Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002

Public Law 107-327

Inayet Hadi

Professor Gage PAD 5001, Section 001

December 14, 2006

Afghanistan Freedom 22 Table of Contents Executives Summary 3 Legislative History I. Historical Background 4 II. House's Committee on International Relations (HCIR) Action 7 III. Committee of the Whole Takes Action 8 IV. Senate Action 10 Provisions of the Law VI. Title I Economic and Democratic Development Assistance for

Afghanistan 13

VII. Title II Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other Foreign Countries and International Organizations

17

VIII. Title II Miscellaneous Provisions 20 IX. Analysis of Impact 21 Bibliography 25

Afghanistan Freedom 33

Executive Summary

This paper reviews the background and legislative history of P.L. 107-327, short

title “Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002,” which was passed on December 04,

2002, and provided military and humanitarian support to the new Afghanistan

government. The Act has three titles with a total of nineteen sections. The first title

addresses economic and development assistance for Afghanistan. The second title

focuses on military assistance for Afghanistan and certain other foreign countries and

international organizations involved in Afghanistan. The last title concentrates on

miscellaneous provisions, such as, forbidden the United States government helping drug

traffickers. It also supports providing body guard services to President Karzai, and

encouraging other nations to disburse the funds pledged to Afghanistan during the first

international conference held in Tokyo, Japan after the Bonn Agreement.

The turbulent political and civil strife Afghanistan faced over the past three

decades did not end with the enactment of public law 107-327 “Afghanistan Freedom

Support Act of 2002.” The Act formalized the framework from which the United States

justified its involvement in Afghanistan after the Taliban government was removed from

political power. The Act became a guiding principle for the United States government to

ensure Afghanistan does not again becomes a safe haven for the enemies of the United

States.

The introduction of House Resolution 3994 in the House of Representatives, and

its referral to the Committee on International Relations on the same day was swift and

quick because of Congress’s concern with placing a policy framework to guide the

Afghanistan Freedom 44 Executive branch actions in Afghanistan. The introduced bills in the House, and

subsequent Senate approved version did not differ dramatically, nor were there any major

disagreements between the Senate and House versions of the Bill.

The impact of the Act on the reconstruction sector of Afghanistan was considered

phantom reconstruction, where the reconstruction is of low quality not having any

substantive effect on the targeted areas or people. The majority of the aid for Afghanistan

reconstruction never left US soil. The aid was disbursed to high priced US consultants,

firms, and organizations that did not achieve either long or short term benefits to the

people of Afghanistan in regards to the reconstruction and development field.

Legislative History

Historical Background

The withdrawal of Soviet (i.e. Russian) troops from Afghanistan in 1989 resulted

in a civil war against the communist government. By 1992, the western backed

opposition forces toppled the Afghan communist government. The various Afghan

opposition forces that toppled the communist government could not agree on sharing

power peacefully, because each group wanted to be the first among the many. As a

consequence a brutal internecine civil war was fought between the various factions that

toppled the communist government. After nearly seven years of civil war the Afghan

people were sick and tired of war, and insecurity in Afghanistan. This was one reason

that the Taliban group was able to assert political control vast areas in such a short period

of time by promising to end civil war, and bring order, peace, and security to the Afghan

people. The Taliban initial existence as a group started in 1995 by taking over Kandahar,

Afghanistan Freedom 55 the capitol of a province with the same name in Afghanistan. They were formed by

Mullah Omar promising to end the civil war, bring peace, security, and justice to the

people.

Initially, the Taliban group was sustained and supported by the Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan along with assistance from other western nations-

states in the late 1990’s. A year later in 1996 the Taliban effectively gained control of

Kabul from the many warring factions involved in the civil war. The civil war

participants after losing to the Taliban formed the Northern Alliance to safeguard their

interests against the new group. The Taliban had asserted direct political control over

ninety five percent of the territory of Afghanistan by the middle of 2001.

