answer brief by timothy w. weber
TRANSCRIPT
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MARK A. ADAMS,
Appellant,Case No. 8:08-cv-1570-RAL
vs.
CORPORATE SPORTS MARKETINGGROUP, et al.
Appellees.
/
_________________________________________________________________
ANSWER BRIEF OF APPELLEESON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
THE HONORABLE PAUL M. GLENN, PRESIDING_________________________________________________________________
Timothy W. Weber, EsquireFlorida Bar No.: 86789BATTAGLIA, ROSS, DICUS & WEIN, P.A.
Wachovia Bank Building980 Tyrone Boulevard (33710)Post Office Box 41100St. Petersburg, Florida 33743(727) 381-2300(727) 343-4059 (fax)Attorneys for Appellees
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. IV
PREFACE ............................................................................................................... VI
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE...........................................................1
ARGUMENT...........................................................................................................12
I. WHETHER THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ABUSEDITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A MOTION FOREXTENSION OF TIME TO OBJECT TO DISCHARGEOR DISCHARGEABILITY UNDER FED.R.BANK.P.4004(B) WITHOUT A HEARING WHERE THE
DEBTOR DID NOT TIMELY OBJECT TO THEMOTION, NEVER REQUESTED A HEARING ONTHE MOTION, AND FAILED TO TIMELY SEEKRECONSIDERATION BEFORE APPELLEES RELIEDUPON THE EXTENSION [RESTATED]..........................................12
II. WHETHER THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ABUSEDITS DISCRETION IN EXTENDING, BY 13 DAYS,THE TIME FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDERFED.R.CIV.P. 4(M), MADE APPLICABLE TO
BANKRUPTCY ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS,WHERE THE DEBTOR EVADED SERVICE OFPROCESS AND WHERE A REFUSAL TO GRANTTHE BRIEF EXTENSION WOULD HAVERESULTED IN APPELLEES CLAIMS BEING TIME-BARRED [RESTATED].....................................................................20
III. WHETHER THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ERRED INENTERING A JUDGMENT DENYING THEDEBTORS DISCHARGE AND THE
DISCHARGEABILITY OF THE SANCTIONSJUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES ANDAGAINST THE DEBTOR WITHOUT AN AFFIDAVIT[RESTATED]......................................................................................24
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IV. WHETHER THE DEBTOR MAY PROSECUTE ANUNTIMELY APPEAL FROM ORDERS ANDJUDGMENTS ENTERED AGAINST LISA ADAMSAND LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. ADAMS, P.A.WHERE THE DEBTOR, A DISBARRED ATTORNEY,WAS PERMANENTLY ENJOINED FROMENGAGING IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICEOF LAW AND WAS WARNED NOT TO REPRESENTTHE INTERESTS OF THESE PARTIES IN THEBANKRUPTCY COURT [RESTATED] ...........................................26
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................27
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................28
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES
Coggin v. Coggin,30 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1994) .......................................................... 18, 19, 20
Colonial Daytona Ltd. Partnership v. American Sav. of Florida,152 B.R. 996 (M.D. Fla. 1993)......................................................................14
Hornekamp v. Van Winkle and Co., Inc.,402 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2005) .............................................................. 21, 22
In re Amezaga,192 B.R. 37 (Bank. D. P.R. 1996).......................................................... 12, 17
In re Teligent Serv., Inc.,324 B.R. 467 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)...........................................................23
In re: Black,180 B.R. 534 (S.D. Ind. 1995).......................................................................20
In re: Datson,
197 B.R. 1 (D. Me. 1996) ..............................................................................16In re: Grunau,
376 B.R. 322 (M.D. Fla. 2007)............................................................... 13, 14
In re: Themy,6 F.3d 688 (10th Cir. 1993) ...........................................................................20
In re: Tully,818 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1987) .........................................................................17
In re: Wade,948 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1991) .......................................................................15
Lepone-Dempsy v. Carroll County Comm.,476 F. 3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2007) ....................................................................24
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STATUTES
11 U.S.C. 102(1) ...................................................................................................13
RULES
Bankr.L.R.M.D.Fla. 7055-2.............................................................................. 25, 26
Fed.R.Bank.P. 4004(b)..................................................................................... passim
Fed.R.Bank.P. 7004 .................................................................................................24
Fed.R.Bank.P. 7055 .................................................................................................25
Fed.R.Bank.P. 9006 .................................................................................................24
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) ....................................................................................................21
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55................................................................................................. 25, 26
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PREFACE
For purposes of this appeal, Appellees will use the following method of
designating the record:
(Doc. #-#, at page)
The Debtor, MARK A. ADAMS, will hereinafter be referred to as "the Debtor."
