anton tedesko and the introduction of thin shell concrete roofs in the united states

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Anton Tedesko and the Introduction of Thin Shell ConcreteRoofs in the United States

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Eric M. Hines, A.M.ASCEResearch Assistant Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Enging, Tufts Univ., Medford, MA 02155; Structural Engineer, LeMessuConsultants, Cambridge, MA 02139. E-mail: emhines@lemessurier

David P. Billington, Hon.M.ASCEGordon Y. S. Wu Professor of Engineering, Dept. of Civil and Envimental Engineering, Princeton Univ., Princeton, NJ 08544. [email protected]

Introduction

In a 1990 talk at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology(ETH)in Zurich, Anton Tedesko(1903–1994) remarked:

A myth exists that engineering is only that which canbe calculated. There may be a certain beauty in analysisbut it may well not be connected with reality. Qualitativejudgment, based on experience is important, even when icannot be expressed in exact numbers(Tedesko 1990).Such comments were typical of Tedesko’s later career, w

he discussed structural failures resulting from overdependenanalysis and lack of sound engineering judgment(Schlaich 1993).Tedesko’s convictions about the proper balance between deanalysis and qualitative judgement had been heavily influeby his work in bringing German thin shell concrete roof techogy to the United States in the 1930s(Billington 1982).

After nearly 2 decades of thin shell concrete roof construcin the United States under Tedesko’s leadership, Americanneers eventually devoted significant attention to the complexferential equations developed by Tedesko’s German colleagthe design and construction firm Dyckerhoff and Widmann Ain Wiesbaden-Biebrich. Such attention was exemplified in1952 publication of ASCE’s Manual 31(ASCE 1952). Howeverrecent archival research coupled with studies of Tedesko’swork in the United States and his innovations in thin shell ccrete roof construction show that he relied more heavily on ccooperation with contractors and extensive structural testingon the application of such complex analysis.

These studies also reveal that it was not the German tecogy itself but rather Tedesko’s approach to this technologyensured the success of American thin shells. Tedesko once“Shells in [the United States] were never copies of designs usabroad(Tedesko 1970, p. 2). Although Tedesko initially built thinshell concrete roofs under the mystique of German patents, hnot apply these patents in his actual work. The German swere important in the United States only in that they provedfeasibility of such work and provided Tedesko with valuabledata. While promoting thin shells in the United States usingages of German designs, he redeveloped thin concrete shelnology to work with American construction practices. The ne
sity for such redevelopment reflected the fact that these structures
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depended as much on their construction and political approvon their design and analysis. In turn, construction and pooften depended on local personalities and local labor. Evereinforced concrete from which they were constructed was lalocal, requiring quality control that was specific to each job(Saliklis and Billington 2003).

Later in his career, when Tedesko warned about the potpitfalls of complex analysis, he commonly referenced strucfailures both in the Unites States and Germany. In particularckerhoff and Widmann had relied heavily on analysis in tdesign and construction of an airplane hangar in Cottbus,many that collapsed in early 1934. This failure, caused by cin the concrete, contributed to the decline of thin shell constion in Germany during the same period that thin shells gaacceptance in the United States.

While Tedesko’s work in the United States bears a clearprint of American society, his background in thin shells was cacteristically German. Tedesko himself was Austrian, andstory of his work demonstrates the importance of individualgineers working across cultures to develop engineering inntions. Tedesko had worked with Dyckerhoff and Widmann fyears before coming to America. During his time at the Gercompany, Tedesko was exposed to conceptual design, riganalysis, and testing of structural models and full-scale thincrete shells.

Dyckerhoff and Widmann engineers Franz Dischinger(1887–1953) and Ulrich Finsterwalder(1897–1989) had developed seeral analytical and structural testing programs by 1930 wTedesko joined the design and construction firm. During Teko’s short stay in Wiesbaden-Biebrich(1930–1932), the firm’sexperimental, analytical and construction activity continueflourish. Finsterwalder and Hubert Rüsch(1903–1979) completedtheir analytical work on the behavior of shallow cylindrical bashells(Finsterwalder 1933; Rüsch 1931). During this time, Dyckerhoff and Widmann developed tables for the analysis ofbarrel shells based on a salt storage hall in Tertre, Belgium.thermore, Finsterwalder spearheaded the construction of thlarge-scale, long, shallow barrel shell in Budapest, and Dischrealized his test structure for a doubly curved surface on a sground plan.

In 1932, Dyckerhoff and Widmann sent Tedesko as its resentative in America to the Chicago design and constructionRoberts and Schaefer. By 1950, Tedesko’s work there had gated several million square feet of American thin shells andmajor innovations: the ribless shell and the wide-spanning,barrel shell. During these 18 years, Roberts and Schaefer emas the dominant figure in the design and construction of Amethin shell concrete roofs. Table 1 lists key structures designeDyckerhoff and Widmann and Roberts and Schaefer that plarole in the German and American development of thin shellcrete roofs. Columns 1–4 in Table 1 list the name, date of com
tion, location, and type of these shells. Columns 5–8 list the di-
F STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING © ASCE / NOVEMBER 2004 / 1639

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Table 1. Structures Central to Development of Thin Concrete Shell Technology in Europe and the United States.

Name of construction Year Location Type

w(width) L(length) d(rise) h(thickness)

Significance(ft) (m) (ft) (m) (ft) (m) (in.) (cm)

Europe

Dome at Church of St. Blasien 1912 St. Blasien, Germany Shallow dome 112.0 34.0 112.0 34.0 17.0 5.30 4.70 12.0 Largest thin shell dome

Century Hall 1913 Breslau, Germany Hemisphere 213.0 65.0 213.0 65.0 105.0 32.00 ribs ribs Largest concrete vaulted construction

Test Planetatium 1922 Jena, Germany Hemisphere 52.0 16.0 52.0 16.0 26.0 8.00 1.20 3.0 First Z-D thin concrete shell construction

Zeiss Works Factory 23 Roof 1923–1924 Jena, Germany Barrel 62.0 19.0 23.0 7.0 30.0 9.00 2.40 6.0 Experimental construction

Schott Dome 1925 Jena, Germany Shallow dome 131.0 40.0 131.0 40.0 26.0 7.90 2.40 6.0 First shallow dome with tension ring

