analysing state building efforts in afghanistan

8/10/2019 Analysing State Building Efforts in Afghanistan

1/44 Regional Studies, Vol. XXVIII, No.3 Summer 2010, pg 31-73

US Strategy towards Post Taliban

Afghanistan: Analysing State

building Efforts in Afghanistan

by

Maryam Mastoor

Assistant Research officerInstitute of Regional StudiesIslamabad


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Analysing State building Efforts in Afghanistan

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CONTENTS

Background to the study 2

Towards democracy 5

Supporting the enemys opposition 6

Strengthening the central government 14

Karzai and the US at odds 16

Election 2009 17

State building under fire 19

Hit the target 19

Ensure security and leave the rest 21Build the means to achieve the ends

years of social engagement 25

Build the state making it a self-governing entity 27

Twofold approach 29

Concluding reflections 33

Notes and References 36


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This study aims at an analysis of state-building efforts made in

Afghanistan under the Bush and Obama administrations. The first part of

the paper discussesBush administrations efforts towards democratizing

Afghanistan. It also discusses how the Obama administration is working

for establishing democracy in Afghanistan and where do the two

administrations differ in their approach. The second part addresses the

dilemma of divergent approaches of the US towards state building in

Afghanistan. Under the banner of state building much has been done but

it was certainly not state building.

Background to the study

Realism has remained the guiding principle of the US foreign policy since the

Second World War. Though it was blended with idealism several times, yet the

prominent characteristics of realist paradigm have always remained fundamentally

dominant in US policy making. The Bush administration also tried to combine power

with principle to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. Its secretary of state Condoleezza

Rice called this dichotomous blend as uniquely American realism.(1)However, some

critics presume it as an imperialist design constructed by the US to achieve its long-term

goals in the region by prolonging its structural presence.

In contrast, the Obama administration appears to follow realism with a tinge of

pragmatism. Carlos Pascual, of the Brookings Institution, commenting on Obamas

national security team, said, Obamas choice of a national security team reflects

seriousness, pragmatism and bipartisanship(2) His clear vision without the blinkers of

idealistic goals, his focused target and his determination has again revitalized the realist

paradigm fashioned with pragmatism in American policy making.

Following 9/11 the US launched war against al-Qaeda network. It was presumed

that this group was behind the attacks on Pentagon and World Trade Centre in

collaboration with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. On 20 September 2001,


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president Bush called for extradition of Osama bin Laden. In response, the Taliban

demanded evidence from the US government to warrant a trial of Osama bin Laden,

which they offered to handle in an Islamic court.

The Bush administration refused to provide evidence and invaded Afghanistan on

October 2001. The light footprint strategy, comprising heavy air offensive but

minimum ground troop presence, was adopted at the initial stage which eventually led to

retreat of Taliban. With the fall of Kabul, in December 2001, the idealistic part of the

Bush administrations foreign policy became operational as the realist objective of

putting an end to Taliban government was achieved. The administration shifted, though

lackadaisically, its efforts on democratization and reconstruction of the torn polity of

Afghanistan. It predicated on the assumption that preventing Afghanistan from

becoming a safe haven for terrorists again, required the building of strong institutions,

functioning democracy and economic development.(3) Hence, on 5 December 2001 a

conference was held in Bonn, Germany, under the auspices of the United Nations. Major

Afghan factions excepting the Taliban but including the Northern Alliance participated in

the conference. In the conference an agreement was signed which authorized the

formation of an Interim Administration (IA) headed by Hamid Karzai, a prominent

foreign-qualified Afghan Pashtun. The agreement also mandated the presence of a

peacekeeping force in the country for ensuring security, effective governance and

unhindered economic growth. Initially, 4,000 troops from different allied countries along

with the US forces participated in the peacekeeping mission. Afterwards, in 2003 the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was given the charge to operate along with

the US military.

Despite the sound theoretical foundations of the US strategy under the Bush

administration, much less was achieved in reality. With the passage of time factors suchas loose and corrupt governmental structure, minimum presence of allied forces,

economic shortfalls, alienation of Pashtuns and increasing gap between the centre and the

general population, led to the resurgence of Taliban in 2006. The Taliban reasserted their

might by carrying out suicide attacks in Afghanistan. According to the Chairman, US

Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, suicide bombings in Afghanistan rose up to


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27 per cent in 2007 over 2006. Critics highlight various loopholes in the Bush policies

that led to the resurgence of Taliban. As Seth Rosen writes, there has been a neglected

war in Afghanistan impaired by insufficient resources, troops, planning and

oversight.(4)Facing a resurgent Taliban, the Obama administration has no choice but to

chart a new path.

The security situation in Afghanistan worsened in the year 2008. Admiral

Mullens statement in September 2008 that I am not sure were winning in

Afghanistan(5) can be seen in this context. Moreover, the New York Times in October

2008 described Afghanistan as being in a downward spiral. There were more casualties

among allied forces which led to a drastic decline in support for the war against terrorism

in the US general public. Consequently, the US presidential candidates were judged on

their proposed policy for tackling the war against terrorism.

Hence, the catchphrase change touted by Barack Obama was seen as a catalyst

of betterment which eventually made him the 44thAmerican president. It was anticipated

that a substantial change in the US policy towards Afghanistan would take place.

President Obama after conducting a six-week long strategic review of previous policies

announced his new Af-Pak Policy on 27 March 2009. The policy outlined a clear

objective of the US presence in Afghanistan, as President Obama said: I want the

American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt,

dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.(6)

The new strategy also included the tribal areas of Pakistan in mapping of battle

space by the US forces. It provided for deploying more troops in Afghanistan,

marshalling aggressive support to Pakistan for eliminating Taliban, and mobilizing

regional actors to take part in disrupting al-Qaeda. Another review was conducted on the

basis of the report presented by Gen Stanley McChrystal, appointed as Commander of USand NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2009. Hence, another detailed version of President

Obamas policy was presented on 1 December 2009.


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Towards democracy

After successful execution of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan

which resulted in toppling the Taliban regime, the international community put its efforts

towards democratizing Afghanistan. In the early years of the post-Taliban Afghanistan,

the Bush administration did not endeavour to take part explicitly in establishing

democracy in Afghanistan. Later, president Bush changed course and started advocating

the value of democracy and eventually established close linkages with Hamid Karzai, the

Afghan president.

In the post-Taliban era, various ethnic groups gathered to get a share in

government. The most prominent among them is the Pashtun group. The other ethnic

groups include Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras represented in a grand group generally known

as the Northern Alliance, another influential group in the country. According to figures

provided by the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Pashtuns

constitute almost 50-55 per cent of the total population.(7) They have been traditional

rulers of the country. Ahmed Shah Durrani and Mohammad Zahir Shah, who ruled the

country as king after the death of his father Nadir Shah from 1933 to 1973, were the most

influential Pashtuns in the history of Afghanistan.

The Northern Alliance was constituted as an antidote to the Taliban regime. This

grouping basically comprises Tajiks and Uzbeks and Mongol Muslims of Herat of Shia

sectthe Hazaras. They all gathered along with the US to bring the Taliban to book.(8)

There are three main players in the alliance: the Tajiks are represented by Jamat-e-Islami

led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Uzbeks by Jumbish-i-Milli-e-Islami led by General

Abdul Rashid Dostum, while the Shia Muslims are represented by Hizb-i Wahdat led by

Karim Khalili and Haji Mohaqiq.(9) Another important group, which is pro-Taliban is

represented by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He is currently considered one of the three most

important insurgent leaders, along with Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani.(10)

The Tajik group in the Northern Alliance became most influential in the post-

Taliban Afghanistan. It was well represented by Mohammad Fahim, Abdullah Abdullah,

and Younus Qanooni.(11) This Tajik triumvirate remained dominant in all political

arrangements of post-Taliban Afghanistan.