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
This is an appeal from a Default Final Judgment (Doc. 1-2) entered against the
Debtor in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding after the Debtor intentionally refused to
file an answer after being given at least four opportunities and two court orders to do
so. The Debtor also appeals an Order entered in the main bankruptcy case revoking
the Debtors discharge based on the Default Final Judgment. (Doc. 9-21)
The history of the parties dispute is quite lengthy and is characterized by seven
years of abuse of the courts by the Debtor resulting in hefty sanctions judgments
against the Debtor and in favor of Appellees, criminal contempt proceedings against
the Debtor for refusing to cooperate with discovery in aid of execution to collect those
sanctions judgments, the Debtors permanent disbarment from the practice of law by
The Florida Supreme Court, the Debtors bankruptcy, and ultimately, the revocation
of the Debtors discharge by the Bankruptcy Court. (Doc. 11-13, generally)
Appellees have been the victim of the Debtors conduct and, as found by The Florida
Bar referee presiding over the Debtors disbarment, have suffered hundreds of
thousands of dollars in damages due to the vexatious and frivolous litigation conduct
of the Debtor. (Doc. 11-13, at 21) (The unrebutted evidence proves beyond any
reasonable doubt that the Respondent engaged in deliberate conduct resulting in
financial damages of over $150,000 to Attorney Timothy Weber and his law firm as
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well as additional financial damages to Mr. Webers former clients in the underlying
litigation.); (Doc. 11-13, at 24) (the misconduct has caused significant financial and
emotional damage to other members of The Florida Bar and the Respondents clients
and adversaries.)
This conduct included, among other things, knowing violation of court orders
and rules to gain an improper benefit or cause serious interference with a legal
proceeding; engaging in protracted intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation to opposing counsel and the court, including intentionally
making numerous false statements of fact to the court with the intent to deceive the
court; knowingly violating court orders; knowingly communicating with represented
persons; knowingly asserting frivolous arguments; and purposefully obstructing
access to evidence. (Doc. 11-13, generally) In addition, counsel for Appellees, and
his law firm, have been the target of frivolous lawsuits, criminal complaints, bar
grievances, and a massive amount of false and defamatory statements spread on the
internet by the Debtor. (Doc. 22-1) Not surprisingly, this conduct continued in the
Debtors voluntary bankruptcy proceeding as well.
The Debtor filed a voluntary petition on October 14, 2005, the day before the
Bankruptcy Reform Act took effect. A notice of commencement was sent to creditors
scheduling a 341 hearing for 12/13/05 and setting the deadline for objections to
discharge and dischargeability for 2/6/06. (Doc. 9-8) The Debtor did not timely file
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15 days after Appellees request for the extension of time, the Bankruptcy Court,
without a hearing, granted Appellees motion to extend the time to object to discharge
and dischargeability, extending the period to April 7, 2006. (Doc. 9-10) In reliance
on the Bankruptcy Courts order extending the time, Appellees withdrew without
prejudice their previously filed but technically deficient objection. (Doc. 21-11)
On April 7, 2006, Appellees timely filed the instant adversary proceeding
against the Debtor, Lisa Adams, and Law Offices of Mark A. Adams, P.A. objecting
to the Debtors discharge (Count I), objecting to the discharge of the sanctions
judgments against the Debtor and in favor of CSM, King, and Martins (Count II);
objecting to the dischargeability of fraudulent transfer claims against the Debtor
(Count III); objecting to the dischargeability of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, defamation, and additional sanctions claims against the Debtor possessed by
Appellees (Count IV); and seeking to set aside fraudulent transfers of assets to Lisa
Adams and Law Office of Mark A. Adams, P.A. (Count V). (Doc. 22-1) Appellees
relied upon 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) to oppose the Debtors
discharge, as well as 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) to oppose the dischargeability of the
Debtors obligations to Appellees. (Doc. 22-1)
Appellees alleged, among other things, that CSM, King, and Martins obtained
state court judgments against the Debtor and the Debtors former professional
association, Mark A. Adams, P.A., that ordered each to provide discovery in aid of
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execution. (Doc. 22-1, at 3) The Debtor and his professional association
contemptuously refused to comply with these court orders during the two years
immediately preceding the filing of the Debtors bankruptcy petition on October 14,
2005. (Doc. 22-1, at 3) During this time, the Debtor dissolved Mark A. Adams, P.A.
and transferred substantially all of its assets to himself and Lisa Adams as tenants by
the entireties and then subsequently transferred those assets to Law Office of Mark A.
