anna kucia document (2)

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Title: The Complex Relationship Between Private Military and SecurityCompanies and the Security of Civilians:

Insights from Colomia

ANNA KUCIA

!"reie #niversit$t Berlin% &ermany'

(stract:Since the implementation of Plan Colombia in the year 2000, the U.S. government has

stepped up its efforts to reduce the drug production and trafficking in Colombia and to en-hance the capabilities of the Colombian security sector in its fight against insurgent groupsinvolved in the drug trade. his program has been introduced !ith the assistance from official members of the U.S. military, but also from Private "ilitary and Security Companies#P"SCs$, !ho have provided diverse services ranging from technical assistance to theoperative e%ecution of aerial spraying of narcotic crop fields. &ue to the ongoing armed conflict in Colombia, the overall security situation for civilians in Colombia has been

strained for decades. 'f special interest !ould therefore be the (uestion, if and in !hich !aysthe activities of this additional player )the P"SCs) have affected the security of civilians.his (uestion is analy*ed by the different types of functions of the companies as !ell as therules of engagement for their deployment in Colombia. he activities of the contractors find themselves embedded in a comple% structure of diverse institutions and instructional chains,!herefore the clear attribution of responsibilities for singular actions reveals itself far from

simple. he study sho!s that especially the operative tasks of P"SCs and the fact that thecompanies+ employees did not face any sanction in case of malfeasance, contributed to thethreat of civilian security in Colombia.

Name: (nna )uciaAddress: "ehrelliner Strasse *+

,-,,* Berlin&ermany

Phone: . /* 0 !-'1- 0 2- 3- /- 45Mobile: + /* 0 !-',51 0 ,4/ 5* 55E-Mail: anna6ucia7gmx8net

This article is ased on a graduate thesis finished in (ugust 3--4 at the "reie #niversit$t Berlin% &ermany8 Iwould li6e to express my gratitude to all the interviewees in Colomia who provided valuale information for

the drafting of this wor6% as well as the 9gate6eepers without of whom the contacts to the interviewees wouldcertainly not have een estalished so smoothly8 ;i6ewise% I would li6e to than6 my supervisor Prof8 <r8 SvenCho=nac6i% his academic team at the Collaorative Research Center !S"B' 4-- of the "reie #niversit$t Berlin%

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]



In the recent past% the phenomenon of Private Military and Security Companies !PMSCs'

has drawn an increasing attention in parts of the media and academic fields8 (mong other

things% this has een due to the expansion of the current private security mar6et% the rising

demand for privati>ed security services% and the oservale conse?uences of these

developments for the provision of security in the contexts of deployment8 In the same manner%events as the unwarranted shooting and in=uring of do>ens of Ira?i civilians y employees of

the PMSC Blac6water in Septemer 3--4 raised not only the interest% ut also the indignation

aout the sometimes rec6less and uncontrolled course of action of PMSCs8,

PMSCs are an expression of a politically sanctioned outsourcing trend of military and

security services once generally associated with the pulic sector8 In contrast to classical

mercenaries% who used to e recruited under legally ?uestionale circumstances from a pool

of individual fighters in order to serve ad hoc for a temporarily limited deployment in a

fighting >one% PMSCs constitute corporate and legally registered% worldwide operative

usinesses committed to the principals of the mar6et8 Their customers @ states% multinational

corporations% inter0 and nongovernmental organi>ations @ assign them through their contracts

security competences with the o=ective of maintaining or !re0'estalishing the control of

force in war or post0conflict contexts andAor delivering selective security services in a given

operational setting8 The spectrum of services extends to such diverse arrays as logistical and

technical security assistance% personal and o=ect protection% advice and training of military

forces% ut li6ewise strategic ris6 analysis and intelligence% peace6eeping and humanitarian

missions% provision of armaments% and direct comat support8 <epending on the character of

the mission% PMSCs may have an impact on local conflict dynamics and strength relations etween the conflict parties8 (s the companies regularly find themselves in a regulative gray0

>one% opening up an opportunity to ypass control procedures in democratic political systems%

they ear the potential of shaping the calculations of intervention0willing countries83

The shortcomings in the regulation of PMSCs also lead to difficulties for the =uridical

examination and sanctioning of crimes committed y employees of the firms8 Incidents li6e

the shooting of innocent civilians y PMSCs raise the ?uestion if and in which ways their

deployment in a given location of operation can affect the security of civilians8 This article

addresses this ?uestion y the example of a current PMSC deployment in Colomia8

Case Study Colombia

ith the deployment of PMSCs in Colomia this study ta6es up a case which hitherto has

een examined in a rather anecdotic and non0systematic way y the current literature81 ( low

intensity conflict holding up for more than four decades% and an enormously rising drug

economy since the ,*2-s had devastating effects on the Colomian state which has lost its

monopoly on the use of legitimate force in considerale parts of its territory to guerrilla and

paramilitary groups8/ Since the year 3---% a small contingent of #8S8 military and PMSC

employees has een wor6ing under a noticeale financial% technical% and military expense of resources in the context of 9Plan Colomia to halt the growing% processing% and traffic6ing of



fight against the insurgents8 In a testimony efore the responsile ouse Sucommittee in

(pril 3--4% a former #8S8 (massador in Colomia and current (ssistant Secretary for the

Bureau for International Darcotics and ;aw Enforcement (ffairs !#8S8 State <epartment'

draw the following interim alance:

Plan Colomia has contriuted to the success of the &overnment of Colomia% to a greater extent than I expectedwhen I was sent there as (massador in 3---8 It has helped estalish security in the country0side% contriuted tostrong economic growth% and fostered pulic confidence in Colomian governmental institutions8 !F' GIHn the

past five years% 6idnappings have fallen y 45 percent% terrorist attac6s y 5, percent% and homicides y /- percent8 !F' Plan Colomia wor6ed% and #8S8 support has een critical8 !F' Colomia is a safer and stronger partner today ecause of our comined efforts to comat drugs and terrorism8+

The 6idnappings% terrorist attac6s% and homicides mentioned here historically have

always hit the civilian population in a disproportionally strong manner and given the fact

that PMSCs played a functional role in this program% it is of vital importance to as6% if and to

what extend these companies have contriuted !positively or negatively' to the variance of such security indicators of civilians8

The revision of the academic state of affairs resulted in the conclusion that the

relationship etween PMSCs and the security of civilians has remained neglected so far8 It

thus proved to e infeasile to methodologically choose the procedure of a theory testing or a

comparative study in order to address the ?uestion focused in this article8 5 Dor was there a

dataase availale which would systematically collect ?uantitative data aout PMSCs in

Colomia% including them in statistics alongside the warring parties and civilians in

Colomia8 ence% in order to find a way to approach this issue% the study followed the

methodology of a ?ualitative% hypothesis0generating single case study%4 which in addition to

the deepened evaluation of primary and secondary literature would also include the

accomplishment of ,* !anonymous' expert interviews in Colomia in the period of March0

(pril 3--482 The research thus consideraly depended on the access to the 9field and to

relevant information aout the topic8 In this light% the study ta6es a middle position etween a

study ased only on written sources% and a long term empirical field study% which esides a

longer stay in the operational locations of the contractors would also include interviews with

the concerned local population8

The analysis of the ac?uired information led to the following approach: if and to whatextend the activities of PMSCs in the context of Plan Colomia have affected the security of

civilians in Colomia will e examined !,' y the respective functions which PMSCs have

exerted in Colomia% and !3' y the rules of engagement arranged for their deployment8 The

term 9PMSCs refers exclusively to those companies that have een engaged contractually

y the #8S8 government in order to provide specific security services within the aid pac6age

of Plan Colomia8 9Security of civilians is understood here as the maintenance of the

physical integrity of citi>ens and residents in Colomia8 This security is considered to e

affected if the right to life andAor to physical integrity is not longer guaranteed% ut also in

case of such a precarious state of health andAor nutrition% that the situation o=ectively can e?ualified as life0threatening8 ith the deepened analysis of two of the companiesJ functions%



the moderni>ation of the Colomian security sector and the aerial eradication of drug fields% a

technical and an operative function are chosen and examined according to their respective

conse?uences for the security of civilians8 9Rules of engagement are understood here as the

regulative frame conditions for the deployment of PMSCs% their emedding in official

instruction chains% and the procedural provisions while executing their operative tas6s8PMSCs did not perform their duties single handedly in Colomia8 This ma6es it necessary to

put their deployment into a wider context of security institutions and non0state actors and

their respective roles in this security setting% as only this procedure can provide for neither an

over0 nor an underestimation of the role contractors played here8 The period of research

ranges from the eginning of 3--- to the end of 3--58

In the course of the article it will e shown that the Colomian case has not consisted of a

classic comat deployment of contractors% 0a circumstance resulting in a heightened difficulty

to examine potential implications for the security situation of civilians8 (t the same time% the

paper argues that different functions of PMSCs can cause very different effects on the civilian

security and that i8e8 the operative tas6s can partly translate into the derogation of the security

situation8 "urthermore% companies in Colomia have not operated independently% ut were

instead ound in a wide mesh of institutional representatives and directives8 (s a result% one

cannot =ustifialy assign a concrete responsiility for singular actions to a specific company

employee8 (lthough the companies were held accountale @at least to a minimal extend@ for

the ?uality of their wor6 y their client% their employees en=oyed a general status of immunity

in Colomia which prevented them from prosecution and sanctioning of crimes li6e the ause

of young women8 Through their indispensale functional contriution to insecurity0augmenting government programs and their road non0regulation% PMSCs in Colomia did @

to a limited degree@ deteriorate the security of civilians in this country8

The structure of the article unfolds as follows: the first section offers a short introduction

to the political context and the priorities of the #8S8 counter0narcotics policy towards

Colomia prior to the initiation of Plan Colomia8 The programmatic direction and

modifications of Plan Colomia in the course of the years are discussed in the second part8

The main sections focus the role and array of functions assigned to PMSCs in the context of

Plan Colomia% as well as the rules of engagement for their performance in Colomia% while

comining these aspects with the respective conse?uences that can e derived for the securityof civilians8 In the concluding part% the results of the study will e shortly resumed and some

hypotheses will e generated% which in turn could form a starting point for deepened or

comparative studies concerned with the same or similar research ?uestion8

Political Contet and the U!S! Counter-Narcotics Strate"y Culminatin" in

Plan Colombia

The political ac6ground of the contractor deployment discussed here was constituted y

the currently longest ongoing violent conflict in South (merica% the roots of which lie at theheart of the inconsistent Colomian state uilding process of the past two centuries% which has

een overshadowed y many civil wars These roots include a never exhaustively estalished



monopoly of the legitimate use of force and a chronic institutional wea6ness of the

Colomian state% resulting in the tendency to violent self0regulation particularly of the rural

population a rigid political system and a political elite whose interests fre?uently were not

oriented towards the common good unfulfilled land reforms and critical ine?ualities etween

different social classes8*

Besides favorale geographical and climate conditions% many of theseaspects have prepared a fertile ground for the extension of the drug economy% which for this

reason can e considered rather a symptom than an originate cause of the ongoing conflict8,-

In the meantime% however% due to the increasing involvement of different conflict groups in

the drug usiness% it appears more and more difficult to reasonaly separate the drug prolem

from the actual conflict8

The fact that the narcotic production in the (ndean countries has risen consideraly since

the ,*2-s% that Colomia evolved to the worldJs principal producer and distriutor of refined

cocaine% as well as the main provider of cocaine and heroin of the #8S8 mar6et% led to a

significant shift of focus of the #8S8 policy towards this region: in a <irective of the Reagan

(dministration illegal drugs were officially declared a 9national security threat8,, This

implicated firstly an outward0oriented counter0narcotics strategy focusing the supply side of

the drug chain% i8e8 the production% processing and traffic6ing of drugs8 ( second implication

of the eginning 9war on drugs was seen in the fact that a typical law enforcement issue

which traditionally pertained to the competences of the police and intelligence services% for

the first time was transferred to military #8S8 institutions8 (s it was assumed that it would e

more cost efficient and effective to detect and destroy narcotics on the very site of their

cultivation% the trend @alongside ongoing interdiction programs@ went to underta6e morecounter0drug measures in the producing countries themselves8 These measures encompassed

the delivery of military technologies% destruction of illegal laoratories% aerial sprayings of

narcotic crops% and counter0narcotics training of the respective national security forces8,3 In

Colomia% these lines of action were tightly ound to the (ntinarcotics <irectorate of the

Dational Police !<irecciKn (ntinarcKticos <IR(D'% the annual udget of which was almost

entirely covered y the #8S8 government8 #p to the initiation of Plan Colomia% <IR(D

received y far the largest part of some *- percent of #8S8 anti0narcotics funds for Colomia8

The first small military operations against the drug production with focal points in Bolivia and

Peru !,*250,**/' which were supported y elite soldiers of the #8S8 Special Lperation "orcesyielded only modest results when measured y the constant amounts of narcotics supplies and

the steady prices for the illegal products in the #8S8 and in Europe8 ;i6ewise% the first aerial

eradication missions in the ,**-s resulted primarily in the relocation of cultivation to more

remote areas% particularly to Colomia% the ad=ustment of the narcotic production rings% and

the extension of the export to other ;atin (merican mar6ets8 In the years ,**/ to ,***% the

cultivation of cocaine in Colomia has nearly ?uadrupled from //%4-- ha to ,5-%,--ha8 Thus%

the supply0side oriented #8S8 measures in the period of the ,*2-0A,**-s were not thoughtfully

enough designed in order to 6eep the pace with the growing drug industry8,1

In the second half of the ,**-s% the growing revenues from the drug usiness helped

especially the "(RC guerrilla !Revolutionary (rmed "orces of Colomia' and the



paramilitary units affiliated in the umrella association (#C !#nited Self0<efense "orces of

Colomia' to gain a historically uni?ue strength8 The (#C used this strength to undermine the

administrative% =uridical% and political ranches of the state apparatus and to inflict military

defeats especially upon the other important guerrilla E;D !Dational ;ieration (rmy'8

Meanwhile% "(RC successfully shifted to large0scale% multi0front operations in ,**5 to ,**2which enaled it to occupy igger towns and to emerge throughout victorious in the comats

against the Colomian army8 The presence of the irregular groups mounted to estimated /-0/1

percent of all municipal districts of the country8 <ue to a deficient state authority% these groups

have een very effective in consolidating their influence and their own% often violently

sustained concepts of order in these regions8,/

(s the military advantage clearly tended in favor of "(RC% CI( experts regarded it as

proale that this guerrilla could gain the power over the whole Colomian territory within

the following five years8,+ The alarmed #8S8 security institutions pressed for a moderni>ation

of the understaffed and technically undere?uipped Colomian military forces which should e

ac6ed up with appropriate advice and training services provided y PMSCs and official #8S8

military advisors8

Plan Colombia and its #rans$ormations

In <ecemer ,**2% the #8S8 and the Colomian <efense Ministers signed a ilateral

agreement to create% e?uip and train a first *+-0man counter0narcotics attalion in Colomia8

( shortly afterwards proposed comprehensive development strategy of the then Colomian

President Pastrana% which due to some divergent #8S8 interests suse?uently underwent a re0formulation y #8S8 government representatives% offered the window of opportunity to a

notedly larger assistance of the Colomian security sector8,5 Dotwithstanding the fact that

Plan Colomia% which was officially signed y then #8S8 President Clinton on uly ,1% 3---%

foresaw a wide range of humanitarian% social% economic and security aspects to e addressed

y a comined effort of national and international sta6eholders% a loo6 at the de facto rought

up financial funds clearly shows that the primary focus of the #8S8 government ased upon

the security sector8,4 In the years 3--- to 3--5% the Colomian military and police received an

averaged 2- percent of the aid8 Contrary to the past two decades% the ?ualitative difference of

the #8S8 assistance consisted in the fact that this time it was the armed forces instead of

<IR(D who received the main part of the funds included in the pac6age8,2

The ul6 of the military support was delivered not in financial assets% ut in the form of

goods and services% and was destined to upgrade the air moility% the intelligence gathering%

the riverine and coastal controls% as well as to improve the structures% the operative

capailities and sophisticated e?uipment of the Colomian security forces8 The first counter0

narcotics attalion created in ,***% which was now personally amplified to a 3832+0man

rigade% enefited from many of the provided items8 These troops should assist <IR(D%

which itself also enefited from a restoc6ing of its aircraft fleet% in its massively enhancedcrop fumigation and interdiction missions8,*



