analytic pitfalls in regards to russia
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An outdated examination of how the US analysis the situation in Russia. In light of events in 2012, some aspects of the essay have been proven faulty.TRANSCRIPT
Addressing Analytic Pitfalls Regarding Russia’s Future
By Damian Niolet
Introduction
U.S. accounts of world history contend that the “Cold War,” during which the U.S. was in
a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and a war of which the U.S. does not hesitate to
proclaim itself the victor, lasted for 44 years. It is no wonder, therefore, that many U.S. analysts
are devoted to solving the enigma that is today’s Russia – despite such a decisive victory over
the former ardent foe – the Cold War was 44 years of conditioning, after all. Tensions between
the two countries, upon the Soviet Union’s collapse right up to this day, have remained. Those
tensions have subsided over time thanks in part to certain reforms Russian leaders have
“initiated,” which the U.S. smiled upon initially; however, the U.S. has since deemed those
reforms to be stagnant, that recent developments demonstrate a reversal of those initiatives and
in some instances a reprisal of Soviet governance, causing renewed tensions.
The tidal nature of these tensions is disconcerting to U.S. policymakers, who want to
understand the future of Russia so as to best orient their relationship with the country towards a
strategic end. Whether that strategy involves positioning the U.S. defensively against a
reemerging Soviet Union or positioning the U.S. as a supportive equal to a truly Federated
Russia depends on the analysis of U.S. analysts. In order to provide U.S. policymakers with the
information they need so as to choose the appropriate course of action, the majority of U.S.
analysts are focusing on the top leaders of the country – President Dmitri Medvedev and to a
greater extent Prime Minister Vladimir Putin – believing that Russia’s future can be channeled
out of an examination of said leaders. This analytic method is rife with problems. The method is
stifling true analysis because it is plagued by overwhelming assumptions, which act as anchoring
biases. The fact is one cannot begin to understand Russia’s future until one understands the
guiding and ruling ideology of the entire country.
The Analytic Pitfalls Associated with Analyses of Russia
It should first and foremost be caveated that this paper will examine open source material
while pursuing a review of the prevailing sentiments regarding Russia and the country’s future.
The reason for this is because U.S. analysts (and policymakers by extension) rely more on open
source material for constructing their worldview of international affairs than on classified
reporting. If one wants to learn about the general perception of policymakers regarding a topic,
one need only listen to NPR reporting on that topic in recent times. In addition, the
overwhelming attitude of journalists toward Russia pervades and colors any sort of analysis that
occurs behind closed doors and thus must be taken into account first. There are bestsellers that
are viewed as more authoritative than any classified report. For purposes of this paper, analysts
and journalists will be grouped together and simply referred to as analysts.
Conducting research on predictions of Russia’s future reveals a striking reality – U.S.
analysts are mesmerized by Putin. It would be too daunting a task to statistically encapsulate this
view. Suffice it to say that from the personal experience of this author, having read many a
report on Russia, very little serious analysis concerning Russia’s future exists that does not begin
with or lean heavily upon an examination of Vladimir Putin. A good deal of these reports cite
Putin’s former affiliations with the now defunct KGB and/or the now thriving FSB and hint at a
certainty that these affiliations are the primary factors that influenced Putin’s political
governance paradigm.1 Other reports utilize and sensationalize what little evidence there is that
1 Adi Ignatius, “A Tsar is Born,” Time, December 31, 2007, 57.
points to Putin having ties to organized crime and suggests that there is no doubt that he does,
thus casting the whole of Russia into the same lot as nothing but a den of thieves.2
Likewise, U.S. analysts treat Medvedev in the same manner; since, in their eyes Medvedev
was a handpicked successor of Putin and likely merely a puppet. Analysts with this mindset are
certain that Medvedev can do nothing apart from Putin. The fact that Medvedev appointed Putin
as the Prime Minister (Russia’s 2nd in command) only affirms their claim, or so they believe.
Most U.S. analysts believe this despite glaring evidence to the contrary. It is easier for U.S.
analysts to arrive at such far-fetched conclusions, even making them assumptions from which to
conduct further analysis, than to accept that Russia is whole-heartedly committed to reforms.
More important, it is easier for analysts to continue to vilify Russia than to reevaluate their
paradigms of the Cold War foe.
