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Probe International's Reply to Acres International's May 8, Submission to 'l'he Assoeiation of Professional Engineers of Ontario, Complaints Conunittee Regarding Probe Internab onal's Complaint Concerning Acres Interna bon aI's Role in 01(: Three Gorges Water Control Prqject Feasibility Study Submitted October 19, For consideration October 22, 1992

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Probe International's Reply to Acres International's May 8, 1992 Submission toThe Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario, Complaints CommitteeRegarding Probe International's Complaint Concerning Acres International's Role in The Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: APEO Document Redacted

Probe International's Reply to

Acres International's May 8, 19~)2 Submission to

'l'he Assoeiation of Professional Engineers of Ontario,

Complaints Conunittee

Regarding

Probe Internab onal's Complaint Concerning

Acres Interna bon aI's Role in 01(:

Three Gorges Water Control Prqject Feasibility Study

Submitted October 19, 19~)2

For consideration October 22, 1992

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1'1WUI~ lNTI~nNI\TlONI\L

Probe International's Reply to

Acres International's Response to

Probe International's Allegations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction

2. ,Jurisdiction: Probe International's response to

Acres' Submission A

:1. Allegations of Professional Misconduct, Negligence and

lnCOlnpctencc: Probe lnternational's response lo

:\cres' SubmIssion 13

Introduction and Summan' of' l)ro['(~~;sj()I1;l1 Wron

A, Inadequate Dam Safety Analysis

l3. Inadequate and FlaweclFloocl Control i\nalysis

C, Flawed and Misleading Cost-Beneil t Analysis

D. Other Major Flaws in the Three Gorges Water

Control Project Feasibl:Lz:ty Study

Appendices

Page

3

LJ

L: J

18

2,' r

o (

44

54

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INTHODUCTlON

1. Introduction

In its May 8, 1992 submission to the Registrar of Association of Professional

Engineers of Ontario (APEO), Acres International Limited (Acres) rejects both

the app'ropriateness of and the legal basis for APEO's exercise of jurisdiction over

the substance of Probe International's complaint against Acres International for

Acres' work on China's Three Gorges dam. Acres International also rejects Probe

International's evidence in Damlning The Three Gorges and our September 3,

1991 response, saying they do not constitute a substantive basis for our complaint

of professional and ethical misconduct, negligence, and incompetence.

Probe International maintains that the APEO has a legal requirement, a

legislative mandate, and a professional duty to all its members ancllicensees to

hold Acres accountable to Ontario-legislated standards, as outlined in the

Professional Engineers Act (lithe Act") and as confirmed by the former Eegistrar

of the APEO Furthermore, Probe International is of the firm view that Acres has

railed to refute Probe International's evidence of professional and cthic1l

misconduct, negligen.ce and jncomp(~t(,IlCI). and rcq\.ll~st~; l)),\[ tlH' ;\!)Fn c()[lflnn

its jurisdiction over this matter and refer this matter to a 118;:ll'Ing.

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PHOUE IN'l'EltNATIONt\L

2. Jurisdiction

The Act states:

2(3) The principal object of the Association is to regulate the practice

ofprofessional engineering and to govern its nwmbers, holders of

certificates of authorization, holders of temporary licences and

holders of limited licenses in accordance with this Act, the

regulations and the by-laws in order that the public interest may be

served and protected.

The position of the Association on the question of jurisdiction, as set out by the

former Registrar, Peter Osmond, is unambiguous. In his lVlarch 25, 1991 letter to

Probe International, Mr. Osmond said:

With respect to the qllestions you raised) I lcould fl·rst confi.rll7. that

this Association takes the position that it has jurisdiction over aU

engineering activities of'its hcencees u'hereuer and howeuer those

actiu!ties tahe place

In its submission of May 8, 1992 Acres makes 1118ny arguments attempting to

convince the APEO to qualify or ignore the clear, unqualified jurisdiction it has

uneler the Act.

*

For example, Acres ci tes a cri tical review of Dcnnming the Three Gorges in Impact

Assessment Bulletin, to argue that the APEO should not have jurisdiction over

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JUHISDICTION

Acres' 'Nork on the Three Gorges dam in China:

In several chapters, western values are used to make judgments about

the social impacts of the proposed project on the Chinese people.

Western values cannot be assurned to be applicable in the asseSSTnent

of international projects, especially in China. "The Chinese have been

socialized undRr different forms ofgovernment) land tenure

relationships) belief structures) norrns) values, and other cultural

dRf'initions. These charCLctenstics appear to have been ignored by

contributors to the text.

iii Can the Complaints Cornmittee of the APEO accept that APEO's jurisdiction is Cjualified

by standards and events in China?

In its iVIay 8, 1992 submission to the APEO, Acres ;:lrgucs that Quebec is lithe na tural

jurisdiction to resolve this matter" because Acres staff c1eliveredlJrofessional engineering

""""""'s "primarily in tbe Province of Quebec,"

iii The issue before the Board is its own jurisdiction, not that of Quebec:

Similarly, Acres argues that Canadian constitutional law limits the jurisdiction of

provincial legislation territorially and that "it would be an extraordinary proposition for the

APEO to aSSUI1J,e jurisdiction and substitute its own 'view on professional miscon.cluct for

that of the appropriate licensing and regulatory body in the jurisdiction in which a company

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PHOBE INTEHNATIONAL

or individual renders professional engineering services,' simply by virtue of the fact that

such company or individual may be also licensed to practice engineering in the Province of

Ontario." Acres goes on to say that it would be contrary to "interjurisdictional comity and

the legislative mandate of the APEO to effectively second-guess the appropriate

maintenance of professional standards in another province with regard to professional

engineering services performed there."

• Probe International is not asking APEO to "substitute" its own professional standards

for those of other jurisdictions. Nor is Probe International asking APEO to "second-guess

the appropriate maintenance of professional standards in <mother province." Probe

International is simply asking APEO to determine whether Acres and its staff, who are

licensed by APEO, delivered professional engineering services to the Three Gorges Weder

Control Project Feasibility Study that met Ontario's standards.

Acres argu.es that the "principal object" of the APEO, as set out in section 2(3) of the Act,

should be interpreted ClS the regulation of the practice of professional engi neering in

Ontario for Lhe protection of the Ontario public interest onl\'.

Again, Probe International rejects this restrictive interpretation and maintains thClt in no

way does the Act relieve licensees of their positive duty at all times to uphold the standards

of the licensing body whose licenses profess to a certain quaJi ty of engineering work.

Nothing in the Act limits the obligation of Ontario-licensed engineers to safeguard only the

lives. health, property, and welfare of Ontario citizens .

• If the public outside Ontario cannot rely upon the APEO to enforce Ontario standards on

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,JURISDICTION

out-of.-province engineering activities by its members, then Ontario engineers are not

professionally accountable for the effect of their actions on the public in the jurisdiction in

which they are practicing.

*

Again, Acres says "It is not evident to us that the exercise of jurisdiction by the APEO in

this matter serves in any way to protect the 'Ontario public interest'. Indeed," Acres

contimles, "it would appear contrary to ." the Ontario public interest ... to effectively seconcl­

guess the appropriate maintenance of professional standards in another province with

regard to professional engineering services performed there II (emphasis added by

complainant).

Again, the issue before the APEO is whether it has jurisdiction, not whether and how il

should exercise its jurisdiction.

JII Can the APEO deem the maintenance of high Ontario standards, under any

circumstances, to be contrary to the Ontario public interest'?

Acres claims there is a conflict between statements made by API;;O's former n.egistrar, IVJr.

Peter Osmond, in two letters to Probe International.

There is no conflict. Both of Mr. Osmond's statements are clear, unequivocal. and consisten t

with the Act. We also note: that APEO's position is consistent WiOl engineering practices in

the U.S. and the U.K.

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PHOBE INTEHNi\TIONAL

~--~-"----

The Royal Charter of the Institute of Civil Engineers in the United Kingdom, the

professional standard-setting body for civil engineers in the U.K., states in its Rules for

Professional Conduct, section 9:

A member in connexion with uJorh in a country other than his own shall order

his conduct according to these Rules, so far as they (Lre (Lpplicable; but where

there (Lre recognized stcwdards of professional conduct, he shall adhere to

them.

In the U.S., engineering state registration boards similarly consider the out-of-state

activities of their licensees. 1;'01' example, the North Dakota State Board of Hegistration for

Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors says "engineers who practice outside our

jurisdiction are expected to adhere to our standards as well as observe the stand8rds of the

jurisdiction which they are in."

Acres argues that it is not possible lito attribute speciflc d siems to Acres or its engineers.

even if they were subject to APEO jurisdiction," clue to /\cr8.'O· corporate relationship to

CY,JV and the many parties involved in the Three Gorges proJccL Il also cites lhe declslOll

of lVIr. Luc Laliberte, Syndic of the Ordn~ des ingenieurs du Quebec, wIlo found the OIQ had

no jurisdiction because it only regulates individuals.

III The difficulty of attributing responsibility is not at issue here, neither are the standards

('md practices of the OIQ. (1'he APEO must decide if it has jurisdiction to consider the

standards and practices of aJI its licensees, individual and cOl'lJorate"

*

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JUHlSDICTlON

Acres also argues that Frobe International is abusing the process, claiming that Probe

International misrepresented a specific finding of the OIQ by translating the verb

"revoyait" to mean "revise" rather than "review."

The OIQ did not provide an official response in English, because as Mr. Laliberte noted, "By

virtue of Law 101, }'rench Language Charter CL.R.Q. c.e-11) we are obliged to write you in

French."

As no official translation exists, there is no reason to accept Acres' translation.

According to the ]?-obert - the definitive French language authority for the French··spe8king

world - the verb "revoir,1I as used by Luc Laliberte in "revoyait," is defmed as "exanliner de

nouveau pour parachever, carriger" or the action of examining again for the purpose of

cOlTection, and directs the reader to the verb "reviser." The same is true for !{arraps

Shorter French (Lnd English Dictionary, as well as the Robert und Collins, Lastly,

La!'ollsse's defines "revoir" as lito see again; to meet again; to revise, to review, to re-

examine, II

F\lrtlwrmore, these various tr:msJations define actions similar to those described by ,J

"Chronology of Activities on the rl'hree Gorges Feasibility Study" (found in Acres' Exhibit L):

COl!7l1lents (!'Om 8C, C1])1\, the 'World Bank, Chinese and Reuieul Board aU

incOl]Jorated into Vols. 7)2,3,4)5)6,7)8,20 and n,

Feb/M8rch, 1988

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pnOBE IN'I'EENI\'l'lONI\J,

Acres also argues abuse in citing the procedures and decisions of other regulatory boards.

In the case of Quebec, Acres states that the OIQ has resolved [this matter] together with a

reasoned decision in wri ting to Probe. II Acres adds that with the cooperation of CYJV, it lIis

providing the APEO with the particulars that were made available to the OIQ (Exhibit 1)

and informed that body's decision. 11 With the matter lI already authoritatively disposed of in

the appropriate jurisdiction,11 Acres argues that Probe International is abusing the process.

Probe International maintains that Mr. Luc Laliberte, Syndic of the OIQ, did not refute

Probe International's allegations of misconduct by Quebec-registered engineers in their

practice of engineering on the rl'hree Gorges feasibility study. In fact, Mr. Laliberte states

tllClt Ii our possible complaint against Hydro-Quebec International, SNC and Lavalin would

be, legally speaking, immediately rejected by the Disciplinary Commi Hee, as these firms

are not and cannot be members of OLll' professional corporation and, as such, CCLnnot lye

jlldged h:y ltS Il (emphasis added by complainant). Because II no individual decision was taken

)1')' any particular engineer for which he/she could be held rcsponsible,1I Mr. Laliberte

explains lIit is impossible for us to attribute to either one or several of our Members toto) or

8ven partial responsibility for any hypotheses, solutions, and rccommcndations ll found in

the Three C;'orgesWuler Conlrol Prqjecl Fensihilily ltc/y.

[n the case of B,C., Acres lntcrtwtional states:

The APEBC decision nUlhes cleor that mCLny olthe concerns presented by

Probe in its booh, J:.}r:Lnm1ing-'-.[he311reg_!Jorges, were to be the subject all/a

c07nplementary study which was to lollol.u the leasibillty study and cleol lulth

construction plunning) ellu{Tol/mentul issues Wid resetllenwnt issues" wllLch

was SZlspended by the People's RepubUc ol Chin.a (PRC) in July 1989, prior to

to ..

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JUmSD!CTlON

its completion. The APEBC suggests that "this report might have satisfactorily

addressed the issues raised by Probe." The APEBC stresses furth-er that the

Probe Complaint addresses concerns essentially beyond the Terms of Reference

of the Feasibility Study under attack, that the Probe critique consists of only

opinion evidence rather than the facts, "and the disciplinf? process of the

Association is not structured to arbitrate diverse opinions."

We maintain that the APEBC made findings of fact without full disclosure and without a

hearing, and through procedures differing from those of the APEO. Therefore we question

the weight that can be accorded to these findings. Moreover, given the opportunity to argue

our case before the APEBC, we believe that the APEBC's decision would have been

different. The APEBC also dismissed our complaint on the grounds that our criticisms

"tended to be opinions" and the APEBC is notstructurecl "to arbitrate diverse opinions." As

you will see from the following evidence and our two earlier submissions, we believe our

cri ticisms are beyond opinion and are a matter of professional standards.

II Once again, the issue before the APEO is whether it has jurisdiction. The existence of

other procedures in other jurisdictions is not relevant to the APEO in determining its own

iclrisdiction in this maLLer.

In sumrnary, the former Registrar's position is unequivocal, and Acres must accept the

/\PEO's jurisdiction in this matter. Acres' position raises several pertinent questions:

II ,should the APEO be bClrred frorn considering a licensee's record in a jurisdiction outside

Ontario?

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PIWDE .[N'J'EHNi\TIONAL

• Do Ontarians have a right to the reassurance that an Ontario engineer observes only the

highest standards, and that he not determine his standards by the expectations of his

clients?

• If an Ontario engineer is found guilty of misconduct concerning his professional conduct

in another jurisdiction, does APEO have no jurisdiction to consider the impact or

implication of that misconduct on the reputation of other Ontario engineers?

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

3. Allegations of Professional Misconduct, Negligence and Incompetence:

Probe International's Response to Acres' Submission B

Introduction and Summary of Professional Wrongdoing

Probe International submits that Damming The Three Gorges, our September 3, 1991

submission, and the body of evidence to follow illustrates errors, omissions, imprudent

assumptions, biases, analytic irregularities, inconsistencies, oversights, and substandard

engineering methodologies that were applied by Acres engineers in their work on the Three

Gorges Water Control Project FeasibiLity Study. We also submit that these failures

compellingly demonstrate the inadequacy of the review process in which consultants and

specialists took part.

\Ve believe this evidence contradicts Acres' argument that its work satisfJed the "highest

,,,md of professional excellence and ethics." We firmly believe that Acres has failed to

uately respond to our complaint, and that a prima {([cic case eXists for a hearing into

the matter.

OU 01· t

III rrhe CYJV engineers failed to employ the recommenclations of JCOLJJ Bulletins numbers

59 and 72 on clam safety precautioru; and selecting seismicity parameters, and therefore

neglected to apply these recommendations in the dam design and the econornic cost-beneflt

analysis;

III CYJV engineers exaggerated and misrepresented the Three Gorges project's f100cl control

benefits;

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]'HOBE INTEHNi\TIONi\L

Ii CYJV engineers failed to taJte into account uncertainty in their risk assessments and

assumptions;

Ii CYJV engineers failed to review existing data on sedimentation as required by the

Terms of Heference, thereby rendering their Hood control, navigation and electricity benefit,

and life-expectancy calculations unreliable and without scientific basis;

1\1 CYJV and its clients claimed they had "reviewed and analyzed, on an integrated basis,

the costs, benefits and other effects of the overall project" and concluded the project was

"feasible and financially viable " without first demonstrating the feasibility of resettling

close to one million people, as the Steering Committee and the rrerms of l~eference required;

1\1 CYJV concluded the Three Gorges project was "environmentally feasible" without the

c1c1ta ann analysis to prove it.

We suggest that CYJV engineers licensed by Ontario have demonstrated professional

misconduct and negligence based on the following provisions of HQgillatioJl :5:18/84 made

under the PLQLQ1i,;;iQJJs.dJ~1}giLH;J;:L0_j~~L:

8()(l) In this section) "negligence" meons em (Lct or on omission. in the carrying out of

the worh o{ a practitioner that constitutes 0 {ailure to maintain the standards tho t a

reasoTwole and prudent practitioner would nwintain in the circurnstcmces.

(l1Jhere the "worh o{ a practitioner" is defined in the Pr:Qf±:;;siQ!HIl

Engill.f}....fDLftcl as IIJproctice o{ pro{essional engineering) meCLTLS CLny oct

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLiGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

of designing, composing, evaluating, advising, reporting, directing or

supervising wherein the safeguarding ot lite, health, property or the

public welfare is concerned and that requires the application of

engineering principles, but does not include practising as a natural

scientist "]

86(2) For the purposes at the Act and this Regulation, "protessional

Tnisconduct" nwans,

(a) negligence;

(b) jc[ilure to nwhe reasonable prouisi,on tor the safeguarding of life, health or

property at a person who nwy (Je atfected by the Icorh jc)r which the

practitioner is responsible;

(c) jc[ilure to act to correct or report a situation thut the !Huctitioner believes

m.uy endanger the safety or the IDeljcIre ol the puZJlic,

lcu/un) to 1Ilolic respons!h1e !HOI'is!ons jc)r complying Ii'ith opjJlicable

statutes) regulations, standards, codes, hy./aws CLlI.cl rilles in connection luith

war!? being undertahen by or under the responsibility oj' the practitioner,'

(f) failure at a practitioner to present clearly to his employer the consequences

to be expected froni a cleuiation proposed in worh, if the professional

engineering judgment of the practitioner is overruled. by non-technical

CUlt/Writy in cases where the practitioner is responsible for the technical

adequCLc)' ofprofessi.onal engi.neering u}orh;

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P]WBE INTEHNATIONAL

91(1) It is the duty of a practitioner to tlte public} to his employer; to his

clients, to other rnembers of his profession} and to hirnselfto act at all tirnes

with}

(iii) devotion to high ideals ofpersonal honour and professional integrity;

(2)(i) A practitioner shall regard his duty to public welfare (IS paramount;

54. Every holder ot a licence, temporcLry licence or limited fiance who jJrouldes

to the public a seruice that is within the practice ofprofessional engineenng

shall sign) date and offix his seal to every final drwuing. specijlcotioTl, plall,

report or other document prepared or cheched !)jI him as part 0/ the seruicc

before r:t is iss lied.

