ang complaint
TRANSCRIPT
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 1
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Conchita Ang 7905 Drake Street Fontana, CA 92336 Plaintiff in Pro Per
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
Conchita Ang, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Aurora Bank
FSB, Mortgage Electronic Registration
System, Inc. (MERS), Homewide Lending
Corp., Quality Loan Service Corp., And all
persons claiming by, through, or under such
persons; All persons unknown, claiming any
legal or equitable right, title, the state, lien, or
interest in the property described in this
complaint adverse to plaintiffs title thereto;
and Does 1-150, inclusive.
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Case No.:
Complaint for (1) Wrongful Foreclosure; (2) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; (3) Wrongful Foreclosure; (4) Quiet Title; (5) Fraud; To Set Aside the Trustee's Sale; and Violation of Civil Code section 2923.5 (Unknown holder of the note and the note was not otherwise assigned by an unrecorded document).
UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMES NOW Plaintiff alleging her causes of action as follows:
Jurisdiction and Venue
1. Plaintiff is an individual domiciled at the premises commonly known as 7905
Drake St., Fontana, CA 92336 ("Property"). The legal description of the Property is: Lot 1, Tract
13 00 8-3, city of Fontana, County of San Bernardino, state of California, as per map recorded in
Book 208, pages 70 through 72 of Maps in the office of the County recorder of said County.
Assessor’s Parcel No.: 1100-321-32-0-000.
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 2
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2. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §392 (a) (1), jurisdiction and
venue are proper because the aforesaid real estate that is the subject matter of this dispute is
located in the County of San Bernardino, state of California.
Parties
3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Aurora Loan
Services Corp. (hereinafter "ALS") was, at all times mentioned herein, an organization of
unknown exact origin and transacting business in the state of California and was doing business
in the County of San Bernardino, state of California. ALS purported to be the servicer of the loan
at issue herein.
4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, Inc. (hereinafter "MERS") was, at all times mentioned herein a
Corporation transacting business in the state of California.
5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Homewide
Lending Corp. (hereinafter "HLC") was, at all times mentioned herein a Corporation transacting
business in the state of California.
6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendant Quality Loan
Service Corp. (hereinafter "QLS") was, at all times mentioned herein a Corporation transacting
business in the state of California.
7. The true names and capacities of defendant's Does 1 through 150, inclusive, are
unknown to plaintiff, who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will
amend this complaint to show the true names and capacities of the Doe defendants when the
same have been ascertained.
Factual Allegations
8. On or about June 1, 2006 plaintiff refinanced the subject property for $456,000.
Attached as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the deed of trust for the refinancing. The lender is listed as
HLC. Defendant MERS is stated to be “acting solely as a nominee of lender….. MERS is the
beneficiary under this security instrument."
9. On or about June 1, 2006 plaintiff executed an adjustable-rate note with defendant
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 3
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HLC, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
10. On May 15, 2009 a Substitution of Trustee was recorded wherein defendant HLC
(the original beneficiary) and defendant MERS (also referred to as a beneficiary) purported to
substitute Quality Loan Service Corp. (“QLS” herein) as Trustee under the Deed of Trust of June
1, 2006 (Exhibit 4).
11. By way of an Assignment of Deed of Trust, attached hereto as Exhibit 3,
defendant MERS "as nominee for Homewide Lending Corp.” (“HLC” herein), purported to
assign the Deed of Trust to defendant ALS. This purported assignment was recorded on October
12, 2010.
12. There is no explanation as to how MERS and HLC were both acting as the
“Beneficiary” at the same time. Nor are there any recorded or unrecorded documents indicating
how defendant MERS had the right or authority to execute the Assignment of Corporate Deed of
Trust (Exhibit 3) on September 28, 2010 and to record that document on October 12, 2010 while
HLC on both the Deed of Trust and the Note. Here, the Note was not otherwise assigned by an
unrecorded document.
13. Attached to the Adjustable-Rate Rider (Exhibit 2) as page 5, is an alleged
"Endorsement Allonge to the Promissory Note." However, there is no chain of title to the Note,
and no explanation of how defendant ALS obtained authority or ownership to endorse the Note.
14. A Notice of Default was recorded on the subject Property by defendant “Aurora
Loan Services, LLC c/o Quality Loan Service Corp.” on April 1, 2009 (attached as Exhibit 5).
15. A Notice of Trustee's Sale of the subject Property was recorded on July 8, 2009
(attached as Exhibit 6) and the Property was sold pursuant thereto.