Werft Hall 1925 Neuss, Germany Barrel 39.0 12.0 52.0 16.0 12.0 3.80 1.60 4.0 Experimental construction

Test Barrel Shell 1925 Biebrich, Germany Elliptical barrel 13.0 4.0 20.0 6.0 5.8 1.80 0.59 1.5 Carried loads as membrane stresses

Dywidag Exhibition Hall 1926 Duesseldorf, Germany Elliptical barrel 39.0 12.0 75.0 23.0 11.0 3.50 2.20 5.5 First published construction

Steel plate model 1926 Biebrich, Germany Shallow circular barrel 0.9 0.3 1.8 0.6 0.2 0.06 0.04 0.1 M1, N1, andH are undefined

Test barrel shell, 1 /3 scale 1927 Frankfurt, Germany Elliptical barrel 15.0 4.7 40.0 12.0 4.4 1.30 0.90 2.3 Asymmetric loads, buckling, deformations

Wholesale market hall 1926–1927 Frankfurt, Germany Circular barrel 46.0 14.0 121.0 37.0 13.0 4.00 2.80 7.0 First large-scale barrel vault construction

Hangar 1927 Kowno, Lithuania Shallow circular barrel 27.0 8.2 66.0 20.0 4.6 1.40 2.40 6.0 First shallow, circular barrel construction

Market halls 1927–1929 Leipzig, Germany Octagonal domes 249.0 76.0 249.0 76.0 98.0 30.00 3.50 9.0 Largest concrete vaulted construction

Steel plate model(Budapest) 1930 Biebrich, Germany Shallow circular barrel 1.3 0.4 4.4 1.4 0.3 0.08 0.08 0.2 Buckling

Wholesale market hall 1930 Budapest, Hungary Shallow circular barrel 39.0 12.0 131.0 40.0 6.2 1.90 2.40 6.0 First large-scale shallow, circular barrels

Kaischuppen(hall for building ships) 1930 Hamburg, Germany Shallow circular barrel 30.0 9.2 80.0 24.0 8.2 2.50 2.20 5.5 Efficient construction

Salt storage hall 1930 Tertre, Belgium Short barrel 144.0 44.0 37.0 11.0 47.0 14.40 2.40 6.0 Source of tables for later structures

Dischinger shell 1932 Biebrich, Germany Dome on square plan 23.0 7.1 23.0 7.1 5.7 1.70 0.59 1.5 Doubly-curved surface on a square plan

Flight school hangar 1933 Kottbus, Germany Short barrel 115.0 35.0 131.0 40.0 40.0 12.30 3.50 9.0 Collapsed due to creep

United States

Brook Hill Farm Dairy Bam 1933 Chicago Circular barrel 14.0 4.3 36.0 11.0 3.3 1.00 3.00 7.6 Stability under 10 times expected live load

Hayden Planetarium 1934 New York Hemisphere 81.0 25.0 81.0 25.0 81.0 25.00 3.00 7.6 First full-scale thin concrete shell in U.S,

Hershey Arena 1936 Hershey, Pennsylvania Short barrel 222.0 68.0 39.0 12.0 81.0 25.00 3.50 9.0 First large-scale project in U.S.

U.S. Army Warehouses 1941 Columbus, Ohio Circular barrel 45.0 14.0 38.0 12.0 7.2 2.20 3.50 8.9 Covered extremely large plan

Signal Corps Hangar 1942 Dayton, Ohio Short barrel 160.0 49.0 40.0 12.0 37.0 11.00 3.70 9.5 Strain gage readings

Budd Manufacturing Plant 1943 Philmont, Pennsylvania Short barrel 122.0 37.0 20.0 6.1 28.0 8.50 3.70 9.5 Strain gage readings

Garage Shop Hangar 1943 Norfolk, Virginia Short barrel 160.0 49.0 40.0 12.0 37.0 11.00 3.70 9.5 Strain gage readings

North Hangar 1944 Camp Springs, Maryland Short barrel 173.0 53.0 33.0 10.0 40.0 12.00 3.70 9.5 Strain gage readings

U.S. Air Force Hangar 1948 Rapid City, South Dakota Short barrel 340.0 104.0 25.0 7.6 74.0 23.00 5.00 13.0 Unprecedented scale, strain gage readings

U.S. Air Force Hangar 1948 Limestone, Maine Short barrel 340.0 104.0 25.0 7.6 74.0 23.00 5.00 13.0 Unprecedented scale

Western Electric Warehouses 1948 Denver Shallow circular barrel 50.0 15.0 50.0 15.0 7.5 2.30 3.70 9.5 Precursor to Harvey test model

Shell model, 1 /30 scale 1949–1951 Bethlehem, Pennsylvania Short barrel 10.0 3.0 1.0 0.3 1.5 0.46 0.10 0.3 Effective width, buckling, end loading

Ribless test shell 1950 Harvey, Illinois Shallow ribless barrel 15.0 4.6 18.0 5.5 1.8 0.56 1.50 3.8 Strength and stiffness of ribless shells

U.S. Air Force Warehouses 1958 Olmstead, Pennsylvania Shallow ribless barrel 39.0 12.0 66.0 20.0 7.4 2.30 3.00 7.6 First ribless shell

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Thin Shell Concrete Roofs in Germany

Although the construction of the 1922 Zeiss planetariumstructure in Jena marks the official beginning of thin shell ccrete roofs in Germany, firms such as Dyckerhoff and Widmhad already amassed significant experience with vaultedforced concrete construction prior to World War I. By 1909, Fvon Emperger had published several examples of reinforcedcrete domes and barrel vaults in hisHandbuch für Eisenbetonba(Handbook of Reinforced Concrete Construction) (von Emperge1909). These domes and barrel vaults had shell thicknessesorder of 3 in.s8 cmd. The barrel vaults were designed and alyzed as arches, with spans of up to 66 fts20 md and tension tiespaced approximately 10 fts3 md on center. Domes were dsigned according to the existing membrane theory of thin shFor example, the hemispherical dome over the Army MuseuMunich had a diameter of 55 fts16.7 md and a thickness of 3 ins8 cmd at the base. Based on the membrane theory and assconstant thickness of the dome, the stresses at the base ofdome under its own weight can be calculated as

f =aq

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where a=shell radius;h=shell thickness; andq=gh, where g=density of concrete. Assuming normal weight concrete,stresses at the base of the dome under its own weight ddepend on the shell thickness and are calculated as

150 pcf

1443 27.5 ft = 29 psif2 kg/cm2g

None of the authors contributing to theHandbuch’sdescription othe Army Museum dome, however, focused on the the low vaof these stresses and the corresponding possibility for largerwith thinner shells.