Adams, P.A. (Doc. 22-1, at 3) This transfer placed all assets of Mark A. Adams, P.A.
out of the reach of CSM, King and Martins, the holders of perfected judgment liens,
and rendered the Debtors stock in Mark A. Adams, P.A. worthless. (Doc. 22-1, at 3)1
Appellees further alleged that the state court judgments were based on the
Debtors willful and malicious actions towards CSM, King and Martins. (Doc. 22-1,
at 4) Moreover, in retaliation for obtaining those judgments, the Debtor willfully and
maliciously filed a frivolous lawsuit against CSM and King and then subsequently
amended to add Weber, BRDW, and Richardson. (Doc. 22-1, at 4) This lawsuit was
dismissed with prejudice but the Debtor willfully and maliciously appealed the
dismissal despite knowledge of its frivolous nature. (Doc. 22-1, at 4) Appellees
alleged the pattern of abusive misconduct perpetrated by the Debtor, including
conduct involving fraud, as well as the Debtors announced intention in disciplinary
1The Debtor did not even list the stock of Mark A. Adams, P.A. on his bankruptcy
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proceedings to continue that pattern of conduct directed towards Appellees. (Doc. 22-
1, at 4)
Appellees additionally alleged that the Debtor willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly defamed Appellees in numerous ways, including posting false internet
articles accusing Appellees of bribing judges and committing other unlawful or
unethical actions. (Doc. 22-1, at 4) The Debtor made false and malicious complaints
of illegal and unethical conduct about Weber and BRDW to the FBI, FDLE, The
Florida Bar, and others for the purpose of vexing and harassing Weber and BRDW.
(Doc. 22-1, at 6) These statements also accuse CSM, King, Martins, and Richardson
of participating in the corruption and illegal activity. (Doc. 22-1, at 6)
Appellees attempted personal service2 of the complaint on the Debtor at his
home but, consistent with prior conduct, the Debtor actively evaded service of
process. (Doc. 10-4, at 2; Docs. 10-5 to 10-15) The Debtor was finally served on
August 18, 2006 at the courthouse. (Doc. 10-9) In response, the Debtor filed
Debtors Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding asserting that service of process
was untimely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) and Fed.R.Bank.P. 7004(e). (Doc. 10-3)
Appellees filed their Motion to Substitute Party, Issue Alias Summonses, and Extend
schedules. (Doc. 22-1, at 3; Doc. 21-5)2Personal service, rather than service by mail, was attempted because the Debtor
chronically claims in court that he does not receive matters by mail or receives them
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Time Period for Service of Process in which Appellees requested that the Court
extend the time periods in Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) and Fed.R.Bank.P. 7004(e) to August
18, 2006 and to deem the Debtor validly served as of that date. (Doc. 10-4) In the
motion, Appellees detailed the Debtors efforts to evade service of process and
historical pattern of doing so, attaching numerous affidavits of process servers and
other who attempted to serve the Debtor. (Doc. 10-7 to 10-15) On December 5, 2006,
the Bankruptcy Court conducted a hearing on the Debtors Amended Motion to
Dismiss Adversary Proceeding3
and Appellees Motion to Substitute Party, Issue Alias
Summonses, and Extend Time Period for Service of Process. (Doc. 11-1)
Following the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order on the various
motions extending the time period for service of process and deeming the Debtor
timely served; finding that Lisa Adams was properly served; rejecting the Debtors
claim, made ten months after the fact, that the Bankruptcy Court was required to
conduct a hearing on Appellees motion to extend the time under Fed.R.Bank.P.
4004(b); and granting Appellees request to correct a misnomer in the professional
association and finding that it was validly served. (Doc. 11-2) The Bankruptcy Court
in an untimely fashion. (Doc. 11-1, at 23)3The Debtor amended his motion before the hearing; the amended motion focused
on the Bankruptcy Courts decision to extend the time for Appellees to object todischarge and dischargeability, the 120 day requirement of Rule 4(m), and thevalidity of service on Lisa Adams, the Debtors wife. (Doc. 10-25)
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denied all of the Debtors motions to dismiss. (Doc. 11-2, at 17)
Pursuant to Fed.R.Bank.P. 7012(a), the Debtor was required to file and serve
an answer within ten (10) days. Instead, the Debtor filed a motion to enlarge the
time to answer, (Doc. 11-25), and a motion for an extension of time to perfect an
interlocutory appeal from the Bankruptcy Courts order. (Doc. 22-2) The
Bankruptcy Court granted the Debtors motion to extend the time to file a notice of
appeal or motion for leave to appeal. (Doc. 22-4) On April 6, 2007, the
Bankruptcy Court also granted the Debtors request for an enlargement of the time
to answer for twenty (20) additional days. (Doc. 22-3) Despite the extension
provided by the Bankruptcy Court, the Debtor failed to plead within the time
allowed by the Court. In addition, the Debtor never filed an appeal from the March
19, 2007 Order.
