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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ~anbiganhtt~ttlt Quezon City FIRST DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, - versus - CRIM. CASES NOS. SB-17~CRM-0220 to SB-17-CRM-0222 For: Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 MARY JOYCE M. ROQUERO Accused. Present: DE LA CRUZ, J., Chairperson ECONG, J. FERNANDEZ,* J. Promulgated on: MAY 0 8 2011 47"/ x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -)( RESOLUTION DE LA CRUZ, J. This resolves accused Mary Joyce M. Roquero's Motion to Quash [Informations dated 02 November 2016J, dated, March 23, 2017, and the prosecution's Comment/Opposition, dated April 4, 2017, thereto. The accused seeks the quashal of the three (3) Informations against her on the ground that her constitutional right to speedy disposition of her cases has been violated because of the vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay committed by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMS) in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. According to her, such delay is shown by the following chronology of events: ·Sitting as Special Member of the First Division as per Administrative Order No. 009-2017, dated January 11, 2017.

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Page 1: ~anbiganhtt~ttlt - Sandiganbayansb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2017/E_Crim_SB-17-CRM-0220-022… · subparagraph (a), paragraph (A), Section 4, R.A. 6713. (b) January 9. 2013: Upon

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

~anbiganhtt~ttltQuezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus - CRIM. CASES NOS. SB-17~CRM-0220to SB-17-CRM-0222

For: Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019

MARY JOYCE M. ROQUEROAccused.

Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J., ChairpersonECONG, J.FERNANDEZ,* J.

Promulgated on:

MAY 0 8 2011 47"/

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RESOLUTION

DE LA CRUZ, J.

This resolves accused Mary Joyce M. Roquero's Motion toQuash [Informations dated 02 November 2016J, dated, March 23,2017, and the prosecution's Comment/Opposition, dated April 4,2017, thereto.

The accused seeks the quashal of the three (3) Informationsagainst her on the ground that her constitutional right to speedydisposition of her cases has been violated because of the vexatious,capricious and oppressive delay committed by the Office of theOmbudsman (OMS) in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.According to her, such delay is shown by the following chronology ofevents:

·Sitting as Special Member of the First Division as per Administrative Order No. 009-2017, dated January 11, 2017.

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t(t:~OLUTIONpp vs. Mary Joyce M. RoqueroCrim. Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0220 to -0222

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1. October 24, 2012 - The Complaint, dated October 2,2012, was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),which was docketed as OMB-V-C-12-0452 and OMB-V-A-12-0517;.

2. January 9, 2013 - The OMS-Visayas issued an Order,directing respondent to file her COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT and othercontroverting evidence to the Complaint, within ten (10) days fromnotice;

3. February 7, 2013 - Respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit,to apply to both 0 B-V -C-12-0452 and OMB-V -A-12-0517; .

4. August 3, 2016 - The OMB promulgated a 9-pageResolution, directing the filing of the three (3) Informations in thesecases.

The accused avers that it took the OMS three (3) years, nine(9) months and ten (10) days to promulgate the OMS Resolution,dated August 3, 2016, reckoned from the filing of the complaint onOctober 24, 2012. The OMS has not advanced any explanationwhy it took such long period of time to resolve an apparently simplecase. Besides, the records do not involve complicated and legalissues necessitating such painstaking and grueling scrutiny.

Besides, the administrative aspect of the October 2, 2012complaint, docketed as OMB-V-A-12-0517, was already decided byGraft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Ivy M. Cabatingan onSeptember 19, 2013, dismissing the case for forum shopping. GIOCabatingan's Decision was reviewed by Acting Director EuphemiaB. Bacalso on October 13, 2013 and approved by OmbudsmanConchita Carpio Morales on January 9, 2014. Counting from thecounter-affidavit of the accused filed on February 7, 2013, onlyseven (7) months had elapsed until the September 19, 2013Decision. Thus, the accused wonders why the criminal aspect wasresolved only on August 3,2016.

The accused likewise challenges the existence of probablecause against her, arguing as follows:

1. The OMS erred in finding that the urgency was the primaryreason for the skipping of public bidding.

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KI::.::>ULU IIUIV

pp vs. Mary Joyce M. RoqueroCrim. Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0220 to -0222

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2. The OMB erred in thinking that the Panubason Festival wasjust a mere contest.

3. It was the Panubason Festival 2010 Executive Committee'sdecision to resort to direct contracting and not the accused's. Theaccused was not a member of the Executive Committee and shemerely issued the Certification as a requirement by the Office of theMunicipal Accountant for the processing of the payment for theservices rendered by Jubilee Super Sounds.