The #8S8 assistance was tied to a numer of conditions: the provided resources should e

exclusively used for counter0narcotic% ut not for counter0insurgency missions8 (s there was a

general fear of a gradually deepening involvement of the #8S8 in the Colomian conflict% a

strategy comining these two prolems seemed neither politically intended nor acceptale for

the #8S8 Congress at that time8 The Colomian army would receive the complete servicesenvisioned y Plan Colomia only% if the enefiting units would account for positive human

rights records and cooperate closely with civilian prosecutors investigating respective

allegations against its personnel8 The units were li6ewise oliged to credily prove that no

!in0'direct connections with the paramilitaries were maintained8 Every year% the #8S8

<epartment of State could either certify the progress in the human rights standards or

withhold 3+ percent of the annual funds until an apparent progress in the critici>ed aspects

would emerge83-

(lthough President Pastrana solicited potential donor countries and international

organi>ations for foreign assistance for this plan on several occasions% most of them remained

reserved% 0 not at last due to the impression of a one0sided counter0narcotics strategy which

mainly reflected #8S8 interests8 (s a result% most of the N48+ illion spent for Plan Colomia

from 3--- to 3--5 were primarily covered y the #8S8 and the Colomian governments83,

(fter the *A,,0terrorist attac6s in the #8S8% the Bush (dministration tended to

contextuali>e the Colomian conflict within its 9war on terror8 In this course% the #8S8

Congress decided to annihilate the separation of counter0narcotics and counter0insurgency and

to grant expanded authority to use the Plan Colomia funds for a concerted campaign to fight

oth drug traffic6ing and 9terrorist organi>ations in Colomia8 This modification alsoincluded a strategic and geographic extension of Plan Colomia% as reflected in the creation

and training of new special security units and a more flexile applying of the funds% for

instance in form of a new guard unit of the fre?uently attac6ed CaOo ;imon0CoveOas0Pipeline

in the north0eastern part of Colomia833

In the rising of 3--3% the negotiations etween "(RC and the Colomian government%

which since their eginning in ,**2 had een shadowed y ac6lashes and rising violence

rates% ro6e off8 The hard0line security approach of President #rie% who stepped into this

position in (ugust 3--3% stood in diametric opposition to its predecessorJs dialog0oriented

policy8 It foresaw the !re0'gaining of the ma=or parts of the state territory% the comat againstinsurgent groups and drug lords y military means% and the initiation of negotiations only

from an advantaged position of strength8 9Terrorism was declared one of the iggest threats

of the nation8 Thus% in the sustance% many matching points could e found etween Plan

Colomia and #rieJs 9<emocratic Security0Program8 Thenceforward it resulted almost

impossile to draw clear0cutting lines etween operations included in Plan Colomia and the

initiatives of the Colomian government831

#he %ole o$ PMSCs &ithin Plan Colombia

"rom their eginning% the consultations in the #8S8 Congress in the run0up of Plan



gradually deepening involvement in the Colomian conflict% implicating the endangerment of

lives of many #8S8 soldiers !9ietnam syndrome'83/ The former #8S8 "oreign Secretary

)issinger explicitly expressed these dis?uietudes when stating that

Plan Colomia ears within it the same fateful momentum which drove (mericaJs engagement in ietnam firstto stalemate and then to frustration: at the outset% the #nited States limits its involvement to training and the

provision of vital military e?uipment @ in this case% large attac6 helicopters8 But once the effort goes eyond acertain point% the #nited States% to avoid the collapse of the local forces in which it has invested such prestigeand treasure% will e driven to ta6e the field itself83+

This preoccupation% which was also shared y the #8S8 Congress% translated to its decision

to send as few military personnel to the conflict region as possile8 here feasile% the

services included in Plan Colomia should e carried out y PMSCs8 Therey one could

capitali>e on PMSC personnel that has already een cooperating with <IR(D in the

eradication sector for several years and which was now planned to e uild up personally and

technically8 Beyond this% oth the #8S8 military and the PMSCs were re?uested to transfer their activities to their Colomian counterparts as early as possile8 (nd% most importantly:

oth groups were held under the legal restriction to engage in military comats835

<ue to the integration of the fight against 9terrorists in Plan Colomia and enhanced

pressure to improved results% the initial statutory troop caps of +-- #8S8 military and 1--

PMSC personnel has een modified twice: in 3--3% the numer of #8S8 personnel was

reduced to /--% while the numer of contractors was expanded to /-- in 3--/ the troop cap

was set to 2-- #8S8 military personnel and 5-- contractors8 (s the personnel rotated

constantly% these limits varied throughout the course of a year% ut reached its full potential

most of the time8 It is important to note that this ceiling only referred to #8S8 nationals and

#8S8 companies8 ence% it was still possile to contract any numer of Colomian or third0

country personnel% or to cooperate with sucontractors ased in any other state except from

the #8S8 The employees% for instance% who wor6ed for #8S80PMSCs fulfilling contracts with

the #8S8 State <epartment within the frame of Plan Colomia in 3--,% originated to ++

percent from Colomia and to 14 percent from the #8S8 The remaining employees were

recruited from countries li6e Peru% &uatemala% Bolivia% "rance% Beli>e% Brasilia% Chile% El

Salvador% Italia and Panama8 But since neither the #8S8 Emassy in Colomia nor the

companies themselves have pulished such figures on a regular asis% the ?uestion of thecomplete numer of contracted personnel in Colomia is condemned to remain in the

speculative sphere834

(ccording to the opinion of many experts most of the services provided y PMSCs in

Colomia @with the exception of some particular sectors@ could y all means also have een

carried out y the #8S8 military itself832 hy then% esides the aove mentioned 9ietnam

syndrome% were they contracted hereQ ( first approach stresses that the contracting of private

companies has reflected a worldwide trend of outsourcing military and security services% not

at least owing to a generali>ed tendency to privati>ation of diverse pulic services83* Secondly%

the transformation of warfare in the past decade has raised the demand for personnel withspecial expertise and experience% whereas the adaptation of national armies to this



development would re?uire time8 The herey emerging demand was covered y experienced

PMSCs81- Thirdly% in the early ,**-s the #8S8 military was scaled ac6% while its current

capacities have een seriously constrained through larger deployments worldwide in the past

years81, "ourthly% with the deployment of PMSCs% the responsiilities and accountaility of

policy ma6ers were intentionally evaded% dislocated and ultimately lurred8 The effectivenessof the classic chec6s and alances associated with the #8S8 political system was hindered% for

instance% through legal acts as the #8S8 International Transfer of (rms Regulations8 (ccording

to this act% a contract etween a #8S8 <epartment and a PMSCs not mounting to the sum of

N+- million did not have to e sumitted to evaluation in the #8S8 Congress8 PMSCs% in turn%

could refer to a contractual discretion clause agreed upon with their client% when as6ed to

comment on their activities8 (dditionally% the companies were not ound y any regulation in

Colomia !see elow'813 "ifthly% unli6e the case of a murdered or 6idnapped #8S8 soldier% the

reaction of the #8S8 pulic towards a PMSC employee confronted with a similar occurrence

would reveal itself less sensitive8 By contracting PMSCs% the political costs for this policy

have een consideraly reduced8 Even the (massador to Colomia under President Clinton%

Miles "rechette% admitted: 9hen private contractors are 6illed% we can simply declare that

they are no part of our military forces811 Sixthly% in the light of a #8S8 military pac6age of this

6ind% the interests of the #8S8 military industry which were served y lucrative purchase

orders should not e ignored8 This practice was additionally supported y the sometimes very

close ties etween representatives of the #8S8 administration and this industry81/ Seventhly% as

a result of its egregious human rights record% the mistrust against the Colomian army was

very high% so that the #8S8 administration considered itself standing on the less prolematicside y contracting private companies8 The corruption of the Colomian security sector also

played its part here81+ Lf crucial significance% eighthly% was the provision wherey PMSCs

were authori>ed to execute search0and0rescue missions in order to help attac6ed or 6idnapped

colleagues8 By performing this function% the congressional restriction of direct participation in

comats could de facto e temporarily ypassed% while the #8S8 government was politically

covered if something went 9wrong815

'unctions o$ PMSCs in Colombia

The undoutedly most visile field of activities of PMSCs in Colomia was the

management of the aerial crop eradication8 It encompassed the delivery of aircraft as well as

diverse personal services: pilots and mechanics flying or maintaining the airplanes and

helicopters instructors for the training of Colomian pilots and mechanics employees

procuring and managing the hericide applied for the eradication experts for the evaluation of

the fumigations accountants% secretaries% fuel specialists% drivers8 Those tas6s lay mainly in

the competence of the #8S8 firm <ynCorp International% ;;C8 The cooperation etween this

company and <IR(D dates ac6 to the early ,**-s% when it signed its first eradication

contract with the #8S8 government8 This activity continued under the umrella of PlanColomia% aleit with the provision of more human and material resources814



( wide range of further flight services has een provided for Colomian security and

intelligence gathering institutions y firms li6e (rinc% <ynCorp% Integrated (eroSystems%

)ing (erospace% ;oc6heed Martin Integrated Systems% Llgooni6 and Lptec8 Some of these

companies transported memers of the counter0narcotics rigade to remote and hardly

accessile narcotic crop fields in order to secure those >ones prior to <IR(D eradicationmissions8 In case of emergency% PMSC personnel would also provide help in search0and0

rescue flight operations8 Moreover% PMSCs were wor6ing in the technical servicing of the

aircraft as well as the procurement of fuel8 Since the Colomian army disposed of only few

experienced air personnel on its own% another activity of PMSCs in this sector concerned the

training of Colomian military pilots% implicating therey the construction of installations% the

delivery of appropriate flight simulators% etc812

(nother segment supported y PMSCs consisted in the installation and maintenance of

radar stations% the management and the logistical support for sophisticated communication

systems% internet surveillance% and airorne reconnaissance aircraft8 Such activities were

supposed to improve the intelligence and information sharing etween the #8S8 and the

Colomia8 ere% companies li6e (ir Scan% (rinc% C(CI% Camridge Communications%

Chenega "ederal Systems% ITT% ;oc6heed Martin Integrated Systems% ManTech International%

Dorthrop &rumman Information Technology International% La6ley Detwor6s% Lptec% Science

(pplications International% Telford (viation% and TR have een contracted8 hile some of

their tas6s were technical in nature and could therefore e regarded as a mere support of

official security forces% other tas6s were clearly directed towards the own interception and

evaluation of information% as exemplified in a shooting incident of a reconnaissance plane y"(RC reels in the year 3--181*

Regarding the training of security forces% it seems that PMSCs carried out this function to

a smaller part than #8S8 personnel8 Most parts of training in the air segment which

encompassed courses for pilots and mechanics were presumaly executed y contractors8 But

this segment did y far not cover the whole range of trainings financed y the #8S8

government in the course of the years8 The ma=or share of seminars held in areas as diverse as

rule of law and discipline% =ungle survival training% or pipeline protection% can supposedly e

ascried to #8S8 military personnel8 Donetheless% PMSCs li6e irginia Electronic Systems and

Raytheon Integrated <efense Systems were reported to providing riverine and maritimecontrol training for different Colomian security units8/-

In respect of the moderni>ation process of the Colomian army% a ig numer of logistic%

technical% electronic% and armor materials and components were delivered in order to

?ualitatively upgrade the standards of the different ranches of the army and the intelligence

services8 The transport of these goods was managed partly y private companies and to

another part y #8S8 personnel8 hile some of the materials were newly purchased% other

items li6e parts of the aircraft were older models% which eforehand elonged to the property

of the #8S8 government and have even een in use during the ietnam ar8 "rom a legal

perspective% parts of these items were either leased from the #8S8 government% or 6ept as



donations from the #8S8 to the Colomian government% or purchased y the Colomian

government from #8S8 military companies8/,

( comination of logistic and advisory support for ministerial authorities and the #8S8

Emassy in Colomia was provided y companies li6e (CS <efense% Construction%

Consulting Engineering% IDS% P(E &overnment Services% and the Rendon &roup8 (s theactivities of the latter consisted mainly in the advisory of Colomian policy ma6ers as well as

the pulic communication of Plan Colomia% it would e more appropriate to classify its

activities as pulic relations consultancy rather than security services8 In the initial stage of

Plan Colomia% another PMSC @Military Resources Incorporated !MPRI'@ was contracted to

help the Colomian government to devise an action plan for the implementation of the aid

pac6age% ut also to improve some organi>ational% planning% and procurement processes

within the Colomian <efense Ministry8 This contract was terminated prematurely in the

spring of 3--,% due to a reportedly unsatisfactory expertise in the Colomian conflict as well

as the lac6 of Spanish spea6ing PMSC advisors% leading to communication difficulties with

the Colomian counterparts8 This need for more native spea6ers among the contracted

personnel% ut also due to the high operations tempo% companies li6e Mantech were contracted

in order to serve as recruitment centers for new and more ?ualified PMSC staff8 /3

(s far as ris6s for personal safety of PMSC employees in Colomia were concerned% the

#8S8 State <epartment indicated in its reports aout 9Certain Counternarcotics (ctivities in

Colomia/1 that potential ris6s depended on the location and the character of the provided

function8 ( main part of the technical and logistic activities has een performed in secured

military or police installations where the estimated ris6 was assessed as 9low% while the wor6 of contractors wor6ing at remote radar sites or conducting aerial intelligence missions were

regarded as 9medium or 9moderate8 It was especially the field of aerial eradication

measures where the associated ris6 was classified as 9significant8

By attempting to summari>e all the listed revenues of the PMSCs stemming from their

contracts with the #8S8 State and <efense <epartments% which @as the title of these report

suggests@ do not include all activities carried out in these periods y private companies for the

#8S8 government in Colomia% one could calculate with a sum of more than N,+- millions for

#8S8 "iscal ear 3--, and more than N1-* millions for #8S8 "iscal ear 3--58 This would

constitute a share of /3 percent !3--,' and roughly +- percent !3--5' of the respective #8S8spending for the Colomian security sector% indicating an ever larger share of the #8S8 funds

handed over to private companies in the course of Plan Colomia8//

ith respect to the division of responsiilities etween #8S8 and PMSC personnel% the

core distinction consisted in the fact that the former were strictly 6ept away from activities in

the field% ecause here the danger of life was at its highest8 Conse?uently% the ul6 of the

functions associated with narcotic crop eradication% considered y the #8S8 State <epartment

report as 9significantly dangerous% was outsourced to the firms8 PMSCs also were authori>ed

to carry out search0and0rescue missions in case of emergency8 So% while the companies

provided technical and logistical support% advice% training% airorne surveillance% and flight

and eradication services in Colomia the role of # S military personnel referred mainly to



professional and advanced training of significant parts of the Colomian army and police%

instruction in e?uipment% technical procedures% and military doctrines% and strategic

consultancy% monitoring% and coordination of the implementation of Plan Colomia in 6ey

institutions li6e the #8S8 emassy and the Colomian <efense Ministry8

In order to approximate to the research ?uestion of potential conse?uences of PMSC for the security of civilians% two of the listed PMSC functions will e analy>ed in detail in the

following two susections8 Ln the one hand% the analysis focuses on a rather technical% force0

multiplier function @the moderni>ation of the Colomian security forces@% while% on the other

hand% it examines a clearly more operative function: the aerial crop eradication8

Moderni(in" the Colombian Security 'orces and Conse)uences $or Ci*ilian Security

(s an immediate reaction to phase of military advantage of the "(RC as compared to the

Colomian army !,**50,**2'% the reform of the security forces was initiated efore theofficial implementation of Plan Colomia% namely in ,**28 The impulse for the reform came

oth from the inner ranches of the Colomian army and from the #8S8 administration where

an urgent sense of agency was seen due to critical warnings of CI( experts aout an

impending sei>ing of power y the "(RC8 ith the help of the security component of Plan

Colomia% the reform was then continued under a consideraly higher allocation of resources8

hen set in relation to the entire Colomian fiscal udget for defense purposes% the Plan

Colomia funds formed a share of 9only +05 percent8 But as experts emphasi>ed% these funds

constituted a very relevant contriution% precisely ecause only well defined segments of the

Colomian security forces enefited from them% and as the identified sectors would proaly

not have een addressed for many years y the Colomian government due to the lac6 of

internal political consensus and unavailale funds8/+ The reform included the following areas:

,8 ransparent administration: PMSCs and #8S8 personnel offered advice for civilian and

military administrators in Colomian security institutions regarding the estalishment of

efficient and transparent administrative procedures8/5

38 nhancement of spending on the security and defense sector : The share of the gross

domestic product !&<P' which Colomia spent for this sector rose from 382 percent in

