AN UNDERSTANDING OF ABRAHAM THROUGH HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA: A STUDY ON THE ETHICS OF ABRAHAM IN THE QUR’AN. 

By

KennethBrownePeters

Thesis

SubmittedtotheFacultyofthe

GraduateSchoolofVanderbiltUniversity

inpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof

MASTEROFARTSin

Religion

August,2009

Nashville,Tennessee

Approved:

ProfessorRichardMcGregor

ProfessorVictorAnderson 

ii

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

"Happy Winds­day, Piglet," said Pooh as Piglet bumped into his stomach, the small creature blown around by the rather blustery day.  "Well it isn't... very happy... for me!"  Piglet exclaimed as he fought the winds.  "Where are you going Piglet?"  Pooh asked, as Piglet is again almost swept away by the wind.  "That's what I'm asking myself, Where?!" Piglet cried as he was completely picked up off the ground by the wind.  He lunged for one end of his green scarf with Pooh quickly grabbing a hold of the other end. 

 "And what do you think you will answer yourself?" said Pooh.

ThejourneyforthispaperhasbeenlongerthanIinitiallythoughtitwouldbe.ButthatdoesnotmakethejourneylesssweetasIaskmyselfwhereIamgoing.ForIimmediatelywonderwhatwillIanswermyself.Therearemanypeopletothankforthepoking,prodding,pushing,shoving,cajoling,andpatiencerequiredtoseemethroughthispaper.Tomyparents,withtheirunceasingloveandsupport.Toallmyprofessors,whoprobablyweren’tsureexactlywhereIwasgoingallthetimewithmypapersbutgavemegoodgradesonthemanyway.ToJasonBivinsofNorthCarolinaStateUniversity,myundergraduatementorandprofessorwholetmetakeallofhisclassesandsomeofthemtwice.ToRichardMcGregor,VictorAnderson,andDavidWoodofVanderbiltUniversity,whoalwayslistenedwhenItriedtomuddlethroughwhatwasinmyheadeventhoughitnevercameoutquiteright.Andfinally,totheladywholistenedtometalkaboutthispaperwaytoomuch,atrulywonderfulperson,Allison.Thankyouall,andMāšāʾAllāh.

Discourse, composed of speaking and silence, 

 is grounded in hearing.   “Only he who already understands can listen.”1 

1Walsh,David.TheModernPhilosophicalRevolution:TheLuminosityofExistence.CambridgeUniversityPress(Cambridge,2008).Page,253:quotingHeidegger.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS  

 

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................................... iiINTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................1CHAPTERI.ISLAM ....................................................................................................................................................5II.HEIDEGGERANDLEVINAS ....................................................................................................... 15III.DERRIDA ........................................................................................................................................... 30CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................. 46APPENDIXA.THESTORYOFISSAC ....................................................................................................................... 50REFERENCES............................................................................................................................................. 54

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INTRODUCTION 

 

 

Tobeclear,weareheretodiscussthestoryofAbraham,orIbrahim,asheis

knownintheQur’an,andhisson.Wewishtoexaminetheethicalcontentofthe

attemptedsacrificeofAbraham’sson.Todothiswewillbeginbydiscussingthe

storyasitappearsintheQur’an.Thiswillbefollowedbyanexaminationofthe

differencespresentinthreeShi‛iteaccountsofthestory.Thiswillbefollowedbya

discussionofthestoryanditsinterpretationbytheSufimysticandphilosopher,Ibn

al‐‘Arabiandcommentariesonhisworks.Uponwhichwillfollowthebulkofthe

paper,whichistheexaminationofthisstoryinlightoftheworkofJacquesDerrida.

ThisworkwillbeintroducedbyexaminingtheworkofMartinHeideggerand

EmmanuelLevinas.Wewillspecificallyexaminetheideasofdecision,hospitality,

andthegiftaspresentedbyDerridaandasitrelatestothestoryofAbraham.We

willshowthatthephilosophyofDerridaprovidesanewre‐interpretationofthe

storyofAbrahamandthatitdoesnotfalloutsidetheboundsofIslamicethics.We

willshowthatthestoryofAbrahambenefitsfromananalysisusingtheconceptsof

thegift,decision,andhospitality.

Aftersuchastirringintroduction,howcouldonenotbeexcitedtodelve

furtherintothemysteriesoftheQur’anandexploreoneofthemostfamous,most

discussedstoriesoftheHebrewBible?Thestorythatmostpeoplearefamiliarwith

concerningtheSacrifice,asitiscapitalizedandoftenreferredtoas,isthestoryfrom

theHebrewBible,specificallytheBookofGenesis,whereAbrahamtakeshisson

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Isaac,hisonlyson[notreallyhisonlyson],tothetopofMountMoriahandoffers

himinsacrificetoGod.Thedevilisinthedetailsastheysay,andinthe

commentariesoftheQur’anthedevilactuallymakesanappearance,anditisthese

details,whichwewillbeexamining.ThestoryintheQur’anhasthesamebasic

outlineastheonepresentedintheHebrewBiblewithsomestylistic,structural,and

proceduraldifferences.Mostimportantly,andthiswewillgointoinmuchgreater

detaillateronisthestoryoftheson,IsaacorIshmael,fortheQur’anisnotspecific

andmerelyreferstothesacrificeof“hisson,”2thesacrificeof“myson,”3“Omy

son!”4“mydearson.”5

Perhaps,tobeginwith,weshouldconcentrateonthestoryasitappearsin

theQur’an.Theoriginalis,ofcourse,inArabicbuttherearemanybeautiful

translationsintoEnglish;theonebelowisbyanearlytwentiethcenturyIslamic

scholarnamedMohammedMarmadukePickthall.ThestoryofthesacrificeofIsaac

orIshmaelappearsinSûrah37,entitledAl­Sãffãt,whichistranslatedas“The

Arrangers”or“TheRangers.”Thestoryofthesacrificeisgiveninayahs99through

113andisasfollows:

Andhe[Abraham]said:Lo!IamgoinguntomyLordWhowillguideme.MyLord!Vouchsafemeoftherighteous.SoWegavehimtidingsofagentleson.Andwhen(hisson)wasoldenoughtowalkwithhim,(Abraham)said:Omydearson,IhaveseeninadreamthatImustsacrificethee.Solook,whatthinkestthou?He(theson)said:Omyfather!Dothatwhichthouartcommanded.Allahwilling,thoushaltfindmeofthe

2Qur’an37:102[Pickthalltranslation](http://www.quranbrowser.org/index.html).3Qur’an37:102[Khalifatranslation](http://www.quranbrowser.org/index.html).4Qur’an37:102[YusufAlitranslation](http://www.quranbrowser.org/index.html).5Qur’an37:102[Pickthalltranslation].

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steadfast.Then,whentheyhadbothsurrendered(toAllah),andhe(Abraham)hadflunghim(theson)downuponhisface,We(Allah)calleduntohim:OAbraham!Thouhastalreadyfulfilledthevision.Lo!thusdoWerewardthegood.Lo!thatverilywasacleartest.ThenWeransomedhimwithatremendousvictim.AndWeleftforhimamongthelaterfolk(thesalutation):PeacebeuntoAbraham!ThusdoWerewardthegood.Lo!heisoneofOurbelievingslaves.AndwegavehimtidingsofthebirthofIsaac,aprophetoftherighteous.AndWeblessedhimandIsaac.Andoftheirseedaresomewhodogood,andsomewhoplainlywrongthemselves.6

Thetaleissituatedinagroupofstoriesabouttheprophets;itisprecededbyastory

ofNoah/NuhandfollowedbyastoryofMoses/MusaandAaron/Harūn.Theechoof

thisstoryintheHebrewBibleappearsinGenesis22:1‐19.Perhapstheprimary

differencebetweenthetwostories,asmentionedbefore,isthatintheHebrewBible

andintheChristiantradition,thesonthatistobesacrificedisIsaacwhereasinthe

Qur’anictraditionthesontobesacrificedisunnamed.Thishasprovided

considerablediscussionforthecommentatorsoftheQur’anonwhichsonwastobe

theobjectofsacrifice.7AbriefsummaryofthepositionstakenbyearlyIslamicate

scholarsisasfollows.For,“indeed,[concerningIsaacorIshmael]peoplelikeJāḥiẓ

(d.255H.),Ya‛qūbī(d.282H.),andTustarī(d.283H.)couldbedistinguished

amongthirdcenturyscholarswhorefrainedfromtakinganydefinitepositiononthe

6Ibid.7ThemostthoroughdiscussionofthesacrificeandthesurroundingstoriesofAbraham/IbrāhīmisJourneysinHolyLands:TheEvolutionoftheAbraham‐IshmaelLegendsinIslamicExegesisbyReuvenFirestone(p.116ff).ThoughSulimanBashearalsoexploreditinanarticleentitled“Abraham’sSacrificeofhisSonandRelatedIssues.”Seebibliographyforfullcitationinformation.

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matter.ThoughitistheearlyfourthcenturyZajjaj(d.311H.)whoseoutward

refrainment(sic)wasnotedbylatersourcesas“athird[distinct]view”(madhhab 

thālith),thesamecanbediscernedfromthewordsofJaṣṣās(d.370H.),Tha‛labi(d.

427H.)andRāzī.Ofthosescholarswhotookapro‐Isḥāq[Isaac]position,notemust

bemadeofṬabarī,Naḥḥās,Qāḍī‛Iyāḍ,Suhaylī,Ibnal‐Jawzī,Qurṭubi,Zurqānīand

possiblyotherstoo.Suyūṭī,thoughwasnotedonceastendingtoacceptthisview,

seemstohavevacillated.Theopposite,pro‐Ismā‛īl[Ishmael]viewwasadoptedby

theearlyfourthcenturyJubbā’ī(d.303H.),“mostofthetraditionists”(thoughonly

IbnAbiḤātimwasspecifiedbyname),[additionally]thetwoShī‛itesṬūsīand

ṬabarsīandotherscholarsandcommentatorslikeAbūBakrb.‛Arabī,IbnTaymiyya,

IbnQayyimal‐Jawziyya,NawawīandSubkī,Nasafi,Naysābūrī,IbnKathīr,Bayḍāwī,

‛Imāī,‛Ālūsī,‛Aynīandpossiblyotherstoo.”8TheearlyhistoryofIslamseemedto

favorIsaacasthesontobesacrificedbutlaterdevelopmentalchangesinIslamand

anemphasisonthedescendancefromIshmaeltendedtoinfluencelaterIslamicate

scholarstonameIshmaelasthesonwhowassacrificed.Whilethedifference

betweenthesonsdoesnotatfirstseemtohavethatlargeofaninfluenceon

intellectualdebates,thesolidifyingofsupportbehindIshmaelasthesacrificialson

showsageneralstrengtheningoftheIslamicidentity.

8Bashear,S."Abraham’ssacrificeofhissonandrelatedissues".Der Islam,67(1990).Page,35.

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CHAPTER I 

 

 

ISLAM 

 

 

AccordingtoReuvenFirestone,therearethreecoherentversionsofthestory

ofthesacrificethatdescendedthroughvariouschainsoftransmission.9He

continuestosaythattwooftheversions,theones“attributedtoal‐SuddīorIbn

Isḥāq,”arequitesimilar“andactuallyrepresentcovariantsofthesametradition”,

whileathirdversionfound“onlyinShi‛itesources”differssubstantially,“although

italsoappearstoderiveultimatelyfromthesameenvironment.”10Accordingto

Firestone,the“fullestrenditionofthesacrificialactisfoundinal‐Kisā’īunderthe

title:‘TheStoryofIsaac’,”whichisincludedasAppendixI.Theal‐Kisā’īversion

howeverdoesnotfallneatlyintoanyofthethreecategoriessetoutbyFirestonein

thebeginning.11Ofthethreeversions,thetwomainversions,attributedtoal‐Suddī

orIbnIsḥāq,“displayimportantdifferencesaswell.TheSuddīversionunderstands

9Firestone,Reuven.JourneysinHolyLands:TheEvolutionoftheAbraham‐IshmaelLegendsinIslamicExegesis.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress(NewYork,1990).Page,116.10Ibid.Page,116.11Ibid.Page,126.Thestorycontainsaninterestingadditionthatisnotfoundinanyoftheotherstorieslisted.Theidentityoftheramasthe“ramofAbel,sonofAdam”isfoundthroughoutthetraditionsbutthattheramisspeakingisunique.Hereisthesegmentindetail:“He[Abraham]wascalled:OAbraham,takethisramandredeemyoursonwithit.Sacrificeitasanoffering.Godhasmadethisdaya[holy]festivalforyouandyourchildren.Theramsaid:”OFriendofGod,sacrificemeinsteadofyourson,forIammoreappropriateforsacrificethanhe.IamtheramofAble,sonofAdam,whogavemeasanofferingtohisLordandwhoseofferingwasaccepted.IhavegrazedinthemeadowsoftheGardenforfortyautumns!”

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theintendedsacrificetobeIsaac,whomustbesacrificedasaresultofAbraham’s

vow.Althoughthesacrificetakesplaceinanon‐specificlocation,thenarrative

assumesthatAbrahamhadnotmovedsincereceivinghisrevelationaboutIsaacin

Syria,thereforeplacingtheactioninaccordancewithBiblicisttradition.But

accordingtotheIbnIsḥāqversion,IshmaelisthevictimoftheattemptedSacrificein

Mecca.AbrahamspansthedistancebetweenhishomeinSyriaandIshmaelin

Meccabyridingonthesupernaturalcreatureal‐Burāq.”12

InreferencetothemaintrendintheShi‛iteversions,Firestonenotes“the

variousrenditionsoftheShi‛iteversionnamebothIsaacandIshmaelasthe

intendedsacrifice.Onlyonerenditionisrepeated,anditisquitestrikingbecauseit

considersIsaactobetheintendedsacrificeatthesametimethatitplacestheact

withinthecontextoftheMeccanḤajj.”13Firestonetranslatesthreedifferent

streamsoftransmissioninhisdiscussiononthe“Shi‛ite”versionofthestory.