Soon after the publication of von Emperger’sHandbuch in1912 Dyckerhoff and Widmann constructed the then largestconcrete dome for the church in St. Blasien(Dischinger 1925)(Table 1). One year later, they completed the Century HalBreslau, Germany(now Wroclaw, Poland). The Century Hall waconstructed of meridional arches and circumferential ringsbecame the first vaulted structure to surpass in clear spaRoman Pantheon of 125 A.D. Both the dome in St. BlasienCentury Hall in Breslau established the Dyckerhoff and Widmengineers as leading designers of vaulted concrete constructyears prior to the first dome in Jena. Therefore, when WBauersfeld(1879–1959) of the Zeiss firm designed his first thshell concrete dome in collaboration with Dischinger in 19neither the size of the dome nor the methods for assessistructural behavior were novel. Instead, the dome was dguished by its extraordinary lightness[about 1-1/4 in.s3 cmdthick] and its clever means of construction. Zeiss built the dto test a new planetarium unit for the German Museum in Mu(Villiger 1926). The only available location for this dome wasthe roof of an existing Zeiss factory building. The low surpluload carrying capacity in the building necessitated that the dbe as light as possible(Rüsch 1973, p. 9). Bauersfeld achieved
light structure by developing a geodesic dome constructed of pre-
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cisely machined iron rods(Flacheisenstäbe) and connections. Th“Zeiss network,” shown in Fig. 1, became famous for its streto support several construction workers without additional fawork.

For advice on creating a smooth surface inside the dBauersfeld turned to Mergler from the Nürnberg office of Dyerhoff and Widmann, who had already built many reinforcedcrete structures for Zeiss(Bauersfeld 1942; Joedicke 1963). Mer-gler suggested guniting concrete against a smooth surfacejust beneath the Zeiss network. This process, called the “Torprocess in German, had only recently been developed. Cowith quick hardening cement—another recent innovation thalowed for guniting of vertical surfaces—Bauersfeld’s Zeisswork thus became the concrete dome’s reinforcement. Dischwho had been with Dyckerhoff and Widmann since 1913, quibecame involved in the design and construction of this first dand worked closely with Bauersfeld to develop what was tocome known as the “Zeiss-Dywidag”(Z-D) process for a widarray of shell structures. The specific patents sought by ZeisDyckerhoff and Widmann in relation to this process weredesign of the network connections and the process of construa thin shell concrete dome with an embedded Zeiss networmore concrete domes exhibited poor acoustics for planetapresentations(Villiger 1926), these patents gradually becamesolete in the broader German and American development oshell concrete roofs. The momentum gathered during thiscooperation, however, was formative in the marketing strategZ-D shells both in Germany and abroad.

Bauersfeld and Dischinger’s first opportunity to refine theprocess arose in 1925 again in Jena where they designedlow dome that was approximately the same size as the domethe Church in St. Blasien built a decade earlier. This new dover the Schott glass works factory was constructed with hathickness of the St. Blasien dome and to withstand substanhigher loads. Dischinger compared the dome’s 1/667 thickto-span ratio to an eggshell, which he claimed to be threethicker than the Schott dome(Dischinger 1925, p. 98).

Dischinger recognized the economic potential in desigsuch shells to cover rectangular as opposed to circular planscrete was less expensive than steel, and such shells exhgreat resistance to fire damage. From 1923–1926, DyckerhoWidmann constructed barrel roofs for factory buildings belon

Fig. 1. Zeiss network for the 1922 Jena test shell(Villiger 1926,p. 11)

to themselves and the Zeiss company. They also constructed



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shells for the explicit purpose of structural testing, and erectefirst commercial barrel shell(Billington 1990, p. 10). In 1927after 3 years of small-scale testing and Finsterwalder’s devment of the bending theory for cylindrical barrel shells, Dychoff and Widmann took on their first large-scale barrel vproject for the Frankfurt Market Hall. Dischinger introducedproject in theHandbuch für Eisenbetonbauin terms of its largescale and emphasized Dyckerhoff and Widmann’s structuraling in preparation for the project(Dischinger 1928, pp. 320–321).

Dischinger and Finsterwalder later described their 1931ket hall in Budapest as a refinement of the Frankfurt pro(Dischinger and Finsterwalder 1932, pp. 26–33). Not only didthey flatten the shell roof significantly fromd/w=1/3.5 in Frankfurt to 1/6.3 in Budapest, but they also made the edge bdeeper and more slender. The summer before Tedesko left fUnited States, Dyckerhoff and Widmann built the Dischinshell, shown in Fig. 2. This test shell performed well underbalanced loads and point loads, and it demonstrated subsresistance to buckling. Its crown deflected only 0.08s2.05 mmd in relation to the corners without cracking un61 psf s300 kg/m2d of dead load. The ratio of this deflectionthe shell’s span was 1/5,000(Dischinger and Finsterwalder 193p. 41).

Dischinger had considered developing a square plan, docurved shell as early as 1923, but the mathematics had provcomplicated(Dischinger 1930, p. 6). He and the other engineeat Dyckerhoff and Widmann first spent 8 years carefully deveing the analysis and construction details of barrel shells wsingle direction of curvature. Based on these 8 years of indevelopment, Dischinger finally created an approach for calcing the stresses in his doubly curved shell, which he was thento build. One might understand such an analytically drivenproach to design as conservative; however, the Cottbus Hcollapse proved that this approach can be dangerous whechecked by a thorough knowledge of structural materials. Furmore, while this rigorous scientific approach strongly influenthin concrete shell roof forms in the United States, suchproaches have typically not generated the most visually comling thin shell forms.