Within the same time period that the Taliban came into existence, Osama Bin

Laden (OBL) needed a different state sponsor to move his operation from Sudan, in order

to be able to create a new political order within his native country, Saudi Arabia.

President Bill Clinton’s Administration and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had pressured

the Sudanese Government to expel OBL. When OBL was asked to leave Sudan he sought

Afghanistan, and its controlling regime to offer him protection and sanctuary (Frontline,

n.d. screen. last). Afghanistan was chosen by OBL because of his past involvement with

fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during1980s.

The Taliban regime welcomed OBL for two primary reasons. First, OBL had

resources to procure military hardware, and support the Taliban government's offensive

against the opposition with men. The Taliban group as the legitimate Government of

Afghanistan (GOA) was recognized by only three other nation-states, United Arab

Afghanistan Freedom 66 Emirate (UAE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The United Nations did not

recognize the Taliban controlled GOA as the legitimate government. As a result it could

not secure capital from inter-governmental groups (IGG) or private firms to sustain its

offensive against the Northern Alliance. Second, it is the tradition of Afghans that if a

person seeks your protection then one is obliged to offer it to him, even though if he had

killed your close families relative the day before in order to show your generosity. This

practice is called Nanewatei (Momand, 2000, para. 2). The aim of the practice is to

provide hospitality and protection to anyone that asked for your assistance.

In the late 1990’s the U.S. Government accused and later indicated OBL of

bombing its Navy Ships and Embassy’s abroad, and demanded that the Taliban

leadership extradite OBL to its authorities. The Taliban leadership’s response was two

fold, first was, ‘we have no extradition treaty with the US Government,’ and second, no

evidence was presented to the Taliban controlled Afghan Courts of OBL involvement in

terrorist activities. As a result they would not extradite OBL to US jurisdiction. Later, the

Taliban agreed to hand over OBL only to a Muslim nation-state that was neutral, and

acceptable to USA. United States Government did not consider this offer as being viable

(Borchgrave, 2001, para. 33). The Taliban government could not convince the US

government to “sign a treaty of extradition” or “offer evidence in Afghan court” of OBL

involvement in terrorist activities, the last option left for the Taliban government was to

offer OBL to a neutral Muslim country to be tried according to Islamic law. The Taliban

movement feared that if it buckled under US pressure, then it would have difficulty

continuing governing because it would have lost face.

Afghanistan Freedom 77

With the airplane attacks on the United State’s World Trade Center, the Pentagon,

and a cornfield on September 11, 2001 the U.S. Government changed its rhetoric into

actions. One year after the attack to dethrone the Taliban Government, US Congress

passed and President signed into law on December 04, 2002 the “Afghanistan Freedom

Support Act of 2002.” The Act laid the foundation of US Government involvement in

Afghanistan.

House's Committee on International Relations (HCIR) Action

House Resolution (H.R.) 3994 was sponsored and introduced by Representative

Henry J. Hyde R-IL, Chair of the House’s Committee on International Relations (HCIR)

on March 19, 2002. On the same day it was referred to the House's Committee on

International Relations. The following day it was “[o]rdered reported, amended, by

House Committee on International Relations” (H.R. 3994 Bill Tracking). The speed with

which the resolution was introduced, reported to a committee on the same day, and

ordered reported, amended, by the HCIR the following day, demonstrated the urgency of

Congress in wanting to design a framework of US involvement in Afghanistan.

On April 25, 2002 HCIR issued a report titled 107 H. Rpt. 420 that unanimously

recommended the passage of the Act. The report also contained historical background

information, purpose of the proposed legislation, and section-by-section analysis of the

Bill. The report states that only two amendments were agreed to in the Markup session,

however, HCIR Markup session itself reads that three amendments were agreed to. The

Markup session records acknowledge three amendments were agreed to, while the report

only mentions that two amendments were agreed to. I will discuss the three amendments

Afghanistan Freedom 88 that were agreed to in the HCIR Markup session.