4. The Municipality of Valderrama could not have conductedan open, public and competitive bidding for the annual PanubasonFestival held from January 22-25 without actual available funds.The budget for the festival would come from the Internal RevenueAllotment (IRA) often released in the middle part of January ..

5. Only Jubilee Super Sounds complied with the specificationsrequired by the Municipality for the Panubason Festival. It offeredmore advantageous term to the government.

6. There are no documentary proofs showing that the accusedgave unwarranted benefits to Jubilee Super Sounds in the years2011 and 2012.

By way of comment/opposition to the accused's motion, theprosecution counters that the preliminary investigation was notattended by inordinate delay, and that the accused failed to showthat the delay was vexatious, oppressive and capricious. It cites itsown chronology of events in the preliminary investigation as follows:

(a) October 24, 2012: A Complaint dated October 2, 2012was filed by Christopher B. Maguad against herein accused-movantfor violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(g), R.A. 3019 in relation to R.A.9184; Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019; Section 7 (a) of R.A. 6713 andsubparagraph (a), paragraph (A), Section 4, R.A. 6713.

(b) January 9. 2013: Upon evaluation of the Complaint, theOffice of the Ombudsman (Visayas) issued an Order which directedherein accused-movant to file her Counter-Affidavit and othercontroverting evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of saidOrder, Complainant was given ten (10) days to file Reply-Affidavit.

(c) February 21. 2013: Accused-movant filed her Counter-Affidavit.

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~ESOLUTIONpp vs. Mary Joyce M. RoqueroCrim. Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0220 to -0222

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(d) December 2. 2013: A draft resolution was forwarded toOMB proper for review and approval.

(e) January 13. 2014: Not satisfied with the draft resolutionfrom the OMB-Visayas, these cases were assigned to a newinvestigator for appropriate action.

(f) However, due to the resignation of the new investigatorassigned to handle the cases, the same were then re-assigned toanother investigator who submitted a draft resolution for the reviewand approval of the Honorable Ombudsman on December 2. '2015.

(g) April 12. 2016: The Hon. Ombudsman ordered the re-assignment of these cases to another lawyer/investigator to re-evaluate the draft resolution.

(h) May 31, 2016: These cases were then assigned to GIPOI Gian Carla V. Hernal for appropriate action.

(i) July 20, 2016: The first draft of resolution was submittedby GIPO I Gian Carla V. Hernal for the review and approval of theHon. Ombudsman.

0) August 2, 2016: A revised draft resolution was thensubmitted which incorporated the correction/s of the Hon.Ombudsman.

(k) August 3. 2016: Hon. Ombudsman approved theresolution which directed the filing of Informations aqainst hereinaccused-movant for three (3) counts of violation Section 3(e) ofR.A. 3019 and which dismissed the charges for violation ofSections 3 (g) and (h) of RA. 3019; Sections 7 (a) and 4(A) (a) ofRA. 6713 for insufficiency of evidence.

(I) September 19. 2016: Accused-movant filed a PartialMotion for Reconsideration assailing the August 3,2016 (Decision).

(m) October 4, 2016: The OMS issued an Order whichdenied with finality accused-movant's Motion for PartialReconsideration. This Order was approved by the Hon.Ombudsman on October 7,2016.'

(n) Thereafter, three (3) separate Informations datedNovember 2, 2016 for violation of Section 3(e), RA. 3019 were filedbefore the Sandiganbayan. The same were docketed as S8-17-CRM-0220 to 0222, which were raffled to the Honorable FirstDivision.

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RESOLUTIONpp vs. Mary Joyce M. RoqueroCrim. Cases Nos. SB·17·CRM·0220 to ·0222

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The prosecution explains that the interim of about three (3)years from the filing of the counter-affidavit up to the issuance of theresolution was brought about by the different levels of preparation,review and approval of the same in the OMB. In addition, the OMBitself is deluged with old unresolved cases as well as new ones, notonly coming from the Ombudsman-Visayas but from otherOmbudsman offices in Luzon and Mindanao, and otherprosecutorial arms of the OMB which all had to pass strict scrutiny.

Moreover, the prosecution states that from the time the casewas deemed submitted for resolution by the OMS, the accused hadnot demanded expeditious action thereon.

The accused's motion is impressed with merit.

The right to speedy disposition of cases should be understoodto be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematicalreckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient 1 In thedetermination of whether the constitutional right to speedydisposition of one's case has been violated, the following factorsmay be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) thereasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such rightby the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay?