3--- to 181 percent in 3--58 Lne should note that% due to economic growth% the &<P hasincreased in this period from estimated N3+- illions !3---' to 15584 illions !3--5'8/4

18 ncreasing of operative security personnel : By the end of the ,**-s% more than +- percent

of the official Colomian security personnel were assigned to administrative tas6s%

resulting in an operative wea6ness of the army8 Ever since% it was restoc6ed from ,/,8/53

!3---' to 3+58+35 !3--5' military memers% wherey the numer of professional soldiers

who were supposed to sustitute the less experienced young conscripts% was raised from

/,8,,/ !3---' to 4+8,2, !3--5'8/2

/8 eorgani*ation of the internal security structures: Traditionally% the different ranches of

the Colomian military were characteri>ed y a distinct life of its own including their ownlogistics% armament% command hierarchies% and intelligence services8 In the course of Plan



similar to its prototype of the #8S8 army8 "or this% so called 9commandos con=untos%

comining army% air% and naval troops and directed y a single general in command% were

founded8 <ue to their particular vulneraility to attac6s% the ma=ority of small control posts

scattered throughout the country was closed8/*

+8 Special security units: The reorgani>ed security architecture was complemented y a widerange of new special units% so that% in addition to the increasing of conventional rigades%

many new rigades and attalions li6e counter0narcotics% moile% mountain% =ungle% anti0

6idnapping% uran counter0terror% infrastructure% and other units have een created8 Many

of them could flexily e deployed within the whole Colomian territory8+-

58 raining and advanced professional formation: Many memers of the newly and existing

troops asolved special training funded y Plan Colomia resources8 These were held oth

in #8S8 and in Colomian ases and included a diverse spectrum of topics8 (s argued

aove% PMSCs were charged with mainly technical training for prospective pilots%

mechanist and electronic technicians% while #8S8 personnel was responsile for a wider

part of training in topics ranging from civil0military relations to special operation tactics8

"rom 3--- to 3--+% more than /58--- Colomians have participated in these courses8

#ntil 3--1% Colomia was considered to e the worldwide iggest receiving country of

#8S8 military training programs8+,

48 /rmament : In order to improve and upgrade the armor standards of the Colomian

military% numerous aircraft !helicopters% spraying and surveillance planes'% rapid coast

guard and riverine control oats% radar stations% night vision and infra0red devices% and

many other components re?uired for weapons0% intelligence0 and communication systemshave een purchased or leased through the Plan Colomia funds8+3

This reform process was extended in 3--3% so that Plan Colomia resources li6e

intelligence sharing etween the #8S8 and the Colomian security services could now e

flexily used not only for the fight against drug traffic6ing ut li6ewise for comating

insurgent groups% leading to synergy effects to the advantage of the Colomian army8+1

"inally% with the assumption of office of President #rie in autumn 3--3% these

developments were accentuated y an explicit political will to emphasi>e the role and more

offensive use of the military% @ an aspect which was of clearly smaller importance for thedialog0oriented agenda of his predecessor8 This political will expressed itself in the

preparedness to engage unconditionally in the concept of Plan Colomia% ut also in the

implementation of own pro=ects outlined in #rieJs 9<emocratic Security policy8 ere%

measures li6e the deployment of police posts in all Colomian municipal districts% the

increasing of the defense udget y raising a particular war tax% or persistent military

offensives li6e 9Plan Patriota to contain the "(RC0controlled areas can e mentioned8 (s

many of these policies aimed at the o=ectives envisioned in Plan Colomia% and since the

#8S8 government perceived #rie as a determined partner in its fight against drugs and

terrorism% not only the financial funds% ut also the strategic consultancy% transport means% andintelligence services included in this Plan have een opened for use for the #rie0programs8+/



This moderni>ation of the Colomian army resulted in constantly professionali>ing

security units% ?ualitative gains in the applied technologies% ut also in enhanced moility8

here formerly wee6ly or monthly wal6s were re?uired in order to reach hidden guerrilla

camps in the hardly accessile =ungle% now @with the support of the air transports@ this was

reversed to a matter of few hours8 The aerial reconnaissance of current movements of theinsurgent groups was collected and analy>ed much faster8 (nd with the help of special infra0

red and night vision e?uipment for aircraft and infantry troops% the military could now nearly

doule its operative capacities to 3/ hours% @ eforehand% y default of such devices% the

troops were only ale to perform their missions y daylight8 (ll these elements had a positive

impact on the troop concentration capacities% and% according to experts% they were regarded to

e 6ey factors for irregular warfare8 (ltogether% these changes resulted in the fact that the

Colomian military evolved from a ureaucratic apparatus to an operative force which

regained the comat initiative in the internal conflict and succeeded in re0shifting the alance

of relative strength as compared to the irregular armed groups to its favor again8++

hat did all these changes mean for the security of civilians in ColomiaQ Statistics of the

Colomian conflict dataase CER(C demonstrate a significant intensification of violence in

the years ,**2 to 3--1% as measured y the numer of conflict deaths and in=uries

!comatants as well as civilians'% and the extent of violent crashes and unilateral attac6s

registered in that period8 Two factors were considered to account for the increased violence:

first% the negotiations etween the Colomian government and "(RC reels had een

accompanied y enhanced violence exerted y all non0state actors% 0 a development which

reached its highest point after the rea6down of the peace tal6s in "eruary 3--38 ( secondfactor was seen in the fact that% given the newly gained technological and human resources

through Plan Colomia% the Colomian military was ale to step up its military operations

throughout the country8+5

The intensification of armed crashes until 3--1 ended deadly in particular for comatants

!government forces% guerrilla reels% paramilitaries'% and to a lesser extend for civilians8 The

highest numers of conflict deaths on the civilian side consisted in some ,85-- casualties in

3--,% as compared to ,84-- dead comatants in the same year8 In contrast% the numer of

in=ured civilians in the years 3--, to 3--/ was notaly higher than for comatants8 It reached

its pea6 of aout ,81+- civilian in=uries in 3--3% as opposed to some *-- in=uries on the partof comatants in the same year8 Paramilitaries were held responsile for the vast ma=ority of

the civilian conflict victims% followed y the guerrillas on the second and government forces

at the third ran68 Many civilians have een 6illed in massacres% the perpetrators of which were

primarily paramilitaries8 In the course of the demoili>ation process of the (#C !3--103--+'%

the massacres reduced significantly% aleit analysts assumed that the victims of massacres

since that time have een chosen more selectively8 The main perpetrators of civilian in=uries%

in turn% were the guerrilla groups8 Much of these casualties resulted from oms and

explosive devices which% due to their dispersing inaccurateness% fre?uently hit innocent

civilians8 Paramilitaries were held responsile for the second highest numer of in=ured

civilians followed y government forces on the third place +4



The internal displacement figures in Colomia culminated within the period of research to

estimated 1 million people8 The vast ma=ority of the displacements were associated with intra0

regional armed conflicts etween the irregular groups% wherey paramilitaries were the most

important group to lame8 (fter 3--3% a non0linear reduction of displacements could e

oserved% correlating with the demoili>ation process of the (#C% ut li6ewise with thegeneral reduction of intensity of the violence starting in 3--103--/8+2

)idnapping constituted a tactic which in 5- percent of the cases was applied y guerrilla

movements8 Their intention was to hold the victims to ransom and therey securing their

financial ases8 Paramilitaries were held responsile for aout ,- percent of the registered

6idnappings% while the remaining 1- percent were perpetrated y common criminals8 ith the

exception of the year 3--3% the figures of this security indicator were constantly reduced

within the analy>ed period8 The improvements were regarded primarily as the result of a

governmental program to enhance controls of the main roads of the country% as well as the

expulsion of some insurgent groups y the army from regions with important traffic axes8

Similar to in the case of the massacres% 6idnappings no longer were carried out in the form of

mass hi=ac6ings% ut tended e executed more selectively8+*

The anti0personnel mines which were laid out primarily y guerrilla groups usually

intended to 6eep hostile parties away from the areas under control8 Devertheless% they very

often hit innocent civilians8 Since 3--3% more military personnel were in=ured and 6illed y

mines than civilians8 In consideration of the fact that estimates amount to some ,--8--- anti0

personnel mines dispersed in many Colomian departments% one =ustifialy can spea6 here of

a lasting humanitarian catastrophe% which over the years has proceeded in a steadfast way8

5-

Regarding the human rights record of the Colomian military% the numer of accusations

of human rights violations was decreasing oth in relation to the augmenting of troops and in

terms of asolute figures8 Internally% the security apparatus was undergoing a 9process of

cleaning and purging5, in which many military memers had to face criminal processes andA

or were suspended from their duties8 The significance and compliance of human rights have

also formed an integral part of the reformed doctrine of security forces8 Many of the courses

aout this topic were held or supervised y #8S8 personnel% while it was regarded rather

improale that PMSCs would also hold seminars in this field8 Some critical comments have

to e made on this issue: according to experts% practice0oriented themes standing closer to thedaily reality of the soldiers have een addressed in the seminars only towards the end of the

time of investigation8 (dditionally% in many cases the motivation to visit such a human rights

training was not so much of intrinsic% ut rather of an externally imposed nature% due to the

imperative to improve the respective statistics as a means to fulfill the conditions set on the

further funding of Plan Colomia8 <uring the complete period of research% accusations of

human rights violations committed y state employees were not only raised y

nongovernmental organi>ations% ut li6ewise y the #8S8 administration8 The accusations

included acts of torture% aritrarily detentions% extralegal executions% and forced

disappearances8 Some of the Colomian attalions were temporarily decertified from #8S8

funds for reasons of disrespect of human rights or unwillingness to cooperate with legal



prosecution institutions8 Particularly stri6ing was the fact that the statistical decrease of

human rights violations of security forces went hand in hand with an increase in these crimes

on the part of paramilitaries8 Even though it has to e assumed that paramilitaries were

independently actors who were not 9dictated this conduct from an external authority% it

nonetheless has to e stated that these groups @=ust li6e in period prior to Plan Colomia@ have een willing to ta6e the lead in the 9dirty part of the Colomian conflict8 #nionists%

human rights activists% teachers% farmers% representatives of minorities% politicians% =ournalists%

and many others still elonged to the target group suffering from threats% displacements% and

murders committed y paramilitaries% while the =uridical prosecution records of these crimes

in Colomia remained low853

(s the overall discussion of the security sector reform and its security effects shows% it is

only =ustifiale to draw conclusions aout the influence of PMSCs at the stage of the technical

assistance% ut not in terms of concrete security implications for the civilians8 In this sector%

the companies were given a limited% aleit very functional role: it was limited ecause they

were not contracted to directly participate in comats% ut rather to support official security

forces in their fight from the ac6ground8 (t the same time% in this setting they constituted

only one figure in the middle of a larger mesh of institutional actors% which encompassed

memers of the Colomian army% police and intelligence services% #8S8 military personnel and

executive staff of the Colomian and the #8S8 governments8 Ln the other hand% their presence

was very functional indeed% since their activities constituted important force0multiplier tas6s

in Colomia8 (ccording to Broo6s% such tas6s ring PMSCs to the position to

dramatically enhancing the effectiveness of their clientsJ existing militaries8 Therefore% PMGSHCs usually contractsmall numers of highly s6illed military personnel @trainers% pilots% technicians% and doctors@ and use them toma6e marginally trained and disciplined state armies sustantially more effective851

ith their technical and logistic ac6ground support% PMSCs have contriuted to the

technical preponderance% enhanced moility% and reaction capacities of the Colomian

security forces% facilitating them y technical and partly operative means to regaining the

relative strength vis00vis the insurgents8 The intelligence provided inter alia y PMSCs

allowed the military to eing timely informed aout the current positions and movements of

irregular armed groups8 (nd due to the lac6 of sufficiently trained Colomian pilots

throughout the whole period of research% the military would not have een supported y such

an amount of aerial troop transports% armaments% and other supplies to the comats fields

without the firms8 By the reparation and spare parts services of PMSC employees% it was

secured that the aircraft were maintained in a constantly operative status8 (ccording to Singer%

the advantage of the outsourcing of services in terms of such Unonlethal aid and assistance%

including logistics% intelligence% technical support% supply and transportation9 lies in the fact

that these firms speciali>e in secondary tas6s not part of the overall core mission of the client8 Thus% they areale to uild capailities and efficiencies that a client military cannot sustain8 The clientJs own military% in turn%

can concentrate on its primary usiness of fighting8 !F' owever% as with their e?uivalent support units in themilitary% although they do not participate in the execution or planning of comat action% they fill functional needscritical to overall comat operations85/



This limited0functional contriution% in turn% was integrated in an overall Plan Colomia

strategy which% due to its definite military conception provo6ed an intensification of armed

comats% @ with the corresponding conse?uences regarding a clearly deteriorating security

situation for civilians until 3--18 Ln this level% not PMSCs% ut Colomian conflict parties

have affected the civilian security8 (fter 3--1% decisive territorial gains of the army% thedemoili>ation process of the paramilitaries% ut also programs of local and national

governance institutions have een crucial in terms of a partly improved security situation of

civilians8 owever% the indicators of 6illed and in=ured civilians still ranged at a historically

higher level then in the past decades85+ <ue to the !re0'appearance of !new' paramilitary

groups% an enormous amount of anti0personnel mines% and a more selectively handled election

of victims% the security situation in Colomia remained precarious8

Narcotic ru" Eradication and Ci*ilian Security

(n almost unalterale rule in Colomia suggests that in areas where illegal crops are

grown% the internal conflict is smoldering8 Behind every narcotic cultivation an armed group

can regularly e found which% in cooperation with local drug rings% usurps parts of the

organi>ation of the narcotic production chain855 &iven that the Plan Colomia strategy to fight

drug traffic6ing aimed at the aerial invasion into the cultivation >ones% the fumigation of fields

with hericides% and the destruction of hidden drug processing laoratories% this constituted a

de facto penetration in the enemyJs territory8 Since the enemy certainly would not accept the

crop eradication of this valuale source of income on its territory offhand% these operations

implicated the exposure the own personnel to the ris6 of comats8 Many <ynCorp employees

have een active in this difficult sector in Colomia% and it is admissile to spea6 here of a

tas6 which doutlessly exceeds the mere logistical sphere and which can thus e considered

as an operative function854

Ln a regular eradication mission% four spray planes were flown y PMSC personnel8 The

plains were e?uipped with specific spray0fixtures and% in some parts% with protection shells in

order to secure the crews from attac6s8

The plains were accompanied y four helicopters% which sometimes were ordered to

Usecure9 the spraying area in the run0up of the mission8 The pilot teams could consist of <ynCorp0 andAor Colomian security personnel8 In addition% there were several Colomian

military memers e?uipped with artillery on oard8 9Securing of the area meant to fend off

potential attac6s against the eradication missions from the ground ahead of time% as well as to

provide protection to the air planes during their eradication flights8 The artillery forces on

oard were given the order to ta6e action only after an attac6 from the other side actually

occurred% @ an order which not always seemed to have een oeyed852

(nother helicopter flying a level aove the proper spraying mission was assigned the

search0and0rescue function for cases of emergency8 (ccording to official statements% the crew

which also encompassed first0aid personnel was staffed with Colomian nationals8 owever%this information is inconsistent with media reports aout actual search0and0rescue operations%



themselves in "eruary 3--,: a crew which had fallen in the hands of "(RC reels was

rescued y these contractors 0e?uipped with machine guns% and under the cover of further

helicopters0 in the middle of a hail of ullets on the ground85*

( reconnaissance plane flying aove the entire operation space and e?uipped with a small

radar on its outside% was responsile for the coordination of the eradication missions8 Thememers of its crew updated all persons involved aout potential threats from the ground8

Provided that a ig presence of insurgents was expected to operate on ground during

spraying missions% the air crews would receive additional support of Colomian infantry

troops8 This tas6 fell primarily in the competence of the counter0narcotics rigade created in

,***8 ;ocal security troops were sometimes also ordered for supporting the fumigations84-

The aforementioned search0and0rescue operation alludes to the peril character of the

spraying missions8 The aircraft have fre?uently een the o=ect of attac6s y guerrilla

sharpshooters8 But there were also singular cases in which local farmers directed their rifles

against the crews% either out of anger% or ecause insurgent groups forced them to do so8

