Anti-corruption institutional

developments in Bulgaria:

good and bad practices Workshop: 14-16 October, Mavrovo

Anti-corruption institutional infrastructure

• Bulgaria lacks a common central institution to fight

corruption(although the EC , including in its latest report under

the CVM and the first EU Anticorruption Report, has stated the

need for the establishment of “independent institution to focus

efforts, make proposals and drive action against corruption”)

• There are • several specialised bodies mandated to drive the country`s

anticorruption agenda within legislative, executive and judiciary

• a number of institutions whose activities may have a strong

anticorruption potential(National Revenue Agency, Custom Agency,

National Ombudsman and others)

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the

Parliament • Parliamentary Commission on Fighting Corruption and

Conflict of Interest (permanent committee)

• consists of three MPs per party group

• accepts and registers the declarations under the Conflict of Interest

Prevention and Ascertainment Act and, if requested, provides information

to the Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest

• reviews, may comment and propose amendments to draft legislation,

assigned by Chairman of the Parliament

• in cases of irregularities and crime, forwards all documentation to the

respective judicial authorities

• In the 42nd Parliament - several comments/recommendations

with regard to draft legislation but only ten commission

meetings and two administrative violation reports under the

Conflict of Interest Prevention and Ascertainment Act and

provided

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the

Judiciary

• Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Prevention of

Corruption in the Judiciary with the Supreme Judicial Council

to implement responsible

• to perform inspections on specific signals about corruption and

complaints, notify competent authorities and inform the SJC about

the results

• to analyse the information on the existence of corruption practices

in the judiciary

• to develop and propose for approval by the SJC specific measures

for the prevention and countering corruption in the judiciary

• for the implementation of the Code of Ethical Behaviour of

Bulgarian Magistrates as well the Strategy for Preventing and

Combating Corruption in the Judiciary

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the

Judiciary(continued)

• Cooperation with the Civil Council to the SJC and other anticorruption

structures within state authorities, including the Ombudsman

• Information with regard to registered signals and complaints is largely

available and consistently reported by the Committee

• Despite the large number of complaints, most of which general in

nature, for the period of four years (2010-2013) there is not a single

registered complaint containing concrete data of corruption, while the

signals concerning controversial practices are only 23 ().

• Standing Committee on Disciplinary Proceedings with the Supreme

Judicial Council

• responsible for disciplinary infringement and disciplinary sanctions(incl. for

corruption-related conduct) to judges, prosecutors and investigators

• no publicly available statistics for disciplinary proceedings against

magistrates on corruption-related grounds

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the

Executive • Commission for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption

with the Council of Ministers (CPCC),since 2006, chaired by the

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, mandated to

• analyse corruption and conflict of interests and propose policies

• propose to the Council of Ministers the anticorruption priorities of

the government on an annual basis

• analyse regulatory acts, potentially vulnerable to corruption and

propose amendments

• prepare strategic documents and coordinating their

implementation

• develop measures for more effective preventive mechanisms

against corruption and conflict of interests in the decision making

process.

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the Executive(continued)

• Positive development - establishment of 28 regional councils on

corruption that often include representatives from local

government, territorial structures, the judiciary, various

ministries, civil society and the business community

• Failures

• CPCC lacks the capacity to effectively perform its functions

• activities of CPCC are difficult to assess, annual reports are

published inconsistently( the last publicly available report is for

2011, but it cannot be accessed, similar to the case with the 2010

report)

• lack of coordination in the regional councils(separate action plans

and produced implementation reports, inconsistencies in reporting

and limited information)

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the

Executive(continued)

• The exotic project BORKOR - a specialised anti-corruption

body, established at the Council of Ministers in 2010 to assess,

plan and develop preventive anticorruption measures through

highly-technological instrument(software) to identify vulnerable

environment conductive to crime

• spent BGN 10.3 million in a three-year period (2011-2013)

• continuous lack of results and clarity in its mission statement – critics from

civil society and the media

• in January 2013 - first interim report , which identified corruption risks,

and listed numbers of vulnerable areas without naming them

• exotic ideas, launched in the beginning of 2014 (i.e. intention to compel all

politicians and high-ranking civil servants to declare their personal

relationships)

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the

Executive(continued)

• Possible solutions

• BORKOR to become a strong institution, having the necessary

capacity to coordinate the fight against corruption and having

authority to assess the plans of other institutions, make a risk

assessment of declarations on conflict of interest and/or act as an

independent monitoring body

• BORKOR to focus primarily on developing the necessary instruments

for fighting corruption and monitoring anti-corruption progress and

the CPCC to be responsible for their implementation

• BORKOR to be abolished and its responsibilities to be transferred to

the CPCC

Specialised anti-corruption bodies within the

Executive(continued)

• Inspectorates - in all ministries, state agencies and other

administrative bodies of the central government, to prevent and

eliminate distortions in the functioning of the administration (as

of 2012 in total 38 administrative bodies, incl. CoM - GI)

• subordinated to the respective authority operate according to

internal rules approved by the relevant body of the executive

power

• Responsabilities

• perform check-ups of structures, activities and processes in the

administration

• assess the corruption risk and propose measures to limit it

• ensure compliance with regulations and laws, including the Conflict of

Interest Prevention and Ascertainment Act

• propose disciplinary proceedings for violations of official duties

Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of

Conflicts of Interest

• Еstablished in 2010(became operational in 2011)

• to implement the amended Law on the Prevention and Ascertainment of

Conflicts of Interest

• composed of five members - the Parliament elects three of the members,

including the chairperson, one is appointed by the President and one by the

Prime Minister.