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Supporting the enemys opposition

The initial strategy adopted by the Bush administration was to support opposition

of the enemy (Taliban). The Northern Alliance which fought along with the US forces

against Taliban was highly favoured by Washington. The Alliance relies on a core of

some 15,000 Tajik and Uzbek troops. They have a stronghold over the northeastern part

of Afghanistan which comprise the Badakhshan province, the eastern Takhar province,

the Panjshir Valley and part of the Shomali plain north of Kabul.(12)

a) Favouring the unfavoured

Abdul Rashid Dostum and Burhanuddin Rabbani (of Northern Alliance), the two

prominent figures in the post-Taliban Afghanistan, come from a bleak past of terror and

intimidation. It was believed that the former king, Zahir Shah would be rendered to

power as people were tired of both, the Taliban as well as the Northern Alliance. The

reign of Northern Alliance after the Soviet withdrawal was a big disappointment for the

local population.(13)However, the later developments again made the Northern Alliance

the most prominent political group in the country. The first manifestation of depending

on Northern Alliance was seen during the Bonn Conference.

b) Bonn agreement

In November 2001, the Bush administration depended on the United Nations

(UN) to forge efforts for establishing a democratic government in Afghanistan. On 14

November 2001, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1378 which mandated a

central role to the UN in establishing a transitional administration and inviting

member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of

humanitarian assistance.(14)

Hence, at the invitation of the UN in late November 2001 prominent Afghan

political factions gathered at Bonn. The Northern Alliance and some representatives of

King Zahir Shah dominated the conference. An agreement was concluded under which an

interim government headed by Hamid Karzai was established which was supposed to

tackle the governmental affairs till the holding of Loya Jirga (gathering of tribal elders

and leading politicians) in June 2002.


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The cabinet constituted of 30 members, out of which 17 positions were held by

the Northern Alliance. Key positions of Ministry of Interior (Younus QanuniTajik),

Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah Half Tajik and half Pashtun) and Defense

(Mohammad Fahim, Tajik) also went to members of the Alliance. King Zahir Shahs

representatives secured eight ministries in the interim administration, including the

Finance, Education and Reconstruction posts.(15)The Bonn agreement called for a broad-

based, multi-ethnic and fully representative government. It also mandated creation of a

central bank, a supreme court, and an independent human rights commission for the

convening of an emergency Loya Jirga by June 2002 which had to decide on a new

transitional government.(16)

a) Loya Jirga 2002

In June 2002, a Loya Jirga was organized under the auspices of the UN. It was

attended by almost 1,500 delegates representing various ethnic groups while some elders

were nominated by the village-level councils (shuras).(17) Ironically Burhanuddin

Rabbani and King Zahir Shah withdrew from the presidential contest. This decision was

seen with scepticism in various circles as the popular will at that time was in favour of

King Zahir Shah to assume the responsibility of head of state. Hamid Karzais extensive

Table 1(18)

Ethnic Representation in Interim Government of post-Taliban Afghanistan

Ethnic groups Total number of ministries

Northern Alliance 17

Rome Group

Representatives of

King Zahir Shah

8

Pashtuns 2, (Ministry of Finance given to a Pashtun but he belongedto the Rome Group)

meetings with Zahir Shah before the convention of the jirga are also seen with suspicion

in this context.(19)


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On 13 June 2002, Karzai was selected as the head of the government. The Loya

Jirga tried to address the ethnic differences. Pashtuns were given a significant

representation in the new government. Out of 30 ministries 13 were allocated to

Pashtuns. One minister, among them, Arif Nurzai, was Pashtun but from a Tajik-

dominated party. He was given the borders portfolio. However, among those 13 only two

important ministries of Interior and Finance were given to Pashtuns. Critics believe that

by allotting the Ministry of Defence to Mohammad Fahim (Tajik) the dominance of

Tajiks over defence-related affairs was ensured as the Ministry of Interior has to depend

upon the Ministry of defence for ensuring internal security. This decision clearly violated

the spirit of democracy, as no significant governmental seat was given to Pashtun, the

majority ethnic group in Afghanistan.

Various analysts disapproved this sheer neglect of the Pashtun community and

referred to it as the main reason for unsuccessful government performance. M.K.

Bhadrakumar, a senior analyst, said that thesingle most important contradiction in the

Afghan situation is the inability to evolve a credible vehicle for Pashtun aspirations.(20)

In later years the US has accepted this fatal mistake of not forming a unified central

Afghan government. The Taliban, who are mainly Pashtuns, were not invited to the Loya

Jirga.

The Rome Group lost their seats allotted in the interim government. It again gave

dominance to the Tajiks. But Zahir Shahs representative acknowledged the waning

political influence of his group by saying that if you are Father of the Nation, (as Zahir

Shah has been named) you are father of all, not just one group.He also made it clear that

his groups mission was to return the former king from exile and convene a Loya Jirga

and as the objectives had been achieved; the group no longer longed to exist.(21)

The country was rife with suspicions about the Loya Jirga. Dr. Omar Zakhilwal,an economics professor in Ottawa University who was a member of Loya Jirga clearly

stated that the popular opinion was in favour of King Zahir Shah, but he waspersuaded

by officials of interim government, as well as the US and the UN to step down from the

political scene of Afghanistan. He said that people wanted an end to the brutal regime of

warlords yet they were in power again, General Fahim being the symbol of


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Afghanistans violent past was again prominent on the political stage.(22) Instead of

establishing democracy and giving importance to public opinion, tools of intimidation

were used to form a government of choice by the international community and the US.

Two eminent expatriate Afghans, Adeena Niazi, president of the Afghan

Womens Association of Ontario, and Omar Zakhilwal, in a joint comment published by

the International Herald Tribune, have criticized Karzai for inducting into his cabinet

three powerful commanders of the Northern Alliance, who according to them were the

very forces responsible for countless brutalities under the former Mujahideen

government. They believe that the Karzai cabinet is not only weighted in favour of

Tajiks instead of Pashtuns but also filled with warlords.(23) The most serious

allegation they make is negligence of the popular sentiment favouring King Zahir Shah as

the head of state, who was eventually removed from having any significant role in

government. Zakhilwal and Niazi also maintain that when the Jirga reassembled after a

two-day break it was found teeming with intelligence agents who openly threatened

reform-minded delegates specially women.(24) However, the two Afghan intellectuals

wish to believe that the seeds of democracy planted by the Loya Jirga would, hopefully,

take root and flourish. It is widely believed that Karzai had come under pressure to

accommodate the warlords and share the decision-making process with them.(25)Who

exerted pressure has not been spelled out, but it is clear that the Americans, more than

any other group, exercised a great deal of influence on the proceedings of the Loya Jirga.

This could not be seen as a happy portent.

Amid suspicions and reservations of various ethnic groups in Afghanistan the

transitional government was installed with the consent of the US and under the auspices

of the UN. This transitional government was supposed to function until the drafting of a

new constitution under which elections were to be conducted in 2004.b) Transitional government 2002-2004

The main task at hand for the Karzai government was the handling of the

worsening security situation together with the formidable task of building a shattered

state. Though Karzai was a popular Pashtun in Afghanistan, yet lack of sufficient

participation of even the Pashtuns in the government made the transitional government


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less effective and hence undermined the very spirit of transition to democracy the real

objective of forming a transitional government.