The first amendment offered in the HCIR, and agreed to was by Representative

Rohrabacher, which included language for the removal of landmines, and to provide ten

million dollars to “carrying out a loya jirga [sic], as well as national, regional and local

elections and political party development” (United States. Cong. House. Committee on

International Relations [USC-HCIR], “Amending,” 2002, p. 49). Loya Jirga translates to

Supreme Assembly, where important public decisions are made in times of crisis and

great change. Representative Hoeffel introduced the second amendment in HCIR, which

was also approved. The Amendment added a statement of Congress to “foster stability

and democratization… that advances the development of democratic civil authorities and

institutions in the broader Central Asia region” (USC-HCIR, “Amending,” 2002, p. 53).

The aim of this amendment was to broaden U.S. foreign policy objectives in the central

Asian region to promote relationships with the Central Asian nation-states. In order to

build military bases to support, and sustain military operations in Afghanistan.

Representative Lee introduced the third Amendment to authorize funding for the

Ministry of Women Affairs of Afghanistan (MoWA). The text of the amendment does

not allocate a certain amount of funding to MoWA, but only that MoWA should be

funded (USC-HCIR, “Amending,” 2002, p. 56). The amendment intention was to

demonstrate the US government commitment to Afghan women rights.

Committee of the Whole Takes Action

House Resolution 3994 was considered by the Committee of the Whole (CotW)

on May 21, 2002, and passed with several amendments to the Senate on the same day.

Afghanistan Freedom 99 There were a total of eight amendments introduced at the CotW, with only two

amendments being withdrawn by the Representatives who had offered them. The other

six amendments were agreed to by CotW with overwhelming majority, near

unanimously.

The first amendment introduced was by Representative Hyde. His amendment

applied certain sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to help counter the

growing of poppies, and to use research performed by U.S. land grant colleges and

universities in the areas of agriculture and rural development to assist Afghanistan. The

amendment offered by Rep. Hyde was agreed to by a voice vote (Bill tracking HR 3994).

Representative Lantos, a Ranking Minority Member on HCIR offered an amendment

with a recorded vote of 415 yeas to 4 nays that would promote “the secure delivery of

humanitarian and other assistance in Afghanistan and require the submission of the

strategy for meeting its security needs within 45 days of enactment” of this Bill (Bill

tracking HR 3994). Another amendment was offered by Representative Hoeffel, and later

withdrawn by him. It would have required and mandated a central coordinator for the

thirteen federal agencies working in Afghanistan to coordinate with other countries and

organizations to ensure that greater cooperation was assured in Afghanistan by the U.S.

government. Representative Hyde (2002) asserted that such an amendment was not

necessary as the State Department already had an individual in that capacity (p. H2769).

Representative Jackson-Lee offered four amendments to H.R. 3994 number 3, 4,

5, and 6. Representative Jackson-Lee withdrew amendment 6, it would have limited

fiscal assistance to Afghanistan, if the President did not certify that the Government of

Afghanistan Freedom 101 Afghanistan prohibited the use of children soldiers. Amendments 3 and 4 dealt with the

need for basic healthcare, a good education for Afghan children and orphans.

Amendment 5 prohibited the use of children in armed conflict. All three amendments

offered by Rep. Jackson-Lee were near unanimously agreed to (Representative Lee,

2002, p. H2772). Representative Waters's amendment was agreed to unanimously, which

prohibited U.S. involvement “in poppy cultivation or illicit narcotics growth, production,

or trafficking, and requires reports concerning the Government of Afghanistan’s progress

in the eradication of poppy cultivation” (Bill tracking HR 3994). The amendment

required the US Government to identify any instrumentality of the Government of

Afghanistan if they were involved in the growth, production, and trafficking of narcotics.

This applied if the instrumentality received U.S. Government funding. As a result of the

passage of this amendment the President was required to issue a report annually of

progress in eliminating poppy cultivation, and heroin production.

