anderson - yours in struggle for majimbo nationalism and the party politics of decolonization in...

8/2/2019 Anderson - Yours in Struggle for Majimbo Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya

1/19

'Yours in Struggle for Majimbo'. Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization inKenya, 1955-64Author(s): David M. AndersonReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 547-564Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036342 .Accessed: 30/03/2012 03:41

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toJournal of

Contemporary History.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/30036342?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/30036342?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd


2/19

JournalfContemporaryistory opyright 2005SAGE ublications,ondon, housandOaks,CAandNew Delhi,Vol40(3),547-564.ISSN 022-0094.DOI:10,1177/0022009405054571

DavidM.Anderson'Yours in Struggle for Majimbo'. Nationalismand the Party Politics of Decolonization inKenya, 1955-64

Over the past 30 years or more, the history of Kenyanpolitics has beenenveloped nthegrandmeta-narrativef the rise of nationalism.Thishas beenthehistorymadebythevictors n Kenya's ndependence lectionsof 1963, theKenyaAfricanNational Union (KANU).This version of Kenya's past hasconsciouslyobscured he uncomfortableambiguitiesof the Mau Mau years(1952-60) andneatly avoidedany acknowledgment f those who then heldalternativevisions of Kenya'spost-colonialpolitical future.'Among thosealternativeswas the policy of majimboism, he centre-pieceof the politicalagendaof KANU'srivalparty, heKenyaAfricanDemocraticUnion(KADU).The term majimboism means 'regionalism', and it was initially promoted byKADUin the pre-independenceegotiationsbetween 1960 and 1963 as thebasis for a devolved constitutionalarrangementhat would protectsmaller'minority' ommunities rom the dominanceof largercommunities.Thiswasaproposalfordecentralization,venfederation,n which six or moreprovincescomprising independentKenya would each have equal status. But in theheatedpoliticsof the early1960s the rhetoricof KANUturnedthe federalistgoal of majimboismnto a slur:majimboistswere derided as tribalistswhoopposedthe broadergoals of nationalism.KANU'svictoryin the 1963 elec-tions was thusa victoryfor nationoverregion,and for nation over tribe. AsKenya becamea de facto one-partystate with the opposition KADUMPsrapidlycrossing he floor in the monthsfollowingindependence,he impetusfor majimboismquicklygave way to Jomo Kenyatta's all for unitythroughharambee(all working together).Everyonewas by then a nationalist,andmajimboism'sroubledhistorywas bestforgotten.There have been three historical interpretationsof these events. GaryWassermanwas the first to dismissmajimboism s partof the Britishplot tosubvertthe potentialradicalismof Kenyannationalism,representedn mensuch as Jomo Kenyattaand OgingaOdinga,and turn it towardmore con-servative and compliantends. His interpretationhas influencedsubsequentgenerationsof historiansof British mperialism.ThepoliticalscientistDonald1 For recent commentaries on the need to break through the meta-narrative of nationalism, seeMarshall Clough, Mau Mau Memoirs. History, Memory and Politics (Boulder, CO and London1998); John Lonsdale, 'KAU's Cultures. Imaginations of Community and Constructions of Leader-ship in Kenya afterthe Second World War',Journal of African CulturalStudies, 13 (2000), 107-24.


3/19

548 Journalf Contemporaryistory ol40 No 3

Rothchild hen offereda more subtleanalysisof majimboism s a keyfeaturein the racial bargaining hat markedKenya'spoliticsin the late 1950s andearly1960s, as liberals oughtto reconstruct oliticalplatformsn thewake ofthe Mau Mau struggle. Rothchild's account gave prominence to thoseEuropeanswho 'broke ranks' to secure multi-racialalliances.A third, andcurrentlydominantview is bestrepresentedn the writingsof Kenya'sseniorliving historian,Bethwell Alan Ogot. In common with other historians ofKenya'snationalistschool, Ogot dismissesmajimboismas a brief and trivialdistraction hat did nothingto disruptthe unityof the nationalistcause. ForOgot, thedifferencesbetweenKANU and KADUwere minimalandso quicklydisappeared nce theinfluenceof thecolonialistshad beenremoved,hence therapiditywith whichKenyabecamea one-party tatein 1964, only 11 monthsafter independence.While Ogot's analysishas the advantageof recognizingAfricanagency,none of the threeapproaches o the politicsof Kenya's nde-pendencestrugglehave seriouslyexamined the motives and organizationofKADUin its promotionof majimboism.2Yet therearepowerfulreasonsforreturningo thisforgottenhistory.Sincethe early1990s, majimboismhas been revived n Kenyaby manyof the samepoliticianswho begantheircareerswithinthe KADUfold some40 yearsago.Ethnicviolence n theelectioncampaignsof 1992 and1997 was stimulatedbycries for majimboism,andin the currentdiscussionsof constitutionalreformin Kenyaa majimboist olution,devolvingpowersto the regions,remainsanoptionthatcommands upport n manypartsof the country.3Themajimboistalternativevision of Kenya's uturemay have dimmedafter1964, but it is apoliticalideathatrefuses o die.The historyof majimboisms rootedin the politicsof Kenya'sdecoloniza-tion. The circumstanceshat speedily brought Kenyattaand KANU to aninclusivenationalpoliticsin 1961, andKADU'santi-MauMauloyaliststo anexclusive,ethnicallybasedregionalism,had at their corea deepironythat isnot reflectedin the meta-narrative f nationalisthistory. Kenya's postwarnationalpartieswere coalitionsof varied and diverse ocal politics, complexorganizations within which negotiation and compromise were constant2 Gary Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization. Kenya, Europeans and the Land Issue1960-1965 (Cambridge 1976), and Robert Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981. AnIntroductory Survey (Basingstoke 1985); Donald Rothchild, Racial Bargaining in IndependentKenya (London 1973) and Keith Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya (Basingstoke1999); B.A. Ogot, 'The Decisive Years' in B.A. Ogot and W.R. Ochieng' (eds), Decolonizationand Independence in Kenya, 1940-1993 (London, Nairobi and Athens, OH 1995), and for moreradical nationalist views, see Peter Anyang Nyong'o, 'State and Society in Kenya. Disintegrationof Nationalist Coalitions and the Rise of Presidential Authoritarianism 1963-78', African Affairs,88 (1989), 229-52.3 M. Ngunyi, 'Resuscitating the Majimbo Project. The Politics of Deconstructing the UnitaryState in Africa' in A. Olukoshi and L. Laasko (eds), Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa(Uppsala 1996); Herve Maupeu, 'Etat Kenyan et conflits ethniques dans la Rift Valley (1991-93)',Studia Africana, no. 5 (1994), 37-46; Marcel Rutten, Alamin Mazrui and Francois Grignon (eds),Out for the Count. The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya (Kampala2001); John O. Oucho, Undercurrentsof Ethnic Conflict in Kenya (Leiden 2002).