With the consent of the Loya Jirga a few changes were made in the Karzai

government.(26) Earlier, the Northern Alliance was predominantly represented in the

government which created a feeling of alienation among the Pashtuns. But even in the

transitional government, the Pashtuns were not effectively represented. Only one

important portfolio, Ministry of Finance, was given to Ashraf Ghani , who represented

the Pashtun belt. However the most important ministry, that of Defence, once again went

to Fahim, who was also given an additional position of vice-president. The new cabinet

included two vice-presidents (including Fahim) none of whom was a Pashtun, and several

presidential advisers.(27)

Table 2(28)

Changes made by Loya Jirga 2002

Before Loya Jirga After Loya Jirga

Hedayat Amin Arsala (Finance Minister)

Abdul Rashid Dostum, who served as

deputy defence minister in the interim

government,

No vice-presidents in the interim

government

Ashraf Ghani (A Pashtun sworn in as new

finance minister

was offered no formal post in the new

administration

A National Security Council was formed as

an advisory body to Karzai

The cabinet included two vice-presidents.

a) Marshal Muhammad Fahim

(a Tajik)

b) Karim Khalili (leader of a faction

of Hazara Shiite party, Hizb-e-

Wahdat)


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It is also ironic to note that the Bonn agreement did not mention any way for

forming the cabinet. It referred only to the Loya Jirga approving the "key personnel" in a

new government without defining who those personnel are, which eventually rendered

unauthorized power to various factions for manoeuvring and exerting influence in the

new governmental arrangement.(29)

Later developments indicated that Karzai did not trust Fahim as the guardian of

his own security. In August 2002 , change in Karzais security guards with US special

forces after the death of Haji Abdul Qadir (a Pashtun who was appointed a vice-president

and head of Ministry of Public Affairs in 2002 ) clearly indicated a rift between President

Karzai and the defence minister.(30)

In such a scenario when the president was wary of his own cabinet how could the

security of the entire country be assured? The Bush administration remained silent over

the chaos created in the Afghan government and continued to optimize use of force

against the Taliban remnants. This neglect created a structural gap in the government.

Hence a loose governmental structure was installed which was unable to tackle the

governance issues the country was facing. It was quite contrary to what was intended.

The defective governance had various problems to face.

Politically, effective representation of all ethnic groups became inherently

difficult. According to a recent survey conducted by the US Central Intelligence

Authority (CIA), there are almost 42 per cent Pashtuns, in Afghanistan who constitute the

basic bulk of population. To the chagrin of all other ethnic groups Pashtuns and Tajiks

are decisively dominant.(31)


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Table 3(32)

Ethnic groups in Afghanistan

Various warlords were also included in the government but their true willingness

to submit to the central authority could not be guaranteed.(33)Another problem was the

absence of a proper constitution which could address the problems of the post-Taliban

Afghanistan. The Bonn conference promulgated the 1963 constitution to run the state

affairs until a new constitution was drafted.

b) Constitutional arrangement

The Loya Jirga held in June 2002 put a representative approval on the transition.

It was attended by 1,550 delegatesincluding about 200 womenfrom Afghanistans

364 districts. Subsequently, a 35-member Constitutional Commission drafted the

permanent constitution, unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates

selected in the UN-run caucuses, at a Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) held from 13

December 2003-4 January 2004. The CLJ ended with approval of the final Constitution

for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

Tajik 27 %

Hazara

9 %

Uzbek

9%

Ajmak

4 %Turkmen

3 %

Other

4 %

Baloch2%

Pashtuns 42%


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The Northern Alliance failed in its effort to set up a prime ministership but they

did achieve a fallback objective of putting checks on presidential powers by assigning

major authorities to the elected parliament such as the power to veto senior official

nominees and to impeach a president. The Constitution made former King Zahir Shah

honorary Father of the Nation, a title that is not inheritable (Zahir Shah died on 23 July

2007). The constitution also set out timetables for presidential, provincial and district

elections by June 2004 and stipulated that, if possible, they should be held

simultaneously.(34)

Though the Bonn agreement and the Loya Jirga laid the foundation of a central

authority in Afghanistan, yet the gaps in the social fabric of the nation could not be

bridged. Warlordism, ethnic differences and lack of a unified national ideology created

more chaos. It became almost impossible to satisfy all the ethnic groups of the country.

Despite having an unavoidable predicament of bringing together all diversified groups in

the nation, the Bush administration and the international community called for elections

in Afghanistan.(35)

c) Elections 2004

President Karzai sought to hold elections by June 2004 but owing to deteriorating

security situation, presidential elections were delayed until October and parliamentary,

provincial and district level elections were to be held in April-May 2005. On 9 October,

presidential elections were held. While the contest was on, various cities were targeted by

the insurgents with rockets. Though there were no serious casualties, yet an atmosphere

of fear gripped people across the country.(36)

Ironically, 15 out of 18 presidential candidates pulled out of the contest and

boycotted the elections with accusations of irregularities; two others withdrew in favour

of Hamid Karzai, leaving him as the only candidate in the field. Abdul Satar Serat, acontender, accused election authorities of favouring the US-backed Karzai. Several

charges of rigging were levelled including the accusation that people were forced to elect

Hamid Karzai.(37)Karzai vowed to accept the verdict of the people, who voted for him

despite rain, snow and the duststorm.(38)


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On 2 December 2004, American vice-president Dick Cheney and his wife

attended President Hamid Karzais inauguration.(39) Though the elections were largely

considered rigged, yet the show of unprecedented support to Karzaias the high-profile

US leader, Cheney, attended his inauguration ceremony clearly indicated that the

American ambitions in Afghanistan were other than democratizing the country. Hence, a

new phase of US strategy started which enhanced the direct link of the Karzai regime

with the Bush administration.

Strengthening the central government

President Bush said in a joint press conference with President Karzai held on 23

May 2005: I am honored to stand by the first democratically -elected leader in the five-thousand-year history of Afghanistan I've got faith in this man as a leader. He has

shown tremendous courage in the face of difficult odds. He's been a strong leader; he's a

good friend to our country(40)

The same day both presidents signed a long-term memorandum of understanding

showing US commitment for reconstruction assistance, including the ongoing training

provided by the US to Afghan military and the police.(41)Since 2004, the main strategy of

the Bush administration was to strengthen the central government by helping Karzai to

curb key regional strongmen and local militia. Gradually Karzai started to marginalize

the regional strongmen. For instance, Ismail Khan was removed as Heart governor in

September 2004, before the elections, and was also not given any post in the government

after the 2004 elections. Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mohammad Fahim were also first

inducted and then deducted from the central government. Two other prominent

militia leaders, Hazrat Ali and Khan Muhammad, were given civilian police chief posts

in 2005.(42)

Appointment as police chiefs reduced some warlords potential to influence the

people as in service they had to abide by governmental rules and regulations. Here it can

also be assumed that for marginalizing the regional leaders, Karzai was the best option

available to the US which made them to support him relentlessly. However, later


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developments showed that supporting Karzai by violating democratic principles was not

a good idea.

In 2006, the security situation in Afghanistan became alarming for the

international community and the US. The Taliban stepped up their operational capability

and began threatening the very existence of the Afghan government. Analysts believe

that the Taliban resurgence is not possible without the support of local population.

Therefore, another strategy was adopted by the Bush administration in 2008, which gave

importance to strengthening local governance to bridge the gap between the people and

the central government.

a) Improving local governance

Since the beginning of 2008, the Bush administration reflected a shift from

strengthening the central government strategy to enhancing the local governance

strategy. It was another step to strengthen the central government by bridging the gap

between the people and the government. By bringing the locals from the grassroots-level

into the central governmental structure the legitimacy of the central government could be

achieved.

The plan included the rebuilding of the shuras (traditional local councils) to help

local people speak for their rights. The most significant action taken in this regard was

the establishment of Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). It was

formed in 2007 to institute a system for selecting governors and district leaders in order

to take this function away from the Interior Ministry. IDLG also initiated governments

Social Outreach Programme intended to ensure closer connections between tribes and

localities and the central government. The programme included small payments of $200

per month to the tribal and other participants in an attempt to persuade them to inform the

people about the threat posed by the Taliban resurgence. The US provided almost $100million to the IDLG programme.(43)Despite efforts to strengthen the central government

and help it gain control over the country, the Karzai regime remained ineffective and

corrupt. Hence, every attempt to reconstruct Afghanistan remained confined as

governance as well as the security situation could not be improved.