Conducting analysis in this vein entails concurrence with certain assumptions, which this
paper intends to underline and subsequently compel analysts’ to erase from their thinking about
Russia. First, suggesting that a country’s future is highly dependent on its top leader assumes
that there are no other sources of power, neither vertically nor laterally. This assumption may
only ever be acceptable when analyzing absolute dictatorships. The assumption cannot be
applied to even nominally free democracies like Russia. Second, suggesting that a country’s
future is highly dependent on its top leader assumes that the specified top leader is directly
responsible for every occurrence in the country and that each was precisely intended. No one
can be in that much control, not even Putin. Third, suggesting that a country’s future is highly
dependent on its top leader assumes that there is no carry over effects from the actions of
previous leaders. There is never a scenario where this assumption is applicable.
2 Catherine Belton, “Putin's Name Surfaces in German Probe,” Moscow Times, May 19, 2003.
A Different Way of Looking at Russia
This paper will now seek to highlight the more common assumptions and analytic pitfalls
that reside in most analytic studies on Russia. Those assumptions that relate to Putin will be
looked at first. As explained above, most analysts are prone to emphasize Putin’s tenure as a
member of the siloviki (the secret police). They will recount recent efforts to bolster the FSB’s
strength and reach.3 They will relate a number of events associated with the increased muzzling
of opposition groups such as newly formed political parties or media outlets.4 In the mind of the
analyst who sees Putin as a communist Tsar reincarnate, all of these bits of information
corroborate each other. Unfortunately, they forget that not even the Tsars were completely in
control of Russia, hence recurrent coups and revolutions.
There is another way of looking at the Russia/Putin dynamic. Addressing the first
assumption introduced above, it is completely possible that there are powers apart from Russia’s
political apparatus that have assisted in creating the state of affairs in today’s Russia. Further, it
is possible that Putin has no purview over these powers. Considering the fact that a large number
of former KGB operatives found themselves in a market economy after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and eventually in charge of significant corporations or elements of organized crime,5 it is
possible that they wished to retain the status quo and prevent Putin’s loss of the Presidential
office. It is well known that there was tampering involved in Russia’s last two Presidential
elections, but it is not certain who the perpetrator was. It is assumed that Putin was the
3 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Russia’s New Nobility,” Foreign Affairs 89, no 5 (September/October 2010): 80.
4 Ignatius, 57-58.
5 Soldatov and Borogan, 81.
perpetrator because it “happened on his watch,” a view which correlates with the second
assumption above.6 This line of reasoning is error upon error.
Now this paper will take a look at Putin’s successor - Medvedev. Most analysts will
contend fervently that Medvedev is nothing more than a puppet of Putin; after all, Medvedev was
handpicked by Putin and Medvedev later “returned the favor” by appointing Putin Prime
Minister. Most analysts thusly overlook that fact that Medvedev was elected into office. This
fact is overlooked because the previous assumption is still fresh in their minds – those elections
were rigged by Putin. Since most analysts were certain that Putin would find a way to
circumvent Russia’s meager constitution, they see Medvedev’s appointing Putin as Prime
Minister as an interim step to regaining power, a step orchestrated by Putin naturally.
There is another way of looking at the Medvedev/Putin dynamic. Again, other sources of
power in Russia could have acted on behave of Medvedev’s and Putin’s party, United Russia,
unbeknownst to the leaders, believing United Russia’s policies would more accurately aligned
with the economic endeavors of the hidden powers. It is also possible that the only reason
Medvedev appointed Putin to be the Prime Minister was to garner more legitimacy for his
particular brand of governance. It would provide instant credibility to have Putin by his side. It
is also possible, and once the evidence is objectively assessed, very likely that Medvedev is
striving to take Russia in a different direction than Putin, albeit only slightly, nonetheless
different. Medvedev has shown on a number of occasions that he does not always concur with
his compatriot, even overturning some of the reforms Putin initiated.7
6 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution, (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 61.7 Eberhard Schneider, "Split in the Russian Political Tandem Putin-Medvedev?" Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA) 3 (Spring 2009): 222 - 224.