Senate Action

The six amendments introduced in the Committee of the Whole were agreed to

and passed. House Resolution 3994 was referred to the Senate on May 22, 2002 and

referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR) on July 09, 2002 to be

come Senate Bill S. 2712 (Bill Tracking S. 2712). Senator Hagel (2002) of Nebraska who

sponsored S. 2712, supported the passage of the Act with an emphasis that the State

Department designates “an ambassadorial level coordinator to oversee and implement

these programs and to advance United States interests in Afghanistan” (p. S6600). The

appointed ambassador would then be responsible to coordinate the activities of US

Afghanistan Freedom 111 Federal Agencies with other countries and international organizations towards a common

goal of maintaining a peaceful Afghanistan.

A few months later, SCFR reported, amended, the Act on August 01, 2002.

Senator Biden (2002) of Delaware sponsored the SCFR report 107 S. Rpt. 278, which

discussed the impact of the Act on the budget, examined the purpose of the legislation,

issued a summary, and analyzed each title of the Act and its impacts.

Senator Reid (2002) of Rhode Island offered Senate Amendment 4956, also

known as the Hagel-Biden-Helms amendment, was unanimously agreed to. The

amendment required that Afghanistan guarantee in its legal structures fostering religious

freedom, welcoming pluralistic society, and monitoring of human rights. The amendment

also added US Government support for Afghan and international efforts to investigating

crimes committed by the Taliban regime and other parties in the past (p. S11147).

However, mass graves sites were not physically protected, or excavated for the purpose

of keeping evidence of war crimes. The mass grave sites as a result of war crimes

committed by the opposition to the Taliban were cleaned up, or removed. Furthermore,

witnesses had come out into the open, and were willing to testify that Taliban fighters

were murdered in cold blood after they had surrendered to the Northern Alliance (Deliso,

2004, para. 33). Instead of the witness receiving protection, they were left to be

murdered, and threatened themselves.

The amendment also discouraged U.S. Operations Enduring Freedom (US-OEF)

military integration with United Nation's International Security Assistance Force (UN-

ISAF). The US-OEF military operations was US led, its main mission was to hunt and

Afghanistan Freedom 121 destroy al’qaida and Taliban remnants. While ISAF was sanctioned by the UN Security

Council to provide security to the new Afghan Interim Authority in Kabul (UNSC Res.

1386, 2001). Operations Enduring Freedom was only to provide technical support to

other countries involved with the UN-ISAF but no troops. This early separation between

the two military forces working cooperatively had a detrimental effect for Afghanistan's

peace and security. This early separation resulted in the resurgence of the Taliban group

early in 2005 and continuing through 2006 because of the overlapping of command

between the two international missions. The final version passed by the Senate was

agreed to by unanimous consent.

Provisions of the Law

Public Law 107-327 is divided into three titles with a total of nineteen sections.

The original Public Law’s sections have has been amended several times over the years, I

will only discuss the provisions of the Law that were passed and amended as of 2005.

There were no provisions in this title that were considered controversial, except by the

few Congress Members that opposed the bill on ideological grounds of not wanting to be

involved with nation building, or that resources were needed to be pay off the national

debt (Paul, 2002, para. 20). If the quotation marks are not provided with citation in this

section then they are directly taken from the section of the public law that is being

analyzed. The engrossed Bill from the House had twenty-two votes against its passage,

with three hundred ninety members voting aye.

Afghanistan Freedom 131 Title I Economic and Democratic Development Assistance for Afghanistan;

This title has eight sections defining it. Section 101 is a Declaration of policy of

Congress; to support the Bonn Agreement, which was an agreement reached by various

Afghan personalities in Bonn Germany during December 2001, to reconstitute Afghan

Government institutions after the Taliban were removed from power. The language in

this section is broad; it aims to “to foster stability and democratization and to effectively

eliminate the causes of terrorism.” Congress provided discretionary authority to the

President to execute the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA 2002).

Section 102 describes the Purpose of assistance to Afghanistan. The primary

purpose of assistance to Afghanistan was to ensure security for the United States itself.

