anatomy of an attack august 2014

28
Know What to Defend Against: Anatomy of an Attack Stephen Coty Chief Security Evangelist

Upload: alert-logic

Post on 09-Jun-2015

487 views

Category:

Technology


1 download

DESCRIPTION

Know what to defend against: Anatomy of an attack, presented y Stephen Coty, Alert Logic Chief Security Evangelist

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Know What to Defend Against: Anatomy of an Attack

Stephen Coty

Chief Security Evangelist

Page 2: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Industry Analysis – 2013 Data Breaches

Who is breaching data?

92% External Sources

14% Inside Sources

1% Business Partners

58% Data Theft tied to Activist

Groups

19% Attributed to state affiliated

actors

How do breaches occur?

13% Involved privilege misuse and abuse

52% Hacking

40% Incorporated Malware

35% Physical attacks

29% Employed Social Tactics

76% Intrusions exploited weak or stolen

credentials

What Commonalities Exist

78% Attacks were not highly difficult

75% Driven by financial motives

69% Were discovered by external parties

66% Took months or more to discover

71% Targeted user devices

*Statistics from 2013 Verizon Business Data Breach Investigation Report

Page 3: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Industry Analysis – 2014 Data Breaches

2014 Mandiant Data Breach Report

Page 4: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Industry Analysis

Page 5: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Industry Analysis - Finance

Page 6: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Industry Analysis - Healthcare

Page 7: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Malicious Actors and the

Tools they use

Page 8: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Various Groups

8

Page 9: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Tools of the Trade

Page 10: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Black Shades RAT

Page 11: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Havex – StuxNet Take 2 with a Twist

http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/26092/cyber-crime/cyber-espionage-havex.html - FSecure and CrowdStrike

• Has Focused on Energy Targets in:

• Germany

• Switzerland

• Belgium

• Suppliers of Remote Management Software for ICS

Systems (2)

• Started attacking US and Canadian Defense Contractors

• Delivered through:

• Spam Email

• Exploit Kits

• Trojanized Installers deployed on compromised web

sites

• Once infected, it now opens a backdoor

• Installs Remote Access Trojan Functionality

Attackers:

• C&C Servers are not Managed Professionally

• Uses additional Payloads to collect data, shows interest in

ICS

Page 12: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Underground Economy

Malware

Distribution

Service

Data

Mining &

Enrichment

Data

Acquisition

Service

Phishing

Data

Sales

Cashing

Gambling Drop Sites

Keyloggers

Payment

Gateway

s

Retailers

Bank

Carding

Forums

ICQ

Validation

Service

(Card

Checkers)

eCurrency

Spammers

Botnet

Owners

Master

Criminals

Drop

Service

Wire

Transfer

eCommerc

e

Sites

Botnet

Servic

e

Malware

Writers

Identity

Collectors Credit

Card

Users

Page 13: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Credit Card Selling Sites

Page 14: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

How do we defend against

these attacks

Page 15: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Security Architecture

Firewall/AC

L

Intrusion

Detection Deep Packet

Forensics

Network DDOS

Netflow

Analysis

Backup

Patch

Mgmt Vulnerabilities

Server/App

Log Mgmt AV

Anti-Virus Encryption GPG/PGP

Host Anti

Malware

FIM

NAC Scanner

Mail/Web

Filter Scanner

Lo-Jacking Central

Storage

Page 16: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Data Correlation is the Key

Page 17: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

NGX SIEM Operations

17

8.2

Million

Per Day

40,000

Per Month

Page 18: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Threat Intelligence

Page 19: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Threat Intelligence

Page 20: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Honeypot Findings

• Highest volume of attacks occurred in Europe

• Attacks against Microsoft DS accounted for over 51% of the overall attack vectors

• Database services have been a consistent target

• 14% of the malware loaded on the Honeypots was considered undetectable by AV

• Underscores the importance of a defense in depth strategy for the need to secure your cloud infrastructure

Page 21: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Partnering with Law Enforcement

Page 22: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Open/Closed Source Intelligence

Page 23: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Monitoring the Social Media Accounts

Page 24: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Following IRC and Forums

Page 25: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Tracking and Predicting the Next Move

• He is a guy from a European country/ (Russia)

• His handle or nick is madd3

• Using ICQ 416417 as a tool of communication

(illegal transaction)

• A simple /whois command to the nick provided us

with good information

• 85.17.139.13 (Leaseweb)

• ircname : John Smith

• channels : #chatroom

• server : irc.private-life.biz [Life Server]

• Check this out user has another room.

#attackroom4

• We can confirm that Athena version 2.3.5 is

being use to attack other sites.

• 2,300 infected Users

• Cracked Software is available in forums

• As of today 1 BTC to $618.00 or £361.66

Page 26: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Forums to Follow – darkode.com & exploit.in- Russian

Page 27: Anatomy of An Attack August 2014

Stay Informed of the Latest Vulnerabilities

• Websites to follow

• http://www.securityfocus.com

• http://www.exploit-db.com

• http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

• http://www.securitybloggersnetwork.com/