from 1995 through 2004. The

case narrative is structured around six important periods in the �life� of the campaign

team: (1) Mutiny, (2) Leadership Vacuum, (3) Campaign Work, (4) Stalled Campaign,

(5) Jumpstarted Campaign, and (6) Managing Forward. The case narrative concludes

14 See Charity Navigator website for criteria http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm/bay/content.view/catid/2/cpid/35.htm

45

with comments from participants on campaign team dynamics, campaign success, and the

relationship between the two concepts.

Campaign and campaign team organization are depicted throughout the case

narrative by Figures (see Figure 4.1 and Appendix F).

Table 4.1: Team Schism�s campaign phases, stages, and timeline

Campaign Overview

Campaign preparations began in 1996 with a �visioning process.� Campus

stakeholders, including administrators, faculty, students, alumni, and other friends

convened to dialogue and gain consensus about their �vision� for the College. The

stakeholders identified three priorities: (1) academic programs, (2) facilities, and (3)

endowment. Vice President for Advancement Snelling, and Development Consultant

Waylon established for each initiative a �visioning team.� In the fall of 1997, the

Campaign planning Lead gifts Kick off Major gifts General gifts Celebration

Quiet Phase Public Phase

�95 �96 �97 �98 �99 �00 �01 �02 �03 �04 �05

Figure adapted from the Fund Raising School, 2002 Campaign Phases.

46

�visioning teams� concluded in its �campaign needs statement� that essential projects

would cost an estimated $78 million dollars.

The campaign feasibility study was completed in 1998. The following year the

board authorized a $78 million dollar campaign goal, a campaign completion date of

December 2004, and the beginning of leadership gift solicitation.

In 1999, the trustees adjusted the campaign dollar goal to reflect increased project

costs estimates and new or enhanced campaign sub-projects. Campaign excitement

escalated fund raising ambitions, and by year 2000, the publicly announced fund raising

goal was $85 million dollars. In 2003, during the general gift stage, the board authorized

a fund raising goal of $105 million dollars to accommodate the addition of a $20 million

dollar building project, which after recalculations had an estimated cost of $22.5 million

dollars.

There were no other publicly announced increases to the campaign goal.

However, the board authorized several increases to the internal or �non-public� campaign

goals after 2003. The main reason for those increases was an unanticipated $30 million

dollar �over subscription� to the College�s endowment15. In early 2005, the Board closed

the campaign�s formal, public phase but planned to welcome contributions to campaign

projects for an undisclosed period. At that time the campaign effort had generated

$139,855,629 dollars, which did not include $16 million dollars raised through the annual

fund campaigns conducted from 2000 (year of the public announcement of the campaign)

through 2004. Campaign leaders estimated that by the start of campaign celebrations

slated for late 2005, the campaign effort should generate over $146 million dollars.

15 Contributions to endowment were restricted. Therefore, gifts to endowment in excess of the endowment goal increased the overall campaign goal by that amount.

47

Case Study

Mutiny 1995-1996

This account of Team Schism begins not in 1996 when administrators began

campaign preparations with a �visioning process,� but the year prior when the team�s

leadership and management faltered (see Figure 4.2). In 1995, the College had recently

completed its most successful capital campaign, raising $58 million dollars against a goal

of $50 million dollars.

Figure 4.1: Campaign leadership team in 1995

The basis for membership on the campaign leadership team appeared to be leadership

role, length of tenure, and success at major gift soliciting. Each team member influenced

President Jennings

Vice President for Advancement Snelling

Director of Development Finley

Regional Advancement Director Sheppard

Regional Advancement Director Vancer

Regional Advancement Director

Long

Campaign Consultant Waylon

Campaign Co-Chair Maddison

48

the team dynamic. However, Regional Advancement Directors Sheppard, Vancer, and

Long strongly influenced the team�s ethos and functionality.

The regional advancement directors were senior team members, having at least

five years with the College. They accounted for the majority of College�s gift revenue.

Vancer and Long are alumni and were College employees prior to joining the

advancement team. Their loyalty to the College was intense. The regional advancement

directors were self-described as, �difficult to manage,� �gifted,� �opinionated,�

�dynamic,� and �competitive young bucks.� Co-workers and supervisors corroborated

the descriptions.

Vice President for Advancement Snelling is an alumnus who by 1995 had served

the College for nearly 30 years in the roles of dean of students and athletic coach.

Snelling was described as �a relational guy� with excellent alumni networks. On the one

hand, Snelling was �the best that the college has ever had.� �He was Mr. [College].� On

the other hand, for several years, Snelling neglected internal matters such as relationship

building, team management, and leadership. He had instead dutifully allocated much of

his time to assisting College President Jennings, for whom fundraising was no forte or

passion.

Study participants were not sure if Snelling�s commitment to his long time friend

President Jennings was done out of loyalty mixed with duty or to avoid managing the

increasingly volatile interpersonal clashes among and with Regional Advancement

Directors Sheppard, Vancer, and Long. Participants said Vice President for

Advancement Snelling actively avoided conflicts because it �was not in his nature.� A

strained relationship developed between Snelling and the regional advancement directors

49

owing to their perception that Snelling was becoming a poor leader and manager, and

was increasingly inaccessible when issues required a �firm hand.�

Snelling had for several years deferred leadership and management of the

advancement team to Director of Development Finley who acted as a buffer between he

and many of the advancement team members, an ill-fated position for Finley.

Participants said Finley, a 20-year College veteran, had transitioned the

development team to an advancement team in the 1980�s. He had hired and trained many

of the advancement team members including Sheppard, Vancer, and Long. He had

�given them their start.� On the other hand, some study participants said Finley managed

with a �short chain,� and �he treated the guys like children,� a style that was intolerable

to the aspiring trio of regional advancement directors. On the other hand, some other

study participants said the �immature behaviors� of the regional advancement directors

warranted Finley�s �very appropriate response� to their behavior.

Finley�s attempts to apply institutional advancement concepts to the management

of the �free wheeling� regional advancement directors were not embraced. The mercurial

relationship between Finley and the regional advancement directors took a sharp turn for

the worse late in 1995. During that time, Finley tried to increase accountability through

the implementation of a management system that provided for structured work and

performance evaluation. Observers of that era called the events, which precipitated the

�leaving� of the 20-year veteran director of development, a �mutiny.� The mutiny set a

stage for team dysfunction that persisted through the close of the campaign.

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Campaign Work, 1996

In the absence of longtime Director of Development Finley, responsibility for

managing the advancement team fell upon the unwilling or unable shoulders of Vice

President for Advancement Snelling. This heightened tensions between Snelling and the

regional advancement directors. Vice President Snelling, in an effort to divert

recalcitrance, began to share that his retirement was eminent. Advancement Director

Vancer said of that period,

[Snelling], the outgoing vice president very much prided himself on being the coach and team leader, and while he certainly inspired and did much to motivate us in his earlier years, in the last several years of his tenure here there was an increasing disrespect, some of that was exhibited publicly. I for one criticized him, I think objectively, for what was emerging through �96 and �97 in the wake of the 1995 retirement of Finley, the director of development. He found himself as the next level of management directly responsible for all of us advancement directors; three of us which, I mentioned, had been here for eight or ten years at that point. And had the gifts we had; the opinions, the baggage we have and the personalities and chemistry and dynamics that we had at that point, he was fully unable to manage us as professionals with all those dynamics.

In the fall of 1996, College leaders convened a group of College stakeholders

comprised of trustees, faculty, staff, students, and alumni for exploratory dialogues on the

future of the College. There emerged from the �visioning� process, three priorities: (1)

academic programs, (2) facilities, and (3) endowment building.

That year, a new and additional regional advancement director was hired. Mr.

Wanger, an alumnus and former College admissions officer, quickly established himself

as a capable fund raiser with managerial and leadership abilities. Wanger became part of

the complex interpersonal relationship dysfunction that plagued the campaign team.

Driven by competition, pride, and loyalty to the institution, the four regional

advancement directors met fund raising goals in the face of a team ethos that was

51

described as unhealthy, and team member interactions that was described as

dysfunctional.

In September 1997, the �visioning� teams reconvened and further refined the

priorities identified in 1996. The teams determined that $78 million dollars would fund

the projects. Later that year the board of trustees authorized campaign planning. The

regional advancement directors said that the campaign preparation and planning phases

were not transparent nor were they engaging enough for them to �own the process.�

Regional Advancement Director Long said,

�but I can�t say that the development staff owned the feasibility study. The president drove it. He basically took its conclusion and wrote it into kind of a strategic plan, or actually what we called vision, and that became the springboard for all of the strategic planning that went into the campaign.

The campaign planning processes were also a disappointment to alumnus and

Campaign Tri-chair Maddison. Maddison had co-chaired the College�s previous

campaign, and had served as the board chair for two terms. Maddison was

knowledgeable about the operation of campaigns. He was therefore especially cognizant

of the dysfunctional nature of Team Schism�s leadership, management, and team

dynamics. Maddison, hesitant to disparage his College, said only that in comparison to

other campaigns in which he had been a part, Team Schism�s campaign had overcome

many potentially debilitating leadership and management problems - especially during

the critical planning processes, particularly regarding the poor use of trustees and other

volunteers. After 30 years with the board, he said that Team Schism�s campaign would

be his last.

52

Formalized Dysfunction

By 1998, the regional advancement directors (Long, Vancer, Sheppard, and

Wanger) were adept at resisting management and more adept at not supporting one

another. One participant said that the development team was a �snake pit,� and �a place

that you would not want to go,� because of the �backbiting and tension.�

Vice President Snelling, unwilling or unable to control the group, had

incrementally deferred the management of the team to Regional Advancement Director

Long. Snelling�s empowerment of Long increased team dissent. There was a perception

that Long�s increased authority was part of a covert succession plan, which had excluded

the other similarly experienced and successful regional advancement directors.

Regional Advancement Director Vancer recalled how his frustration with Vice

President Snelling and Long provoked a confrontation. The purpose of the confrontation

was to �corner� Snelling and have him address the perception that he had colluded with

Long. Vancer recounted:

And in this room I was sitting in the chair you are sitting in, early 1997 or whatever the watershed date was, and in a staff meeting with all of our colleagues. I confronted the vice president and asked him to explain what was going on in terms of this morphing into Long telling us what to do every day all day long. And the vice president became angry and just lashed out right at that meeting and said if some clarity and order is what you want here you have it. Long is going to be your new boss, he is going to be director of development, he is going to be in charge of the campaign and you are going to answer to him and I don�t want any end runs and that�s the way it�s going to be. That watershed event then precipitated within twenty days the departure of Sheppard and formalized the dysfunction that had been informally morphing into existence.

The incident precipitated the resignation of veteran Regional Advancement Director

Sheppard and further alienated Vice President Snelling from many advancement team

members.

53

Vancer continued,

There were others who went into a holding pattern of less than full commitment and performance but ah, survived that interim period of several years and got the work done but I think we lost valuable time with people operating at less than optimum efficiency and I guess there were others who just leaned into the wheel and worked hard, there is some evidence of that.

Leadership Vacuum, 1998-2000

The forces of interpersonal dysfunction combined with the forces of team

disorganization that emerged in the absence of executive level leadership eroded hopes of

productive team synergy. The College president at the time of this interview said:

�There was no one really �cracking the whip� is not the phrase I�d like to use, but there was no one really attending to the organization part of getting things done. And I think as Snelling neared retirement that more and more time was spent on fund raising himself and acting presidential and less and less on organizational matters and that�s kind of why I think the organization had fallen apart.

In 1998, rumors surfaced that President Jennings� retirement was imminent. On

the one hand, some team members welcomed the prospect of change in the vice

presidency and presidency. On the other hand, the prospect of losing familiar

personalities, however dysfunctional, lessened for many their sense of security and

stability. Shortly, there emerged what participants identified as a �leadership vacuum.�

Snelling was perceived by advancement team members as �out of touch� and no

longer an ally, particularly in executive cabinet meetings where he would not endorse

hiring additional development staff or increasing compensation. Regional Advancement

Director Vancer said,

Snelling in fact was probably a retarding factor on our growth and development in a number of ways. But significantly whenever there was a case being made by myself or one of my colleagues, or us as a division, for increasing the size of the staff or adding a position to take on a function or augment something that we were doing to meet very quantifiable goals in terms of a prospect pool, he as the vice president was not an advocate at all, in fact argued at senior staff level that we

54

not add another colleague. Therefore, we went through the last ten years of his vice presidency in a stagnation in terms of the statistical growth, numerical growth of our colleagues. As we are identifying many new prospects, experiencing many successes we were becoming quite taxed in terms of the portfolio and burden that each of us were trying to manage and juggle to the best of our advantage.

Characteristic of the team dynamic in 1998 was stern resistance to management and

unbridled competition among regional advancement directors to ascend the leadership

ranks.

There was competition without context. The regional advancement directors were

competing for promotions and higher salaries. However, the College�s system of

evaluation was capricious. That coupled with eminent departures of the College�s

president, and the vice president for advancement placed the competitive regional

advancement directors in an awkward position, as there was no stable leader or

trustworthy system one could navigate to advance one�s career. There was no guidance.

There were fledgling coalitions among the leadership team and across the

advancement team. However, the regional advancement directors had become a group,

acting as independent agents, fragmented by distrust, lack of support, poor leadership,

and poor communications. Their behavior reverberated and negatively influenced the

ethos of the entire advancement unit. Those problematic dynamics were all the more

highlighted because the regional advancement directors knew that a comprehensive

capital campaign was unavoidably on the horizon. There were, however, no notable

attempts from the College�s leaders or the regional advancement directors to coalesce the

group. A participant shared:

Individually, these guys are all nice people but some of them just bring out the worse in each other, and Snelling would allow them to do that unchecked and it was very negative and very unproductive.

Leadership, management, and camaraderie were not strong, yet fund raising efforts were.

55

Paradoxically, team members were proud that they repeatedly overcame �turmoil� which

they readily identified as self-created and self-perpetuated.

The regional advancement directors had poor relationships with one another and

with executive-level campaign team members. The only indicator of team support

among the regional advancement directors was the acknowledgement that each respected

the others� ability to raise �big money� when needed. The relationships between the

executive level (executive team) members of the campaign team were collegial and

cohesive.

In 1998, the planning phase of the campaign was well underway. While some of

the regional advancement directors were concerned that President Jennings and Vice

President Snelling were �starting a campaign that they would not finish.� Other regional

advancement directors were more concerned that Mr. Waylon, the development

consultant, had driven the critical planning processes. A participant shared, �we went

into the campaign with little or no direction other than the consultant.�

Waylon had guided Snelling for nearly 20 years and Snelling valued the

relationship. However, Waylon (like Snelling) had strained relationships with the

regional advancement directors.

During that time, two events occurred that influenced the functionality and

nature of relationship among campaign team members. The first event was President

Jennings�s formal announcement of retirement effective in 1999. The second event was

Vice President for Advancement Snelling�s formal assignment of campaign director

responsibilities to Regional Advancement Director Long. That promotion was Long�s

second in as many years and it caused an �uprising,� and stymied team member

56

cordiality. Five of the nine participants said Long was not supported as a manager or

leader. Two participants said Long was �out of his element,� which was soliciting major

gifts. Long�s disfavor was also a result of his �cherry picking major gifts,�(cherry

picking is the practice of soliciting dollars perceived to require little fund raiser effort,

typically in conjunction with avoidance of soliciting dollars perceived to require much

fund raiser effort) �not giving credit where credit was due,� and �not having the skills

needed to manage that team.� Long attributed the difficulties he encountered as a

manager and leader to the failure of his teammates to adjust to his style.

In May of 1999, the Board established a $78 million dollar campaign goal and

authorized the start of the lead gift phase of the campaign. That following month

president Jennings retired (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.2: Campaign leadership team in 1999

President Cray

Vice President for Advancement Snelling

Director of Development Campaign Director

Long


Regional Advancement Director Wanger

Campaign Consultant Waylon

Campaign Tri-Chair Maddison

57

A �Fund Raising President�

Jennings� successor Dr. Cray is an alumnus of the College, former professor,

athletic coach, and dean. He had left the College 15 years prior to assume his first

presidency at a similar institution. Cray interviewed for the presidency when the campus

was gripped by debate about the role that Christian traditions would have in the future of

the College.

Dr. Cray emerged as the stronger candidate, not with the faculty but with the

board and students for his steadfast commitment to the College�s Christian heritage and

legacy. Cray considered his appointment a �homecoming� and �his calling.� His

excellent interpersonal skills, sincerity, and staunch views on the role of Christian

traditions at �his College� reassured donors and increased the interest of prospective

donors in the campaign.

Among Cray�s characteristics were a high level of competitiveness, enthusiasm,

and appreciation for the sport and art of fund raising. Cray shared that his fund raising

experiences positioned him minimally to �know what a good campaign looked like,� and

the role of the president in a successful fund raising program. He said:

This is true confession time. I love to raise money. I didn�t always. I don�t think I ever did it before I became a president. I hadn�t asked anyone for any money but you only have to sit in this chair about one day and you realize that you have to do it. And there is no, you just cannot be a college president today without raising money in my opinion. And so you start doing it.

Despite his fund raising sense, President Cray had not fully realized the condition

of the campaign team prior to his arrival. Regional Advancement Director Vancer,

mindful of how a �fund raising president� could �overhaul� an advancement team, was

58

attentive to Cray�s perception of the campaign�s leadership group. Vancer was taken

aback by Cray�s estimation of the team�s condition. He said,

I think he went to make the remark a few times directly that one of the shining stars in his mind as he made the decision as to whether or not to accept the presidency here was an absolutely glowing development office led by a vice president that was the model of models. That was something that he did not need to worry about coming in as a new president, to deal with. He soon found out within a matter of months that it in fact it was a pretty diseased creature in terms of its dysfunctional behavior, made up of a collection of very outstanding individuals, including the one that some of this conversation�s been focused on, but all put in positions of least effectiveness by the vice president that he thought so highly of.

According to President Cray:

There were some personnel challenges, I think would be a good way to say it, that I didn�t anticipate would be here. I would say when I came I was here about a week and I would describe the development team as dysfunctional. And in fact, that word was not used by me, but by others and I think it was accurate, I think they were basically paralyzed and it took us a while to figure it out. I think that there were probably a lot of reasons for it. It was the most disruptive campaign I have ever been involved in.

The president continued:

I think in terms of actually going out and raising money people were able to put that aside and go out and ask people for money and be very successful. I guess what I am saying is although there was turmoil, it was not debilitating.

The lack of civility, which had been present and handled �professionally� or discreetly,

became disruptive to other advancement team members, and known throughout the

campus and local community.

Cray�s efforts to stabilize the team and improve its functioning began with the

removal of director of development responsibilities from Long. The president said that

Long would not be successful as a manager and that his appointments to management and

leadership roles were visible sources of divisiveness. Moreover, he said Long�s

59

leadership and management responsibilities had diverted him from his strength � fund

raising.

Cray assumed �first line� management responsibility for the advancement team.

According to Vancer, this �was a tragedy because he had about ten of us answering to

him and he was getting eaten alive, his calendar was, that was.� After a few months,

Cray realized the untenable nature of his role as interim director of development. The

responsibility for day-to-day oversight of the team reverted to Vice President for

Advancement Snelling. The director of development position would go unfilled through

the campaign.

In October 2000, in the midst of heightened team dysfunction, the often-

referenced economic recession was having a devastating effect in their region. President

Cray announced a campaign goal of $85 million dollars--a $7 million dollar increase to

the goal approved by the board in 1998. The new campaign goal reflected costs

recalculated for inflation, enhanced projects, and belief that corporations and foundations

that had provided them with gift revenue in the worst of economic times would again

favor the College.

The poor relationships between the regional advancement directors

continued to be the prime source of dysfunction. Their fund raising prowess had

sheltered them from discipline. Indeed, Snelling and Long had structured the

organization of the team to accommodate rather than counter dysfunction.

Reflecting that management strategy, Associate Vice President for Advancement

Wanger said of the period:

I think there was a point because things were literally so bad with the lack of teamwork, that it became smarter and probably more productive

60

to keep everybody away from each other and have them function as an independent representative and manage everyone individually.

According to some team members, there was for the first time a decrease in fund raising

productivity.

Stalled Campaign, 2000-2002

In early 2000, the campaign and the campaign leadership team �stalled.� The

team was according to several participants in a �holding pattern.� Vancer said:

What�s going on there is a lot of second guessing in some theatres of the team of the development staff, there is a change of guard with the presidents, there is the yet pending departure of the vice president there is a clear feeling by many of us I consider myself included, that the outgoing vice president has managed to place each of in our positions of least affinity and ability as opposed to putting each of us in positions of leadership or following others that�s most conducive to getting the job done. So we pretty much, in the middle of 2000, if that�s what you are calling the nucleus phase, were at a period of optimum dysfunction.

There was a decrease in gift size and frequency and the team was in a period of

�optimum dysfunction.� Case in point: contributions in fiscal year 1999-2000, those

years prior to the period of �optimum dysfunction,� totaled $25,560,243 dollars.

Contributions during the period of �optimal dysfunction� dropped precipitously to

$9,844,638 dollars. Contributions in fiscal year 2001�2002, the period immediately

after the period of �optimal dysfunction� totaled $28,178,576 dollars.

According President Cray and other participants, team dysfunction was a factor,

but only one of many factors that contributed to the �stall.� To those outside of the team,

the enormity of team�s �optimum dysfunction� was overshadowed by the September 11,

2001 terrorist attacks in America, a �bear� stock market, and recent changes in team

61

leadership--all circumstances which one could interpret as unavoidable and certainly not

the fault of poor leadership or management.

The �freewheeling� manner in which the team had operated was no longer

effective given the difficult environment for charitable giving. In addition, Regional

Advancement Directors Vancer, Long, and Wanger believed they were over-extended

and underpaid. Each had a constituent load of as many as 600 donors and prospects,

which they solicited for the capital campaign and the annual fund. In light of the

narrowing stream of contributions, the veteran fund raising team began to view their

team�s organization and team member relationships as liabilities to their campaign .

In hindsight, the �stalled campaign� was a �blessing in disguise.� Critical

decisions were made that ensured campaign fund raising success and, to a much lesser

degree, team cohesiveness.

Campaign �Jumpstart� �A bean counter with creativity� (Participant)

Vice President for Advancement Snelling had communicated since 1996 that his

retirement was imminent. In 2000, President Cray, in full anticipation of Snelling�s

retirement, launched a search for a new vice president for advancement. The

requirements for the prospective successors were demonstrated success at fund raising

and leadership. Facilitating the retirement of Vice President Snelling presented President

Cray a personal and professional challenge because of Snelling�s history with the College

and intricate relationships with multiple influential College stakeholders.

There were few external candidates, and Cray did not interview his two internal

applicants. Unsuccessful in over a year of searching, President Cray appointed the

62

College�s vice president for finance, Ayers, to the position of senior vice president for

finance and advancement. A participant shared that Ayers, unlike other �finance types�

was creative. He was a �creative bean counter.� Ayers had limited experience as a

solicitor but understood campaign concepts. He said,

I don�t have any fund raising experience other than you naturally come by a little bit in a long career. The VP for advancement office was right next to mine here. He came to the College the year before I did. We became very good friends, Snelling and I. And so we consulted on a lot of things together. So over the years I have been involved in some sense in all the campaigns, kind of on the peripheral so to speak. You know the strategies, developing goals and objectives, met with consultants and those kinds of things over the years.

Reflecting on the strategy of appointing Ayers, President Cray shared:

I knew that Ayers would not raise money himself. I think people who looked at him as a replacement for Snelling were barking up the wrong tree. You know I looked at him as an organizational specialist who had a proven record of being able to organize a group of people and get them to be fully functioning. So Ayers was not hired as a fund raiser. He was hired to organize the team.

Senior Vice President for Finance and Advancement (Vice President for Advancement)

Ayers was credible, consistent, respected, and a veteran manager. He had served the

college for nearly 40 years and at the time of enlistment was planning retirement but

dreaded the prospect of boredom.

Ayers� capabilities were a known quantity. Participants said he was fair, a good

manager, and most importantly, he was an �advocate for his people.� �He would fight

for you.� Perhaps exhausted from infighting, the regional advancement directors slowly

embraced Ayers� �no nonsense� management style. Long said:

He thinks finance. He has been on campus here for over 30 years as the finance vice president and so he is a kind of no nonsense individual and he is a process and system type of person. Your typical development person is the opposite. They are touchy, feely, shmoozy, that kind of stuff. And I happen to be that kind of a style. What I found we needed in order to bring all of the team members back to the same page and get them clearly focused on the goals of the campaign was Ayers. He said I could care less about having coffee and punch

63

with old ladies but I am going to create a structure here that keeps everybody accountable and everybody on the same page and he did it. He did it.

Vice President Ayers had for many years, supported former Vice President Snelling�s

position on not increasing staff or salary. However, once squarely responsible for the

team�s success, Ayers� position on staffing and salary changed. Long said:

Then when Ayers became responsible for our team he all of a sudden saw the light of day, we have been hiring people around here left and right the last three years and there are still more and other things that we should be doing.

Vice President for Advancement Ayers said of his decision to accept the job and

postpone retirement:

So, not being one to turn down a challenge, I thought this would be good way maybe to wind up. If I can be successful at this, it would be a good way to wind up my career. And so I took it on and it has been a lot of fun. Learned a lot. It was a lot different than managing a financial area. Kind of in the sales realm. I think I took a business approach to it you know coming from a business background. So I tried to take a business approach to making the campaign successful.

Ayers said that he �knew that there was going to be real challenges going into

this� but he found that the situation was not as bad as portrayed. When asked to describe

the team climate prior to his taking leadership he responded:

And people warned me when I came in, they said how can you work with these guys, they are fighting again, they are arguing all the time, they are fighting you know it�s just a mess. I never found that. You know there you had a little bit of people that lost their temper but I say that�s part of the thing. I say that if you are on a team, people are going to lose their tempers once in a while.

A study participant described the team climate and the new vice president�s tact. She

said:

Infighting, back biting, and people that were complaining about each other and it was just - I see it as a snake pit, a place that you would not want to go. I would not want to be there. So, and [the vice president] knew where the problems were so when he took over he picked them off one by one as he assessed their strengths and tried to divert that negativity into a positive thing, and I think he did. The potential for it to go back is there.

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On the one hand, President Cray had made a bold move in appointing Ayers as

the new vice president for advancement. On the other hand, President Cray compromised

the effectiveness of the decision by allowing former Vice President Snelling to remain on

the advancement team in a lesser capacity, and fully retiring him in 2002. Participants

viewed Cray�s treatment of Snelling as honorable and a deserved show of respect, but

also as a hindrance to team building and to campaign progress. A participant described

the situation. She said,

The president who had been away from [the College] for 14 years and he saw Snelling who had also been a coach and all this kind of stuff as just the greatest thing since sliced bread. Well, he wasn�t any more but the President never got by those so he kept wanting to include [Snelling] in all this stuff which made it really hard for [Ayers] because the president didn�t really see it that way.

Senior Vice President for Finance and Advancement Ayers planned to �manage

the strengths and neutralize weaknesses,� and �build the team going forward.� The

team�s strength was seniority, �deep� relationships with donors, loyalty to the college,

and competitiveness. He knew that he had capable but distracted fund raisers. The

team�s weakness was a lack of direct leadership and a management system that would

increase functionality in the face of team members� infamous interpersonal relationship

dysfunction.

Vice President Ayers had a plan that would handle the regional advancement

directors. Ayers said,

I, my whole management style is to manage to people�s strengths and try to neutralize the weaknesses and what I tried to do was take this whole group that I inherited and then add some people and get a cohesive group.

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Ayers said that the lack of trust and support, infighting, and poor communications would

lessen with the introduction of consistent and principled leadership and management.

Ayers said:

�But I think internally, when I came the campaign was struggling a bit, floundering a little bit, and I think because we just didn�t have leadership there wasn�t any leadership so, but all the ingredients were you know were there, they just needed to be taken to the next level.