Instead, on April 30, 2007, the Debtor filed a successive4 Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction and a Renewed Motion to Quash Service of Process and to
Dismiss Adversary Proceeding. (Doc. 11-6) This filing was clearly made in bad
faith and solely for the purpose of delaying the proceedings.5 On September 28,
4The Debtor moved to dismiss on the same grounds rejected by the March 19,
2007 Order, apparently in an effort to generate a second opportunity to appeal thedenial of the motion to dismiss that the Debtor failed to timely appeal previously,despite being afforded extra time by the Bankruptcy Court.5 It should not go unnoticed that the Debtor sought to extend the deadline for
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(Doc. 22-7) The Bankruptcy Court denied Appellees motion to default the Debtor
without prejudice to the Plaintiffs right to renew the Motion in the event that the
Debtor fails to file an Answer to the Complaint within twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order. (Doc. 22-7)
Not surprisingly, the Debtor did not timely file a notice of appeal or motion
for leave to appeal the September 28, 2007 Order denying his second, successive
motion to dismiss. Even less surprising is the fact that the Debtor did not timely
file an answer as directed by the Court. Instead, the Debtor filed a number of
documents on behalf of Lisa Adams and Law Office of Mark A. Adams, P.A. and,
most abusively, filed a Motion to Enlarge Time to File Motion for Leave to
Appeal or File Notice of Appeal of Order on Debtors Motion to Enlarge Time to
File Motion for Leave to Appeal or File Notice of Appeal and Debtors Motion to
Enlarge Time to File Response to the Complaint. (Docs. 8 to 10) Incredibly, the
Debtor sought an extension of time to appeal an order refusing to grant him an
extension of time to appeal!
Appellees renewed their motion for default based on the Debtors failure to
plead, pointing out that the Debtor had at least four (4) opportunities to file and
serve an answer and deliberately chose not to do so. The Bankruptcy Court
scheduled a hearing on the renewed motion for default. (Doc. 22-14) As of the
date of the hearing, the Debtor still had not served an answer to the complaint.
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Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order Granting Motion for Default
Judgment. (Doc. 1-4) Thereafter, the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court entered a
default against the Debtor, (Doc. 1-3), and the Bankruptcy Court entered its
Default Final Judgment. (Doc. 1-2) The Bankruptcy Court thereafter entered an
Order in the main bankruptcy case revoking the Debtors discharge and finding
that the Debtors obligations to Appellees were non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.
(Doc. 9-21) The Debtor filed a single Notice of Appeal from both orders in the
adversary proceeding. (Doc. 1-1)
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ARGUMENT
I. WHETHER THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONIN GRANTING A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO OBJECT
TO DISCHARGE OR DISCHARGEABILITY UNDER FED.R.BANK.P.4004(B) WITHOUT A HEARING WHERE THE DEBTOR DID NOTTIMELY OBJECT TO THE MOTION, NEVER REQUESTED AHEARING ON THE MOTION, AND FAILED TO TIMELY SEEKRECONSIDERATION BEFORE APPELLEES RELIED UPON THEEXTENSION [RESTATED]
The Debtor, after intentionally allowing a default to be entered against him,
argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in granting Appellees motion to extend the
time to object to the Debtors discharge and to object to the dischargeability of the
Debtors obligations to the Appellees. The Debtor argues that it was a denial of
Due Process for the Bankruptcy Court to grant the motion without a hearing and
without taking evidence. For the reasons that follow, this Court should affirm.
The Debtor first argues that Fed.R.Bank.P. 4004(b) required the Bankruptcy
Court to conduct a hearing on Appellees motion, relying on the phrase after
hearing on notice contained in the rule.6 However, as the Bankruptcy Court aptly
noted, the phrase after notice and a hearing or any similar phrase7 is defined by
the Bankruptcy Code:
6It is undisputed that the Debtor received notice of Appellees motion.7Rule 4004(b)s provision after hearing on notice has been construed to be a
phrase similar to after notice and a hearing, thus making Section 102 applicableto its procedures. See In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37, 40 (Bank. D. P.R. 1996).
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In this title
(1) after notice and a hearing or a similar phrase
(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular
circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing as isappropriate in the particular circumstances; but
(B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if such noticeis given properly and if
(i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a party ininterest; or
(ii) there is insufficient time for a hearing to be
commenced before such act must be done, and the courtauthorizes such act.
