analysis of hegel's phenomenology

7/29/2019 Analysis of Hegel's Phenomenology

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ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGYReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1868), pp. 99-102Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25665642 .

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Analysis ofHegel's Phenomenology. 99toriness, they " help themselves" to themand eat them uoj and all nature celebrates,like them, these open mysteries, whichdemonstrate what the truth of sensuousthings is.[v.] But those who make such assertions,[p. 81] say, as above remarked* immediatelythe converse of what they mean; a phenomenon which is perhaps the best calculated to arouse reflection concerning thenature of sensuous Certitude. They speakof the extant being of external objects,

which, more closely, may be determinedas real ones, as absolutely particular,wholly personal, individual things, eachone of which has no longer its absoluteequivalent; that this extant Being has absolute certitude and truth. They meanthis piece of paper upon which I write (orrather have written) ; but they do not saywhat they mean. If they really wantedto say this piece of paper which theymean,(and theydo,) this is impossible,sincethe sensuous This which is meant, is unapproachable by language; for that belongs to consciousness?the in itself Universal. During the actual attempt to express it, itwould rot; those who had commenced its description-could not completeit but would have to leave it to others whowould finally themselves acknowledge thatthey were engaged in describing what nolonger existed. Hence although theymean

this piece of paper which is entirely a different one from that above, yet they speakof " actual things," " external or sensuousobjects," "absolute individual essence,"&e.y i. e. they say of them only the Universal ; for this reason that which is calledthe unspeakable is nothing else than theuntrue, the unreasonable, that which is

merely " meant."?If nothing more is saidof something than that it is an actualthing, an external objeet, then one hassaid only the most general thing of it, andwith this has been expressed rather itslikeness with

everything, than its difference. If I say a particular thing, I say itrather as a universal, for each is a particularthing; and moreover, a This thing is anything which one pleases. More closelydesignated as this piece of paper,?so isevery piece of paper a this piece of paper,and I have still merely said the general.But [p. 82] if I will not allow languagewhich possesses the divine nature, immediately to invert themeaning and thus notpermit it to put in a word, but hasten to itsassistance by exhibiting this piece of paper, then I learn by experience what thetruth of sensuous certitude is in fact; Ipoint it out as a Here which is a Here ofother Here's; or in itself a simple complexof many Here's, i. e. a Universal, and thusI apprehend it as it in truth is, and insteadof knowing an Immediate, I perceive it.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY." The special object of the Phenomenology was, by a development of consciousness in itsessential principle, to establish what was toHegel the absolute cognition,?to demonstrate thiscognition to be but the highest step and stage of consciousness. Hegel gives, in thiswork, ahistory of consciousness as itappears in time (hence the title), an evolution of the epochs of thegrowth of consciousness, on itsway to philosophical knowledge."[Schwegler's Hist. Phil.?Stirling's Translation.]The work under consideration, usually

called the first original work of Hegel, appeared in 1807. Some think it " the mostobscure of Hegel's works," but by himself it is called his "Voyage of Discovery." The true student of philosophy mustregard it as the greatest work in the wholehistory of thought. In it are unfolded intheir natural order all the apercus of purescience (pritna philosophia) and these are,

at the same time, recognized in the variousconcrete forms that they have assumed inthe world; thus exhibiting in a sort ofdramatic spectacle the development of themotives of human history. Institutions ofcivilization, phases of psychological culture, historical revolutions, the genesis ofso-called "faculties of the mind"?allthese are shown to have their necessity inthe final cause, the realization of spirit.

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100Analysis ofHegel's Phenomenology.That which is potentially self-conscious?the individual soul, which, as Leibnitzteaches, is a monad and even in its loweststage of development reflects the wholeuniverse?must become actually so, mustdissolve all objective forms by aid of itsalchemy and see in the universe only itsown infinitude.

Such a conception is embodied in a popular form in the religious doctrine of creation. God creates man in his own imagefor his honor and glory. He creates manin order that there may be a being thatcan recognize him. Thus, the end ofmanis stated to be the recognition of God.But God, too, is the infinite person, theEgo or eternal subject who makes possibleall self-consciousness whatever. Hence,the individual in recognizing God or Eternal Reason, recognizes his own true being.The Creator is the essence of the creature,and the latter must recognize the formerif it would recognize its own essence.