(ccording to estimations% some 5-- of such attac6s were carried out within the period of

research8 Irrespective of the shells on the aircraft% many crew memers including PMSC

employees have een reportedly in=ured% and some have even een 6illed84, In the first

instance% the Colomian artillery forces in the accompanying helicopters were responsile for

the protection of the crews8 Donetheless it seems ?uestionale if @as has een proclaimed

officially@ PMSC pilots have actually performed their duties unarmed8 In cases of emergency

self defense% and at the latest while carrying out search0and0rescue missions of the type

mentioned aove% an armed proceeding can e assumed8 ere% the ?ualitative modification of Plan Colomia in 3--3 should also e recalled% when #8S8 Congress gave expanded authority

for #8S8 funds for Colomia% allowing for the usage of all resources heretofore destined for

counter0narcotics programs to eing now also applied for counterinsurgency measures843

The crop eradications were ac6ed y a set of rules which should e adhered efore%

during and after the missions:

Previous to a mission% the regional and local authorities were to e informed aout the

concrete time frame of the eradication8 The responsiility to forward this information to the

local population rested on the local authorities% not <IR(D or <ynCorp8 In reality% there have

een incidents time and again where for 9national security reasons civilians were not warnedin advance in order to attain the desired surprise effect or to anticipate planned attac6s y an

armed group8 Therefore% the motor sounds of approaching aircraft were sometimes the only

reliale source of information announcing the imminent spraying missions841

The informing of local authorities aout forthcoming eradication missions also served to

enale them to ta6e specific safety measures in due time in case there would exist autonomy

territories of ethnic minorities% sensitive ecosystems% or national par6s in the envisioned spray

region8 Regions where communities explicitly decided to shift to alternative crop cultivation

should li6ewise not fall in the target field of fumigations8 Many incidents of protesting

communities have demonstrated that these rules have time and again een violated% not at last%

ecause the Colomian government has principally adopted those security measures only after



spraying missions have een going on for years% and ecause the local authorities were not

provided the necessary resources to respond to the eradications in an appropriate way84/

Regarding the applied hericide%4+ the management and composition of which lay in the

competence of <ynCorp% concrete guidelines concerning the exact ingredients and

concentration ratio were prescried8 But =ust the very first eradication phase 3---03--, in thesouthern part of Colomia evo6ed a wave of demonstrations of the local inhaitants% who

complained aout grave conse?uences for human health as well as the vicinal ecosystems and

fauna8 ereupon% different 9independent investigation commissions were charged with the

examination of the impact of the hericide% which% according to the concrete analysis

constitution% attained very different results8 ithout eing ale to discuss the particular results

in detail here% it is nevertheless possile to principally stress that% in this context it seems not

to e practicale to draw simple causal paths from the fumigation to conse?uences in health

and environment8 (dditionally% this relationship depends on the ?uestion if <ynCorp

employees have adhered to the prescried mixture ratio% what in turn was not o=ect of regular

verifications from a third authority8 But it is li6ewise not possile to ignore that over the entire

period of examination increased incidences of constrained eyesight% allergies and ec>ema%

fever and symptoms of ?ualmishness in the inhaitants of recently sprayed regions were

oserved845 (n Ecuadorian investigation in which a group of general Ecuadorian population

was compared to a group of inhaitants of the order region with Colomia% along of which

aerial eradication has fre?uently een carried out% diagnosed increased indications of modified

cell structures and enhanced cancer figures in the order population8 These constituted the

ground for the filing of a mass lawsuit of these order communities against <ynCorp eforean #8S8 court8 Dotwithstanding the never properly clarified and contested issue% and due to the

need to enhance the effectiveness of the counter0narcotics program% a stronger concentration

of the hericide proportion and the extension of the fumigations to the whole Colomian

territory were authori>ed under President #rie844

<uring the eradication% the air plane crews were instructed to spray the hericide from a

maximal altitude of +- meters !,5/ feet'8 The temperature should not exceed 1+VC !*+ V"'%

and the wind velocity was set on a maximum of + !Beaufort scale'8 (long the margins of the

fumigated fields% a protection >one of ,3 meters !1* feet' should e left untouched in order to

guarantee the ad=acent cultivations would not e affected y the hericide8 &iven the varialegeographic and climate conditions% ut also the fre?uently re?uired security distance to

insurgents who used to attac6 the planes from the ground% these guidelines could often not e

followed8 Therefore% the hericide was also carried y the wind to narrow legal cultivations

and destroyed these crops of the drug farmers% which @esides of coca or poppy@ sometimes

constituted the only asis of susistence for them8 <ue to the inaccurateness of the sprayings%

high concentrations of toxin in the ground water of the respective regions have also een

detected% so that in some regions an endangerment of the food security of the inhaitants

could e oserved842

The responsiility to examine potential complains of the population lay in the hands of a

commission composed of a wide range of government # S Emassy and independent



representatives who also revised the effectiveness of the missions8 In case of a mista6enly

eradicated cultivation or health detriment% compensation services should e provided for the

persons concerned8 hile the Colomian government has always emphasi>ed the small

numer of complains the committee had to recompense over the course of time% a closer loo6

at the actually accepted complains reveals that% due to very high criteria for acceptance% morethan *- percent of them have never een ta6en into consideration8 Sometimes% the concrete

times or locations indicated y the inhaitants did not match with the data sets of <IR(D8

"armers were also often o=ected to having cultivated a small parcel of narcotics in the midst

of larger legal crop cultivation% what legitimated the eradication of the field84*

Sure enough% the farmers concerned 6new well the ris6 they entered y cultivating

narcotic crops8 In the face of lac6ing alternatives which would have guaranteed them a

similarly high income% many remained in this usiness8 (fter a fumigation phase% they

returned to the same fields and started with new sowings8 In this aspect% it is important to

consider that the average annual income of a coca cultivating household was estimated at

N,-8,*/ in the year 3--5 !or some N2+- per month'8 Compared to the Colomian minimum

wage of some N,4- !per month' in the same year% the former option doutlessly offered an

enormous economical incentive8 This was accrued y the fact that the earnings were

considered relatively warranted and stale: as compared to other agrarian products% narcotic

crops constituted a very undemanding cultivation product which could e harvested several

times in the year the mar6eting of the whole crop yield to the distriutor was guaranteed and

the farmers did not have to care for transportation% as the traffic6ers usually pic6ed up the

crops directly at the fields of cultivation8

2-

But there were also farmers whose mere asis of existence was revo6ed through the

eradications8 (s discussed aove% a ig percentage of the internally displaced people in

Colomia could e traced ac6 to the armed conflict etween the warring parties in the

country8 Simultaneously% however% experts attriuted an estimated ,+ percent of the refugees

to the aerial eradication missions8 The seriousness of this figure was ased in the fact that @in

contrast to the so called 9political conflict refugees@ these people could not count on support

from the government once they opted out of this usiness ecause of the illegal character of

the cultivation of narcotic plants8 So% the criminali>ation of former narcotic cultivating

farmers consideraly complicated their efforts to gain new ground in the legal economy82,

(s an alternative option enclosed in the social component of Plan Colomia% farmers were

offered the possiility to commit them to manual eradication andAor to shift to the cultivation

of legal agrarian products in exchange of a temporarily limited income guarantee8 But as it

revealed% the manual eradication measures were fre?uently hampered y threats or even the

outlay of anti0personnel mines through armed groups at the concerning fields% so that the

manual eradication programs did not prove very successful8 In many regions% the alternative

cultivation program li6ewise did not wor6 well8 ere% the effect of the financial imalance

etween the social and the military component of Plan Colomia was felt in an especially

drastic manner% as the provided funds y far did not suffice to support the large numer of

households concerned in the medium turn The assistance was made availale with long



delays% implicating additional plight for the respective families% ut also raising mistrust

towards the Colomian government and the cooperating #8S8 (gency for International

<evelopment !#S(I<'8 In some regions% the deteriorating security situation did not allow for

continuing the alternative cultivation pro=ects8 The ?uality of soil in some coca growing

regions revealed itself to e ineligile for the cultivation of alternative agrarian products8 Thecomplicated geography of the country also posed a serious challenge for the alternative crop

pro=ects% as many remote cultivation areas were lac6ing a functioning infrastructure to

facilitate a connection to larger trade centers of the country8 Sometimes% a disregarded need

for a comprehensive mar6et strategy for alternative products hampered the sales8 Therefore%

these programs were not ade?uately enough designed and financed in order to offer real and

sustained prospects of development for the respective households823

Moreover% the security of civilians was further put at ris6 through the adaptation strategies

of the drug traffic6ers which for instance consisted in the extension and partly shifting of the

narcotic cultivations into areas hitherto not affected y drug production8 The shifting dynamic

activated new comats aout territorial control and the access to the sought0after resources

etween warring non0state actors8 By the initiation of Plan Colomia% the illegal cultivation

areas were concentrated in six departments% whereas this numer has almost ?uadrupled to 31

departments in the course of the period of research8 This was accompanied y the so called

9alloon effect: whenever a massive action against narcotic production was ta6en in one

region% parts of the cultivation would e evaded to other areas currently not in focus of the

eradication program8 In terms of the effectiveness of the fumigations% it was reported that the

delivering process of aircraft and further re?uired resources from the #8S8 proceeded tooslowly8 Besides% and notwithstanding the annually rising hectares of coca and poppy fields

eradicated% many more resources @including further <IR(D ases@ would have een needed

in order to ring the shifting dynamic under an approximately effective control821

(nother adapting method consisted in the intention to disperse narcotic cultivation in ever

smaller parcels interspersed with other legal agrarian crops% wherey the satellite0ased

identification of narcotic cultivations and the precision of the spraying missions for <IR(D

and <ynCorp were consideraly complicated8 More fertile seeds were used% so that higher

yields per hectare could e achieved8 The concentration of coca ushes was also enhanced%

while the actual extent of cultivation fields tended to e scaled down8 More effectivefertili>ers and protective sustances on leaves were applied8 Considering also the

inaccurateness of the sprayings% more than half of the eradicated fields could e re0cultivated

after some months of regeneration from the eradication phases8 Moreover% there were reports

of new clearings of (ma>onian woodland8 These shifting dynamic of illegal cultivations had

not at last an impact on the whole (ndean region% so that losses on production areas in

Colomia could e counter0alanced with an increment in cultivations in Peru and Bolivia82/

"rom 3--- to 3--3% a downward movement in the net production of coca was oserved

within the entire (ndean region !33,%1--ha to ,4-%1-- ha'% whereas etween the years 3--1

to 3--5% this figure stagnated in these producing countries at an uncontested high level

!,+1 2--ha to ,+5 *--ha' This was also attested y records indicating that the degree of



purity and the prices for refined cocaine on the #8S8 and European mar6ets have remained at a

stale level throughout the whole period of research8 These developments could also not e

countervailed y the facts that <IR(D and <ynCorp reached annual records of fumigated

hectare figures that they succeeded in extending their missions to ever more departments that

an averaged *- percent of the fumigated leaves were reported to e actually destroyed andthat the #8S8 supported interdiction and air surveillance yielded ever rising numers of

detected illegal laoratories and confiscated shipments of cocaine and heroin82+ (s a

conse?uence% analysts ?ualified these dynamics as a solely containment of the prolem8 They

stressed that a real solution for the narcotic production issue could only e achieved if the

socio0economic and international dimensions of this prolem @unaddressed y the Plan

Colomia strategy@ were seriously ta6en into consideration:

Colomia !F' continues to sei>e an impressive amount of its own cocaine% to intercept imports of precursor

chemicals% and to destroy drug las8 It is also facing up to the corrupting power of the drugs trade ongovernment% and see6ing to rea6 the lin6s etween drug traffic6ing and insurgency8But as the experience of Bolivia and Peru demonstrate% a long term reduction of the worldJs supply of cocadepends not only on effective law enforcement% ut also on eradicating the poverty that ma6es farmersvulnerale to the temptation of growing lucrative illicit crops8 (ll (ndean countries re?uire greater support for development assistance that can generate growth and create righter prospects for communities at the eginningof the supply chain8 They should also e encouraged to wor6 more closely together to exchange intelligence ontraffic6ing flows and carry out =oint operations8The solution to the (ndean coca prolem does not rest solely in the region8 (ndean governments would not e

grappling with a prolem on this scale if there was no gloal demand for cocaine825

PMSCs would of course argue that it lay in the responsiility of the governments to ta6e

the correct or inade?uate policy decisions% while the companies were only contracted to assistin the implementation of these decisions824 (t the same time% however% it should not e

ignored that assets as the disposaility and expertise of PMSCs can indeed have an impact on

the decision0ma6ing of politicians8 "irstly% within the counter0narcotics strategy of Plan

Colomia% PMSCs have carried out a dangerous activity% as was shown y the ris6 assessment

of the #8S8 State <epartment and the high numer of in=uries and deaths of <ynCorp

employees and Colomian nationals8 (lthough official #8S8 personnel have supervised and

verified the implementation of the strategy% they did not carry out operations in the 9field y

their own8 It can thus e assumed that the decision in support of the assistance to operations in

ColomiaJs hard0fought drug production regions revealed itself less discomforting when noown soldiers had to e calculated among the potential victims8 Secondly% notwithstanding the

explicitly declared will to transfer most activities associated with Plan Colomia to the

Colomian counterparts as soon as possile% the Colomian air personnel were reportedly not

prepared to assume the functions from PMSCs% neither in terms of their ?uantity% nor

regarding the stage of their formation% which regularly extended to several years and re?uired

a certain degree of experience8 (s a conse?uence% in the foreseeale future% PMSC services

would have to e continuously provided and the funding of pilot training programs held on a

stale level if long0term results were to e achieved in this sector822

Therefore% PMSCs have contriuted to a massive narcotic crop eradication strategy which

without their support and long standing experience in Colomia would not have een reali>ed



in this form8 This strategy @due to the choice and management of the spraying hericide% the

non compliale guidelines during and around the eradication operations% the lac6ing

integration of socio0economic and international dimensions of the drug production in

Colomia% the partly shifting of the armed conflict to new cultivation areas% and the

underestimated adaptation of the drug traffic6ers@ constituted an important factor for a partialaggravation of the security situation of Colomian civilians inhaiting the traditional and new

drug production regions8 The physical integrity and food security of many rural households

were put at ris6 y the fumigations8 Because of the partially evo6ed internal displacements

and the re=ection of state authorities to assist fugitive farmers who aandoned narcotic crop

cultivation% the security situation was deemed to remain unstale in the receiving communities

of the refugees8 "inally% the not thoughtfully enough conceptuali>ed and implemented

alternative cultivation programs have li6ewise left parts of the local communities in a

temporary state of precariousness and indigence8

#he %ules o$ En"a"ement $or PMSCs En*isioned in Plan Colombia

Regarding their legal status at the national% regional and international level% PMSCs move

in a regulative grey0>one which falls short of the enhanced relevance of the privati>ed security

mar6et and the variety and ?uality of their activities8 Since this aspect has een descried at

length in terms of its international and regional dimensions elsewhere%2* this section will only

concentrate on the most important fundaments of the PMSC deployment in Colomia8

(s far as #8S8 regulations for private security personnel were concerned% it was held that

the companiesJ employees were not su=ect to the #niform Code of Military ustice @the most

important and comprehensive guidelines regulating the conduct of #8S8 military memers@%

unless there were a formal declaration of war8 Two legislative acts which applied to

contractors were the Military Extraterritorial urisdiction (ct !3---' on the one hand% and the

Patriot (ct !3--,'% which was adopted after the *A,,0attac6s% on the other hand8 Both acts

addressed only some% ut y far not all relevant security issues which were of significance in a

given location of deployment8 (dditionally% the acts remained relatively untested in #8S8

courts and did prove ineffective in order to promptly prosecute PMSC personnel who% ali6e

#8S8 soldiers% were held responsile for inhuman ause incidents in Ira?i prisons8

*-

The fact that #8S8 soldiers and contractors wor6ing in the same deployment setting

executed their missions according to different standards was then intended to e addressed y

a new <epartment of <efense Instruction !3--+' which not at last was a reaction to

considerale coordination0 and competence prolems etween the #8S8 military and PMSCs

in the context of the ongoing Ira? war8 This instruction stipulated a rule wherey contractors

who would fall into the hands of the enemy during an armed conflict should e entitled the

9prisoner of war status as defined in the &eneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of

Prisoners of ar of ,*/*8 But it seems that this guideline was not applied to the Colomian

context: until the time of writing% the #8S8 government did not change its stance towards threeemployees of California Microwave Systems captured y "(RC reels in "eruary 3--1%



Therefore% in the ma=ority of the cases% contractors depended primarily on the Status of

"orces (greement etween the #8S8 government and the country of deployment8 Such an

agreement could estalish the rule wherey contractors were su=ect to the law of the country

in which they were serving% depending then on effective governance institutions of the host

country8 But these agreements =ust as well could simply consist of an immunity status8 In suchcases% contractors who reached the law had to count with their dismissal at worst8*3