11 U.S.C. 102(1). The 1978 Revision Notes explain that a hearing will not be
necessary in every instance. If there is no objection to the proposed action, the
action may go ahead without court action. The 1978 Revision Notes also indicate
that the phrase such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular
circumstances is designed to permit the court to dispense with a hearing. See also
In re: Grunau, 376 B.R. 322, 330 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (Howard, J.) (recognizing that
Section 102 allows the Bankruptcy Court to act without a hearing if one is not
requested by a party in interest or there is not enough time to conduct the hearing).
Clearly, whether to conduct a hearing depends on what is appropriate under
the circumstances, as well as whether a party in interest requests a hearing. In
determining what is appropriate from a procedural standpoint, the Bankruptcy
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Court is clearly vested with a broad discretion. See Id. (reviewing decision of
whether to conduct a hearing for abuse of discretion); and also Colonial Daytona
Ltd. Partnership v. American Sav. of Florida, 152 B.R. 996, 998 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(Kovachevich, J.) (discretionary rulings of the Bankruptcy Court are reviewed for
abuse of discretion). Thus, in this Court, the Debtor is required to show that the
Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a hearing before
granting Appellees an extension of time. This the Debtor plainly cannot do in light
of (1) the Debtors failure to object after receiving notice of the request; (2) the
Debtors failure to request a hearing on the motion; (3) the Debtors failure to
timely seek a rehearing or reconsideration of the order granting the extension; and
(4) the merits of the motion itself.
The record before this Court shows that the Debtor made no objection
to the motion for extension of time before it was granted. The motion was
filed and served on the Debtor on February 2, 2006. The Bankruptcy Court
waited until February 17, 2006 before entering an order granting the
requested extension. Likewise, the Debtor made no effort to request a
hearing on the motion during this time. The Debtor had notice of the motion
and an opportunity for a hearing, which is all that was required by
Fed.R.Bank.P. 4004(b). The Debtor simply chose not to avail himself of
that opportunity.
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Moreover, after the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order granting the
requested extension, the Debtor did not file anything indicating that he had an
objection to the motion or a problem with the Courts act of granting it without a
hearing until months later when the Debtor raised the issue in the adversary
proceeding. Had the Debtor indicated in any way that he objected to the extension
or desired a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court could have afforded the Debtor a
hearing or reconsidered the motion after considering the Debtors objections on the
merits. See In re: Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding initial failure
to grant a hearing harmless due to consideration of a motion for reconsideration).
In short, it was plainly within the Courts discretion to grant the motion without a
hearing where the Debtor did not object or request a hearing and did not timely
complain of the absence of a hearing.
Despite the Debtors procedural challenges, he makes little effort, if any, to
address the merits of the motion for extension.8 The motion for extension was
based upon the fact that the Debtors 341 hearing was continued to allow the
Trustee and Appellees time to investigate fraudulent transfers made by the Debtor
and his former professional association immediately prior to the filing of
8The Debtor never raised an objection that goes to the merits of the motion for
extension in the Bankruptcy Court. The Debtor has not attempted to show that thefacts alleged in the motion for extension were untrue, even after filing multiple
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bankruptcy. The Trustee continued the initial 341 meeting of creditors to allow
additional questioning of the Debtor concerning these transfers and, at the
continued 341 hearing, the Trustee asked the Debtor to produce documents
concerning these fraudulent transfers. They were not available to Appellees at the
time objections to discharge and dischargeability were due; as a result, Appellees
requested an extension and permission to conduct an examination of the Debtor
under Fed.R.Bank.P. 2004.9 The Debtor did not dispute these facts in the
Bankruptcy Court and does not do so here.
Clearly, the continuance of the meeting of creditors and the Debtors failure
to produce documentation of the pre-petition fraudulent transfers was sufficient
cause to extend the deadline. See In re: Datson, 197 B.R. 1 (D. Me. 1996)
(recognizing that an extension of time under Rule 4004(b) is the proper remedy
where the meeting of creditors has been rescheduled or delayed); In re: Amezega,
motions in the Bankruptcy Court concerning the Order extending the bar date.9The Debtor never produced the requested documents, a fact which would have
been developed in the record had the Debtor answered Appellees complaint. TheDebtor has stalled discovery of his finances for years while fraudulentlytransferring his assets out of the reach of creditors. This Court may take judicial
notice that the Debtor is a party to a criminal contempt proceeding beingprosecuted by the State of Florida as a result of the Debtors willful andcontemptuous refusal to comply with discovery in aid of execution on thesanctions judgments entered in favor of Appellees. The prosecution was dismissedon technical grounds and the State of Florida is seeking to reinstate it in the SecondDistrict Court of Appeals. See State v. Adams, Docket No. 2D06-278.