Firestonenotesthat,“the“Shi‛ite”versionisrepresentedbyfourtraditionsfound

onlyinShi‛itesourcesandwithoutconsistentrecordsofauthentication.”14Twoof

thefourchainsoftransmissionarefromRadīal‐DīnAbū‛Alīal‐Fadlb.al‐Ḥasan

12Ibid.Page,119.Firestoneexpandsonhisargumentlaterstating,“Althoughtheyparallelpre‐IslamicJewishlegendsandfeaturebiblical(aswellasQur’anic)characters,onlytheSuddīversionremainstotallywithinthebiblicalchronologyandsetting.ButeventheIbnIsḥāqversionrefrainsfromstrayingtoofaroutsideofthebiblicalparametersbyprovidingforAbraham’stransportationtoMecca,thuspreservingthebiblicalviewofhishomeinSyria.SinceIshmaelisassumedbytheBibletoliveinanArabland,theIbnIsḥāqversionremainsroughlywithintheBiblicistworldview.Thesupernaturalal‐Burāq,ofcourse,pointstogreaternativeArabinfluenceintheIbnIsḥāqversion.”13Ibid.Page,123.14“al‐Ya’qūbī25‐6(anonymous)al‐Qummī2:224‐5(ontheauthorityofAbū‛Abdallāh);al‐Ṭabarsī#1,23:77(anonymous),andal‐Ṭabarsī#2,23:78‐9(ontheauthorityofBarīdb.Mu‛āwiyaal‐‛Ajalī).”Ibid.Page,229,note23.

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Amīnal‐Ṭabarsī15(d.518/1153),withtheothertwocomingfromAbūal‐Ḥasan‛Alī

b.Ibrāhīmb.Hāshimb.Mūsāb.Bābawayhī16(d.328/939),andAḥmadb.AbīYa‛qūb

b.Wāḍiḥal‐Ya’qūbī17(d.277/891‐2).Whenitcomestothenameoftheson,

Firestonenotesthat,ofthefourtraditionsonlyoneisrepeatedandthenameofthe

soninquestionisactuallyIsaac,whichsurprisedFirestone“becauseitconsiders

Isaactobetheintendedsacrificeatthesametimethatitplacestheactwithinthe

contextoftheMeccanḤajj.BothrenditionsconnectIsaactoMeccabyhavinghim

makethePilgrimagealongwithhismotherSarah.”18Whileoftheothertwo

renditions,“Al‐Ya’qūbīappearsalmostambivalentaboutwhotheintendedsacrifice

was,buteventuallynameshimasIshmael.Onlytheal‐Ṭabarsī#2rendition

providesacontextforIshmaelrepresentingtheSacrifice,anddoessoeffectivelyby

transferringIshmaelandHagarfromSyriatoMeccainresponsetoGod’scommand

toAbrahamtosacrificeIshmaelduringthePilgrimage.Thisreasoningisunique

15al‐Ṭabarsī“wasanImāmīShi‛itetheologianandtraditionist.Hisplaceofbirthisobscure,butitisknownthathetaughtinMashhadandcomposedhiscommentaryinKhurasan,wherehedied.Inadditiontohiscommentary,hecomposedanumberofparticularisticShi‛itetracts.Hismajma‛ al­bayānisconsideredaclassicalQur’ānCommentarybecauseitpresentstheviewsofothermajorcommentators.Nevertheless,itgivesprominencetoShi‛iteexegesis.BecauseitincludesmaterialincludingevenMu‛taziliteandSunnitraditionalisttheologicalcomments,itisnotgenerallyconsideredastrictly“Shi‛ite”work,asisthatofal‐Qummī.Nevertheless,al‐Ṭabarsītendstotransmittraditionsonoursubjectfromveryfewsources,mostofthemgoingbacktoJa‛far.Hisworkiscarefullyorganized,andeverysectionofcommentaryincludesintroductorycomments,variantreadingsofthequr’ānicverses,philological,lexicalandsyntacticanalysis,traditions,andoftenhisownopinion,includingesotericinterpretations.”Ibid.Page,167.16“AuthorofaQur’āncommentary,Tafsīr al­Qummī,whohailedoriginallyfromBaghdadanddiedcirca940CE.Accordingtoal‐Najāhshi,al‐Qummīisconsideredtobeoneofthemostreliabletransmittersofḥadīth.”Lowin,ShariL.,TheMakingofaForefather:AbrahaminIslamicandJewishExegeticalNarratives.Brill(Leiden,2006).Page,268.17“Arabhistorianandgeographerwhodiedin897CE.AShi‛iteofthemoderateMūsawīyya,al‐Ya’qūbīwroteahistoryoftheworldbeginningfromcreationthroughtheyearofthework’scompositionin872CE.Whilehisworkisverydetailed,Ya’qūbīhardlyevermentionshissources.”Ibid.Page,270.18Firestone.Page,123.

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amongallthetraditions.”19Firestonenotesfurtherthatneitheroftheothertwo

mainstreams,theSunnistreamsoftransmission,theal‐SuddīorIbnIsḥāqversions

connectthesacrificewiththePilgrimage“inanyway.”20Firestoneconcludeswith

thethoughtthatbyconnectingthesacrificetothePilgrimage.Forhim,theShi‛ite

versionsofthestoryareactuallyakindofIslamiccommentary“althoughitoffers

lesscommentarythantheSuddīandIbnIsḥāqversionsbutevolvedintoalegend

morecloselytiedwiththeIslamicritualconcernsofthePilgrimageandretaining

fewermotifswithdirectBiblicistparallels.”21

Fromherewewillmoveonfromthesourcetextandthetransmittersofthe

traditionstodiscussaninfluentialcommentator,Ibnal‐‛Arabi,whowasa

philosopherandgrandmystic.Heisoftenreferredto,bothbyhimselfandby

others,astheSealoftheMuhammadanSainthood.22Afterexamininghis

commentaryfromtheFususal‐Hikam,orBezelsofWisdom,wewilldiscussa

commentaryonIbnal‐‛Arabi’scommentarybyIsmailHakkiBursevi23,Bothauthors

19Ibid.20Ibid.21Ibid.22McGregor,Richard.SanctityandMysticisminMedievalEgypt.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress(NewYork,2004).23“IsmailHakkiBursevi,whowasoneofthegreatteachersoftheJelvetiorder,nowclosed,andwhotranslatedandcommentedupontheFusûsal‐HikamofIbn'ArabiinwhatmaybecalledthedefinitivecommentaryontheFusûsuptonow,hasaninscriptiononhismodesttombinBursawhichproclaimsthatonlyhewhohastheLoveofTawhidbrandeduponhisheartbringslighttothetombofIsmailHakkiBursevi.”(FromRauf,Bulent."UnionandIbn'Arabi."TheMuhyiddinIbn'ArabiSociety(http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articles/union_ibnarabi.html)(AccessedApril202008).)OntheJelvetiSufiOrder,"JelvetiisthenameofaSufiorderthatwasfoundedbytheTurkishsaintAzizMahmudHudayi.ItsharesthesamespiritualchainastheKhalwatiorderandthustherearemanysimilaritiesbetweenthem.ThetwoorderssplithoweverwithSheikhZahedGilani,wheretheJelvetiorderthengoesontoHajjiBayramandAzizMahmudHudayi.AzizMahmudHudayiwasamongstthemostfamousofallOttomanSufi'sbeingtheSheikhofSultanAhmedIwhoconstructedthefamousBlueMosque.AzizMahmudHudayireadthefirstFridayprayerinthisMosqueonitsopening.TheJelvetiorderwasnotaverywidespreadorderanddidnotextendmuchfurtherthanthebordersofmodernTurkeyhavinganumberofTekke'sintheBalkans.Amongstthemostfamous

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specifyIsaacasthesonmentionedintheQur’an.IntheHebrewBible,Abrahamis

directlycommandedbyGodtosacrificehissonbutintheQur’an,Abrahamhasa

dreaminwhichheseesthathemustsacrificehisson.Abrahaminterpretsthis

dream,ascomingfromAllahandtheQur’anseemstosupportthisnotionwithAllah

sayingthatAbrahamhasfulfilledthevision.NeitherIbnal‐‛ArabiorBursevidiscuss

anyspecificethicalcontentregardingAbrahamsacrificingIsaac,howevertheydo

createasituationinwhichmuchoftheethicalproblemconcerningAllahaskingfor

humansacrificeissidestepped.Ibnal‐‛Arabisidestepsanydifficultybyarguingthat

Abrahammisinterpretedthedream,whichnevercalledforthesacrificeofhisson

butrathercalledforthesacrificeoftheRamthatwaslatersacrificedbyAbraham

afterAllahstoppedthesacrificeoftheson.Ibnal‐‛Arabi,inhisdiscussionofthe

sacrificearguesthatwhen,“AbrahamtheIntimatesaidtohisson,Isawinsleepthat

Iwaskillingyouforsacrifice.ThestateofsleepistheplaneoftheImaginationand

Abrahamdidnotinterpret[whathesaw],foritwasaramthatappearedintheform

ofAbraham’ssoninthedream,whileAbrahambelievedwhathesaw[atfacevalue].

SohisLordrescuedhissonformAbraham’smisapprehensionbytheGreatSacrifice

[oftheram],whichwasthetrueexpressionofhisvisionwithGod,ofwhich

Abrahamwasunaware.”24Here,Ibnal‐‛Arabi’sargumentallowsfortheideathat

AllahisnotresponsibleforAbraham’smisunderstandingininterpretingtheramas

hisson.ThisargumentdissolvesthemoraloutragethatconfrontstheGodof

ofJelvetiSheikhsareIsmailHakkiBurseviofBursaandSheikhMusafaDevati."(FromWikipediacontributors,"Jelveti,"Wikipedia,TheFreeEncyclopedia,http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jelveti&oldid=89237090(accessedApril20,2008).)24al‐‛Arabi,Ibn.TranslatedbyR.W.J.Austin.Ibnal‐‛Arabi: TheBezelsofWisdom.PaulistPress,Inc.(NewJersey,1980).Page,99.

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GenesiscommandingthesacrificeofIsaac.Ibnal‐‛Arabi’sargumentisthatAllahdid

notaskforthesacrificeofasonbutratherthesacrificeofaram25,whichAbraham

misinterpreted.Ibnal‐‛Arabi’sargueslater,reinforcinghisearlieridea,“Godsaysto

Abraham,callinghimO Abraham, you believed what you saw,andHedidnotsay,

“Youwererightconcerningwhatyousaw,”namely[inseeing]yourson,becausehe

didnotinterpretwhathesaw,buttookitatitsfacevalue,althoughvisionsrequire

interpretation.Thus,Joseph’smastersays,If you will interpret the vision.

Interpretationmeanstopassfromtheformofwhatoneseestosomethingbeyond

it.”26

Ibnal‐‛Arabi’sideaofinterpretationisgivenmoreweightandaddressed

repeatedly,inacommentaryontheFusus al­HikamwrittenbyIsmailHakkiBursevi.

Thecommentary,coveringthreevolumes,discussesandexpandsonalmostthe

entiretyoftheFusus.Whilethestyleofthecommentaryissomewhatramblingand25Inhisarticle,“Abraham’sSacrificeofhisSonandRelatedIssues,Bashearsaysthat,“Concerningthekindoftheransombeast,thereisthewidelycirculatedtraditionofḤasanal‐BaṣrīontheauthorityofIbnIshḥāq➝‛Amrb.‛Ubayd,whichsaysthatIsmā‛īl/Ishmaelwasransomedwithabillygoat(tays)whichdescendedfromThabīr.AninterestingvariantaddsthatwhatwasmeantbyQur’an37/107wasnotonlytheransomonthatspecificoccasion“...butsacrificeaccordingtohis[i.e.Ibrāhīm’s]religion,whichisthesunnauntilthedayofresurrection”(...wa­lākinnahu al­dhabḥu ‛alā dīnihi, fa­tilka al­sunna ilā yawm al­qiyāma . . .).Hence,thisvariantendswithasentenceurgingthebelieverstosacrificefollowingsuchsunna.(Lit.:...fa­ḍaḥḥū ‛ibāda l­lāh).”(Page27‐28).26al‐‛Arabi,Ibn.Page,99.Thisthoughtiscontinuedinthenextparagraphwhichreads:“Thuswerethecattle[symbols]foryearsofscarcityandplenty.Hadhebeentruetothevisionhewouldhavekilledhisson,forhebelievedthatitwashissonhesaw,althoughwithGoditwasnothingotherthantheGreatSacrificeintheformofhisson.BecauseofthisHesavedhim,becauseofthemistakennotionthathadenteredAbraham’smind.InrealityitwasnotaransominGod’ssight[butthesacrificeitself].ThesensesformulatedthesacrificeandtheImaginationproducedtheformofAbraham’sson.HaditbeenaramhesawinhisImaginationhewouldhaveinterpreteditashissonorassomethingelse.ThenGodsays,This is indeed a clear test,thatis,atestofhisknowledge,whetherheknewwhatinterpretationwasnecessaryinthecontextofvisionornot.AbrahamknewthattheperspectiveoftheImaginationrequiredinterpretation,butwasheedless[onthisoccasion]anddidnotdealwiththeperspectiveintheproperway.Thus,hebelievedthevisionashesawit.”Bursevi,IsmailHakki.TranslatedbyBulentRauf.IsmailHakkiBursevi’stranslationofandcommentaryon‘Fususal‐Hikam’bMuhyiddinIbn‛Arabi.MuhyiddinIbn‛ArabiSociety(Oxford,1987).Page,424.