Second, to support a broad based government that would have the capacity to be self

sufficient in “projects [conceptions, implementations, and evaluation] and activities that

meet the needs of the Afghan people.” Including supporting alleviating a humanitarian

crisis in Afghanistan, to eliminating drug trafficking and production of illicit narcotics.

The aim of this section was to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe

haven for the enemies of United States.

Section 103 Authorization of assistance; it is categorized into six subheadings.

The first subheading authorizes assistance for urgent humanitarian assistance provisions

for emergency requirements such as food, shelter, water, health care and landmine

clearance. The second subheading addressed repatriating and resettling refugees both

internally displaced Afghans and Afghans outside of the country. It authorized assistance

to international organizations and governments hosting Afghan refugees to ensure to

Afghanistan Freedom 141 screen out “individuals not eligible for assistance from the United States.” The language

specifically authorizes by name the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) to voluntary repatriate Afghans back to Afghanistan from neighboring

countries. The third subheading is titled Counternarcotics (sic) efforts. The subheading’s

language directs the US Government to support eradicating poppy cultivation, to

establish programs for alternative livelihood, and to “purchase nonopium (sic) products

from farmers in opium-growing areas.” This is to be accomplished by providing training

and equipment to Afghan State High Commission for Drug Control to ensure a favorable

policy outcome is achieved in totally eradicating poppy cultivation. To execute the

activities outlined above, the President was authorized to spend between fiscal year 2003

through 2006 a total of fifteen million dollars to support the United Nations Drug Control

Program in Afghanistan.

The fourth subheading authorized the reestablishment of food supplies by

rehabilitating the agriculture sector, and reconstructing basic infrastructure such as

irrigation systems, rural roads, and health clinics. The subheading's language enables the

Executive Branch to stay focused, but allowing enough flexibility to achieve the policy

outcomes of this subheading without being micromanaged. The fifth subheading

addressed a framework for reestablishing the nation-state in Afghanistan by providing

support to the education sector, to provide advisers to the government of Afghanistan in

order to write and implement a new constitution, promulgate new laws, and issue

regulations. The subheading also authorized ten million dollars to hold a successful

constitutional convention that was composed of representatives of Afghans who were

Afghanistan Freedom 151 elected in a fair and free manner, and providing assistance to political parties

development.

The last two subheadings of section 103 required that Afghanistan establish a

market economy, and to assist Afghan women being represented in public service and the

political structure. The section places limits on the disbursement of authorized funding if

the government of Afghanistan fails to adopt a constitution, and establish democratically

elected government, unless the President certifies that the Afghan Government is making

progress towards adopting a constitution and “establishing a democratically elected

government.” The two requirements can be waived if the President can certify to

Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so.

Section 104 Coordination of assistance; strongly urges the State Department to

designate a coordinator having the status of an ambassador in order to design strategy for

securing United States interests in Afghanistan. The Coordinator is required to ensure

that US Government actions in Afghanistan are consistent with this Act. Also, he is

charged with resolving disputes between the numerous US Agencies that are involved in

Afghanistan.

Section 105 Sense of Congress regarding promoting cooperation in opium

producing areas; is divided into three subsections. First, the President is authorized to

withhold aid, both bilateral aid directly and indirectly of multilateral aid to opium

producing areas, if it would promote cooperation. Second, to redistribute the aid withheld

from the opium producing areas to other areas within Afghanistan. Third, to continuously

readjust the boundaries of opium-producing areas. The language is specific as to what

Afghanistan Freedom 161 Congress would like to be the outcome of this Public Law, but it allows the Executive

Branch the latitude to execute US Government interests in Afghanistan. For example, the

President can delegate authority to an Executive Branch Agency defining which areas of

Afghanistan constitute opium-producing areas.

