an issues note - world bank · 1). yet, despite such apparently poor governance, bangladesh has...
TRANSCRIPT
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Bangladesh
Workshop on Governance and Development
---- An Issues Note ----
Background and Context The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s contributed to a remarkable political transition across the developing world. A large number of developing countries and the successor states of the former Soviet Union adopted democratic forms of governance. The spread of democracy has given voice to demands for better governance, fuelled by politicians competing for political power. The relatively weak response to the structural adjustment policies pursued during the 1980s also led to a renewed focus on the quality of governance and weak institutional underpinnings. Since the late 1990s, there has also been increased attention to the “cancer of corruption”. The financial crises of the late 1990s also drew attention to the weakness of regulatory institutions and the quality of governance in the countries worst affected, such as Indonesia.
The increased focus on governance has been accompanied by a growing consensus among development practitioners about the importance of governance to development outcomes. Cross country research has also revealed a close relationship between governance and development, although there remains disagreement about the direction of the relationship. Such cross country research has been made possible by a growing industry producing indicators of governance. This ranges from commercial ventures that are in the business of selling their risk assessments to clients to think tanks such as Freedom House or international NGOs such as Transparency International. The international development agencies have also started to generate indicators based on their own surveys such as the World Bank Group’s Investment Climate and Doing Business surveys, and the World Bank Institute’s World Governance Indicators.
It does not require cross country studies to confirm the harsh reality that most developing states are failing to deliver on their most basic functions: maintaining the rule of law and public order, ensuring the delivery of essential services, regulating markets and reconciling diverse interests among their citizens. Generalizations are dangerous given the wide diversity of developing countries. But the typical developing country is today faced with rising expectations from a rapidly growing and disparate population that is outstripping the ability of weak bureaucracies to deliver services.
Governments are responding with varying degrees of competence to these challenges. At one end are the failed states, where governments barely exist, and when they do, they hardly provide any services. At the other extreme are a handful of countries where leadership and bureaucracies are relatively competent and governments are doing well by the people. In between is a wide spectrum:
weak or predatory states which “consume the surplus they extract, encourage private actors to shift from productive activities to unproductive rent seeking and fail to provide collective goods” (Evans, 1995:24);
young democracies struggling with a difficult political transition, managing simultaneous political and economic liberalization with weak bureaucracies and few checks and balances;
more mature democracies where governments are doing the best they can, but face the same difficulties as the advanced countries when it comes to political corruption and abuse of office.
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Then there are the large continental size polities like India and Brazil which are difficult to categorize, because within their national boundaries can be found the entire range of governance situations from weak or predatory states to relatively good governance.
Bangladesh has a poor reputation for governance, falling at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption perceptions index and ranks poorly on most of the six perceptions based governance indicators in the World Bank Institute’s World Governance Indicators (Figure 1). Yet, despite such apparently poor governance, Bangladesh has experienced above average economic growth and substantial progress in poverty reduction and human development.
Figure 1: World Governance Indicators-Six Aspects of Bangladesh Governance
It is this Bangladesh conundrum that is the principal focus of this workshop. While much has been said and written about the quality of governance in Bangladesh, both by Bangladeshis and other scholars, there has been little empirical research on, or interest in, the larger debate on the relationship between governance in Bangladesh and its development outcomes. Is Bangladesh’s relatively strong performance despite poor governance or is the quality of governance here better than the perceptions? Would development outcomes have been even stronger had governance been better? Or have some aspects of governance been good while others poor? The first objective of this workshop is to help “unbundle” Bangladeshi governance so as to better respond to these questions. The workshop also is intended to better understand what we know about the relationship between governance and development in Bangladesh and what we do not know, and to identify research and policy priorities that might be the subject of future workshops. The focus in this workshop is on the economic aspects of governance. The political dimensions of governance will, we anticipate, be the subject of future workshops.
A secondary purpose of the workshop is to help clarify the key concepts of governance, assess the strengths and weaknesses of different efforts to measure governance and better understand the international debate on the relationship between governance and development.
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Workshop Design The Workshop proceedings will span two days.
The first day is devoted to clarifying the key concepts of governance, understanding the methodology and issues relating to the measurement of governance, reviewing the relationship between governance and development in the literature and examining two case studies of similar development contexts to Bangladesh: India and Indonesia.