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192 B.R. at 41 (requests for extension under Rule 4004(b) should be granted
liberally, particularly where the need for discovery is the basis of the request).
Such extensions of time are necessary to prevent the Debtor from playing fast and
loose with their assets or with the reality of their affairs. In re: Amezega, 192 B.R.
at 41 (quoting In re: Tully, 818 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir. 1987)).
The Debtors challenges to the Bankruptcy Courts failure to conduct a
hearing on the motion are likewise barred by the doctrines of waiver and laches.
As to waiver, the Debtor failed to raise any opposition to the motion before the
order granting it was entered and the Debtor failed to timely request a hearing or
bring his objections to the attention of the Bankruptcy Court. Had the Debtor
complained at that time, the Bankruptcy Court could have conducted a hearing to
consider the Debtors opposition on the merits. Moreover, had the Debtor raised
any objection to the granting of the motion without an evidentiary hearing or the
sufficiency of the showing necessary to obtain the extension, the Bankruptcy Court
would have held a hearing and Appellees would have presented any evidence
deemed necessary. In short, the Debtor simply waited too long to complain that a
hearing should have been held.
In addition, the Debtors arguments are barred by laches as Appellees relied
upon the Debtors inaction and failure to timely object. In fact, Appellees had
timely filed an objection based on the information that it then had available. Once
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the Bankruptcy Court granted Appellees an extension without objection from the
Debtor, Appellees withdrew that objection and used the extended period to develop
a more comprehensive objection and refile. Had the Debtor complained of the
Bankruptcy Courts order or requested a hearing at that time, Appellees could have
maintained their timely filed objection and subsequently amended it.
The Debtor cites Coggin v. Coggin, 30 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1994), a case
which actually forecloses the relief the Debtor seeks. In that case, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Court erred in granting, on an ex parte basis the
day the motion was filed, a motion for extension of time under Fed.R.Bank.P.
4004(b), as no notice of the motion was sent to the debtor. Id. at 1446. However,
the Eleventh Circuit expressly noted that the Debtor did receive the Order granting
the motion. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Debtor, upon receipt of the
Order, should have moved the court to revoke or amend that grant, as it was
improper without a hearing on notice. Instead, whether consciously or not, Coggin
sat on his rights and later brought this jurisdictional challenge. Id. at 1450 n. 9.
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the error in granting the motion ex parte was
that of the court and not the appellees and that the appellees reliance on the grant
of the extension was excusable. Id. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
merits of the motion for extension itself and affirmed the extension based upon an
abuse of discretion standard. Id.
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Notably, in Coggins, no notice of the motion for extension was given to the
Debtor. Id. at 1446. In the instant case, the Debtor received ample notice. In
Coggins, the court granted the motion the same day that it was filed, leaving the
debtor without an opportunity for a hearing. Id. In the instant case, the Debtor had
15 days to lodge his objection and request a hearing. The court in Coggin had no
occasion to address the issue of whether it was appropriate to dispense with a
hearing under Section 102(1) since no notice was provided and no opportunity for
a hearing was provided. As a result, Coggin is clearly distinguishable as to its
finding that Rule 4004(b) was violated.
Nonetheless, even if this Court found that the procedural requirements were
not met, Coggin does not give the Debtor the relief he seeks. The Eleventh Circuit
expressly notes that the only jurisdictional aspect of Rule 4004(b) is the
requirement that the motion for extension of time be filed before the bar date. That
was easily met in the instant case. The procedural matter of how the motion was
handled is not jurisdictional and, only if it was an abuse of discretion for the
Bankruptcy Court to grant the requested extension should the Debtor be afforded
relief from the extension itself. See In re: Black, 180 B.R. 534, 535 n.1 (S.D. Ind.
1995) (rejecting argument that failure to grant an unrequested hearing
automatically required reversal without consideration of the merits of the motion).
Finally, as noted in Coggin, the Bankruptcy Court has inherent equitable
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powers to prevent prejudice to any party who relies upon a procedurally incorrect
order of the court. Id.; see alsoIn re: Themy, 6 F.3d 688 (10th Cir. 1993).
In summary, the Bankruptcy Court was well within its prerogative to grant
the requested extension of time without a hearing, particularly in the absence of
any opposition by the Debtor. The Debtors belated attempt to vacate the order 22
months later was properly denied, particularly since Appellees relied upon the
Bankruptcy Courts order and the Debtors own inaction. The Debtor failed to take
reasonable and timely measures to interpose any objection the Debtor might have
had. Even had he done so, the Debtor has not shown that the result should have
been any different. The Debtor himself sought and obtained countless extensions
of time without a hearing in the Bankruptcy Court and this Court. It is simply
ridiculous for the Debtor, having intentionally failed to answer, to mount as the
centerpiece of his defense the granting of an extension to Appellees under the
circumstances.
