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CUPRINS

OlegBAZALUK,PlatosandIsocratesTraditionsintheDevelopmentofEducationalTheoriesintheHistoryofCulture 5

JordiMUND,Lockespropertyinhistoricalperspective:naturallawandtheshapingofmodernpoliticalcommonsense 19

AnaBAZAC,Themodernsubjectivityand itsquestions :remarksrelatedtoTiborSzabsLesujetetsamorale:essaisdephilosophiemoraleetpolitique,Szeged,2016 41

IonuRDUIC,ModernitateacaneuzeitlaHansBlumenberg 67

AdrianaNEACU,LacritiquedeSartresurleCogitoCartsien 73

GianluigiSEGALERBA,LasstunsdenWegeinerneuenOntologieeinschlagen!.1.Teil

91

CristinelTRANDAFIR,Obteistatnsateledevlmaeromneti.Unstudiudeistoriesocial

184

CtlinSTNCIULESCU,Argumenteprezumtive,vederedeziderativigndirecritic

201

Authors/Contributors 215

PlatosandIsocratesTraditionsintheDevelopmentofEducationalTheoriesintheHistoryofCulture

OlegBAZALUK1

Abstract:Thearticledealswiththephilosophicalanalysisof ideas,whichhaveinfluencedthedevelopmentofthetheoriesofeducationinthehistoryofculture.Thechosenstrategyhelpstheresearchernotonlytostructureinacertainwaygainedbytheempiricalandtheoreticalwayknowledgeinthesphereofeducationbutalsotousetheobtainedresultstocreateanewtheory. Due to received generalisations, the author systematised thediversityofthetheoriesofeducationinhistoriesofcultureaccordingtothetwo linesofdevelopment:Platoand Isocrates.Theauthorconcludes thatthe competition and complementarity that exist between the theories ofeducationofPlatosand Isocrates lines represent educationasamatrixthat formsacertaindirectionofselfrealizationofhumangenerations inthehistoryofculture.

Keywords:Greekculture,education,paideia,theoriesofeducation,Plato,Isocrates

1.Wewillfirstclarifyourterminology.Weconsidereducation

according to Platos views as the moulding in accordance with an ideal.Werner Jaeger, an authoritative researcher on education in AncientGreece,argued thatPlatowasperhaps thefirst touse thewordmould,, as the act.However, even before Plato, Protagoras viewededucationastheactofshapingthesoul,andthemeansbywhichitwascarriedoutasformativeforces(Jaeger,1946:314).

Whenconsideringthisquestion,IlsetrautHadotnotedthatPlatowas the first to study the possibility of the relationship betweenknowledge and virtue, and on its basis, he built an education system.Platos education system should ultimately lead to a real culture, to in the true sense of the word, that is, to the harmoniousdevelopmentoftheindividual,thepeakofwhichwastheacquisitionofwisdomasanartofliving(Hadot,2002:11).

Thus, thanks to theGreeks, theeducationbecomesaculture forthe first time: that is, it becomes a process by which the wholepersonalityismodelledonafixedpattern. 1PereyaslavKhmelnytskyiStatePedagogicalUniversity,Ukraine.

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2. We define our research strategy. We chose the strategy

proposedbyAlexanderLyubishchev in thebookLinesofDemocritusand Plato in the History of Culture as a basis (Lyubishchev, 2000).Following Lyubishchevs logic, we divided the entire volume ofinformationoneducation in thehistoryof culture into two lines:Platoand Isocrates. Lyubishchev preferred Platos line, because in it: ...thespiritofHellenicculturewasmostfullyexpressed(Lyubishchev,2000:110).InLyubishchevsview,theoriginalityofPlatos line inthehistoryofcultureconsistsinfourfeatures(Lyubishchev,2000:110):

1. The free creative theorization,whichdoesnotneglect experiencebutgivesitasupplementalmeaning.

2. The synthetic character of theorization: from the holisticconsiderationoftheresearchproblemtothesingleone.

3. Theabsenceofdogmatismaswellasthecultofpersonality,whichlimitthepossibilitiesofscience.

4. Rationalism, which is fundamentally different from scepticalrationalismoftheoppositeline.

Wedefinedmore exactlyLyubishchevs strategyby theknowledgegained from the recognised researchers of the history of education inAncient Greece: Werner Jaeger, HenriIrenee Marrou and IlsetrautHadot.1InordertoexplainLyubishchevsstrategy,wewerealsohelpedwiththeresearchworksofPierreHadot(Hadot,2005),EugeneAfonasin(Afonasinetal.,2016),LucBrisson (Brisson,2017), JohnDillon (Dillon,2017),PanosEliopoulos (Eliopoulos, 2015),MariaAntonietta Salamone(Salamone,2017),ViacheslavMeshkov(Meshkov,2016)andothers.

Weshallreveal themainmeaningand featuresof the linesofPlatoandIsocratesinthedevelopmentofeducationaltheoriesinthehistoryofculture.

3.WernerJaeger,HenriIreneeMarrou,andothersassertthatallthe

theoriesofeducationinAncientGreecetaketheiroriginfromHomerseducation ( ).2 In The Republic, Plato wrote thefollowing:whenyoumeetencomiastsofHomerwhotellusthatthispoet has been the educator of Hellas, and that for the conduct and

1(Jaeger,1946;Jaeger,1947;Marrou,1998;Hadot,2002).2(Jaeger,1946;Marrou,1998:29).

AnaleleUniversitiidinCraiova.SeriaFilosofie40(2/2017) | 7

refinementofhuman lifehe isworthyofour studyanddevotion,andthatwe should order our entire lives by the guidance of thispoetwemustloveandsalutethem(Republic:10.606e).

TheHomericepicseducationalsignificanceliesinthefactthattherewas a formulatedmoral ideal, towhich theGreeks inmost followedthroughout thehistoryofAncientGreece.Marrouformulatedthis idealinonephrase:itwasaheroicmoralityofhonour (Marrou,1998:30).JustastheMiddleAgesbequeathedustheimitationofChristatitsend,sotheGreekMiddleAgesconveyedTheImitationofaHerotoClassicalGreecethroughHomer(Marrou,1998:33).

The Greeks called a moral ideal in one word kalokagathia(),thatis,theexistenceofbeautyandvalourinman.Inthewordcombinationkalokagathia(),theconceptofkalos()meansbeautiful, it isnotbychance that itcomes first.Foralong time, it showed theprioritypurpose of education to eachGreek,that is,theachievementofphysicalbeautywithasortoferoticaura.1Thesecondplaceinthiswordcombinationtakestheconceptofagathos() that means good or valorous, valour () in theknightly sense, highlighting the moral purpose of education. To beworthy of the glory of the Gods, the glorification in the epic, theperpetuationinthememoryofdescendants,thatwasamoralidealoftheGreeks.

Generalizing the information and somewhat exaggerating theconclusions,wenotethatthesplitofHomerseducationaccordingtothe linesofPlato and Isocratesbegan from Socrates and the Sophists.2Socratessawineducation,firstofall,thepossibilityoffindingthetruthandachievingmoralideals.3Inturn,theSophistsbelievedthateducation

1 JaegerandMarrouwroteabout itreasonablywell (Jaeger,1946; Jaeger,1947;Marrou,1998).2 AsWerner Jaegers, HenriIreneeMarrous, and Ilsetraut Hadots researchshowed, these lines and, accordingly, the theories of education not onlyconfrontedeachotherbutalsoquiteoftencombined,mutuallyopposingothereducationalpractices(Jaeger,1947;Marrou,1998;Hadot,2002).3Inordertobemoreprecise,thentheeducationforSocrateswas,firstofall,aconcern for the perfection of the soul.Platowrote about it in the Apology(Plato,1990:29d30b).Werner Jaeger, revealingaSocratichierarchyofvalues,andwithit,new,dearlygraduatedtheoryofgoods,wrotethatspiritualgoods

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should pursue more utilitarian purposes, filling the basic needs ofsociety. For example, it should prepare leaders, experts, striving toachievethesetgoalsatallcosts.1

The split in Homers education, namely, in the part agathos(), in theunderstandingof themoral ideal, valour, that is intwolinesofdevelopmentthatoccurredaroundthe6thcenturyBC,ledtothetwomajoreventsinthehistoryofeducation(andalsothecultureingeneral!). Firstly, there was a change of emphasis in the wordkalokagathia in theunderstandingof theGreeks,andasa result, thespiritual upbringing becamemore important than physical education.HowaccuratelythistransitionwasmarkedbyMarrou:inhistoryoftheGreeksthecultureofwarriorswas replacedby thecultureofscribes(Marrou, 1998). Secondly, rivalry occurred between two traditions,schoolsofeducation,which,inouropinion,continuestothisday.Attheoriginsofthefirstphilosophicaltradition,therewasPlato;attheoriginsofthesecondrhetoricaltradition,therewasIsocrates.

4. Socrates never spoke of paideia, considering this term as

discredited by the educational practices of his time, above all, theprofessional training given by the Sophists.2 However, the ideas ofSocratesandhislifestyleplayedacrucialroleinthenewunderstandingofpaideia.Forexample, intheApologyPlatorepresentedSocratesastheembodimentof courageandgreatnessof spirit (Plato,1990); in thePhaedo,hedescribedthedeathofSocrates,asanexampleofhisheroiccontemptof life (Plato,1993).3For the followersofSocrates, for those

take the highest place, physical goods below them, and external goods likepropertyandpowerinthelowestplace(Jaeger,1947:39).1Jaegercametothefollowingconclusion:Fromitsfirstappearance,therefore,theaimoftheeducationalmovementledbythesophistswasnottoeducatethepeoplebuttoeducatetheleadersofthepeople(Jaeger,1946:290).2(Jaeger,1947:59).Inthenotestothesecondvolume,JaegerwrotethatSocratesby introducingnew terminology tried to isolatehimself from theSophists.Forexample, the association of teacher and pupil, conversation = teaching(), school= leisure ()andpastime= lecture ().Laterthesewordswere borrowed by professional teachers. Thus, the educationaltechniquesocarefullydevelopedbytheSophistsconqueredthepersonalityandspiritwhichwerethebasisofSocratesteaching(Jaeger,1947:380).3ThisquestionwasconsideredbyJaeger(Jaeger,1947:76).


wholaidthefoundationofPlatoslineinthedevelopmentofthetheoriesof education, paideia became the sumtotal of all thatwas his hisinnerlife,hisspiritualbeing,hisculture.Inthestruggleofmantoretainhissouls liberty inaworldfullofthreateningelementalforces,paideiabecametheunshakablenucleusofresistance(Jaeger,1947:70).