Ayers planned to �build the team going forward� by decisively making tough decisions

based on what was best for the institution. At his retirement, Ayers wanted a team that

would coalesce and persist in force well into the College�s next campaign. He, unlike his

predecessor, did not shy from confronting inappropriate behavior. Moreover, he was

prepared to �build the team from the ground up,� a process that could �shake out� some

of his experienced regional advancement directors. Some dysfunction was normal, but he

would not tolerate disrespectful behavior.

The work of �jump starting� the campaign consisted of six key management

actions, which Ayers attributed to strategy and serendipity. The management actions

began in 2001 during the major gift phase of the campaign. Pressure to raise money was

heightened by the addition of a $20 million dollar building project to the campaign. The

project was added after a failed city tax proposal to construct an athletic facility (which

the College had intended to share with the city) and a donor�s commitment of $8 million

dollars toward the College building its own facility.

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Six Management Decisions Management Decision I: Advancement Audit

A turning point for Ayers was in the year 2000, when he read an article on the

characteristics of successful capital campaigns. With the reading of every paragraph, he

found that his College�s campaign was not consistent with current leadership and

management best practices (planning, organizing, staffing, coordinating, directing,

evaluating, and reporting) and other characteristics of successful campaigns. Ayers hired

the author of that article, Mr. Arrington, to conduct an audit of the advancement team and

the campaign. Arrington, who was now the consultant, observed:

The one thing I did notice from the staff was that when I sat in some meetings when they would get together, individually this is an easy team to work with cause they all are easy to connect with on personal and professional levels and they are all quite competent people. As you probably heard in some of the staff meetings there are some dynamics between some of the members which they kind of go at each other. They get even to the point of being disrespectful at times, it�s a distraction, and there were two or three people on the staff that kind of repeated that, a couple in particular. And the rest of the staff was tiring of that.

Arrington said the College had capable fund raisers who were not in a position to raise

more money or work effectively as a unit because of organizational challenges, which

permitted unproductive team dynamics that impeded functionality. One of Arrington�s

most important observations was not about dysfunction per se. He found that the

campaign case statement did not compel giving. He said:

They worked hard and did good work but there was a bit of confusion and lack of clarity. I observed that the case materials upon which any good campaign was developed was lacking in clarity and content.

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Management Decision II: Hiring a New Consultant

In 2001, in light of the advancement audit, Vice President Ayers released

Consultant Waylon, who had advised the fund raising program for nearly 20 years. Vice

President Ayers said while shaking his head:

�I just didn�t feel that we were getting anything there. He was kind of like too comfortable with us. And I wanted to do an audit. I wanted to bring someone in who could audit the whole area and say what are we doing right and what are we doing wrong. I guess a disappointment was even though it has worked out very well with the new consultant who is unbelievably good. But that was a disappointment to come and find that we had a consultant but he was not adding much value.

Indeed, Waylon had a history of adversely influencing the team and fund raising. A

participant said:

The guys absolutely hated Waylon coming. They just would make trips to go anywhere to avoid talking with him because they felt he was so demoralizing to them. This is not what you would want a consultant to do to motivate your team. I think they resented it and I think it was all a part of the package, you know the problem.

Waylon�s successor was Arrington, the consultant who conducted an audit of the

College�s institutional advancement program and the capital campaign. A former vice

president for advancement and a veteran of over 40 capital campaigns, Arrington said he

signed the consulting contract with President Cray because �that�s the position which is

ultimately responsible for the College�s fund raising performance.� Team Schism

accepted Arrington�s council because Arrington had advised Cray prior to Cray�s taking

this, his most recent presidency. Arrington had also interacted with Team Schism

members at professional conferences.

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Management Decision III: Succession Planning

In 2001, Vice President Ayers promoted Regional Advancement Director Wanger

to the additional role of annual fund director. In 2003, Wanger was promoted to

Associate Vice President for College Advancement. He retained regional advancement

director responsibilities and responsibilities for the College�s annual fund. The aim of the

promotion was twofold: (1) to prepare Wanger to take on the responsibilities of the vice

president for advancement at the close of the campaign, and (2) to extricate Wanger from

the pervasive dysfunction with his regional advancement director colleagues.

Management Decision IV: Managing Strengths and Neutralizing Weaknesses

The regional advancement directors ceased activities that did not directly lead to

major gift solicitations. In 2002, Ayers removed the campaign director responsibilities

from Regional Advancement Director Long. Reflecting the sentiments of that time, a

team member called the removal of Long�s second promotion in as many years, a

�defrocking.�

Later that year Vice President Ayers assigned the additional responsibility of

campaign coordinator to Fryer, a recently hired regional advancement director. Fryer

was �unflappable� said Ayers. She had two immediate impacts. First, her sense of

organization and personable style brought order to campaign operations. Second, with

the aid of counsel from Consultant Arrington, Fryer coordinated an �overhaul� of the

campaign case statement in 2003. Recreating the case mid-way through the campaign

was a necessary risk. The revised case statement positioned the regional advancement

directors to solicit prospects who were hesitant to give.

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Management Decision V: Creating a Prospect Management Research Department

By mid 2002, Vice President Ayers and Campaign Consultant Arrington had

redirected the regional advancement director�s energies toward major gift soliciting.

However, there was no systematic solicitation process. Veteran Regional Advancement

Director Vancer was asked to research the college�s donors and devise a system for more

effective solicitations. Vancer enjoyed the assignment but the effort detracted from his

fund raising.

Late in 2002, Spaulding was hired as an associate director for corporate and

foundations relations in order to research corporate and foundation prospects. An

�ambitious� associate, she soon realized projected revenue from corporations and

foundations, even those in their �back yard,� would not materialize as hoped�making

her position unnecessary in the long run. She persuaded Senior Vice President Ayers to

fund a prospect management and research department, which she would create and direct.

Regional Advancement Director Vancer, who had begun the donor research

process, was asked to refocus his energies on major gift soliciting. He reportedly

facilitated a smooth transition of responsibilities to the new director of prospect

management and research. Arrington shared:

It�s really interesting and here is an example, Preston, of selflessness on the part of one of the staff members here. Before we put Spaulding in prospect research, Vancer would spend hours organizing campaign prospects, he was kind of the major gifts guy. Organizing all this stuff for hours. He would come in here and work until two or three o�clock in morning. The guy is just relentless, his work ethic is unrivaled. But when we put Spaulding in that position, Vancer said, nothing. Vancer reacted in the following way, �that�s now her job I am going to take all this hard work and energy all the investments that I have put in for a couple of years and just turn it over to her and let her do it now.� A selfless move, he handled that beautifully.

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In the context of other campaign expenses, the money invested in donor database

research was significant. The return on investment was high. The College found within

their database many prospects and donors who had not been cultivated for giving and/or

had greater gift giving potential than realized.

Management Decision VI: Developing and Implementing a New Management System

In 2003, there was no formal management system, which structured the work of

the regional advancement directors. Ayers said

The biggest problem as I saw it was that there wasn�t an organization or procedures or kind of process that would allow people to work up to their potential and because of that there was confusion as to you know what was happening and the fact that there wasn�t a strong leader that was kind of managing things�.

Vice President Ayers likened himself to a �leader of a sales team,� an approach

and discernment which were not novel to Team Schism. A similar strategy employed by

former Director of Development Finley seven years earlier met with a mutiny. Ayers

said:

I said I�m going to be a sales manager and if I was managing a sales force what kind of information would I need. That�s how we put that together. The donor research director had the major responsibility for the organization, I had the responsibility for the leadership.

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Table 4.2: Donor/prospect management form with sample of data

Development Officer Name: Wanger - Updated April 15, 2004 Donor/ Prospect Name: Susan and Edward Wojowitz

Status State Rating (1-5) Project

Ask Amount

Ask Date

Follow-up

Notes/ Progress

Request Pending

NJ 3 Science Facility

160,000 9-11-04

9-19-04

President sent note

Ready to be Asked

Unknown Readiness for Ask

Not Ready Declines/ Inactives

Director of Prospect Management and Research Spaulding segmented prospects

by geographic region and rated them by gift potential. According to region, each major

gift director was given a list of prospects. In addition, prospects were reassigned, for the

first time in many years, across regions based on the quality of fit between the prospect

and fund raiser.

Twice monthly Ayers, Spaulding, and individual regional advancement directors

met, planned gift solicitation strategy, and charted progress against agreed-upon goals to

�call on� donors. Arrington advised the processes. Vice President Ayers shared:

So then, we had a person who did all the research and did all the reports that kept people accountable. What she [Spaulding] was able to develop was this chart that is organized by regional advancement director. It�s simply where we are at any one time. You know who the prospects are, who is ready to be asked, who responded, who potential prospects are, and what their past giving record to our annual fund is. We use it as a sales tool and her job is to manage this group of advancement directors making sure they enter their information. We met every other week. Spaulding and I met every other week with each regional advancement director. We went over what they did last week, what are their goals for the next month, who do they have to call yet, and we did that religiously. They did not like it at first because before I came you know they were kind of free wheeling and then we had monthly campaign staff meetings where we bring in the whole group all the fund raisers and we would almost do a peer evaluation where we

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have all the major donors. Spaulding would have a PowerPoint and she�d have the major donors up their and people could tell pretty well if they were slacking off. This person has fifty thousand dollar potential. Where are we with this person? You know if the guy hadn�t done anything, everyone knew about it. It was just like a sales meeting. If you were in sales that how you would operate. And that�s been my strategy.

The management system provided a framework for accountability,

professional autonomy, increased, and focused donor engagement, and soliciting

Vice President Ayers said:

I think at first when we brought in Spaulding to kind-of oversee, crack the whip so to speak over the people, it was some reluctance there because she was, we�d meet so often. They had to work a little harder. They had to call somebody [donors or prospects] and get the information into the computer because they knew next week she�s going to come in with me and we were going to talk about it. Now after, now they resisted a little at first, you know how can we fund raise if we are doing all this stuff, but then they became, they really liked it after a while because all of a sudden they had never had the information in concisely in front of them before they were dealing with this kind of stuff and now they got it in a little packet of information and all that�s there, where every prospect stood, when was the last call made. What�s the next step and so on and so fourth so now I think they really appreciated it.

According to Long, who initially resisted the system,

The structure that the vice president put in place when he took over was what I think got us through in the end, was meeting one on one with people with this director Spaulding who is now our research guru and being able to be held accountable on an individual basis for what we said we would do the previous month. And so you kind of know that every month you need to go into these meetings. And they are not intimidating; they are helpful and say these are the things that I hope to accomplish in the next month. You have Spaulding there as a scribe and as I say the one with a leather whip and you can count the following month you are coming back and you are sitting down again with [the vice president] and [the director of donor research] and holding yourself accountable for what you said you were going to do and then show evidence that you did it.

According to Campaign Consultant Arrington:

Vice President Ayers and Prospect Researcher Spaulding did just a stellar job maybe as good as I�ve ever seen done at bringing people along to accountability without it being too heavy handed and people feeling like, um, it�s a dictatorial process. We struggled a little bit but we got some good buy in to these new donor management processes

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major gifts. That�s a really big in my estimation that is very much a huge part of why this campaign picked up and was successful.

Clear directives and fair means and process to evaluate performance were

welcomed benefits of Ayers�s management program. Prior to Ayers� leadership,

evaluation was arbitrary and capricious, and the process did not carry enough weight to

influence one�s promotion, demotion, or compensation. Vancer said evaluation was a

�Mickey Mouse� activity and no one was held accountable for fund raising performance.

For most of my time here, there have been very few consequences for not getting the job done. The College is a pretty safe place to work in terms of job security and you can find yourself performing anywhere in the range from superior to adequate and not have any heretofore, any concern about your job. And I think that has been a retarding influence sometimes because all of us have had our good and bad period and some of us have made a career of having less than admirable performance and yet have just hung around here for the longest of times. This institution does not have much of a track record of dismissing people. There have been very few people anywhere near my division and my work that have been dismissed in my almost 18 years here. So the consequences in terms of employment are not very threatening.

The new evaluation system considered performance against agreed-upon goals to position

prospects for asks (requests for money) and to make asks in a period.

Three years into his new role, senior vice president for finance and advancement

Ayers had changed the composition and functioning of the advancement team (see Figure

4-4). Regarding the campaign leadership team, Ayers� accomplishments included:

1. hiring a new consultant

2. addressing a failed interim appointment

3. focusing the efforts of the regional advancement directors on major gifts

soliciting

4. initiating a prospect management and research department

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5. hiring an additional regional advancement director and appointed her as

campaign leader

6. appointing a successor for the position of vice president for advancement 7. implementing a management system, that allowed performance evaluation

Figure 4.3: Campaign leadership team 2001-2005

�Building Forward� 2002-2004

In the years 2003 through 2004, the campaign was well into the general gift phase

and, despite the team�s lack of cohesiveness, all of the participants were confident that

they would meet the campaign goal. President Cray was optimistic about improved team

cohesiveness and capacity to �jell� before the next campaign. President Cray said:

President Cray

Senior Vice President for Finance and Advancement

Ayers

Assoc. VP Advancement /Reg. Adv. Dir., Ann.

Fnd. Dir. Wanger


Long


Vancer


Fryer

Campaign Consultant Arrington


Spaulding

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Last year was the year that I felt we were fully functioning and you know you get a sense that you are clicking on all cylinders. And I would say that the academic year 2003-2004 was where we started to click on all cylinders. I would say last year in my opinion was the best year of the campaign. There were very few distractions and we just flat out raised money.

In February 2005, the campaign concluded. The College had raised $141 million

dollars through campaign efforts, not including $17 million dollars raised through the

annual fund. A week after the public announcement of the campaign conclusion, Ayers,

the senior vice president for finance and advancement, promoted Associate Vice

President for Advancement Wanger, who was also the director of the annual fund and

regional advancement director to position of vice president for college advancement.

Ayers again began his plan to retire after having served for an undisclosed period of time

during which he would work on a contractual basis with the college.

Reflecting on the campaign and looking ahead to the next campaign, President

Cray, former Vice President for Advancement Ayers, Regional Advancement Directors

Vancer and Long, and Advancement Consultant Arrington shared their observations

about the team.

President Cray commented on team cohesiveness:

As of today, I would say quite good, better than at any time in the six years I have been here. I think they feel good about themselves, feel good about the College. I think you can be successful with individual stars but you are not going to be as successful as if you had camaraderie, and fun and people really appreciated each other and I think we got this as the campaign wore on instead of decreasing camaraderie the team increased camaraderie. That was a good sign for us I think. I attribute that to Ayers.

Vice President Ayers commented on team building:

And I think we have been able to build a new team going forward. We hired a number of new people and so I think that some of the things we

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did in the campaign are very basic to good fund raising going forward. So I think we positioned ourselves not only to be successful in this last campaign but we are also ready to go forward.

He continued,

I think it is very good right now. It wasn�t that way when I started. But it�s very good. I think success makes you feel good and ah, I think that our people generally like each other. They get into their little arguments but I feel pretty doggone good about our team now and what will happen when I leave and there is a transition. But right now I feel that they all like each other we have parties you know everybody comes they enjoy each other. They enjoy each other�s company. It�s good, a lot better than it has been.

Regional Advancement Director Vancer reflected on the team�s core strengths:

The arrival of President Cray and the promise of his arrival that went back four months before his actual arrival added a lot of energy to the campaign and I would say that was the huge turning point and that kept the whole thing together. You got to recall that despite the dysfunction in the team and the lost valuable time, some of which occurred during boom economic times and some which occurred during difficult economic times we still were raising money and raising money better than most colleges and universities our size do. So you, we can guess all day about what may have been but the fact that we had a solid institution, a great constituency, a good case, and a number of veteran people that regardless of the fact that they weren�t working at optimum efficiency and had attitudes, were nevertheless performing and money kept getting added to the total and then with [the president�s] arrival and changes in personnel and leadership positions and so fourth that emerged over time, there was a whole new energy in the process.

Regional Advancement Director Long commented on the team�s level of commitment to

the College:

I think that the team is very strong right now. Very strong. And I have to add something here, Preston, I do not know whether other schools can say this, employees in the development office here are deeply dedicated to the institution and I think then there are frustrations, problems and whatever that might come into a team trying to pull off a capital campaign that here often times those things are minimized because everybody believes in a broader vision of the institution.

Consultant Arrington commented on cohesiveness:

Well I would say I saw cohesiveness as below average when I started and I would say that maybe a B or B-[presently]. I certainly would not

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rate them as an A. Not at all. I think they do respect one another, they work pretty well with one another, it�s a good cohesive team. I am thinking now of the major gifts officers. The staff. Very cohesive I think you get an A+ in terms of cohesiveness with the VP, you know it depends on whom you are talking to about on the team. The overall team under Ayers�s leadership, an A because they respect him and will go to the mat for him. If it�s how they work collegially with one another, the respect they share for one another, the lack of back biting or backbiting, you know I would say a B at best perhaps a B.

At the close of the campaign, the youngest and most recently hired campaign

team members were optimistic about their next campaign, which they estimate would

begin in three to five years. However, the relationships of the more senior team members

were far from cohesive. Some were concerned that in the wake of the campaign there

would be fewer distractions from personality conflicts which had festered for nearly 20

years. When asked how the successful fund raising troupe would sustain cordiality, the

newly appointed Vice President for Advancement Wanger said, �I would say that we

function best when we are not together.�

Campaign Success

Participants discussed campaign success in clear and broad strokes. For example,

team members were mindful of progress toward the overall dollar goal and their progress

toward funding particular projects. Participants described success as achieving goals and

objectives. The campaign goal was to raise money in excess of predetermined sums as

quickly as possible. Campaign Tri-chair Maddison said that a successful campaign

should raise approximately 50 percent more money than the preceding campaign. Using

this measure, the campaign was a great success. He also said that the campaign was not

successful in the use of volunteers or overall organization.

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Campaign objectives included building a �sustainable team,� �raising awareness

with your constituency,� and overcoming unanticipated obstacles. College President

Cray shared:

Well I think you would have to start with your primary goal, which is to raise money. I would put that out as number one. Nobody enters a capital campaign to win friends. They might say that and it�s a very nice bi-product but you got to raise money. And, and you know I think secondary to that I would say that it gives you an opportunity to get your case out before the people about what matters to the institution and you do have an opportunity to win friends for the college, to nurture people, to set them up maybe for the next campaign, to maybe move them along the line a little bit towards a more major gift. It was certainly a success in terms of money raised and I guess however you want to look at it, people are in capital campaigns to raise money.

Senior Vice President for Finance and Advancement Ayers added:

I think we have been able to build a new team going forward. We hired a number of new people and so I think that some of the things we did in the campaign are very basic to good fund raising going forward. So I think we positioned ourselves not only to be successful in this last campaign but we are also ready to go forward�Even if we have turnover whatever in the next few years, I think we have established a strong basis for doing even better in the future. I think the infrastructure that has been built here as far as how donors are identified, cultivated, and managed has been its going to last. That will last. That will last to the next. There is sustainability in the system.

Regional Advancement Director Vancer said:

It�s been a success because it transcended two presidencies, leadership of two different vice presidents, some modest changing of the guard of development officers was conducted toward the front end and right on through an economic downturn, and was conducted during a period in which other major philanthropic institutions in our geographic region were not raising any money.

Case Analysis The Heuristic Framework as Context

The purpose of the analysis is to augment data presented in the case narrative with

descriptive data regarding the case in the context of the heuristic framework. The

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analysis does not attempt to qualify data, but rather to present data reflecting selected

campaign outcomes (see Figure 4.5).


Construct: Campaign Success

The campaign success construct was composed of six concepts: (1) initial goal

and adjusted goal, (2) percentage of priority projects funded, (3) alumni participation

percentage, (4) endowment value increase, (5) trustee financial contribution, and (6)

five-year annual total giving average (see Table 4-2).

Initial goal: Adjusted Goal

College leaders increased the overall campaign dollar goal several times for

reasons including new projects, enhanced projects, and �over subscription� to the

endowment. A participant likened the fund raising goals to �moving targets,� and said

that, �the carrot kept moving.� When the �carrot� or �target� moved, team members

Campaign Success

1

Team CoreProcesses & Performance

4

Team Dynamics

7


5


3

Team Design Factors

2


6

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appeared to have regrouped, refocused, and to have gone about raising dollars to meet the

new campaign goal. Some campaign team members were frustrated - not with increased

campaign goals, because that was the nature of campaigns, but with the reasons why the

dollar goals and project prioritization changed.

Table 4.3: Campaign success construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

Construct Concepts Description Key Observation Initial goal and adjusted goal(s)

Goal announced to the public and revised goal(s).

The overall campaign goal was increased three times.

Revenue to expense ratio

The average amount spent to raise one dollar.

The institution reported less than (≤).10 cents to raise one dollar.

Percentage of priority projects fully funded

The percentage of priority projects that were fully funded with campaign dollar contributions.

Undesignated contributions were allocated to projects not fully funded by designated contributions. Therefore, all projects (100%) were funded fully, but not directly.

Alumni participation percentage

The percentage of alumni who contributed to the campaign effort, however, the scope of the campaign was defined by the institution.

Alumni participation decreased from 41% percent at start of the campaign to 33% percent at campaign conclusion.

Endowment value

Endowment values at the start and the conclusion of the capital campaign.

Endowment value increased approximately 37% percent over the campaign period.

Campaign success

Trustee financial contributions

The dollar contributions of trustees to the campaign. However, the scope of the campaign was defined by the institution.

All trustees contributed financially to the campaign. Forty trustees contributed $9,269,219 dollars over the campaign period.

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Construct Concepts Description Key Observation Five-year

annual total giving average

The average amount of dollars donated from all sources over five years. The average is calculated by taking the year considered and the four years preceding and dividing by five.

The average annual giving contributions increased from $11,869,700 dollars to $18,288,488 dollars over the campaign period.

Participants said poor planning was the result of poor leadership and management during

critical and early phases of the campaign. On multiple occasions, participants returned to

donors to gain permission to redirect committed dollars to new projects. This was

believed to have compromised longstanding relationships with �friends of the college.�

Revenue: expense

Specific details of fund raising expenses were not divulged. However, the college

reportedly spent no more than .10 cents to raise a one dollar.

Table 4.4: Campaign dollar goal adjustments

Campaign goals adjustments Dollar Amount Years Initial goal 1 Internal $78 million 1997-2000 Adjusted goal 1 Public $85 million 2000-2003 Adjusted goal 2 Public $105 million 2003-2004

Percentage of priority projects funded.

Some campaign projects were �over subscribed� or over funded, while other

projects were �under subscribed� or under funded. In the final accounting, all priority

projects were funded fully through the allocation of non-designated contributions to

under funded projects. The failure of Team Schism to fund priority projects may have

been a result of multiple factors, including poor campaign planning regarding project

feasibility. A goal of campaign planning was to estimate how much money donors would

82

give to a particular project, and based on that information the campaign goals were

established.


Alumni participation percentage decreased slightly and steadily from 39 percent

in 2000, the year of the campaign announcement, to 33 percent in 2004, the year the

campaign concluded. In 1996, the year in which campaign preparations began, the

alumni participation was at its highest of the years for which data was collected for this

study. The decrease in alumni participation may be an artifact of multiple and

consecutive years of requests by Team Schism members for alumni to participate in the

capital campaign, in addition to requests from other members of the College�s fund

raising team to participate in the annual fund.

Table 4.5: Alumni participation percentage

Year

Number Alumni of

record

Number Alumni solicited

Number Alumni donors

Participation percentage

Contribution (Face value)

1996 19,684 19,684 8,080 .410 4,640,360 2000 22,405 22,227 8,575 .385 6,781,570 2002 23,523 23,335 8,801 .377 6,378,848 2004 24,945 24,734 8,247 .333 9,287,525

The alumni participation percentage as presented was calculated by the Council on Aid to

Education, in their annual survey, by dividing the number of alumni who contributed

during the period by the number of alumni available. Dividing the number of

83

participating alumni by the number of solicited alumni slightly increases alumni

participation percentage on paper.

Endowment value (increase)

The endowment value and amount of endowment per student increased. The

endowment value closely followed the prevailing economy between 1996, the year in

which campaign preparations began, and 2000, the year the campaign was announced,

and 2004, the year the campaign was concluded. Campaign efforts generated over $60

million dollars for endowment against an initial goal of $35 million dollars. The large

amount of donations to endowment was unanticipated.

Table 4.6: Endowment per student, market value, and percentage change from previous year

Year Endowment Per

Student

Endowment Market Value

Percentage Change in Endowment Market Value

From Previous Year 1996 25,453 74,397,000 23.8 2000 43,134 126,942,000 19.8 2002 37,258 111,736,401 -4.2 2004 38,504 118,131,390 3.8

Governing board financial contribution

There was an overall decrease in the number of board members. However, the

dollar amount of board members� contributions increased steadily, and then decreased

overall in the last year of the campaign. The decrease did not reflect absence of financial

commitment but rather the fulfillment of earlier made campaign commitments prior to the

close of the campaign. There was 100 percent board participation each year of the

campaign.

84

Table 4.7: Governing board participation

Year Number of Board

Members

Total Financial Contributions

Total 1996 38 1,502,770 2000 38 2,064,040 2002 33 3,238,323 2004 34 2,464,086

Mr. Maddison, a two-time campaign chair and former board chair and alumnus,

had served on the board for nearly 20 years. He had given generously to the campaign,

as had all of the board. He was disappointed that he and other volunteers were poorly

managed. Maddison said that the job of a board member in a campaign is

straightforward.

You take people you think can further that goal and you make them your chair or co-chair. The criteria you use many times: (1) can they give themselves, (2) do they have good interpersonal skills, (3) are they effective at going out and making an ask, and (4) will they work. But as you are looking at major campaigns, volunteers can be excited generally for short periods of time, but they generally aren�t good for long-term situations like capital campaigns. So the role of that volunteer whether it�s a co-chair or solicitor or any of the other roles, and advisor, really needs to be, you need to expect that, those people are told what to do, and asked to do it, and held accountable for doing it. And I guess speaking for myself personally, I didn�t take the initiative because I did not have the accountability, and you need to hold volunteers accountable.

The seasoned campaign volunteer added that leadership of campaigns was not the

responsibility of volunteers but the responsibility of the �professional� fund raising staff.

He said in a most respectful manner that while the was campaign successful in dollars

raised, it was not well run early on. The campaign, he said, improved in organization in

its last few years. However, he and other volunteers had grown tired by that time and

85

needed rejuvenation, which did not happen. Mr. Maddison was knowledgeable and

careful not to disparage the campaign team or his College. He guarded his words more

so than any study participant did.

Five-year annual giving total average

Giving tended to increase between 1996 and 2004, and may reflect increased

intensity of soliciting.

Table 4.8: Five-year annual total giving average

Year Five Year Average

(Grand Total) 1996 11,869,700 2000 14,171,336 2002 14,738,775 2004 18,288,488

Construct: Campaign Team Design Factors

The campaign team design construct consisted of four concepts: (1) team

composition and size, (2) diversity, (3) tasks, and (4) organizational complexity.

Table 4.9: Campaign team design construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

Construct Concept Description Key Observation Team Composition and Size

Team membership The team had as many as ten members consisting of president, cabinet members, consultants, trustees, directors, and coordinators

Campaign Team Design Factors

Diversity Skill variety Diversity increased greatly with multiple changes in leadership and team membership, which occurred throughout the campaign.

86

Tasks Work functions and activities

The primary activities were donor identification and solicitation. Eventually the activities were made routine, and managed systematically.

Organizational Structure

Organization arrangement

The formal structure of organization was centralized. Multiple and failed leadership assignments led to various dysfunctional formal and informal organizational arrangements which operated outside of a centralized frame.

Team composition and size

Over the course of the campaign, team size increased from seven to eight

members. However, team composition changed markedly during the last three years of

the campaign. It appears that college leaders mistakenly believed that they entered the

campaign with a team that was capable of successfully completing the work. As shared

earlier, over the eight-year span of the campaign, Team Schism incorporated two

presidents, three vice presidents for advancement, two campaign consultants, two

directors of development, two campaign directors, multiple and tumultuous interim

appointments of team members, and the establishment and staffing of an office for

prospect management. The analogy used with the participants in follow-up interviews

regarding the many staffing changes was that Team Schism was a large aircraft that had

its propellers replaced while airborne and did not succumb to gravity. The analogy like

Team Schism defied convention.

