"anxiety" in heidegger's being and time: the harbinger of authenticity

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College of [email protected].

Philosophy Scholarship Philosophy

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"Anxiety" in Heidegger's Being and Time: eHarbinger of Authenticity James MagriniCollege of DuPage , [email protected]

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Recommended CitationMagrini, James, ""Anxiety" in Heidegger's Being and Time: e Harbinger of Authenticity" (2006). Philosophy Scholarship.Paper 15.h p://dc.cod.edu/philosophypub/15
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Anxiety in Heidegger's Being and Time:The Harbinger o Authenticity

M MagriniDePaul University

ABSTRACT: Analyzing the fundamental ontology of Dasein in Martin Heidegger'sBeing and Time, this essay details the essential relation ship between the mood ofanxiety (Angst) and Dasein 's authentic comportment to existence. Although a highly

disturbing experience, anxiety holds the potential for enlightenment, as it opens Daseinto the fundamental characteristics of its temporal authenticity. Dasein assents to itsSelfhood and enacts its freedom in a resolute, authentic manner only when it grasps thedifficult and burdensome aspects of life revealed by way of Angst 's attunement. Thus,I argue that anxiety is the single most important mode of human attunement thatHeidegger describes .

This essay examines the relationshipbetween the mood of anxiety (An gst) andDasein's authentic comportment toexistence. It will be shown that anxiety isa potentially enlightening experience ,which brings Dasein before the mostfundamental characteristics of authenticity,including Dasein's awareness of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being , which itprojects while bearing the full weight ofits primordial guilt , thereby owning up tothe nothingness at the root of its Being,and further , facing the uttermost, insur

mountable certainty of its possiblenon-existence , or death. As a far-reaching primordial possibility of disclosure,anxiety makes manifest in Dasein itsBeing towards its ownmost potentiality

for-Being - that is , its Bein g }ree for thefreedom of choosing itself and takinghold of itself' (Being nd Time ,232/188 . To choose and take hold ofoneself, as Heidegger conceives, is toassent to one's own most potentiality-forBeing and exist in an authentic manner.

This includes Being-in-the-world in sucha way that one is beholden to the pastand accountable for the future .

For the most part, Dasein exists inan inauthentic manner (everydayness),which amounts to choosing not to chooseitse(f, and is characterized by the perpetual movement of falling. This mode ofexistence for Heidegger denotes an

understanding in which the existentDasein does not understand itself primarily by that apprehended possibility ofitself which is most peculiarly its own(Basic Probl ems of Ph enomenology,279 ). In the inauthentic mode, Dasein'sunderstanding and discourse are expressedwithin the idle talk and curiosity of the

they-self , disclosing existence in asuperficial and ambiguous manner.Tranquilized by what seems a completeunder standing of things, Dasein neversets out to acquire an authentic under

standing of existence and is unconcernedwith the clear-sighted projection of itsownmost possibilities. Lost in the theyself , Dasein does not enact its ownBeing and either avoids , or remainsoblivious to , the uniqueness andpeculiarity of its Being and its genuine

possibilities.Thi s lack of authentic self-understanding

is a problem for Heidegger, who is concerned with bringing Dasein . back toitself to face its own Being with honesty

and integrity. Asking how Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being is to begrasped and enacted , Heidegger offers asolution that spans nearly the entirety ofDivision II of Being nd Time. WhenDasein exists authentically , he concludes, Dasein is itself in and from itsown most peculiar possibility , a possibility that has been seized on and chosen by


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the Dasein itself' BP, 287). Authenticexistence constitutes Dasein's mostextreme possibility of existing, whichprimarily determines its Being. Asopposed to moving along passively withthe ebb and flow of things, Dasein, forthe first time, is emphatically choosing tchoose itself and its own way in theworld . t is for this reason that Heideggerconsiders authentic existence an extremepossibility for Dasein. 1 However, beforeDasein comports itself authentically, itmust be brought back from falling andthe they-self' to instead face itself andthe ultimate conditions of existence. Thisis accomplished by way of the revelatorymood Stimmung) of anxiety, which forHeidegger represents the harbinger of

authenticity.Moods are fundamental states of

attunement that color Dasein ' s dispositionand awareness, out of which it uncovers ,or discloses, things that matter. Prior tocomporting itself to any situation, Daseinis already immersed within a mood ofsome kind, as attunement is always atwork influencing its worldly orientation.Heidegger describes attunement as a primordial way of Being that precedes allcognition and volition, and [is] beyond

their range of disclosure BT, ]75/136).However, not all moods are equallyrevealing. For example, everyday moodssuch as love, happiness, boredom, irritability, and fear do not provide fundamental existential insight into Dasein' sBeing as a whole ,