In respect of Colomian regulations for PMSC activities% it was held that all forms of #8S8

funded assistance including the services of contracted personnel ased on a series of multi0

and ilateral agreements signed in the past decades8 The fundament of the cooperation in the

security field consisted in the multilateral Inter0(merican Treaty of Reciprocal (ssistance

!Rio0Treaty ,*/2' in which the countries of the western hemisphere have pledged to grant

themselves mutual support in case of an immediate threat of one of the treaty memers8 In

,*+*% a ilateral treaty was signed which stipulated the general rule wherey every

forthcoming treaty etween oth states could e ratified through the simple signature of the

responsile Colomian Minister !normally the "oreign Minister' in accordance with the

cainet% and without the need to sumit the document to an examination of a third controlling

instance% as could e% for instance% the Colomian Congress or a court8 This was followed y a

general agreement concerning economic% technical and related assistance !,*53' which

included some concreti>ing paragraphs aout #8S8 military support towards Colomia8 These

stipulated that oth the memers of #8S8 military and other contracted #8S8 personnel sent to

Colomia should en=oy the same privileges li6e the #8S8 diplomatic staff hosted in the

Colomian territory8 (ll following agreements in the security sector have een signed asrespective 9annexes of this frame treaty8 This was also the case for Plan Colomia which was

adopted as an annex in the year 3--- and updated in 3--/8 (ccording to the official

interpretation of the Colomian government% the activities of PMSCs therefore were also

covered y these Plan Colomia annexes8*1

( critical point here concerns the fact that in the meantime of this long series of

agreements% a new Colomian Constitution entered into force in ,**,% which prescried that

every international treaty forming a ground for future i0 or multilateral cooperation had to e

sumitted for revision to the Colomian Congress8 In addition% the Constitutional Court was

li6ewise oliged to scrutini>e international treaties in regard of their constitutionality8 Lnlysuse?uent agreements ased at such initial frame treaties could then e ratified in a

simplified form which would not re?uire the two revision steps anymore8 (s a conse?uence% a

Colomian collective of lawyers sumitted the ,*+*0agreement to the Constitutional Court

?uestioning if it would not also need to undergo a constitutional revision y the Court8 In its

sentence% the Court stated that not the ,*+*0agreement ut instead the Colomian law DV 2-

!;ey 2- de ,**1' constituted the due asis for the respective agreements on foreign

assistance8 (ccording to the =udges% this law would cover all treaties etween Colomia and

other countries the su=ect of which were international grants and allowances8 ( critical aspect

of this decision% in turn% is that it de facto allowed for the possiility that the Colomian



government accepted any 6ind of international assistance without a political or legal revision

from a third authority8*/

Irrespective of the argumentative path one may select% in oth cases the implication was

the same: employees of #8S8 PMSCs serving on Colomian territory en=oyed a status of

remar6aly privileged 9civilians8 They were treated as common #8S8 diplomatic staff onColomian territory8 They were given a categorical freedom from prosecution under

Colomian law8 (nd% since President #rie has signed a respective ilateral agreement

re?uested y the Bush (dministration in Septemer 3--1% contractors =ust as #8S8 military

personnel were assured non0delivery to the International Criminal Court8*+

Thus% in an overall view with the unsatisfying legal instruments at the international and

the regional level and the ?uestionale legal accountaility of PMSCs in the #8S8% it can e

stated that private security personnel serving in the frame of Plan Colomia were opened a

window of opportunity to move eyond the legal space proportioned to Colomian and third

country civilians in Colomia% without having to fear =uridical conse?uences8 In the light of

this general regulative freedom in Colomia% two further ?uestions come in mind: first% to

what extend PMSC personnel were held accountale y their client while carrying out their

contractual dutiesQ (nd second% which civilian security implications did this legal status have

on the contractorsJ conduct off0time in ColomiaQ

,bli"ations urin" the Accomplishment o$ PMSC 'unctions

PMSCs serving in the context of Plan Colomia were neither acting on the ground of self

proclaimed directives nor completely uncontrolled8 The asic guidelines for the counter0

narcotic and counter0insurgency policies were developed y representatives of the #8S8 and

Colomian governments% not PMSCs8 The client !#nited States' was not simply sitting in the

9distant ashington and waiting for results8 The #8S8 was present with its own

administrative and military personnel in the country of concern and% given the continuing

illegal exports of narcotics from Colomia to the #8S8% they had a vital interest in the success

of the contracted companies8 In respect of its share of funds on Plan Colomia% the #8S8

government insisted on its right to determine which sectors should e proportioned with what

amount of resources from these funds8 The administration and allocation of #8S8 assistancerested therefore exclusively in the hands of #8S8 institutions8 It was thus the #8S8

administration who decided what 6ind of PMSCs it wanted to cooperate with% and which

functions of Plan Colomia should e covered y the companies8 (ccordingly% the #8S8 also

reserved their right to supervise% evaluate% and coordinate the wor6 of PMSCs with the

li6ewise deployed #8S8 military personnel and the Colomian security institutions in

Colomia% wherefore a doule0trac6ed chain of instructions was used:

The first strand too6 course from the #8S8 State <epartment% to the there located Bureau

for International Darcotics and ;aw Enforcement !ID;'% and to the Darcotics (ffairs Section

!D(S' in the #8S8 Emassy in BogotW% Colomia8 D(S was responsile for the counter0



narcotic strategy of Plan Colomia and supervised those PMSCs who have een contracted to

perform functions in this field8

The second strand went along the chain from the #8S8 <efense <epartment% to the #8S8

Southern Command !Southcom' in Miami !"la8'% and the Military &roup which was also

ased at the #8S8 Emassy in Colomia and supervised the PMSCs contracted in the militarysector8

Both of these Emassy divisions were responsile for monitoring the compliance with the

troop cap for the private security and #8S8 military personnel and to ring the support services

of these two groups in Colomia in line8*5 In issues of Plan Colomia% the #8S8 Emassy not

only was the primary contact of reference for the Colomian government% ut also for the

Colomian security institutions which were the eneficiaries of Plan Colomia goods and

services8 Every process lin6ed to Plan Colomia which was supplied y #8S8 funds or was

regarded as a condition for continuing the transfer of these funds was accompanied y the

#8S8 Emassy8 Consistently% every relevant procedural step had to e arranged with and

examined y the authori>ed emassy representatives8

The division of laor etween the different actors can e demonstrated y an extract of the

wor6ing process of <IR(D and PMSCs: it lay in the competence of <IR(D to prepare

periodic satellite0ased reviews of the existing narcotic crops in Colomia8 In a second step%

this data was verified y flight missions and examined in terms of the ?uestion if a national

par6% an indigenous autonomy territory% or the li6e was located in the identified narcotic crops

>one8 Suse?uently% a long0term chronogram aout the forthcoming eradication missions

detailing concrete locations% time frames% and the re?uired personnel and materials wasdeveloped8 This chronogram was then sumitted to D(S which surveyed it and also decided

if the re?uested resources could e actually procured8 Since% for instance% the aircraft enclosed

in Plan Colomia have not only served for narcotic crop eradication ut also for other flight

support missions% the coordination of the utili>ation of these means was necessary8 ith the

final decisions of D(S% oth <IR(D and <ynCorp were given the instruction to carry out the

next spraying phase8 (t this level of planning and decision ma6ing% it thus was D(S who

presided over the PMSC and who was authori>ed to give instructions to the private security

personnel8 Lnly on ehest of this Emassy division% the developed chronograms could e

implemented8 So% it was not thin6ale% for instance% that <IR(D or <ynCorp wouldaccomplish eradications on their own initiative and without the accordance of D(S8*4

Lnce an authori>ation was given and a team composed of <IR(D and <ynCorp personnel

was allocated on an operational <IR(D asis in order to carry out an eradication mission%

oth groups were acting as e?ual partners8 hile <IR(D employees were supervised y a

<IR(D commander% the PMSC personnel disposed of their own spo6esman8 Done of these

representatives was authori>ed to give instructions to the memers of the respective other

group8 Through the cooperation of the representatives the groups were held to agree on all

wor6ing activities as well as to mutually update themselves aout the daily advances8

The conduct of the participants of the spraying missions was regulated y a specific

operational protocol In case of an armed attac6 against the spray planes for instance the



protocol instructed the pilots of the planes to immediately uplift the altitude of flying and

therey directing the aircraft out of reach of fire8 In case the threat continued% PMSC0%

<IR(D0% or intelligence personnel who would oserve the operation site from an associated

reconnaissance plane was instructed to revo6e the entire operation and to re?uest all

participants to return to the operational ase on ground8*2

( spraying phase was regularly followed y a verification process of the concluded

missions% in which the effectiveness of the eradication and potential claims of the concerned

communities were supposed to e scrutini>ed8 This process was underta6en y a commission

composed of representatives of <IR(D and D(S% the Colomian Dational <irectorate for

Darcotics !<DE'% the Interior0 and Environment Ministries% the Colomian Institute of

(griculture and "ishery% as well as independent engineers and scientists !see also aove'8**

This example can e regarded as representative for most services of contractors carried

out in the context of Plan Colomia8 PMSCs did not act autonomously or y their own

initiative% nor did they perform singular and stand0alone duties8 Rather% they filled gaps in

specific% well defined sections within a wider wor6ing context in which various institutions

had their share% and their missions formed part of a roader strategy directed towards the aims

to support the Colomian security forces in their fight against drug traffic6ing and 0since

3--30 also against insurgents% and to assist in their structural reforms8 Lperations li6e the

aerial eradication or airorne surveillance were fre?uently carried out y mixed teams of

PMSC0 and official employees% and many of the delivered resources were destined to

familiari>e the Colomian counterparts with sophisticated techni?ues and procedures% so that

they henceforward would e enaled to apply these methods y their own8 This intertwineddivision of laor etween private and pulic figures resulted in a setting wherey the support

of the companies would have yielded only limited effectiveness if the official security

personnel would not simultaneously have met their duties% too% @ and vice versa8,--

Thus% on the one hand the companies indeed disposed of some leeway in terms of the

actual ways of performing the contractual agreements% their personnel policies% the concrete

?uality of their services% etc8 Ln the other hand% however% the performance of the companies

has een supervised% evaluated and coordinated with other processes and institutions involved

in Plan Colomia y the #8S8 Emassy8 The aforementioned example of a prematurely

terminated MPRI0contract% in turn% points to the fact that% for reasons of effectiveness% the#8S8 government was y all means prepared to ring the cooperation with a PMSC to whom it

traditionally had shared a good relationship,-, to an end8 (side from these supervising

functions of local #8S8 officials% it was therefore the ris6 of loosing a governmental contract

which provided for a minimal accountaility of the companies8 This accountaility% however%

held true only towards the #8S8 client and only in terms of the agreed contractual contents% ut

not towards the Colomian government or% much less% the Colomian people8

%e"ulati*e 'reedom ,utside the &orplace



hat have een the implications of the unregulated legal status of PMSC personnel for

civilian security in the time eyond their contractual dutiesQ In order to explore this ?uestion

it firstly would e important to 6now if Colomian civilians were aware of the presence of

PMSCs in their country and if they were ale to distinct etween #8S8 military personnel and

company employees8 (s the interviews revealed% there were ig differences etween the uran population% who normally lived far from the locations of deployment of PMSCs% and the rural

population% who lived close to the ases and towns where private security personnel were

accommodated% or who got into contact with them y means of their activities% as for instance%

the eradications or maintaining services on radar stations8 Some civilians wor6ed as

employees in military ases or hotels where contractors lived8 Information aout PMSCs

could also e ac?uired from some reports in the Colomian media or even guerrilla

propaganda% in the latter of which presumaly no clear division lines etween #8S8 military

and PMSC personnel have een drawn8 ith regard to their wor6ing and leisure clothing%

contractors did not exhiit a consistent practice% so that neither it was always possile to

determine if the employees were in service or not% nor did it seem feasile to externally

distinguish the firmsJ employees from official #8S8 military personnel8,-3

( further distinction criterion would e the ?uestion if the ases where PMSC personnel

were accommodated have een strictly guarded% and if they were instructed not to leave the

asis for security reasons% or if they rather stayed at relatively safe locations allowing the

employees to get into contact with the surrounding local communities8 In contrast to the

operational <IR(D ase in San osX de &uaviare% capital of the department &uaviare and a

traditional narcotic cultivation region with a high presence of guerrilla groups% wherecontractors !and #8S8 military personnel' lived completely separated% another part of PMSC

personnel who were deployed in the vacation resorts Melgar !<epartment Tolima' and

Tumaco !<epartment DariOo' mostly were not accommodated in military installations8

Instead% they rented hotels or apartments in the town centers8 They would hire local

inhaitants as cleaning or 6itchen personnel and integrate in the local 9night life8,-1

In regard of crimes against civilians% two cases of sexual ause ecame 6nown8 The first

concerned +1 female minors and young women in the town of Melgar and the neighoring

&irardot8 In (ugust 3--/% reports were pulished according to which contractors were

accused of producing twelve pornographic floppy discs and +1 videos with the respectivewomen and some additional male actors8 These videos were offered for sale at the lac6

mar6ets of different Colomian towns and in the internet8 Many of the women were minors

who elonged to lower social classes8 They were proposed the offer to participate in

pornographic film productions at the street or while wor6ing for the contractors in their

accommodation locations8 (pparently% they were promised to gain a large amount of money

as measured y the average local incomes8 (s the payments never came% some of them

informed the police% wherey the case ecame actually pulic8 Many of the women concerned

were forced to leave their hometowns due to humiliations they and their families have

suffered in their communities8 The second case of ause li6ewise occurred in Melgar when a

PMSC employee 0together with an # S sergeant0 sexually aused a ,30year old Colomian



girl in (ugust of 3--48,-/ The incidences ring ac6 to mind the scandal of <ynCorp in

Bosnia% where some employees were accused of involvement in an international human

traffic6ing ring and forced prostitution of female minors8 Some ,2- company employees were

deployed there in ,**+ for the assistance in humanitarian and peace 6eeping missions8 The

only sanction some of the <ynCorp employees faced at that time was the dismissal y thefirmJs director8,-+

(lthough no further incidents of this type ecame pulic% it is possile to derive some

general implications for the security of civilians from these cases% which would e li6ewise

applicale for similar incidents: "irstly% this was a crime committed y several individuals% not

a systematically oservale conduct of PMSC personnel in Colomia8 The closeness to the

local population and thus the opportunity to commit such an action seemed to have

constituted critical factors here8 Contractors living in isolated and secured ases had much

less opportunities to get into contact with local communities8 Secondly% it is eyond ?uestion

that such crimes can e and indeed are also committed y official soldiers of national or

international armies8,-5 Thirdly% the essential difference etween regular soldiers and private

security personnel% though% was the fact that for the latter there were no control mechanisms

availale to prosecute such crimes8 (s was argued aove% the fundamental immunity

guaranteed to #8S8 contractors in Colomia posed an opportunity to move eyond the legal

sphere without fearing the ris6 of legal sanctions8 #nli6e the employees in Bosnia% in this case

no dismissals of the accused have een reported8 Contrary to the #8S8 military personnel%

private security employees were not su=ect to a military code and could not e held

accountale efore a military court8 (nd as opposed to memers of the Colomian securityforces% whose conduct @not least in regard of their human rights performance@ was regularly

certified y the #8S8% no similar security clearances of contractors have ta6en place8 ,-4 (

re?uested discussion on the part of Colomian civil society representatives aout these

une?ual legal standards within respective authorities have reportedly een hindered y #8S8

representatives8 Yuite the contrary: when memers of a lawyer collective @=ust as #8S8

officials on their on0site inspections to examine the human rights practice of Colomian

military units@ were aout to collect on0site information of the ause incidents and to hold

tal6s with the local population% they were constantly 9accompanied y PMSC employees% @ a

ehavior that admittedly raised more suspicion than trust8,-2

(t this individual level of conduct% a certain deterioration of security @very limited in

terms of extent and ?uantity@ y the direct interference of private security personnel can thus

e assumed8 Because this non0regulation of PMSCs remained unchallenged% it constituted a

latent threat of civilian security which may have led to further similar incidents at any time8

Conclusion

<rawing on a recent !and ongoing' PMSC deployment in Colomia% the article raised the

?uestions if and to what extent private security personnel could affect the security of civilians

in a given area of operation This ?uestion was addressed y the analysis of the actual



functions of PMSCs at the one hand% and y the rules of engagement for their deployment on

the other hand8 hile it was argued that due to their emedding in a complex mesh of

institutions and directives the attriution of responsiilities for single actions was far from

simple% the functional PMSC contriution to insecurity0augmenting policies and their

unregulated legal status in Colomia constituted factors which @to a limited degree@ worsenedthe security situation of civilians in this country8