Dischinger boxed-in his extremely thin doubly curved swith massive edge diaphragms. He thereby closely approximthe boundary conditions that he needed for his analysis to w

Fig. 2. Dischinger shell loaded by the Dyckerhoff and Widmengineers in 1932 in Wiesbaden-Biebrich, Germany(Courtesy oPrinceton Tedesko Archive)

but he sacrificed the dome’s potential to appear as light as it

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actually was. Later, shell builders such as Heinz Isler andCandela did not place such a high premium on exact mathecal stress calculations, but they managed to create forms cosquare plans that were at least as efficient and certainlyvisually compelling than those created by the DyckerhoffWidmann engineers(Billington 1983, pp. 171–193; 213–232). Incomparison to Isler and Candela, Dischinger was more anthan designer. Fortunately, it was Dischinger’s propensitycombining analysis, structural testing, and construction rthan his love of complicated math that influenced Tedesko.

Early American Thin Shell Concrete RoofConstruction: 1932–1938

After the successful completion of several large-scale domebarrels in Europe, Dyckerhoff and Widmann decided to exptheir operations to the United States. Tedesko, who had prioperience both living and working in the United States, was seRoberts and Schaefer in Chicago for a trial period of 2 yearsemployee of Dyckerhoff and Widmann. Tedesko came to Chithrough an older friend from Vienna, John E. Kalinka, with whhe had lived and worked during his previous travels in the UnStates.

Tedesko’s early correspondence with Kalinka regardingshells in the United States was not always optimistic, andmen recognized that construction costs would determineshells’ feasibility. Nevertheless, the interest on both sidesmained strong due to the friendship between Tedesko and Kaand especially the trust that Dyckerhoff and Widmann placethis friendship. For the German company, shell construction“a matter of trust”(Tedesko 1931a), and such trust was the singmost important aspect of this new business relationship.

Dyckerhoff and Widmann’s response to RobertsSchaefer’s official proposal asked for 4% of the contract pricthe preparation of calculations and drawings for the firststructures to be built in the United States. Admitting that thiswas higher than the traditional design costs of reinforcedcrete, they stressed that such a cost increase was “manycounterbalanced by large savings in material”(Tedesko 1931b). Itwas to these savings in materials which the German comattributed the rapid proliferation of thin shells built by their fiin Europe despite tough economic times. They went on to sthe “daring” nature of these shells and their flawless recorperformance up to that point.

This is the result of extremely careful calculationschecked continuously by actual tests as to the correctnesof theoretical assumption, and likewise the result of care-ful execution of construction work. We must emphasizethe necessity for the same carefulness in the design anconstruction of shell structures in the U.S.A. A neglect inthis respect would inevitably lead to failures—detrimentalto the development and progress of shell structures noonly in the U.S.A. but also in Europe, damaging the suc-cess of our work and effort for many years(Tedesko1931b).Tedesko also expressed in a letter to Kalinka his pers

worry that introduction of thin shells in the United States wobe dangerous and difficult. He further explained:

Our engineers don’t understand the American businessstandpoint that one can only have employees which bring“direct results” to the firm. I wrote you earlier that a few
of our people do mostly theoretical work for which an
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American firm would not pay them. For this reason, thereare also no notable advances in theory coming out of U.Sfirms. I know that you stand in a difficult position withrelation to your “business men,” but you must make clearto them that shell construction will from time to timedemand expenditures which do not bring immediate re-sults (Tedesko 1931c).For instance, it was a must that the American engineers b

test structure in the United States in order to allay DyckerhoffWidmann’s concerns abroad as well as the concerns of theing authorities at home. For the test structure, the two firmsto acquire the contract for the German Pavilion at the “CentuProgress” 1933 Chicago World’s Fair. Tedesko stressed thafore any advertising campaign for shells be started in Americwould be necessary to build a large structure “to prove thefulness[of thin concrete shells] from the point of view of practical American construction”(Tedesko 1931d).

Early attempts to design and build thin concrete shells inYork led to a lively exchange between Ross, vice presideRoberts and Schaefer at the time, and A. V. VanVleck, the pdent of the Society of Structural Engineers in New York CVanVleck had threatened to blackball the Chicago companNew York City if they did not provide New York engineers wcalculations with which to check their work. VanVleck explainhis position and offered acceptable conditions.

In the first place if the designs are made in accordancewith any secret formulae or theories, how can any Engi-neer be in a position to check them and assure the ownethat they are safe and in accord with good engineeringpractice. In the second place you put yourselves as contractors in direct competition with practicing engineerswhich constitutes a situation that we have eliminatednearly 100% here in the Metropolitan area after manyyears of tireless effort.

My advice to you is that you co-operate with the engi-neer by giving him the benefit of such technical discov-eries as you may possess; by having your trained engineers go to his office and assist him to a thoroughunderstanding of your theories and formulae and how toapply them and if you deem it necessary check his de-signs of your construction until such time as you feel fullconfidence in his ability to handle it without your check(VanVleck 1932).These conditions might appear to have jeopardized both

erts and Schaefer’s and Dyckerhoff and Widmann’s hopeworking in New York while maintaining the secrecy of their pcess, but in reality, membrane theory calculations for a hspherical dome were no secret at all. VanVleck’s suspicion rewhat persisted until the 1940s as the air of secrecy and telogical sophistication surrounding Z-D shells. Instead of emsizing that Tedesko and his colleagues at Roberts and Scheld patents for Z-D construction in America, it is perhaps mtruthful to say that Tedeskowasthe patent for Z-D constructionAmerica.

Hayden Planetarium, New York

Heeding VanVleck’s warnings, Tedesko succeeded in arranthat the Hayden Planetarium(Fig. 3) be the first full-scale Amercan thin concrete shell, under the condition that “foreign prodwere ruled out of consideration”(Bertin 1935). This meant tha
the dome would be built on more traditional falsework rather than
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on a Zeiss network imported from Germany. Thus, the constion became more challenging, and Tedesko’s contributioncame more important. Without the Zeiss network in placeHayden was built in a fashion similar to the German domethe Army Museum and the Church of St. Blasien at the beginof the twentieth century. Thus, while the new planetarium aratus itself had very clearly been imported from the Zeiss cpany in Germany, the structure that housed the apparatumostly American.