In the preface to this work, Hegel takesoccasion to advance the claims of what heconsiders the true method of philosophy,against views then prevalent. Thus, according to him, philosophy should be a scientific exposition of truth and have astrictly systematic form; it should not bea mere series of genial philosophemes.First principles are only beginnings. Theyare seeds ; their truth is their developmentinto organic systems. The acorn is an oakin its abstract and hence untrue form.But while advocating system he is carefulto discriminate the true method from inadequate methods, such, for example, asthat of Spinoza and Wolff (the mathematical method) and that of the disciplesof Schilling (a schematizing formalism).The mathematical method is defective inthat its procedure is arbitrary ; the demonstrator has in view the final " quoderat" etc., and makes this and that construction, postulates these and demonstrates those preliminaries, refers now toan axiom and then to a definition?allwithout showing the necessity of the procedure. In the end, one perceives why thedemonstrator pursued the course he did, buthe sees too that itwas subjective choice that

guided. The mathematical method is not amethod for discovering truth, but only ofcommunicating truth after it is seen. Again,themethod of" schematizing formalism," inwhich one merely classifies data obtainedfrom experience according to a ready-madescheme, does not arrive at a true systemany more than the labelled bottles of theapothecary constitutes such. It is the disease prevalent among philosophical dilettanti, to use a few abstract categories onall occasions and subsume everything underthem.

The true method seizes the subject-matter and holds it fast; first taking it according to its most obvious phase, it allows itto show up its presuppositions one afterthe other until we have the elements constituting quite a different object, beforeus.* The three stages of an exhaustivesystematic treatment are those of immediateness, mediation, and absolute mediation.(See Vol. i. of this journal, pp. 3-4; Vol.ii., p. 1.)The difficulty of Hegel to new beginnerslies in their inability to mark the transitions from one of these stages to theother. And not only do they fail to separate these stages, but they fail to distinguish even the discursive remarks (u external reflections,") with which he opens thesubject, from the rigid scientific treatmentthat follows.

In the chapter of the translation beforeus, the paragraphs from [a.] to [e.]t inclusive, contain only external reflections;from [f.] to [i.], inclusive, we have the immediate stage ; from [k.] to [m.] the stageof mediation; from [n.] to [s.], inclusive,

* We quote from an admirable article onHegel, by J. E. Cabot, North American Review, No. ccxix., p. 456:" The essence of Hegel's method consists intaking any statement, any fact that offers, atits own valuation, and treating it as if itweretruth. In thisway its inherent limitations aresure to show themselves, and not simply as error, but as an advance towards a more complete statement." " It is a favorite device ofHegel's to show how the paradoxes and selfcontradictions which the understanding perpetually encounters, but which it usually dodgesand derides as metaphysical subtilties whencalled to notice them, are in reality the com*ing to light of what is wanting in its ownstatements, and needed tomake them true."



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Analysis ofHegel's Phenomenology.101the absolute mediation. Then follow?[t.]to [v.]?some more reflections to show wherewe are with our result. Let us examinethe content more minutely :[a.] Since it is evident that we cannot comprehend a result without first considering the premises, we are obliged toneglect all forms of knowing that are obviously inferential, and apply ourselves firstto what seems to be immediate or intuitional knowing. Of course, we do notknow, until it has been demonstrated tous, that such intuitional knowing is not entirely sufficient.

[b.] It offers itself as the truest andmost satisfactory mode of knowing. It seemsto give us the very concrete reality itself.But, in fact, such certitude merely says " itis" and does not say aught of the definitedistinctions and limits which belong to theobject and give it individuality. An object is through its relations to other objects, and a relation cannot be cognizedimmediately. To cognize a relation implies that the sensuous intuition be madea tool in the hands of a higher?a synthetic mode of cognition. The senses cannot draw inferences; they merely givepremises. But premises such as they furnish are not things, but mere elements ofthings?mere abstractions or determinations.

[c] Moreover, it is evident upon reflection that every immediate certitude involves the distinction and determinationof subject and object, and that such distinction and determination is a mediation,and hence we have a relation and not asimple immediate. When I say, " This object is," a ground is implied : " because Isee it." But this implied ground will render it untrue the moment I look somewhereelse. If I assert it on the ground that Isaw it, or that some one else saw it, then Iam asserting the troth upon other groundsthan immediate sensuous certitude, andinvolve a complicated series of groundssuch as memory, language, definitions,credibility of testimony, etc., etc.

[d.] We need not, however, continuethese reflections; let us rather summonthis certitude before us and note its procedure.