4/19

Anderson:ationalismndKenyanarty oliticsfDecolonization 549

featuresof policy-makingand decision-taking.KANU was stigmatized bymanyas thepartyof Mau Mau.This was truein part;manyformerdetaineestook prominentpositionswithintheparty.But KANUwas, of course,also thepartyof thoseamongthe GikuyuandLuo who hadvehementlyopposedMauMau. Despitethe perceivedethnicexclusivityof the Mau Mau movement,KANUadoptedan inclusive,nationalistprogrammehatrejectedall formsofethnicparticularism,most especiallymajimboism.KADU,on the otherhand,so often presentedby its supporterswithin the Britishestablishment s repre-sentinga combinationof the 'loyal tribes'who had staunchlyopposedthethreatof MauMau,andtheEuropeanmulti-racialists ho wouldseeto it thatappropriatepro-Britishpolicies were retainedafter independence, nsteadretreated nto majimboism'sdivisiveethnicpoliticsamid threatsof secessionand violence. We need to begin by reflectingupon the developments hatshapedthesepoliticalpostures.Theidea of majimboismwasconceived n there-emergencef Africanpoliticsin the latteryears of the Mau Mau Emergency,between 1955 and 1960.Africanpoliticalpartieshad beenbannedunderthe Emergency egulationsnJune 1953, butthe introductionof the LytteltonConstitution n 1954 openedthe door to Africanand Asianparticipationn centralgovernment hroughanelectoralsystem.This reformwas to be closelycontrolled.FromJune 1955,political partieswere againpermitted,but only at district evel andwith thediscretionof colonialofficerswho approvedparties or registration.Nationalpartieswere not permittednthiscolonial'micro-management'f re-emergentpoliticalactivism.A plethoraof localpartiessoon sprangup under he super-vision of the state.Amongthe first to be registeredwere the Nairobi DistrictAfricanCongress(laterto split in 1957 with the formation of the NairobiPeople's ConventionParty),the Mombasa AfricanDemocraticUnion, theAbagusiiAssociationof SouthNyanza, the TaitaAfricanDemocraticUnion,the NakuruAfricanProgressivePartyand the AbaluhyaPeople'sAssociation.Otherssoon followed,manyof them cultivatedbythe districtadministration.The aimof thesecolonialreforms,Ogothasastutelyobserved, wasto createabase upon which a collaborativeAfricanleadershipcould emergeand toundermine hesupportof Mau Mau freedom ighters'.4ThoughAfricanpoliticianswereby no meansalways compliantwith theseaims, colonial policies did have the effect of nurturing ocal politicswhilehindering heexpressionof nationalaspirations.Moreover, he British oughtto rewardtheirallieswhile punishing heir enemies.In the CentralProvince,the heartland f MauMausupport, heregistration f partieswasnot permit-ted (so as to minimize Gikuyu influence). But in the Maasai and Kalenjin ruralareas of the Rift Valley and Southern Provinces, where formal politics had beenslow to emerge after the second world war, officials gave encouragement to thefew politicians who were already active to now consolidate their support4 Ogot, 'The Decisive Years', op. cit., 48.


5/19

550 JournalfContemporaryistory ol40 No 3

through ocalpartyorganizations.Amongthese were TaitaarapTowett,J.M.ole Tameno, Daniel T. arap Moi, J.K. ole Tipis and F.K. arap Chumah-typicalof a youngergeneration allwere around30 yearsof age) of mission-educated, ocal councillorsand schoolteachers henbeingnurtured o replacethe older,uneducatedraditionalist hiefs who hadpreviouslybeen the main-stayof colonialgovernment.Allfiveof theseKalenjin nd Maasai eaderswereconservativegradualists n politicalterms, and all were identifiedwith thecolonialgovernment's ampaignagainstMau Mau.Thesemen each stood forelection to the LegislativeCouncilin 1957. OnlyMoi was successful,beatingTowett and ole Tipisto represent he Rift Valley.But the elections of 1957wereveryfarfromnationalistpolitics,or even frompartypolitics.Moi, Towettand ole Tipis had gone on the campaign rail together,sharingthe hustingsandpolitely takingturnsto speak.Theirelectoratewas selectedbya qualifiedfranchise,defined on the basisof income,educationandgovernment ervice.This gave some electors two votes, others three.In the Rift Valley,from anestimatedpopulationof 900,000 therewerefewerthan 5000 registered oters.This narrow class-basedand regional focus of politics was reinforcedbycolonial regulations hat prevented hose electedto the LegislativeCouncilfromconsolidatingheirpositionwithin broaderpartyaffiliations.Evenwhenthe LennoxBoydConstitutionof 1957 increasedhe numberof Africanrepre-sentativeson the LegislativeCouncilfrom8 to 14, Towett and ole Tipis beingsuccessfulnthe nextballot,therewasstillno opportunity llowedfornationalpoliticalorganization.sLocal networks of patronageand clientagethereforecontinuedto mobilizeAfricanpoliticsfor Moi and others likehim, includingfuture ellow stalwartsof KADUMasindeMuliroand RonaldNgala(elected n1957 for North Nyanzaand Coastrespectively).The colonialadministrationencouragedthese men in building local power bases, thus developingandstrengtheninghe politicsof the non-Gikuyuareas.During1958, Moi firstestablished heBaringoDistrictIndependence arty n hishomeland,and thenhelped to foster similarorganizations n the Kalenjindistrictsof Kipsigis,Nandi andElgeyo.Over he nexttwo years,herelentlesslyoured heKalenjin-speakingareasof the WesternHighlands n his LandRover,drummingupsupportat well-attendedpoliticalrallies and speaking o the various AfricanDistrictCouncils,all of this facilitatedbythe colonialadministration.6When nNairobi on LegislativeCouncilbusiness,Moi variouslyshared his Pumwanilodgingswith ole TipisandJ.K.Seroney,who representedhe Nandiarea,andbecamea close friendof RonaldNgala,the coastalpoliticianwho wouldgo onto lead KADU. These ruralmen, raw, inexperienced oliticiansand staunchChristians or the most part, had few links and little in common with theGikuyuandLuopoliticianswho sat on theLegislativeCouncilalongside hem,men such as the rural businessman Oginga Odinga, the smart young tradeunionist Tom Mboya and the returned Americangraduate Julius Kiano, whose5 Ibid., 54-6, 60-1. For an excellent contemporary overview, see A.J. Hughes, East Africa. TheSearch for Unity (Harmondsworth 1963), 93-145.6 Andrew Morton, Moi - the Making of an African Statesman (London 1998), 87-8.