\\'e suggest Lll:lL CYJV engineers Jiccnsec11Jy OnLuio ))(\v(; demon Lnt

incompetence based on Lhe following provision of Lhe El:QfQQ.QiQllaU~llgirle_e]'s Acl:

29(3) The Discipline Committee may tind C1 II/ember of the Association or a

holder of a temporary licence or a hmited licence to be incompetent it in its

oprnwn,

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

(aj the mernber or holder has displayed in his professional responsibilities a

lach of knowledge, shill or judgment or disregard far the welfare of the public

of a nature or to an extent that demonstrates the member or holder is unfit to

carry out the responsibilities of a professional engineer.

]r;

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PIWDE INTlmNA'I'IONi\L

EXAMPLES OF PROFESSIONAL WRONGDOING

A. Inadequate Dam Safety Analysis

The points contained in section A are dealt with in Chapter 10 of Damming The Three Gorges. A

more detailed technical discussion of this subject prepared by Dr. Philip Williams in 1990, and on

which Chapter 10 is based, is attached as appendix A.l to this submission.

With a project the size of Three Gorges, we believe a reasonably prudent engineer must consider

tbe worst-case scenario in its risk and safety analyses. Failure to do so demonstrates negligence

pursuant to section 86(1) and professional misconduct pursuant to sections 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the

Code of Professional C~onduct; incompetence pursuant to section 29(3)(a) of the Professional

!~ngineers Act; and a violation of sections 91(1)(iii) and 91(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics

A.l Inadequate 'l'rcatrnen t of Ground Acceleration (appendix A 1 p2)

According to ACl'es, CYJV used lCOLD Bulletin No. 46 OCOLD H)8J) as the reference for

evaluating the seismic risk of the Tl)ree Gorges project. TTow(~ver. subseCluent documents incluclui!;

reo L)) hu lleti n s were a V;) ila hI eat th e ti me the feasibi li s tll dy was prepmcd and nvo of' t Iw~;e

dealt with the issue of seismicity

rCOLD Bulletin No. 59, Dum ~S'afety Ciwdelines (lCOLD 1987) stressed tl1C irnportance of usi ng the

"latest standards cmd methods" for evaluating seismic activities. rCOLD Bulletin No. 46, used by

CYJV, did not contain the latest standards. These standards were contained in the Guidelines for

Selecting Seismic Parameters For Lurge DOl!2 Projects prepared by USCOLD in 1985 which became

the basls for leOLD Bulletin No. 72 (TeOLD 1989). Bulletin No. 72 rnakes clear that the firsL

chapter of Bulletin No. 46 "summarily treated the problem of seismic input for dam analyses, II and

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

the objective of Bulletin No. 72 is to outline the II state of the art in this field" and to provide

guidelines to help dam designers to select the seismic input parameters concerning large dams.

According to leOLD Bulletin No. 72 page 17, the location and description of faults II should incl ude

documentation on the existence of or lack of historic or pre-historic activity (paleoseismicity) for

each fault." Although Acres says that CYJVs analysis of seismicity included a comprehensive

cataloging of earthquakes, this included historic activity only. CYJV failed to consider

paleoseismicity and, instead, limited its assessment to historic data (Vol 4 p 4-4).

CYJV also failed to adequately determine the key design parameter of ground acceleration CYJV

ignored the estimates of ground accelerations determined by the methodologies of severell

respected researchers, using instead the lowest available estimate (i.e. it used 0.17g insteCld of

05g). CYJV then used this lowest estimate as a "starting point for safety evaluation of the main

project structures" (Vol 4 figure 4.2, attached as appcncllx ;\2). I<~xpcrience with Californl

eal'tbquak8s indicates that even the highest of the estimates considered - O.Sg - may be optimlstic:.

Ground accelerations of 1.Og were measured at the Pacoina IJam during the ('3.5 magnitude San

Fernando earthquake. l

l'nclerC'stirnating ground ;lcceleratiol1 is imprudent. parLicuL!rl\ in thiS case lwcwse, to

[CULl) criteria, Three Gorges would be an "extreme ]']sl\" project requiring the most COnS(TVClllV('

design approach (appendix A;3). If the more realistic ground acceleration estimate ofO.5g is usee! it

appears tJ1at the return frequency of the maximum earthquake ror which it is designed will be

exceeded about every 200 years instead of every 2000 years as intended (Vol 4 figure L1.6)

lVerLical accelerations of O.6g were measured about 20km a wayfrom the 7.1 magnitude Lama Prieta earthquake, as compared to theO.12g that would have been predicted using CYJV's methodology.

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PHOBE INTEHNi\'J'IONi\L

We suggest that the inadequate treatment of ground acceleration contained in the feasibility study

is unacceptable for a reasonably prudent engineer licenced in Ontario, and that it demonstrates

negligence pursuant to section 86(1) and professional misconduct pursuant to sections

86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct, and a violation of section 91(2)(i) of the Code

of Ethics.

A.2 Inadequate Analysis of Reservoir-Induced Seismicity (appendix A.1 p3)

Acres' response does not properly address our allegation that CYtN failed to adequately consider

tbe risks associated with HIS, and therefore failed to incorporate the dTects ofFUS in their dam

design.

lCOLD Bulletin No. 72, page 27 states: "Even if all the fmllts within a reservoir are considered

tectonically inactive, the possibility of reservoir-induced seismicity should not be totally ruled

out." 1

\1/e refer the Committee to volume 4 plate 4.8 (attached as appendix 1\.4) which shovls several

£;1111ts running right under the dam site itself. Although these faults have not been confirm to be

in,luivc (as indicated by CY<JV's parenthetical qualiJiccltion that the L1UltS arc "generalh

l'(;COIEoJidated"), CYJV Ulrried out its analyses assuming that they were macLlvc. If' any 01 theSe'

fclUltS arc still active, increased ground acceleration and offsd after the dam is built must be