The second day will focus exclusively on the Bangladesh experience, attempting to understand the Bangladeshi conundrum of relatively strong growth and social outcomes combined with allegedly weak governance. Following an overview of the governance-development relationship in Bangladesh, with a focussed look on one aspect of governance (rule of law and property rights), the workshop will focus on a few Bangladeshi development successes (human development, garments) and failures (the power sector) and attempt to understand the role governance played in those particular outcomes.
The following provides a brief overview of the issues to be discussed in each session.
SESSION 1: Governance – Conceptual Issues, Measurements and Relevance
Governance and the State: Concepts and Definitions
The term governance is inextricably linked to the concept of the State. Public goods and
services are essential to promoting growth and reducing poverty. Without security and order, for instance, there can be little productive activity. Or, unless property rights can be adequately protected, there will be little investment in both physical and human capital. But public goods and services will tend to be grossly underprovided if their provision is left to private individuals and firms. Hence, for any significant progress to take place, some entity, larger than the simple agglomeration of individuals/clans/tribes/firms in a given geographic region, i.e. a country, needs to have the authority to provide and manage public goods and services. This entity is the State.
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What then is Governance? Many definitions have been offered but at the core of each is that governance refers to the manner in which the State acquires and exercises authority (to provide and manage public goods and services). In medieval Europe, it was the king, his court advisers, his army, and the Lords that combined to form the State and wielded the authority to provide public goods and services, although their authority did not emanate from the people but through historical antecedent and tradition. In modern democracies, it is the Executive (including local governments), the Legislature, the Judiciary, and a host of (relatively) independent bodies, e.g. constitutional courts in some countries, that form the State and in combination produce the public goods and services needed by the citizenry and the business community. Their authority however is a delegated one: the citizenry voluntarily cedes the authority to them. The two exemplify differences in systems (or types) of governance. Today there are many different systems, including many variations of so-called democracies.
Accountability of the State refers to its responsibility and that of its stewards (politicians/policymakers, bureaucrats, legislators, judges etc.) to citizens to deliver public goods and services and explain and face the consequences of any failures to do so. It can be broken down into three linked components. The first is the accountability of politicians to citizens as well as businesses and other organized interests (political accountability) The second is the accountability of State agencies to politicians in their role as policymakers and within this the accountability of front line units of ministries to their central units (internal accountability). And the third is accountability of “front line” units, whether
these be service delivery units, regulatory agencies, or enforcement agencies (e.g. the courts) to their respective clients (social accountability).
Internal accountability has a vertical and horizontal dimension. Vertical internal accountability refers to the chain of responsibilities of lower level units in a ministry to the higher units that they respectively report to; horizontal internal accountability on the other hand refers to the responsibility of the Executive branch of the State to report to and explain its performance to the so-called institutions of restraint – the Legislature, the Judiciary, the Ombudsman, and other independent Constitutional bodies. If political accountability is weak, politicians have strong incentives to use the State’s coercive and policy making powers for their own private gain. If internal accountability is weak, bureaucrats could do the same or, somewhat less perniciously, simply shirk from their responsibilities, e.g. moonlighting. And if social accountability is weak, there is little feedback information that policymakers can rely on to help them assess how well their respective ministries are meeting the needs of their clientele.
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Measuring Governance
The growth of interest in the relationship between governance and development has led to an increasing interest in measuring the quality of governance. This in turn has generated a thriving “governance indicators” industry. These indicators are both “objective” and “subjective”. Objective indicators report on facts -- the existence or otherwise of particular laws and institutions, quantitative indicators of governance activity (e.g. the number of corruption cases prosecuted), or more recently the cost of doing business indicators produced by the World Bank Group (number of days to start or close a business). Subjective indicators rely on perceptions of stakeholders (citizens, investors, civil servants, judges, lawyers, litigants) and “experts”. The World Bank Institute has for about a decade produced a set of composite indicators for six aspects of governance: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. These composite indicators are based on some 37 different data sources. The workshop will expose participants to a broad overview of the problems of measuring governance and the current state of governance indicators and their likely future evolution. This is intended to help participants better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the indicators currently used to judge Bangladesh’s governance performance, and to encourage local efforts to generate indicators that are more closely geared to the unique circumstances of Bangladesh.