6/19


political heritagewas mainly urban, who were enveloped in ideologicaldebates,andmanyof whom hadpastconnectionswith the nationalistKenyaAfricanUnion(KAU),banned n 1953. Thecommitmentof Moi andhis con-federates o regionalpoliticslacked nationalistaspiration:Tribalismwill livefor at leastanother iftyyears',DanielarapMoitoldtheBBCwhen interviewedinAugust1958.7The seedsof majimboism ad beensown.Theywouldnow bewateredbythe stormof rapidpoliticalchange.By the summerof 1959, the African elected members n the LegislativeCouncil had effectivelymanoeuvredaround the ban on nationalpartiesbyseparatingntovoting blocks. Thesegroupingswould eventuallyresult n theformationof the two nationalpartiesthat would contest the independenceelections.InJuly 1959, the KenyaNational Party(KNP)was formedby 8 ofthe 14 Africanmembers(Moi, Towett, ole Tipis, Ngala, Muliro, Khamisi,Nyaga and Muimi).8 n response, Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya and JuliusKiano announced hat the remainingrumpof Africanmemberswould formtheKenyaIndependenceMovement KIM).ThoughOgotdescribes his as 'thefirst split in the ranksof Africannationalism', t more obviouslyreflectedavery significantdividein political ideologyand practice:between those whohad embracedthe notion of regional politics, advocatedgradual politicalreform andadopteda broadlyconservativepoliticalideology (the KNP),andthose who had all along argued or a nationalperspective, ampaignedmoreaggressivelyorrapidpoliticalchangeandsupporteda moreradicalandpro-gressivepolicyagenda(theKIM).9The eventsat the first LancasterHousetalks,called nJanuary hefollowingyear to open discussionon Kenya'spath to independence,only servedtoemphasize the growing differences between the two groups. FollowingLancasterHouse,with independencenow the declaredgoal of Britishpolicy,the protagonists ushed o secure heirpoliticalconstituencies.ByApril1960,Muliro stood at the head of the Kenya AfricanPeople'sParty,and Moispearheadedhe RiftValleypoliticians n drawing he four districtpartiesofthe WesternHighlands into a new larger grouping, the KalenjinPoliticalAssociation.10While Muliro and Moi followed their own rural politicalinstincts to consolidate local power bases, the membersof the KIMlookedtoward the national stage. In May 1960, the KIM transformedtself intoKANU,withJamesGichuru akingon therole of actingPresident inprepara-tion for Kenyatta's ventualrelease romdetention, he achievement f whichKANUplacedat the head of its politicalmanifesto). n reaction o the forma-7 Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya, op. cit., 77.8 Simiyu Wandibba, Masinde Muliro. A Biography (Nairobi 1966), 14.9 Ogot, 'The Decisive Years', op. cit., 61, for the quotation; Wandibba, Masinde Muliro, op.cit., 15-17, for context.10 East African Standard,22 April 1960, for an account of the meeting. Kalenjinpolitical iden-tity had first begunto take shape in the 1940s, in the form of the Kalenjin Union, established as anorganization for ex-servicemen, and then through the activities of Kalenjin students at the AllianceHigh School and at Makerere College. See BenjaminE. Kipkorir,The Marakwet of Kenya (Nairobi1982).


7/19


tion of KANU, in June 1960 Muliro and Moi held a mass rally of 8000followersat Kericho,wherethey were joinedby RonaldNgala representingthe Coastal AfricanPeople'sUnion and by delegates romthe MaasaiUnitedFrontandthe SomaliNational Association.At the end of a long day of nego-tiations the mergerto form KADU was announced.Smallerdistrictparties,among them the North Nyanza District Congressand the Kilifi AfricanPeople'sUnion, now also affiliatedwith KADU."Each faction within thecoalitionrepresentedhe local interestsof its own region,and each wantedprotectionfor those interestsunderthe independenceonstitution.Majimbo-ism was thus the common hread inking heRiftValleyandCoast to thecauseof the SomaliNational Associationandalso to manyother,smallercauses.Inthe wake of the Kerichorally the proclamationsof majimboismbecameincreasingly belligerent,as KADU's 'Youth Wingers'declared themselvesready o protect he interestsof theirpeoplesbyforce of arms.From he begin-ning,KADU'smajimboist mbitionsweredefensiven character ndbornoutof fear - and for Moi and the belligerentKalenjin his meant fear of theGikuyucolonizationof the RiftValley.12The fears that fed the majimboist ausewere the productof colonial rule.The mobilizationof the smaller ethnic groups within KADU established abulwarkagainstthe dominanceof the larger,wealthierand better-educatedLuo and Gikuyu,groupsthat had takenearlierand lasting advantageof theopportunities f colonialism.KADU'spromotionof majimboismwas a logicaland potentiallyeffectivemeans to disarmthe overwhelmingpolitical andeconomic power representedby this Luo-Gikuyuaxis within KANU. Thedemonizingof the Gikuyu n the colonialpropaganda ampaignagainstMauMau between 1952 and 1960 had donemuchto fosterdistrustof all Gikuyupoliticians,buta deeperhistoryof Gikuyucolonizationof Kenya'sRiftValleyand WesternHighlandsover more than50 yearsof colonialrulegavethe fearof Gikuyu dominationa sharperedge. Similarly, he dominantposition ofthe Luo in the labourmarket,particularlyor skilled work of all kinds,waspopularlyperceivedby the 1950s as a barrier o the advancement f others,especially he Abaluhya,Kalenjinandcoastalpeopleswho wereby thenseek-ing to move into the labour marketin increasingnumbers.Theseeconomicrivalrieswere the verystuff of Kenya's ocal politicsby the 1950s and theyplayed a significantrole in shapingthe KANU and KADU alliances.After1960, the fearof economic dominationandpoliticalexclusiongreatlystimu-lated the majimbocause.The newnationalparties irst ockedhorns nthegeneral lectionof February1961. Despite tspoororganization ndthedivisionsandrivalries hat ledsomemembers o standas 'independents' gainstofficialpartycandidates,KANUwon a large enough victoryin 1961 to form an interimgovernment,but the11 Ogot, 'The Decisive Years', op. cit., 65; Wandibba, Masinde Muliro, op. cit., 16.12 Claire Medard, 'Strategies territoriales. Territoire ethnique et territoire etatique au Kenya'(Colloque Politiques des territoires, Bordeaux, October 1994), 13-15; Cherry Gertzel, ThePolitics of Independent Kenya 1963-68 (Nairobi 1967), 9-10; Morton, Moi, op. cit., 93-4.


8/19

Anderson:ationalismndKenyan arty oliticsfDecolonization 553

stickingpointwasKenyatta.KANUdecided o makeKenyatta's eleasea con-dition of takingoffice,and turgedKADU o showsolidaritywith it inthisgoal.Whilst KADU'sAfrican eadershiphad publiclysupported he campaign orKenyatta's elease,t took the view thatthis could be morereadilynegotiatedbyan interimAfricangovernment.KADU therefore entered discussions withGovernorRenisonearly nMarch1961, to theoutrageof KANU.Afterseveralweeksof brokering,Renisonwas abletoannounceon 18April1961 thatKADUwould form a minority coalition governmentin alliance with the liberalEuropeanNew KenyaGroup(NKG)andtheKenyaAsianParty, hus,at leastbriefly,pushingoutKANU andKenyatta to thepoliticalmargins.Europeanpoliticsat this point playedan importantrole in consolidatingthe ideology of majimboismwithin KADU. In the months before the firstLancasterHouse conferenceof 1960, the politicalunityof Kenya'sEuropeancommunityhad been irrevocablysplit. The United Party,which in 1960became heKenyaCoalition,hadlong enjoyed hesupportof thevastmajorityof the Europeanpopulation.LedbyPuckBriggsandCavendish-Bentinck,heKenya Coalitionrepresented raditionalsettler conservatism.SupportedbysmallerEuropeanandownersandbythe multitudeof Europeannewcomers othe colony in the postwaryears,most of whom filledlower-orderobsin theurbanareas, hepartycampaigned gainstmulti-racialism,eeking o preservethe colour bar andto maintainseparatevotingrollsand reserved epresenta-tion for the Europeanminority.The rival Europeanparty, the New KenyaGroup (NKG), was formed by Michael Blundellas a liberal,multi-racialalternative o the older style of Europeanpolitics. Blundell'sappealwas towealthierfarmersandthe professional ommunity,groupsthat werelikelytobe moresecure n the transition romsettlercolonialism o majorityrule andwho thereforehad reasonto negotiatea compromisewith the conservativeAfrican middle class who they hoped would shape Kenya'sfuture.Thoughmost commentators avelampooned he KenyaCoalition as the dinosaursofan imperialpast,whileportrayingBlundelland his supporters s the 'progres-sive'visionariesof a 'New Kenya', t was recognizedat the time thatthegoalsof the NKG remained emarkably arrowand sectional.Blundell kilfully iedEuropean nterests o those of 'minority'Africangroups, linkingthe racialbargaining orthe protectionof Europeanprivilegewith the issueof regionalautonomy.Thestrategyof Blundellandthe NKG, writesOgot, was 'first,tocreatea multi-racial tate as an alternative o all-Africangovernment, hen,to destroy Kenyattapolitically by forminga governmentwithout him and,finally,to divideAfricanpoliticiansand force a majimbo(decentralized)on-stitution with minority safeguards'."This interpretation airly reflectstherealityof eventsas theyunfolded.Thestrategywouldfail overall,butits goalsdrewtheNKGvery firmly nto theembraceof KADU.Majimboism eaturedprominently n the campaignrhetoric of the 196113 Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, op. cit., 75-104; Hughes, East Africa, op. cit.,131-4; and Rothchild, Racial Bargaining, op. cit., for the analysis; Ogot, 'The Decisive Years', op.cit., 63, for the quotation.