considered in a reasonably prudent design. CYJV engineers failed to do so. Reinforcing ICOLIYs

~~~-------------------~---~-------~---------~---------------------

l.The }\.oyna Dam in India initiated approximately a 6.0earthquake, killing 200 people, in an area that had notpreviously been seismically active.

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!vlISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

caution is the statement by Sherard, Cluff and Allen in Geotechnic that Ilconcrete dams on active

faults, or near some major active faults, are not advisable." l

We suggests that CYJV's failure to adequately assess the risks of RIS reveals negligence and

professional misconduct pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Code of Professional

Conduct and a violation of section 91(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics. They also violated section 54 of

the Eegulationsby failing to sign and seal their drawings.

A.3 Inadequate Analysis of Structural Stability (appendix A.I p3)

Acres claims that the Three Gorges dam has been designed so as not to be endangerc:;d by both the

PMF event and the MCE event, using approaches and criteria consistent with internationcd

practice for feasibility studies ofJarge multi-purpose water resources projects. We disagree, and

suggest that CYJV failed to use acceptable design parameters and risk assessments to ensure

tructural s tabi Ii ty.

E3ecause CYJV failed to adequately evaluate the impacts of IUS and ground acceleration, they

could not take these crucial parameters into account in their structural stability ana s, I rJ)

13ulleLin No. 72 section 5.:!.1 on cOl1creLe (LIm::; r:xplains thaL c!vl1,unic nl1itc clement l'i'sponc:('

cll](]lyses, whicl1 require peak ground motion parameters, should be carried out for most clams In

higl1 risk or hazard ratings. CYJV failed to complete a d.yn81nic fini te clemen t response analysi s

even tbough Three Gorges would rate as an "ex treme risk" project according to ICC)IJ) critel'lcl

(appendix A.3). Hather than deferring this critical analysis until after project approval, as CYJV

did, it should have been included in the feasibility study.

lSherard, L, et aI, "Potentially active faulLs in damfoundations," Geotechnic, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 367428, 1974.

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PROBE INTERNATIONAL

Although CYJV'$ structural analysis indicates tensile stress in the dam, CYJV fails to project

whether a higher, more realistic ground acceleration will cause cracking. Design changes to deal

with cracking would add significantly to the cost and feasibility of the project.

According to ICOLD Bulletin No. 59, section 4.7.4: "Due to the risk ofreservoir-inducecl seismicity,

in dams exceeding 100 meters high or storing more than 1. km3 of water, due cognizance should be

taken of the requirements to design for seismic loading even in regions without any historical

seismicity."

We suggest the CYJV's inadequate analysis of structlJxal stability reveals professional misconduct

pursuant to section 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) and negligence pursuant to section 86(1) of the Code of

Professional Conduct..

A.if Inadequate Treatment of Reservoir Landslides (Clppendix A.l rA)

defends CYJV's assessrnent of landslide risk by making two points. First, Acres sLates tlwt

some lAO landslides in the reservoir were catClloged and characterized, and the slopes were

evaluated for stability. Second, that waves triggered by landslides would not affect the safe!\ of'

the clam.

First, cataloging and evaluating landslides which occur in the area is insufTi.cient. Wiele

Ouct.uatlons in reservoir levels are highly likely to have a destabilizing effect on potential slide

areClS in the Three Gorges region because the region is already susceptible to major landslides.

According to ICOLD Bulletin No. 59 section 6.2.1: "Critical reservoir rim areas should be surveyed

for banks which may become unstable during or after reservoir fi.lling or drawdown the colletpse of

which rnay affect the safety of the clam or any other facility in the vicinity of the reservoir." CY,JV

~ 22 ~

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

,-------------

optimistically and mistal{enly assumes this crucial factor can be ignored because of the

unsubstantiated assertion that submergence of the toe will increase st?bility (Vol 4 p 5-11).

With respect to Acres' claim that landslide-induced waves would not affect the safety of the dam,

we refer the Committee to volume 4, figure 5.1 (attached as appendix A5) which shows CYS\T's

predicted landslide-induced waves of 20 to 50 m. Note that, although CYJV dismisses the

cCltastrophic impact of these waves because of lithe policy of resettling people to a level of

[elevation] 182 or higher ll (Vol 4 p 5-12), the feasibility study says elsewhere that people will

remain at elevations 162 m. (Acres acknowledges this fact in its May 8, 1992 response in its

IISubmission 13 '1 pg. 7, B.5(i).) Therefore, in the event of a 50 III wave, even when the reservoir is

drawn down to the 140 m flood control level, hundreds of thousands of people Jiving above 162 III

are at risk.!

Fina]]y, it should be noted that both natural and reservoir-induced earthquakes, whose frequency

ground acceleration rnagnitudes are grossly underestimated by CY,IV, \vi)) have a

de~;t(lbilizirlg effect on potential slide areas.

l3y failing to assess the nsk ofre~;ervoir landsJides, CYJV has ignored tl1e risk to the I ,\\'elf,uc

;)Ild properLy ofLhe population it plans to IC;1\'e in the ,)ctive flood control rescnoir ;)1'(;;)

suggest this dCJnonstrates negligence pursuant to sectioll 86(l) and profession;\I misconducL

j)msuant to sections 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct; incompetence pursuant

to section 29(::3)(a) of the Professional Engineers Act; and a violation of section 91 (2)0) of the Code

of Ethics.

LA landslide-induced wave at the Vaiont Darn killed 4000 people.

?,:l -

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PROBE IN'I'ERNATlONAL

A.5 Underestimation of Spillway Failure (appendix A.I p5)

Acres claims that, before CYJV recommended its spillway design, extensive reviews of

Chinese studies and models were carried out. We believe that reviewing previous and

ongoing models and studies is insufficient for estimating the risk of spillway failure.

CYJV did not carry out a risk assessment to determine the risks to public safety and the

economic costs of spillway failure, despite CYJVs recognition that the "discharge per unit of

width of the submerged spillway bays is well beyond the proven world experience." A

reasonably prudent engineer would at least have analysed the performance, reliabili ty and

frequency of failure of spillways at other mega-dams to cleterm ine the probability of failure

of spillways at Three Gorges.

As per CYJV's recommendation that lithe feasibility of SllCh a high unit discharge should be

reviewed during final design," CYJV should have been explicit th2\t spillway operations had

not been proven feasible.

We suggest that CYJV's recommendation to build the dam despiu' not proving that the

spillways will perform safely constitutes nCi~ligencc pursuant to n 86(1) and

professional rnisconducl pursuant to section 86(2)(a)(b)(c) and (el) or the Code of'

Professional Conduct.

A.G Ilisk of Cofferdam Failure (appendix A.I po)

Acres has presentecl information from the feasibility study in a way that tends to

unclerstate the risk of cofTerdam f~lilure.

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

Acres suggests that a 5 to 6 m water level difference between the upstream and

downstream side of the Phase II cofferdam is insignificant. We wish to point out that 5 to 6

metres of water stretching back over hundreds of kilometers of reservoir is not an

insignificant volume of water.

Acres also suggests that the consequences of failure of either the Phase II or Phase III cofferdams

would be "primarily limited to flooding the construction site." We disagree, and we refer the

Committee to three pages from the feasibility study contail1(;,d in appendix A.6. The Phase II

cofferdam will be buil t to eleva tion 90 and will store 1 km3; the Phase III cofferdam will be buil t to

elevation 135 and will store 12.4 km3. If a devastating flood wave washes out one of these

cofferdams, a large flood wave will be released with flow rates exceeding a hundred thousand cubic

metres/second that wendd overwhelm the Gezhouba Dam downstream, whose reservoir capacity is

less than 0.5 km3. The massive flood wave would continue downstream, devastating the Y,ll1gtze

flood plain, probably overtopping tbe Jingjiang dike, and drowning hundreds of thousands oC

'T'he eh ances of such an event are underestimated ]))' CYJv. The 12 percen t chance oC coCfercLlm

Cailure during tbe construction period used by CYJV is optimistic because it is b,lsed on ClIl

un istic construction eell] Ie. For exampl e, CYJV mates the FJ!wsc 111 cofTcl'CL1m wi]! hr'

built to 135 m in just () months. They do not project tbe increased risk of failure if the darn is

constructed over a longer, more realistic, schedule .

.._-_....._---_._-----_...._--

1. Such 8. cofferdam failure occurred in 1986 on a much smaller scale inthe U.S. when the Auburn cofferdam was washed out in a flood, releasingabout 0.15 km~-3 and a flood flow in the order of 20,000 cubic metres/sec;but fortunately the downstream Folsom reservoir was able to containthe flood peak.

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PROBE INTEHNATIONAL

By failing to assess the risk of cofferdam failure CYJV has ignored the risk to the life,

welfare and property of the population near the project. We suggest this demonstrates

negligence pursuant to section 86(1) and professional misconduct pw'suant to sections

86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct; incompetence pursuant to section

29(3)(a) of the Professional Engineers Act; and a violation of section 91(2)(i) of the Code of

Ethics. They also violated section 54 of the Hegula tions by failing to sign and seal their

specifications and plans (e.g., see '1014 plates 4.15,4.16,4.17, etc.) .

.. :2 () .

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, iNCOMPETENCE

13. Inadequate and Flawed Flood Control Analysis

All of the points contained under section B are dealt with in Chapter 8 of Damming The Three

Gorges. A more detailed technical discussion of this subject prepared by Dr. Philip Williams in

1990, and on which chapter 8 is based, is attached as appendix B.I to this submission.

Acres response does not address our allegations that CYJV failed to provide an objective and

systematic analysis of the reduction of flood risk expected from the project, and also failed to show

that the project was tlle most cost-effective approacb to providing this flood risk reduction,

B.I Misrepresentation of the Purpose of the Project (appendix B.1 pI)

Acres' response does not address our allegations, belt we believe the implications of its response

need to dealt with,

Acres states that the area that will obtain significant £1ood control ben ts is }9,4:)9 km2 with an

estirnated population in 1987 ofS).87 million. This fails to address the contradictions contained in

the feasibili study which we mentioned in our book and in our submission to APEO in m l'

I :)~)]. That j,;, the an,;) which the engineers chim \Viii be protected (l'om fl bvU](~ ))jIS

described in different parts orthe study as approximately: 20,000 sq.km, Lmill ion sq.km, G,700

sq.km, and 4,000 ,oC].km,

nather than completing a systematic evaluation of potential Oood control benefits, ,TV has

unquestioningly accepted for the primary goal of the Three Gorges dam operation the Chinese

government cliclclte of increasing £1ood protection of the Jingbei and Jingnan areas from a 250 year

flood to a 1000 year flood. This reducticn constitutes such a hypothetical, incremented increase in

f1()od protection that it would be considered highly unusual anywhere else in. the world. In order i

() r~;

~I

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P!WBE INTEHNATIONAL

accomplish this lofty goal of flood protection for some people, CYJV has developed a plan that puts

people living in the reservoir area - people who, at 162 m, are currently at no risk of flooding - at

risk of inundation from a 20 year flood.

Furthermore, Acres attempts to exaggerate flood benefits by implying that flood protection for the

Jingbei and Jingnan areas constitutes over 80 percent of the total flood benefits from the dam.

This is not the case. According to the CYJV's own economic analysis (appendix 13.2), only 10

percent of the project's £1ood control benefits are attributable to the Jingbei and Jingnan areas.

The same economic analysis from CYJV's study (appendix 13.2) shows that approximately 80

percent of the flood benefits will accrue to areas that will remain flood-prone, i.e. flooel diversion

areas and beach areas l. IIowever, CYJV has calculated the benefits based on a dollar value per

square kilometer and the economic growth r:ate in this area equal to that in non-flooel-prone an;as.

'1'here is no logic in assuming that people will invest as much money in expensive ch'iellings 01

llstries in an area that they knO\v will be subject to flooding as they will in an area not subJecl

to flooding. Moreover, people who do build in flooel-prone areas generally nood-proof then' slruc

tures, thereby decreasing the cost of flood cl<lmages further.

13eC;Hlse the flood control analysis in the study is so rife with contr::ldictory c]ainls, l'x:lf;r-;cr:lled

beneflts, undcrestirnated costs, and distortions of fact, we can only conclude thal t' e

were unable to justify the feasibility of the Three Corges dam for reasons of flooel protection.

Instead, Acres invokes Chinese government policy to justify their deviation from acceptable

standards of analysis and practice. We suggest this constitutes negligence and proi'essional

misconduct pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct.

l.Beach areas are strips of land next to the river which are onthe river side of existing embankments.

'28

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MiSCONDUCT, NEGLiGENCE, iNCOMPETENCE

13.2 Unrealistic Operating Criteria (appendix B.1 p2)

Acres did not address the point we made in our complaint. As we pointed out in our submission of

September 3, 1991 and in our book (p.92), the operating experience of large multipurpose

reservoirs during large floods indicates that there can be substantial deviations from prescribed

operating procedures which result in greatly reduced flood benefits (see section B.2(iii) below).

Acres substantiates a very serious concern we have with their operating criteria. Acres confirms

there are no operating rules that will override political decisions and human error; instead,

decisions will be made by "consensus opinion."

B.2(i) Potential Conflict Between People Affected by the Filling Reservoir and Those

Getting Helief fronl Flooding' Downstream (appendix 13.1 p3)

For the first tin1e, Acres (representing CYJV) has acknowledged that its pl::=ln recornmends leaving

at least 500,000 people in the active flood control reservoir area. The resettlemen t and f100d

control experts who reviewed the CY,lV study for Probe International uncovered this fact after

comparing various population and resettlement figures contained in the feasibility study The

plight of these balfmillion people has been concealed from dccision-nwkers ;:lS this circulw;tance 1S

J)ot even mc;ntionecl in CYJV's Volume J. which 1S a 'Istand ,lione ll document prep,)

rnakers and potential international funders.

ford SJOl]-

Acres says these 500,000 people Ilwill continue to be affected by flooding. II It must be made clear

that tbe construction of this dam will put these 50(),000 people at risk of flooding for the first tllne.

Currently, people living upstream, at elevations of 162 m to 182 m, are not at risk offlooding.

These 500,000 people will not avoid the devastating effects of flooding simply "by climbing a Cew

meters to complete safety. II We suggest that this comment shows complete disregard for public

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1'lWBE INTERNi\'l'lONAL

welfare in general, for the particular circumstances of the infirm, and for the loss of livelihoods,

crops and property. Such an attitude demonstrates professional misconduct pursuant to section. .

86(2)(b) and (c) of the Code of Professional Conduct and a violation of section 9l(2)(i) of the Code of

Ethics.

Acres' final point, that damages along the river without the dam would be gJ.'eater than damages

around the reservoir, is based on faulty analysis, CY,JV has assumed that people living upstream

slang the river who live with, and depend upon, annual flooding have made the same economic

investments in their flood-prone area as people who live in areas currently not prone to flooding

(i.e. the land at 162 metres that LinD be subject to flooding /))ith the reservoir). This assumption is

questionable. People living along the river, who have lived with flooding, flood-proof their property

and make investments appropriate to their own environmental circurnstances.

using its biased assumption, CYJV also distorts its benefit/cost analysis ACC01'd to

study, people in the active flood control reservoir - bet\veen 162 rn and 182 m - wh.o will be

elJsplacecl by the reservoir will carry with them their portable assets and thereby clecre8se the cosl

of floocl damage (Vol 7F p 2·4); while people currently living along the river are not credited wi th

,\n)' measures to decrease the cost of £lewd damage (Vol 7 table 9.6, footrlOte ij). Note thc1t such an

Zlssurnption decreases project costs in the former case and increases project hencflts in the 1'1ttcr.

B.2(ii) Conflict with flower Generation (appendix 13.1 p3)

Acres' claim thst there is Iinot likely to be a change in the operation of the project in favour of

electric power production ll is wrong. Chinese officials 8re currently talking 8bout a Iinormal 175-

meter-deep water storage level ll (appendix B.3) rather than CYJV's recommended 160 m normal

pool level.

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMl'E'I'ENCE

The Chinese government's decision to chose electricity benefits over flood control benefits based on

CYJV's study is a logical one. The electricity to be produced is a real, measurable benefit whereas

as discussed in section B.1 above, most of the flood control benefits are intangible.

CYJV knew that such a change in operating levels might take place. It would have been prudent

therefore to include a warning in the feasibility study about the implications of such a change in

operating levels. (For example, increasing the NPL from 160 m to 175 m will decrease the

efficiency of draining the reservoir. This would result in increased sediment build-up downstrearn

and in the reservoir which in turn would impair the ability to draw down the reservoir in advance

of floods.) We suggest the failure to point out these potential consequences is contrary to section

86(2)(0 of the Code of Professional Conduct, which instructs an engineer licenced in Ontario to

present clearly to his employer the consequences to be expected from a deviation from his proposed

\",ork.

B.2(iii) Conflict with Downstrerun Development (appendix 13.1 p3J

i\cres has not addressed our concern that operating procedures might be altered to protect down

slre21m development. instead. Acres has implied that dam operating rules, and some planned

i':d t1g dnd forecasting systems, will prevent a conflict beL\veen dam operations ancl downstream

development.

:Vlost of the flood benefits claimed by CYJV result f)'om economic development in the river channel

(beach areas) and overflow dlversion areas that has yet to occur. Even though these areas will

remain flood-prone, CYJV has predicted that investment per square kilometer and economic

growth rate will be the same inside the existing embankments as outside. This assumption is

imprudent and impractical, but is necessary for CYJV to boost its projected Good control benefits.

In rational flood control planning, it is standard practice to specify Hood-prone areas downstream

:n -

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PHOBE: INTEENATIONAL

of major dams as "floodways " and prohibit or control development in these areas. This allows dam

operators to follow operating procedures - which include regular high flood control releases -

without the fear of drowning out downstream developments.