[e.] Its first attitude must be that ofthe mere assertion of the simple existenceof the object without conditioning its assertion by introducing the Ego as inany way essential to the truth of the assertion.[f.] The senses can testify only ofwhat is present to them in time and space?the Now and the Here. Any assertionon their part, will be a predication of somecontent or other to the Here or the Now,for example : " The Now is night." " TheHere is a tree." But experience shows atonce that the individual contents of the

Now and Here, which the senses testify of,do not abide.[g.] The subject and predicate of the.sensuous assertion do not coincide. The

Now and Here are universals, and of anyparticular content that is attributed tothem, we can with equal propriety denythe truth or affirm it. The universal isboth affirmative and negative at the sametime. Therefore, each particular act ofsensuous certitude refutes all others andis refuted in turn by them.

[h.] Language seizes the abiding, andhence, the universal. No particular content of sensuous certitude can be communicated.

[i.] " The Here is a tree" is not true,for the reason that the Here is anythingelse that happens to be present to the senses,and the mentioned assertion does not tellwhich senses are meant. The senses themselves must be taken into consideration,for it is their presence that makes the Nownight or day. The meaning is the essential condition which gives truth to the assertion. I must add to the assertion thiscondition and always be particular to statethe subject who knows.

[k.] Therefore^ the first attitude of thesensuous certitude toward its object mustbe changed. It has found that the objectcannot be asserted purely, but that the assertion must bring with it at the same timea voucher for the truth by adding the essential condition, namely, the Ego whomeans the particular content asserted. Itis this "meaning " that prevents our certitude from inverting itself.

[1.] Let us examine this new attitude



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102Analysis ofHegel's Phenomenology.and see what will come of it: "The Nowwhich I see is day ;" " the Here which Isee is a tree." But it is obvious at oncethat we are still in difficulty, forwe cannottell what we mean by " I." Every observeris a subject or " I," and his object is in aHere and Now.

[m.] The Ego is as universal as theHere and Now. In fact, we cannot saywhat we mean. The particular, for itself,that we wish to seize by a sensuous intuition seems to escape us.[n.] It is evident that we have failedin our attempts thus far. But there is stillone way left. We posited the objective asessence at first, and then we posited the

subjective as essence; now we can posittheir union as essence, and beyond this wecannot go, but shall be obliged to give upthe cause and refuse all truth to sensuouscertitude if here it fails.

[o.] The truth is seized in the relation of the Ego to the object,and both are

alike essential in it.[p.] Let us now finally see whetherthe immediateness of the relation can be

preserved, considered in and for itself.[q. r. 8.] The point of time (the Now)and the point of space (the Here), or theThis in general, can be seized only throughother points or This's which fix and definethe former. From this, it is evident that

every sensuous knowing must involve anactivity having three stages : (1) I seizethe object as This, but I cannot do it (2)except by separating it from the Not-thiswhich of course must also be my objectwhile I am engaged in the process. (3)Therefore, in seizing an object, I necessarily transcend it (and cancel it) and seizeit in identity with another or higher totality which includes its other-being or limits. And hence, my act of seizing it (ina cognition) is a three-fold act which negates as well as posits or affirms the object.The Universal is the unity of the partic

ular and its other-being (alterum); it isthe Finite and that on which it depends.The Me and Not-Me together make the totality, and the Universal is this totality.No object can be completely known untilall its complications with other things areunravelled. The shallowest Knowing mustaccomplish this to some degree. The sensuous certitude (it must be allowed) canknow only what occupies Space or Time ;but whatever is extended in Space or Timemust be a compound having parts, and thesensuous Knowing is a seizing of such partsin their synthesis, and hence a mediation.We find in this third attitude of the certitude an answer to the question: Canwe know immediately ? This answer is :No, for objects themselves are mediatedand hence require mediated knowing, ifthey are to be known in their truth.A knowing of an object sensuously, involves a distinguishing and uniting of theabove and below, right and left, before andafter, &c, and such a knowing is not animmediate but a mediate, and we call itper-ckftion,* a taking through [something else].

[t. u. v.] Hegel concludes this chapterby alluding to the Mysteries which wereremnants of religious rites of WesternAsia, wherein was celebrated the consciousness that the essence of man is supersensual and immortal, i. e. abides throughmediation, and does not perish like thefood of the body. Even animals act asthough they knew that sensuous thingsare not permanent or true, but destructible(or digestible even). But one who shouldundertake a complete description of a sensuous object would find the task interminable, for the reason that new peculiaritieswould arise in it, through its changeablenature, faster than he could describe them.

The next chapter is a consideration ofPerception.

* German= Wahrnehmung.

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