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anxiety is a generalized , highly disturbing dread arising from Dasein, whichinduces a crisis of meaning. Anxietyprovokes a shattering breakdown in theeveryday, familiar ways in which Daseinconducts its life and most dramaticallyillustrates the principle of breakdownand revelation within Heidegger'sphilosophy. For example, in Division ISection Chapter 16 (Being ndTime), Heidegger analyzes the breakdown of ready-to-hand equipment andthe subsequent revelation of w orldthrough the phenomenon of the unready-to-hand. When a tool functionsproperly, its authentic readiness-tohand remains inconspicuous . On thecontrary, when a tool ceases to functionproperly, or becomes unusable, it quicklydraws the attention of the user to thesystem of relations of which it is a partas it is directed toward a specific task. Atthe instant of breakdown , Dasein catchessight of everything connected to thework; the totality of the workshop, soto speak, is lit up. The nature of equipmentality and the referential totality ofthe ready-to-hand are simultaneouslymade explicit, disclosing the overallpurpose of the project (towards-this) andthe manner in which the project must

proceed in order to reach fruition il1-.order-to). Anxiety induces a similar phenomenon, albeit on a larger scale, for inthe moment of Angst s attunement, theentirety of Dasein's existence is disrupted ,its life no longer works, or functionswith meaning. A breakdown occurs, andthe phenomenon of the world announcesits presence, disclosing the complexsystem of reference relations withinwhich Dasein is immersed.

When the world announces its pres

ence in anxiety, Dasein ' s everyday existence (inauthentic) falls into a state ofconfusion; meanings and interrelationsare lost, and a slipping away of beingsoccurs. At the moment anxiety swells,Dasein no longer feels at home withinthe comfort and safety of its inauthenticBeing-in-the-world, as the thoughts andinterpretations of the they-self' lose

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meaning, force, and significance. Thingsthat were once familiar and comprehendible show themselves in problematicways. Dasein is momentarily lefthanging as a homeless, thrown being.Alienated, in the mode of the not-athome (Unheimlichkeit), Dasein is forcedbefore the nothingness of existence. 4This primordial, uncanny existentialmode of the not-at-home represents forHeidegger the most fundamental way ofexistence, acting to individualize Daseinfor its own Being, revealing the unique ,individual possibilities, which it alonehas the potential to enact as Being-inthe-world.

However , the individualization (existential solipsism) that occurs in anxietyis the exact opposite of solipsism as traditionally conceived , i.e . as a retreat intothe secluded interiority of the consciousness , and is instead Dasein's boldreclaiming of its world and Being .Anxiety works on Dasein so as to bring itout of the world of the they-self' to faceits own world as world, and thus bringit face to face with itself as Being-in-theworld ST, 233/188). Anxiety freesDasein to take hold of its existence bythrowing it back upon that which it ismost anxious about - its own potentiality

for-Being-in-the-world provokingDasein to reflect upon that which mattersmo st in its existence. Heidegger claimsthat anxiety arises out of Being-in-theworld as a whole , and when Dasein isanxious, its Being as care is disclosed.Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety

shows Dasein as factically existingBeing-in -the-world . The fundamentalontological characteristics of this entityare existentiality, facti city , and Beingfallen T , 2351191).

The ontological understanding of careprovides important insight into Dasein'sexistence , as the three modes (ecstases)of temporality are implicit within itsdefinition as ahead-of-itself-as-alreadyin-the-world and Being-alongside inthe world .5 Heidegger views primordialtemporality , the ontological meaning ofthe care-structure, as a finite phenomenon.