When this practice is neglected and development in £1oodways occurs, operators will tend to stop

making regular releases of water in order to protect these areas. If this happens, too much water i

held in the reservoir and when a large £1ood occurs, large volumes of water must be released to

prevent dam failure. Such a large release will inevitably result in severe downstream damage!.

Had CYJV evaluated a II£1oodwayl' below the Three Gorges dam, or even taken into account the

rational behaviour of people protecting themselves in nooel-prone areas, the ca!cll!ated flood

benefits would be substantially less.

B.2(iv) Spillway Operating' Assumption (appendix B.l p:3)

states that II·it was assumed thClt a fixed pClttern of reservoir operation \vould be rigidly

followed by the TGP operators." However, as outlined in our previous section B.2(iii), operating

procechlres ma.y be altered in order to protect downstream development. CYJV did not assess the

consequences if its assumption of perfect spillway u]JC;ration is not realized.

Acres also states that its assumption of perfect spillway operation "w ill generate a conserV,lUv(;

estimate of the potential benefits." 'rhis cannot be true since 3. conserv8tive estimate would have LiJ

consider impaired spillway capacity which would bClmper water evacuation procedures and there-

by decrease flood storage. CYJV's overly optimistic statements about spillway operations is con

l.As occurred in 1983 when the Bureau of H.eclamabon was forcedto make designat.ed releases, and f100el out. t.he communitiesdownst.ream of the Boulder darn on the Colorado River. Since thedam's completion, the Bureau of Reclamation had neglectedcontrols on downstream development in nooel-prone areas.

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

trary to the advise of R. Lafitte, Chairman ofICOLD's Committee on Dam Safety who says

with respect to spillway design, estimates "should always be given with ranges,

demonstrating that they are imprecise calculations." l

We suggest that CYJV's failure to carry out a systematic risk assessment or assess the range of

consequences ifits assumption is incorrect demons(;rates negligence and professional misconduct

pursuant to section 86(1) and 86(2)(21) of the Code of Professional Conduct.

13.3 F'lood Routing- Model Was Inadequate (appendix 13.1 p4)

In its response, Acres admits that due to IlinsufEcient data on the several hundreds of kilometers

of channels ll CYJV was unable to use a hydrodynamic model. Instead, it deemed it Ilappropriatell to

demonstrate the feasibility of the project by using a flood routing model to simulate water levels at

on ly 12 locations over a 500 km stretch of river, like a series of reservoirs. This is unacceptable.

using CYJV's own figures, the degTee of error in the flood routing model is unacceptably

large.

JV admits that a 20 cm change in w,lter level against a dike can mean 20 percent cl1cmge in

flood benefits (Vo] 7 p 9-32) Est.imates of river stages based on t.he j)J'(;c!ict.io]1s ort.his mode!

in only 12 places on a river like the Yangtze ". \vith a complex f10w net\vork, diversion areclS,

f100dplain lakes and large t.ributary flows - can be in error by several metres which could make t.he

difference between the preservation of dike integrity and total dike failure.

Such a large discrepancy between the model results and the actual water now volumes is indicated

in CYJV's own testing. To Ilvalidate ll the flood routing model, CYJV cornpares computed versus

1. Lafitte, It, "Progress in dam safety in relation to floodrisks," Water Power & Dam Construction, September, 1992.

33

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PIWBE JNTERNi\TlONAL

-,,--------------

observed flow volumes. The discrepancy between observed alld computed flow volumes during the

flood peal\: is about the same as the total flood storage of the Three Gorges reservoir - in the order

of 20,000 m3 to 30,000 m3 (appendix B.4). We believe that such a "validation" would be considered

unacceptable for planning a large flood control project in Ontario.

Given the inaccuracies with using (1 flood routing model, and the possible consequences of error,

we believe that it is negligent to present the findings of a flood routing analysis 3S representing

the river flow "reasonably well" as CYJV did (Vol 7 p 7-10).

fIad CYJV proceeded with the flood routing 1110del as a preliminary assessment, CYJV should

have said that there was a significant chance of error in the projected £1ood protection and that if

this chance of error were taken into account this could seriously affect the proposed reservoir size

and operation. Alternatively, CYJV could helve insisted that hydrodynamic modeling be completed

prior to the completion of the feasibility study CYJV did neither.

Uneler section 8C3(2)( ell of the Coele of Professional Coneluet, engineers m us t make responoi blc

provisions for complying with applicable standards. We suggest that the tools w;ecl by CYJV

engineers did not ensure compliance with acceptable standards.

13.,1 J;~xag'gcration of Floocl Benefits (appendix 13,1 prj)

We cannot oven;tate the importance of CYJV's erroneous assumption that the investment per

square kilometer and the economic grO\VUl rate in £1ood-prone areas is equal to that in areas not

prone to flooding. Such em assumption is highly qtlestionable.

One of the basic tenets of flood I)1cmageI1H;nt planning is that Hood darnage potential and the type

and value of land use are closely related. Obviously people prefer not to build in Hood-prone areas

J.j

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, fNCOMPET.ENCE

and if they do, they flood-proof their property and limit economic investment. These actions greatly

reduce the flood damage that would occur in the "without project 'l alternative, hence reducing the

net benefits for the project. In the case of Three Gorges, if the growth rate in flood-prone areas

without the project was 40 percent of the unrealistic g-lowth rate projected for these areas with the

project, total flood benefits would be zero (appendix B.5).

E.5 Ornission of Project Costs from the Cost-Benefit Analysis

13.5(i) Additional Population to be Hesettled (appendix B.l p6)

Acres implies "risk of loss of life" is the only criteria for resettlement compensation. We suggest

that failing to consider the welfare of the people affected, the potential loss of subsistence (,'OPS,

and the loss of property demonstrates professional misconduct pursuant to sections 86(1) a

2)(b)(c) of the Code of Professional Conduct, and violates section 9](2)(1) of tl1e Code of FLtJics.

\\'e would like the Committee to keep in mind that more than half a million people will be; Ct 11l

is area - between 162 ill and 182 In - some of whom will be affected by frequent flood \V

sdggest that designing an 'llleged flood control project which leaves people around the ed the

",'servoir to clirnb "hig)JCl' up e river han "when flood wdLers ,Ire stored wCl\1ld not Ill'

clc',~c.'Jcnblein Ontario.

E.5(ii) Backwater Effects During Future Floods (appendix B.1 p6)

Acres' staternent that the "critical Dood stage at Chongqing (198 m) is not expected to be exceeded

during a l-in-100-year Good" is based on the estimates of sedimentation found in Volume ~) of the

feasibility stucly. However, these estimates rely on a gross underestimation of the river's bcdioad

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PHonE IN'J'EENi\TlONi\L

._-~~-~_._--------~i1!i"

(0.05 percent of total sediment) - an unprecedented, low estimate (Vol 5 p 7-1 and Vol 5A p 3-1). A

higher, more realistic, level of bedload would have a severe impact on the aggradation of the

riverbed upstream. l

Acres' statement that "Flooding [at Chongqing] to levels below 198 m will cause liWe damage" is

contrary to their own statistics which show damaging flows to occur above 186 m. A July 1981

f100d with a peak stage of elevation 19;:3 affected over 137,000 people and caused flood losses of 190

million yuan (x 0.2703 =: approx. U3$51 million) (Vol 7F table 2.2, attached as appendix 13.6). Even

using the optimistic assessment of upstream sedimentation contained in the feasibility study, at

Chongqing water levels for a lOO-year Hood will rise 1 to 2, metres within 30 years, affecting

hundreds of thousands of people. It appears that CYJV recognizes this, as it claims "future

upstream reservoirs and conservation measures" would n:duce sediment deposition. However,

neither the cost of these reservoirs or measures nor the cost of incremental flood damages in

Chongqing is included in project costs.

CYJV has failed in its sedimentation analysis to demonstrate the danl will function as predicted,

that the clam will not require costly remedial measures, and that the dam will not change the

c::xisting sediment regime m ~;uch a \vay as to risk the livl~s and property of hundreds of thousancls

of people.

\Ve suggest that failure to carefully and thoroughly evaluate the effect of the Three Gorges clam OJ}

the sediment l'(;gime of the Yangtze HiveI' demonstrates professional misconduct and negligence

LA bedload equal to 2-8 percent of suspended sediment is widely accepted.According to D.D. Simons and Fuat Senturk's Sediment Tl~i;1nsportTechnologv,

1977, "the amount ofbedlol1cl transported by a large, cleep river is about[) t.o 25 percent of the suspended load."According to Chinese engineer Vl.W.L. I-luang, M.C.E., Ph.D, the gravel and coarse sand,typical of bedload, has accumulated to a depth of 35 metres at the Three Gorges dam site.

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, lNCOMPETENCE:s£-_-fil- _

pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct, violates section

9l(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics, and demonstrates incompetence pursuant to section 29(3)(21) of the

Act.

B.5(iii) Repairs to Dikes Downstream of TOP (appendix B.l p7)

Acres says that a "short length of the riveI'" may experience downcutting. According to CYJV's own

study (Vol 5 p 10-2), after 30 years scouring may reach] GO Ian downstream of the Gezhouba

dam. This is not a Iishort length II of river. According to CYJV (Vol 5 p 10-3) the most serious

problem this scouring migh t prod uce is a channel shift which would direct How against the flood

protection dikes at Jingjiang, undermining their integrity and possibly increasing the flood risk

beyond the current 250-year flood. These problems can be mitigated by river training, the

feasibility study concludes. HiveI' training cost for this reach of the river alone could easily exceed

US$l million/km. 'rhis scenario wendd add a half-billion dollars to the project cost, but is not

Included in CYJV's estimates.

B.5(iv) Flood Damag'es to CO;lstal llCi_,Oons due to Reduced Sediment Deposibon

(appendix B.] p7)

Acres suggests that our allegation is false because "the impacts on the Yangtze estuary as (1 result

of sediment deposition in the TGP reservoir are not expected to be significanL '1

CYJV admits in the feasibility study that there v-/ill be "coastal retreat" but that this retreat "will

be fairly limited" (Vol 5 J p 4-7). We wish the Committee to note, however, that the area at

the mouth of the ;{angtze is highly populated and intensively developed and any retreat could have

serious economic ramifications for the area, Moreover CYJV based this prediction on the

.. :)'7.

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PROBE INTEHN/\TIONAL

unprecedented and unrealistic assumption that the reservoir will have a IIhigh flushing efficiencyl'

and will therefore retain 90 percent of its storage capacity. CYJV did not calculate the impact if

this extremely optimistic assumption does not hold true.

According to World Bank Technical Report #71 - Reseruoir Sedimentation: Impact) Extent, and

Mitigation .. the only large clams that have successfully dealt with sedimentation through fltlshing

ar~, clams whose reservoir is practically emptied prior to the flood season (e.g. the old Aswan dam).

Given the lack of success of flushing regimes at other large dams, CYJV's prediction that nearly

the same amount of sediment will reach the coast with the clam as reaches the coast without the

dam is questionable in the extreme. It shoulcl be pointed out that in ICOLD Bulletin No. 59 section

6.3.2 it states: liThe accuracy and reliability of suspended silt and soLid bed flow data derived from

histoLical records should be checked by comparison with data from neighboring drainage areas

with similar geornorphologic characteristics." The section of volume 5 of the feasibility study W111Ch

discusses tbis aspect of the sedirnentation analysis has bad so rnany parts removed pursu,lnt to

the Access to Information Act that it is difficult to determine why CYJV did not do such d

companson.

There are many outstanding questions about CYJV's analysis of sedirnentdtion, particularly

whether or not a review of existing clata took place. The Terms of I\cference for the feasibJli

study include: "3.3 (vii) Prepare, input and analyse sedimentation data to provide an assessment

comparable to that of the Chinese sedimentation program" (Vol LA p 1-4). And yet, under

Compliance un:th the Tenns a/neference, the same vol ume says, "The 'ferms of Reference rela tee!

specifically to sediment, articles 3.3 (iv), (v), and (vi), have been met by CYJV" (VoiLA p 2-7). No

mention is made to section 3.3 (vii) which specifically requires an analysis of sediment<ltion datel.

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

Apparently such an analysis of existing sedimentation data did not take place. In the

sedimentation volume, although CYJV says that the llfield data used to construct and calibrate tly

physical models are especially important for [theJ Three Gorges Project,1I it admits that IICYJV did

not review these studies directli ' (Vol 5 p 2-3). Despite not seeing them, CYJV concludes "that the

basic data are adequate and probably are better in both quality and quantity than are usually

available for a project of this kind. "

CYJV also lists the main sedimentation reports prepared by several Chinese agencies and

research institutes. CYJV admits it did not even review these reports but concludes instead that

"A number of brief surnmary reports and publications from these groups were made available by

YVPUI (Vol 5 p 8-:3).

Since sediment can have a negative impact on virtually all dam operations including but not

limited to flood control, navigation and power generation, the importance ofCYJV's omission

cannot be overstated. According to lCOLI) Bulletin 59 section ().3.2 the "origin and reliability of 'il.

data should be checked to avoid reliance on basic errors which may have been introduced into

observation and data processing systen1s and procedures."

\Ve l'C'Cjuest that the mmittee determine whether or nol C:YJV eXal1lil1 imell[;lliol1

, and of what that data consisted. ]i' C;YJV faded to cornplete such an examination, we sugf;esl

this constitt.ltes negligence and professional misconduct pursuant to sections S()(1) and

86(2)(a)(b)(c)(cl) oUhe Code of Professional Conduct. We also suggest that the failure to clearly

point out to its client that the impacts of sedirnentation could not be determined without reviewing

and incorporating existing data constitutes professional Il1isconduct pursuant to section 8(-)(2)(0 of'

the Code of Professional Conduct.

39

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B.6 Risk of Catastrophic Dam Failure

B.6(i) Increased Risk of Dike Failure (appendix B.1 p9)

We repeat that, contrary to what Acres claims, 160 km of downcutting is not II localized II and the

protecti.on of the Jingjiang dike may require river training which has not been included in the cost

estimate (Vol 5 pp 10-2 and 10-3).

F'urthermore, Acres' statement that Ilwater level fluctuations downstream of Gezhouba will be

small II is contrary to its own findings which indicate that water f1uctuations may occur as far a\vay

as 40 km downstreanl of Gezhouba (Vol 1 p 13-11). The problem of increased undercutting

<.md erosion along this reach is likely to be compounded by the daily peaking po\ver now

fluctuation of between 3200 and 12000 m3/seconcl.

We suggest that neglecting to assess the potential risk of dike failure, and to include the cost of

repairs to these dikes in the project costs,n,veals negligence and professional misconduct

pursuant to sections 860) and 86(2)(a) oftbe Code of Professional Conduct.

B.(j(ii) Damages in the Event of a Dam Failure (appendix 111 p9)

In its response, Acres attempt.s t.o limit the issue ofdem) failure to t.he probability ofspillwclY

failure. This reinforces our point that CYJV failed to carry out a systematic risk analysis of aU

possible failure rnodes. As present.ed in section A above, some of the more serious omissions

include: seismicity, landslides, structural design, cofTerdam fail ure, etc. Such a systematic risk

analysis, according t.o ICOLD Bulletin No. 59 section 21.1, should include an emergency action

plan t.o Iideal wiLl), but. not be limit.ed to'l a series of measures including the preparation of

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

"inundation maps for flows up to the design flood, and for catastrophic conditions caused by dam

failure, inclusive of the corresponding risk analyses. 1I

As pointed out in our section A above, CYJV failed to address the issue of dam design and safety.

It has also failed to assess the risk to human life and darnages that would result in the event of

darn failure. We suggest that failing to do so demonstrates negligence and professional misconduct

pUrS1Jant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct; incompetence

pursuant to section 29(3)(a) of the Professional Engineers Act; and a violation of section 91(2)(i) of

the Code of Ethics.

The risk of catastrophic failure of the dam as presently planned could easily be of the same order

of magnitude as the risk of a 1000 year flood - for the prevention of which the project is being

proposed. If the potential cost of dam failure 1 were included in. the assessment of the project it

would be clear that property damage would be so large that even with a 1 in 10,000 year failure

probability, any flood benefits claimed for the dam would be negated.

B.G(iii) H.isks Associated with Large Increases in Population (appendix 13.1 p10)

Acres has not add our allegation. As noted earlier, C JV predicts invesLment pel' square

kilometer and econolnic growth rates in the beach areas and flood eli version areas equal to that in

non-Hood-prone areas. In fact, tlleir estimate of f100d beneflts depends on such growth. To include

these areas in a floocJ benefit calculation is questionable (as already outlined) but to ignore the

increased risks to these people - who are being encouraged to move into the flood way of the clam -

is unacceptable for a reasonably prudent design.

l.Mark, RK., "Disasters as a Necessary Part of Benefit-CostAnalyses," SciQnce, vol. 197, September 16, 1977.

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Eather than dealing with our concern, Acres provides information about the flood storage

capacity of the dam. As discussed in sections B.5(ii) and B.5(iv) above, CYJVs estimate of

sedimentation and the flushing ability of the dam is unrealistic. In fact, CYJV's projected

flushing ability is unprecedented and extraordinarily optimistic particularly given the

potential cohesive nature of the sediment in the Yangtze. The World Bank's Technical

Paper #71, Reservoir Sedimentation states:

Sediment f7ushing is a useflll method to fget! rid of the existing deposits. It becOlnes

nwre attractiue when the silting up of a reseruoir has reached an advanced stage. In

the future) it lulU find wider lise us sedinwntation or world rescruoirs hecomes worse.

The efficiency offlushing depends on the rate with luln:ch the d.eposits can IJe

reentrained hy the flow. Existing hnowledge) mostly gCLlned from lahorCLtory studies

and theoretical inuestigations) su.ggest that rate oj'reentrCLinmen.t Z>i reseruoirs i.uil! (ie

strongly effected by the cluy content oj' depos its)' 1Il.i7u'rcdogy oj' cluys CLnd chen/lcCLI

regime oj' !/)uter ... Processes oj' and relating to reel/troinment of deposits hewe !lot

lJeen. Investigated In. reseruoirs. Prototype research in thiS eJrea loll! he highly

reward/Tlg.

CYJV based its reservc)]r seelimenL1tion analysis on a simpllst.ic 0111; dimension:!1 model

that ignores the complexities of now patterns in resel"\'OJr,; and ignores cohc:siol1 dCc:cLs or

fine sedimcmt. lfjust these factors alone were taken into account, it i,; extremely unli

that the fluslling predictions would be realized. According to the World BanI, Technical