In the case of the Hayden Planetarium, the technology forconcrete shell construction had to be developed in accordpolitical necessity rather than engineering experience. Tedserved as the principal advisor to the engineers at WeiskopPickworth, to whom he gave his own membrane theory caltions as guidelines. Tedesko filled these calculations with detions of loads and stresses, clearly making the theory availaNew York engineers, while giving actual stress values only inlast couple of pages. Tedesko’s calculations for vertical loaflected almost exactly those published by Emperger in 1Tedesko calculated maximum compressive stresses underbined loads on the order of 85 psis6 kg/cm2d. These low stressetogether with a thickness to span ratio of 1/324, placed theden Planetarium’s structural efficiency somewhere betweeMunich Army Museum and the Jena Planetarium.

Brook Hill Farm Dairy Exhibit, Chicago, Ill.

If Hayden Planetarium reenacted Dyckerhoff and Widmann’sWorld War I experiences with thin concrete shells, a small sbarrel shells in Chicago provided Tedesko with his first chanconduct large-scale tests similar to those run by the Germanin the late 1920s and early 1930s. Failing to obtain the confor the German Pavilion at the Chicago “Century of ProgrWorld’s Fair in 1933, Roberts and Schaefer was awarded atract for Brook Hill Farm’s dairy exhibit, shown in Fig. 4.

One good-natured advertisement for the exhibit stressedthe Brook Hill Farm cows would “enjoy comfort and safgreater than that ever before enjoyed by any cows anyw(Anonymous 1933). Of course, the more serious subtext ofstatement was that this new building type was economical

Fig. 3. The original 1934 Hayden Planetarium at the MuseumNatural History in New York City(Courtesy of Princeton TedesArchive)

rable, fireproof, and able to cover large areas with a minimum of



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supports. Furthermore, since the Brook Hill stalls were tempoTedesko tested them under ultimate loads prior to their demoafter the Fair. Therefore, the stalls provided Roberts and Schwith the chance to publish the first load tests carried out onforced concrete barrel shells in the United States(ENR 1935).

In scale, the Brook Hill Farm barrels were similar to the 1Biebrich test shell and the 1927 Frankfurt test shell(Table 1).Tedesko’s concern about possible imprecision in Americanstruction, however, prompted him to increase the shell thickby a factor of five from 0.6 in.s1.5 cmd at Biebrich to 3 ins7.6 cmd at Chicago. Whereas failure of the little known Biebrtest shell would have set back Dyckerhoff and Widmanntemporarily, failure of the Brook Hill Farm shells would haseriously jeopardized Tedesko’s efforts to build thin shells inUnited States. Specifically, a wooden lamella roof in Chicagorecently collapsed under an unbalanced snow load. This cohad already predisposed the Chicago Building Commisagainst so-called thin vaulted constructions(Kalinka 1931).

Tedesko had previously noted from the tests at Frankfurtunbalanced loads deformed a Z-D shell on the same ordmagnitude as uniform loads. He had further described themate load on the Frankfurt scale model of 197 psfs964 kg/m2dand remarked on a single line in his notebook, “VorzuglicVerhalten!” (Excellent Behavior!) (Tedesko 1930). Therefore, hproceeded with confidence in testing the Brook Hill Farm shHis feeling was confirmed when the Brook Hill Farm barrel shdeflected only 1/2,200 of their 36 fts11 md length (ENR 1935).

Hershey Sports Arena, Hershey, Pa.

Tedesko designed his next significant project, the Hershey SArena, to span 222 fts68 md with a thickness of only 3.5 ins8.9 cmd (Fig. 5). With this design, he reestablished the thinnof such shells in proportion to their scale and completed thtroduction of thin concrete shells in the United States. Althothe Hershey Arena has recently been discussed in detail(Saliklisand Billington 2003), it is helpful to mention the project briefland to clarify its importance concerning the themes of this p

In order to provide jobs and boost morale during the Depsion, Milton Hershey had decided to construct a sports arenacompany labor. No outside contracts would be made for the

Fig. 4. The Brook Hill Farm exhibition stalls at the 1933 “CenturyProgress” World’s Fair in Chicago(Courtesy of Princeton TedesArchive)

gineering or construction, and the company’s bookkeepers would



record the costs of construction as a portion of the monequired to manufacture chocolate bars. Tedesko persuaded thshey company that its workers, although inexperienced instruction, could indeed build such an arena(Tedesko 1991). At 32years of age, he knew that he was taking a calculated riskproject that might open the door once and for all for thin sconcrete roofs to be built in the United States. For Tedesko,shey was the project of a lifetime—an opportunity that he cnever have had in Europe(Tedesko 1986).

While the inexperienced but eager workforce at Hershey etually proved to be an asset, Tedesko was not given full contrthe construction until the project was well underway. Initially,experience as an engineer gave him little credibility as a lewith Hershey’s management.

[T]here were some Hershey plant managers whothought that my instructions were too strict; these meninterfered and discouraged others from following my ad-vice… My tests and measurements were not always takenseriously(Tedesko 1991).For instance, Tedesko once set up a certain construction

under the assumption that shifts would be 12 h long. Theagement then limited single shifts to a maximum of 8 h. Acritical moment, this left Tedesko without his best workers2.30 a.m., a thunderstorm flooded the construction site, semudslides of unhardened concrete cascading down the sidthe structure onto the flat side roofs. For fear that this extra wwould collapse the side roofs, Tedesko had his remaining wopunch holes in the relatively new concrete roofs for drain(Tedesko 1991).

One can imagine the scene at Hershey on the following ming as the job leaders sat, close to tears, staring at what appto be a ruined project. Tedesko offered to see the construthrough on the condition that he be given full authority overjob—including the careful measurement of material propeand structural deflections. The new arena was then completemonths in spite of opposition from managers who wanted todown construction over the winter. Furthermore, the new aattracted many admiring visitors during and after its construcOne of these visitors was Lt. Commander Ben Morreel ofU.S. Navy, who eventually became an important contact fo

Fig. 5. The 1936 Hershey Arena in Hershey, Pennsylvania(Courtesyof Princeton Tedesko Archive)

curing many of Roberts and Schaefer’s projects for the military.