Regarding the functions of contractors in the frame of Plan Colomia% the study showed

that this deployment did not foresee a classic comat operation% in which the #8S8 government

would have engaged a contingent of #8S8 soldiers and PMSC forces in order to offensively

perform a military operation against adversaries8 (mong other reasons% the unwillingness to

eing gradually dragged into an internal conflict and therey ris6ing the lives of #8S8 soldiers

have constituted a critical factor during the initial passing of Plan Colomia in the #8S8

Congress8 So% the actual fight on the narcotic crop fields and the territories occupied y

insurgents should e unalteraly carried out y Colomian security forces8

In a second step% y resorting to a detailed analysis first of a technical force0multiplier tas6

and second to an operative function% the research demonstrated that% depending on the

respective function% the conse?uences for the security of civilians can turn out very different8

In the first case% @the moderni>ation of the Colomian security forces@ the focus of the

companies was ased at the delivery% installation and maintenance of logistic and technical

e?uipment% the assistance in air surveillance operations% flight support% technical training and

professional formation of Colomian personnel% and administrative consultancy8 This

contriution of PMSCs% however% constituted an integral part of a y far roader PlanColomia strategy% in which a diverse range of further Colomian and #8S8 security officials

and institutions participated% and whose overall aim was to enhance the Colomian security

forcesJ technical predominance% moility and reaction capacities and therey shift the relative

strength as compared to the insurgents towards the side of the state8 The un?uestionaly

military direction of Plan Colomia provo6ed an intensification of the armed conflict and was

therefore reflected in a consideraly deteriorating security situation of civilians until 3--18

hile the technical performance of the companies in this sector has een of functional

importance% at this stage it was not possile to attriute to them a direct responsiility on the

precarious and suse?uently improving security situation of civilians in Colomia8In the second case% analy>ing the operative PMSC function of aerial eradications of

narcotic crops% the paper again showed that private security personnel acted amidst a larger

institutional structure% so that these companies alone could not =ustifialy e accused of actual

detriments to civilian security8 Devertheless contractors have played a 6ey role in this sector8

"irstly% they assumed a dangerous activity with which they ris6ed their lives and which the

#8S8 government was not willing to transfer into the hands of its own military8 Secondly%

throughout the entire period of research it was reportedly not possile to sustitute PMSC

personnel through Colomian nationals% ecause% for instance% pilot trainings would have

re?uired more time and practical experiences on the part of the Colomian pilots concerned8

ithout the disposaility and expertise of PMSCs the counter0narcotic strategy thus would



not have een reali>ed to such an extent8 <ue to many conceptual and financial shortcomings

of the social component of Plan Colomia and the underestimated adaptaility of drug

traffic6ers% the security of parts of the rural population has een temporarily deteriorated8

(s far as the specific rules of engagement for the PMSC deployment in Colomia are

concerned% the provisions made oth y the Colomian and the #8S8 government resulted inthe fact that #8S8 contractors were assigned a diplomat0li6e status in Colomia which shielded

them from prosecution and legal sanctioning in this country8 <uring the phases of performing

their contractual duties in Colomia% the firms were emedded in two directive chains starting

in two #8S8 <epartments and ending in two divisions of the #8S8 Emassy in Colomia8 Their

performance was inspected and evaluated on0site% so that some form of minimal

accountaility regarding the contractual agreements towards the #8S8 client can e assumed8

Regarding the time spent outside the contractual activities% in contrast% private security

personnel moved in a legal grey0>one% which in sporadic cases led to the detriment to the

physical integrity of civilians8 These incidents occurred in settings where PMSC employees

were not accommodated in secured and separated military ases% ut in common hotels and

apartments in the midst of smaller towns where they could move unrestrictedly8 Thus% the

immediate closeness to the local population @including the opportunity to immediate contact@

constituted a relevant factor in this aspect8 In order to resume the results of the study% the

following hypotheses emerge:

,8 The ?uestion if private security personnel can affect the physical security of civilians in a

given operational setting depends on the specific function assigned to them within a frame

of deployment8 Lperative functions ear a far larger potential to affect the security of civilians than functions of a mere logistic or technological nature8

38 The direct responsiility of PMSCs for impacts on the security of civilians depends on the

?uestion if they en=oy a ma=or autonomy while performing their duties% or if they instead

act within a roader we of institutions where many figures do contriute to one specific

outcome8 The more a contractor deployment is emedded in a complex mesh of

institutions and the more contractors depend on decisions% instructions and contriutions

of other participating institutions% the less it is possile to attriute them a direct

responsiility for the conse?uences on civilian security8

18 (s the simple assignment of responsiility for certain actions alone would not yet lead toany legal conse?uences% the e%istence, rigidity and denseness of regulative structures for a

contractor deployment and the individual conduct of private security personnel play a 6ey

role as to direct effects for the security of civilians8 The more uncertain the legal status of

PMSC personnel and the less the control of compliance of the existing rules% the more

proale the civilian security will e negatively affected y the companies8

/8 The security of civilians is affected y the existence of opportunities to physical contact to

private security personnel8 The more opportunities are given for the direct contact etween

PMSC employees and civilians% and the less non0regulated the conduct of the former% the

more proale negative conse?uences for the security of civilians can e expected8



(s the relationship etween the deployment of PMSC and the security of civilians in a

given operational setting have remained academically unexplored so far% this study can e

regarded as a first attempt to test an analytical path in order to gain more clarity in this

?uestion8 The generated hypotheses could constitute a starting point for longer timed field0

and comparative studies focusing this relationship which for their part would serve toconfirm% advance or revise the hypotheses elaorated here8 (lthough the hypotheses have

een derived from the analysis of PMSCs in a low0intensity conflict% they nonetheless ear the

potential to eing also transferale to humanitarian or post0conflict deployments8



//8 (lfredo Rangel SuWre>% UParasites and Predators: &uerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colomia% 8ournal of nternational /ffairs +1% no8 3 !3---': +4405-, (ngel Raasa and Peter Chal6% Colombian 5abyrinth3 he Synergy of &rugs and nsurgency and ts mplications for egional Stability !Santa Monica% C(: R(D< Corporation Pro=ect (IR"LRCE% 3--,'8

++8 (nne 8 Patterson% 9Counternarcotics Strategy in Colomia8 Testimony efore the ouse "oreign (ffairs CommitteeSucommittee on the estern emisphere% ashington% <C% (pril 3/% 3--4% http:AAwww8state8govApAinlArlsArmA215+/8htm8

558 Stephen van Evera% 6uide to "ethods for Students of Political Science !Ithaca% DA;ondon: Cornell #niversity Press%,**4'% ++054 (ndrew Bennett% 9Case Study Methods: <esign% #se% and Comparative (dvantage% in "odels, umbers 9

Cases. "ethods for Studying nternational elations% ed8 <etlef "8 Sprin> and ael olins6y0Dahmias !(nn (ror% MI: The#niversity of Michigan Press% 3--/'% 1-0138

448 (rend ;i=phart% 9Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method% he /merican Political Science evie! 5+% no8 1!,*4,': 5*3 arry Ec6stein% 9Case Study and Theory in Political Science% in :andbook of Political Science, ;ol. < % ed8"red ;8 &reenstein and Delson 8 Polshy !Reading M(: (ddison0esley% ,*4+'% ,-/0,-2 Bennett% 9Case Study Methods:<esign% #se% and Comparative (dvantage% 338

228 By experts I mean persons who due to their professional ac6ground or institutional context either constituted a parton the analysed field or disposed of an exclusive access to the re?uired information8 See Michael Meuser and #lri6e Dagel%9ExpertInneninterviews @ vielfach erprot% wenig edacht8 Ein Beitrag >ur ?ualitativen Methodendis6ussion%9 in =ualitativ-empirische So*ialforschung. 7on*epte, "ethoden, /nalysen% ed8 <etlef &ar> and )laus )r$mer !Lpladen: estdeutschererlag% ,**,'% //3 ochen &l$ser and &rit ;audel% %pertenintervie!s und (ualitative nhaltsanalyse als nstrumenterekonstruierender Untersuchungen !iesaden: S erlag fZr So>ialwissenschaften% 3--5'% ,-8 ( further criterion forchoosing ade?uate interviewees was the re?uirement wherey their information should reflect a preferaly wide spectre of

6nowledge and opinions8 Therefore% among the interviewees there were security advisers% staff of the Colomian <efenseMinistry% facilitators etween this ministry and the #8S8 Emassy in Colomia% former Colomian <efense and ice<efense Ministers% high0ran6ing memers of the Colomian military% a former director of the Colomian (ntinarcotics<irectorate of the Dational Police !<IR(D'% academics% independent analysts from inter0 and non0governmentalLrgani>ations% human rights and laor rights lawyers% and Colomian civilian pilots8 Dotwithstanding the herey otainedvariety of opinions% the information of some further 6ey groups who would have completed this spectre was not availale:

Deither representatives of the PMSCs in focus nor staff from the #8S8 Emassy in Colomia were willing to give interviewsin the topic8 <ue to security concerns% it was also not practicale to interview rural community memers who live in theareas of operation of the PMSCs in Colomia8

**8 "or a detailed analysis of the driving factors and dynamics of the Colomian civil war see% for example% Raasa andChal6% Colombian 5abyrinth3 he Synergy of &rugs and nsurgency and ts mplications for egional Stability Da>ihRichani% Systems of ;iolence. he Political conomy of ar and Peace in Colombia !(lany% D: State #niversity of Dewor6% 3--3' arvey "8 )line% 9Colomia: ;awlessness% <rug Traffic6ing% and Carving #p the State% in State 4ailure and

State eakness in a ime of error % ed8 Roert Roterg !ashington% <C: Broo6ings Institution Press% 3--1'% ,5,0,23&ustavo &allKn% 9uman Rights: ( Path to <emocracy and Peace in Colomia% in Peace, &emocracy, and :uman ightsin Colombia% ed8 Christopher elna and &ustavo &allKn !Dotre <ame% ID: #niversity of Dotre <ame Press% 3--4'% 1+10/,,8

,-,-8 Cornelius "riedendorf% 9<rogen% )rieg und <rogen6rieg%8 <ie #S( und )olumien im aussichtslosen )ampfQ%9 in Politische :errschaft in S>d- und "ittelamerika% ed8 Raimund )r$mer !Potsdam: #niversit$tsverlag% 3--5'% ,558

,,,,8 (rlene Tic6ner% 9#8S8 "oreign Policy in Colomia: Bi>arre Side Effects of the \ar on <rugsJ% in Peace, &emocracy, and :uman ights in Colombia% ed8 Christopher elna and &ustavo &allKn !Dotre <ame% ID: #niversity of Dotre <ame Press% 3--4'% 1-*01+38

,3,38 ames van ert% 9The State <epartmentJs Darcotics Control Policy in the (mericas% 8ournal of nteramericanStudies and orld /ffairs 1-% no8 301 !,**2': 2 Raasa and Chal6% Colombian 5abyrinth3 he Synergy of &rugs and

nsurgency and ts mplications for egional Stability% 3-0338,1,18 Raasa and Chal6% Colombian 5abyrinth3 he Synergy of &rugs and nsurgency and ts mplications for egional

Stability% ,3 International Crisis &roup% Coca, &roga y Protesta Social en ?olivia y Per@ !BogotWABrussels: Informe sore(mXrica ;atina DV ,3% 3--+' #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime% Coca Cultivation in the /ndean egion. / Surveyof ?olivia, Colombia, and Peru !formally unedited document% 3--5'%http:AAwww8unodc8orgApdfAandeanA(ndean]full]report8pdf8 Interviews% BogotW% (pril 1 and ,1!'% 3--48

,/,/8 Ricardo (rias CalderKn% 9<er Plan Colomia im regionalen und gloalen ̂ usammenhang%9 7/S - /uslandsinformationen no8 1 !3--,': 5 Peter aldmann% &er anomische Staat. Aber echt, Bffentliche Sicherheit und /lltag in 5ateinamerika !Lpladen: ;es6e und Budrich% 3--3'% 3-4 #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance "easures and 5ong-erm Costs for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport toCongressional Committees% !ashington% 3--1'% http:AAwww8gao8govAnew8itemsAd-14218pdf8 Interviews% BogotW% March3,a% 34a (pril /% ,-% 3--48

,+,+8 Interview% BogotW% March 3,!a'% 3--48



,5,58 <iana Marcela Ro=as% 9Estados #nidos y la guerra en Colomia% in uestra guerra sin nombre% ed8 "rancisco&utiXrre> San_n and &on>alo SWnche> &Kme> !BogotW: IEPRI% 3--5'% +- Tic6ner% 9#8S8 "oreign Policy in Colomia:Bi>arre Side Effects of the \ar on <rugsJ % 13,

,4,48 The respective policy areas of Plan Colomia were economic recovery% fiscal and financial reform% negotiated peacesettlement% moderni>ing the Colomian security institutions% counter0narcotics strategy% alternative agriculturaldevelopment% raising popular conscience for transparent governance% social and humanitarian programs% moili>ation of theinternational community8 See Presidency of the State of the Repulic of Colomia% Plan Colombia ) Plan for Peace,

Prosperity and the Strengthening of the State !BogotW% ,***'%

http:AAwww8usip8orgAliraryApaAcolomiaAadddocAplan]colomia],-,***8html8,2,28 (dam Isacson% 6etting n &eeper. he United States+ gro!ing involvement in the Colombian conflict !ashington:

Center of International Policy Report% 3---'% ,03% http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcoiprAcoipr--38pdf "rancisco ;eal Buitrago% 5ainseguridad de la seguridad. Colombia DEF-200E !BogotW: Editorial Planeta Colomiana% 3--5'% 3,*8

,*,*8 Isacson% 6etting n &eeper. he United States+ gro!ing involvement in the Colombian conflict % 3 Raasa and Chal6%Colombian 5abyrinth3 he Synergy of &rugs and nsurgency and ts mplications for egional Stability% 518

3-3-8 #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% <rug Control8 Specific Performance Measures and ;ong0Term Costs for #8S8Programs In Colomia ave Dot Been <eveloped8 Report to Congressional Committees% 34 Interviews% BogotW% March32 (pril ,-% 3--48

3,3,8 The #8S8 government contriuted an amount of some N/84 illion to Plan Colomia in the period of 3---03--58 SeeMaximilian )ur> and olfgang Muno% 9<er Plan Colomia: )olumien im isier des )rieges gegen den Terror der #S( in;ateinameri6a% ?rennpunkt 5ateinamerika% no8 1 !3--+': 3201-% and (dam Isacson% Plan Colombia ) Si% 1ears 5ater !ashington: Center of International Policy Report% 3--5'% ,8

33338 It is important to note that a share of //` of this pipeline elongs to the property of the #8S8 Lccidental PetroleumCorporation8 See Ro=as% 9Estados #nidos y la guerra en Colomia% ,38 See also ;arry Storrs and Connie eillette% /ndean

egional nitiative #/$3 41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H /ssistance for Colombia and eighbors !ashington: CRSReport for Congress% 3--1'% /% http:AAfpc8state8govAdocumentsAorgani>ationA3/-//8pdf and &erhard <re6on=a0)ronat%9)olumien: Mi6ro0)riege und "riedensinseln% nternationale Politik und 6esellschaft % no8 3 !3--/': ,+18

31318 Presidencia de la ReplicaAMinisterio de <efensa Dacional% PolItica de &efensa y Seguridad &emocrJtica !BogotW%3--1'% http:AAalpha8mindefensa8gov8coAdayTemplatesAimagesAseguridad]democratica8pdf Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!'(pril ,- ,1!'8

3/3/8 Press Release from Rep8 anice Scha6ows6y !<0Illinois'% 9Scha6ows6y introduces Bill to end funding of secret warand private armies in (ndean region%% (pril 3+% 3--,% http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaA-/3+-,8htm Ingrid aicius and(dam Isacson% he Kar on &rugs+ meets the Kar on error+ !ashington: Center for International Policy Report 3--1'%http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaA-1-3ipr8pdf8

3+3+8 enry (8 )issinger% &oes /merica eed a 4oreign PolicyL o!ard a &iplomacy for the 2 st Century !Dew or6 Get

al8H: Simon Schuster% 3--,'% *,835358 Connie eillette% /ndean Counterdrug nitiative #/C$ and elated 4unding Programs3 41 200E /ssistance!ashington: CRS Report for Congress% 3--+'% 5% http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaA-/,3-*crs8pdf8