Diversity

Team Schism�s competency was enhanced by the addition of new and differently

skilled personnel with no apparent institutional or interpersonal �baggage.� Cray, the

87

second president, added enthusiasm and higher expectations for fund raising. Ayers, the

second vice president for advancement, introduced management systems. Arrington, the

second consultant, contributed to campaign planning, solicitation strategy and the

coaching of team members. Spaulding, the director of prospect management and

research, helped create a system for managing donors and campaign solicitation

processes. Fryer, the regional advancement director and campaign coordinator,

contributed much needed organization to the day-to-day operations and collaboration

with other advancement team units.

Tasks

The primary functions of the team members were major gifts solicitation and the

management of gift solicitation processes. However, given the organizational disarray

and leadership vacuum that emerged in 1997 and persisted until 2001, a group of

generalists emerged and there was wholesale role drift. With role drift and a leadership

vacuum, there was intense unstructured and unchecked competition for leadership and

management positions. With this, the primary functions of soliciting gifts and managing

a gift solicitation process were compromised. However, as management and leadership

improved so did organization structure, task clarity, and accountability for carrying out

tasks.

Organizational structure

Team Schism�s organization was consistent with the centralized model of

advancement team organization. Centralized organization structures are characterized by

88

President Cray

Senior Vice President for Finance and Advancement

Ayers

Assoc. VP Adv. / Reg.Adv. Dir./ Ann.. Fnd. Dir.

Wanger

Regional Advancement Director Long



Fryer

Campaign Consultant Arrington


Spaulding

Campaign Tri-Chair Miller

the president's direct supervision of the vice president for advancement, who in turn

provides direct supervision to the balance of the advancement team (see Figure D).

Table 4.10: Team organization at campaign conclusion

Construct: Campaign Process Design Factors

The campaign design construct consisted of four concepts: (1) campaign

initiation, (2) planning and phases, and (3) campaign complexity.

Campaign initiation

Consultant Waylon, the first campaign consultant, played a significant role in

initiating the campaign and shaped the planning processes. Some participants credit

89

campaign initiation to President Jennings. Other participants believed that the consultant

and Vice President Snelling played a significant role in persuading the college to embark

on the campaign as a way to retire long time President Jennings ceremoniously.

Table 4.11: Campaign processes design factors: construct, concepts, and descriptions and key observations

Construct Concepts Description Key Observation

Campaign Initiation

The person(s) who initiated the campaign.

The vice president for advancement promoted the campaign with trustees as tribute to the outgoing president.

Planning and Phases

Campaign planning and organization

The campaign formally consisted of a quiet and a public phase.

Campaign Processes Design Factors

Campaign Complexity

Complexity of planning and execution.

Campaign complexity was unremarkable at the onset, but increased with initiation of donor research, tracking, and fund raiser accountability systems.

Planning and phases

The elements of the quiet phase consisted of: (1) recruitment and orientation of

volunteers, (2) developing a needs statement, (3) conducting a feasibility study, (4) hiring

a consultant, and (5) soliciting lead gifts. Team Schism failed to carry out or carried out

poorly several of those key processes. The Team recovered from a poor start by

changing campaign executive level leadership, campaign operations, and fund raising

strategies. The team effectively carried out each of the elements of the public phase,

90

which consisted of: (1) kick-off, (2) sequential solicitation, (3) major gifts solicitation, (4)

general gifts solicitation, and (5) celebration.

Campaign complexity

The campaign increased in sophistication and operational precision with the

adoption of a donor management system that served as the hub of campaign operations

and clarified organizational relationships. The evidence of increased complexity

included increased numbers of donors and prospective donors, increased data on donors,

increased number of solicitations, and increased communications with prospective donors

and active donors. The campaign was complicated by team members� relationships,

which prohibited essential team communication, support, and collaboration, elements

necessary to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The evidence of campaign

complication was the necessity of sophisticated management systems devised to control

team member dysfunction such as the avoidance of team meetings.

Construct: Team Core Processes and Performance Factors

The team core processes and performance construct consisted of six concepts: (1)

work management, (2) relationship management, (3) external boundary management, (4)

production of results, (5) evaluation and, (6) maintenance of effectiveness.

91

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92

Work Management

From 1996 through 1998, President Jennings and Vice President for

Advancement Snelling did not inspire the campaign process. There was no strategic

campaign plan or work management system in place. There was a �leadership vacuum,�

and campaign work was not well organized. At the time of the interview, the new college

president, Cray, had assumed a significant role in fund raising and had inspired campaign

efforts. Senior Vice President for Finance and Advancement Ayers, provided welcomed

leadership and management. He and the director of prospect management, Spaulding,

directed the work of the campaign team. The new consultant, Arrington, advised on

broad and specific strategies for all advancement functions.

Relationship management

Successful fund raising and dysfunctional organizational relationships

characterized Team Schism. The introduction of functional organizational structure and

accountability lessened opportunities for interpersonal relationship dysfunction. No overt

attempts were made to increase team cohesiveness.

External boundary management

The team responded effectively to several external to the team issues that had the

potential to influence fund raising. For example, there was a failed city tax ballot for an

athletic facility and the campus debate on the role of Christian traditions. There were few

perceived threats to the team per se because team members tended to not have an

orientation to the team as an entity to protect. However, many of the team members had

93

strong associations on campus, and in the local community. Therefore, boundaries were

blurred.

Production of results

Objectives and goals were met through the implementation of a management

system that structured the work of regional advancement directors. Results were also

attained through the hiring of additional and differently skilled staff, adept in the

application of fund raising computer technology.

Evaluation

Prior to the arrival of Vice President for Advancement Ayers and Campaign

Consultant Arrington, evaluation of team member performance was perceived as

inconsistent, arbitrary, and capricious.


Fund raising effectiveness was maintained by strict adherence to solicitation

strategies and accountability for performance. The implementation of a management

system based on a sales team model provided the means to observe and systematically

increase fund raising activity. Most notable was each team member�s personal drive to

raise as much money as possible and do so independently of other team members.

Construct: Influences External to the Institution

Two noted events occurred outside of the institution, which influenced the team

and the campaign: (1) economic recession and (2) failed tax ballot. The economic

94

recession reportedly stymied corporation and foundation contributions and reduced the

need for three dedicated corporate and foundation relations staff. Instead of reducing the

staff, the assistant director of corporation and foundation relations was reassigned to a

new position titled director of prospect research management. The second influence

external to the team was a tax proposal to build a major recreational facility for the city

that would be shared by the college. The ballot failed and the college added the $22

million dollar facility to the campaign.

Construct: Influences Internal to the Institution

There was an intense campus discourse on the role of Christianity in the life of the

College. President Cray reaffirmed the prominent role that Christian principles would

continue to have in the life of the College. Vancer said:

I think one of the strengths of the team is the environment in which it operates because we have an institution that is comfortable in its own skin. Its had a consistent mission for a number of years. It knows where it�s headed. If we talk to alumni who graduated ten years ago, 30 years ago, or 50 years ago they all see the college as the same institution that has not evolved through a series of different mission statements and purposes so the environment is highly conducive to success.

Construct: Team Dynamics

The team dynamic construct (relationships) was the confluence of all of the

constructs in the heuristic framework, believed to influence campaign success. President

Cray shared that team relationship dynamics were a product of leadership and

management. He said that leaders should aspire to have cohesive teams and understand

95

that this is not always possible. Several team members shared his point of view. When

asked how important relationships were to campaign success, the President stated:

I think pretty important. You like people going out meeting donors when they feel good about themselves and their contributions to the team and it may manifest itself in a subtle way, if that isn�t there, but subtle ways that can be damaging to a campaign. I mean I don�t think that people need to be best friends but I think they need to respect each other and they need to have fun with each other to develop this sense of camaraderie and team work that enables them to leave their office and make an ask with confidence. They�ve got to feel good about the organization and they�ve got to feel good about themselves and the team they are working with.

Case Summary

Team Schism raised $137 million dollars in the face of multiple organization and

interpersonal challenges. Ineffective leadership, ineffective management, and

dysfunctional interpersonal relationships among team members characterized Team

Schism early on. Central characters were three regional advancement directors, and their

coexistence was tumultuous at best. They were loyal alumni, highly competitive, and not

easily managed. The interpersonal relationships among the directors, and with the

College president, vice president for advancement, and consultant that began the

campaign was characterized by the absence of effective communication, as well as little

collaboration or trust.

Team interactions in the years leading to the campaign were harbingers of the

pervasive interpersonal dysfunctional and ethos, which �dogged� the team for the first

half of the eight-year effort. The three regional advancement officers were prolific fund

raisers. However, their behavior went unchecked because of their value to the fund

96

raising effort. Their many years of experience were not harnessed for the campaign

planning processes.

Into the campaign, a new president was appointed. After some time, he identified

the team�s dysfunction, factors contributing to dysfunction, the consequences of

dysfunction, and a solution. The president observed the absence of effective day-to-day

operational leadership and management. His solution was appointing his vice president

for finance to the additional role of vice president for advancement. The new vice

president was inexperienced at fund raising but an excellent manager of people and

processes. Shortly after his appointment, he replaced the College�s long time

advancement consultant, added new and differently skilled members to the ranks of the

leadership team and facilitated a new campaign case. Most consequentially, he

introduced a management system that lessened role ambiguity, and notably reduced

conspicuous personality clashes between the three key fund raisers.

The second president, vice president, and consultant aimed to build an

advancement team for the future. They eventually demanded adherence to standards for

behavior, fully knowing that their actions may lead to a loss of one or more of the

disruptive, feuding regional advancement directors. The directors� personal dislike and

lack of trust for one another did not lessen but was less conspicuous to observers.

Team members attributed success at fund raising to: 1) personal commitment to

the College, 2) length of employment or experience at fund raising, 3) quality

relationships with donors built over time, and 4) individual effort. They perceived a

loose relationship between success at fund raising and team dynamics. They perceived a

97

stronger relationship between success at fund raising and campaign design and

organization.

Interpretation

The fund raisers (regional advancement directors) were successful because they

each developed over many years, major gift producing relationships with donors. These

key external to the team relationships did not require the team to exhibit all behaviors

characteristic of effective teams. The dysfunction exhibited by the regional advancement

directors was not only a reflection of their relationship quality but the president�s

tolerance for such behavior as long as the dysfunction did not compromise gift revenue

intake.

Relationship Orientations

Team Schism was characterized by four relationship orientations: (1) internal to

team, (2) external to team, (3) institution/mission affinity, and (4) competitive (see Figure

4.7).

The internal to the team orientation reflects relationship quality and intentional

efforts to build a cohesive unit. Several Team Schism members charged with raising

money did not get along well and �behaved badly.� In the face of a constant revenue

inflow, leaders, while demanding a collegial work environment, did not actively pursue

team cohesiveness for fear of losing prized major gift fund raisers.

The external to the team orientation represents team members� interpersonal

relationships to external team constituents, particularly donors. Team Schism members

98

went to great lengths to build and maintain trusting, caring relationships with persons

who were external to the team.

Institution and mission loyalty orientation represents how the team members

related to the college and its mission. Team Schism members tended to be alumni, loyal

to the institution, and embraced the mission. At the time of the interviews, Team Schism

members� length of employment with the College averaged 16.5 years. The shortest

length of employment was three years and the longest was 40 years (see Appendix F, for

team membership composition over time).

The competitiveness orientation represents Team Schism members� orientation to

competition. Unchecked and unstructured competition often caused team dysfunction.

However, competitiveness appears to have driven the team members to achieve success

at fund raising.

Figure 4.5: Four relationship orientations

External to Team Orientation

(+)

Institution/ Mission Loyalty

(+)

Competitive Orientation(-/+)

Team Dynamic

Internal to Team Orientation

(-)

99

CHAPTER 5

Team Franchise

Case Background

Team Franchise (pseudonym), a comprehensive campaign leadership team, raised

nearly $80 million dollars between years 1996 and 2004, against a campaign goal of $65

million dollars.

The President, who was appointed with a fund raising mandate, assembled the

five-member leadership team during the pre-campaign needs assessment phase. The

team consisted of the college president, vice president for advancement, campaign

consultant, trustee board chair, and executive director for development. The team�s

interpersonal relationships and competence increased over the course of the campaign.

Events and interpersonal dynamics potentially debilitating to the campaign and leadership

team were countered by unwavering confidence in presidential leadership. One of the

potentially debilitating events countered was a entire development unit consisting of six

staff �turn-over� twice, owing to exacted and voluntary resignations. The College�s

president said, �At the outset, it [advancement unit] was sub-standard, and we had to

keep adding people along the way.� He continued, �When I left there I felt really good

about the advancement team.�

100

Team Franchise aspired to: (1) exceed the campaign dollar goal, (2) fund fully the

five major campaign projects, (3) rebuild and strengthen the advancement unit, (4)

increase the number of donors, and (5) increase donor charitable propensity. Team

Franchise members attributed campaign success to presidential leadership. This account

of Team Franchise was conveyed in five sections: (1) Institution overview, (2) Case

narrative, (3) Case analysis, (4) Case summary, and (5) Interpretations.


Founded in the early 1800�s, the College is a private, selective, liberal arts and

sciences institution operating independently of its American Baptist affiliation. The

College has multiple accreditations, enrolls approximately 1,300 students, and has a

faculty to student ratio of 1:11. Ninety-four percent of the faculty have a Ph.D. or

equivalent terminal degree. The college ranked in the top ten of all colleges in several

academic areas and ranked in the top 20 for numbers of graduates who go on to earn a

Ph.D. The institution emphasizes �experiential education� conveyed through �off

campus study,� a �purposeful� or �actionable� senior project, and a �model career

development/advancement program.�

In the fiscal year ending in 2004, the College�s endowment was valued at

approximately $136 million dollars. Endowment per student was $104,821 dollars.

Annual operating expenditures totaled $42 million dollars. The college ranked third

lowest among affiliated peer institutions considering the above financial measures.

101


The case narrative was organized loosely around Team Franchise�s three

campaign phases: (1) pre-campaign needs assessment, (2) silent phase, and (3) public

phase (see Figure 5-1). The case narrative concluded with comments from participants

on campaign team dynamics and campaign success, and the relationship between the two

concepts.

Figure 5.1: Team Franchise�s campaign phases, timeline, and gift revenue

Campaign Overview Pre-campaign needs assessment

The pre-campaign needs assessment began in the year 1996 and concluded in

1999. During that three-year period, the College conducted a formal capital needs

assessment and feasibility study. A case statement, campaign organization, campaign

system, and procedure were developed. College trustees approved the campaign �stretch

goal� of $65 million dollars. While selected �advance gifts� counted as campaign

Phase I: Pre-Campaign Needs Assessment Phase II: Silent Phase Phase III: Public Phase

�96 �97 �98 �99 �00 �01 �02 �03 �04 �05 �06

$10,465,556

$25,648,648

$42,413,642

TOTAL $78, 527,846

102

contributions, the team did not consider that three-year period part of the five-year

comprehensive campaign. During that period, the campaign leadership team was

assembled.

Silent phase

The silent phase began in the year 1999, and concluded in 2001. During this

three-year period, the advancement unit underwent extensive capacity building and

reorganization. The team focused on creating a major gifts office for the cultivation and

solicitation of donors having potential to contribute leadership gifts ($100,000 or more)

and major gifts ($25,000 or more) during a five-year period.

Public phase

The public phase began in the year 2001, and concluded in year 2004, several

months ahead of the public date for completion16. The campaign�s dollar goal, projects,

and organization were announced to the public. During that time, the team solicited

leadership level gifts, major gifts, and general gifts. Gifts to the general fund made

during the public phase were counted toward the campaign total.

Case Study Phase I: Pre-Campaign Needs Assessment, 1996-1999

By the year 1996, college trustees were eager to begin their next campaign. They

faced four problems. Foremost, fund raising was not a passion, priority, or strength for

16 The date made public for closing the campaign was December 2004, but the latest date authorized for completion of the campaign was December 2006.

103

College President Banner. Second, President Banner precipitously and conspicuously fell

from campus favor and no longer had the support necessary to lead what would

necessarily be an ambitious campaign. Third, fund raising past performance is a

harbinger of future success, and the College had for several decades performed

marginally at fund raising. For example, the last campaign exceeded the $46 million

dollar goal by a few thousand dollars. However, the College�s current consultant said,

�They made it [the goal] with well, what we call a �scorched earth fund raising policy�

which is, they made it [the campaign goal] with a lot of future provisions and verbal

bequests kinds of things.� Fourth, following that campaign, college leaders jettisoned

approximately one-half of the advancement team � a decision they would contend with

throughout the next campaign. 17

Early in 1996, President Banner resigned, but not before appointing a new vice

president for advancement and an acting provost. Regarding the new vice president for

advancement, the trustee chair said, �President Banner knew he was leaving. It was a

lame duck kind of action.� The basis for the appointment was a �tight job market and

availability of a candidate named Mr. Dalton.� President Banner assured skeptical

College trustees of Mr. Dalton�s capabilities, and willingness to adapt to the style of the

next president. On the other hand, the campus community welcomed the appointment of

Ross Paulson to acting provost. Paulson had nearly 30 years on the faculty and was well

respected, attributes he used to calm the unrest left in the wake of the departure of the

former provost.

17 The advancement unit was comprised of the campaign leadership team, development team, alumni and parent relations, communications, and operations. Each had a unique culture and rare was group crossover.

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In the middle of 1996, trustees appointed Dr. Benton as College President.

Benton, an active scholar, administrator, and leader had been successful at fund raising as

a university dean. However, this appointment was his first presidency and first time

leading a comprehensive capital campaign.

The antithesis of his predecessor, President Benton was charismatic and

impressive in presentation. He drew comparisons to a former College president who had

over three decades prior to set the standard for presidential leadership at the institution.

President Benton stirred a dormant optimism about the College�s future for many faculty,

administrators, and trustees. Moreover, students, alumni, and others embraced him. He

was said to have a �big personality� and was �prone to hyperbole but not in a self serving

way. He was always lifting up those around him.�

President Benton tactfully applied himself to campaign work. During the pre-

campaign needs assessment (the first three years) he:

(1) halted campaign activity

(2) retained a new consulting firm

(3) assessed the readiness of the advancement division

(4) Appointed a new vice president for advancement

(5) facilitated a community engaging capital needs assessment

(6) ordered a feasibility study

(7) set the organization for the advancement unit

(8) facilitated key trustee appointments

When asked about his initial impressions of the advancement team, Benton said, It [the advancement team] didn�t exist; the advancement operation was sub-standard. They had a difficult time. At that time the president resigned, there was no campaign planning, there was no campaign staff.

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At any rate, I didn�t come into anything; I came into a void, and had to build it all.

Team member recollection of campaign activity prior to Benton�s arrival differed. For

some there had only been discussions or �campaign talk.� For others, tangible campaign

activity occurred; albeit premature, poorly organized, and perhaps the cause of more

harm than good. The executive director of development recalled that period and its

tumult. She said, �The campaign had a lot of fits and starts.� She continued:

The infrastructure should have been done previously, before we launched anything. To go out publicly and talk a little about a campaign and not have done a feasibility study; that is not good business practice� a campaign dollar amount had been thrown out before a feasibility study had been done. Not wise things to do.

She continued,

When President Benton came, we put it [the campaign] on hold for about a year or so to get the team up and functioning and get what he would refer to and what I would now, a proper advancement team. President Benton saw where we were. We had to stop. It was a very wise decision. And it was his, and I know the board agreed with it.

The campaign effort was without the aid of a consultant. Vice President for

Advancement Dalton arranged an interview for President Benton with experienced

principals of a recently formed campaign-consulting firm. Benton tended to be decisive;

however, the selection of that consulting firm was one year in the making. When asked

about their role in the campaign, the lead consultant (Consultant Wellington) said,

Our role was an organizational one, helping them to look internally at what structure they needed to be successful for the long term in advancement, but also to be successful in campaign. It was an advisory one in terms of counseling the president and the staff how to work together. And then it also had sort of a bigger picture, visionary, structural role in how to involve all of the tiers - particularly board members - in that effort. And, I would also say it had a training component to it too, and a mentoring component to it, and some would say a therapy component to it.

Describing President Benton, she said, �The president is a powerhouse--hard to say no to.

He is a force. He is a major force to reckon with.� She said, �My initial assessment was

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that the president was very powerful, very persuasive, highly motivated, and motivating

and would be a good fund raiser.� She was not impressed with the remainder of the

advancement team. She said,

The staff was incredibly weak. We were surprised that a college of that stature would have such a poor structure to support philanthropy. Where they were strong was in corporate and foundation relations. Weak in alumni support. Weak in annual fund support. Weak in major gift support and pretty weak in planned giving as well and an odd data base management system, good stewardship on the administrative side under the CFO. Very strong, very good stewards of the resources entrusted to them. Communications program in terms of public relations, marketing communications was very, very weak.

Over the course of the campaign, many of the �weak� areas were improved upon and

many were not.

President Benton�s desire to build his own campaign team was apparent. A

participant said,

Presidents, they have to put together their own teams. It�s a kind of relationship that is very necessary and different people seek different qualities in their associates and partnerships.

Approximately six months into his presidency, President Benton exacted the

resignation of Vice President for Advancement Dalton. A participant said, �Benton and

Dalton had conflicting styles and Dalton had to go.� Benton also released the ineffective

director of the annual fund hired by Dalton. A participant who brought Dalton�s

leadership and management deficiencies to President Benton�s attention said, �He

[Dalton] had not been here two days, and I knew he would not work. He would not make

it.�

Benton launched a national search for a new vice president for advancement.

During the search, he attended to vice president for advancement duties. After one

academic year, the position remained unfilled. The campaign consultant met the

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President�s disappointment with perspective on hiring practices. She said, �fund raising

is not rocket science. You can teach it if the person has the right attributes. Foremost,

the College needed a vice president in whom the president had great confidence and

trust.� During the interview process, Benton heavily weighed the prospect of

interpersonal connection with candidates. According to a participant, Benton�s approach

to building a cohesive team tended to fail, as considerations given to interpersonal styles

appeared to outweigh considerations of skill.

Having unsuccessfully searched outside the college for a vice president for

advancement, President Benton identified Ross Paulson, the faculty member who had

three months earlier returned to the faculty after having served as acting provost for one

year. Benton said,

Most schools, when they get in those sorts of predicaments will turn to the best of the campus statesmen, and so that�s what I did. He [Paulson] had been there and was a household word at the college.

The invitation to serve as acting provost was a welcomed surprise, said Paulson. He said

�I had my back turned, so to say and was identified to come in as acting provost.�

Paulson�s passion for the college drove his decision,

It�s a job I took on because you know, I�m excited about this college. I love the students it serves. I�ve seen many generations of students go through its halls and I feel very energized by each and every one of those encounters. When I was in the acting provost position, it became very clear that the college was having to retrench, but at the same time, you know there wasn�t anything that we could do about the fact that we had to say no to a lot of very good ideas, innovative, creative, initiatives because there was simply no money to be able to take that action. You�d have to take it from something else that was already cut down to its very bones to be able to afford it. So, that knowledge of the college being less than what it really could be fueled me greatly to step up to the plate and to really focus in on the fundraising side of things. Because I knew the job of the provost, the job of the faculty, and the experience the students would have out of all that magic would be greatly enhancing if we could start saying yes, if we could start doing more with more instead of doing less with less.

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Paulson accepted the provost position with grounding in academic life owing to years of

teaching and committee work. However, the invitation to serve as vice president for

advancement was daunting because of Paulson�s inexperience with advancement.

However, his inexperience was overshadowed by his commitment to the College and

growing loyalty to President Benton. Paulson said:

So at the conclusion of that search [for vice president for advancement] he [president] knew that he had to move forward with some leadership up there and he asked if I would come in as vice president for college advancement, and I quite frankly had to ask him �What�s that?�

Consultant Wellington applauded Paulson�s �sacrifice� and �commitment.� She said,

This [vice president for advancement position] isn�t anything he ever wanted to do, not anything, he aspired to do. I thought he was an incredible campus and community citizen to take this job on � And so he put aside his own personal needs and interest to take on this role.

Upon accepting the position, Paulson did not anticipate fully the steepness of his learning

curve or the extent of advancement team disrepair. He said:

It was not a perfect transition. I had to learn a tremendous amount. I had to learn it on the job and I trusted my colleagues to teach me the right lessons along the way. I think they did a very good job. I was the college�s worst asset at that time. I really was very naïve. I knew very little about even how to manage such a large population of individuals.

Six years after accepting the vice president for advancement position, Paulson recalled

the condition of the advancement team prior to his arrival and the corrective measures

taken.

We had a deficit in that area at the conclusion of the last campaign. The college took steps to work within a balanced budget, and the campaigns don�t save the college from economic realities. One of the areas that they made adjustments in had to do with communications and development. They downsized those groups so that when I came on board we were not a campaign-ready staff. We were sort of woefully behind where we needed to be to be effective in the campaign. A big portion of my energy and time went into sort of rebuilding the staff. We had not had a director of development in nine years, we had no major gift office, one had not existed at the college, we did have a planned gift officer, and we had a corporations and foundations officer but that was about the extent of it. So we had to create an infrastructure that in fact could support the work of a campaign. We had to educate

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ourselves about what a campaign meant, we had to educate a board of trustees about that, and we had to coordinate all that activity with then President Spencer Benton. I think we were very fortunate at that time to have a president that understood campaigns and had been through them before and really knew the role that each of these constituent groups needed to play in the success of the campaign.

According to a participant, President Benton�s selection of Paulson perplexed some staff,

some faculty, and some donors. However, in Paulson, President Benton had a

trustworthy partner who was well rooted in the college.

Paulson�s �soft heart� and his being �not one who welcomes conflict� was

endearing to some and disconcerting to others. In spite of limited management

experience, President Benton said he gave Paulson autonomy to build the advancement

team. Paulson said,

He [President Benton] was an extraordinary mentor. Because obviously I knew nothing about this area. He gave me the reign to make the decisions to make the mistakes and to not feel the college or the relationship we had with our constituents would be penalized in any way.

Paulson had autonomy but Benton did �fire� several advancement team members

early into Paulson�s appointment because, according to the President, it was appropriate

that he have those conversations with poor performing advancement team members. He

said,

I had to fire people [development staff] but I didn�t interfere with Ross�s authority within the development area, not once. I believe in surrounding yourself with real talent, and dealing with talent and then moving on, giving people really big responsibilities.

Paulson did indeed have big responsibilities. However, multiple failed hires,

reassignments, and unsolicited resignations were attributed to his style and lack of

managerial experience. All the while, however, dollar contributions made during the pre-

campaign needs assessment phase did not wane.

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Benton felt his team would be complete when he secured the support of the

trustee board chair. An alliance there would grant him latitude and support to lead the

campaign as he saw fit. After several trustee meetings and committee sessions, it was

apparent to observers that Benton and Trustee Board Chair Lane �did not partner well.�

According to a participant, their styles were incompatible as were their perspectives on

courtesies extended to the president. For example, the consultant said:

The more the president got involved with understanding the budget and the institutional history, the more he felt that there was weak leadership in the board chair. That there was not strong fiduciary oversight and that some of the differences were tangible or intangible. And one of the major ones was how the president�s spouse was acknowledged for all that work she did on behalf of the institution. The former board chair did not acknowledge that at all; just took it as he expected it was given and the current board chair really recognized her contributions.

As Trustee Board Chair Lane�s term neared expiration, President Benton recruited

20-year veteran Trustee Doug Aimes to return to the board as chair. Mr. Aimes had been

away from his position as trustee chair for one year because board policy permits serving

no more than six consecutive three year terms. Therefore, Aimes had not participated in

the presidential search process that yielded Benton. However, after meeting with the

president, Mr. Aimes was impressed. He said,

I remember always being impressed with the enthusiasm he had. The spirit in which he approached his work, the conviction he had for private liberal arts education, and just his own being and experiences that he was eager to share with people. It was really stimulating to be around him� There were no questions in Spencer Benton�s mind. He knows why he�s there, what he wants to do, and where he is going, and that�s really exciting.