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Karzai and the USat odds

President Obama after assuming power gave first priority to Afghanistan and

initiated strategic reviews to address the problem. He came with a clear objective of

defeating and dismantling al-Qaeda and the stress is not on state-building or resolving

the politically motivated ethnic disputes. The new US envoy for Pakistan and

Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, has been very critical of Karzais shortcomings a

sharp departure from the Bush days. Therefore it was believed in the beginning that

Obama's arrival in the White House and the wind of change sweeping through

Washington could lead to the Karzais ouster from presidency.(44)

It was a ripe time for such a change as international support for Karzai, who was

once highly favoured, had waned spectacularly because of worsening security situation,

endemic corruption and weak leadership. The economy was also in a bad shape. Poverty

was rampant with almost 53 per cent people living below the poverty line.(45) The

presidents younger brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, who worked in a convenience store in

the US before Talibans ouster, is now a multimillionaire. He is said to have profited

immensely from the opium trade in his native Kandahar province.(46)But reality turned

out to be different in the second elections in Afghanistan and President Obamas

judgment about the countrys future was put to test.

Election 2009

President Karzais term was to expire on 22 May 2009, and according to the

Constitution(47)which calls for commencement of elections within 30 to 60 days before

the end of presidential term(Article 61), the elections were supposed to be held on 23

April. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) set 20 August 2009 as the election

date, and cited another article (Article 33)(48)of the Constitution to justify the delay. IEC

claimed that it was difficult for the commission to register voters, print ballots, train staff

and launch a public awareness campaign by 23 April.(49)

The United Front(50)objected strongly to the IEC decision and said it would not

recognize Karzais government after 22 May. Karzai in response directed that the IEC set

election date in accordance with the constitution yet again the election commission stuck


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to the date. Later this decision was also endorsed by the Supreme Court. The Obama

administration also backed the decisions of the IEC and the Supreme Court, undermining

the criticism of the political parties.(51)

Mohammad Fahim, who is considered as a symbol of tyranny, was chosen as

Karzais running mate. His second mate, Karim Khalili is also a warlord. Critics like

Griff Witte consider the re-election of Karzai as another chance for warlords to exert their

power for five more years.(52)Micheal OHanlon says that Afghanis were not enthusiastic

about the elections and were only mildly optimistic about Afghanistans future. (53)

The poll, conducted by the International Republican Institute, a nonprofit pro-

democracy group affiliated with the Republican Party and financed by the American

government, found that only 31 per cent of Afghans said they would vote for Karzai

again, far less than in 2004, when he won with 54 per cent of the vote. Fewer than half

43 per centof the population said that Karzais performance warranted re-election.(54)

Doubts could not be dispelled till the date of elections. Some Afghans frequently

expressed their belief that Washington would decide about the leadership in Afghanistan

like before. The 20 August presidential election turned out to be a bigger charade than the

one held five years ago. In 2004 a considerable number of people turned out to vote. But

this time around people were distrustful of the legitimacy of the election process as seven

members of the IEC were appointed by the incumbent president. Other than the trust

deficit, Afghans were fiercely threatened by Taliban that if they went to vote they would

chop off their fingers. Richard Holbrooke, who was in Afghanistan in the last week of

August, is reported to have told Karzai that the scale of ballot stuffing on his behalf was

unacceptable. It was officially maintained that the turnout was between 40 and 50 per

cent. This figure is said to be grossly inflated.(55) The New York Times reported that

Afghans loyal to President Karzai set up hundreds of fictitious polling sites where no onevoted but where hundreds of thousands of ballots were recorded towards the presidents

re-election.(56)

However, Abdullah Abdullah, the main opponent of Karzai, refused to accept the

election result. Therefore, under tremendous pressure a re-election was launched by IEC

to be held on 7 November. But later, on 1 November, Abdullah withdrew from the
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contest and Karzai was announced as the president of Afghanistan for the next five years.

Abdullah said that he asked Karzai to change the election commission officials but

Karzai refused.(57)

Karzai was again sworn in as Afghanistans president for the next five years

amid allegations of fraud and manipulation. Obama administrations capability to deal

with the growing insurgency, corrupt governmental structure, worsening security

situation and sheer decline in support for the war against terrorism among Afghan and

American public, is put to test. The stakes are high; however, the means to achieve the

goal of eliminating al-Qaeda are decisively low. Once again analysts called for putting in

an earnest effort for state-building in Afghanistan, which the predecessor administration

claimed was its objective.

State building under fire

In the post-Taliban Afghanistan the first question that perturbed the US and the

international community was how to set about building the alarmingly shattered state.

The US did not adhere to this task in the early years of post-Taliban Afghanistan, and

remained more concerned about controlling the security situation in the country. After the

fall of Taliban the incapacity on part of the US and the international community to pursue

a comprehensive strategy resulted in a chaotic scenario where neither security could be

maintained nor state-building efforts bore fruit. Both tasks were carried out

simultaneously, without ensuring coordination among the two which eventually led to a

sheer failure of the whole effort.

In this perplexing situation the US strategy towards state-building in Afghanistan

remained paradoxical. Washington alternatively adopted various approaches, but all of

them were destined to be ad hoc and temporary. The strategies followed by the US can be

categorized as under:

Hit the target

Ensure security and leave the rest

Build the means to achieve the end

Build the state to make it a self governing entity


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Two fold approach

Hit the target

Initially, the Bush administration concentrated on hitting the enemy hard. Highlysophisticated technology was used to defeat al-Qaeda. Major combat in Afghanistan,

namely Operation Enduring Freedom, began on 7 October 2001 which included

extensive air raids on Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. The operation was facilitated by

cooperation among 1,000 US Special Operation Force along with about 1,300 US

Marines, Northern Alliance troops and the local anti-Taliban militia.(58)

The light footprint strategy of the US remained predominant in the first five

years of the war. The Bush administration relied mainly on Afghan militia to fightremnants of Taliban. The lack of any coherent and formidable strategy in Afghanistan led

to far-reaching consequences in the later years. It is also believed that the US reliance on

Afghan militia helped Osama bin Laden to escape.(59)

After hitting hard at the target which only helped in dispersal of Taliban forces

into their hideouts, the Bush administration relied on the UN and the international

communitys efforts for stabilization and state-building. As Condoleezza Rice said while

referring to the war in Afghanistan that Americans should fight wars and Europe shouldbuild peace, terming the strategy as new division of labour.(60)President Bush said in

2002, it is now time for the international community to take strong, visible steps to

begin Afghanistans physical reconstruction.(61)

Therefore, international community was given the charge of state-building in

Afghanistan. Eventually, the UN sponsored Bonn Agreement was concluded to establish

an interim government. In the agreement it was provided that the international

community shall help Afghanistan to establish and train a security force and the UN was

requested to mandate an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist in the

maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could be

expanded to cover other urban centres and other areas. It was also mentioned in the

agreement that ISAF could assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistans infrastructure.(62)


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ISAF was given under the command of the United Kingdom, with forces and

assets from 18 different countries.(63)Initially, almost 5,000 troops were deployed under

the banner of ISAF in Afghanistan.(64) ISAF was mandated to conduct security and

stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security

Forces (ANSF). In addition, ISAF helped to bring the Afghan National Army (ANA) up

to operating capability in support of the US which sponsored the overall ANA training

and equipping programme through its Combined Security Transition Command

Afghanistan (CSTC-A) programme. It also provided that ISAF would help and assist

Afghanistan National Police (ANP).(65)