Section 106 Administrative provisions; discuss how administrator’s authorities

were to be recognized in relations to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and to include

Afghan-Americans in both personnel and contracts “to the extent feasible.” The section

encouraged the private sector to donate “appropriate excess or obsolete manufacturing

equipment” for the development of Afghanistan. The language of this section encourages

the use of research and personnel of colleges and university for “agriculture and rural

development” in Afghanistan. The section allows only seven percent of the total allocated

funds can be used for administrative expense. The Comptroller General (CG) director of

the Government Accountability Office was authorized to monitor the implementation of

this Act, and the Inspector General (IG) of USAID was to “…conduct audits, inspections,

and other activities…associated with the expenditure of the funds to carry out this title.”

On the websites of CG there were only two annual reports available, and on IG websites

there were only two projects audits reports done in 2003, and only a few more project

audits completed in 2004. As a result of the vast amount of funds were not being

appropriately monitored by the CG and IG. There have been reports from

nongovernmental groups that shed light on corruption and misappropriation of aid

intended for Afghanistan development, including the reports conducted by the CG and

IG.

Afghanistan Freedom 171

Section 107 Relationship to other authority; this title provides additional

authority, and does not reduce funding or authority provided by other acts legislation.

Section 108 Authorization of appropriations; the President is provided with four hundred

twenty five million dollars each fiscal year to execute this Act except section 103(c) of

this Act, funds authorized by this Act will remain until spent. President Bush referred to

the Marshall Plan developed for Europe after world war two when discussing U.S.

Government commitment to Afghanistan. However, the intentions have not been

translated into commitments. The language of this section is flexible enough that it

provides the President with the resources to make his rhetoric a reality, but sadly enough

the focus and resources necessary were diverted from the reconstruction of Afghanistan

to the war in Iraq (Maloney, 2004, para. 13). The shift in attention, focus, and funds away

from the mission in Afghanistan to the war in Iraq hampered the implementation of this

Act on the ground in Afghanistan.

Title II Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other Foreign Countries

and International Organizations.

Title two addresses the military aspect of US Government involvement in

Afghanistan. It also stipulates the benefits that other countries are to receive for their

military involvement in Afghanistan. This title has eight sections defining it.

Section 201 Support for security during transition in Afghanistan; address the sense of

congress to support and create “a civilian controlled and centrally-governed standing

Afghanistan army,” and to establish “a professional civilian police” force that respect

human rights. In addition, section 201 express supports from Congress to the

Afghanistan Freedom 181 multinational military forces serving in Afghanistan.

Section 202 Authorization of assistance; the President is authorized under the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to drawdown military hardware, training, and education

for the Government of Afghanistan and other eligible countries and organizations

involved in Afghanistan. The President is also giving the authority to contract or use

other means to execute section 202 with three hundred million dollars, which can be

increased with requesting more funds from Congress. This section creates new authority

for the President in order to successfully use the available capital, hardware, and

personnel to execute U.S. interests in Afghanistan. The language of this section is precise

in expressing Congress's preference in the direction of U.S. policy in Afghanistan with

providing the necessary funds, yet, it gives latitude to the President on how this section is

executed.

Section 203 Eligible foreign countries and eligible international organization;

describes in detail what type of activities are covered for assistance, and what countries

and international organization can be eligible under section 202, providing non of the

countries have committed gross human rights violations, supported international acts of

terrorism, or are in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Although Iran is involved

with encouraging that a peaceful and secure Afghanistan is established, this section, I

believe was intended to prevent U.S. assistance from going towards the Iranian

government.

Section 204 Reimbursement for assistance; does not require that assistance

provided under this Act be reimbursed except if assistance is provided under section

Afghanistan Freedom 191 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The amount of assistance provided under

section 644(m) are in addition to funds allocated by this Act.

Section 205 Congressional notification requirements; requires the President to

notify Congress in both classified and unclassified report form fifteen days before

assistance is provided under this title. The report must detail the importance of assistance

“to the national security interests of the United States.” The report form does not have to

be approved by Congress in order to take effect, unless there is a two third vote in each

chamber prohibiting the President from providing assistance to such country or

international organization. The purpose of this section is to keep abreast members of

Congress on the assistance provided under title two of this Act.