2004


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With so much riding on the success of the Hershey SpArena, the structure’s initial deflections due to creep worTedesko, and these worries were exacerbated by stories abo1934 collapse due to creep of Finsterwalder’s Hangar at Co(Tedesko 1975). Therefore, Tedesko designed the Hersheywith substantial stiffening ribs. He also asked DyckerhoffWidmann to send him data on measurements of creep. Thethe graph shown in Fig. 6 and reassured Tedesko that sestructures had reached their maximum deflections due towithin 2 years. In addition to the German data represented in6, Tedesko ordered the collection of similar data from theshey Arena at least through 1938.

Collapse at Cottbus

Tedesko’s construction of the Hershey Arena had pushedspanning, short barrel shells to a scale that was unprecedeneither America or Europe. Later, hangars in San Diego, Califo(Tedesko 1941); Rapid City, South Dakota and Limestone, Ma(Allen 1950), surpassed Hershey in scale with forms that wunique in comparison to European hangars. These large prcontrasted sharply with contemporary German thin conshells whose forms were overwhelmed with stiffening ribs insponse to the collapse of a hangar in Cottbus(Fig. 7) in early1934.

Later in his career, Tedesko often related the following stothe Cottbus collapse as told to him by Finsterwalder.

Finsterwalder had designed several long-span, shell-type concrete hangars for the German Air Force. A fewweeks after removal of the[Cottbus] form centering itwas noticed that the shell kept deflecting and that themoveable doors jammed within the guide rails of the doorgirder. The guides were readjusted for the doors to haveclearance to move again, but after a couple of weeks thedoors jammed again. Finsterwalder over the phone askedhis men in the field to measure the deflection of the doorgirder; they reported a deflection of 20 to 25 cms8–10 in.d. Finsterwalder suggested they measure again;he thought that such a deflection was impossible as thestructure would buckle under such circumstances. At thattime a big crashing noise came over the phone and some

Fig. 6. Graph of creep in concrete structures recorded over a pof two years. Sent to Tedesko by Dyckerhoff and Widmann on M4, 1938(Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archive).

one reported that the hangar had just collapsed.

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The incident was hushed up because of the destructionof numerous planes of Germany’s fledgling air force. Hit-ler ordered that Finsterwalder, the responsible engineerbe shot. An air force officer who participated in the inves-tigation of the collapse managed to have the executionorder revoked, thus saving Finsterwalder’s life. This of-ficer later became General Kesselring, the commander othe German Army during the Allied invasion of Italy.

The investigation of the collapse indicated that it was“plastic flow” that had flattened the shell, creating themoments which in turn increased shell radius and defor-mations until the geometry was such that the structurebuckled. What was then known as “plastic flow” was re-named “creep.”

Nothing was published about the incident, but all kindsof programs were started, including long-term observa-tions, and Finsterwalder’s bridges were equipped withbuilt-in devices to keep track of creep, and all existingshells similar to the Cottbus hangar received stiffeningribs (Fig. 8) (Tedesko 1990).The Cottbus collapse demonstrated the potential consequ

of pushing shell dimensions to unprecedented levels. It also rthe question of how thoroughly Dyckerhoff and Widmann expmentally tested their ideas about this new structure before

Fig. 7. Interior of a scale model of the 1933 Kottbus han(Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archive)

Fig. 8. Interior of a 1934 hangar with similar geometry to Kottbut with stiffening ribs(Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archive)



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structing it. Nearly all of the German testing conducted on eashells such as the Leipzig, Frankfurt, and Budapest Markethad focused on buckling as a central concern.

The writers of this paper have found no evidence of large-stests on the Cottbus structure similar to those conducted inat Frankfurt. Even if they had conducted such tests, could Derhoff and Widmann have ascertained the time-dependentties of creep that led to the disaster in Cottbus? This is a difquestion to answer, especially since Dyckerhoff and Widmmay have tested Cottbus models without publishing the resusending them to Tedesko. In 1973, while discussing the collRüsch assured that the strictest investigations of the calculaand the construction revealed that everything had been doncording to accepted standards(Rüsch 1973, p. 12). The Cottbushangar’s geometry was, however, radically different from theometry of previous Zeiss-Dywidag shells. The length of the Cbus shell was 131 fts40 md, similar to the one at Budapest. Tradius of curvature of the Cottbus shell was 82 fts25 md, similarto the shell at Tertre. In designing Cottbus, Dyckerhoff and Wmann combined their longest spanning shell(Budapest) with theirwidest spanning shell(Tertre) for a new geometry. Additionallthey supported one edge of this shell on a girder, as showFig. 7.

In 1933, Rüsch had written with great confidence to Tedabout this new type of shell.

For your instruction on our latest advances in hangarconstruction, we are sending you two drawings… andtwo photographs of scale models[see Fig. 7]. This type ofhangar is substantially more economical and elegant thanthose that we have previously designed and might alsofind applications[in the United States]. The door spanscan be raised tof197 ftg 60 m and more, the appropriatedepths lie betweenf82 ftg 25 andf131 ftg 40 m (Rüsch1933).Finsterwalder had explained to Tedesko that the Tertre t

gave values for Cottbus that were practically the same asvalues calculated by more exact methods(Finsterwalder 1935).Many years later, Rüsch wrote to Tedesko that the Tertre thad been checked for the extreme cases of Tertre and Budexhibiting their ability to simplify stress calculations for a wvariety of structures(Tedesko and Rüsch 1948). Such focus ostress analysis may help to explain why Dyckerhoff and Widmwas comfortable building a new structural form such as the Cbus hanger with less dependence on structural testing andtoring than for previous structures.

More difficult to explain, however, is Finsterwalder’s willinness to refer to Cottbus as a valid structure for comparing strin 1935, because the likelihood is high that the hangar had alcollapsed. Rüsch’s letter and Dyckerhoff and Widmann’s rec(Dyckerhoff and Widmann 1935) place the design and constrution of the two Cottbus hangars in 1933. However, Dyckerand Widmann’s records report the construction of the smallergar only. Dyckerhoff and Widmann’s Drawing No. 4000. EH.shows this smaller hanger to have had a span ofw=92 ft s28 md,a length of l =131 ft s40 md, a radius of curvature ofR=66 fts20 md, and a shell thickness of 3 in.s8 cmd. Drawing No. 4015EH. 7, depicting the hangar that later collapsed, was checkeFinsterwalder on August 21, 1933, the same date he cheDrawing No. 4000. Dyckerhoff and Widmann’s records list seral hangars with stiffening ribs built in 1934. Coupled wTedesko’s anecdotal comments that the hangars had crept s
cantly and then collapsed several weeks after their construction


t,

(Tedesko 1990), this information suggests that the hangarlapsed in late 1933 or early 1934.