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Care itself, n its very essence, arguesHeidegger, is permeated with nullity(nothingness) through and through (BT ,331/285). Hence , due to the nature of itsbeing, Dasein endures a finite existenceand inevitably faces insurmountableobstacles, which restrict and shape itspossibilities and the enactment thereof. Itis anxiety that discloses the limitations ofDasein's existence by revealing the threeways in which nothingness manifestsitself existentially within the care-structure: 1) Death (2) thrown ness and facticity, and (3) the impossibi I ty of enactingall possibilities. These delimiting factorsrepresent the primordial nothingnesswith which Dasein, enduring a finiteexistence, must come to terms in order toexist authentically.

The Nothing with which anxietybrings us face to face, writes Heidegger,unveils the nullity by which Dasein, n

its very basis, is defined; and this basisitself is as thrownness into death (BT,356/308). Anxiety is about death.Inauthentic Dasein interprets death as ifit were only a biological truism, signifyingnothing more than the physical cessationof the organism. Falling within theeveryday mode of existence, Daseinmisses the existential significance ofdeath and treats it as a present-at-handthing or occurrence. For example, viewingdeath as an event that happens to others,or as a quasi-established , abstractedtruth, which occurs at some point nDasein's distant future, characterizes afleeing in the face 0f death, which s

ultimately a fleeing from anxiety ,described by Heidegger as a fleeing ofDasein in the face of itself - of itself asan authentic potentiality-for-Beingits-Self' BT , 2291184). Living n an

inauthentic way, n the midst of thethey-self, Dasein allows denial anddeception to shield it from the pressingimpact and monumental import of itsmortality. Conversely, authentic Daseininterprets the oppressive void of -anxietyand the ultimate nothingness of death asthe single most integral aspect of authenticcomportment. When Dasein, uncanny

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and individuated, with its worldly relations severed, is brought before the utterpossibility of its no-Ionger-being-able-tobe, its ownmost authentic potentialityfor-Being is revealed as Being-towardsdeath . t not only attunes itself to theinevitability of mortality, but also projects the uncanniness of anxiety intoits futural existence. This, for Heidegger,represents the existential understandingof death as a Being-certain of death,or mortality, and when Dasein takes onthis possibi Iity as its own possibility, tis anticipating and running ahead(vorlaufen) towards or up to its death,with the dual recognition of itsinevitability and indeterminate nature, asdeath, the uttermost possibility of nonbeing, can occur at any moment.

Dasein is free for the possibility ofdeath when it accepts its mortality, andthis is what Heidegger calls the freedomtowards death. At the moment Dasein isfree for death, open for what is possibleat any moment, all of its possibilities aresubordinated to the uttermost possibilityof death and thus become provisional.In its runn ing ahead to death n antici-pation, Dasein is liberated from itsabsorption in the they of everydayexistence and understands its existencein terms of its factical possibilities,which are constrained and shaped bymortality. As Heidegger indicates, anticipation is something other than merelyBeing-certain of death's inevitability;more importantly, it is the freedom forpossibilities within which Dasein holdsand maintains itself. Being-certain fordeath is only disclosed when Daseinenacts the not-yet that is always a partof its Being-ahead-of-itself. In anticipation , Dasein recognizes death as a con

stant and legitimate threat arising fromanxiety's latent presence, which holdsDasein open to the utter and constantthreat to itself arising from [its] ownmostindividualiz ed Being (BT, 310/266).Thus , anticipation is also about anxiety,as running ahead to death is Dasein'sauthentic comportment to death andincludes maintaining, or holding, oneself


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within the threat of death ' s indefinitecertainty.

In Division II , Chapter I (Seing ndTime) , Heidegger ends the discussion ofdeath by explicating the ontologicalpossibility of the existential projectionof anticipation . The question remains.whether or not any phenomenon inDasein's existence actually realizes thisontological-existential possibility of a

Being-towards-death in the concrete,existentiell, i.e., Dasein' s ability tocome to owe anything in facti callyexisting ST, 332/286). Heidegger demonstrates that such a phenomenon existsand refers to it as the conscience.When Dasein owns up to the primordialguilt of existence (nothingness), whichconscience formalizes and silentlycommunicates, it therefore fulfills theontological conclusions about death andis free for the pursuit of its own finitepossibilities within concrete ex istenfi ellsituations.