Section 206 Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other assistance in

Afghanistan and expansion of the International Security Assistance Force; Describes the

findings of Congress that require the US Government to provide humanitarian and

military intervention in Afghanistan, which forms the policy statement under this section.

The implementation of this section requires the President to submit a strategy to Congress

no later then sixty days after the passage of this Act that would cause Afghanistan to

become a viable nation-state. After the initial report, the President is required to submit

after every six months a report updating Congress of progress of US involvement in

Afghanistan. This section’s language is very specific as to what should be included in the

report, and when the reports should be submitted to Congress. The last part of this section

express the sense of Congress that the President sponsor a resolution at the United

Nations Security Council to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Afghanistan Freedom 202 throughout Afghanistan. The President also must enlist allies of the U.S. to provide

military forces to expand ISAF. In August of 2003 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) officially took over command of ISAF. In October 2006 NATO-ISAF deployed

throughout Afghanistan. There are some countries within the NATO alliance that have

caveats that restrict where and how their troops can be used in Afghanistan (NATO,

2006, last screen).

Section 207 Relationship to other authority; the authority provided to the

President under this Act “is an addition to any other authority to provide assistance to the

Government of Afghanistan.” The authority is limited by section 512 of Public Law 107-

115. Section 208 Sunset clause; this Act expired on September 30, 2006.

Title III of this Act Miscellaneous Provisions.

This title has three sections defining it. Section 301 Requirement to comply with

procedures relating to the prohibition on assistance to drug traffickers; this section

prohibits any US assistance to drug traffickers. The section was original introduced by

Representative Waters with the intent of raising awareness that there is potential for U.S.

personnel to get involved in drug trafficking. With objections from Representative Hyde

that the original amendment would greatly restrict U.S. interests in Afghanistan, Rep.

Waters agreed to modify the original language of the Bill to assuage Rep. Hyde concerns.

The language of this section that was enrolled for the President’s signature removed any

mention of potential U.S. Government personnel involvement in drug trafficking, instead

it referred to other public laws that addressed assistance to drug traffickers.

Section 302 Sense of Congress regarding protecting Afghanistan’s President;

Afghanistan Freedom 212 After the assassination of the Vice President of Afghanistan in July of 2002, and

subsequent assassination attempts on President Karzai life, this section required the U.S.

diplomatic security, law enforcement, and military personnel to protect President Karzai

from being killed. These U.S. personnel were to “be succeeded by qualified Afghan

security forces as soon as practicable,” in order to provide lasting self-sustaining security

to the President of Afghanistan. The language required the need for such personnel to be

provided, but allows enough flexibility to the President as to how to achieve this

requirement.

Section 303 Donor contributions to Afghanistan and reports; the very first donor

conference held in Tokyo after the defeat of the Taliban regime provided an inadequate

level of support for Afghanistan development, and worse still the amount pledged was

not being disbursed. Thus Congress in very explicit terms stated “the United States

should use all appropriate diplomatic means to encourage all states that have pledged

assistance to Afghanistan to deliver as soon as possible.” Even with this requirement the

amount of assistance pledged was not delivered effectively for the development of

Afghanistan, most of the aid that was disbursed was considered phantom aid, which was

returned to the host country.

Analysis of Impact

The direct economic beneficiaries of this Act were U.S. corporations who were

awarded hundreds of million of dollars in contracts either by the United States Agency

for International Development (USAID) or the Pentagon through the Army Corps of

Engineers (ACE). Also, there was a political benefit for the Bush Administration prior to

Afghanistan Freedom 222 the 2004 Presidential elections in boosting of the success in Afghanistan. However, the

Afghan people were the losers as the result of implementation of this Act.