34348 #8S8 <epartment of State% 9"(CT SEET: Civilian Contractors and #8S8 Military Personnel Supporting PlanColomia% !ashington% 3--,'% http:AAusinfo8state8govAregionalAarAcolomiaAfact-*8htm #8S8 Emassy BogotW% Colomia%9Personnel contracted y the #8S8 <epartment of State through private #8S8 companies to wor6 in Colomia in support ofthe ilateral counternarcotics effort% !BogotW% 3--,': http:AAogota8usemassy8govAwwwsccen8shtml <ario (>>elini%9)olumien8 ersuchslaor fZr privatisierte )riegsfZhrung%9 in &as Unternehmen 7rieg. ParamilitMrs, arlords und

Privatarmeen als /kteure der euen 7riegsordnung % ed8 <ario (>>elini and Boris )an>leitner !BerlinAamung:(sso>iation ('% 1,013 Storrs and eillette% /ndean egional nitiative #/$3 41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H

/ssistance for Colombia and eighbors% /0+ aicius and Isacson% he Kar on &rugs+ meets the Kar on error+ % *eillette% /ndean Counterdrug nitiative #/C$ and elated 4unding Programs3 41 200E /ssistance% /0+ (vant% 9TheImplications of Mar6eti>ed Security for IR Theory: The <emocratic Peace% ;ate State Building% and the Dature and"re?uency of Conflict% +,,0+,3 S[mme ammer% he Control of Private Security Companies. / Study of the elationshipbet!een the United States and Private /ctors in Plan Colombia% 12 Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!' 32 (pril / ,3!a'%3--48

32328Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!' 32 1- (pril /!'% 3--483*3*8 Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!a' 35 34 (pril -/!'% 3--481-1-8 Interviews% BogotW% March 35 1-!' (pril ,3!'% 3--481,1,8 Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!a' 35 1-!'% 3--4813138 Contracts exceeding the amount of N+- million can easily e ro6en into several smaller contracts8 See Singer%

Corporate arriors3 he ise of the Privati*ed "ilitary ndustry% 3,-8 PMSC contracts also do currently not fall under the#8S8 "reedom of Information (ct8 See (vant% 9The Implications of Mar6eti>ed Security for IR Theory: The <emocraticPeace% ;ate State Building% and the Dature and "re?uency of Conflict% +,38 See also Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!a'



3,!' 32 (pril -1!' ,3!a'% 3--4811118 acoo Yuintanilla% 9The Invisile #S ar in Colomia% !3--/'% http:AAwww8>mag8orgAcontentAprint]article8cfmQ

itemI<b+2-4sectionI<b,8 See also Press Release from Rep8 anice Scha6ows6y !<0Illinois'% 9Scha6ows6y introducesBill to end funding of secret war and private armies in (ndean region% Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!a' 34!a' (pril ,-%3--48

1/1/8 Interviews% BogotW% March 31 (pril /!'% 3--481+1+8 aicius and Isacson% he Kar on &rugs+ meets the Kar on error+ % / Interviews% BogotW% March 1-!' (pril 1!a'

,3!'% 3--4815158 Singer% Corporate arriors3 he ise of the Privati*ed "ilitary ndustry% 3-403-*814148 #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the

Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200G#Public 5a! 0<-22F$% !ashington% 3--1'% http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaA-1-/,/-,8htm Sheila Mysore6ar%9<ynCorp und die Privatisierung des )rieges% Oeitschrift f>r nt!icklung und Ousammenarbeit % no8 / !3--/' !onlineedition without indication of pages'% http:AAwww8inwent8orgAE.^AcontentAarchiv0gerA-/03--/Aschwer]art+8html8 The centraloperation asis of <ynCorp found itself in the head?uarters of <IR(D in BogotW% Colomia8 Three decentrali>ed <IR(D

ases in the Colomian departments &uaviare% Tolima% and Magdalena served as starting points for aerial eradicationoperations in the whole Colomian territory8 The personnel were then flown to destined su0regions where they weretemporarily accommodated in sporadic police or military camps8 See Interviews% BogotW% (pril 1!a' ,3!'% 3--48 RegardingPMSC total personnel numers% <ynCorp has presumaly played the most important role in the frame of Plan Colomia8Estimated 1+ <ynCorp employees have een respectively present in the three decentrali>ed ases8 Most of them rotatedaccording to a two0wee6 rhythm8 In addition to training personnel% administrators% information specialists% technicians%

drivers% and medical personnel one could calculate a total amount of some <ynCorp 3+-01-- employees8 This estimation ofthe author roughly matches with a different estimate made in the year 3--1% which assumed some 1-4 <ynCorp employees providing services in the eradication sector8 ,1* of these persons were said to e #8S8 nationals8 See <an Baum 3--1% 9#S0&uns for ire% !La6land% C(: Corpwatch% 3--1'% http:AAwww8corpwatch8orgAarticle8phpQidb42548 Compared to this figure%the total numer of <IR(D employees in the period of research found itself etween 18+--0182-- persons8

12128 #8S8 <epartment of State% 9"(CT SEET: Civilian Contractors and #8S8 Military Personnel Supporting PlanColomia% #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted tothe Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear200G #Public 5a! 0<-22F$ #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance "easures and 5ong-erm Costs for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport to Congressional Committees% ,3% 31 #8S8<epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress bythe Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200N #Public 5a!0<-22F$Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!a' 34!' (pril 1!a' /!'% 3--48

1*

1*8 #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to theCongress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200G#Public 5a! 0<-22F$ uan "orrero% 9Colomia: Private #8S8 Lperatives on Ris6y Missions% e! 1ork imes% "eruary,/% 3--/% online edition ammer% he Control of Private Security Companies. / Study of the elationship bet!een theUnited States and Private /ctors in Plan Colombia% 12 #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. CertainCounternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ ofthe 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200N #Public 5a! 0<-22F$ Interviews% BogotW March 34!a' 1-!'(pril /!' ,3!' ,1!a'% 3--48 #nli6e most of the PMSCs mentioned in this section% (ir Scan is not listed in the #8S8 State<epartment report to #8S8 Congress aout certain private security activities in Colomia !3--1'8 owever% several distinctauthors do confirm its presence8 See% for example% uan L8 Tamayo% 9Colomia: Private "irms Ta6e on #8S8 Military Role in<rug ar%8 "iami :erald % May 33% 3--,% online edition8

/-/-8 #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to theCongress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200G#Public 5a! 0<-22F$ #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance "easures and 5ong-ermCosts for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport to Congressional Committees% ,5 aicius andIsacson% he Kar on &rugs+ meets the Kar on error+ % + #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. CertainCounternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ ofthe 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200N #Public 5a! 0<-22F$Interviews% BogotW% March 34!a'% 34!'32% 1-!' (pril 3% 1!'% 3--48

/,/,8 #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to theCongress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200G#Public 5a! 0<-22F$ #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia.Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct,

4iscal 1ear 200N #Public 5a! 0<-22F$Interviews% BogotW% March 34!a'% 34!'% 1-!'% (pril 3% /!'% 3--48 In the years3---03--1% the Colomian army was delivered 43 #05- Blac6 aw6 and #0,A #0II uey helicopters% while <IR(D



received further 3, spraying air planes8 See #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance "easuresand 5ong-erm Costs for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport to Congressional Committees8

/3/38 uan L8 Tamayo% 9Colomia: Private "irms Ta6e on #8S8 Military Role in <rug ar%8 Singer% Corporate arriors3he ise of the Privati*ed "ilitary ndustry% ,130,11 #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. CertainCounternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ ofthe 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200G #Public 5a! 0<-22F$ #8S8 <epartment of State% eport toCongress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant toSection NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200N #Public 5a! 0<-22F$Interviews% BogotW%

March 32 (pril /!'8 See also the self0portrayal of The Rendon &roup on its wesite: http:AAwww8rendon8com8/1/18 Lnly two of them have so far een pulished y the Center for International Policy% see #8S8 <epartment of State%

eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200G #Public 5a! 0<-22F$%http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaA-1-/,/-,8htm #8S8 <epartment of State% eport to Congress. Certain Counternarcotics

/ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200N #Public 5a! 0<-22F$% http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaAcontractors8htm8

////8 Iid8 In respect of the calculation of the PMSCs revenues please note that a "iscal ear in the #nited States eginswith the last ?uarter of a calendar year and ends with the end of the third ?uarter of the suse?uent calendar year8 Thecalculation presented here is ased on #8S8 Plan Colomia funds provided for the Colomian military and security sectorfrom Lctoer ,% 3--,% to Septemer 1-% 3--3% and Lctoer ,% 3--+% to Septemer 1-% 3--58 The figures are availale onlinefrom the Center for International Policy% 9#8S8 (id to Colomia Since ,**4: SummaryTales%%http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaAaidtale8htm8

/+

/+8 9Sorpresa general8 ;a salida de los cuatro generales fue traumWtica% tal ve> in=usta% pero necesaria% Semana% May 30*% 3--+% online edition% http:AAwww8semana8comAwf]Info(rticulo8aspxQId(rtb25/,3 Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!'34!a' 1-!' (pril 3 /!a' ,- ,1!a'% 3--48

/5/58 Interviews% BogotW% March 32 1-!' /!'% 3--48/4/48 Index Mundi% 9)olumien @ Bruttoinlandsprodu6t @ BIP !,***03--5'%9 !3--4'%

http:AAwww8indexmundi8comAgAg8aspxQcbcovb5+lbde Ministerio de <efensa Dacional 0 Replica de Colomia% 5ogros de la PolItica de Consolidacin de la Seguridad &emocrJtica !BogotW% 3--4'%http:AAwww8mindefensa8gov8coAdescargasASore]el]MinisterioAPlaneacionAResultadosLperacionalesAResultados

`3-Lperacionales`3-Ene`3-0`3-un`3-3--48pdf 8/2/28 Ministerio de <efensa Dacional 0 Replica de Colomia% 5ogros de la PolItica de Consolidacin de la Seguridad

&emocrJtica% 4204* Interview% BogotW% (pril 3-% 3--48/*/*8 9Survey Colomia% he conomist % (pril 3,% 3--,% 10,5 9Sorpresa general8 ;a salida de los cuatro generales fue

traumWtica% tal ve> in=usta% pero necesaria% Semana% May 30*% 3--+ Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!' 32 (pril /!a' ,-%

3--48+-+-8 #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance "easures and 5ong-erm Costs for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport to Congressional Committees% ,, ;eal Buitrago% 5a inseguridadde la seguridad. Colombia DEF-200E% ,5+ Interviews BogotW% March 31 32 1-!' (pril ,-% 3--48

+,+,8 or6ing &roup on ;atin (merica and Center for International Policy% ?lurring the 5ines3 rends in U.S. military programs !ith 5atin /merica !ashington% 3--1'% http:AAciponline8orgAfactsA-/,-tl8pdf or6ing &roup on ;atin (mericaand Center for International Policy% rasing the 5ines3 rends in U.S. military programs !ith 5atin /merica !ashington%3--+'% http:AAciponline8orgAfactsA-+,3eras8pdf #8S8 <epartment of State% 4oreign "ilitary raining3 8oint eport toCongress, 4iscal 1ears 200E and 200N !ashington% 3--5'% http:AAwww8state8govAdocumentsAorgani>ationA4/2--8pdf8

+3+38 Interviews% BogotW% March 35 34!a' 32 1-!' (pril /!'% ,-% 3--48+1+18 Storrs and eillette% /ndean egional nitiative #/$3 41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H /ssistance for Colombia

and eighbors% / aicius and Isacson% he Kar on &rugs+ meets the Kar on error+ % + Interview% BogotW% March 1-!'%3--48

+/

+/8 Interviews% BogotW% March 34!a' 34 !' (pril 3 ,- 3--48 hile in 3--3 there security officials have only een present in some */- municipal districts% the presence of security personnel in all ,8-*2 Colomian municipal districts has een reached in 3--/8 See Ministerio de <efensa Dacional 0 Replica de Colomia% 5ogros de la PolItica deConsolidacin de la Seguridad &emocrJtica% 41 Interviews% BogotW% (pril ,- ,1!a'8 The war tax has een raised twice sofar8 It was collected among the wealthiest social classes of the Colomian society8 See Storrs and eillette% /ndean egional

nitiative #/$3 41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H /ssistance for Colombia and eighbors% ,- Interviews% BogotW% (pril,- ,1!a'% 3--48

++++8 Interviews% BogotW% March 31 34!a' 1-!' (pril /!a' ,3!'% 3--48+5+58 International Crisis &roup% Colombia+s :umanitarian Crisis !BogotWABrussels% ;atin (merican Report DV /% 3--1'%

4 Lservatorio de <erechos umanos% nforme /nual de &erechos :umanos y de &erecho nternacional :umanitario200H.;icepresidencia de la epublica de Colombia !BogotW% 3--/'% ,*,031-%



http:AAwww8derechoshumanos8gov8coAdescargasAinforme3--/Ainformeanual3--/8pdf orge Restrepo and Michael (8 Spagat%he Colombian Conflict ) here is it :eadingL BogotW: CER(C Colomian Conflict <ataase% 3--+'%http:AAwww8cerac8org8coApdfACSISPresentationwithtext0,-];ow8pdf orge Restrepo and Michael (8 Spagat and uan "8argas% 9El conflicto en Colomia: ?uien hi>o ?uX a ?uiXnQ #n enfo?ue cuantitativo !,*2203--1' in: Duestra guerra sinnomre% ed8 "rancisco &utiXrre> San_n and &on>alo SWnche> &Kme> !BogotW: IEPRI% 3--5'% +,50+3,8

+4+48 Restrepo and Spagat% he Colombian Conflict ) here is it :eadingL% 50,3% 3,031% 1101/ &ustavo &allKn% 9Thisar Cannot Be on with Bullets% in Peace, &emocracy, and :uman ights in Colombia% ed8 Christopher elna and&ustavo &allKn !Dotre <ame% ID: #niversity of Dotre <ame Press% 3--4'% /,50/,48

+2+28 International Crisis &roup% Colombia+s :umanitarian Crisis% 5 #nited Dations Lffice of the igh Commissioner for Refugees% he State of the orld efugees. :uman &isplacement n the e! "illennium !3--5'% Chapter 4%http:AAwww8unhcr8orgAstaticApulAsowr3--5Atoceng8htm &allKn% 9This ar Cannot Be on with Bullets% /,50/,4Interview% BogotW% March 32% 3--48 "or concrete figures of the dynamics of internal displacement in Colomia% pleaseconsult the data pulished on the wesite of the Colomian Consultorio para los <erechos umanos y el <espla>amiento% http:AAwww8codhes8orgAInfoAgrafico0tendencias8htm8

+*+*8 &allKn% 9This ar Cannot Be on with Bullets% /,4 Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!a' 35 34!a' 32 (pril 3 1!'/!'% 3--48 "or the exact records of registered aductions in Colomia% please consult the documents pulished online ythe Colomian "ondeliertad% for instance%http:AAwww8antisecuestro8gov8coAdocumentosA4],5]3--4]/]+2]-4]PM]Cifrasistoricas8pdf8

5-5-8 International Crisis &roup% Colombia+s :umanitarian Crisis% * <iego Ltero Prada% 5as Cifras del ConflictoColombiano !BogotW: M Impresores% 3--4'% 32+ Interview% BogotW% (pril 1!'% 3--48 "or anti0personnel mine figures seethe annual reports of the Colomian Consultorio de <erechos umanos pulished on the weseite:

http:AAwww8derechoshumanos8gov8coAindex8phpQnewseccboservatorio85,5,8 Interview% BogotW% March 3,!a'% 3--4 translated y the author853538 Lservatorio de <erechos umanos% nforme /nual de &erechos :umanos y de &erecho nternacional

:umanitario 200H.;icepresidencia de la epublica de ColombiaQ Restrepo and Spagat% he Colombian Conflict ) here isit :eadingL% 1+015 Buitrago% 5a inseguridad de la seguridad. Colombia DEF-200E% 3,, Centro de InvestigaciKn yEducaciKn Popular% Cifras de la ;iolencia PolItica% R GH !BogotW% 3--5'% http:AAwww8nocheyniela8orgA Lservatorio de<erechos umanos% nforme /nual de &erechos :umanos y de &erecho nternacional :umanitario 200N. ;icepresidenciade la epublica de Colombia !BogotW% 3--5'%http:AAwww8derechoshumanos8gov8coAoservatorioAindicadoresA3--5Adiciemre3--58pdf #8S: State <epartment% U.S.Country eport on :uman ights Practices ) Colombia !ashington% 3--5'%http:AAwww8state8govAgAdrlArlsAhrrptA3--5A4222+8htm &allKn% 9uman Rights: ( Path to <emocracy and Peace inColomia% 153015/ Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!' 34!a' 34!' 1-!' 32 (pril 3 /!a' ,3!a'% 3--48