However, despite making arrangements for ensuring security in the country and

establishing the interim government, there was an utter need for a consolidated command

structure in Afghanistan to coordinate the ISAF operations and to utilize the security

forces for facilitating the reconstruction programmes of United Nations Assistance

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Troop numbers and contributions (ISAF)(66)


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Secondly, ISAF was unable to operate effectively, as it had to change its

command on rotational basis from one nation to another and had to set its headquarters

accordingly.(67)A proposal for ISAF expansion was made to deal with the growing

challenges in the problematic society of Afghanistan. It is documented that even before

the Iraq invasion plan Gen Collin Powell, US secretary of state, proposed that American

forces should join the ISAF peacekeeping force in Afghanistan to help ISAF in expansion

beyond Kabul but defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld immediately rejected the

proposal.(68)

Joseph Biden, the then Senator and current US vice-president warned that,

America has replaced the Taliban with the warlords. Warlords are still on the US payroll

but that hasnt brought a cessation of violence. Not only is the US failing to rein in the

warlords, we are actually making them the centerpiece of our strategy. Why does the

Administration steadfastly resist any expansion of ISAF when everyone has called for an

expansion of ISAF.(69)

Notwithstanding the calls for strengthening the structural capacity of the country

and the expansion of ISAF (which was not done until 2006) for ensuring security, the

Bush administration continued to use warlords for fighting Taliban. The public opinion

turned against the American forces for those who came as liberators became the

supporter of conventional oppressors, the warlords.

Ensure security and leave the rest

In 2003, a realization emerged in the Bush administration to take hold of the

security situation and eventually ISAF was given under the command of NATO in

August 2003. There were no troops from the US in ISAF in the beginning. President

Karzai pleaded several times for raising troop strength but president Bush ignored his

calls.(70)But later predicaments in dealing with the Taliban led to a policy shift in which

the Bush administration consciously focused on ensuring security. Currently, about

62,415 troops have been deployed by the United States in the NATO-led ISAF.(71)

For further improving the security standard and facilitating developmental works,

a Security Sector Reforms (SSR) programme was launched with the support of


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international community. Here again the US took hold of the military reforms. It was

formally established in April 2002 at a security donors conference in Geneva,

Switzerland. Afghanistans SSR agenda consists of five pillars, each supported by a

different donor state: military reform (US); police reform (Germany); the disarmament,

demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants DDR (Japan); judicial reform

(Italy); and counter-narcotics reform (UK).(72)

The US strategy remained focused on enhancing security in Afghanistan. The

Bush and Obama administrations largely emphasized the need for strengthening Afghan

National Security Forces (ANSF). The reformation was conducted in parallel with the

SSR programme and backed by international community.

a) Security sector reforms

The SSR stipulated the creation of an Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan

National Police (ANP) and a reformed judiciary system. It is defined as, the set of

policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way

it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services

in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent,

accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.(73)

The SSR also included the DDR programme which aimed at collecting weapons

from the former combatants and reintegrating them for the purpose of Afghan security.

With all its five pillars the SSR had been the flagship of the Bonn process for rebuilding

Afghanistans security forces and law enforcement.(74)

b) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Initially, the DDR programme succeeded in demobilizing over 62,000 factional

militiamen and collected over 36,000 small arms recovered nearly all heavy weapons

from them between 2002 and 2005. The second phase of the DDR began in 2006 thattargeted nearly 2,000 illegal armed groups under the Disbandment of Illegal Armed

Groups Programme (DIAG). Despite success in collecting weapons from the former

combatants, reintegrating them effectively in the Afghan social fabric remained an

arduous task. Later, the reemergence of Taliban in 2006 slowed down the DIAG


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programme and compelled the government to rearm the militias as auxiliary police to

fight against the insurgents.(75)

DDR was an effective step taken by the Bush administration with the support of

international community. It helped in demilitarization of the Afghan nationals; however,

lack of any alternative opportunity to earn livelihood for those who withdrew from

militias, once again attracted the Afghan nationals towards the Taliban insurgents.

c) Building a NationalArmy and Police

To ensure security it was also decided to create a 70,000-strong Afghan National

Army (ANA). Training was to be provided by the Americans and French. Building of the

Afghan National Army (which also includes Army Air corps) was given tremendous

importance under the SSR programme. By 2006, 30,000 troops were trained and

equipped. In March 2009 the Pentagon measured the size of the ANA at nearly 83,000.(76)

In March 2009 the Obama administration announced a significant increase to

about 134,000 troops in ANA. Experts call it a turn in US strategy where the

administration is seeking the involvement of more Afghan nationals in the security of

their territory.(77)

Table 4

Number of troops in ANA(78)

Bush and Obama Administrations

Bush Administration Obama Administration

30, 000 (2006) 83,000 (2009)

102,000(2010)

134,000 (by 2011)

The operational capacity of the ANA is not up to the mark. It is totally dependent

on the US command structure. Ironically, the ANA is subservient to the US authorities

and often operates without the consent of the Afghan military leaders.(79)

Lack of nationalist feelings in the Afghan population and the distrust of the

international forces are also pertinent factors hindering the growth of ANA as a strong

institution. Secondly, though Afghanistan is spending 1.9 per cent of its GDP(80)on the


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military development yet the unruly financial dependence of the Afghan security forces

on the US is also demoralizing the Afghan nationals. Consequently, in nine years of post-

Taliban period the security structure in Afghanistan could not be improved.

Building Afghan National Police was another formidable task of the SSR

programme. Though there was a dire need to develop the police in a war-torn society, yet

little attention was paid to it. In 2004, the Bush administration emphasized the need for

developing the ANP. Over 60,000 men were trained at initial level. Later, in 2006 a new

US-sponsored ANP development programme was initiated. The programme adopted a

three-pronged strategy to improve the plight of the Afghan police such as (1) increasing

their salaries, (2) equipping them with better ammunitions and (3) providing them with

better training.(81)

Build the means to achieve the ends:

Years of social engagement

In later years from 2004 to 2008, a shift in US policy towards putting greater

emphasis more on state-building to make security operations feasible was seen. Since the

international community failed to provide relief, there was utter disapproval among the

locals about the ongoing military operation on their territory, as they were bitterly

affected by the misery of war. The holding of elections and drafting of constitution as

discussed earlier were two important steps taken in the name of state building. But

interestingly, the US did not take part directly in any of these pertinent tasks. Therefore,

in order to win the support of the general public a change in US operational approach

aimed at showing more social engagementalong with military presence was adopted.

On 23 May 2005, President Bush said: We'll continue to support reconstruction,

economic development and investments that will help educate and build the skills of the

Afghan people.(82)

The most significant step taken by the Bush administration to improve the lives

of Afghans and to facilitate the security operations was the establishment of Provincial

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). President Bush said, Were using Provincial

Reconstruction Teams of military and civilian experts to help local communities fight

corruption, improve governance and jumpstart their economies. Were using Agricultural


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Development Teams to help Afghan farmers feed their people and become more self-

sufficient... In all these ways, were working to ensure that our military progress is

accompanied by the political and economic gains that are critical to the success of a free

Afghanistan.(83)

Creating PRTs was a novel idea implemented in Afghanistan. It is a small

military unit comprising of 100 to 250 troops with civilian representatives, deployed in an

area for extending the authority of central government for ensuring security and

facilitating development works.(84)

PRTs were first established in 2003 to provide critical support to governments

efforts. Its main objectives were to improve security and democratic governance, to

provide essential services, and to expand economic opportunities. The US-led PRTs

constituted uniformed personnel who provided both military protection and civil affairs

support, and civilian personnel from the State Department, USAID, and the Department

of Agriculture. Afghan citizens also served in PRTs as technical experts, interpreters,

long-term stakeholders, and liaison person for link with local communities.(85) The

NATO-led ISAF also led PRTs, for supporting reconstruction and development. It

provided security in areas where reconstruction work was conducted by other national

and international actors.(86)

The Bush administrations initial light footprint strategy in Afghanistan was

later revised. Eventually, in order to direct and assist the NATO-ISAF forces in

Afghanistan, more American troops were deployed. The Obama administration has again

re-emphasized the strategy of increasing American troop level, by announcing, on 27

March 2009, sending an additional 30,000 American troops in Afghanistan and this

initiative is also combined with a civilian surge.