16. A Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed Upon Sale was subsequently recorded
on April 30, 2010 restoring the parties to their positions held prior to the Notice of Trustee’s Sale
recorded on July 8, 2009 (attached as Exhibit 7).
17. No new Notice of Default was ever recorded or served with respect to the
property after the date of the Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed Upon Sale was recorded on
April 30, 2010.
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18. A Notice of Trustee's Sale of the subject Property was recorded on November 24,
2010 (attached as Exhibit 8) with a sale date of December 20, 2010. However, no new notice of
any default was ever given or recorded.
19. By a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale (attached as Exhibit 9), defendant ALS was
granted the Property by QLS on December 14, 2011, six days prior to the sale date. The Trustee's
Deed upon Sale was recorded on December 22, 2011.
20. In conducting the above activities defendant ALS was acting as a loan servicer.
According to In Re Hwang, 393 B.R. 701, 712 (2008), "a loan servicer cannot bring an action
without the holder of the note."
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Wrongful Foreclosure in a Nonjudicial Foreclosure Action
(Cal.Civ.Code §2924; Com.Code §3502)
(As to Defendants ALS, QLS and MERS)
21. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the above paragraphs as
though set forth fully herein.
22. As previously noted herein defendant's ALS and/or QLS, on behalf of MERS and
for itself recorded a notice of default concerning the subject Property and commenced what is
known as a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding.
23. California Civil Code §2924 governs nonjudicial foreclosures. That statute
provides that only one to whom an obligation is owed may enforce the power of sale clause in a
deed of trust. The obligation is the promissory note. A promissory note is a negotiable
instrument, governed by The California Commercial Code at §3104(a).
24. California Civil Code §2924 is comprehensive, but not exhaustive. California
Golf, LLC v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1053. California courts allow additional remedies
to pursue misconduct arising out of nonjudicial foreclosure sales when not inconsistent with the
policies behind the statutes. California Golf, LLC v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1067 -
1070.
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 5
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25. Two important policies behind the statute are: (1) to protect the debtor from
wrongful loss of property, and (2) to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the
parties. Id.
26. California Commercial Code §3502 sets forth the rules governing dishonor of a
note. As in the instant matter, where a note is payable upon demand, the note is only dishonored
if "presentment" is duly made to the maker.
27. Under California Commercial Code §3501(a) "presentment" means a demand for
money by a person "entitled to enforce the instrument."
28. Further, the law requires that upon demand of the person to whom presentment is
made the person making presentment shall (A) exhibit the instrument, (B) give reasonable
identification and, if presentment is made on behalf of another person, reasonable evidence or
authority to do so, and (C) sign a receipt on the instrument for any payment made or surrender
the instrument if full payment is made. California Commercial Code §3501(2).
29. This case, presentment did not occur. In fact, presentment could not occur.
Defendants Aurora Services, QLS and MERS did not pay for the obligation, did not receive the
obligation, and did not collect or demand payments. Defendants Aurora Services, QLS and
MERS do not have the ability to enforce the instrument or the obligation thereunder because
these defendants are not the holder of the Note or validation of the underlying debt or obligation.
30. California case law provides that only the holder of the note can initiate
foreclosure proceedings regardless of to whom the mortgage is owed. See Adler vs. Sargent
(1895) 109 Cal. 42, 49. In addition, a mortgagee's purported assignment of the mortgage without
an assignment of the debt which is secured is a legal nullity.
31. In Bennett vs. Taylor (1855) 5 Cal. 502, the California Supreme Court held that a
mortgage is a mere incident to the debt secured by it, and in order to maintain an action on the
mortgage, the debt must first be proved. (Emphasis added). That court made clear that the holder
of the note is the only party entitled to enforce the rights granted by the note.
32. The California Supreme Court has also held that an action will not lie on the mere
recitals in a mortgage of the existence of the debt. Shafer v. Bear River & Auburn Water &
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Mining Co. (1855) 4 Cal. 294.
33. A loan servicer cannot bring an action without the holder of the note. In Re
Hwang, 393 B.R. 701, 712 (2008).
34. These cases are still valid. Other legal scholars agree with their rationale. The
Restatement (3d) of Property (Mortgages) §5.4 states that "the person holding only the deed of
trust will never experience default because only the holder of the note is entitled to payment of
the underlying obligation." (Emphasis added).
35. Recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held, in Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Hillery, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100056 (N.D. Cal.),
that the Restatement passage above establishes as valid California law - the deed alone is a legal
nullity.
36. In this case, defendants ALS, QLS and MERS are nowhere named in the note and
none of them have the legal right to enforce the note.
37. The California legislature enacted Cal. Comm. Code §301, which states: "Person
entitled to enforce an instrument means (a) the holder of the instrument, (b) a non-holder in
possession of the instrument who has the rights of the holder, or (c) a person not in possession of
the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to §3309 or subdivision (d) of
§3418.
38. Defendant ALS, QLS and MERS cannot meet any of the three requirements and
therefore none of them is entitled to enforce the note or to foreclose.
39. Such "standing" requirements have recently prohibited foreclosures throughout
America.
40. Cal. Comm. Code §1201 defines a "holder" as: (a) the person in possession of a
negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to and identified person, or (b) the person
in possession of a document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bear or to the order of
the person in possession.
41. Here, the note is a negotiable instrument (Cal Comm. Code §3104). Defendants
ALS, QLS and MERS are not holders of the note.
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 7
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42. Plaintiff is informed and believes that defendants ALS, QLS and MERS do not
possess the note. Moreover, plaintiff is informed and believes that these defendants also do not
have any rights of a holder.
43. Accordingly, defendants ALS, QLS and MERS do not qualify as a non-holder in
possession of the note with rights of a holder and cannot foreclose under §3301(b).
44. Defendant ALS, QLS and MERS have not made the requisite showing and
plaintiff should be protected against, among other things, a claimant that may appear at some
later time, claiming an interest in the obligation or this Property.
45. Accordingly defendants ALS, QLS and MERS failed to meet the requirements of
the Commercial Code and are thus precluded from foreclosing on the Property.
46. In light of the various transfers of interest of the obligation in this matter, it is
unclear as to whom, if anyone, has the legal right to foreclose.
47. Even assuming defendant's ALS, QLS and MERS had the legal right to enforce
the obligation, pursuant to California Civil Code §2924 (discussed below) the power of sale may
not be exercised until California Civil Code §2935.5 has been complied with - and it was not.
48. Plaintiff seeks legal relief against the defendants for conducting an unlawful
foreclosure, including an order canceling and setting aside the Notice of Trustee's Sale, Trustee's
Deed upon Sale and all documents related to the improper nonjudicial foreclosure, especially
considering that defendants gave plaintiff "Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed upon Sale" on
April 28, 2010 and recorded the notice on April 30, 2010 (see Exhibit 7). No new "notice of
default" was ever filed by defendants. Plaintiff also seeks costs of suit, general damages, special
damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys’ fees.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Lack of Standing to Conduct a Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale
(As Against Defendants ALS, QLS and MERS)
49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the prior paragraphs as
though set forth fully herein.
50. In order to conduct a foreclosure action a party must have standing.
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51. California Code of Civil Procedure §725(a) and 726 provide for judicial
foreclosures, whereas California Civil Code §2924, et seq., provides for nonjudicial foreclosures.
52. If these defendants elected to proceed with judicial foreclosure under California
Code of Civil Procedure 726 it would be required to prove it has the ability to enforce the
underlying note.
53. There are constitutional requirements (standing) and prudential requirements
(including real party in interest). Morrow v. Microsoft Corp. 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (9th
Cir. 2007).
54. Concerning procedural due process, the defendants’ nonjudicial foreclosure action
is defective, null and void, not only because the action violates California Civil Code section
2923.5, but also since it was not brought by both the present owner of the note and party entitled
to enforce the note as required under Cal. Comm. Code §3301. Indeed, there is evidence that a
defunct entity actually owns the note and is the real party that might be able to enforce the note.
55. Defendants are required to have standing. Defendants purport to own the note at
issue in this matter, thereby asserting they can enforce any rights granted thereunder. However,
they seek to do this without showing they ever had possession of the note or somehow became
the holder of the note. The law in this area is well settled based, in part on long-standing
authority that a party seeking relief must assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Valley Forge Christian College
v. AMS United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 476 (1982).
56. This standing requirement is an essential and unchanging part of the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article III of the US Constitution. Without the note, the defendants
lack standing to enforce it or anything else related to it.
57. Defendant's ALS, QLS and MERS are not the owners of the note, did not possess
the note, and none of them is a "real party in interest." They cannot conduct a nonjudicial
foreclosure.