Paper #71 lithe hydraulic and sedimentation processes in reservoirs are strongly threc­

dimensional and stratification can have a major effect on these processes ...A need exists to

develop more comprehensive mathematical models than the present one-eli mensional

variety."

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

---W-'------------------------------------

We suggest that the failure to adequately assess the risk to people who move into the area

downstream of the project by underestimating the effect of sedimentation on the flood storage

capacity of the reservoir demonstrates negligence and professional misconduct pursuant to

sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct, and a violation of section

9l(2)(ii) of the Code of Ethics.

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C. Flawed and Misleading Cost-Benefit Analysis

C.l Overestilllated Flood Control Benefits

Acres has not presented new information or arguments to rebut our evidence (as described in

Dwnnring The Three Gorges and our September 3, 1991 submission to the APEO) that they

overestimated flood control benefits.

Acres states in its May 8, 1992 response, that lithe flood control benefits attributable to Tep have

been conservatively estimated." We believe our two earlier submissions and section B of this

response illustrate how Acres, representing CYJV, has done the opposite by:

II misrepresenting the flood control capabilities of the Three Gorges dam in its feaslbility ~;tudy;

II exaggerating flood benefits in its May 8,1992 response to APEO;

Ii exaggerating flood benefits in its feasibili study by assuming investment and

development in flood-prone areas that would not be permitted in other jurisdictions in the

interest of public safety, and that \vould not spontaneously occur because of the obvious

risks to life and investments; and

Ling flood beneflts in its CCclsibility study by ignorillg disaster preparedn ss

measures,

For these reasons, we submit that l\cres engineers have failed to accurately evaluate the

flood control benefits revealing negligence and professional misconduct pursuant to sections

86(1) and 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d)(f) of the Code of Professional Conduct, and a violation of section

91(2)(i) ofthe Code of Ethics.

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C.2 Used an Unrealistically Low Discount Rate

Acres presents no new information to address this issue. Acres just states in its May 8,

1992 response that its base discount rate (10 percent) was determined "in consultation with

the Chinese Government and the World Bank."

However, as we stated earlier, since the World Bank's practice is to apply a 12 percent rate

of disccnmt in its economic appraisals a 12 percent discount rate should have been applied

to the Three Gorges dam. CYJV's failure to do so skewed, and thus exaggerated, the

project's net benefits (Vol :J table 7.3).

We suggest that Acres' choice of a 10 percent discount rate constitutes a failure to make

adequate provisions to meet acceptable standards, and therefore, dcrnonstrates professional

rnisconduct pursuant to section 86(2)(C]l of the Code of Professional Conduct.

C.;3 Used An Unrealistic Hate of Exchange

Tn Damming The Three and our September 3, 1991 subrnissjo)l to APED we describe

how CYJV's use of the adrninistered ange rate unden' ti !r1,1 the real cost of the dam.

Acres responded by changing the subject to the cost-benefit ratio, aI'!;uing tbat had CYJV

used a realistic exchange rate its cost-benefit model would "improve the economic viability

of the project as benefits increase more than costs."

But for reasons pointed out in section 13 above, in our September 3, 1991 submission to

AI~E(), and in DanLming The Three Gorges, we believe the beneflts predicted by CYJV in its

cost-benefit model are biased, misrepresented and arbitrcu'ily calculated. As a result, its

cost-benefit predictions assuming different exchange rates have no credibility.

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Acres response is irrelevant to our original point: if a free market exchange rate - which

reflects real costs - had been used, the estimated cost of the dam to the Chinese economy

wcyuld rise substantially (by 19.5 percent according to CYJV estimates, Vol 3 table 7.3). We

suggest that Acres chose to use the administered exchange rate to disguise the project's

total cost, thereby demonstrating professional misconduct pursuant to section 86(2)(d) of

the Code of Professional Conduct.

CA Overlooked, Unrealistically Accounted For, or Ignored Factors Affecting

Costs and Benefits

CA(i) Time and Cost Overruns

It is difficult to accept Acres' response that its feasibility study Ilfully documents the best

estimates of construction time and costs and the implications of time and cost overnlns"

when the studies on construction logistics were deferred to ComplemenLu'y Slllches \A/hich

were never completed. For this reason, we submit that CYJV does not have the necessary

information to conclude that the construction schedule it proposes can be achieved. Nor do

we believe the implications of its sensitivity analysis - cited in Dcunmlng The Three Gorges·

were considered and ref1ected in the )'(;cornmendation to proceed.

Since the PlWI of Operation for the Complem.enrary Srudles recognizes that lithe Three

Corges project will be the largest construction project undertaken since the founding of' t.he

PRC,II CYJV should have satisfied itself that a project, \vhich is so vulnerable and

susceptible to time overruns, could actually be carried out. on schedule before issuing an

unqualified statement that lithe project as recommended is found feasible and financially

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

viable" (Vol 1 p 2-1). CYJV's failure to do so, we suggest, constitutes negligence and

professional misconduct pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(d) of the Code of

Professional Conduct.

C.4(ii) Transmission and Distribution Losses

Acres claims in its response that losses in the electrical system are fully accounted for in

the load forecasts used in the economic analyses. However, the only references to

transmission losses we can find are in footnotes to Table 2.1 and Table 3.1, Volume 10, Part

LA, which state simply that transmission losses are included in the load forecasts. But no

estimates of those transmission losses, either in toted or broken down by region, are given.

VIe submit that Acres has not IlfuUy accounted" for the transmission losses, as it claims.

Furthermore, in the Province of Ontario engineers could not put forward proposals for the

expansion of the electricity supply systern \vitho1.lt detailed data on transmission and

distribution losses. CYJV's failure to do so suggests negligence and professionalrnisconduct

p1.u·su,mt to sections 86( 1) and 86(2)(a)(d) of the Code of Professional Conduct.

C.4(iii) China's Shortage of Funds Not Included in His\{ Analysis

Acres has failed to address our point. Acres' argument, that an "important reason for

conducting the Feasibility Study" was to support applications to international agencies for

funding, is irrelevant. The reason for completing an economic risk analysis is to identify

various factors that would render a project uneconomic. As pointed out in Damming the

Three Gorges, CYJV's failure to consider China's lack offunds as an uncertainty in its risk

analysis is a major omission.

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CA(iy) Cost of Decommissioning the Dam, Sediment Control and Dredging,

Repairing, Downstream Dikes

We suggest that Acres' argument that lithe project is unlikely ever to be decommissioned, II

cannot be substantiated in light of the many scenarios that would require early

decommissioning, for example, earthquake darnage, sabotage or acts of war, landslide

damage, and greater than predicted sediment accumulation. CYJV h'as not taken into

consideration the technical and financial requirements of a deactivation plan as outlined in

ICOLD Bulletin No. 59 section 23.1.

Acres claims in its response that "provision is made in the operating and maintenance cost

for periodic rehabi1i tation. II FIowever this "provision" is described in fou l' sentences (Volum e

3, pp 4-13, 4-14), and refers to the staff costs of running the powcr plants, and the costs of

running and maintaining thc navigation facilities.

Meanwhile our evidence - that the costs of river training to correct channel shifting,

maintenance of dikes, and dredging the sediment from the reservoir, etc., have been

omitted - renlains unanswered.

We suggest that failure to take these costs into account consLiL1Jtes negligence "mel

professional misconduct pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(cl) of the Code of

Professional Conduct.

C.4(v) Impacts of Inflation

Acres has provided no new information in its response.

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C.5 Underestimated Resettlement and Environmental Costs

C.5(i) Environmental Costs

Acres argues that CYJV's allowance for environmental mitigation - equivalent to two

percent of the project capital cost - is "well in excess of any identifiable costs required to

complete the environmental impacts assessment, monitor the environmental effects during

and after cons truction and provide funds for mi tiga tion of unavoidable imp acts. II

Since the environmental assessment was deferred to the Complementary Studies which

were never finished, we fail to see hO\v Acres can know that two percent is "well in excess of

any identifia.ble costs" of monitoring and mitigating environmental problems that have not

been studied or identified.

subrnit that Acres' method Cor determining the costs of monitoring and mitigating the

environmenta.l problems caused b.y the Three Gorges dam, is without scientific or economic

merit and constitutes negligence and professional misconduct pursuant to sections 86(1)

;wd S6(2)(;:\)(]))(c) of' the C:ode of'Prof'essional Conduct.

C.6(ii) Apparently Ignored Expenses

Acres' adrnission that inconvenience Lo waLer-borne transport \vill occur confirms our

complaint that CYJV distorted the cost calculations by omitting the cosL of disruption to

navigation downstream of Chongqing in its feasibility study.

Acres tries to justify omitting the $270 milJion compensation to the Ministry of

Communication for interruptions to navigation during construction of the dam on the

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PHOJ3E INTE11NATfONAL

grounds that it wouldn't have affected the economics of the project lias it is a transfer cost

rather than a real resource cost to the Chinese economy. II By this reasoning many of the

costs of the Three Gorges dam - involving costs to state bodies - could have been similarly

ignored, and the dam's cost could have been falsely discounted even further. But the cost of

the Three Gorges dam to the Chinese economy, in the form of diminished navigation

activity, is real and should have been counted by CYJv.

These omissions, we submit, constitute a failure to maintain the standards that a

reasonable and prudent practitioner would maintain in the circumstances. We suggest this

constitutes negligence and professional misconduct pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)

of the Code of Professional Conchict.

C.5(iii) Lack of Socia'! Conscience in Project Optimjzation

response validates our complaint. Vie submit that trading off the public welfare J n

the interest of the highest net econonlic benefits constitutes professional misconduct

pursuant to sections 86(2)(b) and (c) of the Code of Professional Conduct and is a violation

of section 91(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics.

C.:5(iv) Underestimating the Jncrelnental Cost of Hesettlement

Acres' response confirms our original complaint that it did not assume increasing

diseconomies of scale in resettlement. Acres cites four resettlement cost estimates to

demonstrate it assumed that per capita cost of resettlement would increase as the number

of people resettled increased. However, CYJV's figures, shown in Volume 9, Figure 9.1

(attached as appendix C.1) do not demonstrate this relationship at all. From NPL 150 to

NPL 160, and from NPL 150 to NPL 170 the total cost of resettlement per person declines

cso -

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even though the number to be resettled increases.

Furthermore, Volume 3, Figure 4.4 (attached as appendix C.2) shows that when

resettlement reaches its peclk for the recommended project - approximately 82,000 people

would be resettled each year from 1997 to 2000 - CYJ"V estimates that annual resettlement

costs would remain constant. Therefore CYJV has not assumed an increasing per capita

cost of moving people as the number of people resettled increases.

Both references demonstrate that CYJV has not recognized that stresses associated with

resettlement, and the miti[.;ating cost/person, rise exponentially w.ith the number resettled,

We submit that a failure to adequately account for these costs demonstrates misconduct

pursuant to section 86(2)(b) and (c) of the Code of Professiorlal Conduct and also violates

section 91(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics.

C. 5(v) Sedim.entation Effects Near Chongqinf';

Acres' defense - that the present va] ue of any incremental chunages caused by higher water

Ic\'(;)s resulting from sec]IJJ1Cnt deposition is so small CIS to be irr(,lev,m( in the cconomic

analysis - is based on a bedload estimate that is wildly at odds with other researchers.

CYJV estimates bedload to be 0.05 percent of total sediment, wh(~reas a generally accepted

estimate of bedload in large rivers is between 5-8 percent (see section B.5(ii) above), CYJV~;

gross underestimation of the amount of bedload has resulted in a severe underestimation of

the potential sedimentation effects at Chongqing.

As discussed in section B.5(iv) above, CYJV failed to cOlnplete an assessment of existing

sedimentation data. We therefore suggest that CYJV has failed in its sedimentation

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---_..._---_....._--------------------------------_.

analysis to demonstrate the dam will function as predicted, that the dam will not require

costly remedial measures, and that the dam will not change the existing sediment regime

in such a way as to risk the lives and property of hundreds of thousands of people.

We slJbmit that failure to carefully and thoroughly evaluate the effect of the Three Gorges

dam on the sediment regime of the Yangtze River demonstrates professional misconduct

and negligence pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(b)(c) of the Code of Professional

Conduct, violates section 91(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics, and demonstrates incompetence

pursuant to section 29(:3)(a) of the Act.

C.G(vi) Treatment of Unregistered Population

'l'he llIlregistered or "Hoating population" accounts for between 10 percent to 30 percent of

the urban population to be resettled (approximately 27,000 to 80,(00) As pointed out in

The Three Gorges, and as confirmed by Acres in its response, CYJV used the

lowest possible estimate of IIf10ating population" in its compensation calculations, leaving

an indeterminate number of people to resettle themselves without compensation.

\\ (' s this constitutes pro ollal misconducL pursu,rnl. (0 sectiolls 86(2)(!J)(c) ,md a

violation of section 91(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics.

C.G(vii) Uncertainty in Numbers of Unregistered Population

Acres resporicls that "this matter does require further investigation and a new census," and

CYJV recornmends that one be done lias soon as a decision to implement the Three Gorges

Project has been made II (Vol 9 p 12-3). IIowever, since a new census could reveal

significantly more people deserving of compensation, and that by CYJV's own estimate this

52 -

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MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

additional population could increase the total cost of the project by 29 percent, we are

unable to understand why CYJV did not insist that a census be prepared first.

Failure to determine how many people would need to be resettled, and therefore what the

total costs of the project would be, seems to us to demonstrate professional misconduct and

negligence pursuant to sections 86(l)and 86(2)(a)(b)(c) of the Code of Professional Conduct

and violates section 9l(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics.

C.G Withheld Information

Acres' justification for withholding critical cost inforrnation further diminishes confidence

in its economic analysis.

rnilarly, Acres' deletion ofcruciCll information about the mathematical model used in its

sedimentCltion analysis is cause to doubt its veracity (Vo] 5A p 3-1, attached as appendix

3). Because sediment behaviour will affect flood control capabilities, navigation, and

po\ver generation, and could destabilize river banks, dikes and the operation of the clarno

the economic viahility of the Three Corges clam will be fundamentally affected this

('I'Llci ;11 clemen L.

.' :lJ

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Do Other Major Flaws In The Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study

Dol Flaws with Resettlement

Documents submitted by Acres to APEO reveal that CYJV failed to demonstrate the

feasibility of resettling the people who would be displaced by the Three Gorges reservoir,

and thus failed to demonstrate the feasibility of the Three Gorges dam as per its Terms of

Heference.

LJ nder the Term s of Iteference for the Three Gorges IVuter Control P7'OjectFeasibility Study,

CYJV was required to:

prepare un envi7'Onmcntai assessment which, Inter ulz:u) will ret/lew) evullwte and

recomnzend on the . . teeflnlcul and social feasibility oj'plans liJr resettlement of

Inlwhltunts und relocution ot lil.unlcipalz:ties, Industry) trcu/.spodatlon) etc. li'o711 oil

prq}ect areas.

T'hrec Gorges Feasibility Study. Terms of Eeferencc, June] G, 1986,

(Annex A of Exhibit I, Acres' Submission to

However, as explained in the Chronology of Activities on rI'hree Corges Fe,lsibiliLy Study

(Exhibit 1 in Acres submission), after reviewing the feasibility study draft reports at its

fourth meeting (September 14 to 18, 1987 in Beijing), the Steering Committee determined

that the IIfeasibility for EesettJernent could not be fully demonstrated wi thout further work

on land availability, non agricultural employment and irnpact on receiving areas and

populations. II

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By January 22, 1988, the International Panel of Experts had reviewed the feasibility study

and reported that CYJV had complied with the Terms of Eeference, "except for problems

with resettlement, "

Tn order to cover this deficiency, Supplemental Terms of Eeference were incorporated into a

Terms of HeferCllce for Complementary Studies, The 'T'erms of Heference for the

Complementary Studies, signed on July 14, 1988, made demonstration of the feasibility of

the darn dependent upon first demonstrating feasibility of resettlement.

At the 5th Steering Comnu:ttee m.eeting, held in Montreal January Z8-23, Z.988) It 10US

conclu&:d that the dmftPeasibilityRcport on the Three Gorges Water Control Project

establishes the technical and econom.iccd fcasi/Ji1/ty of the project, subject to clear

demonstration of' the feasibiUt), and cost of resetilement.'/(emphasis addN! hy

complailwlU)

Terms a/Reference Clnd Scope 0/ Work for Complementary Studies

Three Gorges IVater Control Project, February 4, 1988

(Annex A of Exhibit 1, Acres' ,Submission to APEO)

n Lo carry ouL these C'olllj)/imelltur\' Studies until J~ll111 ,'\'

1989, Yet in October 1988, CYJV issued Volume 1 of the Feasibility Study, and claimeclln it

Lhat:

This f('asibility stud,y has revlelued and ww,lyzed, 011 WI integrated basis, the costs)

bene/its and other effects oj'the oueml! prQject {rom. an International perspective. The

study has also sough t to address the concerns raised by the Steering COlnmittee

consisting oj'M\VREI~ CIDA Wid IBRD and its ]Janel 0/ Chinese CLnd interI2CLt!OIlO!

experts.

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PIWJ3E IN'l'ElmATlONi\L

-----------------------------

CYJV engineers thus concluded in Volume 1 of the Feasibility Study that IIresettlement is

feasible at NPLs 150 and 160 assuming the financial and organizational resources

recommended are made available" and lithe project as recommended is found feasible and

financially viable ll and "should be carried out at an early date. "