Aimes anticipated the request to return to the board and planned to accept the

nomination. The request to serve again as trustee chair was a surprise and presented him

with a dilemma. Mr. Aimes had recruited Trustee Chair Lane to that position and

believed he was doing an outstanding job. He said,

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And to this day, I would make that decision again. Chuck was absolutely the right person to chair that board. What I did not realize is how his style and Spencer�s style were going to be at conflict with each other. Of course, now, Spencer was not on the scene when we asked Chuck to chair the Board.

A campaign veteran, Mr. Aimes understood the seriousness of the incongruous styles.

He met with Trustee Chair Lane. They agreed that the College would be best at that time

served if Mr. Aimes assumed trustee chair responsibilities the next term. The former

chair became trustee chair emeritus. Mr. Aimes said,

Spencer never had to worry about whether he was really being second-guessed, challenged, or doubted again. Because that�s not my style. My style is more support and encouragement and if I have an issue, I am going to approach it in a way that it�s my issue not Spencer�s issue. I�m going to approach it: I need to better understand this. Tell me where I am missing this. I am going to approach it that way and that style works really well with Spencer because Spencer, as I came to know him, is a very thoughtful person. He does not like to say anything untoward about anybody, and likes to be very positive and really is very powerful in that sense. He and I just worked extremely well together.

The consultant said of the pairing of President Benton and Trustee Aimes,

Benton was buoyed by a very strong and supportive board chair. Both of them are very optimistic, the president and the board chair. The president had the advantage of having a board chair who was very supportive and sometimes bucked him up. They partnered well.

Vice President Paulson said of the relationship between the president and the trustee

chair,

The relationship between the board chair and the president has to be just absolutely pristine, I mean that has got to be a partnership that would take the ship through any storm. It�s really got to be on purpose, in a strong way, it doesn�t mean that the chair of the board has to support the president, and this is a challenge sometimes for colleges and presidents. But the board chair has to support the president. The president has to be absolutely honest with the board of trustees and not hide anything from them, which means that they know about all the dirty laundry that exist within the college, and is able to make key decisions knowing that they don�t have a perfect environment for exercising those decisions.

Trustee Board Chair Aimes became President Benton�s closest confidant, and greatest

advocate. President Benton had assembled his campaign leadership team. He had

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strongly considered team member potential and heavily weighted interpersonal style and

loyalty. Team members noted Benton�s tact at assembling the team. One participant

said, �We would follow him anywhere.� Team Franchise members enjoyed a high level

of trust, conflict resolution, problem solving, supportiveness, and a commitment to what

was best for the college and team members.

Pressed to rebuild the campaign staff, Vice President Paulson filled the director of

development position that had been vacant for nine years. The new director created an

impressive campaign plan on paper and articulated the design well. The plan was highly

dependent on volunteers. Accordingly, President Benton assembled volunteer teams

composed of trustees, faculty, alumni, parents, and students. The teams identified and

prioritized campus needs that totaled $120 million dollars.

The process of identifying and prioritizing campaign priorities was complex, time

consuming, but those involved in the process enjoyed the experience. Participants were,

however, disappointed and even dismayed by the results of the feasibility study. The

study estimated donor propensity at only $60 million dollars- half of what they needed.

The downsized advancement team coupled with years of inattention to fund raising by

former administrations that �hadn�t been externally focused, and hadn�t engaged alumni

confidence� had taken a toll. The consultant said,

Often when we do a feasibility study, we ask an institution to identify its top 100 to 150 major gift prospects from which we would draw a pool of say 50 for interview. The college really had trouble coming up with 50 names. That said to us they needed to do a lot of work to grow their major gift prospect pool.

A positive finding of the feasibility study according to the consultant was �A great deal

of growing confidence in presidential leadership. And, this was a turn because they had

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had enough turnover that there was a lack of confidence in the leadership.� She

continued,

Have you met him [the president]? He is very personable for one thing. He is very smart. He is very strategic and he creates warm relationships with people that make them want to join him in things. So the search committee must have felt that and we certainly heard that during the feasibility study.

Biding time

President Benton and Trustee Aimes said their relationship permitted candid

conversations. Aimes said, �There was nothing we could not talk about.� When asked

what threatened team cohesiveness, each team member expressed concern about the

havoc of �unchecked personal agendas�. For example, President Benton had impeccable

academic and leadership credentials, and needed only a successful capital campaign to

ascend presidential search committee �short lists.� Trustee Chair Aimes shared with

President Benton a perception that he was using the presidency and that campaign as

�stepping stones� to a more prestigious institution. Aimes said,

He was pretty clear with us that he would not leave the college for a lesser position and that he was being heavily recruited. It was not as if he was out there looking. So we sort of struck a deal, if you get into a search and start to get whittled down to the ten or so finalists you got to let me know that, and I don�t want to pick up the local newspaper and see that XYZ is interviewing three candidates and one of them is the President of the college. I don�t want to hear about it that way. We had a great understanding on that and as a result, he was very open with me about the recruiting that was going on.

Benton�s forthright admissions of ambition and commitment to the college strengthened

ties with Aimes. According to Aimes, the success of the president and the campaign

were mutually inclusive and he would ensure success for both. Aimes�s balanced

commitment to President Benton and the college was made evident on multiple

occasions. For example, based on his trust of President Benton, Aimes successfully

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advocated Benton�s $65 million campaign goal with trustees. Some trustees speculated

that Benton understated the college�s fund raising potential to assure his personal success.

Aimes said,

I could start to see as we were establishing the goal that Spencer needed to have a successful campaign under his belt and when he got so adamant that 70 [million] was not going to be achievable and had to be at sixty-five, I said, you know we got to go with 65. That�s it folks. A lot of people wanted seventy and I just said I am deferring to the president. This campaign succeeds and fails based on his efforts largely and if he is saying 65, this is 65 so we can cut that debate off.

Aimes said the campaign was a focal point but there were other important matters that he

and the president attended to that strengthened their relationship. He said,

It�s interesting because in some of these questions or some of these issues. I don�t necessarily categorize them as campaign issues, they are leadership issues, when you talk about the relationship that Spencer and I had, that was less about the campaign and more about doing what�s best for the college. OK. Because we would necessarily spend time on the campaign but there were always other issues going on and how those issues were managed and how those issues were going to be resolved would naturally or obviously have an impact on someone�s desire to participate in the campaign. So, I can say there is always campaign overtones. But I think Spencer�s and my work was always about what was in the best interest of the college and how in the time that we were going to work together how were we going to make a difference. The campaign was one of those things. But it was for me not the single most important thing. There were lots of things going on.

By the end of 1999, President Benton had assembled a leadership team, and

gained support for the campaign dollar goal and organization. The reach of his charisma

and leadership appeared to have no limits. The college was on track to launch the

campaign. At the close of the pre-campaign needs assessment, campaign contributions

totaled $10,465,556 dollars toward the $65 million dollar goal. The next challenge for

the leadership team was to rebuild the advancement team during the silent phase of the

campaign.

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Phase II: Silent Phase, 1999-2001: �Building an �A� Team�

President Benton�s campaign leadership team appeared stable and a model of

collaboration. However, the team failed to exact a similar ethos throughout the campaign

organization (communications, alumni and parent relations, and development) where

there were bouts of resignations, firings, demotions, and reassignments.

The advancement unit required leadership, management, additional and better-

skilled personnel, technology, and systems. Three years into the president�s

administration, those issues had not been addressed successfully. Explaining the

deliberate nature of building the advancement team Benton said, �People understood that

we were after an �A� team and that �B,� �C,� or �F� wouldn�t do at all.�

One of Vice President Paulson�s unsuccessful appointments was the director of

development who created the complex campaign plan. Only six months after his hire, the

director was �let go on mutual terms.� According to Paulson, the director was technically

competent but too mechanical and ineffectual toward the nuances of the college�s mission

and donor �sensitivities.� He said,

We found that some of our appointments were people that had experience in fund raising, and understood that technically, but they couldn�t develop a kinship with the college and its mission and the kind of college it was. And then, the sensitivities and sensibilities that are alumni. And we didn�t have time to allow them years to develop this kind of relationship. We had to make sure that these were people-focused and not process-focused people. Even though their goal was very black and white, you know, it was dollars raised. So when we had a situation like that, change was necessary, I mean there was a turnover as we discovered the right people for the slots that we have up there. There will always be that, and you have to have the conversation and I think people quickly come to an understanding that this is, while it looks very, a wonderful kind of opportunity for people to get involved with, it is very hard work, it is very intense and you�ve got to make the mark early on in terms of building connections. If you can�t do it,

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we�ve got to look for someone else that can. There were people that were brought in and had to leave.

When asked about the effect of hiring and firing on the overall advancement team and the

leadership team, Paulson said:

It does not trickle up. You know I think in all those situations, I go back over them. We celebrated each of those key appointments when they were made. But when we realized over time that they were not right for the college, it was agreed, I mean I did a lot of those hires, I mean I poured myself into that interview process and the things of that sort, but when it was clear that this was not working out it was clear to everyone. And they knew, I mean both the individuals that were let go and were encouraged to move on, you know. And the people that were connected to them, closest to them, everybody knew there was agreement we had to make an adjustment here and that sometime it was the only adjustment that was available to us was the fact that we had to have some turnover there.

He continued:

You know, I think that it disheartens them when it doesn�t work out right, but I think they also recognize the fact that should they attempt to allow the poor fit to go on, it would do more harm than the momentary frustration. They understand that a bad fit does great harm and that they simply just need to move on. And it�s not really anyone�s fault, you know, it�s the chemistry of the moment, it�s the energy of the issue and not all people can be all things.

Paulson hired a new director that advancement team members considered a �kind

person,� �mother-like,� but unprepared to lead the development team. She worked in the

advancement office ten years prior. She was released when the college downsized the

advancement unit. She was invited to return to the team as annual fund director but was

pressed by the president and his wife into the recently vacated director of development

position. A participant said, �You would have never known from her resume that she had

no fund raising or management skills.� Another participant said,

It�s interesting if you think about other people who had responsibility but did not provide leadership, there is a woman named Jen Downey who had the title of director of development and really did not deliver. She just did not deliver. The organization worked around her. She is a good person. Very process oriented. Not action oriented.

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The consultant said Paulson, despite coaching on effective management, did not

address effectively Downey�s shortcomings. The problems persisted. During that time,

informal leadership and management of the development staff fell to the willing hands of

Annual Fund Director Johnston. Johnston started her career at the College in a part time

position as assistant director of development operations. She had since 1991 been

promoted five times. By 1999, she was the regional advancement director. As former

director of the annual fund, she had come to know many College supporters. She said,

she was at that time the only staff person �calling on individual donors� and had been so

for several years. She was not officially on the campaign leadership team at the time, but

would develop strong relationships with several of the team members. President Benton

had come to rely on her to introduce him to donors. Vice President Paulson had come to

rely on her to manage the advancement staff and build a major gifts team. The consultant

found Johnston receptive, and willing to implement recommendations. In 2002,

President Benton facilitated Johnston�s promotion to director of major gifts. A

participant said,

She [Johnston] was a clearly a performer early on. She kept stepping into new challenges and taking them on. She stepped into the director of major gifts program and she really put together the first major gifts team for the college. The recognition that she received there was that she was elevated to be director of development. Essentially, she has been the acting vice president for the last year.

Having started from the �bottom� of the development organization, Johnston was

respected as a nexus for the leadership team and the other advancement units, which she

referred to as �pods� (alumni relations, development, and communications). She shared

her perspective on why the advancement team had multiple staffing problems. She said,

I got seven promotions during my stay at the college. It was really nothing thought out strategically on my part, Preston, but I knew instinctively that to be a good leader, I needed to understand the

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process. How you do this from the inside. I have seen almost everyone fail coming in from the outside because they did not understand our culture - they truly did not understand the basics of fund raising and development. They didn�t really have the basic fundamentals of fund raising and management was a huge thing.

Despite staffing issues, financial support to the campaign grew steadily and on

pace. However, during the silent phase, it became apparent that the campaign would not

have the level of volunteer support anticipated. Volunteers, particularly trustees, had

contributed large dollar gifts but little time. Such was also the case with alumni, parents,

and students. Trustee Aimes said,

So often, we would hear from the Sue Wellingtons [the consultant]of the world, even from Spencer and Ross that the success of the campaign was going to be because the trustees, the volunteers, would lead the campaign. Well, I always sat there and said bullshit. The success is going to be because you are leading it, we want to follow you, and I firmly believe that that was the success. Spencer did lead the campaign, and Ross did lead the campaign. They had to think about it every single day. Every single hour they had to think about it. It was their livelihood. We the trustees could float in and out. Now I can appreciate that we had to write some big checks, okay, and we had to be inspired to do that. We had to show leadership in doing that but we weren�t out there making the calls. It was their fortitude, it was their real effort that made the difference in my opinion.

The advancement team did not have the infrastructure or expertise to manage

volunteers. The president carried the weight of securing large gifts. A participant said,

The president was getting most of the big gifts and the president would make it appear to everyone else that others in advancement had gotten the gift. He would immediately shine the light on others that were involved with helping.

President Benton�s strength of leadership and success at soliciting large gifts took on

legendary proportions. The consultant said,

When I look at other institutions that we work with, this campaign was really delivered by the president and supported by staff and by the board chair. There was not strong campaign steering committee or executive committee leadership. The campaigns co-chairs were not strong. They may have been strong trustees. They were not strong leaders for this campaign. I think that team was strong and became stronger as it became more apparent that they were the ones that were going to deliver on the

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campaign and that there was not going to be a larger group of volunteers.

During the silent phase, Team Franchise raised a $25,648,648 making the total dollar

amount raised $36,105,204 towards the campaign goal of $65 million dollars.

Phase III: Public Phase, 2001-2004

In 2001, President Benton announced the campaign case, priorities, dollar goal,

and organization to the public. During the public phase, the campaign staff increased in

size and skill. The advancement staff continued to experience multiple hires, promotions,

reassignments, and resignations. In 2003, Development Director Downey was demoted.

She was again demoted in 2004. In 2003, Director of Major Gifts Johnston was

promoted to director of development. Despite frequent travels with the president and

daily work with the vice president, Johnston said she had not viewed the inner workings

of the campaign leadership team until her promotion to director of development.

Johnston focused on hiring and training major gift officers and continued to

provide stability during the tumultuous staff transitions that would continue throughout

the campaign. Johnston assembled and trained the major gift directors and intensified

fund raising activity and relationship building. However, the deployment of major gift

directors in the field came too late into the campaign to build the rich relationships

needed to secure major gifts for that campaign. The team was an investment. They

would solicit gifts as available, but focus on building actionable relationships with donors

and donor prospects that would carry over to the next campaign. Johnston found

satisfaction in having built a team. She said,

Once we developed a major gift office and actually built it, built the budget for it, trained, hired, trained and took these people out on the

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road, their outreach is now phenomenal. For example if we would have had four or five visits a month from people that were way overburdened, meaning myself and the VP, Ross Paulson, at the time, that was pretty good. With the major gift office, last month for example, we had 57 visits from three people, and that�s what you need to do. To launch your campaign, come in at $78 million, build a team, and do everything all at once is not the way the textbook tells you to do it but it�s the way we did it. So I feel it was very successful on several fronts.

Early in 2004, the campaign was on track to exceed its dollar goal. However, two

campaign projects including the $10 million dollar library renovation and addition were

not funded fully. Trustee Aimes said,

I could see also this funding of the library was really weighing heavily on Spencer to the point that it became whether or not we hit the campaign goal, success was going to be determined on whether or not we did the library.

Despite the campaign dollar shortfall, Trustee Chair Aimes assured the college a

successful campaign, and along with that a successful presidency for President Benton.

Aimes said,

We are going to do the library and we will raise the money through borrowing, and all of a sudden this big burden was lifted off his shoulder and it was like he was free to go. Spencer had painted himself into that corner and that was a defining time and who was he to recommend that the board authorize more borrowing. We took that on. I said you are not recommending that, I am. So, I became the advocate of borrowing what we needed to finish the library. Even though there had been whispers about �we�d better not borrow anymore or this or that.� We were not going to let that defeat the success of the campaign so we ultimately had to borrow the funds to finish the library.

At Aimes� recommendation, the campaign was concluded ahead of schedule, freeing

President Benton to pursue career opportunities. Aimes said, �I was very committed to

him individually and I told him, I am going to go to bat for you. I won�t be an obstacle.�

Aimes also knew that it would be counterproductive to try to retain the president by

increasing his compensation or benefits as other trustees wanted. He said,

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Once all the trustees got to the point of understanding the power that he had, they wanted to make sure he stuck around for as long as we could keep him. There were some that thought we should have done more to keep him. But heart to heart, I think that would be the worse thing to do if he was still here he would be suffering.

President Benton resigned and soon thereafter accepted a presidency at a more

prestigious institution. Increasing the appeal for President Benton of the more prestigious

institutions was turmoil in the provost office at the college.

By the close of the year 2004, Team Franchise added $42,413,642 dollars to the

campaign making the total raised $78,527,846 dollars, exceeding the campaign goal by

more than $13 million dollars, and completing several months ahead of schedule. The

campaign was �soft closed,� meaning that the team would seek contributions until all

projects were funded fully.

Before departing, President Benton promoted Director of Development Johnston

to executive director of development. Johnston continued to strengthen the major gifts

team, and manage the development team. She had hoped for a promotion to vice

president for advancement or at least some recognition for serving in that capacity for at

least one year. Executive Director Johnston resigned and accepted a vice presidency at

another institution. Vice President for Advancement Paulson was named acting College

President. The college�s new president was named in 2005 and �campaign talk� preceded

her arrival. Campaign preparations were underway.

Interpersonal Relationships

Campaign leadership team members were asked to share their views on internal

team relationships and the role those relationships had on campaign success. President

Benton said,

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Well we spent a lot of time together. First of all, we�re good friends, and it was easier to work with them because of the fact that we were all congenial. We also could discuss just about anything amongst ourselves. So no matter how complicated the question might be, we were able to talk about it.

He continued,

We met a lot, we worked hard, and I also would try to make sure that I did the right thing by those individuals. So you know if we were traveling late somewhere, I would take them to a good dinner in San Francisco or something like that. So we tried to have some light time, as well as work like hell time.

Trustee Aimes had good working relationships with each of the leadership team members

but communicated primarily with President Benton and Vice President Paulson. He said,

Clearly, a shared agenda, a shared vision of what needs to be done, what the priorities are, and how the work ought to be organized. There was never any doubt about that. No one had any hidden agenda, it was all driven by what was best for the college, what was best for the campaign. Who would be best positioned to do the task. The conversations with Spencer necessarily had to be very open and honest and very thorough in that sense. So that was the way we were. We could talk at that level.

He spoke specifically about his relationship with President Benton saying, �He and I just

worked extremely well together.�

Executive Director Johnston said that relationships are important, and as she

ascended the organization ranks, she realized that the various �pods� or units within the

advancement team did not mingle and she did not think that was a good practice.

They�re [relationships] vitally important. Well you have to have trust, and open communication as best you can, so you know, again I�ll go back to these different pods, the ones that seem to have good morale throughout the third floor in advancement, were the ones to say, oh we need to think about this, we could be better here, we�re doing this well, you�re doing this well, how can we do this. So you know, those pods I think worked very well. As a total I�m not so sure back when, I know when I started meeting which was probably two years ago, with Spencer and Ross on a weekly basis that was always good. I don�t recall when anybody besides Spencer or Ross met with Doug Aimes. So I can�t describe their, that relationship. Which you know, I think that is a downfall. I don�t think that�s a good thing.

123

She continued,

It�s just very important to me personally that I can trust someone, what they are saying to me is what they�re saying to others. You know trust is earned; it�s not given by title. I learned that I could trust Spencer Benton, that I could tell him what he needed to know and that he would take care of it in an appropriate way or just bookmark it or whatever. You know your president, a lot of times people are yes people to your president. And I know a lot of people were. But you know that doesn�t help move the institution forward. So trust is very important to me up and down, up and down the ranks.

Vice President Paulson said,

If I had to boil it down to a word it would, was going to, be trust. I think that in this business where so much personal information is exchanged, where teams have to form around a dynamic that you can�t always describe, there is a chemistry about enabling other people that are nearly strangers to be comfortable and to understand why these professionals would be excited about their mission, about their purpose about their college is so much, and once that trust is not there it�s a team that comes apart very quickly. And it�s a very precious commodity not found easily, not found often and one that is easily jeopardized. I cannot tell you how many times I have seen people just erode trust by gesture, body language, tone of voice. Once you have it, it is hard to keep it. It is something that you have to work at all the time.

When asked about the nature of interpersonal relationships, the consultant said,

�They [the other leadership team members] blew off steam at each other and got over it.�

She continued,

Absolutely critical. They do not need to love each other; they really need to respect each other. And so they don�t need to be best buddies. If they can become friends and have that kind of relationship that can be a bonus, but more than anything, they have to be able to work together. I think there is synergy there. If you have a good sense of team, you know somebody has your back. Someone is going to partner with you that can tug you from out of the sheets in the morning. I also think that people repeat pleasurable experiences and if we make fundraising pleasurable for people and they get good results, it makes them want to be part of that more. You don�t want people to go A.W.O.L or go passive aggressive.

More campaigns fail for lack of donors than for any other reasons. You can have a fabulous team. If you don�t have prospects and you therefore don�t have donors, it doesn�t matter if you are joined at the hip and have a love in, but there is a synergy and momentum that comes from bringing a campaign together. A campaign creates a whole

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different attitude among people it gives people a very, a focus, it gives people a deadline. When people come together in a common cause that way things happen that you don�t expect will happen. If you don�t have a base of prospects and if you don�t have donors, it doesn�t matter about the team. It doesn�t matter about the party. It does not matter about the publications or the communications. It doesn�t matter about the staff.

She also said that the biggest threat to a successful campaign �is turnover in every way

turnover in presidency, turnover in board leadership, and turnover in staff.�

Campaign Success

Team members shared their views on campaign success. Campaign Consultant

Wellington said,

There are a number of success factors that we look at for campaigns. The most obvious one is did the campaign achieved its dollar goal. But the other ones is did it help to build morale on campus. Did it help to build a major gifts infrastructure for the institution? Did it engage an informed volunteer advocate who can speak now in a more educated way about the institution about the need for philanthropic support for the institution and did it help to identify the next generation of donors and leaders, volunteer leaders on behalf of the college are some that come to mind.

President Benton said a successful campaign is �one that raises money, and raises

friendships and relationships simultaneously.� He said the biggest threat to success was:

Being too successful too fast. So, if the goal is not always a stretch goal, they�re not putting out as much as they could, both staff and donors. If they think the goal is too easy to reach, they just won�t do enough. They need to be pushed to go that extra mile to get those extra million dollars.

Vice President for Advancement Paulson said,

Well, I think that in our situation we would define it [success] in both our identification and developing in equal relationships with our external constituency of friends, foundations, corporations, and alumni, and then there is of course meeting the dollar goal of each of the cases that we would go forward with. So in some incidences, we�ve been highly successful and others we continue to work on ways of funding those initiatives. Well this particular campaign I think has a third factor

125

in success and that was building a dynamic and successful, well, a dynamic team in the advancement operations.

Executive Director of Development Johnston said,

Well most people would probably look and say, did we meet the goal? That is certainly one measure of success and it was for us. But we were also building, and we use this, and what I mean by building, we were building an infrastructure of the college and building connections with our constituents. So there were two main goals in this campaign overriding: the dollar goal and building connections with our constituents.

Case Analysis The Heuristic Framework as Context




campaign outcomes (see Figure 5.2).


Campaign Success

1


4

Team Dynamics

7


5 Campaign Design Factors

3

Team Design Factors

2


6

126

Construct: Campaign Success

The campaign success construct was composed of six concepts: (1) initial goal:

adjusted goal, (2) percentage of priority projects funded, (3) alumni participation


five-year annual total giving average.

127

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128

Initial goal: Adjusted Goal

Capital needs were estimated at $120 million dollars, and donor charitable

propensity was estimated at $60 million dollars. The initial internal goal was $60 million

dollars. The �stretch goal� of $65 million dollars was announced to the public and not

adjusted thereafter. The overall dollar goal was exceeded. However, trustees �soft

closed� the campaign, meaning that Team Franchise would continue to seek campaign

contributions. On the one hand, the unchanged campaign goal reflected the accuracy of

the president�s estimation of overall giving. On the other hand, the disproportionate

funding of lesser priority projects reflected a poor assessment of donor preferences.


Campaign Goals Adjustments Dollar Amount Years Initial goal I Internal $60 million 1996-1999 Adjusted goal II Public $65 million 1999-2004

Revenue: expense

Each dollar raised cost 16 cents.

Percentage of priority projects funded

Team Franchise funded four of their five campaign projects (contributions funded

three projects and one project was funded by a mix of contributions and loan). The

under-funded project had not been funded to goal at the close of the campaign.


The number of alumni solicited each year increased during the campaign,

reflecting the natural increase in number of alumni (see Table 5.3). Every year following

the public announcement of the campaign, the number of alumni contributors decreased.

However, the dollar value of their combined contributions tended to increase. Many

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alumni tended to participate in the College�s annual fund drives. Contributions to annual

fund drives were counted along with undesignated contributions to the campaign.

Therefore, no accurate account of alumni participation was calculated.

Table 5.3: Alumni participation percentage

Year

Number Alumni of

Record

Number Alumni Solicited

Number Alumni Donors

Participation Percentage

Contribution (Face Value)

1996 12,814 10,438 4,804 37.5% - 1998 13,342 10,985 5,056 37.9% 1,288,470 2000 13,602 11,436 4,710 34.6% 3,040,970 2002 13,838 11,672 4,354 31.5% 2,806,120 2004 14,606 13,353 4,261 29.2% 3,606,237

In addition, in their annual survey the Council on Aid to Education calculated the alumni

participation percentage as presented by dividing the number of alumni who contributed

during the period by the number of alumni available. Dividing the number of

participating alumni by the number of solicited alumni markedly increases alumni

participation percentage on paper.

Endowment value

With the exception of the year 2002, college endowment increased as did

endowment per student. The endowment value appears to have followed closely the

economic trends between 1996 and 2004, but with a higher than average rate of return on

investment. The College�s campaign literature stated, �For many years the college has

overachieved in both its educational mission and financial management.�

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Table 5.4: Endowment per student, market value, and percentage change from the previous year

Year Endowment Per

Student


Percentage Change In Endowment Market Value

From Previous Year 1996 54,260 68,802,000 11.1% 1998 78,698 97,900,200 21.7% 2000 85,879 117,396,000 12.4% 2002 83,362 115,372,839 0.1% 2004 105,821 135,431,239 16.0%


The College�s trustees were generous with their time and dollars, but more so

with their dollars. Trustee financial participation was 100% percent and the annual total

amount contributed tended to increase each year of the campaign.

Table 5.5: Governing board financial contributions


Members

Total Financial Contributions

Total 1996 57 347,211 1998 53 431,893 2000 59 911,455 2002 58 3,222,054 2004 51 2,683,960


One calculates the average by taking the year considered and the four years

preceding and divide by five. One observes a steady increase in contributions consistent

with intensity of campaign solicitation activity.

131

Table 5.6: Five-year annual giving total average

Year Five Year Average (Grand

Total) 1996 6,237,356 1998 6,062,050 2000 7,655,340 2002 10,478,936 2004 13,661,792




Table 5.7: Campaign team design construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

Construct Concept Description Key Observation


Team membership

The team consisted of president, vice president, executive director of development, campaign consultant and campaign co-chair.

Diversity Skill variety The team was diverse, owing largely to the mix of styles. The team was not diverse in member skills.

Tasks Work functions and activities

The primary activities were donor identification and solicitation. Much effort was invested in hiring and training staff.

Campaign team design factors


Organization arrangement

The structure of organization was centralized.

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Team Franchise consisted of the college�s president, vice president for

advancement, executive director of development, trustee chair, and campaign consultant

(see Appendix G for team membership composition over time).