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thetranslationcouldhavesufferedfromsomeediting,theroughnessofthe

translationfromTurkishtoEnglishallowsthereadertostayfocusedonwhatthe

authoristryingtocommunicate.OfparticularinteresttothispaperisBursevi’s

expansionoftheabovequotedsectionsinwhichhediscusseshowthesacrificeof

Isaacwasnotnecessarybecauseitwasnotaskedfor.ThemistakeofAbrahamwas

intheinterpretationofthedream.

Interestingly,BurseviimpliesthatthereasonthatAbrahamdidnotinterpret

thedreamcorrectlywasbecausehedidnothavethetypeofknowledgerequiredto

interpretdreams.FollowingisaquotethatillustratesBursevi’sinterpretationof

thesacrificialscene.“Nowletitbeknownlikethis,thatinthewordsofGodthe

High:‘AndWehaveredeemeditwithagrandsacrifice’,thefactthatHesacrificed

thegrandimmolationforthesonofAbrahamisbecauseinthemindofAbrahamit

washisson,butwhathereallysawwastheram,whichwasapparentinthedream

intheimageoftheson.ThustheappearanceoftheraminthedreamoftheCaliph

oftheMostCompassionate(raḥmân)(whichwasAbraham),andbecauseofits

relationshipofbeingsacrificedforit,ashasalreadybeenmentionedbeforethis,the

words:‘AndWeredeemeditwithagrandsacrifice’descendedbecauseofwhatwas

therewasinthemindofAbraham,becauseofallthistheShaykh[Ibnal‐‛Arabi’]in

thesestanzasquestionsbywayofdelvingdeepintothematterthatitwastheram

thatAbrahamsawinhisimaginationintheimageofhisson,andtherebyhepoints

atthefactthatitssensoryimageofbeingaramwassacrificedinhisdreamtothe

12

imageofhisimaginationwhichwasseenintheappearanceofamaninhisdream.”27

ThefollowingquotealsoseemstosuggestthatwhileAbrahammisunderstoodthe

natureofthedream,itwasnotentirelythefaultofAbraham.Thequoteseemsto

suggestthattheraḥmân28ofAllahinterferedwiththeheartofAbraham,whichin

turnallowedhimtoonlyaccesstheliteralsenseinhisheartratherthanthe

interpretivesense.For“Abrahamdidnotinterpretthedreambecausehewas

accustomedtotakingformtheuniverseofrepresentation(mithâl),andwhenthe

HighGodelevatedtheheartofAbrahamfromtheuniverseofrepresentationto

extendoveritHisraḥmân,andlefthimwithoutit,hiskhayâl29,tookthemeaning

fromhisabstractedheart,andhispowerofimagingdispensingfromthemeaningof

theimagehadimagedtheramintheformofIsaacduetotheestablishmentofthe

establishedrelationshipinsubmissionandconcordancebetweenIsaacandtheram.

ThusthedreamofAbrahamnecessitatedinterpretationbuthedidnotinterpret

it.”30Now,whetherornotBurseviwasattemptingtoshiftsomeoftheblameto

AllahinextendinghisraḥmânovertheheartofAbrahamorwhetherBurseviis

simplylookingforanotheravenueofexplanationtodetailwhyAbraham

misunderstoodthedreamisupfordebate,thoughalmostcertainlyhewasnot

shiftingtheblametoAllah.Therestofthetextwouldseemtosuggestthatitwas

27Bursevi,IsmailHakki.TranslatedbyBulentRauf.IsmailHakkiBursevi’stranslationofandcommentaryon‘Fususal‐Hikam’bMuhyiddinIbn‛Arabi.MuhyiddinIbn‛ArabiSociety(Oxford,1987).Page,424.28AdifficultwordtotranslateinArabicbecauseithassuchawidefieldofmeaning.Raḥmânisconsideredtobeoneofthe“99NamesofGod”andisoftentranslatedas“TheAllBeneficent,TheMostMercifulinEssence.”ThenameRaḥmânappearsatleast114timesintheQur’anasitispartofthebasmalawhichintroducesmostchaptersoftheQur’anandreadsbismi­llāhi ar­raḥmāni ar­raḥīmi,whichistranslatedas"InthenameofGod,MostGracious,MostMerciful."29Looselytranslatedas“imagination.”30Bursevi.Page,425.

13

Abraham'sfaultbecauseBursevilaterimpliesthatthemisinterpretationofthe

dreamwasthefaultofAbrahambecausehe“wasnotmindful.”31Bursevi,in

attemptingtocoverallthepossiblefacetsofthediscussion,alsoseemstosuggest

thatitcouldhavebeenatestbyAllahtoseeifAbrahamhad“appertained”“the

knowledgeofinterpretation”butthatAbraham“contrarytohisusage(habit,

custom)”“interpretedtheimageofIsaacwiththatoftheram.”32However,andthis

isoftentheconclusionoftheinterpretationsconcerningthisstoryinIslamicwork,

“whatbecamemanifestinthisisthecompletionandperfectionofAbraham’sand

Isaac’ssubmissiontoandbeliefinGod.”33

WhileIbnal‐‛ArabiandBursevihavemadeanefforttoabsolveAllahfrom

theethicalimplicationsofhumansacrifice,thereremainssomequestionastothe

ethicalcontentofAbraham’swillingnesstosacrificehisson.Inhisarticleentitled,

“AmbiguitiesaboutAbraham,”ThomasMcDanielarguesthatAbrahamintheQur’an,

beingawareofthecovenantofNoah,detailedintheHebrewBible,wouldhave

knownthathumansacrificehadbeenabolished.Hisargumentisdetailedas

follows.“Genesis9:6iswhereGodtoldNoah“Whoever sheds the blood of man, by 

man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image.”Withthis

stipulation,capitalpunishmentwasintroducedtoNoahandhisprogenyasthe

deterrentagainsthumanskillingfellowhumanbeings.Itwasasuccinctprohibition

against(1)humansacrifice,(2)againstmurder,and(3)againstwarfare.IfAbraham31Ibid.Page,429.Thequotegoesontosaythat“Abraham(S.A)wasnotmindful,didnotknowofwhatwasrequiredofinterpretationintherealmofdreams,anddidnotallocatetheportionnecessarytotherealmofdreams,andAbrahamattestedtothedreambecauseofunawarenessofthis.”32Ibid.Page,430.33Ibid.

14

was,asstatedintheQur’an,in“Noah’sparty”andwasNoah’s“follower”(šî‛at)he

wouldsurelyhavebeenawareofGod’sprohibitionofandpenaltyforanyhuman

sacrifice.Thus,whenAbrahamwastestedbyGod’scallinadreamforhimto

sacrificeIshmael(accordingtotheQur’an,Sûrah37:101‐110),orinreallifeforhim

tosacrificeIsaac(accordingtoGenesis22),twoliveswereatrisk‐‐Abraham’sown

life,aswellashisson’s.NotonlywereIsaacandIshmael,accordingtothedifferent

traditions,willingtocooperatewiththeirfatherandbeobedientuntodeath,but

Abraham,too,waswillingtodie‐‐forthecovenantwithNoahwasinforceand

Abrahamwasnoexception:“Abraham,ifyouslaughter/sacrificeahumanbeingyou

diealso.”Itwasjustthatsimple.ThetruthrevealedwasthatGoddidnotwantthe

bloodofIsaac,orofIshmael,orofAbraham.ThecovenantwithNoahremained

sacrosanct.Humansacrificeshadbecomeasacrilege.”34

Thisisaninterestingperspectiveonthesceneofthesacrifice.Rarelyisit

suggestedthatIbrāhīm’slifewouldbeforfeitifhesacrificedhisson.Thisparticular

argumentdoesnotseemtobewellsupportedbytheQur’anwhichmakesno

mentionofAllahtakingIbrāhīm’slifeforsubmittingtoAllah’swill.However,itdoes

provideapossibleavenuefordealingwiththeethicalrepercussionsifAbrahamhad

actuallysacrificedIsaac/Ishmael.TheideaputforthbyMcDanielarguesthat

Abrahamwouldhave,ineffectbeencommittingtwosacrifices,twomurders,ortwo

suicides,amurder‐suicide.Tomyknowledge,thishasnotbeensuggestedbyanyof

thecommentatorsonthisstory.

34McDaniel,Thomas.“AmbiguitiesAboutAbraham”(http://tmcdaniel.palmerseminary.edu/CMBBP3‐6x9_Article.pdf)Page,2.

15

CHAPTER II 

 

 

HEIDEGGER AND LEVINAS 

 

“ThesacrificeofIsaacisanabominationintheeyesofall,anditshould

continuetobeseenforwhatitis‐‐atrocious,criminal,unforgivable;Kierkegaard

insistsonthat.Theethicalpointofviewmustremainvalid:Abrahamisamurderer.

However,isnotthespectacleofthismurder,whichseemsuntenableinthedense

andrhythmicbriefnessofitstheatricalmoment,atthesametimethemostcommon

eventintheworld?Isitnotinscribedinthestructureofourexistencetotheextent

ofnolongerevenconstitutinganevent?”35Withthisquotewewillbegintheshift

fromIslamicinterpretationstoastudyofthestoryusingcontinentalphilosophy.

Oftenwhenweattempttodiscussphilosophyoranythinginthesocialscienceswe

attempttobeginatthebeginning,anobviousplacetostartforsure,buta

deceptivelydifficultonetoidentify.Evenmoredifficultisovercomingtheideathat

thereisabeginning,oftenwemustsimplyplunkourselvesdowninaplace,ina

time,inaspot,underatreeperhaps,andbegintheworkthatplaguesthebeginning.

Whereverwebeginwillbeinsufficient,sowebeganwithaquote,fromsomeonefar

morefamiliarwithbeginnings,aphilosopherbythenameofJacquesDerrida.The

35Derrida,Jacques.TranslatedbyDavidWills.TheGiftofDeath.SecondEdition.UniversityofChicagoPress(Chicago,2008).Page,85‐86.

16

abovequotewillbetherevolvingthoughtthatisthefocusfortheremainderofthis

paper:therepeatabilityofthesacrificeofAbraham’sson,therepeatedsacrificeof

Abraham’sson.However,wemustmovebackinphilosophicalthoughtthrough

philosophicalhistorytoseehowDerridacomestothisconclusion.

ToretracethephilosophicalhistoryofDerridawewillbeginwithHeidegger.

MartinHeideggerwasaGermanphilosopheraroundthetimeofWorldWarIIand

hewasamemberoftheNaziParty.Hispoliticalaffiliationsareimportanttothe

extentthattheyshapebothHeidegger’sthoughtandthethoughtofhisfollowers

andcritics,Derridaincluded.Heidegger’sphilosophicalpositionsareincredibly

importantforEuropeanphilosophy,ifonlyasanattemptbyphilosopherstotryto

rejectthem,workaroundthem,incorporateparts,orincorporatethewholeof

Heidegger’sthought.Themainphilosopherswewillbediscussing,Emmanuel

LevinasandJacquesDerridaarebothproductsofanengagementwithHeidegger’s

thought.Heidegger’sfirstbookBeing and Timeisprobablyhismostreadwork.

DavidWalsharguesthatHeidegger’s“placeinthehistoryofphilosophyisstill

rootedinthisonebook,Sein und Zeit(1927),andthereisconsiderablebasisforthis

perceptionsinceitwastherethathedemonstratedthepowerofexistenceover

thought.Fromthatpointonthoughtwouldhavetomovewithinthemovementof

existence.”36

Formoreonthisidea,wemustquicklycirclebacktoHeidegger’steacher,

EdmundHusserl,whowasalsoatremendouslyinfluentialphilosopher.Husserlis

36Walsh,David.TheModernPhilosophicalRevolution:TheLuminosityofExistence.CambridgeUniversityPress(Cambridge,2008).Page,237.

17

bestknownfor,“showingthatthephenomenonisalwaysanappearanceof

something,whichitshowsandconcealsatthesametime.”37Forexample,andthis

mayseemsimplebutitwasarevolutionaryimportantthought,whenyouseean

object,youdonotseeitsentirety.Youseepartsofit,thefront,ortheback,maybe

thesides,butyoudonotseeitinitswhole.Apartoftheobjectisalwaysconcealed

fromyou.Thisisatthesimplelevelofappearance;therewasalsothethoughtthat

eachobjecthadanessence,abeing.ThisthoughtstretchesbacktoPlatoandhis

Forms.Therefore,itwasunderstoodthatyoucouldseetheappearanceof

somethingbutthatappearancemaynotbeitsreality.Heidegger,however,“wasthe

onewhograspedtheontologicalsignificanceoftheachievement,forhesawthatit

wasnowpossibletocontemplatebeinginafarmorefundamentalwaythanthe

juxtapositionofappearanceandrealityhadpermitted.Thereisnobeingbehind

appearancebecauseappearanceisitselfamodeofbeing.”38Thatistosaythatthere

isnosplitbetweenappearanceandreality,betweenappearanceandbeing.For

appearanceisafunctionofourbeingandnotsomethingseparate.“Phenomenology

isourwayofaccesstowhatistobethethemeofontology,anditisourwayof

givingitdemonstrativeprecision.Onlyasphenomenology, is ontology possible.”39

Herewehaveintroducedtwonewwords,ontologyandphenomenology.

Ontologyissimplythestudyofthenatureofbeing,itdealswithquestions

concerningwhatthingsexist,andphenomenologyisabranchofphilosophy

primarilydevelopedbyHusserl.Phenomenologyworkswiththeunderstanding

37Ibid.Page,245.38Ibid.39Ibid.