Probe International suggests that CYJVs failure to carry out the Terms of Heference and to

warn its clients and the public of this failure's implications, and CYJVs subsequent

recommendation that the project is feasible and financially viable and should be carried out

at an early date, without demonstrating that resettlement is feasible, constitutes professional

misconduct, negligence and incompetence pursuant to sections 86(1) and 86(2)(a)(b)(c)(d)(f)

of the Code of Professional Conduct, section 9l(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics and section 29(3)(a)

of the Act.

Further evidence of Acres' ignorance about the feasibility of resettlement is found in its

J'(;sponse (,Subm:ssiol) 13, D.I) when; it indicates that only "sample areas 'l along the reservoir

were inspected and where it states ambiguously that "land is likely available to

accommodate the farm-based resettlement plans. 11 (emphasis added by complainant)

/\s for t.he aLLit.ucle of populations to be affected by Uw resettlement scheme, we direct tbe

Complaints Commit(;ee to our September 3,1991 submission which remains unansvv'cl'ed by

1\cres.

D.2 Inadequate Environrnental Assessment

Acres has failed to address our evidence - described in Dam.ming The Three Gorges <'md in

our September 3,1991 submission - t.hat its environmental assessment is "fatally flawed_"

{-j () -

Page 57: APEO Document Redacted

MISCONDUCT, NEGLIGENCE, INCOMPETENCE

Furthermore, the logic in Acres' argument to the APEO, that the Three Gorges dam is

environmentally feasible "providing that identified discreet gaps in the data base are fillecV

essential studies are done, and an "ongoing environmental monitoring and mitigation

program is implemented" is indefensible. No scientist can seriously declare his experiments a

success prior to obtaining the data, and doing the studies. As for mitigation, the reason to

conduct an environmental assessment before a project goes ahead is to determine whether or

not the costs of lTlitigation would render a project uneconomic.

Uy declaring the Three Gorges project "environmentally feasible" when neither Acres nor the

Chinese government have fllled the minimum requirements of a credible environmental

assessment, Acres demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of

environmental assessments and a profound disregard for the people whose livelihoods and

health wi]] be affected by the environmental consequences of the dam. Moreover, Acres'

;\rguments to the AT)EOmake a mockery of the scientific method.

suggest, as pointed out in secLion C.5.1. above, that Acres' method for determining the

costs of mOIlitoring and mitigatin[; the environrnental problems caused by the rrhree Gorges

d;un, is without scientific 0)' economic merit and constitutes negligence pursuant to section

1) of the Code of Prof'e:;sional ConducL. declaration that the Three Co)'ge~; (!elm l~;

"environmentally feasible" in the absence of information to substantiate this claim

constitutes ll)'ofessional misconclucL, negligence, and incompetence pursuant to sections

] I, 8()(2)(a)(b)(c)(d)(f') of the Code of Professional Conduct, and :'1 \iolation of section

29(3)(a) of tbe Act and section 9l(2)(i) of the Code of Ethics.

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Appendix A.I

A review of the dam safety analysis of the erDA Feasibility Study of the Three Gorges Project

Philip B. Williams Ph.D, P.E.

The consequences of failure of the proposed Three Gorges Dam would rank as history's worst

miln-made disaster. More than 300 million people live downstream on an intensively cultivated floodplain

that provides much of China's food. It is therefore reasonable to expect thilt a key design criterion for the

project is ensuring that the risk of failure is kept extremely low.

Because of the limited operating experience with large dam projects of this type, and the record

of safety incidents that have threatened the integrity of large dams in the last two decades, it is reasonable

to expect that the feasibility study wi]] utilize the best available techniques to demonstrate that the design,

construction, operation and decommissioning of the project will keep the risk of failure acceptably low.

Unf'ortunately, the feasibility study does not address the safety issue systematically or coherently.

It provides no acceptable risk criteria, no mapping of' the area and population at risk, no comprehensive

risk assessment that identifies all the potential failure modes, no identification of fail-safe measures.

BCC,Hlse safety is not analysed as a discrete topic, major failure mechanisms or combinations of failure

mechanisms are ignored. There are many such possibilities, for example, a reservoir-induced earthquake

that inillilks new landslides close to the dam or sabotage or military acticlil that disables spillway gCltes

immcdiately before the flood season or unanticipatecl delays in construction leading to the overtoppng and

washing out of one of the cofferdams.

Where some safety issues are discussed in different sections, major assumptions are made whose

effcct is to incrcase the risk of failure of the dam if the project is constructed as planned. The probable

risk of failure is likely greatcr than the one in 1000 year flood for which the project is designed.

Examples of these optimistic assumptions are:

1

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1. .LInderestimation of earthquake ground acceleration

One of the most important structural design criteria for a dam is the estimation of ground

acceleration in the event of what is termed the maximum credible earthquake (MCE). There are

substantial uncertainties in the selection of the MCE and also in the prediction of ground accelerations at

various distances from the fault.

For the Three (Jorges design a 6.5 magnitudeearthquake OCCUlTing on a fault 17 km away was

selected (Vol 4 p 4-6). (It should be noted that the methodology used is ICOLD bulletin 46 based on US

Bureau of Reclamation procedures. Within the US these procedures have been frequently criticized by

engineering geologists as too optimistic in estimating MCEs.) For this MCE a horizontal ground

acceleration of 0.17 times gravity (g) was estimated as a "starting point for safety evaluation"

(Vol 4 p 4-7) and a vertical acceleration of 0.1 g simply estimated at 2/3 of the horizontal acceleration

value (Vol 4 p 9-8).

Even with information provided in the study this assumption represents the most optirnistic

interpretation possible of likely ground acceleration. Fig 4.2 of Volume 4 shows the range of different

estirnates to be between 0.17 and 0.5g. Experience with California earthquakes indicates that even this

upper limit may be optimistic, with 1.0g ground accelerations measured at the Pacoima Dam during the

6.5 magnitude San Fel'l1anclo earthquake, and vertical accelerations of 0.6g measured about 20krn away

from the 7.1 magnitude Loma Prieta earthquake, as compared to the 0.12g that would have been predicted

using the feasibility study methodology.

A reasonably prudent design to ensure the integrity of the dam would use ground accelerations at

least three times higher than those selected. If 0.5g is used it appears that the return frequency of the

maximum earthquake for which it is designed will be exceeded every 200 years instead of every 20GO

years as intended (Vo] 4 fig 4.6).

2

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2. InadeguatQ.-,'lnal)'sis of Reservoi(:lllduced Sei;;I]lici ty

While the study recognizes that the dam's reservoir can initiate earihquakes, in developing

ground acceleration design criteria only histodcal records of earthquakes are llsed. This means that the

design acceleration selected are likely to be too low ai1CVor occur more frequently than expected. In

addition there appears to be substantial uncertainty regarding movement of the most important of these

faulls as the "need for careful assessment", that presumably has not yet been undertaken, is stressed

(Yo14p4-14).

The treatment of reservoir-induced seismicity (RIS) is cursory and does not appear to recognize

the seriolls potential for damage to the dam that can occur. For example, the Koyna Dam in India initiated

approximately a 6.0 earthquake, ki1Jing 200 people, in an area that had not previously been seismically

active. The study appears to assume that RIS occurs only on faults that are presently proven active, and

implies that only shOJi lengths close to the dam site could be activated (Vol 4 p 4- 16). It does not identify

the length of identified faults passing under the dam itself (Vol 4 p 3-9) or the displacement that would

occur if these were activated. It appears that the dam is designed based on the optimistic assumption that

ll.Q movement will occur on these faults.

Even assuming the optimistic estimates of ground accekr'atio!1 during earthquakes, it is cle,lr thal

there are substantial unanswered questions related to the structural design of the dam whose satisfactory

resolution can add appreciably to the cost of the project. The structural analysis indicates tensile stresses

in the upstream face of the dam (Vol 4 Table 9.5). While it is not clear whether these are predicted to

cause cracking, because of what appear to be conflicting assumptions regarding the tensile strength of the

concrete during extreme load conditions (Yo] 4 p 9-19 and 9-12), cracking would almost ceriainly occur

with more realistic assumptions for ground acceleration. It is recognized thal even higher tensile stresses

would occur in the upper part of the dam but no dynamic response analysis of the dam has been canicd

Page 61: APEO Document Redacted

out to identify where cracking could occur and what design modification needs to take place

(Vol 4 P 9-19).

Cracking can also occur due to inadequate control of temperature during placement of the

concrete. Because no comprehensive assessment has been carricd out, many possible failure modes have

not been analysed, including the performance of the dam during an earthquake with prior cracking;

dynamic loading from landslide-generated waves; higher than projected siltation levels; and rupture due

to fault movement underneath the dam.

4. UnQ~I.fsti mation ~fli sks.c.:ausecl by catastroJ2.i:lLc Iands lid ing

Although the risk of landsliding into the reservoir is discussed in the feasibility study, the threat

to people living around the reservoir and downstream and the threat to safe operation of the dam is

greatly underestimated. The seriousness of this issue is indicated by the experience of the Vaiont Dam

where a landslicle-generated wave killed 4000 people. The study has carried out no systematic analysis of

hazard zones at risk from the waves 20 to 50 m high it estimates could result from individual landslides

(Yol 4 fig. 5.1), but clemly tens of thousands of people living within and adjacent to the reservoir would

be killed by such events, which apparently occur at intervals in the order of a decade. (Apart from other

optimistic assurnptions, the analysis has mistakenly assumed [hat all people living in the reservoir will be

relocated above 182m.)

The feasibility study has not investigilted the effect of earthquakes, including those induced by

the reservoir itself, on ilctivating landslides on slopes it hilS rated as stable. Its conclusion thilt "no

significant change in slope stability will occur due to the project" (Vol 4 p 5-11) is highly questionable

considering the effect of reservoir level fluctuation, even on those slides whose toe is pemlanently

submerged in the reservoir. Nor has the study evaluated the effect of impilc( of landslide waves on

spillway gates at the time of rapid drawdown immediately prior to the flood season.

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5. Underestimation of risk of spillwa:Lfailure

As the largest hydroelectric darn on the world's fourth-largest river, the Three Gorges project

incOlvorates many experimental technological innovations. One of these is the construction of the world's

largest spillways, each with a capacity of about 2200 m3/sec, the average flow of the Missouri River. The

study confidently asserts "there is no reason to believe that these structures could not be successfully

designed, constructed and operated" (Vol 4 p 12-7), even though the discharge per unit width is "weJl

beyond proven world experience". This confidence is undercut in the same paragraph of the report which

states "The feasibility of such a high unit discharge should be reviewed during final design",

In fact the limited operating experience of extremely large flows through such spillways indicates

a high possibility of failure due to cavitation and erosion caused by the extremely high velocities and

pressures that can threaten the integrity of the dam, as has occurred at the Tarbela, Glen Canyon and

Hoover Dams. With the Three Gorges Project it is possible that these problems will be aggravated by

abrasion from the high sediment load carried by flood flows.

Anothe;r questionably optimistic assumption is that minimal erosion and predictable scour

patterns downstream of the dam relying on the "good ancl homogeneous quality" of the rock in the plunge

pool area (Vol 4 p 12- ]2). Again, actual operating experience with scouring during very large flows over

spillways is vcry limitecl but il](licates a significant pussibility of failure that can threaten the integrity of

the dam - as again nearly occurrecl at Tarbela. Continual remedial works to correct scouring can add

significantly to operating costs of the project.

5. F,lil1!xe to ~9Jlsider QPwniiJn;arlL~JIectsQL cofferdam failur:f:

During the construction of the project a series of temporary cofferdams will have to be

constructed across the river. In Phase II a rockfill cofferdam will store about 1 km] of water to elevation

90 and is designed to withstand the 100 year flood "uncleI' emergency conditions" (Vol 4 P 1-8).

5

Page 63: APEO Document Redacted

In Phase III of the project a temporary, rolled concrete cofferdam wm be constructed that will

impound about 12 km3 of watel' to elevation 135 (Vol 4 P 8-30) for a period of 4 years - although it is

uncertain whether an 85 m high dam can be constructed in the 5 month period allocated for it. This

cofferdam is designed to withstand the 200 year flood "under emergency conditions ll (Vol 4 p 1-9).

If larger floods occur these cofferdams can qu'ickly wash out, releasing a large flood wave with

flow rates exceeding hundred thousand cubic metres/sec that would overwhelm the Gezhouba Dam

downstream whose reservoir capacity is less than 1/2 km3 (Vol 4 appendix A p 1-3). The flood wave

would continue downstream, probably overtopping the Jingjiang dyke downstream drowning hundreds of

thousands ofpeople. (Such a cofferdam failure OCCUlTed in 1986 on a much smaller scale in the US when

the Auburn cofferdam was washed out in a flood, releasing about 0.15 km3 and a flood in the order of

20,000 cubic metres/sec, but fortunately the downstream Folsom reservoir was able to contain the flood

peak.)

'1'he feasibility study estimates, based on an optimistic construction schedule, the probability of

such a catastrophe to be 3% for Phase II and 2% for Phase 11T, making a total probability of about 1 in 20

(Vol J p 18-6). Such a risk should be considered unacceptable.

The risk of failure of the darn increases with its age as construction materials deteriorate,

mechanical systems such as spillway outlet gates fail; and the effects of a series of problems - such as

cO!Tosion, abrasion, siltation, and downstream scour - accumulate.

The planned economic lifetime of this project is 50 years, whilst Chinese culture has lived with

the Yangtze for 4CX)() years. Whether the physically safe lifetime of the. project is 50 or 200 years,

provision should be made in the feasibility plan for decommissioning the project in a way that ensures the

safety of those living downstream.

6

Page 64: APEO Document Redacted

PHILIP B. WILLIAMS

---~-~,----------~~-~-----~-~~----~~

EDUCAflON

1970

196<5

Ph.D, in Hydraulics, ~peciallzjng in fluvial sediment hydraullcs,University of London, 'Ux[jversity College Civil and MunJdpal Eng:lnwnngDepartment, United Kingdom,

Bachelor of EngJne--efing in ClyJ1 and Structural Enginooring,Sheffield Univorsity, Civil Engineering Dtlpartment, Unitoo Kingdom

PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION

Civil Bnglneer No, 21483 (OJUfomia)American instltuto of Hydrology, No, 359European Engineer UK;ICE 182Chartered Engineer 473117"50 (UK)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

1979.present

1988

1976·1919

1973-1975

1970·1972

PreslrJontPhilip WillIams & NsocietCB, Ltd,

Le<:turor in El1vironmental PlanningDept. of Landscape Architecture, University of l...sliforniB., Berkeley

Dr. Philip B. WillIams, P,E.Consultant in HydroIQl.D', San Francisco, California

Sonior AssociateEnvironmental Impact Planning Corporation, San Francisco, California

Mnlor EnglneorBechtel, Inc., Plpe1!no Division, San Francisco, (,~lifomia

Dr. WU!lams hU8 been engu.\:od in u wide range o( hydrologic lind engineering hydraul~ work sinCXlho re~ived hit Ph,D. and emigrated to ll1c u.s, In 1910, In 1976, he started work 8.5 (\ priV(jie

consultant,,forming Philip WJ11iams and Associates in 1979, Itt thels.at two decadet\1 he has developedconsiderable expertise in II wide Tange of technIcal ll;SUes as well ali wHeT-relatoo policy l&ilue.s bothin the \).S. Hnd abroad. From his orlgingl research field of sediment hydrauIICtl, Dr. Williams bNJpioneered practiclll techI\ksl analysee In wetland hydrology, rIparian zone hyd.raulic:s, lake waterbllianees, the impacl~ of climate cbange, and estuarIne Inflow management. HiB work h.M covered 8.

wide variety of probJel)'ls, IncludJng delineation or flood hazards, l\rrul)'jis of SCI! level rlsel Balt marnhrestoration de:ilgn, anal)'1Si.s of reservoir operatlon, harbor maintenance dredging pla.lU, watershedsedlment yield analysIs, groundwater management plam, and coastal lagoon restoration.

Page 65: APEO Document Redacted

Much of thi.., work hllZ been related to anrdyzJ.ng the e1lVlronmental effecU of hydrologic changes, andtha has often involved working with ptOfessionll.l& of other disciplines to prepare feahibility Btudles,mllnagemertt plans, or environmental impact slUc1{es. He hll8 directed and participatoo ill more than250 !Such 5tu(1lcs, includin~ projecu OIl flODd control, wetland r~lorl1tion, residential dovelopmcn~

national park plans, water rcsouro::-s development, nod estuarine managcIDGnt plans.

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

A.ni<.:ri,can Society of Civil EngineersIn,stitute of Civil Enginccr:J (UK)Americ.an Water Resour~ AssocintionSociety of Ecologic Restoration and ManagementAlncrle<ln Shore &. Beach Protection SocietyAssociation of W~tl.nndl$ SCientistsUS COmmittee on urge DamsInternational Water Resources AssociationAssociation of State Floodplain ManagersAssocintton of State Wetland Manage:rr,EstuarIne Research Federation

PUBLICATIONS

Williams, P.B" 1991. TIle esse against large dams, Civil Engineering, ASCE, New York. Augns( 1991.

W1!llams, B,B" 1991. Rivers 'lnd lako~: pllfnming the flow. 1n: J. Porritt, e<L, Save the Earth.Thruer PublIshIng, Atlanta, GeorgJa.

Abbe, T, P. Goodwin, and P.B. Williams. Marsh erosion by wave action in Corte Mwiera Bay.CDustal Zone 91 Conference Proceedings, Paper No, 245.

Abbe; T.;P.B. WllliHmJJ, and P, Faber, [n pro8s, Monitorlng thc physical eyolut1QnD~-tldal 'I'1'¢thudrestoration proJCGt5, Co1l5ll;l1 Zone 91 COnference Proceedings, POHer-Puper No. 911.

Goodwin, P, and P.B. Williams, Short-term characteristics of coastal lagoon entrances [n CaliforrtilLCOl.\stal Sedimenl~ '91, SymposIum on QuantitatIve Approflche~ to l.-afistill Sediment. ASCE, Seattle,WA.

WUliUlIlJ5, F,B., 1990. Chapter EIght, "Flocx.1 control analysIs,' and Chilpler Ten, "Dam safety anruY5i5,'Ln: 0, Ryder (od.)" Damming the Three OorgCl\. Probe InternatIonal, Toronto, canada.

WHlialIlJ5, F,B" 199D, Rylhinking flood cor1Lro] channel design, Civil Engineering, ASCE, Now York,January 1990,

Flof$heim, J,L. tlud P.B. WjllialilA, 1990. F100d loss reduction and erosion control. FapN pre&lntedat The Coumry [n the City Sympmlul11, Portland, Oregon, April 1990.

COtlt5, R.N" M,L Swanwn, and P,B, Wlll!i.1ffi.'l, 1989. Hydrologic analysis for coi\JltB.l wetland

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Pagfl 3

te1ltoratIon, Environmental Mllllagement, Vol. 13, No, 6,

Williams, PoB" 1989, Managing freshwater intlow to the San Francisco Bay ~tuary, Prc>eeedittgs ofthe Fourth International Q:>n.ference 011 :Rogulated Rivero, Regulated Rivors, Vol. 4, No, 3,Septomber 1969, .