Table 5

US forces in Afghanistan(87)

Year No. of troops

2004 18,000


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2006 30,000

December 2008 32,000

April 2009 39,000

October 2009 65,000

2010 102,000

In these years of engagement, where troop level was increased and state-building

efforts stepped up, one significant development was the conclusion of the Afghan

Compact.

a) The Afghan Compact

In 2006, the Afghan Compact, a five-year plan between the Government of

Afghanistan and the international community, established a framework for SSR and

included the overall goals and objectives for the ANP. This agreement established the

original goal to develop a 62,000-strong professional police service committed to the rule

of law. This was later modified by the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)and a subsequent decision made by the government set the new goal for ANP aiming at

82,000 police officers.(88)

Despite all the efforts for strengthening the international and national security

forces in Afghanistan, security could not be maintained. The insufficiency of both

international and national security forces compelled the Afghan government to raise

informal militias, mostly in Pashtun areas, where the Taliban were active.(89)Nonetheless,

efforts to build the Afghan state continued in later years as well, including an initiativetaken by the Bush administration in the name of state-building which is also supported by

the Obama administration, for the improvement of the agriculture sector.

b) Improving the agricultural sector

The Bush administration started different projects involving various

multinational stakeholders for developing the agriculture sector. About 80 per cent of the


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Afghan population is associated with agriculture. USAID was given the task to renovate

the irrigation systems, build roads and to provide fertilizers and seeds to increase crop

productivity, strengthening food security and improving family income and rural

employment.(90)Agriculture contributes about 31 per cent to the gross domestic product

(GDP) of Afghanistan.(91) After 2002, the economic growth of Afghanistan was quite

satisfactory, where agriculture remained the driving force. The GDP increased by 29 per

cent without the drug money in 2002, but declined 16 per cent in 2003 and 8 per cent in

2004.(92)

These figures show a sharp decline in the GDP growth. Deteriorating security

situation has once again curtailed the independent economic growth of the country.

Afghanistan has become dependent upon continuous financial assistance from the

international community to run its affairs. The gap owing to the shift in the US strategy in

the post-Taliban Afghanistan led to serious implications. It not only slowed down the

economic growth but also boosted the opium production. The narcotic money was then

used by the Taliban to reorganize and to reemerge as a threatening force. The opium

money is estimated to be contributing 50 per cent of the GDP of the country. Its volume

in monetary terms is more than US $ 3 billion. Despite strong pressure from the

international community to contain opium production, Afghanistan produces around 92

per cent of the worlds opium.(93)

The transient efforts to build the state for winning the local Afghan support and

for facilitating the military operation were thwarted by the growing pace of insurgency.

The continually deteriorating situation underscored the need for another approach by

putting in an earnest effort to build the state, which has never been done in true spirit so

far.

Build the state making it a self governing entity

In the last years of Bush administrations second term, four comprehensive

policy reviews were conducted by top civil and military figures. Im not convinced

were winning it inAfghanistan, Adm. Mike Mullen,chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff, told the Congress during the time the review was under way. Yet he emphasized, I

am convinced we can.(94)

Though there was realization among some administration officials that it was

essential to have a governing and beneficial Afghan state where the US could pursue its

long-term objectives. For instance, Madeleine Albright while refereeing to the war

against terrorism suggested that full spectrum dominance on the battlefield could only

be achieved if the United States developed the capacity to rebuild the countries it

invaded.(95)

The four policy reviews however could not lead to a policy change regarding

state building in Afghanistan, though president Bush approved increasing the American

troop level there. In January 2009, about 5,000 troops were sent to Afghanistan though

Gen Mckiernan requested 30,000 more soldiers.(96)Despite acknowledging the trouble in

Afghanistan no emphasis was given to state-building. Ashley Tellis considers state-

building as the most cost effective goal because it is the only one that willguarantee

long-term security, in his opinion, any strategy whose primary objective is to hasten a

U.S. exit will fail to create the institutions necessary for Afghanistan to handle the

terrorist threat.(97)Salma Malik, a leading scholar and teacher associated with the Quaid-

i-Azam University, also endorses the idea saying: It is but inevitable for the US to

engage in reconstruction of Afghan society. As this issue by itself is a cause of further

dispute, discord and in worst case scenario all out policy failure and collapse of a fragile

society as Afghanistan.(98)

Another scholar, Gilles Dorronsoro, is also of the view that the US should leave

behind a viable Afghan government which is able to survive the withdrawal. He

acknowledges that the resources available to international community are limited for

developing institutions yet according to him, building such institutions is the onlyrealistic exit strategy.(99)Michael E. OHanlon , director of research in foreign policy,

and Hassina Sherjan , president of Aid Afghanistan for Education, argue that the US is

committed to state-building in Afghanistan because a weak Afghan state would threaten

American security.(100) Such a repercussion which links US security to that of

Afghanistan was also mentioned by President Obama in his speech on 1 December 2009.


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In November 2005, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld wrote in a directive that

stability operations in Afghanistan are a core US military mission that the Department of

Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support and he said that such operations would

receive a priority comparable to combat operation.(101) Earlier, he even turned down

Collin Powells proposal to send more troops to Afghanistan.(102)

The Obama administration also seems reluctant to concentrate on state-building

in Afghanistan which scholars believe is the only feasible option for the US to make

Afghanistan a self-sustaining and responsible state. Troop level has been increased and

there is more emphasis on controlling the security situation. Recently, the Obama

administration has also pressed President Karzai hard to put an end to corruption in his

government. Adding fuel to the deteriorating situation, President Karzai reacted by

threatening the US that he would rather join the Taliban if he was not trusted. Scholars

like Bruce Riedel clearly says that Karzai is playing to the nationalist sentiment of

Afghans; he knows that Afghans will never accept foreigners becoming their direct

decision-makers, therefore the international community is stuck with Karzai.(103)

Eventually, things have become more complicated for President Obama, whose Afghan

policy still lacks a clear directionwhether to exit or to prepare for a prolonged stay.

The 2009 elections are also considered faulty. Therefore, any strategy which

clearly addresses the question of state-building is not seen in both Bush and Obama

administrations. However, Bush used the jargon state-building only several times to

legitimize the presence of US forces in Afghanistan; but on the contrary, President

Obama is clear in his objective which is to dismantle, defeat and disrupt al-Qaeda and he

has not used the term state-building.

Twofold Approach(104)

Since the resurgence of Taliban the US is pursuing a twofold approach in

Afghanistan. First, it is heavily spending on military combats and is also increasing the

troop level in the country. Second, it is emphasizing state-building by encouraging

international assistance for reconstructing Afghanistan. The international community held

various conferences for pledging hefty amounts for rebuilding the war-ravaged country.


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Here is a table that shows some important international conferences held in the

perspective of announcing aid for Afghanistan.

Table 6(105)

International Conferences

(to raise money for reconstruction of Afghanistan)

Conference year Total amountPledged ($)

Amount pledgedby the US ($)

Tokyo Conference 2002 4.5 billion -

Berlin Conference 2004 8.2 billion 1 billion

London Conference 2006 10.5 billion 1.1 billion( planned to

ask Congress)

Paris Conference (A

Showcase of Afghanistans

Progress)

2008 - 26 billion

The table presents a comparison of the amount pledged by the international

community and the amount pledged by the US. It clearly shows that the US has remained

the major donor, yet the emphasis of US aid has been mainly on military assistance. This

is also a fact that the amount pledged by the international community is hardly delivered.There is a lot of discrepancy in what was pledged and what was actually delivered.