Heidegger does not express conscience in traditional psychological , ethical, or religious terms . Rather , he viewsconscience as a form of understanding,expressed as a silent voice which urgesDasein to end its flight into the inauthentic world, i.e ., face the nothingness of

its Being as thrown-prqjection, own upto its primordial guilt , and assume theresponsibility of enacting it s authenticpotentiality-for-Being. n vocalizing whatanxiety intimates , conscience remindsDasein that it does not control its ownBeing, as the C;lr-e-structure is ultimatelygrounded in primordial nothingness.Since anxiety discloses this fact it istherefore integral to the phenomenon ofconscience. In uncanniness , remindsHeidegger, Dasein stands together with

itself primordially. Uncanniness bringsthis entity face to face with its undisguised nullity, which belongs to thepossibility of its own most potentialityfor-Being BT, 333/287). Like facingdeath , the acceptance of guilt's burdenrequires Dasein to confront the disturbing truths of existence brought to light inanxiety.

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The reticent voice of consciencespeaks from the depths of anxiety's rumbling silence . The summons of Beingguilty is potentially audible because ofDasein's ontological predisposition forhearing:

Only in keeping silent does theconscience call; that is to say, thecall comes from the soundlessnessof uncannniness, and the Daseinwhich it summons is called back intothe stillness of itself , and called backas something that is to become still.Only in reticence, therefore, isthis silent discourse understoodappropriately in wanting to have aconscience. t takes the words awayfrom the common-sense idle talk ofthe they ST, 343/296).

The uncanny call of Dasein (conscience) in its thrown nothingness isunfamiliar to the ordinary , everydayDasein and thus resonates as a distant,

alien voice. The silent discourse ofconscience rings in an unfamiliar andanomalous manner within the loudconfusion of inauthentic existence. Forthis reason, the voice penetrates the crashand rattle of idle chatter and reaches the

they-self, attempting to induceDasein ' s authentic Self' to pay heed toits message and return into the reticence

~ f [its] existent potentiality-for-BeingBT, 322/277) . However, to merely

have the voice of conscience reach theinauthentic Dasein is not sufficient tocall it back from the they into itsexistent potentiality-for-Being. For thepossibility exists that Dasein, absorbedwithin its fallen everyday existence, mayignore the call , fail to understand it , or

remain oblivious to its urgent communications. Hence , just as there exists aninauthentic reaction to death, there existsan inauthentic response to conscience.Heidegger states that as Dasein runsfrom its primordial guilty nature, it isagain fleeing the oppression of anxiety ,and in this instance it is fleeing in theface of the conscience .


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Heidegger argues that guilt, in theeveryday sense, emerges when Daseinendeavors to cover over, or flee from, theagitation it experiences by way of Angst.Attempting to quell its unsettledness,Dasein passively adopts the ethicalmores of the they-self as rigid criteriafor its behavior. When the voice of thethey-self' is erroneously protracted and

universalized, it forms that whichHeidegger refers to as the worldconscience. To envisage the conscienceas an objective, formalized phenomenon,with content supplied by the venerableobligation to religious beliefs, principlesof reason, or societal mores, is torespond in an inauthentic manner to thecall of the existential conscience .Although the voice of the conscience isthe call of care (Dasein's own call), inauthentic Dasein judges the caller after themanner of the world, i.e., the collectivevoice of the they-self, and interpretsconscience as a power that it can comeacross Objectively (BT, 323/278).Heidegger contends that the traditionalconception of conscience and guilt, asexpressed within psychology andreligion, for example, originate from themisunderstanding of the existentialconSClence.