Socratescalledtotakecareofonessoul,ratherthanconcentratedonachievingearthlygoods.Thecareof thesoul in theunderstandingofSocratesisthenecessityoftakingthoughtforwisdomandtruthandtheperfection of ones soul (Plato, 1990: 29e). For the rationalizedworldview of the Greeks, the way to genuine life based on spiritualvalues, spiritual selfimprovement is a completely new space of selfrealization.

However,asthegreatGoethesaid:InthebeginningwastheDeed!JaegershowedhowdeeplyPlatoandSocratesotherpupilswerestruckwithaconsciouschoiceofdeathoverlifebytheirTeacher(Jaeger,1947).Withoutsacrificinghisideals,havingdrunkabowlofpoisononhisownfreewill, Socratesproved the strength of spiritualvalues, ofwhichheregularly spoke and, accordingly, the domination of the soul over thebody.ItisnotfornothingthatinthehistoryofculturethelifeanddeathofSocratesarecloselyinterwovenwiththelifeanddeathofJesusChrist.Thefirstwasakindofthemoralpatternforthesecond.

Pierre Hadot believes that by his choice, Socrates asserted thatphilosophy is, in essence, away of life (Hadot, 2005).The fundamentaldifference between sophists and philosophers was that the first onespreached themagic ofwords, aimed atmasteringdispute and speechskills,andthelatterconsideredphilosophyasalifechoice,asthenecessityof selftransformation. In view of this, Platowrote his dialogues not toinform,but to form tomould inaccordancewith the lifeanddeathofSocrates, as the ideal of the life and death of the true philosopher.Socrateslifechoiceallowedustoconsiderthephilosophynotonlyasaconscious choice of a certain mode of life as the fundamentalphilosophicalchoice,1butalsoastheartofdeath.1

1On this subject,PierreHadothaswritten: Generally speaking, Ipersonallytend toconceiveof the fundamentalphilosophicalchoice,andhence theefforttowardwisdom,asthetranscendingofthepartial,biased,egocentric,egoistself,in order to attain the level of a higher self. This self sees all things from a

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In theeraofPlato, thephilosophical traditionwasdistinguishedbythreemain features (Hadot, 2005): a) the concern to exercise politicalinfluence,butaccordingtothenormsoftheplatonicideal;b)theSocratictradition,i.e.thewilltodiscuss,providetraininginaccordancewiththequestions and answersmethod; and c) themost important thing inPlatonism is intellectualism, i.e. the separation of soul and body, thetraditionof the liberationofsoul frombody.Neoplatonistsconsider thistraditionat the levelofunderstandinga lifeasa lifeof thoughts,a lifethrough reason, spirit, or according to Hadots terminology in auniversal perspective.2 For example, according to Plotinus the soulmust rise from its individual level to the levelof theUniversalSouloreven the Divine Intelligence, inwhich thewhole ideal system of theUniverseislocated(Hadot,2005:211).

5. Platowas able not only to convey the basic ideas of Socrates

about the soul, the necessity of taking care of the soul, phronesis() thatwasSocraticaspirationtoknowthegood,etc.,butalsoon theirbasis todevelopholistic theoryof education, inaccordance towhich,uptothepresenttime,thehumangenerationshavebeenformed.IfSocrateshadsaidthatknowledgeofthegoodwasmansgoalandhisstandard,thenPlatosoughttofindthewaytothisgoal,byaskingwhatwas thenatureofknowledge.3Hence, thehighesteducationalvalueofthetheoriesofeducationaccordingtoPlatoslineisthestrivingfortruththroughrationalcognitionandthepossessionoftrueknowledge.HereiswhatPlatowroteaboutthisinthedialogueHippiasMajor(Plato,1990:298b):

Hippias: Perhaps, Socrates, these things might slip past the manunnoticed.Socrates:No,bydog,HippiasnotpastthemanbeforewhomIshouldbemostashamedoftalkingnonsense.

perspectiveofuniversalityand totality,becomingawareof itselfaspartof thecosmosandencompassing,then,thetotalityofthings(Hadot,2005:139).1SocrateswordsinPhaedo:Otherpeoplearelikelynottobeawarethatthosewhopursuephilosophyarightstudynothingbutdyingandbeingdead(Plato,1993:64a).2See[Hadot,2005].3See[Jaeger,1947:85].


Hippias:Whatmanisthat?Socrates:Socrates,thesonofSophroniscus,whowouldnomorepermitmetosaythesethingscarelesslywithoutinvestigationthantosaythatIknowwhatIdonotknow.

In the seventh book TheRepublic, the famousmyth of the caveprovestheunderstandingofknowledgeasaliberatingforcethatrelievesthe soul from ignorance (Plato, 1994). In thedialogue Gorgias,Platocalledignorancetheworstofevils(Plato,1990:527e).Platorestoredthelost unity of knowledge and life, thereby giving the opportunity ofacquiring the knowledge of absolute values to which Socrates hadaspired.Platobelievedthatbecamepossibleonlythankstoaphilosophy,which, inhisunderstanding,was thehighest formofeducation.1Platowrotethatthewaytoobtaintrueknowledgewasalongdetour.

Only those who are fifty years old, who have survived the tests andapproved themselves altogether the best in every task and form ofknowledgemustbebroughtatlasttothegoal.Weshallrequirethemtoturnupwardsthevisionoftheirsoulsandfixtheirgazeonthatwhichshedslightonall,andwhentheyhavethusbeheldthegooditselftheyshalluseitasapattern for the rightorderingof the stateand the citizensand themselvesthroughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn, devoting thegreater part of their time to the study of philosophy, butwhen the turncomesforeach,toiling intheserviceofthestateandholdingofficeforthecitys sake, regarding the tasknot as a fine thingbut anecessity; and so,when each generation has educated others like themselves to take theirplaceasguardiansofthestate,theyshalldeparttotheIslandsoftheBlestand there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials andsacrificesforthemastodivinitiesifthePythianoracleapprovesor,ifnot,astodivineandgodlikemen(Plato,1994:7.540bc).

A philosopher, in the understanding of Plato, possesses a moreprofoundknowledgeof the trulyvaluable things in life thanothersdo.Thatiswhy,accordingtoPlato,onlythephilosophersarethebearersofthekaloskagathos.2InPlatostheoryofeducation,thephilosopherisanewidealofman,apatternfordeliberatelymoldinghumancharacter.

Aristotle(adiscipleofPlato)madean importantcontribution to thedevelopmentof thePlatonic tradition ineducation(Aristotle,1983).We

1WernerJaegerwroteatlengthaboutit(Jaeger,1947:8586).2(Jaeger,1947:268).

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note the contrast thatAristotle introducedbetween science ()andeducation (),whichmostGreeksunderstoodwhatwenowcall the general culture. In the concept ofAristotles general cultureOnly a philosopher can truly know anything, because he has aknowledge of higher principles; andwhoever did not study the firstphilosophy, he would forever remain only educated(),evenifhiseducationisuniversal(Hadot,2002:20).

Considering Aristotles contribution to the development of thePlatonic tradition, John Sellars showed that despite Socrates (andtherefore Plato) and Aristotle were committed to the pursuit ofknowledge,betweentheirphilosophiesasawayoflife,therewasaclearmetaphilosophicaldivision,which led to the formationof the scientificand humanistic conceptions of philosophy in the history of culture(Sellars, 2017). Socrates pursued knowledge in order to live aphilosophical life,whileAristotle lived a philosophical life in order topursueknowledge.This importantdifference led to the fact thatalongwith Socrates humanistic image of philosophy,whichwas concernedwithwhat itmeant to be human and how to live a good human life,Aristotles scientific image of philosophy emerged, providing adisinterestedpursuitofknowledgeforitsownsake.1

6.ItmustberecognizedthatPlatoandhisunderstandingofpaideia

asanewwayoflife,whichwasorientedtowardsnewvaluesandideals,set a bar too high for his epoch. According to HenriIreneeMarrou,preciselybecauseofPlatoshighdemandsforeducation,theeducatorsoftheGreeksinthe4thcentury,andafterit,theentireHellenisticandlater

1 JohnSellars literallysaid the following:Itseems, then, thatwehaveaclearmetaphilosophicaldivisionbetweenSocratesandAristotle.Botharecommittedto thepursuitofknowledgeandbothofferan imageofan ideal life involvingthepursuitofknowledge,butnevertheless there isacleardifferencewhenweturntotheirultimatemotivations.Socratespursuesknowledgeinordertoliveaphilosophical life,whileAristotle lives aphilosophical life inorder topursueknowledge. This is a subtle but, I think, important difference. It is also thedifference between what I earlier called the scientific and humanisticconceptions of philosophy. Aristotles scientific image of philosophy is adisinterestedpursuitofknowledgeforitsownsake;Socrateshumanisticimageofphilosophy isconcernedwithwhatitmeanstobehumanandhowtoliveagoodhumanlife(Sellars,2017:8).


Romanworlds,up to themodernWesternEuropean typeofeducation,becamenumerous followersof IsocratesTheoryofEducation (Marrou,1998).