According to a report by Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

(ACBAR), overall $39 billion has been pledged by the international community up to

2011 but so far only 40 per cent of the amount has been spent. Only $15.18 billion has

been disbursed, $10 billion committed but not disbursed and $14 billion is pledged

only and not committed and disbursed. This indicates an overall $ 10 billion shortfall in

aid. The report also specifies that even out of the disbursed amount 40 per cent goes backto the donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries.(106)

A huge amount of aid was pledged by the international community and the US

during the Bush administration. Some of the pledged amount as mentioned above has

been spent, yet the plight of Afghanistan remains the same. The Taliban resurgence is

gaining strength as public opinion is turning against the ongoing war on terrorism, Karzai


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government is adamantly following its faulty policies and has become difficult to tackle

and the security of neighbouring countries is also at stake owing to the unending

destabilized situation in Afghanistan.

Table 7 (a)

Discrepancies in International Assistance for Afghanistan(107)

Aid pledged but not

Committed or

Disbursed (2002-11)

Aid committed but not

disbursed (2002-08)

Aid disbursed (02-08)

$14 billion $10.23 billion $15.18 billion

Table 7(b)Aid pledged

2002-08 (in $m)

Aid disbursed

2002-11 (in $m)

Percentage of pledge

fulfilled

US/USAID 22,789 5,022.9 22%

Saudi Arabia 220 76.9 35%

ADB 1,740 58 547.8 31%

China 14 .5 41 28%

Turkey 90 20.8 23%

Spain 253.29 25.6 10%

India 942.03 204.26 22%

World Bank 2,627.2 852.72 32%

Therefore, President Obama seems to strengthen this twofold approach in

another way. Stabilization will be given primacy along with boosting military might.

Two international conferences have been held since President Obama took office but

instead of pledging more loans and asking for international assistance, Obama is seekingthe support of international community on his changed approach on this unpopular

prolonged conflict. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a conference, held in The

Hague in 2009 that(108) We must... support efforts by the government of Afghanistan to

separate the extremists of al-Qaeda and the Taliban from those who have joined their

ranks not out of conviction, but out of desperation.


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administration relentlessly supported the Northern Alliance, largely despised in

Afghanistan for their brutal rule after the Soviet withdrawal. They were made a part of

the government which reduced the credibility of the US war against terrorism.On the

one hand the Bush administration supported the Northern Alliance for securing a political

settlement and on the other it supported the warlords for fighting against the Taliban. As

US mainly depended on air raids and light footprint strategy, therefore less than the

required number of US troops could not fight the Taliban remnants on ground. Thus by

favouring the unfavoured in Afghanistan, the US and the international community have

lost the local support which they had in the beginning of their mission against al-Qaeda.

After the establishment of democracy in 2004which also lacked legitimacy as

the 2004 elections were seen as riggedpresident Bush adopted a strategy to strengthen

the manufactured central government in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, the president,

became a spoiled darling of the west. Facts regarding his fast falling credibility, and

ineffective and corrupt governance were initially ignored and Bush continued with

calling him a friend and a great leader.

However, President Obama does not seem to believe in just establishing a centre-

to-centre relationship. He ordered a complete strategic review of the situation in

Afghanistan and it was conducted twice. Then he announced a strategy which has tried to

encompass all pertinent elements including the intolerance for ineffective and corrupt

governance. Though the 2009 elections were also considered rigged, yet they are not

given the cover of legitimacy. It was believed that Obama would change leadership in

Afghanistan but his pragmatic approach made him realize that owing to the ground

realitiesas Karzai has developed a strong foothold in Afghanistan the US would

have to bear with him. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is tactfully handling

Karzai and is not covering up his wrongdoings.The problematic and difficult terrain of Afghanistan was mishandled by the Bush

administration. The strategies employed remained indecisively fluctuating and no

formidable and comprehensive strategy was ever adopted. Under the banner of state-

building various approaches were formulated yet all of them were implemented half-

heartedly. To target and hit al-Qaeda hard was the first strategy executed by president


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Bush. Operation Enduring Freedom skilfully ousted the Taliban and al-Qaeda was

temporarily dismantled. But the Taliban re-emerged from their hideouts as Bush relied on

light footprint strategy hence; they were unintentionally, or maybe thoughtlessly given

space to reorganize themselves.

Sensing the chronic nature of threat to security president Bush focused on

ensuring security. However, the other pertinent and pressing task of state-building

without which security could not be assured, was left aside. Consequently, in 2003

NATO was given the command of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). But as

the Iraq war started in 2003, nothing concrete was done in 2004 and 2005. Later, in 2006

the US troop level was substantially increased from 18,000 (in 2004) to 30,000. Many

well-conceived programmes for ensuring security like DDR, SSR and DIAG were

initiated. The institutional capability of ANA and ANP were improved. No doubt, such

programmes were beneficial but the main organs, the executive, judiciary and legislature

on which the edifice of a state is erected, were not improved.

Another phase of Bushs strategy that started in 2005 onward can be described as

years of social engagement. During these years (2005-08) some temporary relief was

given to the local population primarily through PRTs, yet nothing substantial was done to

improve the functioning of the state. The Afghan Compact (later modified as ANDS) was

also concluded in the milieu of social engagement in Afghanistan.

Other strategies, which demanded an earnest commitment on the part of the US

like developing the Afghan state to the fullest (build the state to make it a self-governing

entitydiscussed earlier), were also suggested by various analysts. But such a strategy

was never and will not be implemented. State-building requires long-term commitment

and abundant resources, and the US is unable to provide that on account of economic

crunch and a changed public opinion at home which no longer favours a prolonged warwhich has claimed heavy US casualties.

Since the start of the conflict in Afghanistan, a twofold approach has always been

underway which calls for some developmentlargely by raising international assistance

and execution of military operation to be conducted side by side. But the deteriorating

security situation could not be controlled and the resurgence of Taliban has now become


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an uncontrollable and chronic phenomenon for the international coalition forces and the

US.

Various analysts believe that if the US had remained more consistent in state-

building, efforts it could have achieved the support of the local population, which is

undoubtedly imperative for winning this complex guerrilla war. Some scholars like Jean

Luc Racine therefore advocate a more balanced approach which calls for a sustainable

equilibrium between the military solution and strengthening of the Afghan state.(111)

This war is becoming more complex by the time. It has perturbed various

strategists and analysts who find themselves nowhere as far as the search of any workable

strategy for Afghanistan is concerned. The recent undignified removal of Gen

McChrystal over his sluggish remarks about President Obamas team and his policy in

Afghanistan can be seen in this context. The shift in Obama administrations policy

which calls for winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population, is the right

decision, yet the realization is seen as being too late. It is going to require a lot more

resources and a full commitment by the US as the Afghanistan problem is spilling over

and spreading like an epidemic in the neighbouring areas as well.

Peace can only be achieved if the process of state-building is carried out across

the whole spectrum, a legitimate government is established, economy is revitalized in a

self-sustaining manner and institution-building is pursued without leaving any loopholes.

Instead of concentrating on the fight in the troublesome areas of Helmand and Kandahar,

the more peaceful areas should be targeted with structural refinement. Only then could

the mushroom growth of Taliban be stopped. Otherwise, as predicted by Sir Rodric

Braithwaite, the path to the exit door is likely to be protracted, tortuous, and bloody. (112)


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Notes and References

1. Condoleezza Rice, Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a

New World, Foreign Affairs, July-August 2008.

2. Carlos, Pascual, A New American Realism, Brookings Institution, 2 December

2008.

3. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S.

Policy, Congressional Research Service, 30 April 2009

4. Seth Rosen, Less is not more in Afghanistan, World Politics Review,

Cambridge University Press, 27 March 2009. Accessed from

.