Williams, P.B., 1989, Adapting water resour~ management to global clImate change. VillnchConkrenC{] on Developing Policies for ManagIng the Effects of Climate Change, Sp6Cial Issue ofC1imaUc C;:hange,

Wil liBmE , PoB., 1989. Rewrltlng CallfornIa's water plan. Bay Alert, January 19:89, Bay In.stltutc,Sausalito.

Wllljams, P.B., and MoL Swan.lOn, A new approach to flood protection design and ripariunmanagement. Procee<ilngs of the 2nd Otlifornia Riparian Systems Conference, 1988.

Williams, P.B" 1988, tile 1mpac't ot climate chango on San Francisco Bay, Proceedings of tilt SecondNorth American Conference on Proparlng for Cllmate Chnnge, DeccmbN 1988, Climate Institute,WashIngton, D.C

WIlliams, P.B. and J. Morrison, 19-8& Warm Springs Marsh fe8toratioll, an e;xample of creativemiligatiort Proceedings of the National Symposium on Wetlands '88: Urban Wotlands and RiptlriRnHabItat. Association of SWte WetJand Managers.

WIlliarrus, p,a and J. Galton Oale, 1988. Integrating tidal wetland restoration 1n coaswl flood bwsindesign - the ox.umple of Shorebird Marsh. Proceedings of the NatJonal SympoBlum on Wetlancil; '88:Urban Wetlllnds and Riparian Habitat. Nsoc1l.1tion of State Wetland Mnnagers.

Williamll., P.B., A Shepherd, alld P. Fab~r. 1988, Monlwrlng a tlc.1B.l restoration site In San FfllncilicoBay" the Muz:z.i Mar:;h. Proceedings of the NatIonal Symposium on Wctll1ncM '88; Urban Wetl,mdsand Riparian Habitat. Association of State. Wetland Managers,

Williams, P,B, und M, J~lyn. How much fresh water doos San Francisco Bay need? WaterfrontAge, Vol. 4, No, 2, Spring 19&8..

Williams, P.B" M. J05se.lyn, 'and F. Wernette, 1987, River flow, salinity, and vegetation inthe managed and unman,<lged wetlands of Suisun Marsh: Paper prC\'3onted to the 9Lh BiennialInternational Estuarine Research Conference, Now Orleans, October 1987.

Haltiner, J,P. and P.B, WlUJams, 1987, Hy(Jraullc design for salt lIHmh restoration. Pupe.r presentedat the 8th Annual Meeting oUhe Society of Wetland Sclontists, Seattle, WashIngton, May 1987,

Wllliam&, P.B., 1986, HydrologJc d~i~n for coastal wetland restoralfon, Proceed!ng;s of the SceondA5s0datlon of Slale Wetland Managct.l SymposIum on Mltigatlol1, New Orlean3, October 1986.

Williams, PoB., 1983. Damming the world, Not Man Apart., VoL 13 j No. 8, OetobN 1983.

Wllliam£, P.B. and T.R Harvey, 1983, calJfomln coastal &ult m8r1ih restOration design, ASCB ThirdSymposium on coastal and Ocean Management, Coastal Zone 83, June 1983.

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P8gB 4-----------------------------------

WI11!ams, P.B, and E, Areru, 1981. Wind and buIlding energy m1l5umption: an overview. ASCEConferenoo Pro~edlngs Preprint 81·128, New York, May 11·1.~, 1981,

Williams, P.R, 1979. The ErR procC8:J 3S a tool for implementing flood plain management policJes.Proceedingn of Flcxxl Manag~ment ('.A) 11 ference, Sacramento, CaHfomin. C.a1iforniR DepL of WaterResources, Rep. ·#44.

WilliUffil$, P.B., 1978. Darn design: is (he technology faulty? New ScientL~t. February 2, 1978.

WIlliams, P.B., 1977, Taking another look lit clC\:trjcul gy8tem reliability. Public Utilities Fortnightly.MRrch 17, 1977.

Williams, P.B. and P,H. Kemp. The initIation ofBcdlment ripples from artJflclal disturbances. ASCEHydrauH~ Dlvi5ion Journal. Junc 1972.

Wllliams, P.B. unci P,H, Kemp. Tho initiation of sexl!meot ripples on Out so.nd beds. ASCEHydraulics DlvJslon Journal. Aprll 1971.

Williams., P.B. a aI., 1970. Deposition velocftJes, transition Yclocilies, llnd spatial di5tributi0l1 of solidsin slurry pipelines, I-IydrotraDsjX)rt 1 Proceedlngs J Coventry, England,

Page 68: APEO Document Redacted

Appendix A.2.,..*

THREE GORGES PRO,JECT FEASIBILITY REPOR

0,6 ---,------------,.----------,--,----------------

LEGEND

215010080

Arnbraseys (1978)

Campbell (1981)-Average

Schnabel and Seed (1973)

From Figure 4, I

Esieva and Villaverde (1973)

60

-0-

I

2010

o~+-----

j

I

\I

~

DISTANCE (km)

,COMPARISON OF M s .5 ATTENUATION RELATIONSHIPS

Page 69: APEO Document Redacted

5.3. INFLUENCE 0[" POTENTIAL HJSK . ,, Appendlx A.3

The potential ns ~ associated with dams.: c.on.~ists of stmcD.H"al components andsOcio-cCDnom" ic com~onents. The structural components of potential risk clependmostly on stqrage ca~8cityand on the height of the d.am, as the potentia) downstreamconsequences are pr portional to the mentioned vs.lues.

Socia-economic risks can be expressed by a number of persons who need to beevacuatedJn CClSt: 0 dunger and by potential downstream damage.

It is possible to ate the potential r1sk by weighting tbe mentloncd components,n.ssociatJng a larger weighting factor 'to dams with larger storages, posing largerevacuation rcquiren ~nts and entailing larger potential downstream d8TTlagc. In thisway a risk rating ca 1 be formulated and subdivided into different classes, rangingfrom low to cxtrem ,

It should be ke::>t in mind that tbe above mentioned weighting or risk compo­nents, and espcciall, the soci° "e,cOIIOD11C risk components, are assessments based onjudgement aDd fen ~ct the lInpacr of the .socia-economic environment. Differentcountries wilt there 'ore find it necessary to adapt the soclo-ec-Dllomic risk contri­bution to suit th(~; reyuiling circumstances. The foregoing consideratloDS caD beused as general gui Jance in this respecT.

The t\Yo following 'fables arc convenient to rate the risk iissociated with (bmsFOUl risk factors a e separately weighted as 10\\1, moderate. high or extreme:

T--~--··_--------.-. 'T-~ ----~-··-·r--~----

;., ]20 120·) I 1-0,/ ~., 0,](6) (4) i (1) (0)

,I > 45 45-30 I 'J 0- 15 <. I 5(6) (4)! (2) (0)

> j aoo 1000·100 I 100-1 None

(l2) (8) II (4) (0)

Wgh lv\odcr atc Low NOlle

(J 2) U~)_J_~_~,~_._ _(~ _

Height (m)

Evacuotion Req jirerncnts(No, of persons) "." .. """.

IPotential Downstlcam Da-I

I I

'['''''''/I.-,.L

mil ge

'--~~I--'~'-i- --~2xtrerne ~ High'~ I ~M~e'hl:l ~~,O\v.

-_. ") COJ;;dbU-;;:~ ,i,k (weighting poi"") :~-.l .. .I

- ..~----_ ..._,--._- ---/_....._..

cit)' (hrnJ

) +'"''II·r

I] II

39

OJ

.__...__ .._ ..__~_._.. ..._ . ._ .. ~,__..,. , . .__'.•_ ..__.. '_..__'._,__--0_._. _

I1

I

Page 70: APEO Document Redacted

DAMSiTEGEOLOGY PLAN

NOTE: GEOLOGY SiMf"dflEO FRO)...! ,;,VPO PLATE"DAM"- I 19S:> DESIGN F:[PCRT

·Nt: SAHD b

Veilture

CP. .... liiTE W:T~'

- I)

PLATE 48

_S;"~~l' LOA;) "'TfH HO

.LUlo'il.H..t - l,;A,H:

ROCK OiTCh,

E:NCL,n~s (

PP.E G['TI'.QU8:, DRY SEASOI, SHOP,ELlI

(EL .... O t)

SHORE llHf. OF GEIHQUet. R[SilVO)R

(EL 56:+:)

ZONE Of DEEP WEATHE.":IHG

DIA[;A~ u:'\;c

FAULT ~R SHf.A" ZOriE(GENERU-lY R'::t::ONSOLIOATEO)

SY!!>BO'ce?

LEGEND

I T g;~\~:~~~~c:~:\~;al

~ CIPM Yangtze Joint

. MARCH 1988 J

UAOf'ikOYILlAG::-~

." ..."

N

I~1r~J

[---I

'/

Page 71: APEO Document Redacted

THREE GORGESAppendix A.5

PR00ECT FEASIBILITY REPORT

HEJGHT OF WAVE (m)

100

80-

r©I" --

!2 16 20 2'4 27

60

B\ 0'

x 40- \ cC CL<lJ

<lJ ::J..c ..c 0

N,-

0 U::J0 0' 0 c.c - 0If) N :;:;: If)

@-\---------,---r~--I-'----'- ------,-=--:::2-='=;::::~....,...L...__r--r===r_____1

24 20 16 12 8 4 Xintan 4 8

DISTANCE (km)

A - Calculated wove for 16 x 106 m3 entering.reservolr(Water Level = 150m) at lOOmis

8 - Physicol model test result for 16 x 10 6 rn 3 entering reservoir(Water Level = 130m) at 67 mls

C - Observed wove from June 12,1985 slide with 1,6x 10 6 m3 entering reservoir(Waier Level = 66m) at 31 mls

JIANGJIAPO I_ANDSLIDERESERVOIR WAVE ATTENUATION

Volume 4

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THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT

TABLE 1.1 - THREE GORGES RESERVOIR STORAGE

Appendix A.6

~--- --~-~--_._.--~---""---"-~---~----- -" - ~ -_._---------~--------- _.~--~._--~.~~_.-------------- .- -----_._-"._-~-._--------

LEVEL (m) VOLU~1E (km 3) LEV El_ (m) VOLUt~E (km3) LEVEL (m) VOLUi,IE (km 3)~---_.~----

--_._------~-_._._--"._----- ---~-_._----- ---_.._-------~-- -_._-~.-~---~---,~-

110 4.60 140 14 .70 170 34.40111 - 4.75 141 15 .16 171 35.32112 4.91 142 15.62 172 36.27113 5.09 143 16.09 173 37 .23114 5.29 144 16.57 174 38.22115 5.50 145 17 .06 175 39.22116 5.7= 146 17 .56 176 40.25117 5.98 147 18.07 177 41 .291U3 6.24 148 18.60 178 ~2 .36119 6 ,- 1 149 19.14 179 43.46• ::J ~

120 6.80 150 19.69 180 411.57121 7.11 151 20.27 181 45.71122 7.43 152 20.87 182 46.87123 7 .76 153 21 .48 183 '13.0612 11 8.10 154 22.10 184 /19.28, ,) 1- 8.45 155 22 .74 185 ')0.52L:J

126 8.81 156 23.40 1136 51 .80127 9.17 157 24.0(3 187 5:3 . 1012Ll 9.55 15Ll 24.77 188 5L~ .43129 9, 159 25 .118 189 55.80

'\ .--,,/"\ 10,33 160 26.20 190 5;' .20! j ')

131 10. :; 3 161 26.94 191 .b3132 11 . 14 162 27 .70 192 60.10, l. ') 11 .56 163 2Ll.47 193 61 .GO1 J.J

13 /+ 11 .99 164 29.26 194 63.1135 12 .42 1 C' C 30 .en 195 64.72.0 :J

136 12.87 166 30.90 196 66.33137 13.32 167 31 .75 197 67 .99138 13.78 168 32.61 198 69.68139 14.24 169 33.50 199 71 .41

._~-- ..------------- _._-_._---------~-~ -------_.----- ,---------"-----..-- ~ ---------- - ------- - ---~----

4A - 1---2-- Table 1.1

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THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT

TABLE 1.2 - GEZHOUBA RESERVOIR STORAGE

A.6 can't

LEVEL VOLUME(m) (krn 3 )

60 0.14

I

4A

62

64

66

68

70

-- 1--3 --

o . 1 9

o .25

o.31

o.37

0.43

Table 1.2

Page 74: APEO Document Redacted

A.6 con't

The difficulty of achieving this schedule Isdiscussed In Volume 2, Section 4.4.2 and Iscommon to aJi altematlves. It Is CYJV's opinionthat wn:h adequate equipment, preparation andtraining of key f)BrsDnneJ it is feasi~e to constructthe RCC cofferdam within the time allotted. Therewill bB no difference in the common constructionproblems PDsBd fOf any alternative.

Proposals fOf different tyPBs of cofferdam arementioned In Section 8.1 of this volume. However,thes("1 options would restrict navigation capacityduring construction and have not boon consideredfor this feasibility study.

.2 Right Bank Intake Dam and Powerhouse

scheduled for competlon by the time the reservoirIs raised to Its intermediate level of EI130 in JUly ofYear 12.

The excavations for the permanent shipi(s(23 379 000 m3 for the YVPO Base Scheme) arethe most difficult on the project. They have veryhigh rock cuts that call for careful coordination ofSUppDrt work. The open-cut work will have to becarefully coordinated with the undergroundexcavation.

The major drfferences in the p€rrnanent shiplocksfor various NPLs arise from changes in the heightof the head works, the numb€! of locks and theheight of the lock walls. These are summarized inthe following table:

Dilm Oest CDp<l to Invert

r--~~----~ t-----__;-~--t:.-~-n-:-e-1rt.--.-~~-~1W;'-IL;'-I'... Lo4"Pk ..

YVPO Base 50 175 50 32.5 4D I 40 I 40 --.

I Ait. 1 50 185 60 32.5 I 40 I 40 i 40! --!I All. 2 60 1~: I 60 38 I 36 I 36 f 36 \ I

I~:~ .. __ J~ .. ~:l ~J ~~L~j ~~I~J;;The Increased length for five locks instead of fOlifmeans more work but not more difficult work. Whileconstruction of the permanent shiplock is a rnajorundertaking there Is a reasona~e time available forconstruction even with an additional lock.

Lock Walls

H<light

----_._---_.,--------_._--------------------_ ...:Head Worb

DCLNPLArrangement

Construction of the right bankIntake dam In Stage III Ispossible within the timescheduled by YVPO. However,the rlgtit bank PDwerhouse civilconstruction and Installation oftudJlnes and generators IsJUdged to require the sameoverall duration as the lefl bankpowerhouse, 47 months fromtilE) start of powerhouse civilconstruction to opmatlon of thefirst unit. This means a sixmonth extension of theschedule fOf first generation atthe right bank p0Wertiouse and.IS appncat~e to all schemes.

18.3.7 Navigation Facllitleg_...------------~--_._----._--- ----

.95

.76

.98

.88

l'

18.3.8 Schedule Risk

The probability of completing any phase ofconstruction on time has been estimated (see VoL 2

Section 5) and is shown below:,...,...,.-.-.-.--.-.-.-----,

r,Cgl&~;8l1!

.::.i:il~rfl#·iil ••• tliii~~WJ?~1{g1'

'------'--'--'----

Preparatory Phase- .98-Phase r .Phase.I!.·..•••. ··.· ·· ••Ph.a.w< fli to<Pro{ec1 CDmPl~tlon .96CumulaUv8 .'ProbabiHty .87Construction of the permarH:lnt shlplocks Is

.1 TemPDrary Shlpock

The construction equipment proPDsOO by YVPO Issurtable to build the temPDrary shlpock In theavaiiable time. The CYJV recommendation toIncrease the range of operating levels, wouldrequire a gr8<lter volume of concrete to be paced.This can be accommodated within the sameschedule and construction pan.

.2 Shlp/ft

Shlpift construction as scheduled by YVPO for itsBase Scheme Is Judged to bB practicable but noteconomic. The CYJV alternatives do not Includea shlpHft. ThIs Is dlscussBd In Sec1lons 8 and 12.

.3 Permanent Shlpocks

Volume 1 - 18-6 -

Page 75: APEO Document Redacted

A review of the nood control analysis of the erDA Feasibility Study of the Three Gorges Project

Philip B. Williams Ph.D, P.E.

Although most of the economic benefits claimed for the proposed Three Gorges Project are

forelectricity generation, in the public arena the dam's advocate have claimed flood protection as the

pri mary need for the project. It is freq uen tl y stated that unless the dam is bui 1t, catas trophic flooding will

occur downstream on the middle reaches of the Yangtze floodplain, affecting millions of people.

The feasibility study's role, therefore, is to provide an objective and systematic analysis of the

changes in flood risk provided by the dam and to demonstrate that the project would be the most cost­

effective approach to providing additional flood protection. For a project of this magnitude - one of the

world's largest civil engineering projects, which can potentially affect hundreds of millions of people - it

is reasonable to expect that such an analysis would be accurate, use the best available techniques, and

havc a consistent methodology.

Unfortunately the study does not achieve these goals, for the following reasons:

I . EUIVir:&C2LtIJC:J2LQjl;;.i,;J jSj1Ji Srevu:se J1K~t

In the summary of the feasibility report (Yol 1 sections ].2 and 1.4.4) which is presumably

written for funders and key policy makers, it is stated that the project's main flood control function is to

protect 20,000 km2 of downstream floodplain inhabited by 10 million people. But throughout the study

there appears to be confusion over the main flood control goal; for example, in the volume summary (Yol

4 p 1) it states that the project "can provide flood protection to approximately 1 mil1ion km2"; but

elsewhere (Vo] 7 p 1-21) it states more precisely that the "primary flood control objective of the project

and its operation must be to guarantee the integrity of the major dykes protecting the Jingbei Plain and the

Jingnan Region" - an area of 6700 km2 (see Vol 7 table 9.2).

1

Page 76: APEO Document Redacted

The computed flood benefits described in the detailed technical analysis do not substantiate even

the least grandiose of these statements. In the benefit analysis the average reduction of flood area is

claimed to be about 4000 km2 (Vol 7 fig 1.4) but this nurnber itself can be misleading. About three

quarters of the benefits claimed for the project are attributable to the reduction in the frequency, anclnot

the elimination, of flooding of just three areas - two overflow diversion areas and thefloodway area

adjacent to the river channel between the dykes (referred to as beach areas). Only about 10% of the f10exl

benefits are attributable to protecting the highly populated Jingbei Plain and Jingnan region (Vol 7 table

1.5) yet the flood control storage and operation is designed specifically for this 10% (Vol 7 P 1-10).

Only a detailed reading of the study reveals that the project goals and operational design of the

project are not as stated, but instead to upgrade protection for the Jingbei and Jingnan regions from the

current 250 year level to lOOO year f]oodlevel (Vol 7 p 9-10, table 9.2). This means that the flood control

operational design is not based on an objective benefit/cost analysis, but on a subjective judgment that

these areas require levels of protection higher than the 250 year flood (Vol 7 table 9.2).

2. 1.J nre'lLLSlLCQ12gIltti~lliilL~Iil~il\

The feasibility study has recommended an opel'ational plan for the dam that establishes the

,U110Ullt of flood flows released and stored based on dowilstrealll flood levels (Vol 7 section 8), 'ro

achieve the flood benerits cLlillled ror the project means that this operational schedule will have to bc

rigorously followed - particularly during large floods.

Actual operating experience or large multipurpose reservoirs during large floods indicates there

can be substantial deviations rrolll prescribed operating procedures, resuHing in greatly reduced flood

benefits, In common with these other projects, the Three Gorges design has flood control operational

cri teria that:

2

Page 77: APEO Document Redacted

CQjlflicL}VitlL12Qwer j2Loduction _QQeration. Because power production provides cash

revenue there will be strong institutional pressure to operate the dam to maximize power

generation by delaying emptying of the reservoir for flood control or keeping the

reservoir higher than required to maximize power head. In fact the feasibility study

already acknowledges that the operating criteria may be modified once the project is

completed, to increase power generation at the expense of flood control (Vol I p 11 14).

Such changes are not reflected in the analysis of benefits.

CoUDicU'IiltLiJo\:VnstrC:_ilLlLQevelQprnenJ,.c Most of the flood benefits claimed for the

project result from growth of development in the river channel and overflow diversion

areas. During major floods dam operators frequently disregard operating rules and fail to

make required releases when faced with the certainty of flooding downstream property

versus the uncertainty of later catastrophic flooding. This can substantially reduce flood

con tro] effecti veness .

.llJ:U:~ a lj sti c: aS~\11ll1!Ji9r:U)LJ)Q[~c:t s12jlli'lllY~P-~'lli.91L Actu a1opera ti ng exper icnce sh0 ws

that when large floods occur there is a substantial risk that designated spillway release

capacity IS not achieved because of operator errors or malfunctions of the spillway (e.g.

the e/.pericncl' with Tarbela or Glen Canyon). 'rhis too can substantially reduce flood

control storage and flood benefits.

Conf1j,C:L\'ILtIL~Qplefui,Dz.irLUlf:-.-L(;servQiLHowever, the most significant operational

problem not recognized in the study is that the Three Gorges project is unlike any other

flood control reservoir because about 500,000 people will be living in the designated

flood control storage space of the reservoir (Vol 7 appendix F tabl.c 5.1). Only people

living below the 162 meler power pool level will be relocated, and therefore everyone

between level 162 and 182 will be inundated by the storage of floodwater in the

3

Page 78: APEO Document Redacted

reservoir, as well as additional hundreds of thousands affected by backwater upstream to

Chongqing. This means, for example, that in the event of say a 100 yearflood the dam

operators will have to choose between flooding out large numbers of people living in the

reservoir or large numbers of people living in the river channel and overflow diversion

areas downstream. In fact the analysis indicates that for such a flood more people may be

flooded in the reservoir than downstream (Vol 7 table 9-4). Whilst it is hard to predict

rational decision-making in these circumstances, it is likely that the operators will weigh

the certainty of reservoir flooding more heavily, meaning that larger flood releases will

be made, negating many of the claimed flood benefits.

3. IJlade~L111tle ,walysis of flood le_'{<:JS-

The most important parameter that determines flood risk is the height of water against the lowest

point of the dyke, For large rivers like the Yangtze with a complex flow network, diversion areas,

floodplain lakes and large tributary flows, the water surface during a flood will not have a flat slope at a

particular flow rate but one that varies in time and space, As is recognized in the feasibility study (Vol 7 P

7-1), hydrodynamic models can be used to simulatc the water levels, but were rejected for this analysis

because "the accuracy of the input data is much beyond the scope of the present study". Presumably the

input claw referred to is detailcdmapping of downstream ch;mnel gcomctry, Instead of using a

hydrodynamic model an analytically crude flood routing model is used for project design, simulating

water levels at only 12 locations on thc more than SOO km reach of river downstream by modeling the

river as a series of reservoirs, This model therefore cannot be used to identify the times and locations

along the river where the progression of the flood flow would first overtop the dykes, Use of such a model