II. WHETHER THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONIN EXTENDING, BY 13 DAYS, THE TIME FOR SERVICE OFPROCESS UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 4(M), MADE APPLICABLE TOBANKRUPTCY ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS, WHERE THE DEBTOREVADED SERVICE OF PROCESS AND WHERE A REFUSAL TO
GRANT THE BRIEF EXTENSION WOULD HAVE RESULTED INAPPELLEES CLAIMS BEING TIME-BARRED [RESTATED]
The Debtor fixes his argument on Appellees failure to obtain service of
process within the 120-day time limit and erroneously asserts that the Bankruptcy
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Court was required to dismiss the complaint absent a showing of good cause;
however, the Debtors argument totally ignores that the Bankruptcy Court is vested
with wide discretion to consider other factors that would warrant an extension of
the time for service, even when a showing of good cause is not made.
If a defendant is not served within 120 days, the court may extend the time
for an appropriate period upon a showing of good cause. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).
Additionally, Rule 4(m) grants the trial court the discretion to extend the time for
service in the absence of good cause. See Hornekamp v. Van Winkle and Co., Inc.,
402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005). Among the factors that may be considered
in the exercise of such discretion, a trial court may look to whether time limitations
would bar the action from being re-filed, whether the defendant is evading
attempted service or whether the defendant is concealing defects in service. Id.
(citing to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) Advisory Committee Note, 1993 Amendments). The
plaintiff in Horenkamp miscalculated the deadline for obtaining service of process
and ended up serving the defendant 29 days after the time-limit for service of
process had expired. Id. at 1130. The Horenkamp court held that, even though
there was no showing of good cause on the part of the plaintiff, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by extending time for service of process in order to prevent
the plaintiffs claim from being time-barred. Id. at 1133.
In the instant case, the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised its discretion in
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granting Appellees an extension of time for service of process on the Debtor. The
Bankruptcy Court noted that Appellees had made a number of attempts at personal
service and presented evidence that the Debtor was evading service of process.
However, the Bankruptcy Court faulted Appellees for failing to serve the Debtor
by U.S. Mail. Appellees explained to the Bankruptcy Court that the reason
Appellees did not utilize service by U.S. Mail was that the Debtor chronically
complains about receipt of documents in the mail. Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy
Court determined that Appellees did not show good cause for their failure to effect
service on debtor within 120 days. (AP, Doc. 23, at 8)10
However, relying on Horenkamp, the Bankruptcy Court noted that Appellees
would be time-barred from re-filing should the action be dismissed, and that they
encountered unusual difficulties in their efforts to effect personal service on the
Debtor.11 (AP, Doc. 23, at 1011). The Bankruptcy Court determined that the
Debtor acknowledged that he had been personally served on August 18, 2006 and
10 In its Order, the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged Appellees contention that theDebtor had a prior history of claiming that he had not received litigationdocuments sent to him by U.S. mail, and that Appellees believed that personalserve was the safer rout to avoid questions regarding proper service. (AP, Doc.
23, at 8). The Order then goes on to note that Appellees process server mademultiple attempts at the Debtors residence. (AP, Doc. 23, at 8).11 While the Bankruptcy Court did not make a final determination that the Debtoractively evaded service, the court did not that [a]t a minimum the record showsthat the [Appellees] encountered unusual difficulties in their efforts to personally
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that a short extension of 13 days would promote the Courts policy of resolving
matters on the merits. (AP, Doc. 23, at 1011).
While the Debtor focuses on the absence of good cause, the Debtor fails to
address the appropriate issue of whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion
in granting a 13 day extension under these circumstances. It is true that a plaintiff
bears the burden of proving good cause for failure to timely serve a debtor. See In
re Teligent Serv., Inc., 324 B.R. 467, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). However, as
Horenkamp indicates, good cause is not the only basis upon which an extension
may be granted.
Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court was required to consider factors other than
good cause. Where a trial court finds that a plaintiff failed to show good cause for
failing to serve process within the 120-day period, the court still must consider
whether any other circumstances warrant an extension. See Lepone-Dempsy v.
Carroll County Comm., 476 F. 3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2007). The Lepone-
Dempsy court held that the district court abused its discretion for not at least
considering whether the plaintiffs claim would be time-barred absent a permissive
extension. Id.