Unlike the everyday idea of guilt,existential guilt is a form of obligationcharacterized by an emptiness, a lack ofcontent, which Heidegger expresses inthe following terms: Being-the-basis fora being that is defined by a not - that isto say, as Being-the-c2sis o a nullity(BT, 329/283). Dasein is guilty becauseits possibilities for the future , past, andpresent are all influenced and constrainedby the primordial nothingness thatresides in the care-structure. To enact its

authentic existence, Dasein must own upto its guilt. It must acknowledge andaccept that the possibilities that it seeksto project itself upon are limited bynothingness, which manifests itself in

thrown-Being, death, and the fact that inchoosing one possibility it is thereforeprecluding a host of other equally viableoptions. Freedom, writes Heidegger,

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is only in the choice of one possibility -that is , in tolerating one s not havingchosen the others and one s not beingable to choose them (BT, 331/285).

t has been the aim of this work toanalyze anxiety as the harbinger ofauthenticity, but s a neutral mode ofattunement, Angst is the forerunner toboth Dasein ' s authentic and inauthenticmodes of comportment. Thus, to merelystand courageously before anxiety doesnot amount to choosing an authenticexistence based on what anxiety reveals,for Angst merely brings one into themood for a possible resolution (BT,394/344). f anxiety is to be consideredand acknowledged as the harbinger ofauthenticity, n active move in whichDasein chooses to choose itse(f isrequired (recall the contrast betweenDasein ' s authentic choosing to chooseitse(f and the inauthentic choosing not tochoose itse(f). Dasein must thereforeincorporate the insight gained in anxietyand actively take on the responsibility ofits death and the guilt-ridden nothingness of its existence. Heidegger locatesthe means by which to open Dasein tothe enactment of its authentic potentialityfor-Being within the phenomenon of

resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), whichis to say, positively incorporatinganxiety's seemingly negative influence:

lA]nxiety can mount authenticallyonly in a Dasein which is resolute.He who is resolute knows no fear;but he understands the possibility ofanxiety as the possibility of the verymood which neither inhibits norbewilders him. Anxiety liberateshim .from possibilities which countfor nothing , and lets him become

free or those which are authenticBT,394/344).

To initiate authentic Being-in-theworld , a transformation of inauthenticexistence is required. Dasein must submitto the .disturbing revelations of anxietyby way of wanting-to-have-a-conscience,i.e., choosing to own up to its being-the-


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basis of a nullity as thrown-projection.This blameworthy attitude, or authentichearing of the call of conscience, isDasein 's ownmost Self taking action initself on its own accord in its Beingguilty , and represents phenomenally thatauthentic potentiality-for-Being which

Dasein itself attests (RT, 342/295). Theauthentic understanding of conscience ,which signifies a readiness for anxiety, iswhat Heidegger terms resoluteness , which is the authentic disclosednessof Dasein. This distinctive mode ofdisclosedness holds within itself

Dasein's authentic Being-towards-deathas the possible existential modality for

its own authenticity, which it enacts inthe existentiell (RT, 353/305). Heideggerlinks resoluteness , as disclosedness, or

uncovering, to the authentic truth(aletheia) of existence, the most primordial, and indeed the most authenticdisclosedness, in which Dasein is itspotentiality-for-Being (RT, 264/221).

In the moment of resolute openness,which is nothing other than wanting tohave a conscience, throwing itself downupon its Being-guilty in readiness foranxiety, Dasein opens itself to whatHeidegger terms the Situation, or theauthentic way of Being-there (RT,

347/300). As previously stated, Dasein'sauthentic existence represents anemphatic choosing to choose itself.However, to understand Heidegger'sconception of Dasein in the moment ofresoluteness, the traditional notion ofvolition as the deliberate choice of asubject must be reconsidered. , This isbecause resolute Dasein is not willfullychoosing between the competingalternatives of inauthentic and authenticexistence. Rather, Dasein is openingitself up to Being; its choice, so tospeak. is already made when it allowsitself to be called by conscience to ownup to guilt and accept the nothingnessof existence. Therefore, Dasein is not somuch choosing authenticity and theSituation as it is choosing its actionswithin specific situations. In resoluteness, Dasein, released from the oppressive

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influence of the they-self, pushes forward authentically into its possibilitieswith the existential understanding ofwhat is factically possible at each andevery moment.