9/19


election,althoughKADU at that time had no clearnotion of how this goalmightbe achieved n constitutional erms.What became he 'majimboconsti-tution' was initially draftedby the New Kenya Group, during the lattermonths of 1960, as theyframeda pro-federalistmanifesto or the protectionof European nterests.By November 1960, Blundellalreadyfelt confidentenough of gaining significantAfricansupportto declarethat the animositytoward dominanceby Gikuyuand Luo would 'undoubtedly'ead 'to a civilwar' in Kenyaif a federalsystemwas not instituted.14While many smallerEuropean settler farmers worried that regionalism might undermine theirclaims to landrights hrougha CentralLandBoard andthis more thananyother issueturnedthemaway fromsupporting he NKG- majimboismwaspossiblythe only issueupon which the Africanmembersof KADU and theirEuropeanallies could easily agree by the end of 1960. The generalelectionresult of February1961 only servedto strengthenhe resolve of both KADUand the Europeans hat a majimboconstitutionwas crucialto theirpoliticalsurvival.KANUgained67.4 percentas opposedto KADU's16.4 percent ofthe total vote in these polls, but the distributionof seats won showed veryclearlythat KADU's base of support ay only in the RiftValleyand Coastalconstituencies. t was evident hat KADUwould be very unlikely o overcomesuch a deficit in any subsequentnational elections,and that without verysubstantialprotectionEuropean epresentationwouldbeobliterated."sThe principalauthors of the federalconstitutionwithin the New KenyaGroup found enthusiasticmajimboistsupporterswithin KADU. AlongsideBlundell, Havelock, Reginald Alexander and RhoderickMacleod, PeterOkondo emergedas the leadingKADUdraughtsman f the proposedconsti-tution.A formerassociateof KANU'sOgingaOdinga,Okondo had failed towin nominationfor a KANU seat in Nyanza in 1960, and so joinedKADU,winninga seatfor his new partyas a National Member. ncollaborationwithBlundelland Havelock,it was Okondo who helpedto draftproposals alonglines that marriedAmericanand Swiss notions of federalism.'6KADU'scom-mitmentto majimboismnow had substantivepolicy aims,which were takenup in the political speechesof Ngala, Moi, Shikukuand Muliro. BetweenAugustand October1961, the 'majimbo onstitution' ast anever-lengtheningshadowover the colonialgovernment'salks withKADUandKANU,the twopartiesseemingly urther han ever fromcompromise.Bythetimethat KADUdelegatesarrived n London for the Second LancasterHouse conference nFebruary1962, the partywas firmlycommittedto a federalconstitution.KADU had by then engaged the Swiss constitutionallawyer Dr EdwardZellwegeras an adviser,and in the Britishparliament he ConservativeMPFredericBennettwas energeticallydirectinga ginger groupof Toriesto pro-mote the KADU proposals to give Kenya's politics a 'tribal foundation'.'714 Wasserman, oliticsof Decolonization, p. cit., 99.15 GeorgeBennettandCarlRosberg,TheKenyattaElection1960-61 (Oxford1961).16 Kyle,The Politicsof theIndependence f Kenya,op. cit., 137-8.17 Ibid.,137.


10/19

Anderson:NationalismndKenyanPartyPoliticsf Decolonization 555

The alliancewith KADUandthe vehicleof majimboism llowed the NKGto cloak the protectionof Europeanpoliticalinterestsbehind the 'legitimate'fears of Africanminorities.Writinghis first volumeof memoirs,published n1964 only shortlyafter Kenya's independence,Michael Blundellpresentedthis commitment o majimboismpurelyas a concernof the Africanelementswithinthe KADUalliance: Regionalism, r "Majimbo"as it was called,hadan immediateand attractiveappealto tribesin all the ruraland remoteareasof Kenya',hewrote,'asit offered hem a measureof control over the issuesofwhich theywere most apprehensive,uch as land, education,the police,andthe compositionof the Civil Service.''8Thirtyyears later, his posthumouslypublishedsecond volume revealed a more candid picture of the politicalmanoeuvrings f the moment:'I did not personally hink regionalismwas apermanent olutionto Kenya'spoliticalfuture',he wrote, 'but it was obviousthatsomethingof the sort was necessaryf severe nternal ensionswerenot toarise.' Blundellrecalled hat he fearedthat an overlycentralizedgovernmentwould 'be a recipefor civil war at sometime in the future and would furtheraccentuate the already strong tribal feelings'.19Other Europeans hen heldsimilar views. When Reginald MaudlingvisitedKenya in November 1961,having taken over as Secretaryof State from Iain Macleodonly one monthearlier,he was deeplyalarmedby the intensityof the ethnic rivalrieshe wit-nessed among the Africanpoliticians.Maudling thought 'tribalism'to be'moreimmediately xplosivethanracialism',and was 'quitecertain hat thereis a dangerof serious ribalclashes nthiscountryunlessa solution s found'.20If the 'fear actor'haddrivenMuliro,Moi, Ngala and otherstowardmajim-boismin the firstplace,as Rothchildhasargued,21y 1961 the agitationwith-in KADUwascausingBritishpoliticiansand officials o waver. As the SecondLancasterHouse talks approached,scheduledfor February o April 1962,KADU eadersdid their evelbestto promote ederalism s a conditionof theirparticipation.Various statementsexpressed ears of the fate of lessergroupsshould federationnot be accepted,andtherewerefrequent hreatsof resigna-tion. While Somalipoliticianswould eventually ook toward a politicalfuturebeyondKenya,no othergroupeverseriously anvassed orsecession,althoughhotterheads wereproneto suggest t as a possibility.In a speechdeliverednIten in October1961, KADU'sWilliamMurgorhad ragedagainstthe pres-ence of Kikuyusquatters n the Kapsabet orestand threatened hat KADU'YouthWingers'would remove hemviolently f thegovernment ouldnot doso through egislation.22t a KADUrallyin Kimilili,Moi referreddirectly o18 MichaelBlundell, o Rougha Wind London1964), 298-9.19 Michael Blundell,A Love Affair with the Sun. A Memoir of Seventy Yearsin Kenya (Nairobi1994), 116.20 Thequotation s cited n Morton,Moi,op. cit., 113.21 Donald Rothchild, MajimboSchemes n Kenyaand Uganda' n JeffreyButlerand A.A.Castagno (eds), Boston University Papers on Africa. Transition in African Politics (New York,Washington,DC and London1967),291-310.22 Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya, op. cit., 139, giving a first-hand account.


