Antiphon on Time (B9 D-K)

Francis M. Dunn

American Journal of Philology, Volume 117, Number 1 (Whole Number465), Spring 1996, pp. 65-69 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University PressDOI: 10.1353/ajp.1996.0013

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ANTIPHON ON TIME (B9 D–K)

The simplest and clearest formulation of Antiphon’s understand-ing of time is the statement that time is a concept or measure, not a sub-stance (87 B9 Diels–Kranz). This fragment is regularly cited in discus-sions of Antiphon, but Richard Sorabji has stated that it belongs not toAntiphon the sophist but to a minor peripatetic. He gives no argument insupport of this statement,1 but given the potential importance of thisfragment both for the views of Antiphon and for early theories of time,we must consider whether or not its attribution is secure.

ANTIPHON OR ANTIPHANES?

Fragment 9 in Diels–Kranz is a brief entry from the Placita of Ae-tius (1.22.6) under the heading Περd ï�σÝας øρÞνïυ, preserved in Sto-baeus (1.8.40b):2

\Αντιφ�ν καd ΚριτÞλαïς νÞηµα j µÛτρïν τeν øρÞνïν, ï�ø �πÞστασιν.

�ντιφ�ν F: �ντιφÀνης P, F mrg., Photius

In the text of Diels–Kranz, emphasis is used to distinguish the quote orcitation proper (νÞηµα j µÛτρïν τeν øρÞνïν) from the gloss or clarifica-tion that accompanies it (ï�ø �πÞστασιν). The distinction seems to mecorrect: since it is not immediately obvious what it means to regard timeas a “concept or measure” (and two thinkers may have done so in differ-ent ways), the gloss is an attempt by the compiler to delimit this (shared)view. The delimiting term is relatively late (�πÞστασις with the impliedmeaning “substance” is not attested before Aristotle and Theophrastus;

1Sorabji, Time, Creation, Continuum 95:“I have already remarked that Aristotelianswere very much divided on the relation of time to consciousness. Two of them, Critolaus (c. 190–155 B.C.) and Antiphon (or Antiphanes), are said to have held that time is not a re-ality (hupostasis), but a concept (noêma) or a measure (metron),” citing Stobaeus Eclogae1.8 and Diels, Doxographi 318.

2The text of the fragment follows Diels and Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,and the apparatus follows Diels, Doxographi. In what follows, the Placita ascribed to Ae-tius are cited from Diels, Doxographi, and Stobaeus is cited from the edition of Wachsmuthand Hense, Anthologium. On the compiler of the Placita, see the following note. ContrastGuthrie, History III 292 n. 1, who states that this formulation by Antiphon “is the earliestextant Greek definition of time,” and goes on to compare it with that of Aristotle in thePhysics.

American Journal of Philology 117 (1996) 65–69 q 1996 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

cf. LSJ sv III). So if the first thinker cited is Antiphon the sophist, usageconfirms that the term was later supplied by the compiler; on the otherhand, if we suspend judgment on the identity of Antiphon (or Antipha-nes), this late usage does not help to date the view that time is νÞηµα jµÛτρïν.

This brings us to the attribution of the fragment: was Diels correctin printing \Αντιφ�ν? and was he correct in identifying this figure as theAthenian sophist? Taking the first question first, we must consider thepossibility that the marginal gloss in F was meant as a correction, andthat the lemma assigning the fragment to Antiphanes should be fol-lowed. Context, however, clearly indicates otherwise. Under the rubricΠερd ï�σÝας øρÞνïυ, the compiler of the Placita3 has assembled theviews of various philosophers: Plato, Xenocrates, Hestiaeus of Perinthus,Straton, Epicurus, Critolaus and the Stoics (1.22.1–7). Antiphon thesophist is repeatedly cited in this compilation (2.20.15, 2.28.4, 2.29.3,3.16.4), whereas Antiphanes the comic poet is never cited at all. The tex-tual confusion arose because this portion of the Placita was extracted byStobaeus, who also quoted profusely from Antiphanes and other comicpoets. To scribes copying Stobaeus, the playwright’s name suggested it-self more readily than that of the sophist, and the former therefore be-gan to replace the latter.4

I have assumed so far (as all editors have done) that the textualvariants �ντιφ�ν and �ντιφÀνης entail a choice between Antiphon thesophist and Antiphanes the comic poet. Faced with such a choice, wemust choose Antiphon, but Sorabji suggests a third alternative, namelythat Antiphon or Antiphanes is a late and obscure peripatetic philoso-pher. What are the merits of such a suggestion?