58. The question becomes: how can an untouched and unseen document be legally
transferred when none of the parties had even seen it or knows where it is (especially if it is
listed as being owned in some bundle of securities, located no one knows where)?
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59. The owner of the note is an unknown to any of the parties in this matter. These
defendants in fact do not even claim to own the note. Indeed, defendants are not lenders and
never even attempt to claim ownership of notes generally. The procedural due process
requirement of being a real party in interest in order to move for nonjudicial foreclosure should
be enforced.
60. The law also has a requirement for substantive due process. This concerns the
ability to enforce the underlying obligation. Obligations in mortgages are governed by Article 3
of the negotiable instruments statutes. The underlying note is a negotiable instrument, and its
enforceability is governed by Article 3.
61. Defendants do not possess the note and have no rights to enforce the note under
California commercial code sections 3301(a), (b) or (c). Defendant fails the substantive due
process requirements to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure action.
62. It has been long understood that a mortgagee of record has standing to bring a
nonjudicial foreclosure action and foreclose its mortgage interest in the property, provided that
the note is endorsed to it, or in blank, and it is in the possession of the party seeking to foreclose.
63. Neither of the above possibilities is present.
64. Notwithstanding that defendant's elected to proceed to foreclose nonjudicial he
pursuant to California Civil Code section 2924, et seq., it still must have the ability to enforce the
underlying note.
65. This issue is so significant that other jurisdictions are enacting statutes which
require the trustee in a foreclosure sale to obtain proof the beneficiary is the actual holder of the
promissory note. (See State of Washington, Deeds of Trust Foreclosure Law ESB 5810, effective
July 2009. Similarly, many courts are denying foreclosure because of the failure to prove
standing. This is all based on the simple proposition that the entity that is foreclosing has a legal
right to foreclose.
66. The Kansas Supreme Court recently held that a nominee company called MERS
has no right or standing to bring an action for foreclosure. Landmark National Bank v. Kesler,
2009 Kan, LEXIS 834.
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67. Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Relief finding that none of the defendants
herein can enforce (1) the initial Notice of Default dated March 31, 2009 and recorded April 1,
2009 (Exhibit 5); (2) the initial Notice of Trustee's Sale dated July 2, 2009 and recorded July 8,
2009 (Exhibit 6); (3) the Notice of Trustee Sale dated November 4, 2010 nor (4) any subsequent
foreclosure effort, because defendants gave plaintiff Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed upon
Sale dated April 28, 2010 and recorded April 30, 2010 (Exhibit 7) and because defendants, nor
any of them had any enforceable rights in the note Or Deed of Trust.
68. Defendant's threatened eviction of plaintiff from her residence and unless
restrained, will do so by conducting an unlawful, illegal and or fraudulent eviction (Exhibit 10).
69. Pecuniary compensation is warranted as plaintiff’s residence is unique.
70. Injunctive relief is immediately necessary to enjoin defendants from completely
perfecting the fraudulent foreclosure, fraudulent Trustee's Deed upon Sale, and to prevent the
defendants, and each of them, from perfecting clear title with respect to plaintiffs residence. All
of this relief is justified because defendants have no real authority to enforce the underlying
obligation in this matter.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Wrongful Foreclosure Where Defendants Failed to Make a
Valid Attempt To “Work-out” the Loan
(As to defendants ALS, QLS and MERS)
71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the prior paragraphs as
though set forth fully herein.
72. California Civil Code section 2943.5(a)(1) provides that "a mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary or authorized agent may not file a notice of default pursuant to section 2924 until 30
days after contact is made as required by paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due
diligence requirements as described in subdivision (g). The law further requires that not less than
three months shall elapse from the filing of the notice of default before Notice of Sale is
provided stating the time and place thereof in the manner and for a time not less than set forth in
section 2924f.
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73. California Civil Code section 2925.52 provides that "a mortgagee, trustee or other
person authorized to take sale shall not give notice of sale until at least 90 days after the lapse of
three months as set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of section 2924, in order to allow the
parties to pursue a loan modification to prevent foreclosure, if all of the following conditions
exist: (1) the loan was recorded during the period January 1, 2003 through January 1, 2008,
inclusive, and is secured by residential real property; (2) the loan at issue is the first mortgage or
deed of trust that the property secures; (3) the borrower occupied the property as the borrowers
principal residence at the time the loan became delinquent; (4) the notice of default has been
recorded on the property.
74. California Civil Code section 2923.52 provides that the three-month period for the
filing of a notice of default is extended by 90 days before a notice of sale may be given.