18

thattheobjectsandeventsthatweperceiveandunderstandareinour

consciousnessratherthanoutsideofourconsciousness.40Phenomenological

reductionis,“asHegelsuggested,thetruthofperception.Fromthisexciting

discoveryintheimmediatedynamicsofperception,itdidnottakeHeideggerlongto

applyitwithinthelargerdynamicsofexistenceasawhole.”41ForHeidegger,

"definitivelylocatesthesubject,existenceorDasein,withintherealmoftruth.

Humanexistencenotonlycarrieswithinitthecapacityfortruth,butalsoisalready

amodeofopennesstowardit.WithHeidegger,theshifttowardexistence[from

essence]wascompleted,andhehadthecapacitytodemonstrateitsexplicationas

theimplicationoftheWesternphilosophicaltradition.Nowhereishissignificance

betterattestedtothanbythefactthathiscritics,manyofwhomofferindispensable

correctives,mustnowdosowithinthemodeofphilosophizingheestablished.42To

puthismoresimply,weneversimplyencounterobjects,people,orentitieswithin

theworldbecausetheworldisalreadyfilledwiththingsofsignificance.For

example,youwillneversimplyseeatree.Thetreemaybesurroundedbyother

trees,itisintheground,itiscoveredinleaves,anditmayhaveanimalsonit.You

canneverencountersimplyatree,foritwouldhavenosignificancetoyou.Some

philosophersarguethatifwewerepresentedwithsomethingtowhichwehadno

reference,thereisapossibilitythatwewouldnotevenacknowledgeit;wewouldbe

unabletoseeit.Everythingintheworldisrecognizablebecauseofitsrelationto40“Phenomenologywasbasedontheawarenessbywhichconsciousness,inbeingawareofobjects,isalsoawareofitselfanditsrelationshiptothem.Byturningtowardtheprocessofperception,itispossible,therefore,togainanawarenessoftheprimordialrelationshipbetweensubjectandobjectthatmakesperceptionpossible.”Ibid.Page,236.41Ibid.42Ibid.Page,243.

19

otherthings.Itisonlytherelationshipstootherthings,thedifferencesbetween

things,whichallowustorecognizeanobject–tolookatatreeandseethatitisa

tree.Forthetreeis“alwayswithinanalreadyconstitutedworldofsignificance.The

brillianceofthephenomenologicalanalysesonwhichHeideggerembarksisoftenso

mesmerizingthatonecanreadilyunderstandwhymanyreaders,andeventhe

authorhimself,couldtendtooverlooktheprimacyoftheconnectionwithbeing;for

hemakesitclearthatourcapacitytoperceiveanything,fromequipmenttosigns,is

possibleonlybecausewealreadyinhabitaworlddisposedtosuchperceptions.The

availabilityofthingsasready‐to‐handispossibleonlybecauseofthepresenceofa

worldoftheready‐to‐handthatisnotitselfready‐to‐hand.”43

Heidegger,notcomfortablewithsimplyreferringtopeopleorhumansas

Beingsinhisworksoptstocoinatermwithnobaggage.HecallsthistermDasein

orDa‐sein.IncolloquialGerman,thistermmeansexistencebutHeideggerwasvery

specificinhisusageoftheterm,hedidnotwanttoindicatethatthetermhada

subject.For,HeideggerthetermwasusedtouncovertheprimalnatureofBeing

(Sein),hedidnotwantittobeassociatedwithsubstance.Aswesawearlier,

Heideggerbelievedthatwewerealreadyalwaysabeingengagedwiththeworld

andthereisneverawaytonotbeengagedwiththeworld,youcanneverbe

separatefromtheworld,youcannevernotbebeing‐in‐the‐world.Oneofthe

fundamentalcharacteristicsofDaseinforHeideggerwastheconceptofcare

43Ibid.Page,247.

20

(Sorge).44“WemightsaythatitisbecauseDaseincarriesthequestionofitsbeing

withinitselfthatitiscapableofprojectingthatquestiononallothersandtherefore

ofunderstandingthemassuch,inrelationtotheirbeing.Theprimordialityofcare

thatHeideggerannounces[…]isnotjustsomegenericcare,butthecareaboutbeing

thatisatthecoreofDasein.Thisistheverymovementofitsexistenceandwhatit

canbringinadvancetoallthingsasdisclosure.[…]Daseincandisclosebeing

becauseitcarriesthequestionofbeingwithinitasitsdeepestcare.”45Withthis

foundationofDasein,ofbeing,ofpersonhood,ascarewemoveclosertoour

concern(s),toourthoughts,regardingAbrahamandhisson(s).

Whichbegsthequestion,howdowehavethoughts,whatarethoughts,how

dowethink?Ifcareisthefoundationofourbeing,ofourSein,thenwhat?Whatis

nextistounderstandunderstandingandtodothatwemustfirstconsiderthinking,

hearing,andknowledgeitself.ForHeidegger,“thoughtisitselfaneventwithin

being.Thisiswhyitcanneverbefullypenetrated,evenbyitself.Forthethinkeron

thepathoftheprimordial,thetranscendentalcanhardlysuffice.[…]Notheoryof

meaningcanincludeitsownexistentialhorizon,nor,Heideggerunderstood,canit

44TheprimarymodeofDaseiniswhatHeideggercallsbeing‐towards‐death,notdeathinsomemorbidsensebutintheideathatwearealwaysalreadymovingtowardsourdeath,deathwhichcannotbeknow.Thisisnotanannihilatistic,orfatalisticideabutratheranacceptancethateverymomentisonemoremomentclosertodeath,whichisthepossibilitythatisanabsoluteimpossibilityforDaseinbecauseitcannotbeknown.Onecannotknowonesowndeathandtherecognitionofthedeathofothersisnothing,foronesdeathisnotanempiricalevent,itisourownmostpossibility,anditisthispossibilitywhichmakesanindividual.45Ibid.Page,252."Dasein'sfacticityissuchthatitsBeing‐in‐the‐worldhasalwaysdisperseditselforevensplititselfupintodefinitewaysofBeing‐in.Themultiplicityoftheseisindicatedbythefollowingexamples:havingtodowithsomething,producingsomething,attendingtosomethingandlookingafterit,makinguseofsomething,givingsomethingupandlettingitgo,undertaking,accomplishing,evincing,interrogating,considering,discussing,determining....AllthesewaysofBeing‐inhaveconcern(Fürsorge,care)astheirkindofBeing."MartinHeidegger,BeingandTime,trans.JohnMacquarrieandEdwardRobinson.NewYork,(Harper&Row,1962).H.56

21

reallysayanythingaboutitself.”46Thisideaappliestoalltheoriesandstructuresof

meaning.Thetheoryofevolutioncannotsayanythingaboutthetheoryitself,it

arguesforawaythatlifehasevolved.Thetheoryofthecreationoftheuniversehas

nothingtosayaboutthetheoryitself,butratherabouthowparticlessmashed

togetherafterthatfirstinstant.Evenatheoryoftheories,howtheyareformed,

whattheyare,whatapropertheoryismadeupof,cannotcontaintheideaofa

theorybutcanonlydescribeit,andatthisitalways,inevitablyfails.Atheoryof

meaningcannotincludethetheoryofmeaningforevenifoneweretotryyouwould

havefailedbeforeyouevengotstarted.Walsharguesthat,“thetruthofbeingis

accessibletoDaseinbecauseitisitselfthestruggleforthetruthofbeing.Thelong

modernpreoccupationwithepistemologyisnowconcludedinHeidegger’s

recognitionthatithasbeenlargelyanexerciseinfutility.Howcanknowledgeofthe

worldbegroundedinthebeingofasubjectthathasnotitselfbeengrounded?”47

Andfurther,“Beingispriortoknowingbecauseknowingisitselfamodeofbeing.

[…]Neitheramethodnoratechniqueofconfirmationisavailablebecausewe

cannotstepoutsidethevantagepointoftruththatconstitutesthebeingof

knowledge.Allwecandoisaccepttheuncertaintyofthequestforknowledgethat

makesitpossible,whilerecognizingthatthequestinuncertaintyisnotincidental

butconstitutiveofourexistence.”48Thesearchforknowledgeisnotaresultofour

beingbutratherwhatmakesourbeing.Finally,withHeidegger,“theunityof

theoreticalandpracticalreasonoccursnotasatheoreticalsynthesisbutasthepre‐

46Ibid.Page,252,note26.47Ibid.Page,253.48Ibid.Page,254.

22

existentialunitywhoseunfoldingconstitutesexistence.Neitherincontemplating

norinactingcanwestepoutsideoftheexistentialpreconditions,butwemust

recognizethatitiswhowearethatisimplicatedineachcase.Whatvariesisthe

degree.OnceDaseinisunderstoodasDasein,asexistence,therecanbenowayof

gettingatwhatitisasanessenceoranentity.Existenceisthatwhichisnever

presentorispresentonlyasitexists.TheonlyaccesswehavetoDaseinasawhole

isglimpsedfromwithinitsmovement.Novantagepointissuperiortothatinwhich

Daseinputsitsownexistenceasawholeintoquestion.”49

Heidegger,throughouthiswork,isinthesearchforanauthenticself.The

authenticself,forHeidegger,beginswitharecognitionthatwewillalldie.As

morbidasthisthoughtsounds,Heideggerbelievesthattheaversiontothis

recognitionisthefirstbarriertowardsauthenticity.Hecallstherecognitionofthis

modeofbeing,being‐towards‐death,inthatweareallalwaysalreadybeing‐

towardsdeath,butthisrecognitionmustberecognizedandinternalized.Being‐

towards‐deathistherecognitionthatyouwilleventuallydie,thatthereisnogoing

backwardsintime,thateverydayyouaremovingtowardsdeath,andthatatthe

momentofyourdeathyouwillreachyourutmostpotentialasaBeing,asDasein.

Youwillhowevernotexperienceyourdeathbecausedeathcannotbeexperienced;

itistheendofexperience.Being‐towards‐death,care,andrecognizingthat

knowledgeisconstitutiveismovingtowardsauthenticity.However,“authenticityis

everthedrawingawayfrominauthenticity.GuiltistherecognitionthatDasein

neverhascontroloveritsownbasisofitsbeing,inasmuchasthisbasisfirstarises

49Ibid.Page,255.

23

fromitsownprojection;rather,asbeing‐its‐self,itisthebeingofitsbasis.Itis

becauseDaseinneverachieveswhatitisbutisalwaysonthewaytoit,throughthe

exerciseofitsfreedom,that“Dasein as such is guilty.”Thisprimordialityofguiltthat

Heideggerdevelopsmustbeunderstoodinafullyexistentialsenseasacondition

thatcanneverbeknownbecausewealreadylivewithinit.”50Thisoriginaryguilt

wouldnotbeguiltastypicallyunderstoodratherthisisafundamentalguilt,thatis

unknown,andunrecognized.Itisnotanegativecondition,butratherarisesfrom

thefactthatwecannotbefullyauthenticandcanneverbecomefullyauthentic.

However,thisguiltalsohasanordinarysense,whichisrevealedfromthe

primordialityofguilt.Wenotonlyexperienceguiltexistentially,thatiswe

experienceguiltprimordiallyandthuswithoutrecognizingit,butwealsomirror

thatprimordialityinoureverydayselves.Thisdrawingawayfromauthenticity,

fromanunderstandingofourselvesasDasein,istheeverydayguilt,andassuchis

therecognitionthatwitheverychoicewedenyotherchoices,otherpossibilities.

Wesacrificeotherchoice,otherpossibilities.Thisideaisthebeginningto

understandingtherepeatabilityofAbraham’ssacrifice.Withthechoiceofabagof

chipsforlunchwerecognize,mostlyunconsciously,thatwemighthaveoptedfor

thefruit,forthebaggieofvegetables,fortheyogurt,reallyforanythingthatwasnot

thatspecificbagofchips.Forinpickingthatbagofchipsyoualsodeniedyourself

steak,chicken,orflamingo.Theguiltisnotrecognitionofwhatyoushouldhave

done,butratherarecognitionofwhatcouldhavebeen,inallitsmyriadinfinity.

Usingthisunderstandingofauthenticity,weareabletobeginpokingatthefigureof

50Ibid.Page,257.

24

AbrahamandhisGod.Wemightstarttoimagineanewinterpretation,anewsense

ofthesituation,whereperhapsAbrahamacknowledgedfeelingguilty,eventhough

hetoldhissonhisplansandhissonagreedtothecourseofaction.Onewonders

whatthemoodofthesonwasafterhearingthathisfatherhadadream,sentfrom

God,inwhichhewastobesacrificed.Didthesonacceptthenewscheerfullyandgo

tohisendwithasmileandwave?Washepensiveandwithdrawn?Didheflinch

whenheheardthenews?Didherecognizethathiswouldbetheendofhisyoung

life,fortheQur’antellsusthathehadjustlearnedtowalk.Ifhewasindeedonly

justwalking,washeoldenoughtorecognizethedecision?Washeoldenoughto

appreciatetheimpactofit?Doesitmakeadifferencehowheacceptedhisfate,or

doesitonlymatterthatheacceptedit?Thenarrative,ifthatistheproper

descriptor,issilentaboutthetoneoftheson’sacceptance,indeeditissilentabouta

greatmanydetails,includingthetimelinesinvolved.Didthesonacceptthenews

rightawayandofferhimselfuponthespot?Didhespendsometimemullingover

thesituationandweighingtheprosandcons?Didhemakealist,sothathecould

viewhisdecisiongraphically?Thestoryisunclearandisthusopentomany,varied,

andperhapswildlydifferentinterpretations.Howtoproceed?Onecouldask,what

differencedoesanyofthismake?