Diversity

Team Franchise membership was diverse in skills. However, President Benton�s

�the brains behind the operation� high-level involvement may have minimized the

potential contributions of team members. A participant said, �Very few people would

probably say to him something different from what they thought he wanted to hear.�

Tasks

Team member roles were clear. President Benton led the campaign. He provided

close oversight to the advancement team. The vice president for advancement led and

managed the advancement team. The executive director of development managed the

day-to-day fund raising operation, which included recruitment, training, monitoring, and

carrying out corrective actions with the staff. The trustee chair provided support to the

president ensuring nothing impeded the campaign. The campaign consultant provided

the president, vice president for advancement, and executive director of development

technical and emotional support.


Team Franchise�s organization was consistent with the centralized model of

advancement. Characteristic of centralized structures is direct presidential supervision of

the vice president for advancement, who in turn provides leadership to the balance of the

advancement team.

133

Figure 5.3: Team organization at campaign conclusion


The campaign design construct consisted of three concepts: (1) campaign

initiation (2) planning and phases, and (3) campaign complexity.

President Benton

Consultant Wellington

Trustee Chair Aimes

Executive Director for Advancement Johnston

Vice president for Advancement Paulson

134

Table 5.8: Campaign process design factors construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

Construct Concepts Description Key Observation Campaign initiation


Trustees

Planning and phases

Campaign planned and organization

Pre-campaign planning Quiet Public

Campaign process design factors

Campaign complexity

Complexity of planning and execution.

Highly complex plan not executed because of staffing model and lack of experience.

Campaign initiation

Trustees initiated the capital campaign.

Planning and phases

Team Franchise carried out the campaign in three phases: (1) pre-campaign

planning, (2) silent, and (3) public (see Figure 1).

Campaign complexity

Team Franchise�s campaign plan was highly complex and well organized.

However, complexity and sophistication committed to paper were not realized in

practice. For example, the volunteer organization failed because complexity outstripped

organizational capacity to carry out the plan.

135




production of results, (5) evaluation and, (6) maintenance of effectiveness.

Table 5.9: Campaign team core processes and performance: construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

Construct Concept Description Key Observation Work management

Work delegation Delegated by president

Team core processes and performance Relationship

management, conflict management

Internal team relationship management

Managed by president


External to team issues management

Team members were dispatched to address external to team matters.


How established objectives and goals are met

President monitored performance against goals.

Evaluation The process for observing fund raising effort in the context of desired outcomes.

Informal evaluation process of team members perceived as contributors.

Team core processes and performance

Maintenance of effectiveness

How the team maintains effectiveness over the course of the campaign.

President�s motivation

Work Management

The trustee chair conferred with the president and vice president for

advancement. The President delegated campaign work and carried out much of the major

gift solicitation. The vice president for advancement provided broad leadership to the

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advancement unit. The executive director of development managed day-to-day

operations. The campaign consultant provided counsel to the president, vice president for

advancement and the executive director of development.


There was no formal program for building and or sustaining team member

interpersonal relationships. President Benton modeled behavior. The trustee chair said,

�Spencer is a very thoughtful person. Very positive. Very powerful in that sense.�

President Benton praised exceptional performance and tended to give credit to others.

The campaign leadership team was cohesive. However, the types and quality of

relationships within the team varied (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Campaign leadership team interpersonal relationship orientations

In the above Figure, arrows indicate relationship orientations. Solid arrow lines

represent stronger relationships. Dotted arrows lines represent lesser strength

relationships. All of the leadership team members oriented to the president, and he

President

Consultant

Director/Executive Director of

Development

Other Advancement

Team Units/Personnel

Trustee Chair Vice

President for Advancement

137

toward them. The president appeared to have close interpersonal relationships with each

of the team members and the closest relationship with the trustee board chair.

The executive director of development said the advancement team was informally

structured into pods based on interpersonal relationships, rank, and division within the

advancement team. Few team members crossed �pod� boundaries. The exceptions were

development directors.


Team Franchise�s members had strong relationships across campus, with the

greater community, and with constituents. Therefore, little in the external environment

occurred without Team Franchise members� knowledge or was outside their reach of

influence. For example, President Benton learned that a nearby university planned to

�kick off� its comprehensive capital campaign the week prior to the College�s �kick off.�

The university president was convinced to reschedule the kickoff to accommodate the

college.


Campaign objectives and goals were met by (1) assembling a campaign

leadership team, (2) reorganizing, staffing, and equipping the advancement organization,

(3) engaging planning process, and (4) monitoring all aspects of the campaign and taking

corrective actions.

138

Evaluation

Participants said President Benton was an �open book� and �you always knew

where you stood with him.� This approach served as ongoing feedback for performance,

albeit informal. Evaluation measures were (1) progress toward the overall dollar goal,

and 2) progress toward the funding each campaign project or objective.


President Benton maintained fund raising and team cohesiveness by modeling

behavior and providing monetary and non-monetary rewards. Benton encouraged a

strong sense of ownership, commitment, and responsibility to the campaign.


Team Franchise contended with a sluggish regional economy, the terrorist attacks

of 2001, and the deaths of several students. The consultant said that campaigns are

highly vulnerable to external influences. Team members did not believe the campaign

was overly influenced by circumstances external to the college community. The

consultant said,

The economy was difficult. The campaign was not deterred by September 11 and they kicked off their campaign right after it. The following month they went public on it. In some ways, it was a community builder for them.

The president said,

[The city] itself, not the college, but the city was really having a rough time. When [a company], whatever year that was bought out [company] and [company]. I mean we had some externals that had to

139

deal with the business climate and the economic climate in [the city] that we couldn�t flee from. And those were very real issues.


Several events internal to the organization influenced Team Franchise and the

campaign. Among those influences were: (1) results of the capital needs assessment and

feasibility study (2) staff turnover, and (3) discontent within the college�s executive team.

When college leaders learned that capital needs well outstripped donor financial

commitment, there was tension between the administrators believed responsible for fund

raising and the college faculty. The effect was an increase in Benton's status. During the

�Pre-campaign needs assessment� and �Silent phase,� Team Franchise contended with

steady turnover of staff. Benton's position was that they were building an �A� team.

However, no team member said the turnover at the lower levels of the campaign

influenced the activity of the campaign leadership team.

Over the campaign period, there was unrest at the cabinet level owing in great

part to difficulties in the provost�s office. Two participants believed discontent in the

provost�s office hindered consensus building, occupied much of President Benton�s time,

and made his decision to resign less difficult.

The consultant said,

A campus issue can derail a campaign. That can sideline leadership in ways you never think it would. It can throw work off by six months. Big decisions around which there are emotions can derail campaigns.

She continued,

There were several student deaths over the course of the campaign, but nothing derailing or distracting from the campaign.

While there were debates and �falling outs� among faculty and between faculty and the

president about campaign priorities, and campaign dollar goal, the greatest internal

140

influence appears to have been consensus about the need for a successful capital

campaign. President Benton said,

The only thing that I would point to there, Preston, would be the absolute necessity that we all knew existed that [the College] flat out had to have an injection of serious money. So if there was anything in kind of the ethos there, it was that our needs are so great that everybody was willing to go that extra mile.

Construct: Team dynamics

The team dynamic construct (relationships) was the confluence of all of the

constructs in the heuristic framework, which were believed to influence campaign

success. Team Franchise members had a shared understanding and commitment to

campaign success. The team was designed with professional competency in mind and

perhaps foremost, the fit of member interpersonal natures with those of the president.

The complex campaign design outstripped leadership team and staff capacity to carry out

the plans. Team Franchise was managed from the �top down�. Despite the president

having limited one-on-one interaction with the advancement staff, he was aware of day-

to-day advancement team dynamics.

Case Summary

Team Franchise�s story began with the appointment of President Benton. Benton

had a mandate to conduct a successful comprehensive capital campaign. This was

Benton�s first presidency. However, he quickly proved himself a prolific fund raiser and

leader. He exacted a profound influence on every considered aspect of campaign.

President Benton systematically assembled a loyal leadership team and proceeded to

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�drive� the campaign process in a collaborative spirit from conception to conclusion.

Benton�s team was relatively new to campaign fund raising and grew quickly in skill.

Benton effectively articulated his commitments, both to lead a successful campaign

and to advance his aspiration to lead a more prestigious institution. At the close of the

campaign, Benton resigned and accepted the presidency at a more prestigious institution.

Participants considered the campaign a success despite its concluding with under funded

key campaign projects.

The campaign leadership team was insular and perceived stable after Benton

�fired� his vice president and director of development. However, the lower levels of the

advancement organization were perceived unstable and experienced high turnover of

staff.

At the beginning of this research, a new president had succeeded Benton, but was

not yet inaugurated. At that time, only two of the original campaign team members (vice

president for advancement and the executive director of development) were employed

with the College. Shortly before the completion of the study, the executive director

resigned to accept a leadership position at another College. The vice president returned

to the faculty.

Interpretation

Team Franchise�s campaign gives testimony to the influence of presidential

leadership and management. Benton dominated the campaign process. He had a strong

charismatic style matched by strong leadership and management skill, and a drive to

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excel. The most pronounced characteristic of Team Franchise was its high level of trust,

loyalty, and confidence in the president and their aspirations for the College.

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CHAPTER 6

Team Power Play

Case Background

In an internal document, College trustees qualified this institution�s 75-year

history of capital campaigns not as successful, but as a �succession of positive

endeavors.� This �succession of positive endeavors� was attributed to multiple

substantial donations, often given anonymously by �a few individuals who had the

misfortune of dying.� The largesse of a misfortunate few had the effect of swelling the

College�s endowment and minimizing fund raising effort to the status of �necessary evil.�

A participant attributed the anonymous gifts to campus culture. He said, �Having money

is compared to being evil, or if you are rich you are going against your College identity,

culture, and values.� Another participant said, �[College�s] people do good, they don�t

do well. There is something a bit unseemly about asking people for money.� Further

reflecting the fund raising-prohibitive campus culture, a participant said that the college

appreciates the �outcomes of campaigns but not necessarily fund raising noise.�

In the most recent campaign, College leaders attempted to compensate for its

history of inattention to comprehensive major gift fund raising by allocating nearly $8

million dollars from endowment to fund the campaign.

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In addition, trustees made a commitment to capitalize and professionalize the

development program toward creating and maintaining a fund raising program on par

with the international stature of the institution.

The formal campaign process began under the leadership of a president who was

relatively inexperienced at the college presidency and fundraising. Over a seven-year

span, the campaign team incurred a succession of differently spirited and effective vice

presidents for development. Each of the four appointments were in great part attempts to

enhance the quality of interpersonal dynamics within the campaign leadership team and

most centrally the relationship between the president and the various vice presidents for

development. Despite interpersonal dysfunction, which prompted multiple promotions,

demotions, resignations, and the �quitting of many volunteers,� Team Power Play

(pseudonym), a comprehensive campaign leadership team, raised approximately $175

million dollars against a goal of $165 million dollars.

This account of Team Power Play is conveyed in five sections: (1) Institutional

overview, (2) Case narrative, (3) Case analysis, (4) Case summary, and (5)

Interpretations.


Founded in the early 1800�s, the College is independent, coeducational, and

liberal arts focused. The College enrolls approximately 2,807 students. In some years,

students represent as many as 49 states and 30 or more countries. The college is rated

�most selective18�, and ranked among the 25 top private liberal arts colleges in the

country. It is renowned for its leadership in and commitment to access, equity and

18 U.S. News and World Reports, America�s Best Colleges, 2005

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�educating the whole person.� The college is unique. A former president of the college

wrote, �The College prides itself on marching to the beat of a different drummer.� The

student to faculty ratio is 1:10. Faculty and student research collaboration is a hallmark

of the institution.

In the fiscal year ending in 2004, the College�s endowment was approximately

$651,013,999 dollars. The endowment per student was $199,981 dollars. Annual

operating expenditures totaled $115,710,000 dollars. The College ranked second among

affiliated peer institutions considering the above noted financial measures. The College

adhered to The Council for the Advancement and Support of Education (CASE)

standards of campaign accounting in educational fund raising.


This account covered the activities of Team Power Play primarily from 1997

through 2004. Team Power Play structured its campaign around three phases: (1) pre-

campaign planning, (2) quiet, and (3) public (see Figure 6.1). Over the course of the

phases, the Team experienced the appointments of four vice presidents for development.

The recounting of Team Power Play�s story is organized loosely around the campaign

phases and the appointments of vice presidents for development. The case narrative

concludes with comments from participants on campaign team dynamics, campaign

success, and the relationship between dynamics and success.

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Figure 6.1: Team Power Play�s campaign phases, stages, and timeline

Campaign Overview

Pre-campaign planning (circa 1993-1997)19

By 1993, College leaders had discussed retrenchment for several years.

Discussion of budgets and funding escalated when faculty presented trustees a $23

million dollar facilities enhancement project. The project would become the catalyst and

�centerpiece� for the next capital campaign.

The college�s endowment was exceptionally robust. However, demands on the

operating budget were showing few signs of abatement. Therefore, College leaders

moved to position the Institution for a comprehensive capital campaign. The strategy

included the resignation of the College president--the president who had recently led the

19 Campaign literature did not identify the period prior to the quiet phase of the campaign as �pre-campaign planning�. However, participants identified important activities that occurred in the period immediately prior to the quiet phase, which shaped the campaign.

Campaign planning Lead gifts Kick off Major gifts General Gifts Celebration

Pre campaign planning

Public Phase

Figure adapted from The Fund Raising School, 2002, Campaign Phases.

Quiet Phase

�96 �97 �98 �99 �00 �01 �02

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institution�s capital campaign, which raised $95 million dollars against a goal of $80

million dollars. The outgoing president�s downfalls included pressing radical agendas for

the academic life of the College, and having served in the presidency for ten years. The

next president would have a fund raising mandate, and inherit a campus community

perceived by development staff as not committed to fundraising.

Quiet phase (1997-1999)

During the quiet phase, over four hundred faculty, staff, alumni, students, trustees,

and parents were engaged in a capital needs assessment process. Following the needs

assessment a non-random electronic screening of donors and conventional interviews

were conducted to assess campaign feasibility. During that time, Vice President Adler

�drove the campaign process.� He is credited with building a campaign organization,

recruiting volunteers, populating the board of trustees with campaign-friendly members,

soliciting leadership gifts and building consensus on fund raising objectives and the

dollar goal. The campaign total goal was set at $165 million dollars.

By the close of the quiet phase, $73 million dollars had been raised against a quiet

phase goal of $50 million dollars. That success reopened discussion among trustees

about the practicality of a $200 million dollar campaign goal. Influenced by the

recommendations of the consultant and the vice president for development, the $200

million dollars goal was not approved.

Public phase

The public phase of the campaign began in 1999, and concluded in 2004. During

that period, much organizational energy was invested in building a major gifts unit. As

much energy was devoted to maintaining continuity between vice president leadership

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transitions. During the public phase, several and large bequests and leadership level gifts

were contributed. At the close of the campaign, Team Power Play raised a total of $175

million dollars against a campaign goal of $165 million dollars. However, the team

failed to fully fund three of its five projects, including its �centerpiece project.�

Case Study

Pre-Campaign Planning, 1993-1997

In 1993, in response to a proposed $23 million dollar building project College

President Kilte aggressively �courted� and appointed an experienced major gifts fund

raiser in the person of Winston Adler. Adler�s job was to �take fund raising to the next

level.� President Kilte and Adler were to work closely. According to participants, the

executive foresight and investment in fund raising was unprecedented for the College.

Adler�s excitement was short lived. He said,

The day I arrived in town in a snowstorm and this is a very interesting thing because I uprooted my wife as well, and she had a very senior professional position at a college and no promise of a job at the College. The day I arrived, literally, the day I arrived was the Board weekend, and they were going to introduce me as the new vice president. I got a call that afternoon informing me that Kenneth [the president] was going to tell the Board that he was stepping down, [that that would be his last year] which came as a complete shock to me because I had had no indication of that. I think that I was not the first person that Kenneth did not tell the whole story to. I did not like it at all. It was very upsetting because it is a very important relationship between the president and the chief development officer. That is the key relationship. I didn�t know who the next president was going to be and did not know what direction that president would want the school to go in.

He continued,

It was very difficult. If the person has fundamentally misled you, and you know it, it is difficult to trust anything else they are going to say. But, I had come to [The College] to do a job regardless of who the president was, and one of the great things about running a campaign and doing that work is that there is certain amount of independence that

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you need to do yourself. I was asked to really redo the system and sort of start from the bottom and work it right back up. So there was not any one there really to say you are doing this the right way, you are doing this the wrong way. I reported to Kenneth on my progress.

Adler and President Kilte worked closely that first year. Vice President Adler said,

�Kenneth Kilte gave me enough room and enough support to build the structure that

would support a campaign.� During that period, Adler established powerful relationships

with donors and many trustees.

In 1994, trustees inaugurated President Clara Anniston, the college�s first woman

president. The appointment was Anniston�s first full presidency and the first time she

was charged to lead a comprehensive campaign20. While the president was relatively

new to fund raising, she had at access to over 80 years of fund raising experience in the

persons of Campaign Co-chair Bloom, Vice President for Development Adler, and fund

raising Consultant Mackey (see Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2: Campaign leadership team

20 President Anniston elected not to participate in the study.

President Anniston

Consultant Mackey

Trustees: Bloom, DeShaw, and Duggan

Vice president for Advancement Adler

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There were three campaign chairs. However, Co-chair Bloom, an alumnus with

25 years of trustee service, was said to have provided the most �hands on leadership� and

was closest to the �life of the campaign.� Co-chair Bloom said, �I�m not diminishing in

any way what they [other co-chairs] contributed. They contributed millions while I

contributed tens of thousands of dollars and a great deal of sweat equity.� He said prior

to the president�s appointment, trustees tested thoroughly the proposition of a women

president with major donors. Bloom said:

One of the questions we had in our own minds was whether, or not an alumnus would be willing to respond affirmatively to being solicited by the first woman president of the College. It�s not automatic that the old geezers are going to come into the 20th century, make the major gift, and respond to a request by a woman. We asked some of them and they were most enthusiastic. You put that piece together with the person�s [president] personality and we thought we had a winner. In any case, we were willing to take the risk of hiring the first woman as president and she was a dynamic person. We wanted to take a risk that she could pull off a capital campaign, but there was some risk taking and we were conscious of it.

Vice President Adler had more than one dimension. On the one hand, Vice

President Adler was highly successful at building relationships with trustees and

soliciting major gifts. He was also a capable campaign architect. On the other hand,

Adler�s relationships with his development staff were characterized as �strained� and

�intense.� Adler was not considered a strong manager or builder of cohesive or effective

teams in his early years at the College. Adler said of his relationships within the team,

�they were quite difficult my first year. I think there was probably a sixty percent

turnover in the first eighteen months�. Consultant Mackey said, �Adler was terrific in

developing relationships with very top donors, and converting those gifts. He was not as

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good a supervisor. In fact, he had many minuses as a supervisor of the development

staff.�

Regarding the campaign consultant, Adler said, �I changed consultants very early

in the process. I interviewed the person and found that it was not going to work at all�.

The College�s new consultant was Andrew Mackey, a highly respected campaign

consultant with over 40 years of campaign experience. Mackey had a formal technical

role in the campaign and an informal unwritten role as a builder of consensus on key

matters. He explained his technical role:

We did a study to catch the attitudes of some of the main donors and to get a fix on the goals, and then we helped them set up timetables for the campaign, the committee structures that would be required, the working goal, and how that would break down. We worked on the staffing, what they need, how many staff members, and in what portion of the campaign organization. We helped them not in writing, but helping them ensure they had a good campaign prospectus and campaign promotional materials, and then as they went along we would help them in strategies on leadership donors and solicitation timetables. All of that required on my part, required about a day a month then later on about a day every two or three months... Then I was on call.

Regarding his informal role as a consensus builder, he said, �We deal with higher order

matters. If you ask me whether someone is a liability or an asset or holding up the

process, I will answer the question. But that�s not the role of our firm to involve

ourselves in that level of organizational matter.�

There was consensus that Mackey played a major role in the campaign. One

participant said that Mackey could have had a larger role and influence. The participant

said, �Consultants are there to give advice not to make decisions. So a consultant can

give very good advice and have that ignored and I believe that is often the case in this

situation.�

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Quiet Phase, 1997-1999

�I often say that we were successful in spite of ourselves.�

Participant

Formal campaign work began in 1997, with a capital needs assessment and

feasibility study. The needs assessment identified projects totaling $220 million dollars.

However, donor propensity was estimated at $120 million dollars. By the close of 1997,

Vice President Adler with the strong counsel of Campaign Consultant Mackey had set in

place a framework for campaign strategy, campaign team organization, project

prioritization, and timelines. He recruited campaign chairs, populated the volunteer

organization, and secured financial commitments in excess of the quiet phase dollar goal,

mostly by his own efforts. It was then that the formal campaign took its first negative

turn. Adler said,

I still think that Clara was exactly the right person to be the president of the College. Her sensitivities and her orientation just right on the money and the perfect personality, the perfect mind set, the perfect emotional response set to be the president. They could not have hired a better person as the first woman president of the College. As good of a president as I think Clara is, I think she is a horrible manager of people. We ran into, I ran into difficulties with her and I determined that I wasn�t going to keep working for her.

He continued,

I was working very, very hard in those days trying to pull together a campaign and I was doing that with a lot of clarity and a great deal of success. And at the same time, I am trying to manage people. You are not isolated when you are a vice president at a university. You are part of a management team and there are always interactions on those management team levels, sometimes it wasn�t. I found a number of my interactions with the management team frustrating. Clara I think, I don�t think she is a good person, people manager. She would send different signals and things would happen. There were people on my staff who, a couple of people on my staff, who objected to my management style. Did not like the level of accountability that I wanted people to have, and a couple of them went to Clara and complained. And said, this guy is too tough to work for and Clara called me in and said you have some management issues and I said well okay I can deal with that. Tell me who the people are and how we

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address this and she wouldn�t do that she said no can�t tell you who it is, and so at that point and so at that point and time I decided, okay this is not going to go anywhere, and I started looking for another job.

Adler had served as vice president for five years. He provided the president five months

notice. In his absence, the campaign leadership team would have limited major gifts

fundraising experience and operational oversight. As Adler�s time with the College

neared its close, he recommended Matt Atwater to President Anniston as the new vice

president for development. Atwater was Adler�s mentor. He was an experienced and

successful campaign manager.

Participant perceptions of Adler resignation varied. A participant said, �Adler is

ambitious and not one to stay too long at any institution.� According to the campaign co-

chair, Adler�s departure was a great loss, which negatively influenced the campaign. Co-

chair Bloom said,

We lost Winston early on, and we were real worried because part of the confidence that board had in launching a campaign was that we had this very, very dynamic vice president. He would have been a lead solicitor on par with the president if he stayed there. What are you going to do, you can�t chain him to a desk!

Bloom continued, sharing his perception of what might have precipitated Adler�s

departure.

There was some tension between the president and the vice president that clearly, were kept under wrap. With his staff, Winston was hard charging, a go-get-�em guy. Some of the staff had been around for a long time and they were frankly tired. They were not aggressive go-get-�em people and I think they were a bit intimidated by his dynamism and aggressiveness. And, so I am sure there was tension between him and some of those staff and I am sure that was a damn good thing.

Participants tended to believe Adler left because of his strained relationships with the

chief financial officer, key trustees, president, and many of his staff. One of Adler�s

successors said,

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Winston Adler was hired to push The College�s development into the 1990�s. He tried. He developed a culture of major gift fund raising... Winston Adler is one of the most capable fund raisers you will see. From what I understand, and from what I observed, and heard, he was not good at building a team of professionals under him. He was a major league poacher of top prospects and was not too interested in sharing the glory with his colleagues. And with all that in mind, and with a very strong personality in the sense of right and wrong, was not suited long-term to have a good relationship with our president, so that caused his jettison right as the campaign started.

Another participant commented on the tenuous relationship between the Vice President

Adler and President Anniston:

It was a difficult relationship. I think that Clara admired Winston�s intelligence and also his broad vision not just for development but the whole liberal arts culture. He was very aggressive, arrogant, really pushed-really hard, and he pushed so hard that she began to push back. And so, at first, they had an excellent relationship and it became less and less good. During the time he was here, they spoke less and less... He was staffing her on visits, but they stopped having discussions about other things. It was common knowledge in the office. It probably was not common knowledge across campus. They still worked well in tandem when they did development visits together. You know, I actually was not the fly on the wall in any of those discussions. I only saw it from Winston�s perspective. He felt disenfranchised. I don�t think I can really answer specifically except to say that I watched the transition from everything was going swimmingly, and then I saw him with her a couple of times, �you have to do this you have to do just this� and you don�t tell a president that he or she has to do something, you just can�t. He had just a wild sense of fun. Incredibly, incredibly, smart, good writer, visionary, very abusive. Beat. Beat his staff up and rather narcissistic as well. To tell the truth I have never seen anything like it before. If he hadn�t left when he did, I sure would have left. I know that she [the president] knew [the circumstances] because I think a lot of development staff actually went to her. So there was nearly a mutiny.�She knew there were problems but she also in many ways still relied on him because he really took good care of her. He prepped her and they had solicitation strategies, and he could talk about where exactly in the cultivation process they were when they would go to visit particular people. Again, apart from abusive side, he has tons of charisma, the positive stuff is absolutely amazing, and the negative stuff is just as powerful. He could turn the positive stuff on and she responded to it. He really follows the money and that is what a major gifts officer or VP... he was a great major gifts officer but managerial-wise his vision was great but the people aspect was totally lacking. Trustees loved him and major donors really responded to him because they saw a side that he wanted them to see and that side of him is delightful.

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Adler said he harbored no ill feelings toward President Anniston. He said,

Clara played a major role in articulating the vision and appetites of the college. She played a very major role in setting the tone. She did exactly what a good president should do. She established the vision of a leader. People accepted her as a leader at the College. People felt her relationship with the College was very appropriate and she was very effective at that and still is. The three motivators that people give to a major capital campaign are leadership, vision, and fiduciary responsibility and Clara did a great job of providing vision.

Against the recommendation of outgoing Vice President Adler, Consultant

Mackey and key trustees, President Anniston appointed Connie Hague to the position of

acting vice president for development. Hague had been hired by Adler some six months

prior and had limited fund raising experience. A participant provided context for the

president�s selection of Hague. She said,

Again, if you looked to his [Adler] staff at that time it was a little bit thin. There were a couple of people he was considering and he, I believe at the time did make the right decision by asking Connie to come on, but that was a huge learning curve, which she never, she just kind of never. There were many complications. She was the right person to be hired as the interim acting vice president, I believe in my opinion.

Several months into the interim appointment of the Vice President for Development

Hague, President Anniston made an unpopular decision. The impact would border on

catastrophic. Against the recommendations of key trustees, the campaign consultant, and

the raised eyebrows of development team staff, President Anniston did not conduct an

extensive national search for a new vice president for development. She instead made

known her intention to appoint Acting Vice President Hague to vice president for

development.

Support for Hague was slow coming or did not come at all. An agreement was

reached between the president and trustees with the endorsement of the consultant to

support the inexperienced interim vice president, and president with the contractual

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appointment of Matt Atwater as campaign director. Atwater would manage the day-to-

day operations of the campaign. Participants shared that Atwater�s relationship with

former Vice President Adler, coupled with his hire (which was done without the full

endorsement of President Anniston) ill-fated Atwater with President Anniston.


Atwater had 30 years of experience at managing fund raising operations, with a particular

eye toward accounting. Atwater said of his unique role:

It was largely a young group. There was not a great deal of experience. I saw a group that was actually looking for someone to come and say this is how you do it and this is what you need to be thinking about�

He continued,

We know that she [the vice president] does not know how to run a campaign. And therefore, when I came in, I had talked to the staff and they felt comfortable that I did know what I was talking about, that I had a clear runway to move ahead because they were looking for

President Anniston

Consultant Mackey

Trustee Co-Chair Bloom

Campaign Director Atwater

Vice president for Advancement Hague

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direction and leadership and that is what I gave them, while not stepping in front of the vice president.

Six months after the hire of Campaign Director Atwater, Acting Vice President for

Development Hague was formally appointed vice president for development.