5. Katzman, op.cit., (ref. 3).

6. Barack Hussain Obama, Speech on New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

in Washington D.C, New York Times, 27 March 2007.

7. Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Patterns of Power, Strategic Comments,

International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Volume 7, Issue 10, 2001.

8. Ibid.

9. Afghanistans Northern Alliance, BBC, online 19 September 2001

10. Ibid.

11. Mohammad Fahim was defence minister of Afghanistan in 2002-2004, and also

served as vice-president in 2002-2004. He is still serving as vice-president of

Afghanistan since 2009. Abdullah Abdullah served as foreign minister in

Transitional Government of 2002 and Government term of 2004. Yunus Qanooni

served as interior minister in Interim Government and education minister in

Transitional Government of 2002-2004.

12. Afghanistans Northern Alliance, BBConline, 19 September, 2001

13. Ibid.

14. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Current Issues and US Policy, Congressional

Research Service,24 October 2009.

15. War on Terror: After the Taliban, BBC online, Archives.


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39. Vice-President and Mrs. Cheney to lead U.S. Delegation to Afghanistan

Inauguration, Whitehouse Archives, Online, 2 December 2004,

40. President Welcomes Afghan President Karzai to the White House, Whitehouse

Archives, Online, May 200541. Ibid.

42. Katzman, op.cit., (ref.3).

43. Ibid, p.18

44. Jerome Starkey and Kim Sengupta, Obama ready to cut Karzai adrift As

support for Afghan leader wanes, rivals go to Washington for meeting with new

President, in Kabul, Independent, 23 January 2009,

45. CIA Fact File, op.cit., (ref.31).

46. John Cherian, Flawed Vote, Frontline, Vol 29, Issue 19, 12-25 September 2009

47. See for details of Afghan Constitution (ref 34)

48. The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to elect and be elected. The law

regulates the conditions and means to exercise this right-Article 33 of Afghan

Constitution, op.cit.

49. Katzman, op.cit., (ref.3).

50. In April 2007, Wolesi Jirga (House of People, Lower House) Speaker Yunus

Qanooni and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani (both, like Abdullah,

are prominent ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures and former associates of the

legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masood) organized a broader (it

includes some Pashtuns) opposition bloc called the United Front (UF). For

more information see: Kenneth Katzaman, 5 June 2009, available at:

.

51. Ibid.

52. Griff Witte, A Karzai Victory Is Just the Ticket for Regional Commanders, The

Washington Post,17 June, 2009

53. Prospects for Afghanistan's Future: Assessing the Outcome of the Afghan

Presidential Election Events, Brookings Institution, 25 August 2009

54. Dexter Filkins, Poll Shows Drop in Support of Karzai as a Leader, New York

Times, 16 June 2009,

55. Cherain, op.cit., (ref.46).


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56. Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, Fake Afghan Poll Sites Favored Karzai; Official

Reports, New York Times, 6 September 2009.

57. Afghanistan elections 2009, CNN online news, 1 November 2009,

58. Katzman, op.cit., (ref.3).59. Ibid.

60. James M. Lindsay, Ivo H. Daalder Bush Has an Obligation to Build an Afghan

Peace, BrookingsInstitution, 24 November 2001,

61. President Bush Joint Statement with Japan's Prime Minister and Saudi Arabias

Foreign Minister, Whitehouse Archives, Online, 12 September 2002,

62. Text of Bonn Agreement, see .

63. NATO Chronology, NATO, Online. Accessed from:

64. Rashid, op.cit, (ref.16), p.197.

65. Information about functioning of NATO, available at: .

66. ISAF Placemat, The NATO-ISAF Placemat sets out the approximate numbers of

forces provided to ISAF by Allied and other contributing nations, the location and

lead of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the countries responsible for ISAF

Regional Commands, available at: .

67. History of NATO-ISAF in Afghanistan, Available at: .

68. Rashid, op.cit., (ref.16), p.134.

69. Text of Joseph Bidens speech reported in Biden Promises $130 million for

Security in Afghanistan,Los Angeles Times, 17 May 2002.

70. Reyko Huang, Peacekeeping in Afghanistan: Local Requests vs International

Response Centre for Defence Information, 28 February 2002. See

.

71. See .

72. Mark Sedra, Security first: Afghanistan's security sector reform process, The

Ploughshares Monitor, Volume 24, no. 4, 2003,


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73. Security Sector Reforms Reportof US Department of State, US Department of

Defense, and US Agency for International Development, (USAID), available at:

.74. Ali A Jalali, Legacy of War and Challenges of Peace Building, p.23-55 and

Robert I Roberg, Ed Building a New Afghanistan, (Washington D.C: Brooking

Institution Press, 2007), p.242.

75. Ibid.

76. Greg Bruno, Afghanistans National Security Forces,, Council on Foreign

Relations, (online) 16 April 2009

77. Ibid.

78. Source: Ali A Jalali op.cit., (ref.74), and Bruno, op.cit., (ref.76), and Keith B

Richburg, U.S. makes small strides in getting Afghan army fighting fit, but

hurdles remain, Washington Post, 1 February 2010.

79. Jalali, op.cit., (ref.74), p.34.

80. CIA Fact File, op.cit., (ref.31).

81. Jalali, op.cit., (ref.74).

82. President Bushs Speech on 23 May 2005, White House Archives, Online.

83. President Bushs Speech on 9 September 2008, White House Archives,

Available at:

.

84. Jalali, op.cit, (ref.74).

85. Information about PRTs in President Bushs era, available at:

.

86. Information about NATO in Afghanistan, available at .

87. Sources: Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,

and U.S. Policy, 1 March 2010, CRS, Kenneth Katzman, 30 April 2009, op.cit

and Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Elections Constitution and Government 25

May 2006, available at .

88. See for number of troops in ANSF: Available at .


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89. Barnett R Rubin, Afghanistans Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy,

Council on Foreign Relations,March 2006.

90. See Whitehouse Archives, Available at: .91. See for statistics, CIA Fact File, op.cit., (ref.31).

92. See for statistics, World Bank, Country profiles available online.

93. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Afghanistan; Weak State and Regional Security, Seminar

Papers May 2008, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.

94. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shankar Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan

Policy, Exposing Points of Contention,New York Times,22 September 2008

95. Madeleine Albright, Bridges, Bombs or Bluster, Foreign Affairs, September-

October 2003.

96. Katzman, 30 April 2009, op.cit., (ref.3).

97. Ashley Tellis, Alexander Neil and Pothier Fabrice Strategies for Afghanistan.

Carnegie, Endowment for Peace, 26 February 2009,

98. Interview taken on email from Salma Malik, Assistant Professor in the

Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University,

Islamabad, 1 June 2010.

99. Gilles Dorronsoro, Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,

Carnegie, Endowment for Peace, January 2009.

100. Micheal OHanlon, Five Myths About Afghanistan, Brookings Institution, 13 April

2010.

101. Ibid.

102. Donald Rumsfelds earlier disapproval of sending more American troops in

Afghanistan can be compared. Rashid, op.cit, (ref.16), p.134.

103. Bruce Riedel, Stuck with Karzai, Brookings Institution, 13 April 2010.

104. Term used by Ashley Tellis, refers to greater investment in both military and non-

military resources including state building and targeting terrorist sanctuaries in

Pakistan, Dorronsoro, Focus and Exit, op.cit., (ref.99).

105. Sources: Year after Bonn, Dawn 4 December 2002, and Conference at Bonn

available at

and International conference raises $8.2 billion for Afghanistan's recovery UN

accessed from


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&NewsID=10295>, and World Pledges $10.5 bn for rebuilding Afghanistan, The

News, 2 February 2006.

106. Ibid.

analysing state building efforts in afghanistan

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