IsocratesfoundedhisschoolinAthensin393BC,andPlatofoundedthe Academymuch later, between 387 and 361 BC. Isocrates schooloperated for half a century, and despite the fact that Isocrates alwaysbelieved that hewas teaching philosophy, in fact, itwas a rhetoricalschool. Inhis treatise Antidosis,whichhewrote at age 82, Isocratescame to the following conclusions: ...when anyone elects to speak orwritediscourseswhichareworthyofpraiseandhonor,whicharegreat and honorable,devoted to thewelfare ofman and our commongood, hewill feel their influencenot only in thepreparation of agivendiscoursebutinalltheactionsofhislife.Itfollows,then,thatthepower to speak well and think right will reward the man whoapproachestheartofdiscoursewithloveofwisdomandloveofhonor(Isocrates,1980:15276277).

IfPlatoseducationwasaimedatobtainingtruethroughpossessinggenuine knowledge,1 then Isocrates education led up to a cult of theLogos: the understanding of the basics of eloquence, grammar andspeechstyles.InthebasisofIsocrateseducation,thedemandwasbasedonthehighercultureoftheSophists,whowerereadytoteachvirtuesformoney.2According toPlatosProtagoras,despite the fact that theSophists recognized the significant role ofknowledge, theirmoral andpoliticaleducationofpeoplewasnotbasedon it(Plato,1990).Isocratesplacedgreatestvalueontheeducationalpractice,trainingofsoughtafterintellectuals in Greek society, that is, eloquent, talkative and welleducatedpeople,whopossessedadevelopedaesthetictasteandskillsofcreativeselfexpression.3

In Republic, Plato confessed that inmost cases, the knowledgesought by the philosopherwas not in demand in real life, therefore, 1 IlsetrautHadotwrote:...forPlato, thatwasnotaboutgeometry,arithmetic,astronomy and music in a practical sense, but rather about theology andphilosophyofnumber, figure, soundandmotionsof celestialbodies (Hadot,2002:10).2Platowritesaboutit,forexample,intheApology(Plato,1990:19e20a)andProtagoras(Plato,1990).3This question is expounded indetail in the books ofWerner Jaeger,HenriIreneeMarrouandIlsetrautHadot(Jaeger,1947;Marrou,1998;Hadot,2002).

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avoidingridiculeandmisunderstanding,thephilosopherwasforcedtokeephiseyesfixedontheconstitutioninhissoul(Plato,1994:9.591e).

Isocratesmodelofeducationescapedtheproblemofalienationandimperception of the methods of the Platonic tradition in educationbecause his training prepared pupils not for future, but for dailydemand.Isocratesdidnotrequirestudentstomakeachoiceofawayoflifeandtoconcentrateonachievingethicalgoals.Isocrates,incontrasttoPlato, preferred to give the basic knowledge to his pupils that weresoughtafter in the society. Isocrates model of education prepared apupilofthegeneralculture,whocouldadapt toanychanges insocietyand be realized in any field of activity: politics, art, and spheres ofproduction. Isocrates prepared his pupils for real political activity, forsolving specific types ofproblems. Isocrates believed that itwasmoreuseful forpupils toobtain trueknowledgeof thepressingproblemsofthe society than to go into unnecessary subtleties, seeking accurateknowledge in completelyuselessquestions.Thedaily life requirednotnew stunning ideas, but rather, tested common sense, the source ofwhichwasa tradition.Therefore,Isocratesadapted to therequirementsof society and sought to develop the ability to make faster, moreinformeddecisions; theability toassessand resolvedifficultsituations;respond correctly to events that determine public opinion; etc. in hispupils[Isocrates,1980].

Wecanseefromthehistoryofculture,thephilosophicaltraditionineducation,whichwasfocusedonachievinghighidealsbyobtainingtrueknowledge that eventually prepared an insignificant percentage ofintellectualsthinkers, hermits, which were not always understood bycontemporaries.However, the rhetorical tradition in education,whichwas limited to a standard set of knowledge and its unification, theformationofageneralcultureandcommunicationskills,asitturnedout,laid the foundations of intercultural dialogue, that is, the culture ofhumanism. The ideal of the Isocrates education was the knowledgeaccessible to all, the general culture, the space of the Logos, whichensured the unity of humanity.1 That is why classical humanism is

1 Werner Jaeger wrote that the Greeks used the Logos () as aformative force in education, and by it to shape the livingman as thepottermouldsclayandthesculptorcarvesstoneintopreconceivedformthatwasa


primarily concernedwith the development of aesthetic perception; artandliteraryeducation.AsMarrounoted,intermsofutilitytothesociety,IsocratesdefeatedPlatointheeyesofposterity(Marrou,1998:313).

7.Thus,inclassicalGreekeducationaimedattheformationoffree

personalities,whowereawareoftheircapabilities,needs,andrights,thetwoprincipalcompetingtraditionswereformedineducation:PlatoandIsocrates.Overthepast2,000yearsofthedevelopmentofthehistoryofculture,thesetraditionswereenrichedbyahugevarietyofempiricalandtheoretical knowledge. Referring to the previous research works ofAlexander Lyubishchev, Werner Jaeger, Pierre Hadot, HenriIreneeMarrou,IlsetrautHadot,HarryAustrynWolfson,VladimirPlatonovandothers,aswellastheresultsofouranalysisoftheproblem,weformulatethemain featuresof the theoriesofeducationaccording to the linesofPlatoandIsocrates.

Fromourpointofview,themainfeaturesofthetheoriesofeducationaccordingtoPlatoslineare:

1. Therelationshipbetweenthetheoriesofeducationandthetheories(concepts)oftheUniverse.Inthetheoriesofeducationaccordingto Platos line, the basis of the philosophy of knowledgedeterminethefeaturesthatformnewgenerations.1

2. The theories of education according to Platos line are based ongenuine,scientificandphilosophicalknowledgeofmansplaceatthe scalesof theEarthand theUniverse.Theyare inaconstantsearchof theanswer to thequestion:What ismanandwhat isthemeaningofhisbeingatthescaleoftheUniverse?2

3. The theories of education according to Platos line formulate anunderstandingofmansimage;whatkindofmanheshouldbeinthemeaningof , that is, adesired (or ideal) image.They

bold thatwasabold creative ideawhich couldhavebeendevelopedonlybythatnationofartistsandphilosophers(Jaeger,1946:xxii).1From thewritten sources thathave survived toourgenerations, thatwas inPlatosworks, for the first time the connectionbetween thepeculiarityof theworld knowledge and the understanding of education was traced. Platospedagogicalviewscannotbeunderstoodbeyondhisepistemology.2Thedominance ofAristotles scientific image of philosophy that provides adisinterestedpursuitofknowledgeforitsownsake,JohnSellarsdescribedinhiswork(Sellars,2017).

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generateaculturalidealasaformativeprincipleandthehighestprinciple of morality (the categorical imperative in theterminology of ImmanuelKant), for the achievement ofwhichmanandsocietyaredirected.1

Ingeneral, the theoriesof educationaccording toPlatos line shouldbeadirect consequence (or a particular case) of the theories of theUniverse andestablishasystemofviewsandevaluationstowardsmansplaceatthescalesoftheEarthandtheCosmos.Theymustdeterminethefeaturesofworldviewofhumangenerationsandthelifestyleinaccordancewiththedeclaredidealnorm.

Isocratestheoriesofeducationinourunderstandingare,firstofall,avarietyofeducationalpractices,whichareaimedatthefulldevelopmentoftheinternalpotentialsofman,thetrainingofhighlyqualifiedpersonnelthat satisfies the needs of complicating sociocultural environment andtheproductionsphere.

Tosomeextent,thetheoriesofeducationaccordingtoIsocrateslineadapt the worldview sets of the theories of Platos line as a specialeducational rationality2 to the conditions of everyday existence. Ideally,theirmaingoalistomobilizehumangenerationstorealizethemeaningsof human presence on the Earth and in theUniverse, defined by thetheoriesofeducationaccordingtoPlatosline.

Fromourpointofview, the competitionand complementarity thatarebetween the theoriesofeducationof the linesofPlatoandIsocratesrepresenteducationasamatrixformingacertaindirectionofselfrealizationofhumangenerationsinontogenesisinthehistoryofculture.Thetheoriesofeducationaccording toPlatos lineestablish the idealof themoulding,and answer the question: Whom should we educate in the risinggenerations?The theories of education according to Isocrates line bydailyeducationalpracticesensure theachievementof thedefined ideal,i.e.morefocusedonfindingtheanswerstothequestionHowshouldweeducatetherisinggenerations?

1 In thebookWhat isAncientPhilosophy?PierreHadotshowed thatall thephilosophers,which founded theirschools:Plato,Aristotle,Epicurus,Plotinus,etc.,formedacertainwayoflife,withthemeaningofthedesiredideal.In the Platonic tradition, philosophy is a way of life, and education is adeliberatelymoldinghumancharacter inaccordancewithan idealofacertainwayoflife.2IntheunderstandingofVladimirPlatonov(Platonov,2013).


REFERENCES

AFONASIN, E, AFONASINA, A., SCHETNIKOV, A. (2016) Ancient Cosmos.EssaysonAstronomyandCosmologyinAntiquity.St.Petersburg:RHGA.

ARISTOTLE.(19761983)CollectedWorksinFourVolumes.Moscow:Mysl.BAZALUK, O. (2017) The Strategies of Systematization of the Theories of

Education.TheMainMeaningandFeaturesoftheTheoriesofEducationofPlatosandIsocratesLines.InFutureHumanImage.Volume7:1127.

BRISSON, L. (2017) Family, Political Power and Money in the NeoplatonicSchoolofAthens.In(Schole),11.2:333340.

DILLON, J. (2017). Paideia Platonik:Does the Later Platonist Programme ofEducationRetainanyValidityToday?In(Schole),11.2:321332.

ELIOPOULOS,P.(2015)EpicurusandLucretiusontheCreationoftheCosmos.InPhilosophyandCosmology.Volume14,2015:249255.

HADOT,I.(2002)LiberalArtsandPhilosophyinAncientThought.Moscow:GrecoLatinCabinetbyYu.A.Shichalina.

HADOT,P. (2005)Philosophy as aWay ofLife:Conversationswith JeannieCarlierand Arnold I. Davidson. Trans. V. A. Vorobyov. Moscow, St.Petersburg:Stepnoyveter;KoloPubl.