75. Defendant did not wait the additional 90 days and held the sale on December 20,
2010. In doing so they failed to follow proper procedures. Defendants previously gave plaintiff a
Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed upon Sale dated July 28, 2010 and recorded on July 30,
2010 (Exhibit 7). Since there was a rescission defendants were required to file a new notice of
default, which they did not do.
76. Defendants, and each of them, violated California Civil Code section 2923.52 by
pursuing its sale without giving plaintiff the benefit of the additional 90 days, resulting in the
need to debtor to file bankruptcy to stop the sale.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Quiet Title
(As against All Defendants and all persons claiming by, through, or under such person, all
persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate lien or interest in the property
described herein adverse to plaintiffs title thereto.)
77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the above paragraphs as
though set forth fully herein.
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78. Defendants failed to comply with required notice requirements specified by law
as described herein. Following the rescission of the Trustee’s Deed defendants were required by
law to restart the notice of default process, but did not do so.
79. Plaintiff is the owner of the residence located at 7905 Drake St., Fontana, CA
92336.
80. Can the basis of plaintiff's title is a deed granting the above-described property in fee
simple to plaintiff dated June 1, 2006 and recorded in the official records of the County of San
Bernardino in Book 208, pages 70 through 72 (Exhibit 1).
81. Plaintiff is informed and believes in on such information and belief alleges that
defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or under such person, all
persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest adverse to
plaintiff in the above-described property.
82. Plaintiff seeks fee simple title to the property over any other claim. The legal
description of the Property is set forth hereinabove.
83. Plaintiff brings this action against defendants or any other person claiming
interest in the Property to quiet title to the Property, setting aside the fraudulent Trustee's Deed
upon Sale. The claims of defendants are without any right whatsoever in such defendants have
no right, title, estate, lien, or interest whatever in the above-described property or any part
thereof.
84. Currently the Property is encumbered by the Trust Deeds held by defendants.
85. None of the defendants have any legitimate interest in the Notes.
86. Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court to release all other Trust Deeds and grant
quiet title to Plaintiff.
87. A lis pendens will be immediately filed against the Property.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Fraud –Knowingly Acting As Real Parties In Interest With Full Knowledge That The Deed
of Trust Had Been Destroyed When the Note was Securitized.
(As Against All Defendants)
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88. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each of the above paragraphs as
though set forth fully herein and further alleges on information and belief, the following:
89. As security for the Note which is the subject of this action Plaintiff executed a
Mortgage (hereinafter referred to as the "Deed of Trust") identifying MERS as "nominee for
Lender and Lender's successor's and assigns .. [and as a] beneficiary under the Deed of Trust
described herein. Subsequently the parties have changed from time to time as the defendants
herein have seen fit in order to wrongfully claim to be parties in interest to the Note, though none
has ever seen or touched the Note, nor can they determine its whereabouts, if there is.
90. The alleged loan was nevertheless registered on the SEC as a Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) Trust and became a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for
the purpose of tax exemption.
91. REMICs are investment vehicles that hold commercial and residential mortgages
in trust and issues securities representing an undivided interest in these mortgages.
92. A master servicer of the REMIC was possibly appointed as was a Trustee,
Defendant Aurora Loan Services LLC.
93. Normally, the Trustee of a Trust has the power and responsibility to administer
the assets of the Trust but in the case of a REMIC no such power exists.
94. Once the REMIC containing Plaintiffs loan was formed, the loan was converted
into a security owned by thousands of shareholders throughout the world and was traded on Wall
Street.
95. At that point, the state of Plaintiff’s loan changed and was converted forevermore
into a stock.
96. Once Plaintiff’s loan was securitized and converted, it forever lost its security.
97. Since the loan was sold and securitized into stock, the lender can no longer claim
that it is a real party in interest, or even that the loan stills exists as a loan, since double dipping
is a form of securities fraud.
98. A negotiable instrument can only be in one of two states after undergoing
securitization, not both at the same time. It can either be a loan or a stock.
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Once the instrument is traded as a stock, it is forever a stock and therefore regulated, as this loan
was, by the SEC as a stock.
99. The subject Mortgage states that the Mortgage secures the Promissory Note.
The Promissory Note, by conversion into stock, was extinguished as a collateralized asset and
therefore the Trust secures absolutely nothing and ALS, QLS nor MERS, none being the real
party in interest, have no standing to foreclose on Plaintiff.