Governance and Development
Though there had been extensive research earlier into the causes and impact of poor governance, and in particular of corruption,
1 it was not till the mid 1990s, with improvements in
data and econometric techniques, that large cross-country analysis of the impact of governance and institutions on investment and growth emerged. This research has shown that corruption, which is both a symptom and cause of bad governance, discourages private investment and, more generally, that the quality of governance institutions has a significant, if not predominant, impact on economic growth (Maoro, 1996; Keefer and Knack, 1996; Wei, 1996, 1997; World Bank, 1997; Kaufman et al, 2000 and 2002; Rodrik et al 2002). Furthermore, it has provided
1 See, for instance, Susan Rose Ackerman (2004) and Robert Klitgaard (1988). Much of the work on rent-
seeking that punctuated the literature from the mid 70s to the 80s, e.g. Krueger (1976), Bhagwati (1978),
essentially tackled conceptual issues.
Two other concepts are often associated with governance: transparency and inclusiveness. Transparency refers to “the increased flow of timely and reliable information that has the attributes of
access, comprehensiveness, relevance, quality, and reliability. Lack of transparency results from State actors deliberately withholding access to information, misrepresenting information, or failing to ensure that the information provided is of adequate relevance or quality.” Transparency is a fundamental building block of accountability. Without appropriate information provided at the right time and the right place, it would be difficult to hold State actors accountable for their decisions and actions.
Inclusiveness means that “citizens have equal rights before the law and have equal opportunities to exercise those rights.”
1 It can be viewed as a dimension of political and social
accountability. For instance, when a particular ethnic group is excluded from voting and from access to basic services, politicians, bureaucrats, and the courts will be relatively unresponsive to the needs of this group. So accountability is weak and service delivery is deficient. Another example is elite capture of service delivery depriving the poor of
One term that is invariably associated with governance is incentives.1 The incentives of State actors are
influenced and shaped by processes that underpin the different accountabilities of the State as well as its capacity. Institutions shape individual incentives and thus affect outcomes. Douglas North has defined institutions very broadly as “the rules of the game” that govern the protection (or lack thereof) of property rights and underpin the rule of law. This encompasses a wide range of phenomena, from informal arrangements to formal laws and regulations or from simple norms to a complex set of rules, e.g. an importation rule for sugar vs. the Constitution.
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empirical evidence of what analytical studies have long argued and case studies have suggested: corruption distorts the allocation of resources in ways that hamper poverty alleviation, i.e. corruption hurts the poor (Maoro, 1998; Davoodi and Tanzi, 1998; Gupta, S. et al, 2002.). The workshop will also be exposed to an overview of the main research findings on the relationship between governance and development and an assessment of the quality of our understanding of this relationship.
SESSION 2: Comparative case studies: India and Indonesia
Bangladesh is not the only country in which relatively good growth and other development outcomes coincide with poor governance. Session 2 on Day 1 will review the experience of two countries with similar experiences. India is a continent size economy and therefore does not lend itself to generalizations on governance since it encompasses within its borders a wide variety of governance situations, and several states that appear to be failing states. The focus on India will be on some overall governance trends and policy developments followed by a more intensive look at one Indian state, Andhra Pradesh. While Bangladesh and India have a common history of colonial rule, Indonesia also has much in common in Bangladesh. These include a common religion, a common experience with military rule, and a poor record on governance combined with a remarkable performance in the area of economic growth and social development. Speakers and participants will attempt in each case to draw some lessons from these two case studies.
DAY TWO
SESSION 3: Governance and Development – Bangladesh Context I
This session will explore alternative hypotheses regarding the governance-development nexus in Bangladesh. First, was there an unexploited potential in the existing or pre-existing governance structure, i.e. a “slack” in the governance system so that reasonably satisfactory growth took place following improved policies without facing a governance constraint? Second, was governance indeed a constraint on growth in the past and did the favourable effects of policy reforms in some spheres (macro-economic reforms, pro-private sector policies, partnerships with NGOs) partly offset the constraining effects of bad governance? Third, can the current rate of economic growth be sustained without improvement in governance? Or is the faster growth of which Bangladesh may be capable being frustrated by poor governance?