It is likely that the first official mention of the Cottbus collapknown to Tedesko was in a 1937 German publication(Mehmel1937, p. 20), which Tedesko received in the same year. Thisticle referred to two hangars at Cottbus, explaining thatsmaller hangar had been retrofitted with stiffening ribs aftering crept substantially and that the slightly larger hangar hadlapsed. The article also mentioned that deformations insmaller hangar had implied an elastic modulus ofE=993 kss70,000 kg/cm2d. In his 1948 letter to Tedesko on shell buckliRüsch noted that this same value for the elastic modulus ofcrete should be used in order to estimate deformations ishells due to creep. Rüsch explained that a new radius of cture could be calculated based on the deformed shape and thoriginal elastic modulus should be applied to the buckling etion for the deformed geometry(Tedesko and Rüsch 1948).

While the Cottbus collapse changed the course of thinconstruction in Germany, it did little to hinder further develment of thin concrete shells for military hangars in the UnStates. The Cottbus collapse puts into perspective both the dof the Hershey project in 1936 and the uniquely American quto later innovations in wide-spanning hangars. Furthermodemonstrates the potential danger in basing design decisionmarily on stress analysis.

Warehouses, Hangars, and Market Halls

With Hershey a success and with the onset of the war, Roand Schaefer received several contracts for military warehand hangars in the early 1940s. Few of the projects duringtime matched Hershey in scale, but, collectively, these shorrel shells(so named because their arching spanw was typicallygreater than their lengthL) provided the opportunity to conduseveral full-scale structural tests and to lay the foundationlater research on buckling in short barrel shells.

Visually, these shells reflected differences in the AmericanGerman approaches to economically constructing barrel shelarge quantities. Dyckerhoff and Widmann had quickly realthat the Zeiss networks were more useful to the constructiothin shells than to their structural behavior. By the late 1920s

Fig. 9. Typical construction of a modified Zeiss network to be uas false-work for the 1927 Frankfurt Market Hall(Courtesy oPrinceton Tedesko Archive)

2004


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Zeiss networks had been redesigned to serve as falsework(Fig.9), while traditional reinforcing bars were placed inside the sfollowing the principal tensile stress contours. DyckerhoffWidmann used this falsework in the construction of several lstructures such as the Frankfurt Market Hall, the Budapest MHall, and the Hamburg Kaischuppen. The long barrel shelleach of these structures were designed with only a maximutwo barrels set end to end. Several of these barrels would tharranged next to each other in the direction of their archingw, typically less than half their lengthL. In the case of the Franfurt Market Hall, shown in Fig. 10, falsework for five barrels wused to cast all 15 barrels side by side. By the time falseworthe fifth barrel had been setup, the first barrel had hardenedficiently for its falsework to be moved to the sixth position.

Without access to the precision Zeiss networks in the UnStates, construction of a large number of American barrel sproceeded with wooden falsework that was constructed tolengthwise along a track, as shown in Fig. 11. Fig. 12 shseveral barrels of the 1943 Budd Manufacturing Plant in Pmont, Pennsylvania, shortly after commencement of construcThe resulting structure, shown in Fig. 13, had a very diffeappearance than the long barrel shells in Germany. Charactof such American structures was their relatively short lengthtween stiffening diaphragms in relation to their arching s

Fig. 10. Long barrel shells covering the 1927 Frankfurt Market H(Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archive)

Fig. 11. Typical American falsework, setup to roll lengthwise alontrack (Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archive)

JOURNAL O


These short spans did not require edge beams as deep aGerman counterparts and later allowed Tedesko to develoinnovative ribless shells.

American Innovation, Wide-Span Hangars,and Ribless Shells

In February 1947, Tedesko warned his colleagues not to lepreceding successful full-scale tests and experiences with haand warehouses make them overconfident.

We should not increase our headaches by making astructure bolder than necessary without considerable savings in cost. Zaborowski’s suggestion to have the clientnot deal with inexperienced contractors is not applicableto public jobs. While our knowledge as to the bucklingbehavior of arches has increased, I am not satisfied yewith our knowledge regarding the buckling of shells andof shell cantilevers.

Our calculations are still based on a number of ques-tionable assumptions. Wherever costs are not appreciablaffected, I would choose the stiffer and more substantialstructure which will not give us difficulties if constructionis not in full accord with design requirements.(Tedesko1947).

Fig. 12. Budd Manufacturing Plant in the initial stagesconstruction(Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archive)

Fig. 13. Aerial photograph of the 1943 Budd Manufacturing PlanPhilmont, Pennsylvania(Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archive)



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With the Cottbus collapse still fresh in mind, Tedeskoconcerned about the behavior of wide-spanning, short bshells(see Fig. 14) after decentering and the effects of creepconcrete stiffness. In order to study these issues more in depbegan corresponding with Professor Bruce Johnston of LeUniversity about the possibility of conducting structural teTedesko decided to commission the Lehigh test structures1/30 scale replica of the hanger in Rapid City, South Dakotahad also pressed the Army Corps to obtain strain gauge reafrom the completed structure. Three weeks before the Rapidtests were carried out, he solicited input from his colleagueRoberts and Schaefer, reminding them that “the results oftests may influence the line of thought to be given to the tesLehigh and may complement information that we may want toat Lehigh” (Tedesko 1948). By December 20, 1948, it had bedecided that these tests would investigate the buckling of wspan, short barrel shells, and in particular the contribution oshell to the arch’s resistance against such buckling. Theseeventually confirmed the theoretical analysis performed onRapid City hangars(Thürlimann and Johnston 1954).