100. Since the Lender sold the loan to a REMIC, it forever lost the ability to enforce,
control or otherwise foreclose on Plaintiff property, including the right to assign the Mortgage or
endorse the Note. It was no longer the real party of interest.
101. If Aurora Loan Services LLC or any of the other defendants herein owned the
Note, it or they would have to be taxed on the interest earned from the Note. If the REMIC
owned the Note it would have a tax liability.
102. To avoid double taxation, under Internal Revenue Code 860, the loan was put into
a SPV so that only the shareholders are taxed and therefore are the real parties in interest.
103. Because of IRS code 860, the Aurora Loan Services LLC/Trustee (or any other
defendant in this case) is not the real and beneficial party in interest because the REMIC does not
own the Note, the shareholders do.
104. By distributing the tax liabilities to the shareholders, the REMIC has also
distributed the parties in interest.
105. Since a Promissory Note is only enforceable in its whole entirety and thousands
of shareholders own the subject Note, no one of them can foreclose on Plaintiff home.
The asset of the REMIC was registered and traded as a part of a security and as such cannot be
traded out and is permanently attached and converted into stock preventing the Note from being
assigned and securitized again and again which would create securities fraud.
106. Since Plaintiff loan went into default, it was written off by the REMIC and
received tax credits from the IRS, was therefore discharged, and settled destroying the Note
forever.
107. After securitization, the Note cannot be re-attached to the Mortgage through
adhesion.
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 15
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108. Under the UCC, the Promissory Note is a one-of-a-kind instrument and any
assignment must be as a permanent fixture onto the original Note much like a check.
109. There is no endorsement on the original Note.
110. The original Promissory Note has the only legally binding chain of title, otherwise
the instrument is faulty.
111. The original Note had to be destroyed upon securitization because the Note and
the stock cannot exist at the same time.
112. All Defendants lack standing to enforce the Note.
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
As to the First Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure against all defendants.
1. For general damages in the sum of $4,560,000.
2. For special damages and the court may determine.
3. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish the defendant's and
deter others from engaging in similar misconduct.
As to the Second Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief against all
defendants.
4. That this court declare that defendants cannot enforce the fraudulent, illegal, and
unlawful Trustee's Deed upon Sale recorded December 22, 2011 (Exhibit 9).
5. A permanent injunction be issued that the defendants and each of them lack
standing to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure concerning the subject property.
As to the Third Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure against all defendants.
6. For general damages in the sum of $4,560,000.
7. For special damages and the court may determine.
8. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish the defendant's and
deter others from engaging in similar misconduct.
As to the Fourth Cause of Action for Quiet Title against all defendants.
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 16
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9. A permanent injunction that defendants lack standing to conduct a nonjudicial
foreclosure concerning the subject property.
10. A judgment that plaintiff is the owner of the subject property and that defendants
have no interest whatsoever in the property.
As to the Fifth Cause of Action for Fraud against all defendants.
11. General damages in the sum of $4,560,000.
12. For special damages and the court may determine.
13. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish the defendant's and
deter others from engaging in similar misconduct.
Dated this ____ day of May, 2012. ____________________________
Conchita Ang, Plaintiff in Pro Per
VERIFICATION
I am the plaintiff in this proceeding and have read the answer. I declare under penalty of perjury
under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: __________, 2012
_______________________
Conchita Ang
Plaintiff In Pro Per
Ang vs. Aurora, et. al. - Page 17
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing complaint has been furnished by US
Mail properly addressed and with proper postage on May ___ 2012.
To:
Aurora Loan Services, LLC
Business Service - Residential Sub-Servicing
10350 Park Meadows Dr.
Littleton, CO 80124
Aurora Loan Services
PO Box 1706
Scott's Bluff, NE 69363 – 1706
Aurora Bank FSB
2617 College Park
Scott's Bluff, NE 69363 – 1706
Quality Loan Service Corp.
2141 5th Ave.
San Diego, CA 92106
Phone: 619-645-7711
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)
1818 Library St., Suite 300
Reston, VA 20190
McCarthy and Holthus, LLP
1770 4th Ave.
San Diego, CA 92106
Phone: 619-685-4800 Fax: 619-685-4811
TFLG, A Law Corporation
2121 2nd St., Suite C – 105
Davis, CA 95618
Phone: 530-750-3700 Fax: 530-750-3366
By: _______________________________________
Print Name: ________________________________
Address: ___________________________________
City, State, Zip: _____________________________