Ourquest,oursearching,ourhopeisthatwecanfindsomewaytoanswerat

leastsomeofthesequestions,maybemore.ForHeidegger,“whatwecalllawsof

thought,theprinciplesofidentityandsufficientreason,arenotsimplythe

regulativeprinciplesofourthinkingbuttheprimordialself‐disclosureofbeing.We

donotimposethembutareourselvesimposeduponbythemastheverypossibility

25

ofourthinkingatall.Thinkingandbeingarethesameinthesensethatitisonlyby

standinginthelightofbeingthatwecanperceivewhatis.Thisisaninsight

discoverednotbyamethodavailabletousinadvancebutbysubmittingtothe

movementofbeingwhichdisclosesit.Truthisirreduciblypoetic,foritisnotwe

whopossessitbutitthatpossessesus.Ourtaskisonlytogiveexpressionasart,in

whichalonethesamenessofthinkingandbeingisunfolded.”51Oncewerecognize

thatthinkingandbeingarethesame,thatthereisnobeingwithoutthinkingwe

moveanothersmallsteptowardsunderstanding,critiquing,orarguingwith

Abraham.Welearnthatateveryminute,ateverydecision,weinsomesmallor

largewayrepeatthesacrificeofAbraham.AswequotedDerridaearlier,and

throughthethoughtsofHeideggerweunderstandthateachdecision,ifsuchathing

exists,ismerely,arepeatofthesacrificeofAbraham.Eachdecisionisadecisionto

sacrificeeverythingforonething,tosacrificethesonforeverything,tosacrifice

everythingfortheson.

AmongthemanyphilosopherswhotookupthegauntletofHeideggerian

philosophy,wewilldiscusstwoofthemostprominent,EmmanuelLevinasand

JacquesDerrida.ChronologicallyLevinasappearedfirstsowewillbeginby

discussinghistakeontheworkofHeidegger,inwhichheexpandedturned

Heidegger’sfocusontheindividualintoafocusonthatwhichisoutsidethe

individual,theOther.TheaxisofLevinas’thoughtistheideathat“ethics”assuch,

precedesthe“ontology”ofHeidegger.Beforeweproceed,perhapsweshould

discusswhatLevinasmeansbyethics.Bergoargues,“ifethicsmeansrationalist

51Ibid.Page,282.

26

self‐legislationandfreedom(deontology),thecalculationofhappiness

(utilitarianism),orthecultivationofvirtues(virtueethics),thenLevinas's

philosophyisnotanethics.Levinasclaimed,in1961,thathewasdevelopinga“first

philosophy.”Thisfirstphilosophyisneithertraditionallogicnormetaphysics.Itis

aninterpretive,phenomenologicaldescriptionoftheriseandrepetitionoftheface‐

to‐faceencounter,ortheintersubjectiverelationatitsprecognitivecore;viz.,being

calledbyanotherandrespondingtothatother.Ifprecognitiveexperience,thatis,

humansensibility,canbecharacterizedconceptually,thenitmustbedescribedin

whatismostcharacteristictoit:acontinuumofsensibilityandaffectivity,inother

words,sentienceandemotionintheirinterconnection.”52Whichisalongwayof

sayingthatLevinas’focusisontheethicsofinterpersonalandinter‐Other

relationships.Levinas“isverymuchawareofthequestionablenessofthe

identificationsof“ethics”and“ontology,”asiftheycouldbetreatedasself‐

containedentitiesapartfromthemovementbywhichtheyemerge.[…]Heintends

toshowthattheprioritizingmovementbywhichphilosophylivesinthe

unconcealmentofbeingcontainsthecrucialimplicationofunreachabilityassuch.It

isnotthatethicsprecedesontology,butthatethicsitselfisneverreachedbecauseit

isalways“before.”Theprioritizingmovement,ifitistakenseriously,meansthat

eventhephilosophicalappropriationscanneverbeappropriated.”53

ForHeidegger,existencebeganoutofavoid,outofnothingness,anditisto

nothingnessthatwereturnaftertheeventofdeath,theeventthatwecannot

52Bergo,Bettina,"EmmanuelLevinas",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Fall2008Edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.),<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/levinas/>.53Walsh.Page,292.

27

experience.However,Levinas"doesnotbeginwithnothingness,fromwhich

Heideggerneverfullyseparateshisreflection,butratherseesthesuperabundance

ofbeingasthebeginningwithinwhichanothingnesscanarise.Hebeginswhere

HeideggerstrainstoreachinhismovementfromDaseintotheunconcealmentof

being.ForLevinasbeingisalreadyinunconcealment."54Levinasbelievesthat

ratherthancomingfromnothingness,beingcomesfromasuperabundace,an

overflowing,anditisinthisoverflowingthatpocketsofnothingnessappear.This

abundancealsoispresentinhowLevinasconceivesoftime,inwhichinstantsarean

importantpart.Liketheinstantinwhichthedaggerwasstoppedshortoftheson's

throat,ortheinstantinwhichAbrahamdecidedtocommittothesacrificeofhisson.

ForLevinas,“thepresentbringsabouttheexceptionalsituationwherewecangiven

aninstantaname,andconceiveofitasasubstantive.”55Forexistence,“isnolonger

synonymouswiththedurationbutratherwiththeinterruptionofdurationby

whichtheeternityofsubstanceiseffected.“Abeginningdoesnotstartoutofthe

instantthatprecedesthebeginning;itspointofdepartureiscontainedinitspointof

arrival,likeareboundmovement.”Everyinstantistheinstantofcreation.[…]

“Thefreedomofthepresentfindsalimitintheresponsibilityforwhichitisthe

condition.Thisisthemostprofoundparadoxintheconceptoffreedom:its

syntheticbondwithitsownnegation.Afreebeingaloneisresponsible,thatis,

alreadynotfree."56Freedomisnotfree,isoftenaphrasebandiedaboutwhen

discussingcivilrightsandthelimitstothoserights.Howtruethephraseringsnow,

54Ibid.Page,293.55Ibid.Page,296.56Ibid.Page,296‐297.

28

forwhatLevinasisarguingisthatfromthemomentofourbeing,fromour

emergencefromthevoid,fromthenothingness,fromthesuperabundance,fromthe

overflowingwehavearesponsibilitytotheOther.Wehaveafreedomgrantedtous

asbeingbutinthatfreedomlaysaninherentresponsibility,unavoidable,andoften

unrecognizedbutstillpersistentandoriginary,totheOther,totheOtherOthers,to

theOthersOther.Inotherwords,“thesubject,[…],isnotfree,ormoreaccurately,

heisfreeonlybecauseheisnotfree.“57ThisideabegsthequestionofAbraham’s

responsibility.Washefree,andinbeingfreewasheresponsible?Washe

commandedbyGodtoofferupthesacrificeanddoesthattakeawayhisfreedom,

hisresponsibility?CouldAbrahambefreeandunresponsible,irresponsible?Could

heberesponsibleforhisactions,histhoughts,andbeunfree?Whoisaccountable?

WewillexplorethisconceptfurtherwhenwecometoDerridaandhisnotionsof

freedomastheyrelatetoAbrahamoftheHebrewBible,whichofcoursewewill

redirecttoAbrahamoftheQur’an.

Walsharguesthat,“bothancientandmodernhadstruggledtoconceiveof

therelationshipbetweenthesubjectandtheinfinite.NowLevinaswasabletoshow

thattheinfiniteisneitherapresencenoranabsencebuttheprioritybywhichthe

subjectisconstituted.58Ormoresimply,“fullness,notpoverty,iswhatdraws

existencefrombeyondbeing.”59Intheend,“Levinasmaynotalwayshavefoundthe

mostperspicuousformulationfortheexistentialeschatologyheglimpsed,buthe

markedoutthemeaningofthephilosophicalrevolutionthroughtheprioritization

57Ibid.Page,321.58Ibid.59Ibid.Page,332.

29

ofethics.”60Inaddition,“Levinascompletedtheprioritizationofpracticalreason

thatbeganwithKant,butitwasDerridawhounfoldedtheprofusionoftheoretical

consequences.ItwasDerridawhosawthefullsignificanceofthephilosophical

revolutionthatLevinashadmadeirreversible.”61Derridaarguesthat“signification

ispossible,[…]notbecauseofanoriginaltowhichwemightmakerecourse,but

becauseeventheoriginalisinthepositionofasignifiedtous.Wedonotground

signification;itiswhatgroundsus.TheHeideggerianopeningoruncoveringof

beinghasbecomewhatopensus,notwhatisopenedbeforeus.AswithLevinas’s

prioritizingoftheother,Derridalocatesusinrelationtosignificationratherthan

theotherwayaround.”62

60Ibid.Page,333.61Ibid.Page,335.62Ibid.

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CHAPTER III 

 

 

DERRIDA 

 

ToaidinourdiscussionofDerridaandtheopeningsthathisphilosophical

insightsprovidewewillturntosomeoftherecentworkofHentdeVries.DeVries’s

analysisfocusesontheworkofKierkegaardandDerridaandtheirideasconcerning

thesceneofsacrificeinGenesis.SørenKierkegaard,afamous19thcenturyDanish

philosopherandtheologian,treatedthestoryofthesacrificeofIsaacextensivelyin

hisworkentitled,Fear and Trembling.JacquesDerridaaddressedthestoryofthe

sacrificemanytimesbutmostfamouslyinhisbookThe Gift of Death,orinFrench,

Donner la mort.Derrida,“readsthestoryofthesacrificeofIsaacasthenarrative

ellipsisoftheparadoxicallogicofobligation,absoluteresponsibility,duty,and

decision[ifsuchathingexists]thatmarkstheethical‐‐and,perhaps,morethan

simplyethical‐‐relationwiththeabsoluteOther,forwhich“God”isthesingularand

mostpropername.”63DeVrieswrites,“accordingtoKierkegaard,asDerrida

elaboratesinThe Gift of Death,thetestimonyofobligationentailsananxietyinthe

faceofagivendeathorofagivingofdeath,ofadonner la mort,whichisalsoa

monstrosity:thenecessityofchoosingbetweenone’sloveandthesacrificeofthis

63DeVries,Hent.ReligionandViolence:PhilosophicalPerspectivesfromKanttoDerrida.JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress(Baltimore,2002).Page,151.

31

love.Abrahamtransgressestheorderoftheethical,inKierkegaard’seyesthe

validityofandrespectforauniversallaworgenerality,Kantianmorality

(Moralität),Hegelianethicallife(Sittlichkeit),andevensimplecommonsense:in

short,whattiesusnotonlytoformalorabstractrulesbutalsotobeGod’scommand

tosacrificehisbelovedson,andbykeepinghisintentionssecret,byspeaking,of

necessity,tonoone,Abrahamviolates‐‐indeed,sacrifices‐‐thebasicprinciples

thatgoverneveryhumancommunity.Ethicallyspeaking,Kierkegaardinsists,

Abraham commits a criminal act, and his sacrifice is nothing but murder.[Emphasis

mine]”64ThatAbrahamcommittedmurderisaconclusionreachedbyallthree

writersbutwasathesisinitiallyofferedbyKierkegaard.Kierkegaardarguesthat

eventhoughGodavertedthesacrifice,AbrahamfullyintendedtokillIsaacandwas

onlystoppedbyGod.65TheimportantdistinctiontobemadebetweentheHebrew

BibleversionandtheQur'anicversion,aswe'venotedbefore,isthatinGenesis

Abrahamdidnotspeaktoanyoneaboutwhathewasgoingtodo,aboutwhathewas

toldtodo.HedidnottellSarah,hedidnottellIsaac,hetoldnoone.IntheQur’an64Ibid.Page,152.65Kierkegaard,Søren.TranslatedbyHowardHongandEdnaHong.FearandTrembling/Repetition.PrincetonUniversityPress(Princeton,1983).Iffaithcannotmakeitaholyacttobewillingtomurderhisson,thenletthesamejudgmentbepassedonAbrahamasoneveryoneelse.IfapersonlacksthecouragetothinkhisthoughtallthewaythroughandsaythatAbrahamwasamurder,thenitiscertainlybettertoattainthiscouragethantowastetimeonunmeritedeulogies.TheethicalexpressionforwhatAbrahamdidisthathemeanttomurderIsaac;thereligiousexpressionisthathemeanttosacrificeIsaac‐‐butpreciselyinthiscontradictionistheanxietythatcanmakeapersonsleepless.”(Page,30).Andagain,“ButHegeliswronginspeakingaboutfaith;heiswronginnotprotestingloudlyandclearlyagainstAbraham'senjoyinghonorandgloryasafatheroffaithwhenheoughttobesentbacktoalowercourtandshowupasamurderer.”(Page,55).Finally,“ThestoryofAbrahamcontainsjustsuchateleologicalsuspensionoftheethical.[…]ifitiscertainthatAbrahamrepresentsfaithandthatitismanifestednormativelyinhim,whoselifenotonlyisthemostparadoxicalthatcanbethoughtbutisalsosoparadoxicalthatitsimplycannotbethought.[…]Therefore,Abrahamisatnotimeatragicherobutsomethingentirelydifferent,eitheramurdereroramanoffaith.Abrahamdoesnothavethethirdtermthatsavesthetragichero.ThisiswhyIcanunderstandatragicherobutcannotunderstandAbraham,eventhoughinacertaindementedsenseIadmirehimmorethanallothers.”(Page,57).