A second set of questions relate to the relative importance of different components of governance in respect of their impact on growth. Are property rights more of a constraining factor than contract enforcement? If the risk of outright expatriation is not a constraint, what about uncertainty of property rights arising from illegal encroachment? Are corruption and government effectiveness the most important constraints? Is corruption a byproduct of lack of accountability and inadequate rule of law?
SESSION 4: Governance and Development – Bangladesh context II
This session is intended to drill down from the macro-economic level to key sectors where Bangladesh has done well (human development and garments) or is experiencing a crisis (electric power) to better understand the relations between governance and development in Bangladesh. The human development discussion is intended to focus on the remarkable strides Bangladesh has made in terms of coverage (increase in school enrolment, number of schools)
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and the challenges it continues to face in terms of the quality of services delivered. Why has governance not been a constraint in one case, and is it the source of relatively weak performance in improving quality? What has been the role of NGOs in helping government deliver in this area?
In the area of garments, the workshop will address the issue of why the garments sector has managed to show such dynamism and growth when the cost of doing business surveys and the investment climate surveys suggest significant private sector dissatisfaction with governance and a consensus on its adverse impact on their operations. Are these surveys exaggerating the difficulties the private sector generally faces, or did the garments sector receive exceptional treatment including through a lax regulatory regime which may be responsible for some of its current labour relations problems?
The failures in electricity provision which have become a major constraint to Bangladesh’s development reflect the inability of the state to create enough capacity in the public sector or to facilitate private provision of electricity. The workshop will focus on the factors behind these failures and possible ways out.
Concluding Plenary session: The governance challenges ahead
The concluding plenary session will ask a panel of eminent persons to summarize the main messages they have picked up from the workshop. The panel will attempt to develop a consensus on what we know about the relationship between governance and development and what we do not yet fully understand. On the former, the panel will try to distil some key future looking policy and institutional messages for the next government. On the latter, the panel will recommend areas for future research.
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ANNEX A
WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
BANGLADESH AND COMPARATORS
1. BANGLADESH IN COMPARISON TO OTHER LOW INCOME COUNTRIES
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2. BANGLADESH AND COMPARATORS: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
