~,,im. Behav., 1995. 49, 841-842

COMMENTARIES

Anatomy dissected

COLIN ALLEN Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4237. U. S.A

(Received 13 June 1994: initial acceptance 14 August 1994; ,finai ucceptance 18 October 1994; MS. number: AS-1114)

The recent reviews of Anatomy of a Controversy (Wenner & Wells 1990) in Animal Behaviour (Dyer & Smith 1994; Faulkes 1994) reflect the book’s divided nature. Wenner & Wells have long argued that the dance language hypothesis of von Frisch and Gould, that recruited bees locate food sources by using the information about distance and direction that is available from bee dances, is mistaken. Their view, the odour search hypoth- esis, is that recruited bees use only odour to locate food sources. On the one hand, Anatomy of a Controversy purports to be a case study in the history and philosophy of science, and Faulkes’ review treats it primarily as such. On the other hand, the book clearly prolongs the argument against von Frisch, Gould and their supporters, and Dyer & Smith chose to focus their review this way.

Dyer & Smith criticize Wenner & Wells’ review of the dance language hypothesis literature for its ‘numerous examples of bias and obfuscation, most of which will be difficult to appreciate for readers who are otherwise unfamiliar with the original papers’ (page 1242). When I first read Anatomy of a Controversy almost 3 years ago, I probably fell into this category of naive readers. I thought that Wenner & Wells had exposed serious flaws in the experiments that were at the heart of the dance language case. I still think that Anatomy of a Controversy provides a valuable lessongin identifying necessary experimental controls, even if Dyer & Smith are correct that supporters of the dance language hypothesis had in fact, or have since, used those controls.

As a philosopher, however, I was dismayed by Wenner & Wells’ presentation of views in the philosophy of science. I concur with Dyer & Smith’s comment that ‘it seems to us . . that the philosophy in this book often serves less to illumi- nate than to rehash old arguments and to bash

those holding opposing views’ (pp. 1243-1244). Dyer & Smith preface this comment with the modest remark that the philosophy in the book might be better evaluated by a professional phil- osopher. What follows is my attempt to justify that remark.

The positions that Wenner & Wells labelled ‘realist’ strike me as straw positions. Effectively, Wenner & Wells did to philosophers of science what Dyer & Smith argue that they did to sup- porters of the dance language hypothesis. Realists are portrayed as essentially dogmatic, unable to concede that their theories might be incorrect and resistant either to contrary evidence, if Carnapians, or to confirmatory evidence, if Popperians (see also Faulkes’ uncritical accep- tance of this characterization). But realism is simply the view that there are theory-independent facts for scientists to discover. No realist in his or her right mind should confuse this view with the claim that his or her current theories are the correct ones, particularly not in an area as con- tentious as behavioural biology. A certain amount of tenaciousness against all comers is probably a virtue in a scientist, whether realist or relativist, but this is not to say that one must reject out of hand the possibility that one’s views are false, and realism does not require any such thing.

More significantly, however, the position espoused by Wenner & Wells seems incoherent. They describe the dance language hypothesis and the odour search hypothesis as rival paradigms, and Faulkes correctly reports that they consider their view to be a version of Kuhnian relativism (Kuhn 1970). For Kuhn there are no paradigm- independent standards for truth or rationality. Yet throughout their book, Wenner & Wells describe the odour search hypothesis as more credible than the dance language hypothesis. By what standard? They would say by the standard of

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the ‘crucial’ experiments that they have per- formed. Such experiments may, in Kuhn’s view, contribute to paradigm change, but not because of any logical requirement that the competing para- digm be rejected. Faulkes says, ‘Wenner & Wells are not claiming that science is only a matter of good salesmanship, nor that science can never progress’ (page 1241). Neither would Kuhn say this, but the notion of ‘progress’ being appealed to must be clarified. Kuhn admits that science does progress, in the sense that ‘Later scientific theories are better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in the often quite different environments to which they are applied’ (1970, page 206). But he im- mediately goes on to state, ‘That is not a relativist’s position’ (emphasis mine).

I suspect, however, that Wenner & Wells are not Kuhnian relativists at all. Their insistence, as reported by Faulkes, that it is necessary to ‘advo- cate a much greater use of strong inference; that is, creating tests that pit several hypotheses against each other’ (Faulkes 1984, page 1241) is nothing with which a realist would disagree. Their claims that the dance language hypothesis ‘failed repeated tests’ (1990, page 186) and that such tests ‘provided strong support for an . . odor-search model’ (page 185) indicate that they think the method of strong inference provides paradigm- independent standards for choosing between the hypotheses. If, as Dyer & Smith maintain, the

tests have been done and the odour search, hypothesis has been found lacking, only the, worst kind of relativism, where simply anything goes, could favour dogmatically clinging to an empirically unimpressive hypothesis.

Wenner & Wells identify many issues of interest to historians and philosophers of science, includ. ing the roles in science of sociological factors, teleological thinking, and anecdotes. Both realists and relativists could learn a lot about the im. portance of these factors from an unbiased case study of the bee dance controversy. Anatomy of a Controversy would provide a useful resource for such a study. but it is too one-sided to be that study itself.

I thank Marc Bekoff for helpful comments and discussion.

REFERENCES

Dyer, F. C. & Smith, B. H. 1994. Book review of Anatotny of a Controversy. Anim. Behav.. 47, 1142- 1244.

Faulkes, Z. 1994. Book review of Anatonzy of a Con- troversy. Anirn. Behav., 47, 1241-1242.

Kuhn, T. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wenner, A. M. & Wells, P. H. 1990. Anatomy of a Controversy: the Question of a ‘Language’ A~nong Bees. New York: Columbia University Press.