32

however,asweread,Abrahamdiscussedhisdreamwithhissonandhisson

consentedtothedream.TherearestoriessurroundingthesceneintheQur’an

whereAbrahamnotonlytellshissonbutisalsoconfrontedbySatan.Inthestories,

thefigureofSatanplaysanarguablyethicalrolebytellingeveryoneinvolvedthat

thesacrificeofAbraham’ssoniswrong.Satanconfronts,Sarah/Hagarandwarns

heraboutwhatAbrahamisgoingtodo,SatanconfrontsIsaac/Ishmael,andfinally

SatanconfrontsAbrahamhimselfbutallthreerebukeSatanandsaythatifGodwills

thesacrificethanitmustbedone.DeVriescontinueshisanalysisbysayingthat

accordingtoKierkegaard,thefaithofAbrahamwasfaithoftheabsurd,that

AbrahamhadfaiththatGodwoulddemandthesacrificeofIsaacbutwaswillingto

doitanyway.66For,“insuspendingtheethicalinfavorofapurportedlyreligious

obligation,Abrahamdemonstrateswhatittakestoassumeresponsibilityforan

absolutecommand.Hispassionwhenfacedwiththesacrificeofhisson,hisanxiety

athavingtosacrificehislove,istheexamplesetforeverydecision‐‐onceandfor

all.Itistheexampleofallexemplarity.Everyethicaldecisionthatdeservesthe

nametakesplaceasthesimilarpronunciationofasingularshibbolethandthus

retainsacertainidiosyncrasyorsecrecy.Assoonasitenterslanguageandbecomes

partofdiscourseoreventhesubjectofdiscussion,nottomentionaDiskurs,an

ethicaldecisionlosesitsdistinctivecharacter,itssignificanceor,rather,significance,

66DeVries.Page,156.“Letusreturntothestructureofthesacrificeorthegift,tothegivingofdeathsaidtofigurethisstructureoftheexcessofabeyondofduty,an“over­duty.”Abraham,Kierkegaardwrites,“hadfaiththatGodwouldnotdemandIsaacofhim,andyethewaswillingtosacrificehimifitwasdemanded.Hehadfaithbyvirtueoftheabsurd,forhumancalculationwasoutofthequestion;itwascertainlyabsurdthatGod,whorequireditofhim,shouldinthenextmomentrescindtherequirement.Heclimbedthemountain,andeveninthemomentwhentheknifegleamedhehadfaith‐‐thatGodwouldnotrequireIsaac.”Abrahamhadfaith“byvirtueoftheabsurd,byvirtueofthefactthatforGodallthingsarepossible.”“

33

tousetheformulationLevinasemploystoindicatehowtheabsoluterelationwith

theabsolute[God]manifestsitselfwithoutappearing,presenting,revealing,oreven

being“itself.”[emphasismine]”67

Theideathatassoonasanethicaldecisionenterslanguage,assoonasitis

considered,itloosesitsstatusasanethicaldecisionisanargumentputforwardby

Derridathatmirrorsmanyofhisotherconcepts,notablythegiftandhospitality.

Eachoftheseconceptsiswrappedintheotherforeachideaisadifferentnamefor

thesameconcept.Thedecisionlosesitsstatusasadecisionbecausedecisionsonce

consideredbecomeprograms.Theremustbeanimpossiblemoment,amomentof

impossibility,foradecisiontotrulybeadecisionforDerrida.Itisnotunlikethe

conceptofthegift.ForDerridaarguesthattherecanbenosuchthingasapuregift

becauseassoonasagiftisgivenitentersintoaneconomyofexchangeinwhich

eitheranother“gift”isgiveninreturn,satisfactionforthegiftisexpressed,orthe

giverforgivingthegiftfeelssatisfaction,thegiftisannulled.Derridaarguesthata

puregiftcannotexistbutthatifitdid,thegiverwouldhavetogivethegiftwithout

knowingthattheygaveit,andthereceiverwouldhavetoreceivethegiftwithout

knowingthattheyreceivedit.Thisimpossiblemomentisalsoreflectedin

hospitality,inthegiftofhospitality,inthedecisionofhospitality,inthehospitality

ofthegiftanddecision.Agiftandhospitality,ifsuchathingsexist,beginswitha

decision,worksthroughadecision,andexiststhroughadecision.Derridasaysthe

following,concerningdecision,“farfromopposingundecidabilitytodecision,I

wouldarguethattherewouldbenodecision,inthestrongsenseoftheword,in

67Ibid.Page,158.

34

ethics,inpolitics,nodecision,andthusnoresponsibility,withouttheexperienceof

someundecidability.”Concerningthisundecidability,hesays,“ifyoudon’t

experiencesomeundecidability,thenthedecisionwouldsimplybetheapplication

ofaprogramme,theconsequenceofapremissorofamatrix."68Frommy

understanding,theimpossibilityconcerningthedecisionmustexistintime.Though

Derridaseemstoarguethatitmustexistoutsideoftime,inanimpossibleinstant.

Buteverydecisionisamoment,asecond,aminute,anhour,alengthoftimein

whichapersonmustworkthroughthedecision.ButDerridaarguesthat,“ifthe

decisionissimplythefinalmomentofaknowingprocess,itisnotadecision.Sothe

decisionfirstofallhastogothroughaterribleprocessofundecidability,otherwise

itwouldnotbeadecision,andithastobeheterogenoustothespaceofknowledge.

Ifthereisadecisionithastogothroughundecidabilityandmakealeapbeyondthe

fieldoftheoreticalknowledge.SowhenIsay‘Idon’tknowwhattodo’,thisisnot

thenegativeconditionofdecision.Itisratherthepossibilityofadecision.”69The

questionforusthenbecomes,whatofAbraham’sdecision?Wasitadecision,orthe

consequencesofapreprogrammedmatrix?Wheredidthedecisiontakeplace?

Weretheremultipledecisions?Thedecisiontotellhisson,thedecisiontowalkto

MountMoriah,thedecisiontorebukeSatan,thedecisiontotaketheknife,the

decisiontostrikeandwhatofgiftsandhospitality?Wasithospitabletoperform

theseacts?Wasthesacrificereallyagift?Mustasacrificebeagift?Ifso,agiftto

whom?

68Kearney,RichardandMarkDooley(Ed.)QuestioningEthics:ContemporaryDebatesinPhilosophy.Routledge(London,1999).Page,66.69Ibid.

35

Toanswersomeofthesequestions,wemustlearnmoreofhospitalityand

thegift.Wehavelearnedbrieflyofdecisionsbutwemustdelvedeeperintotheidea

ofhospitalityandthegift.However,beforelaunchingintoadiscussionofthe

conceptofhospitalitywewillbrieflydiscusstheconceptoftheconcept.Derrida

arguesthat,“ifeveryconceptsheltersorletsitselfbehauntedbyanotherconcept,

byanotherthanitselfthatisnolongerevenitsother,thennoconceptremainsin

placeanylonger[emphasismine].”Thisistosuggestthatideaofaconceptcannot

standonitsown,thatconcepts,likelanguage,likecultures,arealwaysinterwoven

withotherconcepts,thatyouneedcertainconceptstodiscussotherconcepts.

Derridacontinueshislineofthoughtsaying,“thisisabouttheconceptofconcept,

andthisiswhyIsuggestedearlierthathospitality,theexperience,the

apprehension,theexerciseofimpossiblehospitality,ofhospitalityasthepossibility

ofimpossibility(toreceiveanotherguestwhomIamincapableofwelcoming,to

becomecapableofthatwhichIamincapableof)‐‐thisistheexemplaryexperience

ofdeconstructionitself,whenitisordoeswhatithastodoortobe,thatis,the

experienceoftheimpossible.”70

Derridagoesontosaythat,“hospitality‐‐thisisanameoranexampleof

deconstruction.Ofthedeconstructionoftheconcept,oftheconceptofconcept,as

wellasofitsconstruction,itshome,its“at‐home”[son chez­soi].Hospitalityisthe

deconstructionoftheat‐home;deconstructionishospitalitytotheother,tothe

otherthanoneself,theotherthan“itsother,”toanotherwhoisbeyondany“its

70Caputo,John.DeconstructioninaNutshell:AConversationwithJacquesDerrida.FordhamUniversityPress(NewYork,1996).Page,111.

36

other.”“71Tofurtherthisconcept,wewouldarguethattheconceptofhospitalityis

simplyanothernameforthegiftandtheconceptofthegiftissimplyanothername

forhospitality.Thegiftrequiresthehospitalityoftheotherandforpurehospitality

tobeconceivedrequiresthegift.Derridaarguesthatforhospitalitytobepure,one

mustbereadytonotbeready.Thatpurehospitalitycan,must,willbeableoccurat

anytime,onanyhorizon,thattheremustbethepossibilitythatitwillneveroccur.

However,thesehospitalities,thesepossibilities,thesehosp‐ossibilities,areall

situatedintime.Doeshospitalitythanexistintimebutalsooutoftime?Ifwemust

bereadytonotbereadyforsomethingthatmaynevercome,thenwewillhavetobe

readytonevermakeadecision.Perhapshospitalityandgift“exists”inthe

undecidabilityofthedecision.Becauseitseemsthatsurroundingthemomentsof

purehospitalityorthepuregift,therewillbedecisions.Youhavetodecidetobe

readyfortheimpossible.Youhavetobepreparedforthepossibilityofthe

impossible.Derridasaysthat,“unconditionalhospitalityimpliesthatyoudon’task

theother,thenewcomer,theguest,togiveanythingback,oreventoidentifyhimself

orherself.Eveniftheotherdeprivesyouofyourmasteroryourhome,youhaveto

acceptthis.Itisterribletoacceptthis,butthatistheconditionofunconditional

hospitality:thatyougiveupthemasteryofyourspace,yourhome,yournation.Itis

unbearable.If,however,thereispurehospitalityitshouldbepushedtothis

extreme.”72Perhapspurehospitalityispossiblebutnotapuregift.Derridagoeson

tosay,“IfyouaretheguestandIinviteyou,ifIamexpectingyouandamprepared

71Derrida,Jacques.EditedbyGilAnidjar.ActsofReligion.Routledge(London,2002).Page,364.72Kearney,Page,70.

37

tomeetyou,thenthisimpliesthatthereisnosurprise,everythingisinorder.For

purehospitalityorapuregifttooccur,however,theremustbeabsolutesurprise.”73

Uptothemomentofthegift,oruptothemomentofhospitality,decisionswould

havetobemade.Forhospitalityandthegifttoberealizedrequiresbeingswhich

willhavemadedecisionsbeforeandwillmakedecisionsafter.

JohnCaputoarguesthat,“forhospitalitytooccur,itisnecessaryfor

hospitalitytogobeyondhospitality.Thatrequiresthatthehostmust,inamoment

ofmadness,tearuptheunderstandingbetweenhimandtheguest,actwith”excess.”

makeanabsolutegiftofhisproperty,whichisofcourseimpossible.Butthatisthe

onlywaytheguestcangoawayfeelingasifhewasreallymadeathome.”74Caputo

furtherarguesthat,“thehospesissomeonewhohasthepowertohostsomeone,so

thatneitherthealterity(hostis)ofthestrangernorthepower(potentia)ofthehost

isannulledbythehospitality.Thereisanessential“self‐limitation”builtrightinto

theideaofhospitality,whichpreservesthedistancebetweenone’sownandthe

stranger,betweenowningone’sownpropertyandinvitingtheotherintoone’s

home.So,thereisalwaysalittlehostilityinallhostingandhospitality,constituting

acertain‘hostil/pitality.’“75ForDerrida,“theother,liketheMessiah,mustarrive

wheneverheorshewants.IfIamunconditionallyhospitableIshouldwelcomethe

visitation,nottheinvitedguest,butthevisitor.Imustbeunprepared,orprepared

tobeunprepared,fortheunexpectedarrivalofanyother.”76Derridadiscussesthe

differencebetweenavisitationandaninvitationarguingthatthereisanimplicit73Ibid.74Caputo,Page,111.75Ibid.Page,110.76Kearney,Page,70.

38

differencebetweenthetwoconcepts,hesaysthat“itisasiftherewerea

competitionoracontradictionbetweentwoneighboringbutincompatibleviews:

visitation and invitation,and,moregravely,itisasiftherewereahidden

contradictionbetweenhospitalityandinvitation.”77Derridaarguestheideaof

hospitalityinadifferentveinsayingthat,“tobehospitableistoletoneselfbe

overtaken[surprendre],to be ready to not be ready,ifsuchispossible,toletoneself

beovertaken,tonotevenletoneselfbeovertaken,tobesurprised,inafashion

almostviolent,violatedandraped[violée],stolen[volée]preciselywhereoneisnot

readytoreceive‐‐andnotonlynot yet readybutnot ready, unpreparedinamode

thatisnoteventhatofthe“notyet.””78

Wastheresomehostil/pitalityinAbraham’sresponsetotheOtherofAllah’s

request?Wasthegiftgiveninhospitalityorinhostil/pitality?Whatwasthe

responseoftheson,theresponseofAbraham,andwastherearesponsefromGod?

FortheresponseweturntoDerrida,whoargues,“Icanrespondtotheone(orto

theOne),thatistosaytotheother,onlybysacrificingtothatonetheother.Iam

responsibletoanyone(thatistosaytotheother)onlybyfailinginmy

responsibilitiestoalltheothers,totheethicalorpoliticalgenerality.AndIcan

77Derrida,ActsofReligion.Page,360‐361,andhecontinuestosay“Or,moreprecisely,betweenhospitalityasitexposesitselftothevisit,tothevisitation,andthehospitalitythatadornsandpreparesitself[se pare et se prépare]ininvitation.Thesetwohȏtesthatthevisitorandtheinvitedare,thesetwofacesofhospitality,visitationandinvitation,arenotmomentsofhospitality,dialecticalphasesofthesameprocess,thesamephenomenon.Visitorandinvited,visitationandinvitation,aresimultaneouslyincompetitionandincompatible;theyfigurethenon‐dialectizable[non­dialectisable]tension,eventhealwaysimminentimplosion,infact,thecontinuouslyoccurringimplosioninitsimminence,unceasing,atonceactiveanddeferred,oftheconceptofhospitably,evenoftheconceptinhospitality.Towaitwithoutwaiting,awaitingabsolutesurprise,theunexpectedvisitor,awaitedwithoutahorizonofexpectation:thisisindeedabouttheMessiahashȏte,aboutthemessianicashospitality,themessianicthatintroducesdeconstructivedisruptionormadnessintheconceptofhospitality,themadnessofhospitality,eventhemadnessof the concept ofhospitality.78Ibid.Page,361.