A MINOR PERIPATETIC?

Sorabji’s Antiphon (or Antiphanes) is so obscure that he has other-wise vanished without leaving a trace. We must therefore decide if it is

3As Lebedev, “Doxographer Aetius” points out, the name Aetius is attested only bythe often–confused Theodoretus; he suggests as possible compilers the middle PlatonistsArius and/or Eudorus.

4The philosopher \ΑλκµαÝων is likewise replaced by the poet \ΑλκµÀν in Theodore-tus’ excerpt from the Placita, 4.2.2 (Diels, Doxographi 386). Antiphon’s name was appar-ently confused again at 2.29.3, where manuscripts have the lemma \ΑλκµαÝων ^ΗρÀκλειτïς\ΑντÝφαντïς.

66 FRANCIS M. DUNN

likely that the Placita not only cited such an individual, but made no at-tempt to distinguish him from well–known authors who bore the samename. It is worth noting that the compiler of the Placita made no partic-ular attempt to rescue from oblivion the beliefs of insignificant thinkers.Under each rubric he is chiefly concerned with reporting the doctrines ofinfluential philosophers such as Thales, Democritus or Aristotle. Therange of views on a given topic may be broadened by including lesser fig-ures, but these are almost always easily identifiable and well–attested inother sources. The reasons for the flooding of the Nile (4.1), for example,are taken from Thales, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Eudoxus, Herodotusand Ephorus; the notion that the river is filled from a fresh–water sea iscited from a lesser figure, Euthymenes of Massilia, who is therefore iden-tified by his place of birth. The factors that determine a child’s gender(5.7) are cited from Empedocles, Parmenides, Hippon, Anaxagoras, Leu-cippus and Democritus; the lesser–known Leophanes, who advised bind-ing the left or right testicle, is glossed for the reader as ΛεωφÀνης ïyµÛµνηται \ΑριστïτÛλης.5 The minor philosophers cited in the Placita areall known to us from other sources with only two exceptions.6 The sec-tion on tides includes an Apollodorus who is otherwise unknown, butwho is clearly distinguished by his place of birth from other thinkers ofthis name (\ΑπïλλÞδωρïς � Κερκυρα�ïς 3.17.8); and the section on thedestructibility of the universe includes an unknown Epidicus who is dis-tinguished by bearing a proper name (“Liable to Litigation”) that is oth-erwise unattested (2.4.4).7 It is therefore reasonable to assume that in1.22.6 our compiler refers to Antiphon the sophist. It is highly unlikelythat he would refer to an otherwise unknown peripatetic without distin-guishing this Antiphon (or Antiphanes) from a more famous namesake.

One might assume that the juxtaposition of another name with that of Critolaus, an active and influential head of the Peripatos, is suffi-cient identification: the addition καd ΚριτÞλαïς identifies our unknownthinker by school as clearly as � Κερκυρα�ïς identifies our unknownApollodorus by birthplace. But such an assumption is not valid. Whentwo or three names are juxtaposed, it does not follow that they have a

5Aristotle cites Leophanes at de Gen.Anim. 4.1 (765a25). He was also cited, in a dif-ferent context, by Theophrastus, de Causis Plantarum 2.4.12.

6Reference to Aristagoras’ theory of vision (4.13.8) is most likely an error forAristarchus; compare 1.15.9 and 1.15.5, and Diels, Addenda (Doxographi 853).

7Hence the confusion among the manuscripts, which also report his name as �πι-δÝκτïυ and \ΕπÝδεκτïς (Stobaeus 1.21.6). The name was presumably given to a slave incomedy for humorous effect (Plautus, Epidicus 25).