All in all, the preliminary investigation of these cases rolled forfour (4) years and close to four (4) months, counted from the filing ofthe complaint on October 24, 2012 to the filing of the three (3)Informations on February 10, 2017. Upon a solicitous assessmentof the antecedents of the preliminary investigation, the Court agreeswith the accused that the proceedings before the OMB took anunreasonable period to complete. To the Court's mind, the length oftime spent by the OMB is not commensurate to the simplicity of theissues of these cases, and considering further that theadministrative aspect was already dismissed as early as September19, 2013, and which dismissal was approved by OMS CarpioMorales on January 9, 2014. This means that these cases musthave already been subjected, at least initially, to the examinationand analysis of the OMS during these years. Thus, the Court findsit unjustifiable that more years are required to dispose of thecriminal aspect of the case. It appears from the timeline of the

, People v. Coscol/uela, 701 SCRA 188,1952Id., p. 195-196

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t<t=~OLUIIONpp vs. Mary Joyce M. RoqueroCrim. Cases Nos. SB·17·CRM·0220 to ·0222

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preliminary investigation that the cause of delay is internal to theOMS, and that the accused who filed her counter-affidavit withouteven seeking extension pursuant to the order of the OMS, had nocontribution to such delay.

The Court also finds unacceptable the explanation. of theprosecution that the protracted delay can be excused due to the re-assignment of these cases to a new investigator who alsoeventually resigned, by reason of the layers of review theresolutions had to go through, and by the steady stream of casesflooding the OMB. These ratiocinations have already been struckdown in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Division).3 In the saidcase, the Supreme Court held:

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under themantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of thepeople" and as such, required to "act 'promptly on complatrttsftledin any form or manner against officers and employees of theGovernment, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentalitythereof, in order to promote efficient service." This greatresponsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude.Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent dutynot only to carefully go through the particulars of case butalso to resolve the same within the proper length of tlme. Itsdutiful performance should not only be gauged by the. qualityof the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness ofits dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication,such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the caseor any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normalwork activity --- any of which have not been adequately proven bythe prosecution in the case at bar --- there appears to be nojustifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could nothave earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedingsagainst the petitioners. 4

Coscolluela also clarified that it is not the duty of the accusedto follow-up on the prosecution of her cases because:

Being the respondents in the preliminary investigationproceedings, it was not the petitioner's duty to follow up on theprosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of theOmbudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within thebounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly

) 701 sea- 1884 At pp. 197-198

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act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case ofBarker v. Wingo:5

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State hasthat duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistentwith due process."

Indeed, in the more recent case of Almeda v. Office of theOmudsman (Mindanao),7 the Honorable Supreme Courtemphasized that for purposes of ascertaining delay in relation tospeedy disposition of cases, objection of the accused to the delay isnot necessary as long as he takes no part in it. It is likewiseimmaterial that the OMS's failure or inaction is not deliberate. Thus:

"It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve thecomplaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whetherthe (respondent) did not object to the delay or that the delay waswith his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causesdirectly attributable to him." Failure or inaction may not have beendeliberately intended, yet unjustified delay nonetheless causes justas much vexation and oppression. Indeed, delay prejudices theaccused or respondent-and the State just the same.

The Court observes that no delay' can be attributed to theaccused in these cases.

The Honorable Supreme Court likewise decreed inCosco/luela that prejudice occasioned by the delay should beconsidered in light of the interest of the accused that the speedy. trialwas designed to protect, viz:

xxx Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interestof the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimizeanxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit thepossibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the mostserious is the last because the inability of a defendant adequatelyto prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. Thereis also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recallaccurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is notimprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints onhis liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion andoften, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, hisassociation is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obhquy."

5407 U.S. 514 (1972)6 Cosco/luela v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 1997 G.R. No. 204267, July 25,20168 Coscol/uela, supra, at p. 200

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ru:;:,ULU lIONpp vs. Mary Joyce M. RoqueroCrim. Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0220 to -0222

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Considering the Court's finding that the accused's right tospeedy disposition of her cases was violated because thepreliminary investigation took an unreasonably long period of time tocomplete, it is no longer necessary to discuss the rest of the .issuesraised.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, accused MaryJoyce M. Roquero's Motion to Quash [Infqrmations dated 02November 2016], dated March 23, 2017 is hereby GR~NTED, andthe instant cases are accordingly ordered DISMISSED for violationof the right of the accused to speedy disposition of her cases.

Considering that this dismissal is tantamount to an acquittal,the hold departure order issued against the accused by reason ofthese cases are hereby LIFTED, and the bond she posted isordered RELEASED, subject to the usual accounting and auditingprocedures.

SO ORDERED.

EFREN ~ 4·A CRUZChairper~o~;fociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

.~A}JJJiM{L -kA;{A IvtAtt11GERALDINE FAITH A.l£cONG

Associate JusticeL ~O R. FERNA.NDEZ

ssociate Justice