The authentic Situation of Dasein isnot an axiomatic guide to authenticbehavior , presenting a theoretical schemafor human existence. Instead, it is anauthentic way of inhabiting the presentmoment, which modifies and clarifiesDasein ' s relationships, i.e., its concerneddealings with entities and its solicitousBeing-with-Others. The Situation is theauthentic clearing of Being, an openingfor the enactment of Dasein's authentically owned possibilities. Seizing uponthe existential understanding of thrownness and death, Dasein makes its choices

in light of its uncertain future andthrown-past. It is within the Situationthat Dasein' s freedom is born of therelationship between its choices and theconstraints that shape its possibilities. oerroneously conceive resoluteness as adeliberate choice, which estab1ishes thepermanent transformation of Dasein, isto truncate freedom and eradicate thepossibility of ethics, and thus deny toexistence nothing less than the verypossibility of taking action in a particular

Situation (RT, 345/298).When resolute Dasein comportsitself, anxiety has extinguished intrinsicmeaning from its life, and the reasons foracting and making choices hinge uponthe disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible t thetime (RT, 345/298). Authenticity doesnot provide life with a new content, forauthentic existence is in fact devoid ofcontent, nor does it alienate Dasein fromthe world. Rather, authenticity bringsthe Self right into its current concernfulbeing alongside what is ready-to-hand,and pushes it into solicitous Being-withothers (RT, 344/298). Authenticity isa shift in the framework of Dasein' sexistence, transforming the context inwhich it enacts its approaching possibilities.Authentic Being-in-the-world is a spontaneous way of living in which Dasein is


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open and receptive to the approach ofBeing. The radical, authentic transformation to authenticity occurs when Daseinowns up to the disclosed nothingness,or nullity, of its Being, which firstmanifests itself through the primordialattunement of Angst.

Conceived as a temporal phenomenon , the Situation is Dasein ' s momentof vision Augenblick) , or instant, ofauthenticity. In the instant as an ecstasis, writes Heidegger, the existent Dasein iscarried away, as resolved, into the factically determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation ofaction BP, 287). This is the moment ofenpresenting (the authentic present ofecstatic temporality) when Dasein, accessible and free, projects itself into itspossibilities within the factical anddistinct circumstances of its own uniquelife. Such an authentic resolute openness to worldly encounters is onlypossible because Dasein is a temporalbeing that temporalizes, and thus is atonce its future, past, and present asthrown-projecting Being-in-the-world. Thepresent, which is held within authentictemporality , is the sustaining form ofDasein s authentic choices, the resoluterapture with which Dasein is carried

away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in theSituation as possible objects of concernBP, 287).

The authentic temporalizing of Daseinoccurs as it projects its finite possibilities , initiating a forward movementtowards itself as resolute Being-towardsdeath in its ownmost potentiality-forBeing. This movement secures a repetition of the authentic nullity, ornothingness, characterizing Dasein' s

authentic response to the call of conscience. Thrown before the revelations ofanxiety, this future-oriented act ofretrieval is the authentic appropriation ofDasein's having-been . In coming toitself (future) from out of its ownthrown-Being (past), Dasein disclosesthe meaning of authentic Being withinthe instant, or enpresenting (present),

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of the Situation. This ecstatic temporalprocess represents the letting be ofBeing, which has been defined as theauthentic truth of existence. Thus, whenDasein exists authentically, it experiences the world in its basic unconcealment - allowing that which shows itse ffrom itse f to be seen - now not disclosing beings, but the phenomenon of worldas such, i.e ., the overarching matrix ofmeaning and purpose structuringDasein s Being-in-the-world .

The concluding remarks focus onDasein's authentic response to anxiety as

n insightful and philosophical way toencounter Angst. The ultimate situationsof human existence, which manifestthemselves by way of anxiety, representthe very conditions that hold thepotential to make human life genuinelymeaningful. Death , nothingness, andthrown ness, disclosed through anxiety,are precisely what Dasein must accept inorder to exist authentically as its future(free-for-death), past and inheritance(its having-been), and present, thethere, or enpresenting, of existence. It

is of benefit, at this point, to inquire intothe mind-set of the authentic , resoluteDasein as perceived by Heidegger. Is itlikely that while preparing his extensive

analysis of authenticity, Heidegger wasdrawing inspiration from his own existence s a philosopher? Such an assumptionis reasonable, if we envisage the philosopher as one who is attuned and open tolife's most difficult situations.