11/19


the fears of Gikuyu ncursionsand KADU's determination o stand firmonmajimboism: Her Majesty'sgovernmentmust sanction regionalismbeforehandingoverpowerto the African f there is to be peacein Kenya.'Thiswastypicalof the rhetoricof thetime,especiallyn thoseKalenjin reas of the RiftValleywhere fearsof a 'Gikuyu and-grab'were strongest.The rifts betweenKANU and KADUwere by now 'deepand deeplyfelt', and in the LancasterHouse talks Moi would repeatthe threat that 'the people of Kalenjinwerepreparedto fight and die for their land'.23The KADU delegationto theLancasterHousetalksof February 962 was on thedefensive rom the outset,steadfastly refusingto discuss other matters until principles regarding he'structureof government'had been hammeredout. Regionalismhad becomethe first,andperhaps he onlyprincipleof KADU'spoliticalmanifesto.The substance of KADU's plans for a 'majimboconstitution'graduallybecameclear as theLancasterHousetalks rolledon. Theywished to createsixregions,alongside he federalcapitalterritoryof Nairobi.A bicameralegisla-ture would comprisean upperhouse representinghe regions,to which eachregionwould elect sevenrepresentativesrom their own Regional Assembly,anda lower houseelectedbyuniversaladultsuffragen 71 constituencies.Thetwo tiers would haveequalpowersof legislation,but the upperhouse wouldapprovekey appointmentso the courts and armed orces.A FederalCouncilof Ministerswouldcomprise10 to 15 members,at least one but no more thanthreedrawn fromeachregion.The Councilwould elect its own chairmanasHeadof State,a postthat would rotate on an annualbasis.Eachregionwouldhave its own Assemblywith legislativepowersand an executiveheadedby aPresident,who wouldbe electedfromamongmembersof theAssembly.Eachregion would have its own civil service and its own police - who wouldimplement ederallaws as well as regional legislation.To describethis as acumbersome tructurewould be to understatehe obvious.Moreover, t was astructurehatKenyacouldill afford.Maudlingsupportedhepoliticalgoal ofKADU'saspirationsas a bulwarkagainstKenyatta stillregardedas a terror-ist) and Odinga (distrusted or his communistleanings),but he had beenwarnedby the ColonialOfficethat Kenyasimplycouldnot afford an expen-sive federalsystemof government.24The compromiseproposalsput forwardby Maudling udgedthe issue andleft key questionsunanswered.KADU was given a commitment o regionalassemblies,but the precisecharacterof those bodies,theircompositionandtheir exact relationship o centralgovernmentremained o be worked out.KANU,on the otherhand, signedup to the assurances hat the authorityofthe centralgovernmentwouldnot be undermined, articularlywith regard othe disbursementof budgetsto the regions.On key areas,such as the civilservice, regional boundaries and constituency delimitation, all of which wouldultimately be crucial to the powers and operation of the regional assemblies,23 Morton,Moi,op. cit., 110, 100 and 112.24 Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya, op. cit., 144-7.


12/19

Anderson:NationalismndKenyan artyPoliticsf Decolonization 557

Maudlingpledged o set upcommissionsof enquiry o determinehe bestwayforward. This interim settlementwas loaded with contradictionsand unre-solved issues. KADU'sdelegationundoubtedly aw thedangersof this,partic-ularlyin the lightof the party'sweak political positionwithinKenya. Ngalamade everyeffort to push Maudlingtoward firmerpublic commitmentonmajimboism,but failedto persuadehe Minister hatthiswould do enoughtostrengthenKADU's position without compromisingBritishrelations withKANU.For its part,KANU's more measuredresponseto the proposalswascalculatedon a longer-term trategy.In London,they adopteda conciliatorytone to cloak theirdisdain ortheKADUproposals,and allowedthemselves obe persuaded o accept compromises.In Kenyatta's udgment,majimboismwas practicallyunworkableand couldanywaybe outflankedoncepowerwasachieved. He never doubted that KANU would defeat KADU at the ballotbox, and at that point KANU must be ready to make the constitutionalchanges necessary o do away with majimboism.25his, in the event, wasexactlywhathappened.ThoughneitherKADU nor KANU had got what they wantedin London,both agreedto participaten an interimgovernment hat would take Kenyathroughto the final electionspriorto independence.However,once back inNairobi, KANU immediatelymounted a politicaloffensivein which it dis-missed majimboismas anti-nationalistand KADU as 'tribalists'.AlthoughKANU had agreedto regionalassembliesat the LancasterHouse talks, itsseniorpoliticians,ncludingTomMboya,now made it clear thattheyhad nointention of honouringthat agreement n practice.In the face of this well-organizedand efficientKANU campaign,KADU lost ground very rapidly.When Reginald Maudling again visited Nairobi in July 1962, he foundKADU's eaders n angryandbelligerentmood. Ngala openlyaccusedKANUof playinga doublegame,and told Maudlingof his belief that the expatriatecivil service was working in KANU's favour and against KADU'sregionalambitions. Imust tellyou bluntly',he warnedMaudling, thatif the degreeofregionalismagreed n London is whittled down our people will not be pre-paredto continue n a Kenyasuch as KANUenvisages.'Maudlingcouldonlyreassurehim that the boundariescommissionhad not yet sat, and that thismightbe the focalpointfor the revivalof KADU'smajimboist ampaign.26Chairedby SirStaffordFoster-Sutton,heKenyaBoundariesCommissionwasone of five commissionsappointed by Reginald Maudling at the SecondLancasterHouse talks. The commissiontoured the countryin August andSeptember1962, hearing evidence from 210 deputations. It found thatopinions were strongly held - Kenyans had very clear views on whom they25 Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, op. cit., 229, confirms that this was the decision taken.26 Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya, op. cit., 162, quoting Public Record Office(PRO) CO 822/2835, Ronald Ngala's address to the Secretaryof State on his visit to Kenya, 7 July1962.