ISOCRATES. (1980)Antidosis. In Isocrates with an English Translation in threevolumes, by George Norlin. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press;London,WilliamHeinemannLtd.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Isoc.%2015JAEGER,W. (1946)Paideia:The IdealsofGreekCulture:Volume I:ArchaicGreece:The Mind of Athens. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.https://archive.org/stream/wernerjaegerpaideiatheidealsofgreekculturevol1#page/n1/mode/2up

JAEGER,W.(1947)Paideia:TheIdealsofGreekCulture:VolumeII:InSearchoftheDivine Centre. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. https://archive.org/stream/wernerjaegerpaideiatheidealsofgreekculturevol2#page/n1/mode/2up

LYUBISHCHEV,A.(2000)LinesofDemocritusandPlato intheHistoryofCulture.St.Petersburg:Aletheia.

MARROU, H.I. (1998) History of Education in Antiquity (Greece). Moscow:GrecoLatincabinetYu.A.Shichalina.

MESHKOV, V. (2016) The Methodological Analysis of the Platos DoctrineAbout Space and the Person in Dialogue Timaeus. In Philosophy andCosmology.Volume17,2016:200209.

PLATO.(19901994)CollectedWorksinFourVolumes.Moscow:Mysl.PLATONOV, V. (2013) Education as a Sociocultural System: theMethodologicalProblems of the Theory andHistory of Education.Moscow: Russianword uchebnik.

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SALAMONE,M.A.(2017)EqualityandJusticeinEarlyGreekCosmologies:TheParadigmoftheLineoftheHorizon.InPhilosophyandCosmology.Volume18,2017:2231.

SELLARS,J.(2017)WhatisPhilosophyasaWayofLife?InParrhesia:AJournalofCriticalPhilosophy,inpress.

https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/files/28691384/What_is_PWL_Preprint.pdf

Lockespropertyinhistoricalperspective:naturallawandtheshapingofmodernpoliticalcommonsense

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Abstract: The conceptual and theoretical change in nineteenth centurypoliticalphilosophyentailedadeeprecategorizationofinheritedtraditionsofthought that moulded modern political common sense, making ourintellectual past to some extent either invisible or incomprehensible. Thisrecategorization led to what might be called a new interpretiveconjuncture.Inthisregard,itisimportanttonotethatintwentiethcenturypoliticalphilosophythedominantframeworkforunderstandingthepastwasaliberalone.Thisworkwillexploresomeoftheconceptualandphilosophicalconsequences of this issue by considering somemisunderstandings of theworkofJohnLocke.ItisarguedthatsomeofLockescharacteristicideas,suchas property, were rooted, among others, in a longstanding tradition ofnatural law thought, even thoughwe now often encounter these ideas indistortedforms.

Keywords: property, natural law, common sense, sovereignty, Locke,liberalism.

I.Introduction2

Oneof thekeyproblems facedwhenstudyingphilosophicalandpoliticaltraditionsconcernstheverisimilitudeofinheritedinterpretations.Attimes,thereareclear indications that the identificationofacertain traditionwasthe result of a fallacious interpretation or historical and analytical bias,although thismaynotprevent it fromgaining academic acceptance.Theradicalconceptualshiftinnineteenthcenturypoliticalphilosophyentaileda deep recategorization of inherited traditions of thought, making ourintellectualpast to someextenteither invisibleor incomprehensible.Thisrecategorization led to what might be called a new interpretiveconjuncture.3 More importantly, and surprisingly, this interpretive

1UniversityofBarcelona,Spain.2Thisworkhasbeenpossible thanks to the supportprovided through researchprojectFFI201563707P(MINECOandFEDER).3Theterminterpretiveconjuncture isborrowedfromDesan(2004,10).Wecallinterpretiveconjuncturesthosesituationsinwhichseveralfieldsofstudythatareseparated by the dynamics of academic division of labormerge into a certain

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conjuncturehasendedup formingpartof thephilosophicalandpoliticalcommonsenseofourday.This, then, isan issue thatshouldcommandour attention. Indeed, it is important to note that in twentiethcenturypoliticalphilosophy thedominant framework forunderstanding thepastwasaliberalone.SophiaRosenfeldarguesthat:

In the standard liberal account, the triumphofreason,bornof theReformationandthentheScientificRevolutionandheavilynurturedintheeighteenthcentury,playsthecrucialroleintheinventionofmodernrightsbearing individualand the liberal constitutionalismonwhichdemocraticpoliticswaseventuallyconstructed.1

Historically,when extended into political sphere in the seventeenthand eighteenth centuries, common sense provided a platform for achallengetotheexistingpoliticalorderintermsofpeopleandideasalike.Italso led to the reformulation of the political domain. Indeed, reflectsRosenfeld, in the context of profound challenges to notions of bothrepresentation and regulation, this newway of thinking about thinkingwould cease to be simply one idea circulating amongmany andwouldbecomeabsorbed into therealmwestillcallcommonsense.2Weowe tothe famous textofThomasPaine the associationbetween common senseand republican governance, which represents a determining link tounderstand the foundationsof themodernworld.3However,across timethat common sense has been shaped by new contributions that haveundermined its original meaning and make that republicanbased pastpartlyinvisible.

This work explores some of the conceptual and philosophicalconsequencesofthisissuebyconsideringcertainmisunderstandingsoftheworkof JohnLocke. Itwillbeargued that someofLockes characteristic perspective; besides, very different and even politicallyideologically opposingstandsmeet in such a perspective; and despite of the fact that this perspectiveoffers a misleading historical account of the subject, it stands and remains,benefited as it is from the diversity of forms of support it. In a broad sense,constitutesaformofepistemicauthority(Herzog2000,532).Herethefocuswillbeonaninterpretiveconjuncturethatappearinthefieldofthehistoryofpoliticalphilosophy.1 Sophia Rosenfeld (2011), Common Sense. A Political History, Harvard, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,5.2Ibidem.3ThomasPaine(1776),CommonSense,Philadelphia:R.Bell.


ideas, such as property, selfownership and sovereignty,were rooted in,among others, a longstanding tradition of natural law thought, eventhoughwe now often encounter these ideas in distorted or exaggeratedforms. A reassessment of Lockes political thought is thus not only areinterpretationofastrandof liberalismbutalsoof theperspectivemanyliberalsandtheircriticsunderstandtheformationofthemodernworld.II.Aliberalinterpretiveconjuncture

ThewayinwhichLockesworkhasbeenconsideredoverthelast150yearsneedstobereappraised.TheliteraturediscussingLockesideasdatesbacktothebeginningoftheeighteenthcentury,withtheobservationsmadebyBolingbroke,Mandeville,Rousseau,Smith,andJamesandJohnStuartMill,whoareamongthemostwellknown.TheseauthorsoffervariouscritiquesofLockeswork,althoughtheytendtodosowithoutsituatinghisideasintheir historical context; indeed, it often seems that the purpose of thesecritiqueswas tohighlightaproblemofconcern in therespectiveauthorsownintellectualdevelopment.AsformoderncriticaltextsonLocke,thesehavelittletodowiththetheoreticalapproachesoftheeighteenthcentury.Rather,theiroriginscanbetracedbacktotheendofthenineteenthcenturyandtotheattemptsthatweremadetodefineanddevelopacoherentglobalhistoryofpoliticalthought. InfluentialauthorssuchasLeslieStephenwereespeciallykeentoreadLocke in terms of the history of liberal thought, in line with how, inStephens view, the latter haddeveloped inEngland in the seventeenth,eighteenthandfirsthalfofthenineteenthcenturies.1FromthisperspectivetheTwoTreatises formedpartofabroader intellectualmovement that,ontheonehand,soughttolegitimizetherevolutionarysettlementof1688and,on theother, laid the foundations forsignificantpoliticalapproaches thatwould be subsequently developed by Enlightenment thinkers, includingrationalism,utilitarianismandempiricism. During the firsthalfof the twentiethcentury thiswayof interpretingLockeswork continued through thewritings of authors such asLarkin,Sabine, Lamprecht and Laski.2 This secondary literature is founded on 1 Cf. Leslie Stephen (1876),History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,London:Smith,Elder&Co.2Cf.PascalLarkin(1930),PropertyintheEighteenthCentury.WithSpecialReferencetoEnglandandLocke,Dublin/NewYork:CorkUniversityPress;G.H.Sabine(1937),A

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three basic assumptions. First, itwas assumed that enoughwas alreadyknown about who Locke was and why he wrote the Two Treatises.According to this view, Locke was a conservative who wrote the TwoTreatises toprovidephilosophical justification for the 1688Revolution. IntheprocesshearticulatedaglobalconceptionofanemergingcommercialsocietyinEngland,aswellasofitstriumphantWhigoligarchy.1Secondly,itwascommonlysupposed that thebestwayofreading theTwoTreatiseswas to conduct adetailed critical reading ofLockespolitical thought inlight of his other works, particularly his philosophical and religiouswritings.Thus, a correctunderstanding ofhisworkwould come from acareful reading and analysis of the texts themselves. Finally, the TwoTreatiseswere generally seen aspart of a great liberal traditionwhoseoriginswere tobe found in theseventeenthcenturystrugglesagainst theStuart monarchy, the crystallization of which contributed to thedevelopment of commercial and industrial capitalism in the eighteenth,nineteenthandbeginningofthetwentiethcenturies.Thus,theTwoTreatiseswere regarded as one of the defining elements of the canon of a liberaltraditionthatcouldbetracedbacktoThomasHobbesandforwardnotonlytoAdamSmithandtoJamesandJohnStuartMillinBritain,butalsototheFederalist Papers and Thomas Jefferson. In summary, Lockes political