3. BANGLADESH AND COMPARATORS:
POLITICAL STABILITY AND NO VIOLENCE
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4. BANGLADESH AND COMPARATORS GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS
5. BANGLADESH AND COMPARATORS
REGULATORY QUALITY
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6. BANGLADESH AND COMPARATORS RULE OF LAW
7. BANGLADESH AND COMPARATORS CONTROL OF CORRUPTION
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ANNEX B
Six Components of Governance, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, Selected Countries*
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness
Country Year
Voice and Accountability Political Stability/No Violence Government Effectiveness
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/
(0-100) polls (0-100) polls (0-100) polls
BANGLADESH
2005 -0.5 31.4 0.12 9 -1.65 6.6 0.22 8 -0.9 21.1 0.15 10
2004 -0.66 29.5 0.15 9 -1.1 15.1 0.22 9 -0.75 28.7 0.16 11
2003 -0.57 32.4 0.16 8 -0.93 20.3 0.23 8 -0.61 31.1 0.17 10
2002 -0.56 30 0.18 8 -0.73 25 0.22 8 -0.63 28.7 0.17 10
2000 -0.4 35.3 0.24 6 -0.77 23.1 0.28 6 -0.49 36.4 0.2 7
1998 -0.25 41.5 0.24 4 -0.52 26.9 0.28 4 -0.44 38.3 0.31 4
1996 -0.4 38.5 0.22 4 -0.87 18.4 0.34 4 -0.77 21 0.21 4
INDIA
2005 0.35 55.6 0.14 10 -0.85 22.2 0.21 10 -0.11 51.7 0.15 11
2004 0.29 55.6 0.15 11 -1.09 15.6 0.2 12 -0.03 56.9 0.16 12
2003 0.24 52.7 0.16 10 -1.19 14.6 0.22 10 -0.03 57.9 0.16 11
2002 0.36 58 0.17 10 -1.02 19.3 0.2 10 -0.09 55.5 0.16 11
2000 0.4 57 0.24 7 -0.65 27.8 0.24 9 -0.06 55 0.19 9
1998 0.18 52.7 0.24 6 -0.73 20.8 0.25 7 -0.18 52.2 0.25 8
1996 0.23 56.7 0.22 5 -1.03 15.1 0.29 6 -0.45 38.1 0.19 7
INDONESIA
2005 -0.21 40.6 0.14 10 -1.42 9 0.21 10 -0.47 37.3 0.14 12
2004 -0.43 36.2 0.14 12 -1.6 7.1 0.2 12 -0.42 39.7 0.15 13
2003 -0.45 35.7 0.16 10 -1.94 4.2 0.22 10 -0.58 34 0.16 12
2002 -0.52 32.4 0.17 10 -1.57 9.4 0.2 10 -0.55 34 0.16 12
2000 -0.54 30.4 0.24 7 -2.01 2.8 0.24 9 -0.39 39.2 0.17 10
1998 -1.45 10.6 0.24 5 -1.57 7.5 0.26 6 -0.57 30.1 0.26 7
1996 -1.22 14.9 0.22 5 -0.66 23.1 0.29 6 0.08 61.9 0.19 7
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Country Year
Voice and Accountability Political Stability/No Violence Government Effectiveness
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/
(0-100) polls (0-100) polls (0-100) polls
KENYA
2005 -0.12 43 0.14 10 -1.16 14.6 0.22 8 -0.78 25.4 0.15 11
2004 -0.31 40.1 0.14 12 -1.07 17 0.21 10 -0.72 29.2 0.15 12
2003 -0.29 39.1 0.16 10 -1.1 16 0.23 8 -0.65 28.7 0.16 11
2002 -0.69 26.6 0.18 8 -1.11 17 0.22 7 -0.71 24.4 0.16 10
2000 -0.88 23.2 0.24 6 -1.15 13.2 0.28 6 -0.72 25.4 0.21 7
1998 -0.89 23.7 0.24 5 -1.03 15.6 0.26 6 -0.98 12.9 0.27 6
1996 -0.56 31.7 0.22 4 -0.65 24.1 0.34 4 -0.64 29 0.21 4
NIGERIA
2005 -0.69 30 0.14 10 -1.77 4.7 0.22 8 -0.92 20.1 0.15 11
2004 -0.73 27.5 0.14 12 -1.78 4.7 0.21 10 -0.95 15.8 0.15 12
2003 -0.65 29.5 0.16 10 -1.65 7.1 0.23 8 -0.87 17.7 0.16 11
2002 -0.81 23.7 0.17 10 -1.69 7.5 0.22 8 -1.02 12.4 0.16 11
2000 -0.61 28.5 0.23 8 -1.64 7.5 0.27 8 -1 13.9 0.2 9
1998 -1.55 9.2 0.24 5 -1.15 13.2 0.26 6 -1.42 5.3 0.27 6