13/19


wishedto sharetheirregionwith, and with whom theydidnot.27The fiercestdebatesthen, as now, about rightsto land and political legitimacyarose in'border'areaswhere diversepopulationswere intermingled, nd especially nareas wherecolonialpolicieshadbrought nfluxes of new settlement.Historywas invoked as the determinantof these rights,with one communityafteranother ayingdown theirclaims ntermsof historicalprecedent ndacknowl-edged status. Colonial documentswere displayedas 'proof' of dominancethrough heir confirmation f status andrights; he lineagesof chiefswere setout as evidenceof thesourceof politicalpower,andethnographieswrittenbyEuropeansheldup as definitive ourceson ethnicityand culturalaffinity.TheFrenchgeographerClaireMedardhas argued that this melange of ethnicclaimsandcounter-claimss best understoodas 'thepoliticsof territoriality'.By this she means that it was about morethan merelyrightsto land:it wasalso about the legitimacyof politicalauthorities.The claimsmade were thusvery firmlyrootedin the politicsof colonial rule.Inthisway, arguesMedard,Kenya'spost-colonyembraced he politicalblueprintof colonialterritorialityin terms of bothspaceandpower.28KADUand KANUeach mobilized heirsupporterso petitionthe commis-sion. KANU's demandscentredupon the retentionof the existingprovincialboundaries,which wouldease the transition o a post-colonialadministration.The maintenance f the statusquo was presentedas havinghistoricalvalidity- these were 'establishedboundaries',within which communitieshad livedcontentedlyfor many years. But given the regular fiddling with colonialadministrative oundariesover thatperiod,KADU did not find it difficulttochallengethis claim. KADUsupporterscoming before the commission tookevery opportunityto illustrate the many changes that had been made tocolonial provincialboundaries n past years. Among the most emphaticofwitnesseswas SeniorChief ChemwenoCheboi, from the Kalenjin-speakingMarakwetdistrict,who madehis point by producingan old photographofthose in attendanceat a meeting n Nakuruof the representativesf the LocalNative Councilsunder he RiftValleyProvincialadministration f the 1930s.Cheboi 'rememberedhe days when ... West Pokot, TransNzoia, Elgeyo-Markawet,Uasin Gishu, Baringo,Nandi, Samburu,Laikipiaand Naivashawere all representedat such meetings'.2" ADU'ssupporterswere also wellschooledin emphasizinghe rightsof local communities.Chiefs PkemeiLobitandJamesPowonof Pokot,forexample,weretypicalof those who demanded'a regionalformof government', o that 'differentpeoplescan live theirlives27 The papers of the Kenya Regional Boundary Commission (Foster-Sutton) can be found inPRO CO 897/1-9.28 Claire Medard, 'Les conflits "ethniques" au Kenya. Une question de votes ou de terres?',Afrique contemporaine, no. 180 (1996), 62-74; Claire Medard, 'Dispositifs electoraux et nation-alismes ethniques. Reflexions sur quelques strategies territoriales du r6gime kenyan', Politiqueafricaine, no. 70 (1998), 32-40.29 PRO CO 897/7, Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962, record of oral presentations,part 1, 'Meeting with a delegation from Elgeyo-Marakwet African District Council, at Eldoret, 3September 1962', 196-7.


14/19


without undue interferencerom centralgovernment'.3"ut in those areasofthe Rift Valleywhere Gikuyuhad settled and were makingclaims to land,matterscould not be so easilydetermined nly in local terms.TheMarmanetforest,on the edgeof the Laikipiaescarpment,was typicalof a KalenjinareawhereGikuyu quattershad come into the forestsand filled the labour ines ofthe surroundingarms.Here, the claims of the local Kalenjin, n this caseTugen, were supported by the administration, who sought to build up aKalenjinclaim out of gratitude or the help which they renderedduringtheEmergency',but were challengedby local European armerswho supportedthe claimsof theirGikuyu arm abourers o be given smallholdings.As the 01ArabelFarmers'Associationtold the BoundariesCommission, the Gikuyumost certainlyhave the strongestclaim'.31Others thought differently.Thedelegationfromthe KADU branchat Thomson'sFallsdemanded hat all thelands of Laikipia,Nanyuki and Samburu, ncludingthe Marmanetforest,'should be returned' o the Maasaiand their allies. 'We were forcedby theEuropeanso leave theselands',theytold the commissioners,but the time isnow ripe for us to have our own land back.'They made threatsagainsttheGikuyuin thesedistricts,whose claims to land they dismissed.If the Britishwantedthe Maasaito fightafter ndependence,heyconcluded, then et themoverlook our demands'.TheseKADU memberssignedthemselves yoursinstruggle ormajimbo'.32When the KANU delegation came to the parliament buildingsto meetFoster-Sutton's ommissionon 14 August1962, it presenteda caseforretain-ingthe colonial statusquoof provincesand nationaladministrativetructures.Jomo Kenyatta led the delegation. 'These provinces have been workingharmoniouslyfor nearly 70 years now', he told the commissioners. Thepeoplein theseprovinceshave learned o worktogether; hey havesomethingin common.'"3 onscious of the need to undermineany appearance f unityamongthosepeopleswho ostensiblysupportedKADU,Maasai andKalenjinpoliticianswere membersof the KANUdelegation.John Keen,representingMaasai, spokeof the dangersof KADUregionaldictatorships:TheKalenjinnumberabout750,000 while the Masai (sic)are about 70,000, and since theKalenjinare our traditionalenemies,we could not live harmoniouslywiththem.'ChristopherKiprotichwarnedthe commissioners ot to believeKADUclaims that KANU had no supportamongthe Kalenjin,asserting hat manyNandi, like himself,did not want KADUregionalpolitics.34 he most telling30 PRO CO 897/1, Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962, Memoranda - Rift ValleyProvince, 'Memoranda from the Chiefs of the Pokot', August 1962.31 PRO CO 897/1, Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962, Memoranda - Rift ValleyProvince, 'Memorandum from the 01 Arabel Farmers'Association', August 1962.32 PRO CO 897/1, Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962, Memoranda - Rift ValleyProvince, 'Memoranda from the KADU Branch Officers, Thomson Falls', 29 August 1962.33 PRO CO 897/7, Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962, record of oral representa-tions, part I, The Honourable Mr J. Kenyatta, MLC, 56.34 PRO CO 897/7, Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962, record of oral representa-tions, part I, the Hon. Mr JKeen, MLC, and Mr Christopher Kiprotich, 59-60. Keen's comments