HistoryofPoliticalTheory,London:GeorgeG.Harrap&Co.;SterlingP.Lamprecht(1955), Our Philosophical Traditions: A Brief History of Philosophy in WesternCivilization,NewYork:AppletonCenturyCrofts;andHarold J.Laski (1936),TheRise of European Liberalism: An Essay in Interpretation, London: George Allen &UnwinLtd.1TheresearchofLaslettcontributedtoquestionthissortofhistoricalaccount.Cf.Peter Laslett (1956), The English Revolution and John Lockes Two Treatises ofGovernment, Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. 12, 4055. As Charles D. Tarlton(1985,279)rightlysaid:WhenwebelievedthatLockehadwrittenTwotreatisesofgovernmentto justifytheGloriousRevolution,wecouldsayagreatdealabouthispurposes in relation to theeventsof168889.Thebook served to interpret thoseevents,todisclosetheirunderlyingmeaning;philosophyandactionwerejoinedinsuchamannerthatbothgainedlustrefromthelink.But,nowwehavegenerallyacceptedtheviewthatLockeactuallywroteTwotreatisesinthepartisanheatoftheExclusiondebate,andwehavestoppedsayingverymuchofanythingabout thebooks relation to William III and the events of the year in which Lockeanonymouslypublishedit.


theorywas the formal apology ofWhiggism,1 as the theorist of theRevolution(1689)...hadthecommonsenseofhisgenerationonhisside,2and defined the essential outlines of liberal doctrine for nearly twocenturies.3InhisReligionandtheRiseofCapitalism(1926),R.H.Tawneyalsoargued that Lockemerely poured into a philosophicalmould ideas ...whichwerealreadythecommonplaceideasoftheWhigs.4 Nolessimportantintheconsolidationofthisinterpretiveconjuncturewere the midtwentieth century contributions of Strauss, Wolin and,particularly, Macpherson.5 While emphasizing different aspects, theseauthorseachhelpedtoreinforcetheliberalinterpretationofLockeswork.6Of all these contributions the neoMarxist approach ofMacpherson is ofparticular interest, all themore so as it continues to be an indisputablereference for those who incline toward the liberal interpretation ofLockespoliticalthought.InhiswellknownbookonthepoliticaltheoryofpossessiveindividualismMacphersontakesuptheinterpretationmadebyLeslie Stephen in the nineteenth century, but he goesmuch further.Hisbasic idea is that seventeenthcentury England saw the emergence of amarket society which, in turn, gave rise to what he terms possessiveindividualism,whereby individuals become theproprietors of their ownpersons and ofwhat theyproduce, andwill act so as tomaximize theirpersonalprofit.TheidiosyncrasyofMacphersonsinterpretationstemsalsofrom the fact that the author uses the same interpretive mould tocharacterize thework and intentions ofwriters asdissimilar toLocke asHobbes,theLevellers,Harrington,Hume,Burke,BenthamandJamesMill.

1Stephen,HistoryofEnglishThoughtintheEighteenthCentury,vol.2,135.2Harold J.Laski (1920),PoliticalThought inEngland from Locke toBentham,NewYork:HenryHoltandCompany,29.3Laski,TheRiseofEuropeanLiberalism,90.4RichardH.Tawney(1954),ReligionandtheRiseofCapitalism,NewYork:Mentor,214.5Cf. Leo Strauss (1953),NaturalRight andHistory.Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress; SheldonWolin (1960), Politics and Vision, Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress; Crawford B. Macpherson (1962), The Political Theory of PossessiveIndividualism,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.6 In the same vein, for Cranston, Lockes thought reflects an inspiredordinariness, a prophetic common sense.Cf.MauriceCranston (1966), JohnLockeandGovernmentbyConsent,inDavidThompson(ed.).PoliticalIdeas,NewYork:Penguin.

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ThisisanexampleofwhatIhavecalledaninterpretiveconjuncture,sinceMacphersons viewwas at the time considered rather eccentric but soonbecame accepted as the point of reference for understanding thebackground to these classical authors. The hermeneutic dynamics andinterpretive turns thatcharacterize thehistoryofpolitical thoughtshouldthusbereassessed.1III.AnonliberalLocke?

CanLockereallybe locatedwithinthe liberaltradition?Ofcourse,notallthehistoricalinterpretationsofLockehavetakenthisliberalviewpoint.TheworkofRichardAshcraft,amongotherscholars,hasshownhowauthorssuchasRichardPrice,WilliamOgilvieandThomasSpencelinkedLockeswork to, for example, thedefence of thenatural rights of the laboriouspooragainstoppressivelandowners.2Fortheirpart,tienneCabet,AntonMenger andMax Beer all produced socialist interpretations of Lockesphilosophy.3 OfparticularinterestforourinquiryhereistheworkofRuthW.Grant(oneofthemostrenownedcontemporaryspecialistsonLocke).Inher1987bookentitled JohnLockesLiberalism,GrantproposesaunitaryanalysisoftheEnglishauthorsmajorworksandseekstoanalysetheTwoTreatisesasthe paradigmatic case of a systematic demonstration of the liberalprinciples of law and power, which in her view were based on the

1Revealingly,inarecentworkGoodleandPosterorefertotheconceptofepochalcommon sense to qualify the scope of Macphersons theorization: Thenaturalization of neoliberal practices was extended as institutional reform, asdiscursive adjustment, as a form of epochal common sense with omnipresenteffects on social imaginaries. In that sense, its possessive individualistconception had turned into an epochal common sensewithwide cultural andpolitical repercussions in thedaily lifeof societieswithin thehistorical capitalistsystem (MarkGoodleandNancyPostero (eds.) (2013),Neoliberalism, Interrupted.Social Change and Contested Governance in Contemporary Latin America, Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,257).2 Richard Ashcraft (1995), Lockean Ideas, Poverty, and the Development ofLiberal Political Theory, in John Brewer and Susan Staves (eds.), EarlyModernConceptionsofProperty,London:Routledge.3Cf.tienneCabet(1842),VoyageenIcarie,romanphilosophiqueetsocial.Paris;AntonMenger (1899),TheRight to theWholeProduce ofLabour, trans.M.E.Tanner; andMaxBeer(1921),TheHistoryofBritishSocialism,London.


epistemologyestablishedintheEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding.Assheputs it:Lockesworkwillbe treated insteadasanexampleof liberalpolitical theory,andwillbeexamined toassesswhether it isanadequatesolution to theproblems facing liberal theories.1Grantseruditeanalysissits clearlywithin the inherited tradition that interpretedLocke asbeingunequivocallyliberal. InalaterbookonLockepublishedin2003,Grantoffersthefollowingreflection,whichisworthcitinginitsentirety:

Tobegintoaddresstheseissues,someturntothewritingsofJohnLockeasone of themost articulate progenitors of liberal ideas. But this inevitablyinvolves adopting assumptions about the role of ideas in history and therelationoftheoryandpracticeandacautionarynoteisinorder.Thereareanumberofcommon,butfallacious,assumptionstobeavoided.AmongthemisthenotionthatcontemporaryAmericanliberalismisacontinuationof,orfurther development from, its Lockean roots and that for all practicalpurposes,thetwoareindistinguishable.Itiswelltorememberthatthetermliberal, did not even exist until long after Locke was dead, and thatLockeanism might represent a distinct alternative to contemporaryliberalism in important respects rather thansimplyanearlyarticulationofit.2

To reinforce thispoint, shenotes that liberal as apoliticaldesignationcame into the language inBritain in the earlynineteenth century.OxfordEnglishDictionary.3 The shift inview regardingfallaciousassumptions towhichGrantrefersserves toremindusofhowproblematic it is to takeanauthorwhowas himself the inheritor of various traditions and then to locate himindisputablywithinaspecific tradition thatdidnotevenexistat the timehewaswriting.4ThisAmericanscholarisnot,however,thefirsttosuggest

1RuthW.Grant(1987),JohnLockesLiberalism,Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,11.2RuthW.Grant (2003),JohnLockeonWomenand theFamily, in JohnLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernmentandALetterConcerningToleration,ed.IanShapiro,NewHaven/London,YaleUniversityPress,287288.3Grant,idem,303.4 Hundert has shown, moreover, that the very complex of ideas that led todevelopment of classical liberal economic theory did not come into being untilLockehadbeendeadforalmostacentury.Cf.E.J.Hundert(1977),MarketSociety

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thatacautionarynoteisinorder,asasimilarargumentcanbefoundinaseriesofworksonthehistoryofpoliticalthoughtthatemergedduringthe1960sandwhichwerecrystalizedinthe1980s. ThanksfirstlytotheworkofPeterLaslett,andsubsequentlytothatofauthors such as John Dunn, Quentin Skinner, John Pocock, RichardAshcraft,RichardTuck,MarkGoldieandJamesTully,itbecamepossibletoreinterpret the different political traditions and to discover hidden orforgotten aspects of the work of authors such as Hobbes, Harrington,MachiavelliorevenLockehimself.1Whatalltheformerauthorsshareisarejectionoftheideaoftextsasselfcontainedhermeneuticsystems;inotherwords,theideathatareadingofallanauthorstextswouldbyitselfrevealthepoliticalmeaningofthatauthor,withouttherebeinganyneedtoturnto other sources. Equally importantly, these authors also coincide inrejecting the existenceof unitideas thatpersistover time, in the sensedescribedbyLovejoy.2On thecontrary,politicalandmoral ideasmustbeunderstoodinagivensociohistoricalcontext.3

andMeaninginLockesPoliticalPhilosophy,JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,15(1),3344.1 In the case of Locke, Dunns and Tullys contribution has been particularlyimportant.Cf. JohnDunn (1969), ThePolitical Thought of John Locke,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress;JamesTully(1980),ADiscourseonProperty.JohnLockeand His Adversaries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and James Tully(1993),AnApproachtoPoliticalPhilosophy:LockeinContexts,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.2ArthurO.Lovejoy(1960),TheGreatChainofBeing:AStudyoftheHistoryofanIdea,NewYork,HarperTorchbooksed.3 Cf. Quentin Skinner (1969), Meaning and Understanding in the History ofIdeas,HistoryandTheory,8 (1),353. Itshouldbenoted that in thissamearticleSkinneriscriticaloftheliberalinterpretationofLockeasbeinghimselfaliberalpolitical theorist;however,hedoes consider thatLockewasundoubtedlyoneofthefoundersofthemodernliberalschoolofpoliticalphilosophy.Interestingly,inthis article Skinner also accuses authors such asGough,Plamenatz and Seliger,amongothers,offallingintowhathecallsthemythologyofprolepsis,since,inhisview,theyconfusethefuturereceptionofanauthorsworkwiththedeliberatehistorical adherence on the part of that author to a given philosophical andpolitical tradition. Cf. W. Gough (1950), John Lockes Political Philosophy: EightStudies,Oxford,TheClarendonPress;J.Plamenatz(1963),ManandSociety,2vols.,London:Longman;andM.Seliger(1968),TheLiberalPoliticsofJohnLocke,London:G.Allen&Unwin.