The two principal US Government agencies responsible for spending US funds

allocated for the development of Afghanistan were USAID and the Pentagon. The

USAID was the lead agency responsible for managing US funds to reconstruct

Afghanistan, and Pentagon was responsible for ensuring that Afghanistan had a properly

trained national army to protect Afghan territory and government. Both of these agencies

contracted out their responsibilities to US private firms. They in turn subcontracted out

the work to other companies that resulted in finished work not meeting minimum

international quality standard or having the intended results (United States Government

Accountability Office [USGAO], 2005, p. 21; United States Agency for International

Development [USAID], 2006, p. 7). US government issued reports detailing the shabby

reconstruction work approved in Afghanistan bordered on corruption and nepotism,

damaging the prospects for a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan.

According to an independent investigative report by Nawa (2006), USAID

contracted out agriculture development program called Rebuilding Agriculture Markets

Program (RAMP) to Chemonics International Inc (CII). Whose owner, Scott Spangler

was a senior USAID director under the first Bush Administration. According to the

report, Scott Spangler and his wife gave the Republican Party between 1990 to 2003

about one hundred thousand dollars (p. 22). RAMP’s intention was to rebuild the

irrigation systems, build markets for Afghan agriculture products both domestic and

international, and rebuild the livestock sector (USAID, 2006, p. 2). United States GAO

Afghanistan Freedom 232 audit found that CII had failed to develop international markets for Afghan products or to

ensure that the projects were self-sustainable.

Another direct benefit to a U.S. corporation was to Contrack International, Inc.,

was awarded two contracts for the same scope of work from two different offices within

ACE (Dept. of Defense Office of the Inspector General [DoDOIG], 2005, p. 13). The

DoDOIG (2005) audit report discovered that contracts awarded were not being properly

tracked of, or designed (p. 28). Furthermore, the contracts were awarded to one firm

when in fact it could have been successfully contracted out to more then one firm (p. 14 ).

These contracts issued to politically connected corporations hoodwinked the taxpayers

here in the States, and robbed the people of Afghanistan from the generosity of the

American people.

Besides US corporations benefiting from this Act directly, the Bush

Administration was able to paint a story of success in Afghanistan. For example, the

Bush Administration reminded the US public prior to the 2004 Presidential elections the

number of students attending primary school, the number of returning refugees from

neighboring countries, the adoption of a constitution, and etc... While these milestones

were in fact achieved on the surface, there was another undercurrent that was brewing to

the situation that is faced today. This was the unlimited influence of warlords supported

by the United States armed forces, the foreign corruption, the lack of aid circulating in

the Afghan economy, all contributed to the dissatisfaction of the Afghan people from

their own government, which led to support for the Taliban, and while harsh in its

methods achieved security, peace, and brought a defined justice.

Afghanistan Freedom 242 The funding that was allocated to Afghanistan as the result of the passage of this

Act was in reality phantom aid, which never leaves the soil of the donor nation and the

receiving nation has no control over the allocation or the use of the aid money (Jones,

2006). Former member of Congress Don Ritter and Chairman of Afghanistan-American

Foundation testified before the House Committee on International Relations (2006) that

more or less of fifteen percent of US aid stays in Afghanistan, the rest of the intended aid

circulates directly back into US economy (USC-HCIR, “Afghanistan: Is the Aid Getting

Through,” p. 11). Audits have been conducted by the various entities of US Government

such as the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, the Comptroller General

of Government Accountability Office, and USAID Inspector General have all mentioned

in their audit reports of a lack of clear instructions to the contractors for requiring quality

work, not requiring reports from the contractors, and not monitoring the contracts

awarded.

The recommendations provided by these audits, if acted upon in a coherent

manner would achieve long term benefits both for Afghanistan, and the States. The

shabby work conducted by these contractors will no doubt cause long term loss not only

to the Afghan people, but will in fact support the armed opposition in Afghanistan. The

armed opposition can always remind the people that the foreign troops have only

supported those in government that aim to steal their land and resources without

providing peace, security, or defined justice.

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