15/19


commentscame fromMwai Kibaki,who would becomeKenya'sPresidentatthe head of the partythat finallyousted KANU frompowerin 2002, but inAugust 1962 was KANU's articulateExecutiveSecretary nd rising politicalstar.Kibaki firstspokeof the need for unityandcultural ntegration, other-wise we shall neveratanytime haveone nationinthiscountry'.Theburdenofhis argument,however,was economic.The existingprovincesand districtsalreadyhad a costlyinfrastructure hich it wouldbeexpensive o replicate oranynew arrangements,particularlywhen there areno benefitsotherthan thetheorieswhich have beenput forward'.Moreover,hepointedout the impossi-bilityof ensuring hat the provinceswould be of equivalent ize,or of equiva-lent resources.Kibaki hought hat theseeds of future roublesmightlie in anyaccentuationof these differenceshroughpoliticalempowerment.Weaskyouto let us remainwith the presentboundaries',he therefore oncluded, and letus tryto workthem as the new regions.We areconfident hat in thatway weshall consolidatewhat advance here has beentowardsocialintegration,andwe shallhave a basis for further ntegration,which is whatyou, we ourselves,andeverybodyelsewants.'35ButFoster-Sutton as notpersuaded yKANU'spleaforpoliticalcontinuity,and insteadhis Commissionopted to make severaladjustments o Kenya'sboundaries.The commissioners ad beensurprisedbythe 'full extent of groupsuspicionsand hostilities',but thereis surelysome truthin Rothchild'ssug-gestionthat theverycreationof thecommissionhadserved o givevent to the'openexpressionof fearsandanimosities' nd hadraised tribal ensions o newheights'.36 s Kibakihadwarned,their decisionsultimatelyproveddifficult oreconcilewith the fullrangeof claims hat had been set down.Boundaryalter-ations could not possiblysatisfyeveryone. nthewakeof thepublicationof thereport, herewas aflurryof furtherdisputes.Byfarthe mostsignificantwasoverthe status of Kitale.Abaluhya eaders, ncludingKADU'sMuliro,had wantedKitale o be thecapitalof WesternRegion,butthecommissioners laced twith-in an enlargedRiftValley.The quarrel omenteda briefcrisis within KADU,revealing the vulnerabilityof its ethnic-based coalition as Kalenjin andAbaluhyamembersopposedoneanother,but thiswasquelledbyMoi'sspeedydecision hatthepartyshouldsupport heAbaluhya laims.Itwasagreedwith-in KADUthat the RiftValley RegionalAssemblywould use its constitutionalpowersto transferKitaleto WesternRegionafterindependence.37ADU hadthusnarrowlyaverteda potentiallydestructive risis,but it was KANUwhichwould have the finalword on the fateof Kitaleand of majimboism.deliberately took up earlier assertions by Ronald Ngala that 'the adoption of an orthodox West-minster pattern for Kenya would inevitably result in placing absolute power in the hands of adictator'. The statement was made in February 1962, and is quoted by Rothchild, 'MajimboSchemes', op. cit., 294.35 PRO CO 897/7, Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962, record of oral representa-tions, part I, Mr Mwai Kibaki, 64.36 Rothchild, 'Majimbo Schemes', op. cit., 301.37 Ibid., 302-3.


16/19


Theelections hatbroughtKenya o independenceook placein May 1963.It was an unusually omplexevent,with electorsvotingfor the sevenRegionalAssemblies with211 members,26 of themSpeciallyElected), he Senate onemember rom eachof the 40 districts,plusone forNairobi),andthe House ofRepresentativeswith117 single-memberonstituencyMPs,plus 12 SpeciallyElected members to be nominated by the House).38Better financed thanKADU,thanks to supportfrom outsideKenya,and far betterorganizedhaving earned romtheexperienceof 1961- KANUwent to thepollsas firmfavourites o win a majority n each of the ballots. In the campaign,KANUmade it all too plain that it had littleintention of operating he constitutionthatBritishcompromise nd KADUhad forceduponit.JosephMurumbibestsummedup KANU'scollectivevoiceon majimboism,declaring hathis partywould not 'standby and watch the countrygo to ruinbecausea few peoplewant to carveout littlekingdoms or themselvesunder he guiseof protectingtribal interests'."3While KADU's leaders blustered and threatened,theircampaignwiltedthroughlack of money,too few campaignworkers,and-fatally - not enough candidates.In the election for the House of Repre-sentatives,KADUonly managed o field candidates n 59 constituencies,andwas compelled o fight only in seatswhere the partywas most likelyto win.These were signs of weakness that betrayed ts lack of national coverage.Whenthe resultscame,theywerea disaster or KADU.Inthe elections o theHouse of Representatives,KANUtook 72 seats (includingone KADUcandi-date who immediatelycrossed over), while KADU gained only 32. In theSenate,KANU also obtaineda majority, aking20 seats out of 41. But it wasin the elections to the RegionalAssemblies,where KADU had expectedtomake its best showing, that KANU's success was most apparent: he sixregionsweresplitevenlybetween hetwo parties,with KADUgainingcontrolin Western,RiftValleyand Coast,while KANU won majorities n Central,NyanzaandEastern.40he KANUinterimgovernmentwas formedon 1 June1963, withJomo Kenyattaat its head.By the time of the Third LancasterHouse Conferencen September1963,KADU was crumbling.A trickleof membershad alreadycrossedthe floor toKANU, and Kenyattawas now openly deriding he majimboconstititionasunworkableand callingon oppositionmembers o join KANU in a govern-ment 'of nationalunity'.In London,KANUnow demandedmajorchanges othe 'embarrassinglyomplicated'41ajimboconstitution,whileKADUfoughtforthesafeguardso be retained.AsBritish eluctanceo blockKANU becameclearer,the usuallytemperateNgala threatened o proclaimautonomyfor38 PRO CO 822/3166for the details.39 Reportedn theDailyNation,6 May 1963, andquoted n ClydeSangerandJohn Notting-ham,'TheKenyaGeneralElectionof 1963',Journalof ModernAfricanStudies,2 (1964),16.40 SangerandNottingham, TheKenyaGeneralElectionof 1963', op. cit., for a summary, ndPROCO 822/3166 forthe full results.41 Thephrase s Kyle's,ThePoliticsof IndependencenKenya',Contemporary ritishHistory,11 (1997).


17/19


the Coastif alltheprotectionswerenot left in place.Atthe lowestpointof thediscussions,a desperateNgala formallyrequested hepartitionof Kenya.42nthe wake of defeat,Ngala, Moi and the KADU eadershiphadbelatedlycometo realize that the Britishwould not be in a position to ensurethat consti-tutional commitments were honoured after independence.43 enya's newgovernorMalcolm MacDonaldhadall alongworriedaboutthe possibilityoftheKalenjinandMaasaireactingviolently f the tide of politicsturnedagainstthem, but he now decisively ntervened o arguethat the BritishshouldbackKANU and facedown the KADUopposition evenif thismightprovokedis-turbances.44MacDonald showed the foresightand couragethat Renisonhadlacked. The Britishgovernment hereforeagreed o a changethat would per-mit alterations o the constitution on a two-thirdsmajority n the House ofRepresentatives,herebysignificantly educing he protections hat regional-ism had offered.Majimboismwould still be implemented,accordingto theagreement eached n London,butit would be theresponsibility f Kenyatta'santi-majimbogovernment o see that this was done.45This gave KANU theleverage t would need to diminishthe powersof the regions,and it markedthe deathknell of KADU'smajimboistambitions.At independence, n 12 December1963, while Kenyatta ook the helm ofcentral government,Moi assumedleadershipof the Rift Valley House ofRepresentatives, nd Ngala took the same post for the Coast Province. Farfromconsolidating heirpolitical power, both menquicklyrealized hat theyhad beenmarginalized.Both were hinderedat everyturnby a centralgovern-ment unwillingto supportany featureof the majimboconstitution.Withoutauthorized undsfromcentralgovernment,and withoutlogisticalor technicalsupport, he regionssimplycould not function n any meaningful ense.Inthemost dramaticdemonstrationof the power of centralgovernmentover theregions,Minister of Home AffairsOginga Odingarefusedto sign the ordertransferringKitale from Rift Valley to Western Region 'until the peopleaffectedby the transferwere first consulted'. Moi and Mulirofound them-selvespowerlessto enforceKADU'sinternaldecision.46With the die re-cast,severalof KADU's eading ightsnow took a pragmaticook at theircircum-stances.MacDonaldpurposefullywithdrew romarbitrating isputesbetweenthe KADURegionalAssembliesand KANU,enhancingKenyatta'spower inthe processand weakening he position of KADUnationally.Furtherdefec-tions to KANU soon followed,amongthem WilliamMurgorandothers who42 PRO DO 168/49, Sandys o Griffiths-Jones,3 October 1963. Forcontext,see Kyle,ThePoliticsof theIndependence f Kenya,op. cit., 189-93.43 Morton,Moi, op. cit., 116.44 PRO DO 168/45, Malcolm MacDonaldto Sandys,15 September1963, and PRO DO168/49, MacDonald o Griffiths-Jones,8 October1963.45 For the final constitutional ettlement, ee Kenya IndependenceConference,Cmnd2156(HMSO,October1963), and especiallyAnnexA, 'Statement t the FinalPlenarySession',byDuncanSandys.46 Rothchild,MajimboSchemes', p. cit., 303.