Parallel to the laboratory tests at Lehigh, Tedesko and hisleagues developed ideas for how knowledge gained from tecould be combined with construction experience to generatnovative designs. Tedesko had learned that the stiffening ribsmaller, multiple barrel shells slowed the pace of constructiomaking it more difficult to move formwork efficiently. Furthemore, these ribs caused problems with drainage and requireficult flashing details. To do away with the ribs would speed cstruction but would also depart from Dischinger’s origimathematical assumptions. With one testing program for wspanning barrel shells already underway, Roberts and Schdecided to also explore the behavior of ribless shells. To thisTedesko planned another testing program at Harvey, Illinois

The 1950 tests at Harvey(Fig. 15) consciously imitated Dischinger’s tests 19 years earlier in Wiesbaden-Biebrich(Fig. 2). BothDyckerhoff and Widmann and Roberts and Schaefer destheir experiments to test the feasibility of their most innovaidea. The deflections of both structures were well under whaallowable, and they both behaved elastically without cracunder uniform loads, unbalanced loads, and point loads. Tedreported deflections of 0.14 in.s3.6 mmd under 102 pss500 kg/m2d loads at Harvey, which had a ratio of 1/1,530 tobarrels’ 18 ft s5.5 md length (Tedesko 1961). After 8 years origorous analysis, structural testing, and construction, Disch

Fig. 14. Falsework and shell for the 1948 United States Air Fohangar in Limestone, Maine(Courtesy of Princeton Tedesko Archiv)

had staged his 1931 tests as a performance as well as an exper



r

ment. Tedesko must have felt a certain sense of destiny(andhumor) leading to the corresponding photograph of the Hatest shell(Fig. 15). He did not hesitate to enlist Dischinger hiself in the project as a consultant on the theory of ribless shewas the results of these experiments, in conjunction with Dinger’s theory, that Tedesko discussed in his doctoral dissersubmitted some years later at his alma mater in Vienna. Thisthe capstone of Tedesko’s project to bring German thin conshells to the United States. Responding creatively to the chalof adapting German construction to American practice, he doped structural innovations that were uniquely American.

Conclusions

The United States lays claim to two major innovations indesign and construction of thin shell concrete roof structThey are the wide-spanning, short barrel shell, and the rishell. These innovations were led by one structural engineerenergy, enthusiasm, and substantial technical competenceworld that risks misunderstanding engineering innovation aresult of large, expensive teams of engineers and managercrucial to understand how individuals can make a significanference. The story of Anton Tedesko’s efforts to bring thin sconcrete roof technology from Germany to America and thedevelop this technology further demonstrates the power ofviduals to produce innovations in structural engineering.

Essential to the transfer of ideas on thin shell concretefrom Germany to the United States, was the expertiseTedesko brought with him from Germany and the backing oparent company, Dyckerhoff and Widmann. Tedesko had leafrom his German mentors not only how to approach the deand construction of thin concrete shells, but also how to devnew, reliable shell forms. Critical to Tedesko’s own developmof new forms was his talent for and commitment to communtion with clients and contractors. Such communication wasticularly important because the reinforced concrete strucwere often built using local materials and local labor. Later incareer, Tedesko partly attributed the eventual demise of thinconstruction in the United States to a breakdown in commution between designers, owners, and contractors(Tedesko 1970

Fig. 15. Engineers and construction workers standing atop theribless test shell in Harvey, Illinois(Courtesy of Princeton TedesArchive)

i-p. 5).

2004


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Tedesko’s introduction of thin shell concrete roofs inUnited States is outlined in the story of three structures: a hspherical dome(Hayden Planetarium), a small set of long barre(Brook Hill Farm Dairy exhibit), and a large wide-spanning, shbarrel roof (Hershey Sports Arena). These three structures webuilt within 3 years of each other and reflected conceptuallyGerman development of Z-D shells in the 1920s. The HaPlanetarium project forced Tedesko to abandon the applicatiZeiss networks and to work with American engineers andtractors who were openly resistant to foreign technology.Brook Hill Farm exhibit provided him with the opportunityconduct public load tests that proved the safety of such sunder extreme conditions. The Hershey arena provided himthe opportunity of a lifetime to design and construct a structhat was unprecedented in scale not only in the United Statealso in Europe. These three experiences reflected the pecAmerican quality of Tedesko’s experience and paved the wafuture structures that would be known as Z-D shells butwould be American both in structure and in form.

With the viability of thin shell concrete roofs established inUnited States by the late 1930s, Tedesko persisted in woclosely with contractors and conducting structural tests. Hecouraged his American company to monitor as many ofstructures as possible. Sobered by the collapse of a Germagar at Cottbus, Tedesko proceeded cautiously toward his intive ribless shells and wide-spanning, short barrel shells. Into develop the confidence necessary to build these strucTedekso relied more on simple calculations, structural testingextensive communication with contractors than on complicanalytical procedures.

Acknowledgments

Funding for this work was supplied by the National ScieFoundation Award No. 0095010 to Princeton University.writers are indebted to Dr. Anton Tedesko and his widow, STedesko, for giving his personal and professional filesPrinceton University in order to create the Princeton Tedeskchive. The writers are also indebted to Professor Edmond Pliklis for studies of the Hershey Arena and to William Cooformer student at Princeton University, for helping to organizePrinceton Tedesko Archive.

Notation

The following symbols are used in this paper:a 5 shell radius;D 5 diameter in plan of a dome;d 5 depth of a shell; i.e., a shell’s rise above its springing

points;h 5 shell thickness;L 5 length of a barrel shell; andw 5 width of a barrel shell, i.e., the span of a barrel shell’

arch.

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Tedesko, A.(1991). “Introductory remarks: Session on concrete sheACI Convention, Princeton Tedesko Archive, Princeton, N.J.

Tedesko, A., and Rüsch, H.(1948). “Letters between Roberts aSchaefer and Dyckerhoff and Widmann.” January 23, MarchPrinceton Tedesko Archive, Princeton, N.J.

Thürlimann, B., and Johnston, B.(1954). “Analysis and tests of a cylindrical shell roof model.”ASCE Proceedings, 80, Separate No. 4,ASCE, New York.

VanVleck, A. (1932). “Letter from Society of Structural EngineersNew York City to C. P. Ross of Roberts and Schaefer.” FebruaPrinceton Tedesko Archive, Princeton, N.J.

Villiger, W. (1926). The Zeiss Planetarium, R. G. Aiken, translator, W. &G. Foyle, London.

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anton tedesko and the introduction of thin shell concrete roofs in the united states

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