Of assistance in understanding thephilosopher's mind-set is to recall thetwo perspectives from which this essayhas considered anxiety ' S influence. If onthe one hand, Angst is interpreted in aninauthentic manner, as a constant threat

to one s healthful existence, Dasein fleesin fear from anxiety's disturbing effectsto the safety and familiarity of theinterpretations of the status quo. If onthe other hand, Angst is perceived as thebridge to a unique form of understanding,which connects Dasein to the finite realitiesof its Being-in-the-world , then as opposedto prefiguring horror and passivity, anxiety


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announces itself as the harbinger ofDa sein ' s authentic enactment of freedom for its possibilitie s As anxiety isdisclosing the insignificance of the world,authentic Dasein is reinterpreting themeaninglessness and impossibility ofexistence as revelatory. This radicalconversion of the inauthentic viewsignifies that one is letting the possibility

of an authentic potentiality-for-Being belit up, i.e., one is behaving philosophically, awakened by the sense of wonderBT,393/343) .

The philosopher therefore embraces ,through resolute openness, the limitedand ephemeral nature of the world thatanxiety discloses . To abandon the notionof a finite worldly existence in search ofmeaningful consolation elsewhere (e.g.,inauthentic worldly projection or otherworldly projection by way of religion) isto degrade our vast potential, as such

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incoherent aspirations work to tear downour genuine earthly relations. Philosophyis ultimately concerned with enactingways of life that embrace finitude , forexistence is truly philosophical only

when its knowledge is appropriatelyattuned to that which cannot be known,to a destiny that exceeds oneself. RPhilosophy must take up and challengethe ultimate uncertainties that compriseBeing-in-the-world . Heidegger accuratelyconcludes that outside of the single fatalityof death , that uttermost certainty, whichis non-relational and insurmountable, Daseinis a wealth of potential. Considering thedepth and breadth of his treatment ofauthenticity , Heidegger may well be askingthe reader of Being nd Tim e to considerseriously the life of the philosopher asrepresenting an anxious obligation todeath , which frees herlhim for the joyousand challenging activity of living .*

* I thank Professor William McNeiII , author of The Glance of the Eye : Heidegger,Aristotle, and th e Ends of Theory. His comments and suggestions helped to improvethis essay.

Notes

1 Heidegger, Martin, The Concept oj Time. Trans., W. McNeill, bilingual edition (Blackwell:Oxford) , L992 , p. IOE Heideg ger s exact quotation concernin g Dasein ' s authenticity runs thus: The

auth enticity o j Das ein is what constitutes its most extrem e possibility of Bein g Da


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6 , On the Origin of the Work of Art, Poetry , Langua ge, o ught . Tran s.,A. Hofstadter (Harper & Row: New York), 1971, p 67. Reflecting on the phenomenon of authenticre so luteness within The Origin of the Work of Art , Heidegger writes the following: The

resoluteness intended in Being and Time, is not the deliberate choice of a subject, but the openingup of human being, out of its capacity in that which is, to the openness of being.

7 Heidegger describes the immediacy of Da se in 's action-taking when resolute for its ownPotentiality-for-Being in the following terms: Resoluteness doe s not take cognizance of aSituation and put that Situation before itself ; it ha s put itself int o the Situation already . As resolute,Dasein is already taking actio n. (BT , 347/300).

8 McNeill, William , Care for the Self, Philosophy Today (Spring Issue), p 62.

Works Cited

Heidegger, Martin , The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. , A. Hofstadter (Indiana

University Press: Bloomington), 1982 .

Being and Time. Trans., 1 Macquarrie and E Robinson (Harper & Row: New York), 1962 .

The Concept of Time . Trans William McNeill, bilingual edition (Blackwell: Oxford) , J992 .

On the Origin of the Work of Art, Poetry , Language, and Thought. Trans.,A Hofstadter (Harper Row : New York), 19 7 1

What is Metaphysics? Basic Writings. Trans. , David F Krell (Harper Row: SanFrancisco), 1993.

McNeill , William, Care for the Self , Philosophy Today (Spring Issue).

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"anxiety" in heidegger's being and time: the harbinger of authenticity

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