18/19


had been staunchadvocatesof majimboism.47yJune1964, Ngala andMoihad come to the hard decisionthat they could not continue. Whentheymetwith otherKADU eaders o discuss heposition,it was Towett who proposedthat they join with KANU in a governmentof nationalunity. Seroneyhadalready crossed the floor, breaking Kalenjin unity, and Towett nowannounced hathe would no longerstand on a KADU ticket. Moi was facedwith the dilemma of how best to preservehis local support among theKalenjin.He opted for the pragmaticsolution of taking them into KANU,from where he struggledto broker a more satisfactorysettlement for hispeople. Butin doing so, according o his biographer,Moi nevergaveup hisbelief in majimboism.48y November1964 Ngala had dissolvedthe opposi-tion. Kenyahad, in effect,becomea one-partystate. That samemonth, themajimboistconstitutionwas laid to rest when a bill amending ts provisionsreceived henecessarywo-thirdsmajority n the House of Representatives.Paradoxically,t was the strongestmajimboistof all amongthe KADUranksDaniel arapMoi who best survived he politicaltransition nto KANU. Moiwas a politicalpragmatistwho had no pretence o nationalistambitions.Hissupportamongthe Kalenjinwas firmand secure,so he broughtwith him aloyal following.Win over Moi, the KANUpartyfixersquicklyrealized,andyou win over the reliablesupportof the Kalenjin.NeitherMuliro,strugglingto containdissentamonghis Abaluhyaconstituents,norNgala, faced with avarietyof energetic ivalpoliticalmovementsattheCoast,could command hesame level of regionalsupport.Moi was thus the only ex-KADU eaderwhowas rewardedwith a portfolio ntheKenyattaCabinetof 1964. By1966, afterthe resignationof Joe Murumbi, he still majimboistMoi was elevated o thepost of Vice-President.49 decadelater,in 1978, Daniel arapMoi took thepresidencyupon Kenyatta'sdeath, a compromisechoice who was intendedmerely o 'holdthe fort' until KANUcould resolve hepower strugglebetweenits leading ights.But Moi would nevergive themthe opportunity o removehim. Once in power,he deployedhis old skills as the architectof the KADUalliance to brokera seriesof bilateralpoliticalbargains hat undermined heold corporatiststructuresof KANU and securedhis personal authority.Intheseacts he rapidlymade KANUless nationalist n its politics,and farmorelike the oldKADU a partyreliantuponan allianceof politicianswho werefirmlyrooted n the localpoliticsof patronageandredistribution, nd a partythat held within it supportersof majimboism.Under Moi, KANU wouldbecome KADUreborn.5047 Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya, op. cit., 192.48 Morton,Moi,op. cit., 117-18.49 Ibid.,120.50 Thesecomments, ndthe finalparagraph,ummarizeDavidM. Anderson, LeDeclinet lachutede la KANU.Larecomposition espartiespolitiquesdans a successionde Moi',Politiqueafricaine,no. 90 (June2003), 37-55, and 'Kenya'sElections2002 - The Dawningof a NewEra?',AfricanAffairs,102 (2003), 331-42.


19/19


The nationalistprojecthas beena casualtyof Kenya'sreturn o multi-partydemocracy ince1990, in no smallpartdue to the activitiesof the Moi regime.Majimboismhas returnedas a politicalpolicy, first promotedfrom withinKANUbyMoi'sKalenjin nd Maasaisupporterseeking o defend hemselvesagainstthe risingtide of opposition,and then by those in otherpartieswhoargued or constitutional eformas the only way of challenginghe destructiveauthorityand exclusionary actics of Kenya'sone-partystate.Moi's KANUregimesurvived wo multi-partylections 1992 and1997)beforebeingdefeat-ed at thepollsin December 002. Now in opposition,andwith its coresupportlimited o two regions,RiftValleyandNorth-Eastern,everalof themost influ-entialof KANU'sKalenjinMPshave madecleartheirsupport ormajimboism.Andwithin therulingpartycoalitiontherearealso severalprominentmajimbosupporters,ikelyto besympathetico proposals or constitutional eform hatwould devolvepowerto theregions.This decentralization f politicalpowerisnow presentedas a necessary lement n the cultivationof Kenya'smulti-partydemocracy."5In the context of Kenya'scurrentpost-nationalistdebateabout the decen-tralization of political power, the old dismissiveviews of majimboismcantherefore no longer be sustained.To describethe emergenceof majimboistpoliticsin the early1960s as a distractingpoliticaltactic for which therewaslittle real support,or as a temporaryexpedientfor the convenienceof theEuropeanminority, s to ignore ts enduringplacein Kenya'spoliticaldebatessinceindependence.The colonialtemplate rom which themodernKenyastatewas madesustaineda formof nationalistgovernmenthatdidnotallowfortheevolutionof decentralized oliticalauthority.Kenya till has no systemof elec-tive local government,andthe dailyadministration f the provincesand dis-trictsremainsunderthe direct control of the Office of the Presidentwithoutreference o parliament.These were featuresof colonial rule thatthe majim-boistsof the 1960s unsuccessfully oughtto challengentheirvisionof Kenya'sfuture.The fear thatprovokedthe politicsof majimboismn both the 1960sand the 1990s was too often manifest in a belligerence hat alienated thesupportof themajorityof Kenyans,but this should not be allowed to obscurethe importanceof the historicalroots of the debateabout decentralizationndlocalpoliticalrepresentation.nthelongerrunof Kenya'shistory,majimboismmay yet turn out to be a moreenduringpoliticalproject hanwas nationalism.

DavidM.Andersonis UniversityLecturern AfricanStudiesat theUniversityof Oxfordand a ResearchFellowof StAntony'sCollege.His most recentbookis Historiesof theHanged.Britain'sDirty War n Kenyaand theEndof Empire Londonand New York2005).

51 For a clear statement on this from a current Cabinet minister, see KiraituMurungi, 'Ethnicityand Multi-partyism in Kenya', reprinted in Kivutha Kibwana (ed.), Constitutional Law andPolitics in Africa. A Case Study of Kenya (Nairobi 1998), 434-5, and originally published asKenya Human Rights Commission, Thoughts in Democracy Series, Issue III (Nairobi, 1995).

anderson - yours in struggle for majimbo nationalism and the party politics of decolonization in...

Documents