• Rules on both conflicts of interest and incompatibilities, cannot

act upon anonymous signals

• Establishment of conflict of interest

• primarily administrative penalties, which range from BGN 1000 to BGN

20,000

• can serve as a ground for dismissal from pubic office as well. The names of

the persons found to be in conflict of interest are displayed on the web site

of the respective institution, in which they hold office

Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of

Conflicts of Interest(continued)

• Most of the cases decided with a sanction have involved mainly low-

profile public officials and had to do with conflicts of interests at local

and regional level (e.g. mayors)

• The number of investigations regarding top-ranking politicians and/or

administrators is very limited, such cases are moving particularly slow

into their final decisions, with too little publicly available information(

the first EU Anticorruption Report found indications of an arbitrary

and formalistic approach and reasonably assessed that the Commission

has not yet succeeded in acting systematically and independently to

prevent or uncover risks of political corruption)

• The former Chair of the Commission Philippe Zlatanov, was charged

with criminal breach and violation of his duties, which has caused

adverse effects on the Committee headed by him and was found guilty

and sentenced by Sofia City Court (SCC) as a first instance to 3 ½ years

imprisonment

Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of

Conflicts of Interest (continued)

• Proposed changes to the law by the end of 2013

• which can be defined as positive

• widening the circle of persons holding public office for whom the rules

of Law are applicable

• Introducing procedure for removing a person holding public office in

the presence of private interest + opportunity for the person holding

public office on suspicion of conflict of interest to approach directly

the Commission, which is required to adopt an opinion within 14 – days

• expanding the Commission's rights to obtain information from third

institutions including disclosure of bank secrecy etc.

• which can be defined as negative

• no changes in quota system, no grounds for early termination of powers

of the members of the Commission who do not meet the post

requirements

• sharp reductions in the penalties provided for violations of the law

Criminal justice against corruption

• No specialised anticorruption courts

• In 2010 - legislative amendments providing for the establishment of a

specialized criminal court with a jurisdiction to examine organized

criminal group cases and a specialised court of appeal acting as a court

of second instance and a specialised prosecutor’s office of appeal and a

specialised prosecutor’s office, with an investigation department

• The cases of corruption may fall within the jurisdiction of the

specialized criminal court in two situations: either when a case of

corruption related offence is merged with other cases one of which is

under the jurisdiction of the specialized criminal court, or when the

indictment is for two or more offenses related to each other and one of

them is within the jurisdiction of the specialized criminal court;

however, there is no evidence of such cases and best practices in this

area so far

Еnforcing Criminal law in cases of corruption

• Bulgarian criminal law - in compliance with the main international

standards in the field of anti-corruption( the catalogue of criminal

offences and their corresponding sanctions satisfy the requirements of

the major international treaties to which Bulgaria is a party)

• The main forms of corruption behaviour are incriminated and the

sanctions are relatively high

• Most of the corruption-related offences are grave crimes (punished by

more than five years of imprisonment), which means that they can be

investigated through special intelligence means

• Ineffective enforcement - investigation of the crimes at the pre-trial

stage and the subsequent trial proceedings, the result - low number of

cases ending with conviction, lenient sanctions and no successfully

completed high-profile cases

Number of bribery cases registered and solved by the

police (2006-2012)

106

121

112

155 150

154

137

87

77 81

115 113 106

84

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Crimes registered by the police during the year Solved cases out of all crimes registered by the police during the same year

Outcome of pre-trial proceedings for

corruption cases (2010-2012)

226 217

184

261

325

346

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

2010 2011 2012

Cases brought to court

Discontinued pre-trial proceedings

Trend (cases brought to court)

Trend (discontinued pre-trial proceedings)

Share of offenders sentenced to probation for

bribery (2004-2012)

0,00

4,62

30,49

46,74

60,00 58,14 58,96

42,20

29,06

0,00

10,00

20,00

30,00

40,00

50,00

60,00

70,00

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Share of offenders sentenced to probation (per cent)

Duration of imprisonment imposed for bribery (2004-

2012)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Up to 6 months From 6 months to 1 year From 1 to 3 years From 3 to 5 years

From 5 to 10 years From 10 to 15 years From 15 to 20 years From 20 to 30 years

Share of suspended prison sentences (2004-2012)

54,29

67,16

39,02 39,78 37,50

35,38 37,12

53,91

59,06

35,32 34,41 33,04 29,60 29,89 30,65

35,21

40,12 42,30

0,00

10,00

20,00

30,00

40,00

50,00

60,00

70,00

80,00

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Share of suspended sentences (bribery) Share of suspended sentences (all crimes)

Outcome of criminal cases for bribery (2004-2012)

16

22

50

56

50

84 83

53 52

19

45

32

37

30

46 49

62

75

4 5

12 14 14

8 6 7

3 1 0 0 1 2 1 0

2 1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Effective sentences Suspended sentences Acquittals Discontinued proceedings