Authors such as Skinnerwould appear tobe combating the ahistoricismanddecontextualizationofmanywritingsonpastpoliticalthinkers.1Bethisat itmay, what was then a new way of thinking about the history ofpolitical thought made it possible to call into question many of thecommonplacesofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophyandwasaninvitationtoreconsiderindetailtheliberalinterpretiveconjuncturethatmaterializedin the nineteenth century and which was then reinforced around themiddleofthetwentieth.III.PropertyandthepreservationofMankind

Inwhat follows Iwillbrieflysetoutanalternativewayof theorizing themoralandpoliticalcoreofLockeswork,andwillarguethatthisworkcanonlybeproperlyunderstoodthroughreferencetothehistoricalcontextofthe received inheritanceofnatural law.This isnotmerely an exercise inhistoricallexicographybut,rather,anattempttorevealtheextenttowhichfundamentalaspectsofLockesworkhavebeendistortedasaresultofthenaturallawtraditionbecomingobscuredaroundtheendofthenineteenthcenturyandonintothetwentieth.

1 Isaywouldappearsince thereare importantcritiquesof thisapproach fromdifferentperspectives,allofwhichhighlightitshistoricalandanalyticlimits.Fromthepointofviewofthe insufficientrecognitionofLockeasatheoristofagrariancapitalism,NealWoodmakesthekeypointthat:ThemostseriousshortcomingofSkinnersapproach,despitehisemphasisoncontextualanalysisandthehistoricityof the text, paradoxical as itmay seem in view of what has been said, is itsunhistorical character (Neal Wood (1984), John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism,Berkeley, University of California Press, 10). From the perspective of ReinhartKosellecksBegriffsgeschichtetheanalysisoftheCambridgeSchoolisconsideredtobe lacking in methodological consistency: Put into linguistic terms, Skinnersmode of analysis is exclusively synchronic and phrased in terms of individualspeechactsandtheirintendedillocutionaryforce.Heappearstoassumethatachoicemustbemadebetweensynchronicanddiachronicmodesofanalysisandtoassert thatonly a synchronic account canmeethis criteriaofwhat constitutes ameaningful account of political thinking as it actually occurred. The GG[GeschichtlicheGrundbegriffeorBasicHistoricalConcepts]makesuseofbothmodes,butwithoutconfusingthem.Inthiswaytheanalystgains informationthatcouldnotbeacquiredbytheexclusiveuseofeither(MelvinRichter(1986),ConceptualHistory(Begriffsgeschichte)andPoliticalTheory,PoliticalTheory,14(4),623).

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According to thenatural law traditioneachpersonhasbynature theright to selfpreservation, which consists fundamentally in the right toprocure themeansof subsistenceand the right todefendoneselfagainstattacksbyothers.Thisrightofselfpreservationis,bynature,aninalienableright.Lockescontributiontothisquestionisimportantfortworeasons.Ontheonehand,heintroducesaninnovationintothenaturallawtraditionbyarguingthatthefundamentalnatural law isnotselfpreservationbutthepreservationofMankind.1Thus,thelawofpreservationisdividedintwo:thetraditionaldutyinnaturallawtopreserveoneselfandthenewdutytopreserve the restofhumankind.The lattermayalsobederived from thetraditionalnegativeduty to abstain from thatwhichbelongs to another.2Moreover,intheexerciseofthesetwokindsofnaturallawsandduties,twotypesofpowerareemployed:thepowertopreserveonesownlifeandthelifeofothersbypunishing thosewhobreaknatural law (politicalpower),and thepower topreserve oneself and others fromhunger or starvation(labourpowerorproductivepower).3Ifhumanbeingshave therightandthedutytopreservethemselvesandothersfromstarvation,thentheymustbeentitledtotheirPreservation,andconsequentlytoMeatandDrink,andsuchotherthings,asNatureaffordsfortheirSubsistence.4Consequently,the world must belong to Men in common, in the sense that eachindividualhas thenatural right to claim themeansnecessary to achievethe best advantage of Life, and convenience.5 This modifies theseventeenthcenturypopularpremiseinthenaturallibertytraditionwhichstatedthattheworldbelongedtonoonebutwasopentotheappropriationofeach.6

ThisconceptualtransformationhelpstounderstandthesenseinwhichLockewillassuming that theEarth in thestateofnature is thecommonproperty of allmankind come to regard as fundamental the idea thatpeople can appropriate goods without causing harm to anyone, since 1 John Locke (1988), Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd. ed.,reprinted,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,II,135.2Locke,op.cit.,II,6.3II,12930.4II,25.5II,26.6 ForGrotius (The Laws ofWar andPeace, 1624), as forPudendorf (Of theLaw ofNatureandNations,1672),commonmeansthatitbelongstonooneandisopentotheappropriationofanyone.


there was still enough, and as good left.1 I will explore briefly threeimplicationsofthisassumption.IV.Limitedproperty

ThefirstimplicationisthatLockesnotionoftherighttoappropriategoods(whichis,therefore,theveryideaofprivateproperty)shouldberegardedasalimitedright.2NotehowfarthisideaofpropertyassomethingwhichissociallyrestricteddiffersfromtheinheritedliberalinterpretationofLockesideasthatdevelopedattheendofthenineteenthcenturyandthenbecameconsolidatedaroundthemiddleofthetwentieth,aninterpretationinwhichpropertyintheliberalsenselackedanylimitations. In this context,what does propertymean for Locke? The Frenchjuristandhistorian JeanBarbeyrac,acommentatoron theworkofLocke,acutelyobservedin1706that:

MrLockemeansbytheword propertynotonlytherightwhichonehastohisgoodsandpossessions,butevenwithrespecttohisactions,liberty,hislife,hisbody;and,inaword,allsortsofright.3

This remark is essential in order to understand that Lockes notion ofpropertybecomes incomprehensible if it isdetached from thenatural lawtraditioninwhichitoriginates.Lockesaysthishimselfquiteclearly:orthemutualpreservationoftheirlives,libertiesandestates,whichIcallbythegeneralname,property.4Furthermore,thisnotionowesmuchtocomplexmedieval and latemedieval ideas that help to elucidatewhy, for Locke(unlike what occurred in the nineteenth century with the spread ofutilitarianism and the demise of natural law), property is not simply theexclusive right tosomething fromwhichanotherperson is,bydefinition,excluded,but,rather,has todowith theLatinnotionofdominium (whichcanmeanbothownershipandmastery,whicharequitedifferentthings);inaddition,thepossessionofexternalthingsrequiresselfmastery,sinceonly 1II,33.2Cf.J.L.Stocks(1933),Lockescontributiontopoliticaltheory,inJ.L.StocksandGilbert Ryle (eds.), John Locke: Tercentenary Address, London:OxfordUniversityPress.3JeanBarbeyrac(1706),Preface,inSamuelPudendorf,Ledroitdelanatureetdesgens, traduction du latin et preface par Jean Barbeyrac,Amsterdam, diteurH.Schelte,p.V.4II,123.Cf.also:II,87.

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hewho is themasterofhimself can lawfullypossessgoods.1 Inorder tounderstand this fundamental nuance we need to trace the influence inLockes writings of later authors in the natural law tradition, such asSurez, Mariana and Vitoria, who themselves can be linked to earlierwriters like Ockham, Pierre Jean Olivi and Henry de Guent. Of equalimportanceistherelationshipthatLockesnotionbearstocertainconceptsthatonefindsinRomanlaw.IntheRomanlawtraditionanindividualwhoishisownproprietor is sui iuris,unlike slaves, servantsor children,whoarealieni iuris (bydefinition, in thecontextof theRoman family,personswho canonly achieve full legal statusbymeansof a thirdparty, the suiiuris).2

Dominium for Grotius is solely an exclusive right over onespossessions. As Tully rightly states regarding dominium: Translated asproperty in the English editions and abstracted from its regulativeabsolutism, it passes into legal theory in the eighteenth century in theworks of SirWilliam Blackstone.3 The Blackstonian idea of the right ofproperty as the sole anddespoticdominionwhichoneman claims andexercises over the external things of theworld, in total exclusion of therightofanyother individual in theuniverse4mouldedmodernpoliticalcommonsense,makingourintellectualpasttosomeextenteitherinvisibleorincomprehensible.Althoughapropertyofthiskindhashardlyexistedin

1Hisobservationregardingchildrenishighlyinstructive:Anotherthingwhereintheyshow their loveofDominion is theirdesire tohave things tobe theirs; theywouldhaveProprietyandpossession,pleasing themselveswith thePowerwhichthatseemstogive,andtheRighttherebyhavetodisposeofthemastheyplease(JohnLocke (1989),SomeThoughtsConcerningEducation,eds. J.W.and J.S.Yolton,Oxford:ClarendonPress,105).2AsAylmer states: But if the civil lawyershadby thenmoved inwhatmightreasonablybecalledanindividualistdirection,afarmoreimportantdevelopmentwas the successful reabsorption of Romanlaw ideas by English commonlaw,whichiswhatwehaveseenhappeninginthecourseoftheseventeenthcentury(G.E.Aylmer (1980),TheMeaningandDefinitionofProperty inSeventeenthCenturyEngland,Past&Present,86,February,95).3Tully,AnApproachtoPoliticalPhilosophy,108.4WilliamBlackstone(1979[1765]),CommentariesoftheLawsofEngland:AFacmisileoftheFirstEditionof17651769,ed.StanleyN.Katz,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,vol.2,ch.1.