Lastly this paper will suggest that the last assumption, which says that a previous leader’s
actions do not overlap terms of service, is completely false. Further, analysts should assume the
exact opposite – there will most certainly be overlap; the effects of the previous leader’s actions
can greatly impact the predecessor’s time in office. Even if there is truth in the notion that Putin
had a direct hand in incidences such as the election debacle or the gagging of opposition groups,
there is no logic in instantly attributing the continued occurrence of such incidences to
Medvedev. Those types of operations would be difficult to rein in once loosed. Some analysts
would propose that Medvedev is not only allowing it through inaction, but allowing it through
decisive action. They would cite Medvedev’s closing down of the organized crime and terrorism
branch of the FSB as evidence, neglecting to mention that a new office was stood up in its place
that more precisely aligns with a trend occurring internationally.8
It’s About the Ideologies Stupid
When U.S. analysts aim to predict Russia’s future, it would be far wiser to focus on the
ideologies that the top leaders embody, but that span all of Russia. It is the ideologies that not
only the President and Prime Minister of Russia will struggle to adhere to, but also any other
sources of power, which act on behalf of Russia, as well. Ideologies are likely to span the
vertical and horizontals of power when it comes to the future of Russia. When one begins to
look for trends in the prevailing ideologies of the last decade it becomes clear that Russia has
veered little from the course set since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Over all Russia is fixated on
maintaining its position as a world power so as to be able to assert its particular ideals. 9 From
8 Louise Shelley, “Crime, Organized Crime, and Corruption,” in After Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 194.
9 Andrew C. Kuchins, “Why Russia is so Russian,” Current History, (October 2009): 323.
the populaces’ perspective, perhaps a better way of looking at it, Russians are intent on proving
that their unyielding since of nationalism is not misplaced.
Democracy and Capitalism remain key aspects of the strategy to maintain world power
status, otherwise there would have been an utter dismissal of those institutions. U.S. analysts
and policymakers get exacerbated when Russia’s form of Democracy and Capitalism are
inconsistent with the U.S.’s and decree the onset of the resurrection of the Soviet Union, but to
expect Russia’s forms of Democracy and Capitalism to mirror the U.S.’s is lunacy. One cannot
expect a country to have a carbon copy democracy of another when said country has a
completely different governmental structure, geography, demographic, etc., not to mention less
than 20 years of working at it.
What unsettles analysts and policymakers are the measures the Kremlin will seemingly
take to attain the above described ideologies. It is the measures the Kremlin will take to achieve
the overarching ideologies that become the Presidents’ platforms. Taking the platforms of the
last two Russian Presidents into account stands as further evidence that Russia is being very
forthwith about their desired future. Putin’s platform promise was “stability.” Perhaps Putin
forced stability on Russia by creating a near police state, but perhaps that was exactly what
Russia needed. Gorbachev himself thinks as much.10 Putin ensured that the atmospheric
conditions conducive for further coups or revolutions was minimal, to the extent that the
conditions have been absent through Medvedev’s time in office as well.
Russia needed and continues to need time to show everyone that the system can work.
Even slight upheavals like changing from one party to another party with basically the same
views could derail Russia. Putin may have guaranteed no such derailment would occur, allowing
Medvedev to continue where Putin left off. While the overall ideology is the same, Medvedev’s
10 Ignatius, 60.
platform is “modernization.” Now that the political atmosphere has been subdued, Medvedev
has time and room to grow Russia, to show just how well the system is working. As the system
begins to bare more fruit, Medvedev can begin to loosen the Kremlin’s grip on “civil society.”
For example, whereas Putin heightened restrictions on the formation of political movements,
Medvedev is relaxing those restrictions.11
Conclusion
The manner in which U.S. analysts conduct studies of Russia and the country’s future is
akin to how inexperienced and emotional people in the U.S. invest their money. Inexperienced
and emotional investors are quick to withdraw their investments at the first sign of trouble. The
best example would be Apple Inc. Inexperienced and emotional investors believe that the future
of that company rides on Steve Jobs. When there were concerns over Steve Jobs’ health, the
company’s stock dropped dramatically. Had these investors remained faithful to Apple Inc. and
let their investments be, they would likely have far more return on their investment. While Steve
Jobs has been integral in making Apple Inc. what it is, at this point, the company has a strong
enough mission and vision (ideology) to be able to sustain itself and even grow no matter who is
in charge in the future.
U.S. analysts must begin to consider more of the forces at work in Russia other than the
leaders in charge when diagnosing Russia’s future. There a myriad of forces and powers within
Russia, all vying for control of the country’s steering mechanism. Right now, Putin may very
well be the individual with his hand on that mechanism; however, there is no credible certainty
of this, and as such, the idea should not be turned into an assumption from which to base further
analysis of the country. There is in fact more to substantiate the idea that the country as a whole
is whole-heartedly committed to reforms, albeit, reforms as Russia requires them. At the end of
11 Schneider, 224.
the day, one must begin an analysis of Russia’s future by considering Russia’s guiding ideology,
the visions that permeate all of Russia’s citizenry. Then one can begin to understand Russia’s
leaders’ methods for arriving at that goal. The methods may not be like our own, but that does
not necessitate that disparagements be cast on the leaders, country, or their futures.
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