67ANTIPHON ON TIME (B9 D–K)

philosophical affiliation. For belief that god is the spirit of the universe,the Placita cite Diogenes, Cleanthes and Oenopides (1.7.17), juxtaposingtwo contemporaries of Anaxagoras with the third century head of theStoa. They credit both Empedocles and Xenocrates with a belief in tinyelements that are, “so to speak, elements of elements” (1.17.3). Par-menides and Democritus both ascribe everything to a necessity which is“fate, and justice, and providence, and creator” (1.25.3). And examplescould be multiplied.8 So when the Placita attribute the notion that time isa “concept or measure” to two different thinkers, there is no reason toassume that these thinkers belong to the same school.

Finally, the order of lemmas within a particular heading does nothelp to place an author chronologically. In Stobaeus, Placita 1.7 (περdθεï�), for example, place Anaxagoras after Archelaus (14–15), Pythago-ras after Diogenes of Babylon (17–18), Heraclitus after Critolaus (21–22), Parmenides after Boethus (25–26), and Plato after Xenocrates (30–31). So the place of our lemma after one for Epicurus (1.22.5–6) does notimply a more recent date for Antiphon (or Antiphanes).

Diels was therefore right on both counts: the fragment under dis-cussion should read Antiphon, not Antiphanes, and the doctrine it re-ports should be ascribed to the fifth–century sophist. A last possible ob-jection to this attribution brings us to the larger question of the specificview (or views) to which the compiler alludes. Sorabji’s view seems to bethat the doctrine our fragment reports—that time is a concept or mea-sure—cannot be earlier than Aristotle, since it responds to a particularset of problems first articulated in the Physics. By defining time as num-ber (Physics 4.11), and by then posing the paradox that if there is no–oneto “count” time, it will not exist (Physics 4.14), Aristotle raises a questionto which members of his school repeatedly returned, and which was ad-dressed in an interesting and influential way by Alexander of Aphro-disias.9 It may be that when Critolaos calls time a concept or measure(rather than a substance), he is taking sides in this debate and arguing, asAristotle had done, that the existence of time requires a measuring mind.But it does not follow that the fragment attributes a similar argument toAntiphon. The notion that time is a “concept” or “measure” need have

8See for example 1.29.7 (Anaxagoras and the Stoics), 3.15.1 (Thales and Democri-tus), 4.5.1 (Plato and Democritus), 4.5.5 (Parmenides and Epicurus), 5.1.2 (Xenophanesand Epicurus), 5.23.1 (Heraclitus and the Stoics).

9Sorabji, Time, Creation, Continuum 84–97, esp. 95–97; compare Sharples, “Alexan-der of Aphrodisias.”

68 FRANCIS M. DUNN

nothing at all to do with Aristotle’s particular problem, and just as thePlacita cite together the views of Empedocles and Xenocrates on ele-ments and those of Parmenides and Democritus on necessity, here theyjuxtapose a sophistic with a peripatetic view of time.

Exactly what that sophistic view was or might have been is anotherquestion, one that cannot be answered here.Antiphon was certainly con-cerned with the passage and the apprehension of time. He argued thathuman life is ephemeral, a short span within a larger continuum (B50,B51); he stressed that time is not reversible (B52); and he warned againstletting time slip away (B54, B77). Since justice for Antiphon consists nei-ther in general precepts nor in a body of laws, but in an individual’sproper and advantageous action in a particular situation (B44), I suspecthe would argue that time has no existence apart from an individual’srecognition of temporally marked events. But however we reconstructthe details of Antiphon’s views, we may with confidence make use of thecitation from the Placita.10

FRANCIS M. DUNN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

e–mail: fdunn@humanitas.ucsb.edu

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Diels, Hermann, ed. Doxographi Graeci. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1958.Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz, eds. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 3 vols.

Berlin: Weidmann, 1951–52.Guthrie, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy. 6 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1962–81.Lebedev, A. V. “Did the Doxographer Aetius Ever Exist?” In Philosophie et cul-

ture:Actes du XVIIe Congrès mondial de philosophie, 813–17. Montreal: duBeffroi, 1983.

Sharples, R. W. “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time.” Phronesis 27 (1982) 58–81.Sorabji, Richard. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and

the Early Middle Ages. London: Duckworth, 1983.Wachsmuth, Curtius, and Otto Hense, eds. Stobaeus: Anthologium. 5 vols. Berlin:

Weidmann, 1884–1912.

10My thanks to Robert Renehan for his helpful comments.

69ANTIPHON ON TIME (B9 D–K)