the real historicaljuridical world, its association with Locke has beenrecurrent.1

For Locke, life and freedom are inalienable. Likewise, Lockeconsidered material possessions to be alienable although not to anunlimitedextent,sinceinkeepingwiththeancienttraditionofRomancivillawheusedwords such assettled, regulate, submit and subjectwhendiscussingthestatusofprivatepropertyvisvisgovernment.2NealWoodoffersaprecisesynthesisofLockesnotionoflimitedproperty:

Membership inpolitical societymeansplacingoneself andonespropertyunder the jurisdiction of government.Property right then becomes a civilrightundercivillawultimatelyguaranteed,however,bythelawofnature.Property,nevertheless,isnotanabsoluteandunconditionalrightinpoliticalsociety.Lockeneverstood forapolicyof laissezfaire.Property inpoliticalsociety is always subject to regulation from the public good, which isdefinedastheequalpreservationofall.Thisisbecausethefundamentallawof nature, the preservation of society, takes precedence over selfpreservation.Governmenthastherightandthedutytoexercisecontroloverthelivesandpropertiesofcitizens,ifitisdonewiththeirconsentandforthepublicgood,inaccordwiththeruleoflawofnature.Nomeasureinregardtopropertycanrightfullybetakenthatwillimpoverishcitizens.3

V.SelfownershipThisbringsus to thesecond implicationofLockesview,namely that theunderlyingnotionofselfownershiphaspoliticalconsequencesinthesense 1IntheCommentariesasawholeitisclearthatBlackstonehimselfdoesnotconsiderthat thereare empirical realities that supporthis claim.However, the success inspreading his absolutist definition of property has been overwhelming. Tounderstand the importance of the extension of the notion of property as anindividualabsolutedominionfromtheeighteenthcenturyonwards,eventhoughin legal practice it did not exist as such, cf. R.W. Gordon (1995), Paradoxicalproperty, in J.BrewerandS.Staves (eds.),EarlyModernConceptions ofProperty,LondonandNewYork:Routledge.2Cf.II,38,45,117,120.AsAylmerstates:Butifthecivillawyershadbythenmoved inwhatmight reasonablybecalledan individualistdirection,a farmoreimportantdevelopmentwas the successful reabsorption ofRomanlaw ideas byEnglishcommonlaw,whichiswhatwehaveseenhappeninginthecourseoftheseventeenthcentury(Aylmer,op.cit.,95).3NealWood (1983),ThePolitics of LockesPhilosophy,Berkeley andLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,3839.

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thatapersonwhoissuiiuriscannotvoluntarilyrelinquishhisfreedom,asto do so would imply subjecting himself to the arbitrary and despoticpowerofanother.Thissimpleobservationallowsus toseehow itwouldnotonlybeanachronistic to interpretLockes statement thatEveryManhasaPropertyinhisOwnPersoninaliberalsense,butalsothatitwouldbehistorically inaccurate,becauseLocke ismerelyfollowingthethreadofanoldnaturallawtradition.1Indeed,itisinthissensethatmanisLordofHisownPersonandPossessions, is free toorderashe listshisPerson,Actions, and Possessions, and is endowed with a Liberty of actingaccordingtohisownWill.2

Incontrast, the libertarianRobertNozickand theneoMarxistGeraldCohen have founded their theorizations on a pretended right of selfownership from which exclusive and excluding proprietary rights overexternalgoods,attributingtheoriginofthisthesistoLocke.3Theirnotionsof selfownership reinforced an interpretive conjuncture that is largelyincompatiblewiththephilosophicalpoliticalbackgroundofLockesnotionof selfownership.Not only this socalled liberal right of selfownershipdoesnotexist inthe legalsystem,but is incompatiblewiththerepublicanfoundations of ourmodern constitutional systems,whichprohibit thingssuchassellingoneselfasaslave,sellingtherightofcitizenship,sellingtherightofsuffrageorsellpartsofonesownbody.4Infact,inlinewithLocke,

1Anillustrationofthisisthattwothirteenthcenturyauthors,PierreJeanOliviandHenrydeGuent,hadalreadyusedthenotionofselfdominionexplicitly inthesense of selfownership. In fact,Olivi used an expression almost identical toLockesfamoussentence.WhereasLockestatedthatamanwasLordofhisownPersonandPossessions,Oliviwrote thateachone is lordofhimselfandofhisown,thatis,dominussuietsuorum(P.J.Olivi,QuodlibetI,Q.17).Foranexplanationofwhythis isnotacasualcoincidence,cf.BrianTierney,Publicexpediencyandnatural law: a fourteenth century discussion on the origins of government andpropertyinBrianTierneyandPeterLinehan(eds.),AuthorityandPower.StudiesonMedievalLawandGovernmentPresented toWalterUllmann,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,168.2II,27,172,123,57,63.3Cf.RobertNozick(1974),Anachy,State,andUtopia,Oxford:BasilBlackwell;G.A.Cohen (1995), SelfOwnership, Freedom, and Equality, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress.4ForacriticismofNozicksperspective,cf.JordiMund(2005),Autopropiedad,derechosylibertad(deberaestarpermitidoqueunopudieratratarseasmismo


thatargumentwasexplicitlyandconclusivelydemolishedphilosophicallybyKantinTheMetaphysicsofMorals,whereheshowsushowtodistinguishbetween the acceptable concept of sui iuris (his own master) and thehypothetical sui dominus (owner of himself), this being completelyunacceptablesinceitwouldlegitimizenothinglessthanthealienabilityoffreedom.1However, the interpretiveconjuncturewhichpresentsLockeasthedefender of the absoluteproperty over oneself fromwhich exclusiveandexclusiveprivatepropertywouldderiveonexternalgoodshadintheneoMarxistC.B.Macphersononeofitsleadingarchitects:

[The]assumptionsofpossessiveindividualismarepeculiarlyappropriatetoa possessivemarket society, for they state certain essential facts that arepeculiar to that society. The individual in a possessivemarket society ishumaninhiscapacityasaproprietorofhisownperson;hissocietydoesconsist of a series ofmarket relationsHowever hemaywish it to beotherwise, his humanity does depend on his freedom from any but selfinterestedcontractualrelationswithothers.2

VI.Inalienabilityandsovereignty

This leadsus to the last implication,which is that thenotionsofpropertyandselfownershiparenotindependentoftheLockeanconceptofpoliticalsovereignty. For Locke, political sovereignty resides within eachindividual, and it is therefore incompatible with the existence of anabsolutemonarch.Among thediverse and complex traditions ofnaturallaw,Lockecanbelocatedwithinafiduciarytradition,asopposedtothealienist one.3 In Lockes view, the fact that the citizen had politicalsovereigntymeant that itcouldbecededordelegated toa trustee (whichmightbethemonarch,parliamentoramixedsystem),andintheeventthatthetrusteeviolatedthecitizensrightsthroughactsofdespotism,tyranny como aun esclavo?), inM.J.Bertomeu et al (eds.),Republicanismo y democracia,BuenosAires:MioyDvilaeditores.1 Immanuel Kant (2012), The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,90.2Macpherson,ThePoliticalTheoryofPossessiveIndividualism,275.3Cf.Tully,AnApproach toPoliticalPhilosophy;RichardTuck (1979),NaturalRightTheories. TheirOrigin andDevelopment,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press;BrianTierney (1997),The Idea ofNaturalRights.Studies onNaturalRights,NaturalLaw, andChurchLaw 11501625,GrandRapids/Cambridge:WilliamB.EerdmansPublishingCompany.

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orusurpation,thenthelatterwouldbeentitledtoreclaimthissovereignty,includingby force.These rights andduties justify the rightof thewiderpopulationtocometotherevolutionaryaidofanoppressedminority.1

This is precisely the basis of Lockes legitimation of the right torevolution,whichcouldnotbeadequately justifiedwithin the frameworkof Grotiuss theory of selfpreservation. This places Locke within aparticularnatural lawtradition,asopposedtotheFilmeriantraditionthatdefended the theory of natural subjection.Hence it can be argued thatLocke,byadvocatingpolitical liberty inopposition toabsolutemonarchy,constitutes a crucial link in thehistoryofpolitical thought.Furthermore,hisdefenceofthisprincipleallowsustoseehimasanauthorwho,inthissense,formspartofanoldtraditionofpoliticalliberty,onethatiscontrarytothenotionofnaturalsubjection.