39

neverjustifythissacrifice;Imustalwaysholdmypeaceaboutit.WhetherIwantto

ornot,IwillneverbeabletojustifythefactthatIpreferorsacrificeanyone(any

other)totheother.Iwillalwaysbeinsecret,heldtosecrecyinrespectofthis,for

nothingcanbesaidaboutit.Whatbindsmetosingularities,tothisoneorthatone,

maleorfemale,ratherthanthatoneorthisone,remainsfinallyunjustifiable(thisis

Abraham’shyperethicalsacrifice),asunjustifiableastheinfinitesacrificeImakeat

eachmoment.Thesesingularitiesrepresentothers,awhollyotherformofalterity:

oneotherorsomeothers,butalsoplaces,animals,languages.Howwouldyouever

justifythefactthatyousacrificeallthecatsintheworldtothecatthatyoufeedat

homeeverydayforyears,whereasothercatsdieofhungerateveryinstant?Notto

mentionotherpeople.Howwouldyoujustifyyourpresenceherespeakingone

particularlanguage,ratherthanspeakingtoothersinanotherlanguage?Andyetwe

alsodoourdutybybehavingthus.Thereisnolanguage,noreason,nogeneralityor

mediationtojustifythisultimateresponsibilitywhichleadsustoabsolutesacrifice;

absolutesacrificethatisnotthesacrificeofirresponsibilityonthealtarof

responsibility,butthesacrificeofthemostimperativeduty(thatwhichbindsmeto

theotherasasingularityingeneral)infavorofanotherabsolutelyimperativeduty

bindingmetothewhollyother.”79Wasagiftgiveninthesacrifice?DidAbraham

decidetoofferuphissonsimplybecausehewasasked?Wasitacommand,a

request,adream,amisunderstanding,woulditmakeadifference?

Thesequestionslookintothecenterofthevortexregardingthe

responsibilityofAbraham.Thefinalquestioninparticulariscriticalforour

79Derrida,TheGiftofDeath.Page,71‐72.

40

understandingoftheethicalresponsibilityofAbraham.Thedifferencesbetweena

command,arequest,adream,oramisunderstandingareirrelevant.Itiswhatis

donewiththeinformation.Thedifferencesonlydenotedifferenttonesofaskingor

differentconsequencesifthebearerfailstheaction.ForIbrahim,thedifferencesare

evenlessrelevant,forIbrahimwasanobedientservantandanyhintofadirective

wouldbeheldasthehighestduty.Whetherthesacrificewasagiftisperhapsa

betterquestionforDerridaholdsthatthegiftgivercannotknowheisgivingagift

andAbrahamcertainlyknewhewasgoingtosacrificehisson,forhekepthissilence

intheHebrewBibleforthatreason,andintheQur'anhetellshisson.Sofor

Derrida,thesacrificeofthesonwasnotatruegift,itenteredintoaneconomyof

exchange,whichsomeIslamiccommentatorsspecificallymention.Thesacrificeof

thesonwasinpaymentforpastblessingsfromAllah.Thoughthesacrificewasnot

agiftitcertainlyseemstobeofsomehospitality.

InregardstoAbrahamandhissacrifice,Derrida,speakingforGod,about

God,toAbraham,says,“thecommandisrequesting,likeaprayerfromGod,a

declarationoflovethatimplores:tellmethatyouloveme,tellmethatyouturn

towardme,towardtheuniqueone,towardtheotherasuniqueand,aboveall,over

everythingelse,unconditionally:andinordertodothat,makeagiftofdeath,give

deathtoyouronlysonandgivemethedeaththatIasfor,thatIgivetoyouby

askingforit.InshortGodsaystoAbraham:Icanseerightawaythatyouhave

understoodwhatabsolutedutytowardtheuniqueonemeans,thatitmeans

respondingwherethereisnoreasontobeaskedfororgiven;Iseethatnotonly

haveyouunderstoodthatasanidea,butthat–andhereliesresponsibility–you

41

haveactedonit,youhaveputitintoeffect,youwerereadytocarryitoutatthis

veryinstant(Godstopshimattheinstantwhenthereisnomoretime,wheretimeis

nomoregiven,asifAbrahamhasalreadykilledIsaac:theconceptoftheinstantis

alwaysindispensable):thusyouhadalreadyactedonit,youareabsolute

responsibility,youhadthecouragetobehavelikeamurdererintheeyesofthe

worldandofyourlovedones,intheeyesofmorality,politics,andofthegenerality

ofthegeneralorofyourkind.Andyouhadevenrenouncedhope[emphasis

original].”80Andso,“Abrahamisthusatthesametimethemostmoralandthemost

immoral,themostresponsibleandthemostirresponsibleofmen,absolutely

irresponsiblebecauseheisabsolutelyresponsible,absolutelyirresponsibleinthe

faceofmenandhisfamily,andinthefaceoftheethical,becauseheresponds

absolutelytoabsoluteduty,disinterestedlyandwithouthopingforareward,

withoutknowingwhyyetkeepingitsecret;answeringtoGodandbeforeGod.He

recognizesneitherdebtnordutytohisfellowsbecauseheisinarelationshipwith

God–arelationshipwithoutrelationbecauseGodisabsolutelytranscendent,

hidden,andsecret,notgivinganyreasonhecanshareinexchangeforthisdoubly

givendeath,notsharinganythinginthisdissymmetricalcovenant.”81

ThesecretthatDerridareferencesistheaxisaroundwhichheand

KierkegaardinterpretstheAbrahamoftheHebrewBible.Asmentionedbefore,in

theHebrewBible,Abrahamdoesnottellhissonthatheisgoingtosacrificehim.He

doesnottellhimanything.ItisthissilencethatDerridaandKierkegaardholdso

80Ibid.Page,73.81Ibid.

42

abhorrent.Whatwearesearchingforiswhether,AbrahamoftheQur’anisstill

responsibleforhisactionsbecausehedoesnotkeepsilent.OntheAbrahamofthe

HebrewBible,Derridacontinuestosay,“inthisway,hedoesn’tspeak,Abraham

transgressestheethicalorder.AccordingtoKierkegaard,thehighestexpressionof

theethicalisintermsofwhatbindsustoourownandtoourfellows(thatcanbe

thefamilybutalsotheactualcommunityoffriendsorthenation).Bykeeping

secret,Abrahambetraysethics.Hissilence,oratleastthefactthathedoesn’t

divulgethesecretofthesacrifice,hehasbeenaskedtomake,iscertainlynot

designedtosaveIsaac.”82Andyet,Derridaargues,“ofcourse,insomerespects

Abrahamdoesspeak.Hesaysalot.Btevenifhesayseverything,heneedonlykeep

silentononesinglethingforittobeconcludedthathehasn’tspoken.Suchasilence

takesoverhiswholediscourse.Sohespeaksanddoesn’tspeak.Heresponds

withoutresponding.Herespondsanddoesn’trespond.Herespondsindirectly.He

speaksinordernottosayanythingabouttheessentialthingthathemustkeep

secret.Speakinginordertonotsayanythingisalwaysthebesttechniquefor

keepingasecret.Still,Abrahamdoesn’tjustspeakinordertonotsayanything

whenherepliestoIsaac.Hesayssomethingthatisnotnothingandthatisnotfalse.

Hesayssomethingthatisnotanontruth,somethingmoreoverthat,althoughhe 

doesn’t know it yet[emphasisoriginal],willturnouttobetrue.”83Andhere,we

cometotheAbrahamoftheQur’an,foreveninspeaking,evenintellinghissonthat

hehadadream,andinthatdreamthesonwastobesacrificed,wearenotsurehe82Derrida,Jacques.TranslatedbyDavidWills.TheGiftofDeath.SecondEdition.UniversityofChicagoPress(Chicago,2008).Page,60.83Derrida,Jacques.TranslatedbyDavidWills.TheGiftofDeath.SecondEdition.UniversityofChicagoPress(Chicago,2008).Page,60.

43

toldhimeverything.Thestoryislitteredwithholesandinthiswecanonly

conjecture.Perhapshedidnottellhimthemethodinwhichhedreamedhewas

goingtokillhim.Regardless,forDerridaandKierkegaardbeforehim,thesilence

betweenthetruthsorthehalf‐truthsoverwhelmstheethical.Andwherefore

responsibility?Whoisresponsible?IsittheresponsibilityofAllah?IsitAbraham’s

responsibility?IsaacorIshmael’s?

Responsibilityisthefinalquestionwewilladdress,isIbrahimoftheQur’ana

murderlikehiscounterpartintheHebrewBible?IsAbrahamoftheHebrewBiblea

murderasheisaccused?Isitaneither/orsituation?Arewebeinghospitableto

AbrahamandIbrahimbymakingthesejudgments?WewilllistentoDerrida’s

argumentsandthenperhapsboldlymakeadecision,throughamomentof

impossibility,throughamomentofhosp‐ossibility.Derridaasksandanswers,“On

whatconditionisresponsibilitypossible?OntheconditionthattheGoodnolonger

beatranscendentalobjective,arelationbetweenobjectivethings,buttherelationto

theother,aresponsetotheother;anexperienceofpersonalgoodness,anda

movementofintention.”84ButalsoaccordingtoDerrida,“weall,asindividuals,are

definedbytheuniquenessofourindividualplacementintheuniversalityofsin.”85

ThisharkensbacktoearlierwhenwewerediscussingthefigureofHeideggerand

hisideasofguiltasanoriginaryandfoundationalconditionofhumanexistence.

Derridaechoesthesethoughtsbyarguingthattheconflict,thepullbetweenbeinga

responsiblemortalbeingandthefigure,theidea,thepossibilityofthegoodnessof

84Ibid.Page,52.85Ibid.Page,53.

44

theinfinitegiftisthesourceoftheguilt.For,thepullbetweenthetwoandthe

decisionsthatmustbemade,“inevitablytransformstheexperienceofresponsibility

intooneofguilt,”hegoesonfurthertosaythat,“Ihaveneverbeenandneverwillbe

uptothelevelofthisinfinitegoodnessnoruptotheimmensityofthegift,the

framelessimmensitythatmustingeneraldefineagiftassuch.Thisguiltis

originary,likeoriginalsin.[…]Guiltisinherentinresponsibilitybecause

responsibilityisalwaysunequaltoitself:oneisneverresponsibleenough.Oneis

neverresponsibleenoughbecauseoneisfinite,butalsobecauseresponsibility

requirestwocontradictorymovements.Itrequiresonetorespondasoneselfandas

irreplaceablesingularity,toanswerforwhatonedoes,says,gives;butitalso

requiresthat,beinggoodandthroughgoodness,oneforgetsoreffacetheoriginof

whatonegives.”86FromthiswecouldalmostcertainlyconcludethatAbrahamdid

feelguilt,thatIbrahimwaswrackedwithguilt,forwhowouldnotbe?Certainly,

eitheroneofhischildrenwereablessinggivenhisadvancedageandneitherthe

Qur’anortheHebrewBiblearguethathewasapsychopathwithoutfeeling,nordo

theyarguethathewasuncaringordidnotlovehischildren.Forintryingtoliveup

tothisinfiniteresponsibilityhemusthavecertainlyfeltthathewouldfail.Even

werehetobesuccessful,Derridaarguesthathewouldhavefailedstill,forthegift

thathewasgiving,wouldnothavebeenpure,couldnothavebeenpure,forhedid

theactknowinglyandfullyawareofwhathewasgivingup,whathewassacrificing.

Andsowecometohisdecision,forDerrida,“[Abraham]decides,buthisabsolute

decisionisneitherguidednorcontrolledbyknowledge.Such,infact,isthe

86Ibid.Page,52.

45

paradoxicalconditionofeverydecision:itcannotbededucedfromaformof

knowledgeofwhichitwouldsimplybetheeffect,itsconclusionorexplication.It

structurallybreachesknowledgeandisthusdestinedtononmanifestation;a

decisionis,intheend,alwayssecret.Itremainssecretintheveryinstantofits

performance,andhowcantheconceptofdecisionbedissociatedfromthisfigureof

theinstant?fromthestigmaofitspunctuality?”87Andfurther,“Abraham'sdecision

isabsolutelyresponsiblebecauseitanswersforitselfbeforetheabsoluteother.

Paradoxically,itisalsoirresponsiblebecauseitisguidedneitherbyreasonnorby

anethicsjustifiablebecauseitisguidedneitherbyreasonnorbyanethics

justifiablebeforemenorbeforethelawofsomeuniversaltribunal.”88For,

“Kierkegaardwouldhavetoadmit,asLevinasrecalls,thatethicsisalsotheorderof

andrespectforabsolutesingularity,andnotonlythatofthegeneralityorofthe

repetitionofthesame.Hecanthereforenolongerdistinguishsoconveniently

betweentheethicalandthereligious.Butforhispart,intakingintoaccount

absolutesingularity,thatistosaytheabsolutealterityobtaininginrelationswith

anotherhuman,Levinasisnolongerabletodistinguishbetweentheinfinitealterity

ofGodandthatofeveryhuman:hisethicsisalreadyareligion.Inbothcasesthe

borderbetweentheethicalandthereligiousbecomesmorethanproblematic,asdo

alldiscoursesreferringtoit.”89

87Ibid.Page,78.88Ibid.89Ibid.Page,84.