1996 -1.57 3.8 0.22 4 -1.75 6.1 0.3 5 -1.26 5.2 0.2 5
PAKISTAN
2005 -1.23 12.6 0.14 9 -1.68 5.7 0.21 9 -0.53 34 0.15 11
2004 -1.31 11.6 0.14 10 -1.67 5.7 0.21 10 -0.52 37.3 0.16 11
2003 -1.18 14 0.17 8 -1.58 8 0.23 8 -0.56 34.9 0.17 10
2002 -1.12 17.4 0.19 7 -1.51 11.3 0.22 7 -0.57 33 0.17 9
2000 -1.57 6.8 0.24 6 -0.88 19.3 0.27 7 -0.53 33.5 0.19 7
1998 -0.68 30.4 0.24 4 -1.21 11.8 0.26 6 -0.74 22 0.27 6
1996 -1.06 20.2 0.22 4 -1.41 9 0.3 5 -0.39 40 0.2 5
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Country Year
Voice and Accountability Political Stability/No Violence Government Effectiveness
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/
(0-100) polls (0-100) polls (0-100) polls
THAILAND
2005 0.07 49.3 0.12 11 -0.55 29.2 0.21 10 0.4 66 0.15 11
2004 0.25 53.1 0.15 10 -0.38 33 0.2 11 0.37 66.5 0.16 12
2003 0.27 53.1 0.16 9 0.14 48.1 0.22 10 0.29 64.6 0.16 11
2002 0.15 53.6 0.17 9 0.31 54.2 0.2 10 0.26 64.6 0.16 11
2000 0.27 53.6 0.24 7 0.03 45.8 0.24 9 0.19 61.7 0.2 9
1998 0.02 49.8 0.24 6 0.17 50.9 0.25 7 0.04 60.8 0.25 8
1996 -0.05 49.5 0.22 5 -0.06 42 0.29 6 0.58 75.2 0.19 7
VIETNAM
2005 -1.6 7.7 0.14 8 0.34 59 0.21 9 -0.31 45 0.15 11
2004 -1.52 8.7 0.14 10 0.24 55.2 0.21 10 -0.37 42.6 0.15 12
2003 -1.58 8.2 0.16 8 0.32 56.6 0.22 9 -0.31 46.4 0.16 11
2002 -1.34 10.6 0.18 8 0.35 55.7 0.21 9 -0.34 46.9 0.16 11
2000 -1.65 5.8 0.24 5 0.23 53.3 0.26 7 -0.36 41.1 0.18 8
1998 -1.73 3.4 0.24 4 0.35 56.1 0.26 6 -0.24 48.8 0.27 6
1996 -1.39 10.6 0.22 4 0.17 49.5 0.29 6 -0.28 51 0.2 6
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Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption
Country Year
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of Corruption
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/
(0-100) polls (0-100) polls (0-100) polls
BANGLADESH
2005 -1.07 14.9 0.17 10 -0.87 19.8 0.14 14 -1.18 7.9 0.16 10
2004 -1.16 11.3 0.17 10 -0.89 19.7 0.13 14 -1.29 5.9 0.15 10
2003 -1.05 16.7 0.17 9 -0.79 26.4 0.13 13 -1.16 7.4 0.15 10
2002 -1.09 14.3 0.19 9 -0.83 25.5 0.14 13 -1.02 13.7 0.15 10
2000 -0.23 37.4 0.34 6 -0.71 29.8 0.18 11 -0.68 31.4 0.17 8
1998 -0.13 39.4 0.41 4 -0.77 26.4 0.22 7 -0.47 40.2 0.25 5
1996 -0.41 28.9 0.29 5 -0.74 27.3 0.19 6 -0.49 35.1 0.28 4
INDIA
2005 -0.34 41.1 0.17 10 0.09 56 0.13 14 -0.31 46.8 0.12 12
2004 -0.47 35.5 0.17 10 -0.01 52.4 0.12 15 -0.38 44.6 0.13 13
2003 -0.46 36.9 0.17 9 0.03 54.3 0.13 14 -0.39 46.1 0.13 12
2002 -0.39 41.9 0.18 9 -0.02 52.9 0.13 15 -0.41 41.7 0.14 12
2000 -0.31 34.5 0.32 7 0.15 58.2 0.15 13 -0.31 46.6 0.17 11
1998 -0.14 38.9 0.27 7 0.13 60.6 0.18 11 -0.24 54.4 0.16 11
1996 -0.13 41.7 0.23 7 -0.06 54.5 0.16 9 -0.32 44.9 0.2 7
INDONESIA
2005 -0.45 36.6 0.16 11 -0.87 20.3 0.13 15 -0.86 21.2 0.12 13
2004 -0.44 36.9 0.17 11 -0.82 23.1 0.12 17 -0.96 15.2 0.12 15
2003 -0.69 23.6 0.16 10 -0.89 21.6 0.12 15 -1.01 13.2 0.13 13
2002 -0.71 23.6 0.18 10 -0.97 18.3 0.13 16 -1.19 6.9 0.13 13
2000 -0.41 31.5 0.29 8 -1.03 12 0.15 14 -1.05 10.8 0.15 12
1998 0.04 44.3 0.27 6 -1.06 13.5 0.19 10 -1.03 9.3 0.17 9
1996 0.22 57.4 0.23 7 -0.41 41.1 0.16 9 -0.49 34.1 0.2 7