Participants described her role as providing �higher level leadership and soliciting.� The

president�s commitment to and confidence in Vice President Hague was not shared.

Campaign Co-chair Bloom said:

It [appointment of Connie Hague] was not received well by a number of key trustees who didn�t think it would work well. She had her strengths and she had weaknesses. She had an ability and personality that was well received by one particular donor, wound-up being the biggest donor in the campaign. She found him. She nurtured him. The president closed. Beyond that, Connie�s tenure at vice president for development was unremarkable and her personality and her actions with staff and a few trustees made the unhappiness expressed by some trustees turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If instead they had all gotten on board and just supported the women it might have turned out a little differently. That was not to be.

When asked why Hague, an inexperienced leader with limited fund raising experience

was appointed, Atwater said, �the president wanted to appoint a woman.� Another

participant said, �I do not know what was going on inside the president�s head during that

time.� The participant continued:

Presidents live in an environment that they don�t fully comprehend a fund raising process. And I am not saying they should. I am simply saying their information is incomplete so what they think it requires is often times a small part of what it truly requires. However, getting along with the vice president and the board who are involved in the campaign is very important�.

Throughout the silent phase, there was pressure from key trustees to increase the

campaign goal from $150 million dollars to $200 million dollars. Atwater and the

consultant advised against the increase. Consensus was gained by the campaign

leadership team (president, vice president for development, campaign consultant,

campaign co-chairs, and campaign director) to present trustees a stretch goal of $165

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million dollars. The quiet phase of the campaign ran from 1997 to 1999 with a dollar

goal of 30% of the total campaign goal or $50 million dollars. The silent phase effort

generated $72.5 million, or 43.9 % of the overall goal by 1999 and the campaign public

announcement. A vice president for advancement said,

It�s amazing we actually did as good as we did sometimes. It is a credit to some of the really good work by some good people, to overcome all of this. We really did this without all, everything, going for us here�. The money is rolling in beyond belief�

Public Phase

�There was some turnover� Participant

Participants characterized the public phase as busy but not so busy to distract

them from their conspicuous turmoil and interpersonal dysfunction within the leadership

team. Perceptions of Vice President Hague�s leadership and management worsened.

Appreciation increased for the knowledge of the campaign director, Matt Atwater. A

vice president said:

No one dealt with her [Hague]. Nobody talked to her except for the president because they thought she was a lightweight and no real talent, no real ability. And everybody at that time was real impressed with the campaign director and sort of relied on him to do everything. She was just window dressing. She was just the face of development even though she was incompetent. She was awful. The meetings were atrocious. She tried to poach all the time and it was just awful. Awful.

Early into the public phase, the relationship between Vice President Hague and

Campaign Director Atwater worsened hastily and publicly. In addition, there was a

worsening of relationships between the feuding executives and some of the campaign

staff. A vice president said,

The building was in pieces. The vice president was warring. Outright warfare with the campaign director. Matt Atwater had his share of enemies also in the building, except the people I thought had talent, were motivated and were not afraid of hard work loved Matt dearly.

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But he also could come down hard on you. And he did. He clamped down on people hard sometimes. Matt Atwater was the real vice president at this time to us, but Connie Hague was the vice president to the president.

A vice president shared his thoughts on the leadership styles and relationship between

Campaign Director Atwater and Vice President Hague.

He [Atwater] was very great at finance. He tried to get Connie to toe the line. There was a power struggle. There was clearly a power struggle. Matt was again great--really smart--one of the smartest people I have ever met. Could be delightful, but then also a bear when it came to working for him. Difficult. Didn�t play nicely. Just difficult. Difficult rapport with the president, with Connie and then it started to cost him�

The participant continued, comparing Hague with her predecessor, former Vice President

Winston Adler.

Connie Hague felt very, very defensive. She took a very, very keen dislike to Matt Atwater and he to her, and so they are pretty much duking �it out. It was very obvious. Connie beat up on her staff too. She did it in a much more stealthy way. Connie was very pleasant to people�s faces. But Connie was not supportive of her staff. Let me go back and say something about Winston Adler. If one of Winston�s staff made an egregious error � Winston took the blame. �My fault. I�m the vice president. The buck stops here. Why he might, you know, make a person cry or he might put you down on the carpet or make them crawl. But to the outside, he never said, �my staff did this or my staff didn�t tell me.� So in that way he was a really strong leader to the outside because he took responsibility for the entire division. Connie did exactly the opposite, �Oh, well that should have been done but of course you know there was a problem with gift processing, or my staff completely misunderstood� and after a while that starts to wear people down, too.

By year three of the public phase (2002), trustee disenchantment with Vice President for

Advancement Hague was �coming to a head.� Vice President Adler said,

Development is not just showing up and having nice conversation over lunch, it�s about work and really aggressively listening to people and finding out what motivates them and finding out where the match for that motivation is inside the institutions. She never wanted to work that hard.

When asked how the hire of the vice president reflected on the president, a

participant said, �Terrible. Very bad and everyone thought right away that the president

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had made a very bad decision in hiring this senior staff member as vice president.

Awful.� He continued,

Because of her lack of being a good fund raiser, her sense of strategy and timing was so out of whack that we just sat there and shaking our heads and could not believe what we were hearing. And then, what would happen was Matt Atwater the veteran, the pro would question her, belittle her� at least in our private strategy meetings and it was awful. A couple of us would want to crawl under the table it was so bad. So tense. The vice president�s response to each question was always the same. �I am going to visit them next month. I am going to visit them next month.� She said this over and over again, dozens of times. That was her strategy in dealing with top prospects. That�s not a strategy. You use the visit to further your strategy. It was bad.

By 2002, Campaign Director Atwater had �excellent relationships with many

trustees and particularly good relationships with the campaign co-chairs.� A participant

said Atwater was �controlling,� and monopolized the trustees, giving him great

advantage in shaping the campaign and his future, which threatened the president. She

felt frozen out of the �old boys club.�

Tired of Vice President Hague�s leadership, and in a position to leverage a

change, Campaign Director Atwater offered President Anniston his resignation. The

resignation was not accepted. On his ultimatum, Vice President Hague was demoted.

Atwater said:

The president had to make a decision about what to do with her [Hague]. It was a slow, difficult, and to a certain degree, degrading experience for Hague as well as for everybody involved.

He continued,

There were other members of the Board who were always negative about her appointment, and I don�t think they ever changed their minds. So, as things rolled along and the campaign was moving fine, people weren�t impressed that the outcomes were due to her leadership or direct action. So it sort of rolled along until the spring of 2002. Staff was becoming less and less confident with her pronouncements.

161

According to the campaign co-chair, Bloom, President Anniston �caved under trustee

pressure.� Bloom agreed and applauded the outcome and not the process through which

Hague was removed. He said,

It was meddling. Some trustees, they don�t know what the hell they were talking about, were the lead on that. They really pressed on that. Connie was not the right person. They were right in that, but they were wrong to meddle. It was the president�s choice. I thought a couple of members of the board in particular were pushing the president. There is no way a board member even somebody, a co-chair of a capital campaign with regular contact with people in the office can have the kind of detail information you need to make personnel evaluation, and I don�t think that is the proper role of the board. They pressed the president and ultimately she caved.

Another participant said of the demotion:

It was an incredibly awkward time and I think the transition was a just a face saving gesture. A few people felt disenfranchised. She felt completely abused and beat up by Matt who she had earlier tried to marginalize, and had been actually rather successful at it really with the president. And it was sort of get even time. But also it was the best thing for the institution that she not remain the vice president because again, she was a great meeter and greeter but she did not have the substantive knowledge of how to go further after making initial contact with people. She was not good at follow-up; she was poor at follow-up. She was not always good on following up on promises made.

During the transition of leadership from Vice President Hague, Campaign

Director Atwater assumed a larger role managing the campaign organization and staff.

That year Hague was �let go,� but received an enviable severance package. The specific

terms of the severance were not known. However, the amount was perceived by one

participant to have been large enough to fuel dissention. After Hague�s departure,

Campaign Director Atwater was appointed vice president for development and campaign

director through the close of the campaign. By that time, there was little doubt that the

campaign would exceed its dollar goal (see Figure 6.4).

162

Figure 6.4: Campaign team after the exit of Vice President Hague

According to participants, President Anniston did not intend to keep Atwater in a

leadership role or on staff after the campaign. On the one hand, the president depended

on Atwater for campaign management. On the other hand, the president and Atwater had

too much undesirable history. Another participant countered that view saying the

president and Atwater had a good relationship. However, Atwater did not have the major

gift solicitation experience necessary to do the job. A vice president said,

He was terrible at fund raising. He was an expert in campaign organization and setting it up and tracking it and doing the number side. He was an expert in fund raising in the sense that he knew how it was, and how it worked. He just wasn�t good at doing it himself. It was a very odd thing for me to watch. I thought he had the potential to be a lot better. He was very personable. He was supremely intelligent. He just did not have that last gear to get down into it like I did.

Co-chair Bloom said,

There was pressure by some on Matt to raise money but that was not his personality or his major strength to the campaign. In all candor, that was not how the president was going to allow Matt to proceed. Our president is a fabulous closer. She is also a control freak. All major, a disproportional number of major solicitations, she wanted to be the one to make the pitch and the close, given her success at it. Although, we expressed some concerns about it, it only made sense to continue in that mode because she was having great success as a closer.

President Anniston

Consultant Mackey

Trustee Chair Bloom

Vice President for Advancement and Campaign

Director Atwater

163

Another participant commented: �We all knew that the campaign director/vice president,

we knew his relationship with the president was declining fast.� When asked why, the

participant replied:

Because he is one of the smartest guys you will ever meet, and if you don�t agree with him, you are stupid and he lets you know that you are stupid, and he lets the president know that he disagrees with her on many things and says �you are stupid.� That�s the quick answer but you can imagine over time that will sour a relationship. Things went south fast.

Before the close of the campaign, President Anniston began a search for a vice president

for development. A participant said:

The president met with Matt and with his agreement, she looked around a little bit. It was Matt to the end of the campaign. But during the course of the campaign, it became clear that that the president was not going to hire Matt as vice president for development post-campaign.

Campaign Co-chair Bloom praised Vice President Atwater for providing excellent

management to the campaign and serving as a constant and forward-pressing force

throughout the campaign. Participants credited Atwater with keeping the campaign on

course in the face of multiple leadership changes.

There was change, but there was also constancy. Matt Atwater was there throughout. Matt is just a marvelous human being and able to weather the storm and right the ship. Matt didn�t take tension to the point of crisis. Matt is a run it by the numbers man and some people at The College regard that as militaristic. He expects you to get to work on time everyday and be ready to work. The tensions were managed and the lid never came off.

In 2004, the campaign was publicly concluded, but fund raising continued as two

of four major projects were �under subscribed by donors.� The goal of $165 million

dollars had been eclipsed nearly one year prior. Shortly thereafter, a new vice president

for development was named from within the organization (see Figure 6.6).

164

The campaign consultant, the individual with the most experience with the

College and fund raising, was optimistic about the future of the team under the leadership

of the new vice president for development. He contrasted the style of the new vice

president with that of his predecessors. The new vice president was Sam Slater, a major

highly successful major gift director who had worked closely with President Anniston to

secure many large gifts. Consultant Mackey said:

Sam is somewhat in the cut of the same cloth as Winston Adler. Sam is a terrific top-level, one-on-one fund raiser. I think the major difference is he [Sam] has better relationships with his staff, the way he [Sam] works with his staff and the way he works with the president. And Adler and Clara always were at odds with one another. Winston was as odds with his staff. Connie who wasn�t very good at anything. Matt Atwater who knew his fund raising very well but was sort of in an outside sort of position. Then finally, Sam, and it does appear that Sam is bringing most of it together.


President Anniston

Consultant Mackey

Trustee Chair Bloom

Vice President Slater

165

Interpersonal Relationships

Each of the participants said the campaign suffered because of dysfunctional

relationships but they did not know how much of a toll it had taken on fund raising. Vice

President Slater said:

It [the quality of relationships] did not help us. I think if you are talking about the way things should be, the President, key trustees, key administrator, your consultant, campaign director. That people check their egos at the door. I dream of that time. That�s the way it should be because of what you can achieve if everyone is working together. The answer is, this far is, I don�t know. But I look forward to that time. But it did not happen in the last campaign.

Campaign Consultant Mackey said,

Overall, I want to go to the bottom line. The College is a good example of really not good teams. A good example of people who did not relate well together in many ways but because of individual performances they wound up with a successful campaign. You want to analyze it from--was it a really humming, well-integrated team, no it wasn�t. I will go into some of the specifics as we go along but on the other hand, it was overall, a successful campaign. When you think about it, these campaigns in order to success need usually about sixty percent of the money from million and over dollar donors. I do not have the count for The College, but I presume it is somewhere in the nature of twenty-five to thirty which can be handled very individually, and certainly were. And different members of the teams could do those with different relationships and not necessarily working totally together. Obviously, it�s a lot more pleasant when the team meshes and everybody likes to work with one another.

He continued,

Was it a nice place to work? Were people getting along? I�d say basically no. Well in many situations, the chair of the board and the president were somewhat at odds with one another. The vice president for development was at odds in many cases. Within the development office, the corporate and foundation staff leader operated independently and the relationship between the vice president and that individual were not always warm and supported. In this case there were many instances of people doing more squabbling than working closely together, but the prospects were ultimately covered and you could say that the reputation of the institution, The College, a great reputation was sufficient to bring in the support that was asked for by different people, different combinations. I think it had very little to do with the operation of the whole team.

He went further to posit a theory on the relationship between interpersonal relationships,

turnover in key leadership, and fund raising outcomes. He said,

166

The relationships on the team were not conducive to success but the individual performances overcame that� Interpersonal relationships are not necessarily all that important. Individual talents at the very top are, I think, the overriding factor� Poor relationships caused people to leave and that affected dollars. The turnover in the top leadership. You had turnover and relationships, and for each one there was a different relationship with the president of the College. For each one there was a different relationship with the chair of the board, chair of the campaign. So, why weren�t they as successful as they could have been? It was because of turnover, because of different degrees of experience and different degrees of compatibility in that top leadership team�

He concluded,

Turnover has a lot to do with how the perspective donors respond. Take a certain perspective donor that we feel sure has the capability of making a five million dollar gift. And they are responding well to the president and the vice president for development and all of a sudden, the vice president for development, or say the president leaves, the chances of getting the full five million are probably not very good. The donor may say well, I still like the college and I owe it a great deal, so I will give a million. And the same thing could be true of the vice president for development who has a wonderful relationship and suddenly leaves. There is a direct impact to the gifts of people when there are changes in personnel leadership. I have come to a bottom line conclusion. If you could have all the positions filled about two years prior to the announcement of the campaign and have the same people, assuming they are competent people continue in those same positions throughout the campaign my guess is that a campaign could be you know, twenty to twenty five percent larger in terms of achievement of its goal, but there is no way you can prove that. And I don�t know any institution anywhere that has succeeded in keeping all of their key positions filled.

Campaign Co-chair Bloom said,

Interpersonal relationships are always important, but unless you have got people having knock down drag out fights that affirmatively interfere with the mission, its like Donovan and T.O. As long as Donovan is going to throw the ball and T.O. is going to jump up and catch it, it doesn�t matter how they talk21.

Former Campaign Director and Vice President for Development Atwater said,

I think your basic thesis if I read it correctly is that the relationships that are built and are at work within an organization has a direct impact on outcome�. I think a part of it has to do with so much of that work

21 Donovan (Donovan McNabb) a quarterback and T.O. (Torrell Owens) a receiver are professional football teammates who had widely publicized personality conflicts.

167

and particularly if you measure by dollar, is a result of a single individual doing something with a single prospect. Whether it�s the annual fund and you are sending out a blast of letters, every individual prospect gets a letter so it�s an individual solicitation, if you get my meaning. As a consequence, those jobs are highly, I am blanking on the term all I, the only term that comes to mind is cubicle. Everybody has their own cubicle theoretically. If I am a major gifts officer and I have a certain part of the country and I have a certain bunch of prospects and these prospects have little to do with major gifts officer �Y,� so that each one is an individual in the way those jobs are essentially assigned, causes that. It compartmentalizes people. So when you look for the types of dynamics that you are talking about, I think you are right. Well let me say, I agree with the thesis entirely--that is the better the rapport the better the outcome, because outcomes are not only measured in dollars. Outcomes are measured in levels of confidence and willingness to move ahead. You are going to have trouble ferreting that out from people. The question before us is how do these interpersonal, how do these people, how are they successful? I think it starts with the individual. Because remember they are compartmentalized. It�s the collective individual wanting to achieve for his or her own reasons. Fund raising is an interesting business in that it is a sales position where you are out in the field or sending letters or whatever it is, you are a sales person however people who came to inhabit fund raising organizations are the people who have the kind of external comfort working with an outside world, but are possibly more conservative with the outcomes of their work and therefore they take fund raising jobs instead of jobs that you live or die by your commission. You don�t have to be nice to the person in the office next to you. You have to be nice to the person you are trying to get money from. To paraphrase, if you were to go to three organizations you would find three different environments. You would see three entirely different organizations in that one could be an organization where relationships are externally focused. Another would have a culture that teaches expected behavior, and another would be somewhere in between.

A former vice president said,

Success at fund raising requires a couple of things. Number one, first and foremost is a very, very honest evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the institution. Number two is a buy in by the president and the board of trustees to supply the necessary resources, which is always more than people want to deal with, but to supply the necessary resource needed to fund a campaign office, and number three is the ability to attract a strong professional person to run the development office and to articulate the goals and priorities of the campaign, and then to drive an office to success. Because it is about driving, it is not a walk through the park - it is hard work. And beyond that, if there is a good relationship between the university president and the chief campaign officer that�s terrific - if not, that doesn�t really matter. That is a brutal thing to say but unfortunately it is true.

168

Another participant said,

I think if you have staff that are talking to one another, meeting with one another and sharing and are talking the same language, it�s much, much easier�. I think that goes for the president and it goes right down to the development office. Of course, the better the internal team the better the message that goes out. But you know what is interesting to me is that people, some people are going to give no matter what and I think that was evidenced by this last sort of difficult transition we had during the campaign.

Campaign Success

Participants had similar views on campaign success. Campaign Director and Vice

President for Development Atwater said,

A successful campaign is one that achieves its financial objectives as well as the objectives of the campaign itself. The reason for the campaign. In other words, the successful campaign funds the buildings if you have a building, raises the level of endowment, and increase the amount of annual support that is a part of a comprehensive campaign plan. At the same time, it brings to bear a new group and an expanded group of volunteers that can continue to help and support the school both personally and through their volunteer work, going on into the future, and some subset forms the cadre for the next campaign. I�d say it was a success in reaching its dollar objective. I think it was not successful in raising some sub objectives.

Campaign Co-chair Bloom defined success:

A successful campaign would achieve several objectives starting with raising the overall amount, which was the original campaign objective. But in addition to raising the amount of the campaign objective, the most successful campaign would also raise funds within each subcategory of the overall objective and so you would meet the larger target and the subsidiary target as well. Secondary goals reconnect the institution to its constituents in a much more solid way, so that it would in essence lay the groundwork for future campaigns� reposition the school with major donors... raise the visibility of the college in a positive way. They are not direct goals of the campaign, those are subsidiary goals.

Campaign Consultant Mackey said,

You set a goal and it�s successful if you meet the goal. How you set the goal then is a part of campaign success. We do have a philosophy that says push the goal as high as you believe you can, but do make it obtainable. Missing a goal for a college or university is a very discouraging and destructive event. If you don�t achieve most of the sub goals, then you have not really succeeded in your entire effort. Another definition of success is that you meet all of the needs that were

169

originally promoted. The fact of the matter is that not many of campaigns wind up meeting all the needs. They meet their overall goal but not all the sub goals.

Vice President Slater said,

There is a relationship between success and relationships. I would define it this way. The successful leadership team will allow, will help allow the organization achieve its greatest potential. Good work in the trenches. The real truth is if we were as good, if our leadership was as good, as good as it should have been, if our board was prepared as it should have been, if the staff was prepared as it should have been, we could have raised $250 million easily. If we had our house really in order, we could have done so much better. So with all that in mind, hitting one seventy-five is something we should feel very good about our success.

Case Analysis




campaign outcomes (see Figure 6-6).


Campaign Success

1


4

Team Dynamics

7


5 Campaign Design Factors

3

Team Design Factors

2


6

170

Construct: Campaign success

The campaign success construct was composed of six concepts: (1) initial goal:

adjusted goal, (2) percentage of priority projects funded, (3) alumni participation


five-year annual total giving average (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Campaign success: construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

Construct Concepts Description Key observation Initial goal and adjusted goal(s)

Goal announced to the public and revised goal(s).

The public goal, once set, remained despite ongoing debate.

Revenue to expense ratio

The average amount spent to raise one dollar.

The college reported spending 12.6 cents to raise one dollar


The percentage of priority projects that were fully funded with campaign dollar contributions.

Three of four priority projects were funded completely with campaign contributions.


The institution defined the percentage of alumni who contributed to the campaign effort, however, the scope of the campaign.

Seventy percent of alumni contributed money during the campaign.

Endowment value

Endowment values at the start and the conclusion of the capital campaign.

The endowment increased from $326,266,000 dollars to $576,546,386 dollars.

Campaign success


The dollar contributions of trustees to the campaign. However, the scope of the campaign was defined by the institution.

One hundred percent of trustees contributed a total of $5,343,303 dollars over the campaign period.

171

Construct Concepts Description Key observation Five-year annual

total giving average

The average amount of dollars donated from all sources over five years. The average is calculated by taking the year considered and the four years preceding and dividing by five.

The average financial contributions more than doubled between the years 1996 and 2004, increasing from $11,532,300 dollars to $25,169,778 dollars.

Initial Goal: Adjusted Goal

The total capital needs were estimated at more than $200 million dollars.

Consultants estimated donor propensity at $120 million dollars. The initial campaign

goal was $130-$135 million dollars. On the advice of the consultant and campaign

director, based in great part on trustee financial commitments, trustees increased the goal

to $150 million dollars. Key trustees encouraged a $200 million dollar goal. The

consultant and campaign director deemed $200 million was not plausible. Trustees

announced a stretch goal of $165 million dollars to the public.


Campaign Goals

Adjustments Dollar Goal (In Millions)

Capital Needs (In Millions)

Years

Initial goal $130-$135 $200 (+) 1996-1997 Adjusted goal I-Internal $150 $200 1997-1999 Adjusted goal II-Public $165 $200 1999-2004 Revenue: expense

The College reported a cost of 12.6 cents to raise one dollar.

172

Percentage of priority projects funded

Team Power Play identified four broad funding objectives. The objectives were:

(1) student support, (2) faculty support, (3) facilities enhancement, and (4) operations

support. Student support and operations support were �oversubscribed� (over funded) by

donors. On the other hand, facilities enhancement, the �centerpiece project,� and faculty

support were �under subscribed� (under funded) by donors. Team Power Play did not

generate a lead gift for the $23 million dollar �centerpiece� facilities project, which was

the catalyst for the campaign. Ineffectiveness in securing a lead gift implicates

negatively on campaign planning and/or staff effectiveness at execution. In many

campaigns, the College had failed to meet dollar goals for capital projects. Trustees

recommended in a campaign report that the institution reconsider the inclusion of capital

projects in future campaigns. The faculty support objective achieved less than half of its

anticipated $20 million dollar goal.


A stated campaign goal was to solicit every alumnus. Over the course of the

campaign approximately 16,596 alumni were solicited, including 14,700 alumni not

approached through the annual fund drive. Seventy percent of alumni participated in the

campaign.

Table 6.3: Alumni participation data

Year

Number Alumni of

Record

Number Alumni Solicited

Number Alumni Donors

Participation Percentage

Contribution (Face value)

1996 38,569 28,657 12,067 42.1 -- 1998 36,943 30,523 12,655 41.4 11,574,1002000 37,013 31,113 13,300 42.7 28,623,8002002 38,787 31,252 13,140 42.0 15,477,5042004 39,705 32,835 11,775 35.8 8,899,750

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Endowment value (increase.

The College has one of the largest endowments among its affiliated peer

institutions. Participants praised the College�s leadership for resource stewardship. The

overall percentage increases in endowment value were consistent with peer institutions.

Table 6.4: Endowment per student, market value, and percentage change from previous year

Year Endowment Per Student


Percentage Change In Endowment Market Value

From Previous Year 1996 112,817 326,266,000 7.61998 149,528 434,379,000 12.62000 209,096 609,724,000 25.12002 181,256 514,766,849 -10.52004 199,981 576,546,386 10.5


All trustees made financial contributions to the campaign (see table 6.6). Trustee

Bloom said:

I did not think much on the strengths of the board. The board had been built over the decade or two prior to that without a lot of attention given, or priority given, to fund raising. Consequentially, the people who comprised the board were capable in a number of ways but not particularly strong fundraisers and there were not many significantly moneyed people on the board. Reflecting the willingness and ability of many trustees to contribute financially a participant said, �You weren�t going to get one of these sight-setting gifts from any more than one or two of the board members.

Table 6.5: Governing board participation


Members Total financial contributions

1996 37 567,718 1998 39 875,497 2000 41 2,170,710 2002 38 636,825 2004 37 1,092,553

174


The average was calculated by taking the year considered in addition to the four

years preceding and dividing by five. Contribution amounts tended to increase between

the year 1996, and year 2004. This may reflect increased solicitation intensity.

Table 6.6: Five year annual giving total average

Year Five Year Average

(Grand Total) 1996 11,532,300 1998 14,448,660 2000 24,027,600 2002 26,400,839 2004 25,169,778




175

Tab

le 6

.7: C

ampa

ign

team

des

ign

cons

truc

t, co

ncep

ts, d

escr

iptio

ns, a

nd k

ey o

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vatio

ns

Con

stru

ct

Con

cept

D

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vatio

n

Team

com

posit

ion

and

size

Te

am m

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With

stan

ding

four

vic

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esid

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for d

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ent,

the

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.

Cam

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am

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gn

fact

ors

Div

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ill v

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The

team

mai

ntai

ned

a hi

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vel o

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th

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the

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am m

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prim

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con

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mpa

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plan

ning

and

org

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solic

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, pr

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lead

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Cam

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izat

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arra

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The

team

was

cen

traliz

ed.

How

ever

, at t

imes

, the

ca

mpa

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dire

ctor

and

vic

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app

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hav

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the

pres

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man

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176


There were five team members: (1) president, (2) vice president for development,

(3) campaign consultant, (4) a campaign co-chair, and (5) campaign director. The

president, consultant and campaign co-chair were on the team throughout the campaign

from pre-campaign planning through the campaign close. There were, over the course of

the campaign, four vice presidents for development. The campaign director was added to

the team early in the quiet phase and stayed with the team in that role, and then

additionally in the role of vice president for development, ultimately returning to the role

of campaign director immediately after the campaign concluded (see Appendix H, for

team membership composition over time).

Diversity

Team Power Play was diverse in talents and skills. Over the course of the

campaign, there was an infusion of different views owing to different leadership styles,

knowledge, and skills held by the various vice presidents. At the beginning of the

campaign, the team had collectively more than 100 years of experience at fund raising.

Tasks

The primary functions of the team members were to develop actionable

relationships with prospects, solicit gifts, manage solicitation processes, and steward

gifts.

177


Team Power Play�s organization was consistent with the centralized model of

advancement. Characteristic of centralized structures is direct presidential supervision of

the vice president for advancement, who in turn provides leadership to the balance of the

advancement team. In many instances, team member roles were inconsistent with title.

For example, the campaign director, while supervised by the vice president for

development, consistently made multiple and key decisions about the management and

direction of the campaign and enjoyed relationships with trustees typical of those had by

a vice president.


The campaign design construct consisted of three concepts: (1) campaign

initiation (2) planning and phases, and (3) campaign complexity.

Table 6.8: Campaign processes design factors: construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations

Construct Concepts Description Key Observations Campaign processes design factors

Campaign initiation


Trustees initiated the campaign

Planning and phases

Campaign planned and organization

The campaign was organized around a quiet, and a public phase. However, much of the campaign was shaped by activities prior to quiet phase, which is typically called pre-campaign planning.