46

CONCLUSION 

 

 

Perhaps,weshouldblurthelinesbetween"ethics"andreligion"asdoneby

Levinas,Derrida,andAbraham.Thisblurringseemstohappenentirelyonitsown

andwouldbedifficulttochallengeeitherfromethicistsorreligiousfigures,aseach

wouldinevitablybedrawnintotheother,orperhapstheOther.“Thisisallthemore

soforpoliticalorlegalmatters.Thegeneralconceptofresponsibility,likethatof

decision,wouldthusbefoundtolackcoherenceorconsequence,andeventolack

identitywithrespecttoitself,paralyzedbywhatcanbecalledanaporiaoran

antinomy.Thathasneverstoppeditfrom"functioning,"asonesays,onthe

contrary.Itoperatessomuchbettertotheextentthatitservestoobscuretheabyss

orfillinitsabsenceoffoundation,stabilizingachaoticbecominginwhatarecall

conventions.”90ItseemsthemorewefollowthedecisionofAbraham,indeedusall,

tosacrifice,inourrepeatedsacrifices,intherepeatabilityofsacrifice,wedraw

closerandclosertothisaporiaofDerrida's.Thisaporiaaroundwhichrevolvesthe

conceptsofdecision,hospitality,thegift,andresponsibilitydrawsusdownlikea

blackhole.Paralyzedbutfunctioningtheseconceptsrestrainandfreeusatthe

sametime.Again,Derridaargues,“Everythingisorganizedtoinsurethatthisman

wouldbecondemnedbyanycivilizedsociety.Ontheotherhand,thesmooth

functionofsuchasociety,themonotonouscomplacencyofitsdiscourseson

morality,politics,andthelaw,andtheveryexerciseofitsright(whetherpublic,

90Ibid.

47

private,national,orinternational),areinnowayperturbedbythefactthat,because

ofthestructureofthelawsofthemarketthatsocietyhasinstitutedandcontrols,

becauseofthemechanismsofexternaldebtandothercomparableinequities,that

same"society"puts todeathor(butfailingtohelpsomeoneindistressaccountsfor

onlyaminordifference)allows to dieofhungeranddiseasetensofmillionsof

children(thoserelativesorfellowhumansthatethicsorthediscourseoftherights

ofmanreferto)withoutanymoralorlegaltribunaleverbeingcompetenttojudge

suchasacrifice,thesacrificeoftheothertoavoidbeingsacrificedoneself.Notonly

doessuchasocietyparticipateinthisincalculablesacrifice,itactuallyorganizesit.

Thesmoothfunctioningofitseconomic,political,andlegalorder,thesmooth

functioningofitsmoraldiscourseandgoodconscience,presupposethepermanent

operationofthissacrifice.”91

Theabovequoterevealshowallthatthispaperhasdiscussedrelatesto

today'sworldandrevealstheimportanceoftherepeatabilityofsacrifice.Howisit

thatsocietycanlegislateagainstindividualsformurderwhenbyitsverynatureit

countenancethemurder,orsacrifice,ofmillionsofothersincludingmen,women,

children,andinfantsaroundtheworldandhereathome,regardlessofwherehome

is.SowhatisourdecisionregardingthesacrificeofAbraham'sson?Dowehold

himresponsibleasanindividualactingalone,actingonordersofGod,theAlmighty,

theMerciful,theCompassionate?Doeshissocietyplayarole?Wehaveheardfrom

theearlyMuslimthinkerswhoseenodifficultyintheactsofIbrahimwhoarguethat

hewastheperfectMuslim,hewashanif,hewasabsoluteinhissubmissiontoAllah.

91Ibid.Page,85‐86.

48

WehaveheardfromtheMuslimmysticsandphilosopherswhoarguethatIbrahim

misunderstood,hemisinterpreted,hewasconfusedandwasnevercalledto

sacrificehissonbutrathertheram.WehaveheardfromKierkegaardwhocalls

Abrahamamurderforwhetherornothekilledhisson,heintendedto,andwas

stoppedonlybyanactofGod.WehaveheardfromDerridawhofindstheactof

sacrificetobethemostresponsibleactandthemostirresponsibleact.Derridahas

placedhimselfinthemidstoftheaporiatoexploretheeffectsofthiscontradiction.

Wherewillweplaceourjudgment?AswebeganwithMuslimthought,andasthis

paperwasgearedtowardsunderstandingtheMuslimpointofviewthroughthelens

ofcontinentalphilosophy,andastheQur'ancanneitherarguebacknorprovide

moredetails,weconcludethatAbrahamdidintendtosacrificehissonandheis

responsibleforhisactionsbutisnomurderer.Fornowhereintheirliteraturedo

theMuslimsbelievethattheactofsacrificewasmurderandwhilethereare

indicationsfromthelatermysticsthattherewereconcerns,theQur'andidnotname

itmurderandthereforeitisnotmurder.Ultimatelythedecisionofjudgmentisleft

totheindividualreaderandwhileIdonotdeemitmurderbasedonthetraditionsof

Islam,Idofindtheactabhorrentasallpeopledowhentheyconsiderit.However,

asDerridaargues,eachofussacrifice,eachofusmurdereachandeverydecisionso

beforeweactinoutrageatthedecisionofAbraham,weshouldconsiderourown

actionsmorecarefully.For,“Godseesinsecret,heknows.Butitisasifhedidn't

knowwhatAbrahamwasgoingtodo,ordecide,ordecidetodo.Hegiveshimback

hissonafterassuringhimselfthatAbrahamhastrembled,renouncedallhope,and

irrevocablydecidestosacrificehisbelovedsontohim.Abrahamhadconsentedto

49

sufferdeathorworse,andthatwithoutcalculating,withoutinvesting,beyondany

perspectiveofreappropriation;hence,itseemsbeyondrecompenseorretribution,

beyondeconomy,withoutanyhopeofremuneration.Thesacrificeofeconomy,that

withoutwhichthereisnoresponsibilitythatisfreeandrelativetodecision(a

decisionalwaystakesplacebeyondcalculation),isindeedinthiscasethesacrificeof

theoikonomia,namelyofthelawofthehome(oikos),ofthehearth,ofwhatisone's

ownorproper,oftheprivate,oftheloveandaffectionofone'skin.Thisisthe

momentwhenAbrahamgivesthesignofabsolutesacrifice,namelybyputtingto

deathorgivingdeathtohisown,puttingtodeathhisabsoluteloveforwhatis

dearest,hisonlyson;thisistheinstantinwhichthesacrificeisallbutconsummated

‐‐fornomorethananinstant,ano­time­lapse, separatestheraisedarmofthe

murderfrommurderitself‐‐theimpossible‐to‐graspinstantofabsoluteimminence

inwhichAbrahamcannolongergobackonhisdecision,norevensuspendit.In this 

instant,therefore,intheimminencethatnolongerevenseparatesthedecisionfrom

theact,Godgiveshimbackhissonanddecidesbysovereigndecision,byan

absolutegift,toreinscribesacrificewithinaneconomybymeansofwhatthence‐

forthresemblesareward.”92

92Ibid.Page,95.

50

APPENDIX I 

 

 

“Finally,thefullestrenditionofthesacrificialactisfoundinal‐Kisā’ī93underthe

title:“TheStoryofIsaac”:

Ka‘bal‐Aḥbārsaid:SarahconceivedIsaaconthenightthatGoddestroyedthe

peopleofLot.Afterafulltermofpregnancy,shegavebirthtohimontheFriday

eveningofthetenthdayofthemonthofMuḥarram.Alightshonefromhisfacethat

illuminatedwhatwasaroundhim.[Themoment]hetouchedtheground,hefell

prostrateinprayertoGod.Hethenraiseduphishandstoheaveninamotion

[signifying]theUnityofGod.AbrahampraisedhisLordandcalledthepoorand

unfortunate.HefedthemandgavethemdrinkinthankstoGod.

WhenIsaacreachedtheageofsevenyears,hewentoutwithhisfatherto

Jerusalem.Abrahamsleptforanhour[there],andavisitorcame[inadream]and

said:“OAbraham,GodcommandsyoutomakeanofferingtoHim.”Whenheawoke,

hetookafatbull,slaughteredit,anddivideditamongtheunfortunate.Onthe

secondnight,thevoicecametohimandsaid:“OAbraham,Godcommandsyouto

makeagreaterofferingthanthatbull.”Whenheawoke,heslaughteredacameland

93SourceisMuḥammadb.‛Abdallāhal‐Kisā’ī.Ed.IsaacEisenbergandtitled,Vita Prophetarum.Leiden:E.J.Brill,1922.Page,150‐152.Firestone,Page,229.“AttributedauthorofaverycolorfulQiṣaṣ al­anbiyā’datingtothe11thcenturyCE.Theoverallimpressionsuggeststhatal‐Kisā’īreliedtoagreatextentonhismemoryratherthanonwrittensources.Hisworkappearsintendedforapopular,notscholarly,audience.Inmanycases,headoptedstoriesofJewishoriginwhichotherauthorsdidnotknowoforaccept.BecauseofhisrampantuseofJewishorisrā’īlīsources,normativeMuslimscholarsoftenlookaskanceatal‐Kisā’ī’swork.Scholarshiponal‐Kisā’ī’sdatingandfirstnameisdivided.TheprevailingopinionagreeswithEisenberg,theeditoroftheArabictext,thatthemanwasMuḥammadibn‛Abdallāhandthatthetextdatestoaroundthe11thcenturyCE,althoughtheearliestmanuscriptremainingdatestothe13thcentury.”Lowin,Page,266‐267.

51

divideditamongthepoor.Onthethirdnight,thevoicecametohimandsaid:“God

commandsyoutomakeagreaterofferingtoHimthanthatcamel.”Hesaid:“Whatis

greaterthanthat?”ItpointedtoIsaac,andhewokeupinfright.

HesaidtoIsaac,“Omyson,areyounotobedienttome?”Heanswered:

“Certainly,Ofather.Ifyoudesiredtosacrificeme,Iwouldnot[tryto]preventyou

fromit.”SoAbrahamwenttohishomeandtookaknifeandrope.HesaidtoIsaac:

“Omyson,comewithmetothemountains!”

Whenthetwoofthemleft,theDevilapproachedSarahandsaidtoher:

“Abrahamhasresolvedtosacrificeyourson,Isaac!Catchupwithhimandstop

him!”Butsherecognizedhimandsaid:“Away,OcursedofGod!Theyhavesetout

topleasGod!”SohelefthercaughtupwithIsaac.Hesaidtohim:“Yourfatherwants

tosacrificeyou!”ButAbrahamsaidtohim:“Omyson,comeon.Donotpay

attentiontohim,forheisthedevil.”

Whentheyarrivedatthemountain,Abrahamsaid:“OMYSON,ISEEINA

VISIONTHATIWILLSACRIFICEYOU.”HESAID:“OMYFATHERDOASYOUARE

COMMANDED.IFGODWILLS,YOUWILLFINDMEMOSTSTEADFAST!”(Q.37:102).

Hesaid:“Ofather,ifyouwanttosacrificeme,takemyshirtoffmybacksothatmy

motherwillnotseeit[bloodied]andcryalongtimeoverme.Tieupmyshoulders

lestIsquirmbetweenyourhandsanditcauseyoupain.Whenyouplacetheknife

onmythroatturnyourfacefrommelestcompassionformeovercomeyouandyou

fail[tocarryoutyourtask].SeekhelpinGodforyourbereavementoverme.And

whenyoureturn[home],bringmyshirttomymothersothatshemayfindsome

comfortinitoverme.Givehergreetingsfromme,butdonottellherhowyou

52

slaughteredme,norhowyoutookoffmyshirt,norhowyouboundmeupwithrope

sothatshewillnotbesorrowfuloverme.Andwhenyouseeayoungboylikeme,

donotlookathim,sothatyourheartwillnotgrieveonmyaccount.”

Thevoicefromheavencalledhim:“OFriendofGod,howcanyounotbe

compassionateforthissmallchildwhospeakstoyouwithsuchwords?”Abraham

thoughtthatitwasthemountainwhospoketohim,sohesaid:“OMountain,God

hascommandedthisofme!Donotdistractmewithyourwords!”Abrahamthen

tookoffIsaac’sshirt,boundhimwiththerope,andsaid:“InthenameofGodthe

PowerfulandtheExcellent!”Heputtheknifeonhisthroat.Heraiseduphishand

[withtheknife]andbroughtitdownagain.Buttheknifeturnedoverandsaid:

“ThereisnomightnorpowersavewithGodtheMostHighandMagnificent!”He

sharpenedtheknifeonastoneuntilhemadeitashotasfire.Then,hereturnedto

Isaacwithit.Butitturnedover[again]andspokewithGod’spermission,saying:

“Donotblameme,OprophetofGod,forIhavebeencommandedtodothis!”Atthat,

Abrahamheardavoicecalling:“OABRAHAM,YOUHAVE[ALREADY]FULFILLED

THEVISION!(Q.37:105).AndGodsaid:ANDWEREDEEMEDHIMWITHA

MAGNIFICENTSACRIFICE(Q.37:107).Thatis,withamagnificentram.

Hewascalled:“OAbraham,takethisramandredeemyoursonwithit.

Sacrificeitasanoffering.Godhasmadethisdaya[holy]festivalforyouandyour

children.Theramsaid:“OFriendofGod,sacrificemeinsteadofyourson,forIam

moreappropriateforsacrificethanhe.IamtheramofAbel,sonofAdam,who

gamemeasanofferingtohisLordandwhoseofferingwasaccepted.Ihavegrazed

inthemeadowsoftheGardenforfortyautumns!”

53

AbrahampraisedhisLordfordeliveringIsaac.Hewenttountiehimfrom

[his]bonds,buthewasalreadyfree.Hesaid:“Omyson,whounitedyou?”He

answeredhim:“Theonewhobroughtthesacrificialram.”ThenAbrahamwentto

theramandsacrificedit.Awhitesmokelessfirefromheavencame,burnedupthe

ramandconsumeditsothattheonlythingthatremainedwasitshead.

Abrahamdepartedwiththeram’sheadandtoldSarahabout[allthat

happened].ShefelldownprostrateinthankstoGod.”94

94Firestone,Page,124‐126.

54

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