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Country Year
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of Corruption
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/
(0-100) polls (0-100) polls (0-100) polls
KENYA
2005 -0.32 42.1 0.16 10 -0.94 18.4 0.14 14 -1.01 14.8 0.15 11
2004 -0.25 44.3 0.17 10 -1.01 15.9 0.13 16 -0.88 18.6 0.15 13
2003 -0.27 43.8 0.18 9 -1.06 15.4 0.13 14 -0.94 15.7 0.15 11
2002 -0.55 32 0.19 8 -1.08 13.9 0.14 13 -1.09 8.3 0.17 10
2000 -0.26 35.5 0.32 6 -1.03 12.5 0.18 10 -1.14 6.4 0.21 8
1998 -0.17 38.4 0.31 6 -1.02 14.9 0.2 9 -1.03 8.8 0.21 7
1996 -0.43 28.4 0.29 5 -0.83 21.1 0.19 6 -1.12 6.8 0.28 4
NIGERIA
2005 -1.01 16.3 0.16 10 -1.38 5.8 0.14 14 -1.22 6.4 0.15 11
2004 -1.28 8.9 0.17 10 -1.5 4.3 0.13 16 -1.3 4.9 0.15 13
2003 -1.24 10.3 0.18 9 -1.55 3.8 0.13 14 -1.27 4.9 0.15 11
2002 -1.22 11.3 0.18 9 -1.46 4.3 0.14 15 -1.36 2.5 0.16 11
2000 -0.45 29.6 0.3 7 -1.1 9.6 0.16 14 -1.16 5.4 0.18 11
1998 -0.56 25.6 0.31 6 -1.34 3.8 0.2 9 -1.13 5.4 0.2 8
1996 -1.02 13.7 0.29 5 -1.26 7.7 0.18 7 -1.28 4.4 0.27 5
PAKISTAN
2005 -0.6 27.7 0.17 10 -0.81 24.2 0.13 14 -1.01 15.8 0.15 11
2004 -0.89 18.7 0.17 10 -0.83 21.6 0.13 15 -1.06 11.3 0.15 12
2003 -0.78 20.7 0.17 9 -0.69 28.8 0.13 13 -0.76 27.5 0.15 10
2002 -0.83 21.2 0.19 8 -0.75 27.4 0.14 13 -0.85 23.5 0.16 9
2000 -0.81 18.7 0.34 6 -0.75 26.4 0.17 12 -0.94 16.2 0.18 8
1998 -0.2 37.4 0.31 5 -0.79 25 0.2 9 -0.82 18.6 0.21 8
1996 -0.54 25.5 0.29 5 -0.49 35.9 0.18 7 -1.04 12.2 0.27 5
16
Country Year
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of Corruption
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Estimate
Percentile Standard
Error
Number of
Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/ Rank surveys/
(0-100) polls (0-100) polls (0-100) polls
THAILAND
2005 0.38 63.9 0.17 10 0.1 56.5 0.13 15 -0.24 51.2 0.12 13
2004 0.12 58.6 0.17 10 0 53.8 0.12 15 -0.3 48 0.13 12 2003 0.31 63.5 0.17 9 0.04 54.8 0.13 14 -0.35 47.1 0.13 12 2002 0.28 62.1 0.18 9 0.18 56.7 0.13 14 -0.32 46.6 0.14 12 2000 0.68 74.9 0.32 7 0.3 63 0.15 13 -0.37 45.1 0.17 11 1998 0.21 51.7 0.27 7 0.3 62.5 0.18 11 -0.32 52 0.16 10
1996 0.42 65.2 0.23 7 0.45 66.5 0.16 9 -0.33 44.4 0.2 7
VIETNAM
2005 -0.64 25.7 0.17 10 -0.45 42 0.13 14 -0.76 26.6 0.13 11 2004 -0.6 27.1 0.17 10 -0.6 36.1 0.13 16 -0.81 23 0.13 13 2003 -0.54 33 0.17 9 -0.47 38.9 0.13 14 -0.68 31.4 0.13 12 2002 -0.71 24.1 0.19 9 -0.47 38.9 0.13 14 -0.71 31.4 0.13 12
2000 -0.72 21.2 0.32 6 -0.77 25 0.16 12 -0.78 25 0.16 10 1998 -0.61 23.6 0.31 5 -0.94 17.3 0.2 9 -0.67 27 0.17 8
1996 -0.48 27.9 0.26 6 -0.55 33.5 0.17 8 -0.68 26.8 0.25 6
* Note: The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical aggregation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators in no way reflect the official position of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. As discussed in detail in the accompanying papers, countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to margins of error that are clearly indicated and should be taken into consideration when making comparisons across countries and over time.