Campaign processes design factors

Campaign complexity

Complexity of planning and execution

Campaign complexity was unremarkable.

178

Campaign initiation

Trustees initiated the �campaign idea� and in turn gave the incoming president a

fundraising mandate.

Planning and phases

The campaign was conducted in two phases consisting of a quiet phase (1997-

1999) and a public phase (1999-2004). There was a period preceding the quiet phase

(1995-1997) during which campus leaders informally discussed campaign staging. That

phase is typically referred to as campaign pre-planning.

Campaign complexity

Campaign complexity was unremarkable.




production of results, (5) evaluation, and (6) maintenance of effectiveness.

179

Table 6.9: Campaign team core processes and performance construct, concepts, descriptions, and key observations Construct Concept Description Key Observation

Work management

Work delegation The campaign director tended to manage all aspects of the campaign.

Relationship management, conflict management

Internal to team relationships management

Relationships were managed poorly over the campaign period, often stemming from and leading to dysfunction, which facilitated multiple changes in leadership and management.


External to team issues management

Team members managed external relationships.


How established objectives and goals are met

The campaign director applied management systems and tracked performance against goals and objectives.

Evaluation The process for observing fund raising effort in the context of desired outcomes

Management systems

Team core processes and performance


How the team maintains effectiveness over the course of the campaign

Management systems

Work Management

The president provided broad leadership. The work of Team Power Play was

managed by tracking campaign progress toward established campaign goals and

objectives. The campaign director provided day-to-day management.

180


The college president attempted to manage relationships by appointing team

members with whom she perceived interpersonal affinity. This approach tended to cause

as much or more dysfunction as the dysfunction she attempted to abate.


Team Power Play�s members did not believe their campus community supported

fund raising. The president actively involved campus constituents in a strategic visioning

process which trustees believed increased community support of fund raising and the

campaign.


Throughout the campaign period, overall gift revenue exceeded anticipated

contributions. Actions regarding the production of results included adherence to

campaign policy and multiple staffing changes.

Evaluation

With the exception of the president�s evaluation by trustees, there was no formal

evaluation of the campaign leadership team. Former Vice President and Campaign

Director Atwater said, �When you are in a capital campaign, if you are tracking you are

getting the job done, so I do not think that was ever a particular subject of conversation.�

However, when asked about the mechanism used to justify staff promotion,

appointments, and �letting people go,� Campaign Co-chair Bloom said, �those

181

conversations were one-on-one and typically between the individual in question and his

or her superior.�


The president maintained team effectiveness by promotions (increased

responsibility and authority), salary increases, and exacting staff changes at the

leadership team level. The campaign director, in collaboration with the vice president for

development maintained effectiveness by tracking performance and reallocation of

human resources.


According to participants and campaign literature, three events occurred outside

of the institution, which influenced the team and the campaign: (1) �economy slow

down,� (2) September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and (3) low institutional ranking in

national publications.

The effect of the June 2001 market downturn was worsened by the September 11,

2001 terrorist attacks. These conditions had two notable impacts: (1) endowment value

decreased markedly, which placed pressure on the institution to generate more funds for

current and unrestricted uses, and (2) the anticipated size and number of many major gifts

decreased and many anticipated gifts were postponed.

Vice President for Development Slater believed with certainty that the college�s

national ranking, which was actually on the mend, had a broad and negative impact on

giving.

182


Despite trustees earmarking approximately $8 million dollars from the

endowment to underwrite the campaign, the effort was not adequately funded. Moreover,

Team Power Play conducted the campaign in an era of retrenchment, which did not

permit the hire of additional staff or appropriate salary increase. Another internal

influence was the campus climate, which was negative to fundraising.

Construct: Team dynamics

The team dynamic construct is a confluence of all of the constructs in the heuristic

framework. The relationships within the campaign leadership team were complex and

changed in character with each Vice President for development turnover episode. One

could characterize the campaign leadership team with power struggles between the

president, the vice presidents, and campaign director. One could also characterize the

campaign leadership team with the supportive relationships between the campaign

consultant, campaign director, and campaign co-chair. Yet again, one could characterize

the team by the supportive relationship between the president, consultant, and trustees.

Campaign Co-chair Bloom outlined the team�s �dynamic.� He said:

Warm and totally supportive relationship between the campaign director and the consultant, almost intimate. Warm and positive relationship between the consultant and me. Warm and totally supportive relationship between the campaign director and me. Indeed, the campaign director would use me as a sounding board when he had no one else to turn to. And I welcomed that and found that was one of the productive things I did as campaign chair - offer a release for him, and when that was not sufficient, being prepared to throw my weight around as a trustee.

Describing his relationship with the president, he said,

Professional and amicable, not in detail or as robust as I know other campaign co-chairs have with their president. I didn�t want to rock that

183

boat. She didn�t want to rock that boat. It would be better if the campaign co-chair who is going to do the work and the president had a closer working relationship during the campaign than the president and I did.

Outlined below I have diagramed the interaction patterns of the campaign leadership

team members structured around the turnover in the position of vice president for

development.

Vice President Winston Adler

President Anniston was dependent upon the first vice president for development�s

experience and networks with donors and trustees. The relationship deteriorated quickly

in the face of leadership and management style clashes. The president�s relationships

with the campaign consultant and campaign co-chair were collegial. In addition, the

consultant and the campaign co-chair had long and deep histories with the college. In the

Figures, a solid line denotes a good relationship. A dotted line denotes a poor

relationship. Arrow directions indicate relationship orientation (see Figure 6.7).

Figure 6.7: Vice President Adler, 1993-1997

President

Trustee/Campaign Co-Chair

Vice President for Development

Adler Consultant

184

Vice President Hague

The president appointed the second vice president, in the face of resistance from

other team members, staff, and trustees. The president and vice president enjoyed a

supportive relationship at the expense of other team member�s confidence in leadership.

Consequently, the campaign director was hired at the urging of leadership team members

to augment the vice president�s inexperience at campaign management, and leadership

freeing her to solicit major gifts (see Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.8: Vice President Hague, 1998-2002

Vice President Atwater

Forced by an ultimatum from the campaign director and pressures from team

members and key trustees, the president reluctantly and slowly transitioned the second

vice president out of the organization. The campaign director was assigned additional

leadership and management responsibility, which culminated into his promotion to vice

president for development, a position he held until the formal close of the campaign (see

Figure 6.9).

President


Vice President for Development

Hague

Consultant


185

Figure 6.9: Vice President Atwater, 2002-2004

Vice President Slater

Slater, the fourth vice president, was appointed from within the organization after

an unsuccessful national search. Slater had solicited approximately half of the college�s

major gifts. He had developed quality relationships with the key trustees, consultant,

campaign director, president, and many staff.

At the close of the formal campaign, the fourth vice president was appointed, and

third vice president who doubled as campaign director, was returned to the position of

campaign director. His employment contract was not renewed (see Figure 6.10).

President


Vice President for Development /


Consultant

186

Figure 6.10: Vice President Slater, 2004-

Case Summary

The College compensated for years of inattentiveness to fund raising with the

appointment of Winston Adler, a capable vice president for advancement. President Kilte

charged Vice President Adler with elevating the advancement team to a level consistent

with the College's academic reputation. He was to position the College for its next

campaign. To Adler�s surprise, disappointment, and disdain, long-time president Kilte

(who lured him to the College) announced retirement shortly after Adler arrived on

campus and retired within that year.

Team Power Play began its campaign with President Anniston, an inexperienced

president and fund raiser. However, President Anniston had a campaign team with over

100 years of collective experience. President Anniston and Vice President Adler enjoyed

a brief positive relationship. The relationship deteriorated rapidly because of

President


Vice President for

Development Slater

Consultant


187

incompatible leadership and management styles and expectations, which escalated to

poor and sparse communication, avoidance of each other, and diminished trust.

Early in the silent phase of the campaign, Vice President Adler resigned leaving

the campaign without an experienced major gift professional or leader. Outgoing Vice

President Adler recommended to President Anniston a candidate who could succeed him

as vice president. The nominee was an experienced campaign manager named Matt

Atwater. President Anniston rejected the recommendation in favor of appointing Connie

Hague, the College�s inexperienced major gift director, as interim vice president. The

President�s decision did not win the support of trustees, campaign co-chairs, the

consultant, and others. The decision negatively influenced team ethos and functioning

for much of the campaign.

To right the inexperience of the interim vice president and president, Matt

Atwater, who had been recommended earlier to serve as vice president, was appointed

campaign director. The appointment was made at the strong urging of trustees and

others. Atwater was not a gift solicitor, but the campaign organization relied on his

leadership and management over that of the president or the vice president.

Atwater, the experienced campaign director, and Connie Hague, the relatively

inexperienced vice president for development, began an intense and visible power

struggle. Complicating the matters was that neither Vice President Hague nor Campaign

Director Atwater had particularly strong interpersonal relationships across the campaign

staff. Atwater did, however, have very strong relationships with key trustees and the

consultant.

188

After much turmoil, an ultimatum from Campaign Director Atwater, and

increasing pressures from trustees, President Anniston demoted Vice President Hague,

and eventually �let her go.� Campaign Director Atwater was elevated to vice president

for development. He and the president reportedly did not have a strong relationship.

Atwater served as vice president and campaign director for the duration of the campaign.

Prior to the close of the campaign, President Anniston began a national search for

a new vice president. Following the campaign, the vice president�s contracted position of

campaign director was not renewed and his role as vice president ended. The president

appointed a new vice president, Sam Slater, a prolific fund raiser, from within the

organization.

The campaign was formally closed and final campaign matters were handled by

Vice President Slater, who by all accounts had an �excellent� relationship with the

president, trustees, many campaign staff, and the consultant. According to the consultant,

Vice President Slater (vice president number four) embodied the strengths of his

predecessors and the ability to build team and productive relationships both within and

outside of the institution.

Interpretation

Team Power Play�s dysfunctional relationships and turnover of vice presidents

were not overly disruptive to the flow of gift revenue because of highly effective

campaign management systems set in place prior to the inauguration of President

Anniston by Vice President Adler and operated by Campaign Director Atwater.

189

President Anniston became an effective fund raiser with the aide of experienced

fund raisers. However, poor and irreparable relationships between the president and two

of the four vice presidents, as well as a clash of perspectives with the consultant and

trustees negatively influenced relationships on the leadership team.

The president�s appointment of an inexperienced vice president appeared

motivated by several factors including the president�s drive to increase diversity and have

a cabinet member with whom she could have a trusting relationship. On the one hand,

participants appreciated the president�s intent. On the other hand, observers did not view

the appointment as wise, and this perception worsened when the president resisted

replacing the failing vice president.

President Anniston�s search for a vice president with whom she could enjoy a

supportive relationship on the one hand supports conventional wisdom regarding the

importance of the personal relationships between presidents and vice presidents. On the

other hand, the emphasis that the president placed on that personal relationship appeared

to supersede any emphasis placed on appointing a vice president with technical skill. The

president�s appointment of Sam Slater to vice president for development was based on a

balanced combination of technical skill and interpersonal relationship.

Team Power Play exhibited many of the characteristics of associated with effective

teams. For example, team members had a shared understanding of goals and objectives,

and parameters for achieving those goals and objectives. However, participants

attributed success at fund raising to the aggressive work of individual fund raisers on and

off the leadership team, and their work, one-on-one, in the field with donors and

190

volunteers. This fund raising work occurred apparently without regard to leadership team

dynamics.

191

CHAPTER 7

Comparative Analysis

Orientation

Prior to conducting the case studies, four institutions eligible for participation in

this study were evaluated on success at fund raising through an evaluation framework

created from variables identified in a review of fund raising literature and interviews with

fund raising professionals. Three of the four eligible institutions representing the widest

range of success were selected for recruitment and ranked: (a) most superior, (b) less

superior, and (c) least superior. Team Schism, the first team studied, ranked less

superior. Team Franchise, the second team studied, ranked least superior. The third team

studied, Team Power Play, ranked most superior. Ranking assigned prior to the study

was not altered after considering participant interviews and campaign document data

gathered during the study.

The comparative analysis of Teams Schism, Franchise, and Power Play is

organized by the research questions as they correspond to the 7 constructs and 23

variables that compose the heuristic framework.

Presented first is a comparison of teams as possible by the 23 specific variables,

which compose the seven constructs. Presented thereafter is a comparison of the teams

192

by each of the seven broad constructs, which is a synthesis of gathered

information and interpretation, and is thus my response to the main research question.

The main research question was, �How do leadership team dynamics affect

success in capital campaign fund raising?� There were seven research sub questions and

they are enumerated:





5. What influences external to the institution affect campaign teams? In addition,

how?


how?

7. What is the nature of team relationships/social dynamics?

Objective 1: How do team members define success?

Participants offered similar definitions of success (see table 7.1). Responses

included: (1) building development team capacity for future endeavors, (2) exceeding the

overall campaign dollar goal, (4) funding each campaign objective, (5) increasing number

of donors and prospects, (6) transforming institution culture for giving, and (7) increasing

public awareness of the institutions saga and vision (see Table 7.1).

193

Table 7.1: Campaign success definitions by team

Success Measure Team Power

Play Most superior

Team Schism Less superior

Team Franchise

Least superior Building development team capacity for future endeavors.

• • •

Exceeding overall campaign dollar goal.

• • •

Fully funding each campaign objective.

•

Increasing number of donors and prospects.

• • •

Transform institution culture for giving.

•

Increasing awareness of the institution�s saga and vision.

• • •

All participants perceived their campaign as highly successful in the face of

multiple obstacles. However, no team funded fully all campaign projects by the

conclusion of their campaign. To meet fund raising goals for specific projects, each

institution subsidized no fewer than two projects with loans or appropriated undesignated

contributions. Despite direct and subsidized contributions, each institution had at least

one project that remained grossly under funded at the close of their campaign. In two

instances the under funded project was a �centerpiece project.�

Presented in Table 7.2 is a comparison of the campaign teams� outcomes by

campaign success variables.

194

Table 7.2: Comparison of campaign teams by success variables Campaign Success

Construct Team Power Play

Most superior Team Schism Less superior

Team Franchise Least superior

Adjustments to goal announced to public

No adjustment

Two adjustments One adjustment

Cost to raise one dollar

12.6 cents ≤ 10 cents 16 cents


4 projects 50% percent of projects were funded fully with designated contributions and/or allocation of un-designated contributions. 50% of projects were not funded fully at the close of the campaign.

6 projects 100% of projects were funded fully with designated contributions or through reallocation of undesignated contributions.

5 projects 60% funded by designated contributions 20% funded by designated contributions and loan. 20% of projects were not funded fully at campaign close


Participation decreased from 42.1% percent at start of campaign to 35.8% percent at the conclusion of the campaign

Participation decreased from 41% percent at start of campaign to 33% percent at the conclusion of the campaign.

Participation decreased from 37.5 % percent at start of campaign to 27.2% percent at the conclusion of the campaign.

Endowment value increase over course of campaign

$326,266,000 to $576,546,386

$74,397,000 to $118,131,390

$68,802,000 to $135,431,239


100% $5,343,303

100 % $9,269,219

100% $7,596,573

Five-year annual total giving average

Increased from $11,532,300 dollars to $25,169,778 dollars over the campaign period



195

Objective 2: What is the nature of campaign team design?

Teams Schism, Franchise and Power Play were designed purposely and primarily

by presidents and or vice presidents in consultation with other team members throughout

the campaign period. While each president and vice president aimed to exceed the

campaign dollar goal, many of their decisions regarding key team appointments appeared

incompatible with the goal. For example, the presidents who led Teams Schism and

Franchise appointed inexperienced fund raisers in the key position of vice president for

advancement. In the case of Team Schism, the president, unsuccessful at recruiting his

top candidate, appointed a strong manager from within the organization, which proved a

wise decision. In the case of Team Power Play, the most superior team, the president�s

appointment of a vice president reflected her desire to increase diversity and appoint a

team member with whom she could forge an affinity, but the appointment was made at

the expense of fund raising competency, team ethos, and perceptions of her leadership.

The selection of the vice president proved detrimental.

Team membership tended to include the president, vice president for development

or advancement, consultant, campaign co-chairs (trustees), campaign director, and others.

Team Schism had up to ten team members and Teams Franchise and Power Play each

had up to five members (see Table 7.3).

Team Schism had the largest team, and its membership represented the widest

array of organizational hierarchy. For example, the team membership included major gift

directors and coordinators. In contrast, the leadership team membership of Teams

Franchise and Power Play did not extend lower than executive-level personnel.

196

Presidents assembled campaign teams with counsel from campaign-leadership

team members. Campaign leaders intended for team design to follow campaign design.

However, each team failed to meet team design specifications of the campaign plan

because of personnel inexperience and/ or lack of personnel.

Team diversity increased greatly with multiple changes in leadership and team

membership, which occurred throughout the campaigns. The primary activities for teams

were leading, management, external relationship management, and solicitation. The

formal structure of each campaign organizations was centralized. The informal

organizations of the teams took various forms, and dysfunction was heightened when

informal organization superseded the formal. For example, in the case of Team Power

Play, there was a centralized organization. However, the campaign director often led the

president and vice president.

197

Tab

le 7

.3: C

ompa

riso

n of

cam

paig

n te

ams b

y ca

mpa

ign

team

des

ign

vari

able

s C

ampa

ign

Tea

m D

esig

n Fa

ctor

s T

eam

Pow

er P

lay

Mos

t sup

erio

r

Tea

m S

chis

m

Les

s sup

erio

r

Tea

m F

ranc

hise

L

east

supe

rior

T

eam

co

mpo

sitio

n an

d si

ze

Up

to fi

ve m

embe

rs.

The

team

con

sist

ed o

f pre

side

nt,

vice

pre

side

nt, c

ampa

ign

dire

ctor

, cam

paig

n co

nsul

tant

an

d ca

mpa

ign

co-c

hair

Up

to te

n m

embe

rs.

The

team

con

sist

ed o

f pre

side

nt,

vice

pre

side

nt, c

ampa

ign

co-c

hairs

, ca

mpa

ign

dire

ctor

, cam

paig

n co

nsul

tant

, and

dire

ctor

s fro

m

seve

ral d

evel

opm

ent a

reas

.

Up

to fi

ve m

embe

rs.

The

team

con

sist

ed o

f pre

side

nt,

vice

pre

side

nt, e

xecu

tive

dire

ctor

of d

evel

opm

ent,

cam

paig

n co

nsul

tant

and

ca

mpa

ign

co-c

hair.

D

iver

sity

Th

e te

am w

as d

iver

se, o

win

g la

rgel

y to

the

mix

of s

tyle

s an

d sk

ill.

The

dive

rsity

of

skill

incr

ease

d ov

er th

e ca

mpa

ign

perio

d

The

team

was

div

erse

, ow

ing

larg

ely

to th

e m

ix o

f sty

les a

nd sk

ill.

The

dive

rsity

of s

kill

incr

ease

d ov

er

the

cam

paig

n pe

riod.

The

team

was

div

erse

, ow

ing

larg

ely

to th

e m

ix o

f sty

les a

nd

skill

. Th

e di

vers

ity o

f ski

ll in

crea

sed

over

the

cam

paig

n pe

riod.

T

asks

D

evel

opin

g an

d ca

rryi

ng o

ut

cam

paig

n pl

an.

Muc

h ef

fort

was

giv

en to

staf

fing

issue

s an

d m

anag

ing

dysf

unct

iona

l in

terp

erso

nal r

elat

ions

hips

.

Dev

elop

ing

and

carr

ying

out

ca

mpa

ign

plan

. M

uch

effo

rt w

as

give

n to

staf

fing

issue

s and

m

anag

ing

dysf

unct

iona

l in

terp

erso

nal r

elat

ions

hips

.

Dev

elop

ing

and

carr

ying

out

ca

mpa

ign

plan

. M

uch

effo

rt w

as g

iven

to st

affin

g iss

ues a

nd

man

agin

g dy

sfun

ctio

nal

inte

rper

sona

l rel

atio

nshi

ps.

Org

aniz

atio

nal

stru

ctur

e Th

e fo

rmal

stru

ctur

e of

or

gani

zatio

n w

as c

entra

lized

. M

ultip

le a

nd fa

iled

lead

ersh

ip

assi

gnm

ents

led

to v

ario

us

dysf

unct

iona

l for

mal

and

in

form

al o

rgan

izat

iona

l st

ruct

ures

.

The

form

al st

ruct

ure

of o

rgan

izat

ion

was

cen

traliz

ed.

Mul

tiple

and

faile

d le

ader

ship

ass

ignm

ents

led

to

vario

us d

ysfu

nctio

nal f

orm

al a

nd

info

rmal

org

aniz

atio

nal s

truct

ures

.

The

form

al st

ruct

ure

of

orga

niza

tion

was

cen

traliz

ed.

Mul

tiple

and

faile

d le

ader

ship

as

sign

men

ts le

d to

var

ious

dy

sfun

ctio

nal f

orm

al a

nd

info

rmal

org

aniz

atio

nal

stru

ctur

es.

198

Objective 3: What is the nature of campaign design?

Trustees initiated campaigns and appointed presidents, who in turn provided

leadership to campaign planning and the execution processes. Campaign designs

reflected each team�s best-reasoned strategy to meet the campaign goals (see Table 7.4).

The teams shared similar levels of campaign complexity. Complexity or sophistication

did not appear related to dollars raised. Team Franchise, the least superior institution

attempted the most sophisticated campaign design and organization. Team Power Play,

the most superior fund raising institution, had the least sophisticated campaign design

organization. In each case study, campaign complexity level reflected the institution�s

desire to meaningfully engage and strengthen relationships with volunteers. Campaign

complexity level also had the opposite influence of exposing planning shortcomings, and

organizational weaknesses.

For Teams Schism, Franchise, and Power Play, the planned campaign design and

organization greatly outstripped team member capacity to carry out the plan.

Table 7.4: Comparison of campaign teams by campaign process design variables

Campaign Processes Design

Factors

Team Power Play Most

superior Team Schism Less superior

Team Franchise

Least superior Campaign initiation

Trustees and president initiated

Trustees initiated with urging from vice president for advancement and campaign consultant as a tribute to the outgoing president.

Trustees initiated

Planning and phases

Pre-campaign planning quiet phase Public phase

Pre-campaign planning phase Quiet phase Public phase

Pre-campaign planning phase Quiet phase Public phase

Campaign complexity

Least complex

High complexity Highest complexity

199

Objective 4: What is the nature of team core processes and performance?

The nature of team core processes and performance were directly related to

leadership and extent to which management functions were carried out. There are

seven management functions:

1. planning

2. organizing

3. coordinating

4. staffing

5. directing

6. evaluating

7. reporting

Two additional management functions were observed and they are best described as

coaching and renewal (team).

Management systems did not provide directly for interpersonal relationship

quality, but systems appeared to minimize the influence of interpersonal relationships

on campaign outcomes. Systems minimized ambiguity with roles, relationships, and

expectations that tended to precipitate dysfunctional dynamics. For example in the

case of Team Schism , the �leadership vacuum� gave rise to increased self-

management or �freelancing,� and a breakdown in role adherence, which in turn

fueled interpersonal dysfunction, which was not managed until the new vice president

established clear roles and rules of engagement within the team. In the case of team

Power Play, campaign organization was believed to keep the team on track in the face

of ongoing interpersonal turmoil.

200

Tab

le 7

.5: C

ompa

riso

n of

cam

paig

n te

ams b

y te

am c

ore

proc

esse

s and

per

form

ance

var

iabl

es

Tea

m C

ore

Proc

esse

s and

Pe

rfor

man

ce

Tea

m P

ower

Pla

y M

ost s

uper

ior

T

eam

Sch

ism

L

ess s

uper

ior

Tea

m F

ranc

hise

L

east

supe

rior

W

ork

man

agem

ent

Cam

paig

n sy

stem

s Se

lf-di

rect

ed a

nd c

ampa

ign

syst

ems

C

ampa

ign

syst

ems

Rel

atio

nshi

p m

anag

emen

t, C

onfli

ct

man

agem

ent

Rel

atio

nshi

ps w

ere

man

aged

th

roug

h st

affin

g de

cisio

ns.

Con

flict

s wer

e po

orly

man

aged

Rel

atio

nshi

ps w

ere

man

aged

by

limiti

ng o

ppor

tuni

ties

for v

olat

ile

inte

ract

ions

, and

by

clar

ifyin

g ro

les

and

resp

onsi

bilit

ies.

Con

flict

s wer

e po

orly

man

aged

unt

il th

e in

trodu

ctio

n of

a n

ew le

ader

.

The

pres

iden

t man

aged

re

latio

nshi

ps a

nd e

mpo

wer

ed

team

mem

bers

to re

solv

e co

nflic

ts

Ext

erna

l bo

unda

ry

man

agem

ent

Team

mem

bers

wer

e di

spat

ched

to

man

age

spec

ific

issu

es.

Te

am m

embe

rs w

ere

disp

atch

ed to

m

anag

e sp

ecifi

c is

sues

.

Team

mem

bers

wer

e di

spat

ched

to m

anag

e sp

ecifi

c is

sues

.

Prod

uctio

n of

re

sults

Sy

stem

s m

onito

ring

and

self

mon

itorin

g

Syst

ems

mon

itorin

g an

d se

lf m

onito

ring

Sy

stem

s m

onito

ring

and

self

mon

itorin

g E

valu

atio

n W

ith th

e ex

cept

ion

of tr

uste

e ev

alua

tion

of th

e pr

esid

ent,

ther

e w

as n

o m

entio

n of

form

al

eval

uatio

n at

the

cam

paig

n te

am

leve

l. P

erfo

rman

ce w

as m

easu

red

agai

nst c

ampa

ign

goal

s fo

r the

te

am a

s a u

nit.

How

ever

, the

re

wer

e pr

omot

ions

, sal

ary

incr

ease

s, an

d st

aff t

erm

inat

ions

.

Ther

e w

as n

o m

entio

n of

form

al

eval

uatio

n at

the

cam

paig

n te

am

leve

l. H

owev

er, t

here

wer

e pr

omot

ions

, sal

ary

incr

ease

s, an

d st

aff t

erm

inat

ions

. Ev

alua

tions

im

prov

ed fr

om in

form

al a

nd

subj

ectiv

e to

form

al a

nd o

bjec

tive.

Ther

e w

as n

o m

entio

n of

fo

rmal

eva

luat

ion

at th

e ca

mpa

ign

team

leve

l.

Perfo

rman

ce w

as m

easu

red

agai

nst c

ampa

ign

goal

s fo

r the

te

am a

s a u

nit.

How

ever

, th

ere

wer

e pr

omot

ions

, sal

ary

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Objective 5: What influences external to the institution affect campaign teams? In addition, how?

All participants identified the prevailing economy as an external influence upon

their campaign, and subsequently their team. For example, economic downturns were

believed to have decreased the size and number of major gifts, which in turn, increased

pressure to raise money, which then prompted campaign plan reevaluation and in some

cases increased unhealthy competition among fund raisers.

Within each team, participants identified specific influences. Team Schism

members recalled a failed local tax proposal, which made it necessary to add a $20

million dollar building project to their campaign during the public phase. Team

Franchise participants recalled the terrorist attacks and believed donations decreased as

contributions were shunted to disaster relief organizations. Team Power Play participants

attributed a decrease in contributions to a low ranking of the College in a popular national

magazine. They believed that gift revenue had increased since their ranking improved.

Objective 6: What influences internal to the institution affect campaign teams? In addition, how?

Teams Schism, Franchise, and Power Play reported financial retrenchment and

campus discourse regarding campaign fund raising priorities. While participants believed

they overcame obstacles, they noted positive internal influences such as increased support

for fund raising and active participation by the campus community in campaign planning

processes.

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Objective 7: What is the nature of team relationship/social dynamics?

The idea to launch a comprehensive capital campaign tended to begin with

trustees. These volunteers tended to have a collective consciousness with regards to

College history, and a commitment to the institution that allowed them to see beyond the

impact of a particular president or vice president. However, presidents were instrumental

in advancing the life of the institution for a period. Therefore, campaign leadership team

dynamics were influenced most in the short run by trustees� selection of presidents.