JamesTullyconsidersthatLockesfiduciaryconceptionoftherightofrevolt,whichinvolvesthecommonpeopleregainingorconfiscatingpower,constitutesanewdevelopment inhistoricalterms:Inpositing individualpolitical sovereignty Locke thus repudiates 500 years of elite politicalholism and reconceptualizes the origins of political power in a radicallypopulistway.2 It isworth remembering that fora long time ithadbeenthought that the Two Treatiseswas received in 1690 as an unacceptablyradical interpretation of the Glorious Revolution. That Lockes politicaltheorywas,atthattime,regardedasathreattotheoligarchicestablishmentisclearfromthereactionofhisWhigfriend,JamesTyrrell,whorepudiatedLockes ideas in his own Bibliotheca Politica, in which he argued thatpoliticalpowerdidnotreturntothepeoplebutrathertotherepresentativebodiesorgreatcouncils.3Similarly,inTheFundamentalConstitutionoftheEnglish Government (1690) the moderate Whig, William Atwood, putforwardthestrongestobjectiontoLockesthesis:

1Foranexplorationoftherelationshipbetweensovereignty,politicalfreedom,andthe inclusion ofminorities in Lockes political thought, cf. JordiMund (2015),Political freedom in Lockes republicanism, in Yannick Bosc, Rmi Dalisson,JeanYvesFretignetal(dirs),Culturesdesrpublicanismes.PratiquesRpresentationsConceptsdelaRvolutionanglaiseaujourdhui,Paria,ditionsKim.2Tully,AnApproachtoPoliticalPhilosophy,19.3 Cf. J.H. Franklin (1978), John Locke and the theory of sovereignty, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.


others[Locke]aretoolooseintheirnotions,andsupposethedissolutionofthiscontract [James IIvacancy] tobeamere [i.e.pure]commonwealth,orabsolute monarchy, wherein everybody has an equal share in thegovernment, not only landedmen, and otherswithwhom the balance ofpower has rested by the constitution, but copyholders, servants, and theveryfaecesRomuliwhichwouldnotonlymakeaquietelectionbutbringinadeplorableconfusion.1

Incontrasttothesesourcesofpoliticalresistance,Lockewasclearlyawarethattheproblemofthedelegationofpowerandofpoliticalrepresentationwasnotmerelyaquestionofideologybut,rather,theresultofahistoricallyconstructedsetoflegislativepractices,inotherwords,ofwaysofthinkingandwritingaboutpoliticsandofactingpolitically(ofgoverning,ofbeinggovernedandofcontestingthegovernment)thatinEuropecouldbetracedback to the twelfth century. These legal and political practices haddevelopedboththroughnewmeaningsbeinggiventooldconceptsandbygivingacentralroletotheruleof law.Thegradualreplacementoffeudalparticularismwith practices of government based on rights, duties andsovereigntythataffectedthewholeofsocietyhadbecomesocentralbytheseventeenthcenturythatLockecouldwritethatmoral,political,theologicalandlegalthoughtandactionwerebasedontheunquestionableassumption(and practice) that man is a rational animal subject to law,2 anassumptionthatinturnbecamethebasisforhispoliticaltheoryofpopularsovereigntyfoundedontherighttoresistance.3

Contemporary liberalism has integrated a significant part of thisLockeanheritageofpoliticalfreedomunderstoodasa trust,whichhas itsroots in the democratic republican tradition and in Roman civil law.4

1Citedin:Tully,AnApproachtoPoliticalPhilosophy,43.TheparenthesesareTullys.2 John Locke (1975), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H.Nidditch,Oxford:ClarendonPress,3.11.16.3 For a detailed review of this topic, cf. Franklin, John Locke and the theory ofsovereignty;RichardAshcraft(1986),RevolutionaryPoliticsandLockesTwoTreatisesof Government, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press;Mark Goldie (1980), Theroots of truewiggism, 168894,History of Political Thought, 1 (2);MarkGoldie(1980),Therevolutionof1689andthestructureofpoliticalargument,BulletinofResearchintheHumanities,83(4).4 Cf. Antoni Domnech (2009), Droit, droit naturel et tradition rpublicainemoderne, in F. Gauthier,M. Belissa et Y. Bosc (dirs.), Rpublicanismes et droitnaturel lpoquemoderne.Deshumanistesauxrvolutionsdesdroitsde lhommeetdu

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However, there are derivations of liberalism thatmove away from thattradition. For example, unlike what Nozicks interpretation states,1accordingLockesconceptionitwouldbeillicitforamantosellhimselfasaslave,sincehedoesnothaveanunlimitedrightofpropertyoverhimself.Werehetohavesucharighthecouldsellhimselffully,butinsodoinghewouldbecomealienated fromhispoliticalsovereignty,whichaswehaveseen,isinalienable.2Lockesselfownershipisequivalenttobeingsuiiuris,notsuidominus.VII.Conclusion

It would seem, therefore, that RuthW. Grant was right to say that acautionarynoteisinorder.InLockescasewecanseethattheeventsofseventeenthcentury philosophy can only be fully understood ifwe alsotake into account the radical conceptual recategorization that occurredduring the nineteenth century and which became consolidated in thetwentieth, a recategorization that rendered invisible many interpretivenotions that are of fundamental importance for understanding theformation of modern society, and contributed to shape contemporarycommon senseon fundamentalpolitical issues.As JanetColeman rightlypointsout,Lockeandhispeersdrewona living traditionof thoughtwhichhe,likeallcontributorstothetradition,turnedtohisownpurposesin the later seventeenth century.3 This is why it is important from amethodologicalpointofviewtobealerttothefactthatour interpretationof the concepts used by authors belonging to obscured traditions (asnatural law) may be distorted by interpretive conjunctures that render citoyen,Pars:ditionsKim;JordiMund(2017),Laconstitucinfiduciariadelalibertadpoltica, Isegora.Revista deFilosofaMoral yPoltica, 57, juliodiciembre,433454.1Thecomparablequestionaboutanindividualiswhetherafreesystemwillallowhimtosellhimselfintoslavery.Ibelievethatitwould(Nozick,Anachy,State,andUtopia,331).2 As Brian Tierney and Richard Tuck have exhaustively shown, a fullunderstandingofthisaspectofthebackgroundtoLockestheoreticalandpoliticalthoughtcanonlybeachievedbyconsideringlatemedievalcontributionstonaturallaw,especiallythoseoftheSpanishneoscholastictradition.3JanetColeman(1985),DominiuminThirteenthandFourteenthCenturyPoliticalThought and its SeventeenthCenturyHeirs: John of Paris and Locke, PoliticalStudies,XXXIII,100.


these concepts unintelligible, such that, in turn, the normative usage oftheseconceptsbecomesarbitraryandahistorical.ThisisespeciallytrueforanauthorsuchasLockewhowasworkingwithandwithinanumberoftraditionsandcombiningelementsfromeachintransformativeways.

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Themodernsubjectivityanditsquestions:remarksrelatedtoTiborSzabsLesujetetsamorale:essaisdephilosophiemorale

etpolitique,Szeged,2016

AnaBAZAC1Abstract:Thispaperisbothanexpandedreviewandanarticleinsistingonsomeproblemsofthephilosophicalmethodsandthetreatmentofthehumansubjectivity. Thus, it starts from the book of Tibor Szab, Le sujet et samorale: Essais de philosophie morale et politique, Szeged, CentreUniversitaireFrancophone,2016,and,first,highlightshowthedescriptionofthe human subject in the world may stay within the frame of themetaphysical suppositions ormay divert from it. This position towards ametaphysical approach is that which differentiates the contents of thenormative messages of philosophies. Secondly, the paper points out theadventures of the modern continental philosophy to both avoid theinterdependenceoftheobjectiveandsubjective factorsofthehumansubjectandsocietyandtheirunitarycomplex,andtorevealthisinterdependenceanditsconcreteaspects.

Keywords:history ofmodern continentalphilosophy,human subjectivity,praxis, ethics, descriptive and normative in philosophy, fragmentariness,totality,Descartes, Bergson, Althusser, Antonio Banfi,Nicola Abagnano,Cornelio Fabro, Augusto Del Noce, Camus, Sartre, Derrida, Foucault,Lukcs.

Introduction

First, itsaboutmodern thinkers.Wealwayscanuseand interpretancientthoughtsasmatchingwiththepresentandsuggestingbothsimilaritiesandlessons. (And certainly,wemust study and even know all the thinkers,includingheancientones,because theybelong to thecultural treasureofour common humanity: knowing themwe are happier and calmer oncemoreexperiencingthehumancontinuityandthechallengetoreasonaboutdiscontinuityandnewuniversesofproblems).However,theanalysisofthemodern thinkers directly answering to theirmodern era is somehowmorechallenging:sincetheyfacenewsituations,theyhavetounderstandthem,andsince thepermanentcomparisonwitholderasand facts isnot

1PolytechnicUniversityofBucharest.

42 | AnaBAZAC

sufficient, theymust innovate, createnew concepts,adifferent reasoningandnewarguments.AnddidMarxnotexplain that theunderstandingoftheold times ismoreprofoundafter theypassedawayandanewepochhas occurred emphasising the deeper significances of the concepts andfacts?

Secondly,modernityisseenonabroadscale:thoughtheproblemofthehumansubject isdiscussedrather from thealmost latemodernity (endofthe19th century) to thewell installed latemodernity (whole20th century)and beyond, in the socalled postmodernity, onedoes not forget to putDescartesasastake.Clearer,thestake isarationaliststandpointabouttheworld1. Therefore, modern means also contemporary, and this scaleincludesevenlivingphilosophers.

Thirdly, though itsaboutavolume2written in themannerofhistoryofphilosophyandfocusingon/gatheringtogetherdifferentstudiesofethicsand politics, there is a tight logic showing the philosophical efforts andtheirhistorically inherentlyunilateral thesesand conclusions concerningthecontradictoryhuman entity (as individualsubjectivityandat thesametimeas socialbeing,andas individual supply andgameof ideas /orastheoreticalpractice,andatthesametimeascollectivepracticeorpalpableactivity of transformation of both the individuals and society) andconcerningthecontradictoryentityofwhat iscalledhistory:asbothresultof individual thoughts, behaviours and facts, and as collective,transpersonalanddeterminingoutsidepoweroverthepoortransientandimpotenthumans.Indeed,thisdialecticallogicofthingsincludingofmanandhistorywasandisthemostdifficulttounderstand,andphilosophyillustrates not only this difficulty, but also suggests that its own avatars(this lastword as falling/aspect resulted from transformation, as in theancient Indianmythology)mustnotonlybedescribed,butalso criticallyanalysed.

The book ofmy colleague from theUniversity of Szeged,Hungary,fulfils just this task: focusing on man more exactly, on the triad

1Andatthesametimethestakeistonotbeblindtowardstheexperienceofthesubject,as JeanFraoisPetit,Penseraprs lespostmodernes,Paris,Buchet/Chastel,2005,p.132,hasformulated.2TiborSzab,Lesujetetsamorale :Essaisdephilosophiemoraleetpolitique,Szeged,CentreUniversitaireFrancophone,2016.[Thereferencestothisbook,inthetextofthearticle].


subjectivity,praxisandhistoryitcriticallyanalysestheroutesofthinkingofsome important and representativephilosophers:Descartes,Bergson, theHungarian HalasyNagy, the Italians An

anale 40 2 2017 31.12 -...

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