51518 <ouglas Broo6s% 9The Business End of Military Intelligence: Private Military Companies% "ilitary ntelligence

Professional ?ulletin +% Do8 1 !,***': /3% http:AAwww8fas8orgAirpAagencyAarmyAtradocAusaicAmipA,***01Aroo6s8htm85/5/8 Singer% Corporate arriors3 he ise of the Privati*ed "ilitary ndustry% *48 5+5+8 Restrepo and Spagat% he Colombian Conflict ) here is it :eadingL% 3,% 11855558 Ricardo argas Me>a% &rogas, conflicto armado y desarrollo alternativo. Una perspectiva desde el sur de Colombia

!BogotW: &ente Dueva Editorial% 3--1' Interviews% BogotW% March 34!' (pril /!'% 3--4854548 (vant also included <ynCorpJs aerial reconnaissance and crop spraying missions in Colomia to the category of

operational support8 See <eorah (vant% 9Private Security Companies% e! Political conomy ,-% no8, !3--+': ,3/852528 Sheila Mysore6ar% U"eldversuch )olumien% oder: die Privatisierung des )rieges%9 !Broadcasting manuscript for the

&erman radio station estdeutscher Rundfun6 )ln8 Broadcasted on une 34% 3--/ in the series 9<L) + @ <as "eature9'%http:AAwww8wdr8deAradioAwdr1AilderAsendungAwdr]1]dis6ursAfeldversuch8pdf Interviews% BogotW% March 34!a' (pril 1!a',1!'% 3--48

5*5*8 uan L8 Tamayo% 9Colomian &uerillas "ire on #8S8 Rescuers% "iami :erald % "eruary 33% 3--, Singer%Corporate arriors3 he ise of the Privati*ed "ilitary ndustry% 3-2 Interview% BogotW% (pril ,1!'% 3--48

4-4-8 Interview% BogotW% (pril ,1!'% 3--484,4,8 <ue to the secrecy of PMSCs as well as the responsile authorities in Colomia% the exact numers of deaths is not

?uantifiale8 Yuintanilla !3--/' spea6s of aout 3- death PMSC employees since ,**2 in Colomia )urlant>i6 !3--1'counts eight dead <ynCorp employees within the past decade while Mysore6ar !3--/' descries a undle of deathcertificates of <ynCorp personnel she was shown in a Colomian funeral parlor8 See oshua )urlant>i6% 9Lutsourcing the<irty or68 The military and its reliance on hired guns he /merican Prospect % (pril 1-% 3--1%http:AAwww8prospect8orgAcsAarticlesQarticleboutsourcing]the]dirty]wor6 Yuintanilla% 9The Invisile #S ar in ColomiaMysore6ar% 9<ynCorp und die Privatisierung des )rieges8 See also Storrs and eillette% /ndean egional nitiative #/$3

41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H /ssistance for Colombia and eighbors% ,/843438 #8S8 Emassy BogotW% Colomia% 9Regional Cooperation is )ey to elping Colomia !BogotW% 3---'%

http:AAogota8usemassy8govAwwwssms,8shtml #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance



"easures and 5ong-erm Costs for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport to CongressionalCommittees% * S[mme ammer% he Control of Private Security Companies. / Study of the elationship bet!een theUnited States and Private /ctors in Plan Colombia% 1/ /10/5 Mysore6ar% 9<ynCorp und die Privatisierung des )riegesInterviews% BogotW% (pril 1!a' ,- ,3!a' ,1!'% 3--48

41418 (guasanta (rias et al8 vs8 <yn Corp et al8 <eposition of (ssistant Secretary of State for International Darcotics and;aw Enforcement (ffairs Rand Beers% lawsuit against <ynCorp% Inc8% "eruary 34% 3--3% held at the offices of theInternational ;aor Rights "und% 411 ,+th Street% D88% Suite *3-% ashington8http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaA-3-334-,8htm Mysore6ar% 9"eldversuch )olumien% oder: die Privatisierung des

)rieges9 Interviews% BogotW% (pril ,3!a' ,1!'% 3--484/4/8 Storrs and eillette% /ndean egional nitiative #/$3 41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H /ssistance for Colombia

and eighbors% ,- aicius and Isacson% he Kar on &rugs+ meets the Kar on error+ % 2 argas Me>a% &rogas, conflictoarmado y desarrollo alternativo. Una perspectiva desde el sur de Colombia% 2102/ Interview% BogotW% ,3!a'% 3--48

4+4+8 The hericide used for aerial sprayings in Colomia is the road0spectrum hericide URound#p9% produced y the#8S8 company Monsanto8 It is mainly composed of the toxic ingredient glyphosate% a surfactant called Cosmoflux% water%and some other additives8 See #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime% Colombia. Coca Cultivation Survey 200N !&enevaADew or6% 3--4'% 4/% http:AAwww8unodc8orgApdfAresearchAicmpAcolomia]3--5]en]we8pdf8

45458 argas Me>a% &rogas, conflicto armado y desarrollo alternativo. Una perspectiva desde el sur de Colombia% 2,International Crisis &roup% 6uerra y &roga en Colombia% 35034 Marcela ;Kpe>% 9(lgunas apreciaciones del glifosato y lasfumigaciones ndepa* - Punto de ncuentro% no8 /3 !3--4': 1*0// Interviews% BogotW% (pril 1!' ,3!a'% 3--48

44448 Storrs and eillette% /ndean egional nitiative #/$3 41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H /ssistance for Colombiaand eighbors% ,- #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance "easures and 5ong-erm Costs

for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport to Congressional Committees% 3-8 The #8S8 courtdismissed the lawsuit stating that the authority to decide on concrete counter0narcotic measures lied in the #8S8 government%and not in the discretion of <ynCorp8 See #nited Dations% &eneral (ssemly% uman Rights Counsel% eport of theorking 6roup on the (uestion of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the e%ercise of the right of peoples to self-determination. "ission to cuador 200< % (ARCA/A/3 (dd 38 "eruary ,1% 3--48http:AAdaccessdds8un8orgAdocA#D<LCA&EDA&-4A,3-A2*AP<"A&-4,3-2*8pdfQLpenElement and (guasanta (rias et al8 vs8<yn Corp et al8 3--38 <eposition of (ssistant Secretary of State for International Darcotics and ;aw Enforcement (ffairsRand Beers% lawsuit against <ynCorp% Inc8

42428 argas Me>a% &rogas, conflicto armado y desarrollo alternativo. Una perspectiva desde el sur de Colombia% 2,023Mysore6ar% 9"eldversuch )olumien% oder: die Privatisierung des )rieges9% ,- Interview BgotW% (pril ,1!'% 3--48

4*4*8 Interviews% BogotW% (pril 3 ,3!a' ,1!'% 3--482-2-8 Mysore6ar% 9"eldversuch )olumien% oder: die Privatisierung des )rieges9% 4 Ministerio de ProtecciKn Social 0

Replica de Colomia% &ectreto n@mero HNFN de 200E. Salario mInimo legal !BogotW% 3--+'%

http:AAwww8suratep8comAlegislacionAarticulosA551A #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime% Colombia. Coca CultivationSurvey% 5 Interviews BogotW% March 35 32 (pril 1!a' ,1!'% 3--482,2,8 International Crisis &roup% Colombia+s :umanitarian Crisis% ,, Consultor_a para los <erechos umanos y el

<espla>amiento% 9<estierro y repolamiento% ?oletIn de la ConsultorIa para los &erechos :umanos y el &espla*amiento%no8 // !3--1': 5% http:AAwww8codhes8orgAInfoABoletinesABoletin`3-//`3-<estierro`3-y`3- 3̀-repolamiento8pdfInterviews% BogotW% March 3,!a' 1-!' (pril 3 /!a' ,3!a'% 3--48

23238 Storrs and eillette% /ndean egional nitiative #/$3 41 200G Supplemental and 41 200H /ssistance for Colombiaand eighbors% ,3 aicius and Isacson% he Kar on &rugs+ meets the Kar on error+ % 402 International Crisis &roup:6uerra y &roga en Colombia% 3203* Isacson% Plan Colombia ) Si% 1ears 5ater % /0+ Interviews% BogotW% March 1-!'(pril 3%3--48

21218 #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime% Colombia. /nnual Coca Cultivation Survey 200!3--3'% 2%http:AAwww8unodc8orgApdfApulicationsAreport]3--30-101,],8pdf #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific

Performance "easures and 5ong-erm Costs for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport toCongressional Committees International Crisis &roup% Colombia+s :umanitarian Crisis% 34 "riesendorf% 9<rogen% )riegund <rogen6rieg8 <ie #S( und )olumien im aussichtslosen )ampf9% ,51 #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime%Colombia. Coca Cultivation Survey 200N % 4 Interviews% BogotW% March 3,!a' 34!' 32 (pril 3 1!' ,- ,1!'% 3--48

2/2/8 International Crisis &roup: 6uerra y &roga en Colombia% 34 #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime% orld &rug eport 3--4 !&enevaADew or6% 3--4'% 3-5%http:AAwww8unodc8orgApdfAresearchAwdr-4A<R]3--4]18,81]colomia8pdf #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime%Coca Cultivation in the /ndean egion. / Survey of ?olivia, Colombia, cuador and Peru #200<$ !&enevaADew or63--4'% 4% http:AAwww8unodc8orgApdfAandeanA(ndean]report]3--48pdf Interviews% BogotW% March 35 32 (pril 3 ,1!'%3--48

2+2+8 International Crisis &roup: 6uerra y &roga en Colombia% 34 "riesendorf% 9<rogen% )rieg und <rogen6rieg8 <ie#S( und )olumien im aussichtslosen )ampfQ #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime% Coca Cultivation in the

/ndean egion. / Survey of ?olivia, Colombia, cuador and Peru #200<$% *50** Interviews% BogotW% (pril 3 ,1!'% 3--48



25258 #nited Dations Lffice on <rugs and Crime% Coca Cultivation in the /ndean egion. / Survey of ?olivia, Colombia, cuador and Peru #200<$% iii8

24248 Correspondence etween <ouglas Broo6s% President of the International Peace Lperations Mission% and the authorin March 3--48

22228 #8S8 &eneral (ccounting Lffice% &rug Control. Specific Performance "easures and 5ong-erm Costs for U.S. Programs n Colombia :ave ot ?een &eveloped. eport to Congressional Committees #8S8 <epartment of State% eportto Congress. Certain Counternarcotics /ctivities in Colombia. Submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section NDH #b$ of the 4oreign elations /uthori*ation /ct, 4iscal 1ear 200G #Public 5a! 0<-22F$ Sven Cho=nac6i and

Dicole <eitelhoff% iskante 5iaison3 &emokratische 7riegsf>hrung und die 7ommer*ialisierung von Sicherheit % ,/%http:AAwww8polwiss8fuerlin8deAfriedenApdfACho=nac6i]<eitelhoff]3--+]<P]Ris6ante`3-;iaison8pdf8

2*2*8 See% for example% L(# Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in (frica !,*44' #nited DationsInternational Convention against the Recruitment% #se% "inancing and Training of Mercenaries !,*2*' <avid Shearer!(delphi Paper% no8 1,5% Dew or6: Lxford #niversity Press% ,**2' (lexandre "aite% 9Involvement of Private Contractorsin (rmed Conflict: Implications under International umanitarian ;aw &efense Studies /% no83 !3--/': ,550,21olm?vist% Private Security Companies. he Case for egulation Schreier and Caparini% Privatising Security3 5a!,

Practice and 6overnance of Private "ilitary and Security Companies.*-*-8 #8S8 #niform Code of Military ustice http:AAwww8constitution8orgAmilAucm=,**4-5,+8htm #8S8 Military

Extraterritorial urisdiction (ct 3---8 Pulic ;aw ,-5@+31Dov8 33% 3---% http:AAwww8pu6law8comAhiApl,-50+318pdfSchreier and Caparini% Privatising Security3 5a!, Practice and 6overnance of Private "ilitary and Security Companies% 5-<eorah (vant% 9The Privati>ation of Security: ;essons from Ira? 'rbis +-% no8 3 !3-5'% 1120,,*8

*,*,8 uan "orero% 9Colomia: Private #8S8 Lperatives on Ris6y Missions% e! 1ork imes% "eruary ,/% 3--/% online

edition #8S8 <epartment of <efense Instruction Do8 1-3-8/,% Lct8 1 3--+: 58,8,8 (vant% 9The Privati>ation of Security:;essons from Ira?% 11*0/--8*3*38 )elly Patricia LMeara% 9#S: <ynCorp <isgrace nsight "aga*ine% anuary ,/% 3--3% online edition reprinted in:

http:AAwww8corpwatch8orgAarticle8phpQidb,,,,* (vant% 9The Privati>ation of Security: ;essons from Ira?% 1128*1*18 Convenio &eneral para (yuda EconKmica% TXcnica y (f_n entre el &oierno de Colomia y el &oierno de los

Estados #nidos de (mXrica ,*53% (rt8 /% +8 Interviews% BogotW% (pril 3 ,3!a'% 3--48*/*/8 Interview% BogotW% (pril ,3!a'% 3--48*+*+8 Saine )urtenach% U#rie am EndeQ erlegungen >ur a6tuellen )on=un6tur in )olumien%9 ?rennpunkt

5ateinamerika% no8 33 !3--1'% 332 (dam Isacson% aking oT for an /ns!er. he /merican Servicemembers+ Protection /ctT and the ?ush /dministration+s Security elations !ith 5atin /merica !ashington% Center of International PolicyReport% 3--4'% http:AAwww8ciponline8orgAcolomiaAta6ingnoipr8pdf Interviews% BogotW% (pril 1!' ,- ,3!a' 3--48

*5*58 #8S8 <epartment of State% 9"(CT SEET: Civilian Contractors and #8S8 Military Personnel Supporting PlanColomia Interviews% BogotW% March 34!' 1-!' (pril -/!'83--48

*4

*48 Interviews% BogotW% (pril /!' ,1!' 3--48*2*28 Interview% BogotW% (pril ,1!'% 3--48****8 Interviews% BogotW% (pril ,3!a' ,1!'% 3--48,--,--8 Interviews% BogotW% March 34!' (pril /!' ,1!a'% 3--48,-,,-,8 Singer% Corporate arriors3 he ise of the Privati*ed "ilitary ndustry% ,,*0,1+8,-3,-38 Interviews% BogotW% March 31 34!' 32 (pril 1!' /!a' /!' ,- ,3!a'% 3--48,-1,-18 Interviews% BogotW% March 35 (pril ,3!a'% 3--48

,-/,-/8 IvWn Cepeda Castro% 9Marines de los Estados #nidos y contratistas ve=an a menores en Colomia l spectador %anuary 2% 3--/% online edition reprinted in: http:AAwww8elcorreo8eu8orgAespAarticle8php1Qid]articleb/4/4 ClaudiaSalamanca% 9&loali>ation and oyeurism: Sexed Identities Yueen: a ournal of Rhetoric and Power8 Special Issue:Presentations on the Conference on Rhetorics of Identity: Place% Race% Sex and the Person8 #niversity of Redlands% #S(%http:AAwww8ars0rhetorica8netAYueenAolumeSpecialIssue+A(rticlesASalamanca8pdf #nidad Investigativa% 9Investigan a dosmilitares de E8#8 por violaciKn de niOa de ,3 aOos en Comando (Xreo de Melgar l iempo% Lctoer 4% 3--4% !onlineedition'% http:AAwww8eltiempo8comA=usticiaA3--40,-0-4A(RTIC#;L0EB0DLT(]IDTERILR014+++5,8html Interviews%BogotW% March 34!a' (pril 1!' ,- ,3!a'% 3--4a8

,-+,-+8 See% for instance% LMeara% 9#S: <ynCorp <isgrace8,-5,-58 Interview% BogotW% March 1-!'% 3--48,-4,-48 (ccording to Isenerg !3--/' the directors of PMSCs do not see it as their duty to scrutini>e their employees on

possile misconduct in the past8 See <avid Isenerg% / 4istful of Contractors3 he Case for Pragmatic /ssessment of Private "ilitary Companies in ra( !;ondonAashington% British0(merican Security Information Council Report% 3--/'%+4% http:AAwww8asicint8orgApusAResearchA3--/PMC8htm8 See also S[mme ammer% he Control of Private Security

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