Each of the presidents had a unique leadership, management style, and personality

that strongly influenced the campaign team appointments. College presidents assembled

campaign teams and shaped team dynamics with the support of trustees, campaign

counsel, and the essential fund raising leadership and administrative prowess of vice

presidents for advancement. Presidents shaped team dynamics because they dictated or

heavily influenced the decisions about team membership and team member authority.

Likewise, the vice president also influenced the team dynamics, having equal or greater

access to key trustees, consultant, and others.

Assembling and building the campaign leadership team was a personal matter in

which personalities mattered. For example, presidents tended to appoint team members

with whom they had or envisioned having a trusting and loyal interpersonal relationship.

In many instances, presidents weighed trustworthiness or other personal attributes such as

loyalty as heavily as some technical competencies. This was especially the case with the

appointment of vice presidents for advancement. The relationship between the president

and vice president were barometer indicating team ethos and that of the entire campaign

organization.

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Personal attributes and skill were misjudged often. Therefore, campaign

organizations were �under construction� or in flux throughout the campaign period. The

potentially harmful flux was abated somewhat by the stability afforded by the

organization�s effectiveness at carrying out quality campaign management functions

(planning, organizing, staffing, coordinating, directing, evaluating, and reporting).

However, regardless of management, leadership teams tended to have interpersonal

disharmony for some period or over the entire course of the campaigns.

Main Research Question: How do leadership team dynamics affect success in capital campaign fund raising?

I address the main research question by presenting six related, key observations.

Following the six observations is an overall comparison of the Teams Schism, Power

Play, and Franchise, considering success at fund raising and team dynamics.

Key Observations

1. Functional dysfunction

Participants believed team dynamics regarding interpersonal relationships were

positively associated with success at fund raising. However, in the midst of periods

characterized by organizational and interpersonal dysfunction, each team greatly

exceeded its overall dollar goals. Therefore, dysfunction did not appear to keep teams

from achieving campaign success inasmuch as it likely restrained performance and kept

teams from raising more money or reaching their full potential.

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2. External to team orientation

What appeared a phenomenon of successful fund raising in the face of persistent

team dysfunction was explained by the actions of individual fund raisers operating often

as �independent representatives� who developed actionable external to the team

orientations and relationships with donors, which was associated directly with success at

major gift fund raising, regardless of prevailing team dynamics.

3. Emotional IQ and pursuit of an �A team�

The nature of team dynamics regarding interpersonal relationships mirrored

presidents� perception of the strength of relationship between team dynamics and success

at fund raising. Presidents tended to value �emotional IQ� or personal attributes -

particularly trustworthiness - as much as technical skill when appointing team members.

However, over-managing for increased �emotional IQ� at the expense of technical

competencies did not appear to increase success at fund raising within itself, but appeared

to increase dysfunction through high personnel turnover or perceptions of instability.

Therefore, teams experienced ongoing refinement not as much through staff development

(because trustworthiness, loyalty, and other desired attributes are not part of job training

per se), but through culling personnel in search of an �A team.� Considering this

strongly stated observation, one must be mindful that for fund raising, perhaps personal

attributes are essential technical competencies.

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4. The power of leveraged longevity

Participants attributed success at fund raising to prevailing team dynamics

inasmuch as dynamics influenced employment length, which in turn influenced

successful at soliciting major gifts.

5. President�s mirror

Presidents set standards and modeled interactions. What�s more, presidents

sought to assemble teams as extensions of themselves.

6. Management rules

While leadership set standards, management (planning, organizing, staffing,

directing, coordinating, reporting, and evaluating) provided structure and guidance for

interactions, out of which team dynamics emerged and teams responded.

Presented in Table 7.6 is an overall comparison of Teams Power Play, Schism,

and Franchise considering key interactions of the team dynamics construct and the

success construct.

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Table 7.6: Overall comparison of teams considering prevailing dynamics and key success measures

Team Power Play Most Superior

Team Schism Less Superior


Prevailing Team Dynamic

Intense and debilitating style clashes and trust issues between the president and vice presidents, which permeated campaign organization. The team was characterized for disciplined campaign management.

Intense and ongoing interpersonal dysfunction increased organizational dysfunction and vice versa. Problems were mitigated by new leadership and management personnel and practices instituted by new president, vice president and consultant.

Charismatic and superior presidential leadership, management, and control of campaign processes. Supportive loyal and insular campaign leadership team.

Success as Defined by Participants

Team capacity building. Exceeding campaign dollar goal. Viable volunteer organization. Fully fund each campaign objective. Increasing number of donors and prospects.

Team capacity building. Exceeding campaign dollar goal. Viable volunteer organization. Increasing number of donors and prospects.

Exceeding campaign goal. Team capacity building. Viable volunteer organization. Increasing number of donors and prospects.

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Team Power Play Most Superior



Relationship Between Success and Prevailing Team Dynamic

Participants identified strong relationships between success and team dynamics and carried out fund raising work in face of dynamics identified as adverse to campaign success. Strong external to team orientation. Strong orientation to fund raising work. Solicitors worked independently throughout period. Success was attributed to lengthy employment with College, which led to successful major gift fund raising.

Participants identified strong relationships between success and team dynamics and carried out fund raising work in face of dynamics identified as adverse to campaign success. Strong external to team orientation. Strong orientation to fund raising work. Solicitors worked independently throughout period. Success was attributed to lengthy employment with College, which led to successful major gift fund raising.

Participants identified strongest relationship between success and team dynamics and carried out fund raising work in face of dynamics identified as adverse to campaign success. Strong internal to team orientation. Strong orientation to fund raising work. The President structured his team to have strong interpersonal relationship dynamics, and loyalty. Therefore, campaign was perceived a success and attributed to president

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

In this, the final chapter, there is discussion of six key areas. 1) Summary of study

2) Study findings considering selected literature

3) Heuristic framework implications

4) Theory implications

5) Practical implications

6) Future research implications

7) Reflections

Review of Study

Summary of Study

This study design was qualitative and conducted in the tradition of a comparative

case study. This research explored campaign leadership team dynamics and success at

fund raising. The aim of the study was to observe, analyze, and report campaign team

dynamics, particularly interpersonal inner workings. To these ends, I considered two

interrelated and observable activities: (1) the emergence and functioning of capital-

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campaign leadership teams, and (2) the emergence and management of capital campaigns

in the context of the team.

A research framework and interview protocols emerged from a review of

educational fund raising literature and organizational behavior literature that discussed

effective teams. In addition, the design of these key tools was informed by insights

gathered from interviews of fund raising professionals prior to conducting the case

studies.

Four eligible institutions having membership in a consortium agreed to participate

in this study. Three of the four eligible institutions, having the widest range of success at

fund raising were selected. Success at fund raising was observed through an evaluation

framework composed of variables identified in fund raising literature and interviews with

fund raising professionals. The three institutions accordingly ranked: (1) most superior,

(2) less superior, and (3) least superior.

Study participants self-identified and were identified through triangulation and

fund raising literature, which suggested a typical personnel make-up of a campaign-

leadership team. Study participants included presidents, vice presidents for development,

and vice presidents for advancement, campaign consultants, trustees, campaign directors,

major gift directors, and others.

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Research Questions

The main research question was stated as follows:

How do leadership team dynamics affect success in capital campaign fund raising?

To address the main research question, seven sub questions were fashioned to permit

direct and indirect investigation of the phenomenon. The indirect questions explored the

technical dimensions of campaign, team design, and functioning. The direct questions

specifically explored the nature of internal to team interpersonal relationships and success

at fund raising. The research sub questions are enumerated:





5. What influences external to the institution affect campaign teams? In addition,

how?


how?

7. What is the nature of team relationship/social dynamics?

Twenty-one initial interviews and seventeen follow-up interviews were recorded,

transcribed, and analyzed with the assistance of qualitative data analysis software. The

order of case presentation followed the order in which institutions permitted access. Each

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team was named after the case had been fully analyzed. Oral reports on key findings

were given to each team

Review of Findings

Key Observations

Six related key findings emerged from the study. Refer to chapter seven for

discussion of the key findings.

Key findings

1) �Functional dysfunction�.

2) �External to team orientation�.

3) � Emotional IQ and pursuit of an �A team�.

4) �The power of leveraged longevity�.

5) �President�s mirror�.

6) �Management rules�.

Key Study Findings Considering Selected Literature

In the literature review (Chapter 2), I cited the work of several authors that

addressed teams and success, and/or fund raising. Presented next is a brief discussion of

the most relevant literature in light of findings of this study. This section of the

conclusions considers: 1) team types, 2) team theoretical performance, and 3)

characteristics of successful teams.

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Team types

Cohen and Bailey (1997) identified four types of teams: (1) work teams, (2)

parallel teams, (3) project teams, and (4) management teams. The campaign leadership

teams most resembled a hybrid of cross-functional teams and management teams. They

resembled cross-functional teams because members were drawn from different

disciplines; their work was time limited; and team members regularly applied knowledge,

judgment, and expertise to the work. In addition, with the exception of the consultant,

team members appropriated time to responsibilities or projects other than fundraising

during the campaign and returned to other work after the campaign.

Campaign teams most closely resembled management teams because membership

consisted of managers with oversight of units and subunits; and who were responsible for

setting strategic direction, driving performance, integrating disparate efforts, and

ultimately the success of the enterprise. A uniqueness of the campaign leadership team

was that every member (except in some instances the consultant and trustee) was

expected to lead, manage, and participate in the most fundamental of campaign functions

-- soliciting dollars.

Theoretical Basis for Teams

Theoretically, a basis for establishing a team is the potential that individuals

working collectively will achieve more in aggregate than individuals working

independently. There are, in addition to the theoretical increase in productivity, two

levels of actual team performance (see Figure 8-1). One level of productivity is

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�assembly bonus,� a level of performance that exceeds the theoretical level. The other

level of performance is �process loss,� or productivity below the theoretical level

(Nadler, 1997). Nadler�s (1997) team model depicts three levels of team performance

with output observed as a function of numbers of people engaged in the task.

Figure 8.1: Two patterns of actual group performance

A figure that better reflects the findings of this study used Nadler�s figure as

starting place. In this figure, (see Figure 8.2) �success� is represented on the X-axis, and

prevailing team dynamics is represented on the Y-axis. One anticipates a positive

relationship between team dynamics and success at fundraising. To the contrary, I found

a negative or neutral actual relationship between success and team dynamics with

participants expressing desire for a positive relationship. One can only estimate how the

Source: David Nadler and Janet Spaulding and Associates, 1997. (P.7)

Number of People

Units of Output


Assembly Bonus

Process Loss

Actual Performance

Actual Performance

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teams might have performed had they experienced what they perceived as positive

dynamics or the increased presence of characteristics associated with successful teams.

Figure 8.2: Campaign team theoretical performance

Characteristics of Effective Teams

A review of literature on effective teams presented in Chapter 2 identified relative

consistency among authors regarding characteristics of effective teams (McIntyre, 2003;

Parker, 2003; Mosley, 2001; Nash, 1999; Nadler, et al 1997; Larson and La Fasto, 1989;

Snee et al 1998; Cohen et al 1997). The leadership teams were considered against

selected characteristics.

Team ethos and dynamics tended to improve over the five to seven year campaign

period. There were however, prevailing team dynamics and characteristics (see Table

8.1). The absolute presence or absence of characteristics was difficult to gauge.

Therefore, the presence of a characteristic(s) was rated: �high�, �moderate�, or �low�.

0


Actual Performance

Actual performance

Success at Fund raising

Prevailing Dynamic

-

+

- +

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Figure 8.3: Leadership teams considering selected characteristics of effective teams Team Power

Play Most Superior


Team Franchise Least Superior

Author

Effective leadership

Low to Moderate

High High Nash, Mosley, McIntyre, Larson & LaFasto

Clear strategic goals

High High to Moderate

High Nash, Mosley, McIntyre, Larson & LaFasto

Clear roles, and responsibilities

High Low to Moderate

High Nash, Mosley

Collaborative relationships

Low Low High Nash, McIntyre

Team interaction Low to Moderate

Low High to Moderate

McIntyre

Open communication

Low to Moderate

Low High to Moderate

Nash, Mosley

Self-assessment feedback

Moderate Low to Moderate

High to Moderate

Mosley, McIntyre


Low Low to Moderate

High Nadler (1997), Cohen et al (1997)

Cohesive relationships

Low Low High to Moderate

Shared leadership Moderate to Low

High Low to Moderate

Mosley

Civilized disagreement

Low Low High Mosley

Informality Low High to Moderate

Moderate to High

Mosley

External relationships

High High High

Style diversity Moderate to Low

High High Mosley

Networking information

High Moderate High McIntyre

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In addition to the characteristics presented in Table 1, it is important consider the

teams in light of the research of Herb (2001), Nadler (1982), Caplow (1964),

Lewin (1999), and Joyaux (2001).

Effective teams exhibit �skills of interaction� (Herb, 2001). Similarly, Nadler

(1982) wrote, �The nature of relationships and the patterns of behavior that emerge over

time in groups�both among group members and between group members and leaders�

have an effect on the work performance of the group. Thus, these relationships affect

group and organizational performance� (p. 184-185). Caplow (1964) used the term

�valence� to describe the importance of team cohesion, team member �sentiment,�

�friendliness� toward one another, and the achievement of team goals or tasks. Valence

is the capacity to unite, react, or interact. Lewin�s theory on group dynamics identified

the importance of group members forming �linkages� or cohesive relationships with each

other and to the larger group. Joyaux (2002) affirmed, �The degree to which members

are linked defines group health.� Joyaux describes linking forces (2001, p.16)) as:

• Member satisfaction

• Degree of closeness and warmth felt between members and groups

• Pride of membership in the group

• Ability of members to address crises that face the group

• Degree to which members of the group express their ideas and feelings

honestly.

Considering the citations drawn from the slate of authors, Team Power Play, Team

Schism, and Team Franchise were not operating optimally. This was likely related to less

than desirable team dynamics.

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Heuristic Framework Implications

Overall, the framework provided an effective and well structured (although not

efficient) mean to explore the phenomenon (see Figure 8.1). The framework guided the

study loosely, because I was uncertain how the constructs would interact and how

participants would respond to direct questions about their perceptions of interpersonal

relationships or success.

Figure 8.4: Initial heuristic framework

The participants were quite interested in sharing their experiences, and were

curious as to how analysis of data might explain their success given their circumstances,

which were often uncharacteristic of those associated with effective teams.

At the onset of the study, I anticipated but did not fully understand how the

constructs would interact upon the other. Initially, the heuristic framework was

illustrated with constructs having unidirectional influence and all leading to campaign

Campaign Success

1

Team CoreProcesses & Performance

4

Team Dynamics

7


5


3

Team Design Factors

2


6

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dynamics and ultimately to success. Intuitively I anticipated feedback loops and this

assumption was correct (see Figure 8.4). The constructs interacted concurrently and

exerted influence upon the other. For example, perceptions of success influenced team

dynamics as strongly as campaign design factors, team design factors, or team core

processes and performance factors.

Figure 8.5: Revised heuristic framework

An alternative and perhaps more effective framework to explore the phenomenon

would be composed of characteristics of successful teams as the independent variables

and success at the dependent variable. Characteristics of effective teams are discussed in

detail in Table 8.1.

Implications for Theory

Campaign Success


Team Dynamics



Team Design Factors


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Based on analysis of the data gathered, no definitive directional relationship was

found to exist between team dynamics and success. However, one might theoretically

conceive of a positive relationship between team member�s interpersonal dynamics and

length of time on the team. As an extension of that proposition, one can theorize a

positive correlation between a team member�s length of time on a particular team and

success at comprehensive capital campaign fund raising.

Implications for Practice

Campaign leadership teams may benefit from creating and maintaining

environments that reduce personnel turnover. Dysfunctional behavior is likely to occur

during and between campaigns. However, dysfunctional behavior appears to have only a

nominal influence of campaign outcomes when backed by sound management practices,

particularly when the function of each staff member is optimal and the appropriate weight

is given to desirable personal attributes and technical competency.

Over managing for cohesiveness may not necessarily increase success at fund raising.

Implications for Future Research

Several questions emerged that were beyond the scope of this study but of value to

fund raising theory and practice. Through both qualitative and quantitative methods,

future research might explore:

1. The relationship between length of campaign team member(s) employment with

an institution and dollars donated by constituents of those team members.

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2. Donor perceptions of campaign team member turnover and the influence upon

dollar contributions.

3. Campaign consultants� roles, influence on campaigns, and perceptions of

successful campaign teams.

4. The nature of president and vice president relationships, and the influence upon

campaign fund raising.

5. Non campaign-leadership team member perceptions of campaign-leadership

team�s dynamics and the influence on fund raising.

To explore effectively each of the above questions, there must exist reliable and valid

methods to observe fund raising potential and organizational capacity to realize potential.

Current best practices are not reliable or valid.

This study met the standards for a comparative case study. However, a weakness

was a relative lack of diversity across the purposefully selected small private liberal arts

colleges. Considering the aforementioned weakness, with time, and dollar resources

permitting, quantitative studies engaging no less than 100 institutions representing the

range of the Carnegie classifications is recommended. Considering the subject matter,

quantitative research should be complimented with qualitative study conducted in the

tradition of a phenomenology and/or grounded theory.

Reflections

I conclude this study by posing the observations of two participants, who on the

one hand spoke eloquently and passionately about the noble work of higher education

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and the essential role that fund raising plays in advancing that work, and not simply as a

process to generate revenues; but as a higher order transforming endeavor. On the other

hand, the two participants accurately captured the contrarian behavior and sentiments of

the campaign-leadership team members interviewed as well as the professionals

interviewed prior to the study. One of the participants said:

Fund raising is an interesting business in that it is a sales position where you are out in the field or sending letters or whatever it is, you are a sales person� You don�t have to be nice to the person in the office next to you. You have to be nice to the person you are trying to get money from.

The other participant said, �If we had our house really in order, we could have done so

much better.� The �house� he referred to is the team dynamic, a dynamic often perceived

as dysfunctional and emerging from methodically assembled teams. Considering the

many stories told by participants, colleges, and universities can more effectively raise

funds with minor changes to organization or budget and great changes to team members�

behavior. Team members knew that dynamics influenced campaign outcomes, yet

appeared to exercise little control over their behavior; resigning to achieve as much as

functional dysfunction allowed, which was not their best.

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APPENDICES

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Appendix A: Representative Comprehensive Campaign Organization

Board of Trustees

Honorary Co-Chairs

Campaign Steering Committee Development Office

Leadership Gifts Committee

Special Events Committee

Planned Gifts Committee

Annual Fund Committee

General Gifts Committee

Regional Gifts Committee

Major Gifts Committee

Campaign Communications Committee

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Appendix B: Sample Initial Recruitment Letter

December 15, 2004 Dear President ___: Fund raising literature asserts the importance of leadership, management, and teamwork toward campaign success. However, relatively little scholarly attention is given to this topic. My name is Preston Hicks. I am a Ph.D. candidate in The University of Michigan�s Center for the Study of Higher and Postsecondary Education. My dissertation explores successful capital campaigns and campaign leadership/management teams.

Kalamazoo College has an exemplary development program. I would greatly appreciate your permission to conduct a case study of �Enlightened Leadership: Kalamazoo College in the 21st Century,� capital campaign and your campaign leadership/management team.

Selected purposefully for case studies are private, selective, liberal arts colleges and universities located in the Midwest that have strong fund raising programs. I am excited about this research and its potential to enhance fundraising and organizational literature.

The research design requires me to interview key campaign team members including the President, Chief Advancement or Development Officer, Fund Raising Counsel, Campaign Director, Trustees actively involved in the campaign, and others who you believe had integral roles in the management and leadership of the campaign. I have attached an executive summary of my dissertation proposal for your review and will call you after the holiday to learn of your decision. Confidentiality is assured. Sincerely,

Preston W. Hicks CC: ___ CC: Dr. Marvin Peterson, Professor of Higher Education, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Dissertation Chair Enclosure: Executive Summary

308 Minges Hills Drive� Battle Creek, MI 49015 � 269-979-4359�[email protected]

225

Appendix C: Sample Follow-Up Letters to Institutions

December 22, 2004 Dear Ms ____: Thank you so very much for allowing me to share more about my dissertation research, the materials I will request, and the personnel I would like to interview for �An Exploration of Capital Campaign Team Organization and Functioning and Fund Raising Success.� This exploratory research deals with team dynamics and functioning (independent variables) and their relationships to success in fund raising (dependent variables) at private liberal arts colleges and universities. As this is a qualitative study, my interactions with interviewees will shape the research process. At this time, the documents believed necessary to explore and tell the story of the campaign include:

1. Student and faculty handbooks, 2. Campaign case statement, 3. Campaign newsletters, 4. Campaign management team roster (information from your web site?), 5. Contact information for top campaign managers and leaders (please see below)

and, 6. Minutes from high-level management and leadership team meetings (as

available). The primary units of analysis are key campaign managers and leaders. The titles may vary but I would appreciate an opportunity to interview team members including:

1. Chairperson for the Board of Trustees, 2. President, 3. Chief Development and/or Chief Advancement Officer, 4. Director of Development, 5. Campaign Consultant and/or Campaign Director, and 6. Campaign Committee Chair for the Board of Trustees

_____, I would greatly appreciate your recommendations on how to best contact your team members. Given your experiences as a development professional, please let me know if I should consult other documents and/or people. I look forward to speaking with you after the holidays or as your calendar permits. I will call you. Again, thank you for your time and consideration during this busy time of the year. Sincerely,

226

Preston Hicks, PhD Candidate, University of Michigan, Center for the Study of Higher and Postsecondary Education CC: Dr. Marvin Peterson, Professor of Higher Education, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Dissertation Chair

308 Minges Hills Drive� Battle Creek, MI 49015 � 269-979-4359�[email protected]

227

Appendix D: Consent Form

Project Title: An Exploration of Capital Campaign Team Organization and Functioning and Fund Raising Success

Principal Investigator: Mr. Preston Hicks

Consent Form

1. Title of the research project An Exploration of Capital Campaign team Organization and Functioning and Fund Raising Success

2. Names of the researcher Preston W. Hicks, PhD Candidate, University of Michigan, Center for The Study of Higher and Postsecondary Education

3. Description of the research This research will explore the nature of capital campaign team organization, team functioning, team dynamics in particular, and the relationship between team dynamics and success at fund raising.

4. Description of human subject involvement Your involvement consists of being interviewed face to face and/or by telephone by Preston Hicks. You will be asked to recall and comment on your campaign team experiences.

5. Length of human subject participation The approximate time of your interview is 1.5 hours. In the case that a follow up interview is needed, the approximate time of that interview would be 30 minutes.

6. Expected benefits to subjects or to others Although you may not receive direct benefit from your participation, others may ultimately benefit from the knowledge obtained in this study.

7. Costs to subject resulting from participation in the study Your participation (being interviewed) in this study requires the use of your personal and/or professional time and therefore, any costs associated with your volunteering that time.

8. Confidentiality of records/data You will not be identified in any reports on this study. Records will be kept confidential to the extent provided by federal, state, and local law. However, the Institutional Review Board, the sponsor of the study, or university and government officials responsible for monitoring this study may inspect these records. Audio recording or any communication that identifies you as a study participant will be securely archived with the researcher or disposed of at your request.

228

Exceptions to confidentiality agreement Legal duty to disclose harm to self or others supersedes the confidentiality agreement.

9. Availability of further information If significant new knowledge is obtained during the course of this research, which may relate to your willingness to continue participation, you will be informed of this knowledge.

10. Contact Information

Researcher Preston W. Hicks, PhD Candidate 269-979-4359 [email protected] Dissertation Chair Dr. Marvin Peterson, Professor of Higher Education 734-764-9472

11. Required IRB Contact Information Should you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, please contact the Institutional Review Board, Kate Keever, 540 E. Liberty Street, Suite 202, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2210, (734) 936-0933, email: [email protected].

12. Voluntary nature of participation Your participation in this project is voluntary. Even after you sign the informed consent document, you may decide to leave the study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you may otherwise be entitled. You may skip any interview question that makes you feel uncomfortable.

13. Documentation of the consent One copy of this document will be kept together with the research records of this study. In addition, you will be given a copy to keep.

14. Audio/Video Recording of subjects Your interview will be audio recorded. Upon the completion of the research, the recordings will be archived. Audio recording or any communication that identifies you as a study participant will be securely archived with the researcher or disposed of at your request.

15. Consent of the subject: I have read [or been informed] of the information given above. Preston Hicks has offered to answer any questions I may have concerning the study. I hereby consent to participate in the study.

229

__________________________________________________________________ Printed Name Consenting signature

16. Please sign below if you are willing to have this interview audio recorded. You may still participate in this study if you are not willing to have the interview recorded.

Signature Date

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Appendix E: Interview Protocol

Title: An Exploration of Capital Campaign Team Organization and Functioning and Fund Raising Success. Main Question: How do leadership team dynamics affect success in capital campaign fund raising? Sub Questions:

1. How do campaign team members describe campaign success? 2. What is the nature of campaign team design? 3. What is the nature of campaign design? 4. What is the nature of team core processes and performance? 5. What external to the institution influences affect campaign teams? In

addition, how? 6. What internal to the institution influences affect campaign teams? In addition,

how? 7. What is the nature of team relationship/social dynamics? Professional

dynamics?

***

Thank you for sharing time with me today. I have been looking forward to hearing your thoughts on the campaign and the campaign team.

Your participation is voluntary. If at anytime, you feel uncomfortable answering a question or wish to stop the interview, please let me know. With your permission, this interview will be recorded.

Again, thank you. May we begin?

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*** Interview Protocol

Basic information consultant

Would you please share your name, your firm, and your title there? How long have you been involved in fund raising? How did you come to be the consultant for the campaign? Please tell me about your roles in the campaign.

Basic information executives

Would you please share your name and title? How long have you served in this capacity. Have you served the college in other capacities prior? What were they? Note: Passage of time and changes in opinion

Section I - Success

How do you define a successful capital campaign? In what ways was the campaign a success? In what ways was the campaign not as successful as it could have been? Tell me about your initial assessment of the of the campaign idea and the campaign team.

What did the college need to start doing? What did the college need to stop doing? What was the college doing well (should continue)?

What needed to happen to increase the likelihood of success? Performance and evaluation

• How did the team talk about performance or evaluation? • What was the nature of rewards and consequences for fund raising

performance?

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Section II-Team Design/Composition

Who was on the campaign leadership team and why (composition)? What was the strategy for adding or removing team members? How do you feel about the team�s diversity of talents and skills? What were your thoughts on the team�s ability to meet campaign fund raising goals? What effects did changes in team membership and member roles have on the team?

Section III -Campaign design � Fund raising school 2002

I understand that campaign phases and processes overlap but could you please share with

me what was happening with the team dynamics during the processes undertaken in the

quiet and public phase?

Regarding the quiet phase -- What do you recall most about the:

• Campaign planning and team dynamics (preparation, preplanning, planning)

• Lead gifts and team dynamics

• Kick off and team dynamics

Regarding the public phases�what do you recall most about the

• Major gifts and team dynamics

• General gifts and team dynamics

• Celebration and team dynamics

Section IV - Relationships Tell me about the campaign team and the nature of team member relationships. Overall, how would you describe the campaign leadership team�s climate or environment?

233

Was it conducive to success?

How important are team member interpersonal relationships and campaign success? Considering team member relationships what contributes most to campaign success?

Did you observe this with the campaign? Considering team member relationships what are the biggest threats to success?

Did you observe this with the campaign? How did the team deal with or manage conflict?

Section V - Influences on team /campaign What internal to the institution influences do you recall having an impact on�? What external to the institution influences do you recall having an impact on�?

Section VI - Dynamics and Success

Does the team make the campaign or does the campaign make the team? Let�s revisit a question that I have asked earlier in different ways: That question is what is the relationship between campaign leadership team dynamics and campaign success? Thank you for your time today. Is there anything that we did not cover that we should have? May I call you if I have other questions or need clarification? Again, I thank you.

234

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