As the Bankruptcy Court noted in its Order, Appellants may have been time-
serve the Debtor. (AP, Doc. 23, at 11).
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barred from re-filing Counts I through IV of the Complaint if the Bankruptcy Court
were to dismiss the complaint, personal service on the debtor was difficult, and the
13-day extension that was required was minimal. (AP, Doc. 23, at 1011). The
Bankruptcy Court, after considering good cause, weighed these other factors as
required and determined that a brief extension was appropriate. (AP, Doc. 23, at
12). The Debtor has not shown an abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Courts
extension of time and recognition of valid service of process.12
In addition, the Debtor waived its service related defenses by failing to
subsequently file an answer. Having lost the motions to dismiss and having been
ordered to answer on at least two separate occasions, the Debtor refused to file an
answer. The Debtors failure to press his defenses further and refusal to comply
with the Bankruptcy Courts legitimate processes can only be deemed a waiver and
abandonment of the Debtors defenses.
III. WHETHER THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ERRED IN ENTERING AJUDGMENT DENYING THE DEBTORS DISCHARGE AND THEDISCHARGEABILITY OF THE SANCTIONS JUDGMENT IN FAVOROF APPELLEES AND AGAINST THE DEBTOR WITHOUT ANAFFIDAVIT [RESTATED]
12
The Debtor has made passing reference to the expiration of the summons underFed.R.Bank.P. 7004. However, the Debtor does not argue that the BankruptcyCourt lacked the authority to extend the summons under Fed.R.Bank.P. 9006,which permits the Bankruptcy Court to extend any time period under the rules, orthat its decision to do so was an abuse of discretion. The Debtor also does notargue that he suffered any prejudice from the form of the summons.
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The Debtor, relying on Bankr.L.R.M.D.Fla. 7055-2, argues that a default
judgment was improper in the absence of an affidavit in support of the allegations
set forth in the complaint. Once again, the Debtor is incorrect.
To place the Debtors claims in context, Bankr.L.R.M.D.Fla. 7055-2 must be
read in conjunction with Fed.R.Civ.P. 55, which is made applicable to adversary
proceedings by Fed.R.Bank.P. 7055. Rule 55 provides two different circumstances
for the entry of a default. Rule 55(b)(1) provides for entry of a default judgment
by the Clerk if the plaintiffs claim is for a sum certain, the plaintiff submits an
affidavit showing the amount due, and the defendant was defaulted for not
appearing. Rule 55(b)(2) provides for entry of a default judgment by the Court in
all other cases. There is no requirement of an affidavit in Rule 55(b)(2).
Bankr.L.R.M.D.Fla. 7055-2, by its very terms, applies to situations When a
party seeks a default judgment as a result of a defendants failure to respond after
being served with a complaint, . . . . This clearly modifies the situation described
in Fed.R.Bank.P. 55(b)(1) where the defendant is defaulted for not appearing. It
is inapplicable where, as here, the Debtor did respond after being served with a
complaint but is subject to being defaulted for other reasons. The default judgment
entered in the instant case was entered by the Court as a result of the Debtors
willful refusal to plead after being ordered to do so twice.
Nothing in Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 or Bankr.L.R.M.D.Fla. 7055-2 required the
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personally signed by at least 4 judges of that court. However, the Debtor wisely
acknowledged that he was not prepared to test that theory and would not be
asserting these parties rights anymore.
Despite this statement, the Debtor goes right back to practicing law without
a license in this Court, asking this Court to reverse multiple orders involving these
parties. None of these orders were ever appealed by Lisa Adams or Law Offices of
Mark A. Adams, P.A. and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review them. The
Debtors arguments are so lacking in merit that the Debtor ought to simply be
sanctioned in the only way that seems to get through to him final dismissal.13
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Bankruptcy Courts denial of the Debtors
discharge and the dischargeability of the Debtors obligations to Appellees and
grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate.
13Appellees have never collected one penny of the state court sanctions judgments
and have been subjected to years of additional abuse and frivolous appeals whilethe Debtor ignores court orders, fraudulently transfers his assets, and declaresbankruptcy. A monetary sanction is simply pointless.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
sent United States Postal Mail to Mark. A. Adams, 4129 Balington Drive, Valrico,
Florida 33596 this 8th day of December, 2008.
s/Timothy W. WeberTIMOTHY W. WEBER, ESQUIREFlorida Bar No.: 86789BATTAGLIA, ROSS, DICUS & WEIN, P.A.
Wachovia Bank Building980 Tyrone Boulevard (33710)Post Office Box 41100St. Petersburg, Florida 33710(727)381-2300(727)343-4059 (fax)Attorneys for Appellees