in a developed country would not be acceptable for flood benefit analysis.

The validation prescntcd for this flood routing model is not'convincing and shows a discrepancy

between observed and computed flows during the flood peak of about the same volume as the total flood

storage of Three Gorges (Vol 7 fig 7,3). The report acknowledges that the main reasons for this

Page 79: APEO Document Redacted

discrepancy are hydrodynamic effects (Yol 7 p 7-8) but nevertheless concludes, "the model representS

reasonably well" the river flows (Yol 7 P 7-10). Even if this were true the direct translation of flows to

water levels throughout the river using this model would be subject to substantial error. The importance

of accurate water level predictions is emphasized in the study, which notes that even a 20 cm change in

water level against a dyke can mean 20% change in flood benefits (Yol 7 p 9-32).

The usc of a flood routing model instead of a hydrodynamic model means that there are likely to

be substantial errors in the project flood control operational design. In addition key hydraulic factors

affecting flood risk, such as backwater effects and channel characteristics, are underemphasized because

they cannot be siniulated in this model. This is likely to mean that flood benefits achieved by upstream

storage wi]] not be as large when all these other factors arc considered. It can also mean that it is possible

that the operational design could in some circumstances increase flood risks in some areas because the

model cannot predict where the flood peaks are likely to first overtop the dykes.

4. Flood benefits exaooeraled_~ .._~_~ ..__·__~__~Qb .._ ..__ . _

The inadequate flood analysis and unrealistic operating assumptions would both tend to

exaggerate flood benefits of the project. In addition, two other major assumptions have been made that

greatly exaggen\te the value of the flood benefits:

value~ (Yol 7 p 1-16). Such an incrl:ase in real terms over the next 60 years for land that

wi]] continue to be for overflow diversion and "beach" areas downstream is highly

questionable, as it is highly unlikely that such an investment would be made in locations

that renrain flood-prone. In fact some flood agencies in the developed countries regard

the usc of any future growth in flood benefit analysis as conjectural and invalid.

Dse of the S,lrne economic grQwth rate;,s with and witho,ut the darn. One of the basic tenets

5

Page 80: APEO Document Redacted

of flood management planning is that flood damage potential and the type and value of

land use are closely related. Obviously people prefer not to build in flood-prone areas and

if they do they are likely to flood-proof their property. These actions greatly reduce the

flood damage potential in the "without project" alternative, and hence the net benefits

claimed for the project. If, for example, the growth rate without the project was 40% of

that with the project, total flood benefits would be zero (tompare Vol 7 tables

9.3 and 9.5).

This calculation illustrates a fundamental planning error that permeates the flood control

analysis. By failing to clearly define the primary goal as flood damage reduction and

instead focusing on flood control (which is merely one tool for flood management) the

project designers have built in a methodological flaw. They have failed to analyse the

flood management of the Yangtze as a complete system that incorporates not only

"plumbing" but also hydrologic, geomorphic, social and economic factor's.

It is interesting to note that the study only recognizes people's rational response to flood

hazard when it calculates flood darnages to property within the reservoir (Vol 7

appendix F p 2-4).

S. PrQject CostUgU,Qxed

Even disregarding the necessity for relocating all the half-million population between the power

pool and flood control pool level, which in itself could increase project costs by at least 20%, if any

realistic flood control operation is to be carried out several other significant project costs have been

ignored:

BackwaterJlo_Q<:LQ11mages upstLean_L The analysis of flood damages due to flooding of the

city of Chongqing by backwater froni the reservoir docs not take into account the

(3

Page 81: APEO Document Redacted

increase in river stage due to sedimentation. The feasibility report (Vol 1 p 11 10)

acknowledges the problem but claims a "critical" flood stage of 198 m whereas the flood

control analysis shows damaging flows to occur at elevation 186 m (Vol 7 appendix F p

2--1). With even the optirnistic assessment of upstream sedimentation contained in the

study, the 100 year flood level will rise at least 1-2 m within 30 years, affecting hundreds

of thousands of people in the city which has a total population of about 4 million. It

appears that the report recognizes this omission as it claims "future upstream reservoirs

and conservation measures" would reduce sediment deposition. Neither the cost of these

reservoirs or measures nor the cost of incremental flood damages in Chongqing are

included in project cost.

Cost Q.fl~J)airil1£,downstream dyke~ Although the deleterious effect of the clearwater

flows eroding the downstream dykes is acknowledged, the feasibility report claims these

problems will be managed by constructing river training works and dredging (Vol 1 p 11­

11). These costs, which can be ex tremcly large, are not included in the benefit/cost

analysis.

ELoo(LdaD.li~J1Jl~...1Q__(;QastaLC:IQ,'iiQJl-. Unfortunately the feasibility study has not

analysed the role of reduced flood flows, and the capture of sediment, on shoreline

erosion and flooding dcnvnstream. At least 500 km of low-lying shoreline south of the

Yangtze River mouth depends on the extensive rnudflats onshore for protection against

coastal flooding. These mudflats are supplied by the sediment discharged from the

Yangtze. The costs of additional shore protection are not included in the benefit/cost

analysis.

6. Fail1J.l~tosonsider eost-eJfecUY~i\ltenlatj-",--~

Because the primary goal of the study has been defined as flood control rather than flood damage

7

Page 82: APEO Document Redacted

reduction, the importance of other components of the flood management system have been neglected. For

example, it is clear that with or without the project the existing dyke and diversion system provides

substantially greater benefits than flood control storage upstream on the Yangtze. Flood storage in the

floodplain lakes and diversion areas downstream is aboLlt 200 km3 as compared to the project's 31 km3.

Unglamorous alternatives that combine upgrading of critical dykes, modifications to overflow

areas, provision or refuges and perimeter dykes, flood proofing, noocl warning and appropriate zoning

were not examined. The feasibility report states that a long-term program of flood control works

improvements is already under way (Vol 1 p 16-3), but does not present this as an alternative nor discuss

how this affects the benefit/cost ratio. In particular, the study appears to have a somewhat contradictory

aversion for assessing the benefits of even small improvements in the dykes. On the one hand it states

without substantiation that it "would be uneconomic and impracticable" (Vol 7 p 1-2); on the other it

states that a 20 cm increase in height of dykes can increase flood benefits by 20% (Vol 7 P 9-32).

One important alternative component of an improved flood management system that was

investigated was the provision of ring dykes and refuge centers. The analysis concludes that "protective

dykes could be justified if the ilJ1nual probability of flooding is more than 1.5%" (Vol 7 appendix G p I

2). This means thill such measures arc cost-effective alternatives for the three diversion and beach areas

which provide most of the project's claimed flood benefits (sc.c Vol 7 table 9.2). This important

alternative analysis is relegated to an appendix and is not even mentioned in the study's summary of

alternatives (Vol 7 table 4.1).

Non-structural measures such as development restrictions in flood hazard areas can greatly

reduce f10exJ damages. This is recognized but only considered in justifying flood benefits in the reservoir

(Vol 7 appendix F p 6-1), Development restrictions that limit growth in the .overflow diversion and beach

areas that would limit growth to less than 40% of protected areas would negate all flood benefits for the

project.

Page 83: APEO Document Redacted

7. Faihlfe to consider costs of potential catastrophic failure

The study implicitly claims that the Three Gorges project will prevent major loss of life in an

extreme flood such as the 1000 year event. Thus there is repeated emphasis on the catastrophic

consequences of failure of the Jingjiang dyke, the major upstream dyke that protects about 2 1/2 million

people (Vol 7 p 2-3) and thefloocJ control operation of the reservoir is orientated towards managing water

levels to prevent its failure, even though the probability of flood damage is much larger in other areas.

A systematic impact analysis of the project would indicate that such benefits are likely to be

negated, and in fact the potential for loss of life could be greatly increased, for the following reasons:

Increased failure of clownstrearn dykes. There is likely to be an increased incidence of failure clue

to the downcutting of the ri ver-channel undermining the banks (Vol 1 p 11-1). The

inadequate level of analysis of this vitally important impact is illustrated by the statement

"channel morphology should not change significantly because the dykes that presently

border the river are in many cases protected by rip-rap" (Vol 1 p 16-3). The problem of

increased undercutting and erosion is likely to Ix compounded by the daily peaking

power flow fluctuation of between 3200 and 12000 cubic metres/sec. As important as the

physical impact, is the institutional impact of the project. 'J'he construction of the dam is

likely to take funds that might be allocated for upgrading and maintaining these levees. In

common with the history of other flood control dams the perception of improved flood

protection is likely to lead to reduced maintcnance and deterioration of downstream

levees and other flood management infrastructure.

Potential failure of the dafl} As is discussed in a later chapter, the risk of catastrophic

failure of the project as presently planned is probably of the same order of magnitude as

the 1CXX) year flood. Although no dam feli lurc inundation map has been prepared, the

potential loss of life would number in the mi1lions. Property damage would be so large

Page 84: APEO Document Redacted

that even with a 1 in 10,000 year failure probability any flood benefits claimed for the

dam would be negated.

Increas~iLj2Qj2\llll.tlol1jnduced to settle in hazardous areas. Although the study recognizes

the presence of dykes can create a false sense of security leading to higher mortalities

when they fail (Vol 7 p 4-4), it has not applied this same relationship to the presence of

the clam itself. 'rhe analysis of benefits makes it clear that additional population is

anticipated to settle in flood-prone areas. What is not discussed is that these areas wi]]

inevitably become more hazardous over time as the reservoir silts up and the active flood

control space is reduced. Decommissioning costs have not been included in the analysis

so it is likely that as siltation occurs the operation would be modified to maximize

protection against smal1er floods. This leads to a scenario where cities and towns have

been built up in what were thought to be protected areas, ring dykes and refuge areas

have been long neglected and a lOOO year flood occurs, which the dam is no longer able

to control. Inevitably the loss of life in such circumstances is likely to be greater than if

the clam had never been built.

10

Page 85: APEO Document Redacted

N

~.

X

tD

:J:1'D'D(D

:=>n';-.J.I

97;) .

531-

20

24

22

130

395

:,4i)

3 944

872

28

032

42> 140

68 323

17 649

I 16

r I:~ ri t I i) : i:) y U d n x 1() G/km} '-In(j ()dlii'.l~lU

-5'4

.. 0

I. 16

3.31

0.33

0.06

0.1'::

0.0

C. i .5

9.0

0 .. 0

~i9. os

I () . () /

9 j \/

1" 13

1.98

5.20

9.62

4,,39

4.28

0.52

0.43

0.07

0.2"

12" 17

10.0

98.00

in Reservoir

P j cd n

I .. Floo.1ing for l1ot-hor-1! Gench !\:O<:''::.

PLOOD ,oRO~ ARr.-A S

,A,roa Flood Damages

J I n 9 bo i

Jlngnan ion

Honghu Dlvers!on

Dongtlng Diversion

XII longhu

Sanzhou I! 11n Beoch, ;\<811

Other Beach Areas l

Dongting Protocted Area

Jlngjlanq R~

Jingjlong Diversion

Renm i nduyucn

Jlngjlong Extension

Huxishangong

Shangbo I ! i zhou t3'3ach Area

Other Beoch Areas

Sub to t a I

Reduction

Chonoiing]i Roolon

Tf-P EE (J".:R (X S PRO J EC T Fti\ S [8 [ LI TY REPCR T

TABLE 1.5 - FLOCO CDf{THOL llff.f'f'ITS DYAnE}, ["elf'!, LOW NiD HIGi GF'<OliTH SCEN.-\RIOS

AN,~U!\L Il_iTY OF f~LOC{)i\,::;i C;[~~OWTH SCE~'{/'1RjO HiG,J1 CROWTH SCE~RjO

i ::;CUUr~; ~~D D i SCOUrrr ED

FL000 DAY,AGE 0 I seOUNT ED ;: LOC)] D,'}·1AGE DISCOUNT ED

w\T'>10JT 'r{\TH REJYI)CT\C)H POTEt,{TI,A.L FLOC{) 8Er~EFITS P01ENT1AL r'LOCXJ BEr~EFITS

'I'~ n~" IvY"'" "f)'" (v"""'c" '06 106 Ir6 '06IIl--r\tt. 0Jr\"..Jl.:J i:- -,t:.~:. "'J<I~Jt.) _~ yu,Jn >< l' yucn x I yuan x ,0 yuan x I

1 1 (,",) (S) (A,) x (8) C::::) (A,) x (C)

_.-

9.2eo lH,) 340 15304 I 467

4.37 j 79<1 233 8 470 412

o~ /) 6U 1 8 2 81 2 13

1. 0 7 84 5 10 i 4 6 5 ]6

1.80 ) 17i 57 ~ 295 77

59.00 14.3 3,~5 24.1 1422

0 .. 07 j 10 :167 78 150 526 106

0.52 61 ~2,~ 3i9 828&J 431

2 389

3.12 20 56" 641

0.53 32 977 191

3 685 9

1 .. '} 'j 1,02 J ({

1.0 17 17

O. I I iJ'j C)CJ.1 96

963 I 943

3357 t I 5887

, , " 63 II I 84 \

I : I i 'I II bl

Expoctf.;d i j()()d Controi! I I) ---.---- 1 ----

, Ii>2' I - 9~~ r c-, Be n e fit s : , i ' ) 4 0 I I) I L ::JI I_L I ._ ,L ,,_ _ -L- _

NOTE:

---.J

<oc:3re

l--'-

jNIn

~

LT1

-1IlJ0-

re

Page 86: APEO Document Redacted

THREE GORGES PRO-JECT FEAS1BI·LITY REPORT

Appendix B.4

" ....~\

'"

08S E RVED FLOWS

. .... "\COMPUTED FLOWS

YANGTZE RIVER

AT LUOSHAN

., ....2>0 .....

50

70 -

40

80 -.,.----.----------------------------------,

Wl5a:<i:IUV1

a

~

. ",.,E

8o

20

10

o -1--·--·--···-,.-·------·-·,--------·,----···-···MAY JU,>,E JULY AUGUST SEPT

8 0 ..,.-- -----..---- -..--..--.- ----.----------..- ..-- -----..- ..---..--..----..-- -.----.-,

DONGTING LAKE OUTLET

70 AT QILISHAN

~

"or,

Eooo

60 -

50 -OBSERVED FLOWS

'/ . /,

" I ....~,: \:' \....... " .....-'

w 40<.50::g \.-V1 <, 2>0·

" , .......a / ~... . I '.'

f.) .~ \ ..~" ~IITO~~~-+---------·_'..,-' co MPU TE 0 FLOWS , "

MAYo -- --·--·-·--r-·-·····-·----T----------J------

T JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPT

COMPARISON OF OBSERVEDAND COMPUTED FLOWS

YEAR 1954

-- 7·... GVolume 7F!GIIR~ I

Page 87: APEO Document Redacted

4 -- April 1992

Building a new lifeAppendix 8.3

Foe

4It

In

SKE'fCII ivlAP OF PLAN FOR lNtJNDATION,RESErrLEMENT ,AND RELOCATION OF TOWNSAND CITIES

l'r'}'.'Inci,ol divi~i(jn

\.II)C l)f te,\Cnlcrncf1l

lnulld:llion line 0: o:ld,wJ.ler(V~r)' 20 year,

326 townsbips) 291 ow resettle their peoplewilhin their townShips. Ooty 3S \owmhipshave to evacuale their people to nearby ones..'Therefore, the adven.c impact brought aooutby long-distance migration p,n largely beavoided.

3, -D1C Three Gorges Project haJ a long (enn

o(cons(ruction, During the J8ye-.ars from the

preparation stage till complelion, therc will beenough timc Lo arrange production andlivelihocxl [or the disp13ccd rc.siden15,

~. T1K most advantageous o[ all is lhal lhecenlral govefllrneflt has allached great im·portance to thc fescttlement issue, It has

revised the rcsCnkmefl{ polic.)' of a one·time

compcnslllion p<1c\.:age inlo a development·oriented rcs-cttlerncnt's.chemc. Sinc.e 198\ asp,ccial fund o[ 20million yu an (53,7 million)a year tlas been cl1located 10 lhis end, It iJ apri\~lcgc never before enjoyed by thc Other

';.. rc..scrvoir arcas in thc country, Thc trial reset·tlemenl scheme Over the past .six years h.15been succcs-,,{ul.

City. Togelher with ilS SUbordinate projec1.5,it C-<ln create jobs (or more than 30)000people. And marc peopk will be employed 3.., '

more projects will be set up if thc central and

1<X.al governmcn15 purpo.scfully do so duringthe c.onstruction of the Three Gorges hydro­pJWcr sUltion.

2. '1l1c displaced populaLion is relatively

dispcr.s-cd, with a big proyorlion being urbanpopulatIon. Th'e rcscltkment will be confined

to a narrcr"" strip of2,CXXJ blomelers along thereservoir, For urban rc.sidenLs, it is only a

maIler Of'C\',ICU<1tion and emigriltion and rcs­

torallon o[ urb..:1Il funclions Y.ilhOtJlthe need

to cre-ate jobs. The 330,C(X) rural rc..~icJcnt.'i,or

.15.S rx::rccl)t of the lotal displac-ceJ population,

ilccounl only for 2.92 rx-recfJt of the lOlalf;,rming Ix)pulation i.-, tile 19 roufllic..\ andtheir SUbmerged eullr,~Jied l.3nd is anI)' 2.56perceot o{ the lotJI area, wilh 110,CXXJ,mubeing p,1dd)' ncjeJ.~, or 2..3 perc~nt o( {he tot,1!paddy rlelds,

/'.\ctSlly perched On hillsides and mountain.slopes, none o( tIle 32.6 1()\\T,-~hip.s and {ewYi!!;:ges will t>e cntirety under water. Of tlles-c

tial for devclopment. A~ planllcd, part of thcundeveloped land and low-yielding slopes willtx: used through appropriille cultivation andimprovement to provide the 330,CXXl ruralpeople with onc mu e.aeh to grow cash cropssuch as ornngc, le.(l, mulberry and medicinalherbs, and half a mu each of high and slc.ady­yielding farm field, This will ensure the

crnigrtlnl.s a stable means of livcliho::x:l and

wiJJ help them 10 prosper. -Bcsidc.:s, belweenthe ebbing lines of 160 meters and 175 metersthere is an ebbing are.a of 160,C<Xl mu (10,666he(1.3res) where {<lnncrs can grO\-'{ one crop in

; h-.: dry season '111cr( I:; :11..-.0 abund'H1l grazingg:oui)(lln the rescrvoir :lreil!O develop stexK'r;;.is:ng anel processing,

There will abo Ix: gcoJ prosp<:cL~ fOf thetXC1\lSC of the rietllourism resoureC$

the (;orbc..~ arca, ;llld the 0PIX)({Ulliticsbfouglll by the (orthcomlng development in­dL:.>tncs of butlding m;l!erials, construclion,tr;;n·~rx)rla[io{) and services to be promoted,d0:1g with lhe construction of the super dillnP(0)CCl

Resettling the rural areas!ZC'_scllling (he 330,CX,X) farmen in tile r('--scr·

voir Jrea mainly relics on lflC dc\'elopmenl O[macro-agriculture, i.e., maling full ux o[ lhe

ri.eh <lgrieullural 'resourcc..~ in the rc.:;.cr....oir

.", .are<l to develop various bnds of fuming,aquacu1lure <lnel animal breeding, proccs.sing

),':- o[ agriclJltufill <lnd stocK products, (lOU rurala.nd t(N.11ship industries. In farming, it \\111:r.nainly focus on the reclamation Ofw35tc !;wd

~dl.:..;' ':~~.l~ _grow. orange, lea, rnlllber0> mcJicinJl

7~ t; r-' k . . b ., {d . } "2 . - IX .. -.. to' herbs and olhcr ~<:ash ero~ .:-'hlCh .are p,1r,. r:~,c la~!o,ry ,~!~r . .~'! fa e rCJc{( e are (JJ7l0n~ [ 1(, .3}?OO rc~idell{J <? . in/ing Eli B.adailg' '; titularly suiled to \he local conditions.

t~~~::!~!i._;J!::~~L!~~~::'.!_:::__~.:'~~~_~~_j~=::l.' I_!~~ :-, ~_~'·.;_).~)_l.a~o_~ b~:_){_;,_'ll,ji/a .:{~'l>~i_!J L:-- ..- --- ------- --~--- 1\1so, ullprexluctivc nclrls arc to ly,.:: 1m·

proyed to allO'w f;lfmcrs to hJ\'c half 2 f)H! o(

stabJc and higl1')1c!ulng field per rXf5-0n [or

&f<1in produclion,

During Ihe fXlSl six years, ,:6 million yuan(S8_,~ million) ha.~ been ~rprorri3tcd for thedevelopment of terraced fklds and orange,tea and mUltx:rf)', In ~he 19 colllltie-s, 74,(D)I11U (4,900 hcctarcs) of 1.1nd has beenreclaimed :1nd con,Qrueled, v,1th 47,700 mu

(3,ISD hcClarc.l) for grain, 38,100 rnu (1.,5·\Dhecla res) for ortlngc..\ 930 mu (62 hectJrt.:i)for !:0rnclo, 3,&XJ IDIJ (253 hcct:Ht.:i) [or teJand 5,7CX) nil] (380 hectJru) [or such fruits 2.S

~, ' .. "){

~)ICHU ..\N P!\()''':I>~C']:

Advant:lges'nlt: Three (;ort;cs area is :Jbunc!i1flt ill tile .

reYiUrCC5 o{ w;i.~te 13n(( .1gricuitlJrc, animalhus;l,lndry, ,~Jde-linc: pnxJuclion, fi.~hcrj, min· .::'.,' :in<! l<)u(i.~I]), in :lddirion 10 v;'\riou.~ f,l(> ,

:I;\d prli'.'c,\.\!Ilt', ;lI\J '<'(:I~.·I(C llHlu.stll,~,\

'\':',t~C L" "':Ihhl(~h cnvjfonmen,a\ C-;'P;\cII:r' io

rc:~~ tic the lk.p\;lccd lXoP\c.

icrr;;.\ of 1;\1)(1 rc:;..')urcc, !>,w,'C)'S ;ltHJ ell·

h:l\'l: .~ho\\'n tlla: there:He I)c:1rly 20mu (lJ mlilioll hccl.'re.s) o( mount:lIf)

,\1;",:'<.'5111 I:,C 19 countjc.~ where arcIf) tx: rcsculcd, II) which lownsillps

hi\\,~ :U-;<) 1111111Cn mu hCCl;lrc_~) of~r ;,'''y ~Inp('s ,W ix:r;:cnl o(

u:r<..'nt .: 26 mdll\,[) nlU (2S-J,fKX) hee~: ~ , j .,f ('\> it 1\;11 cd 1:1 nd ;\1 ( kr...... )'lc Id t ur;!Ccd

\l.l\::h rnCH)." thuc 1\;\ hlg p\lll'1l

by U Bonlno,dlre(.1.oroflheThreeGor~

gcs ArCIl EcoloQlcIl.l Development Offlceunder1he Stale CO~Jflcll

The rc:>cll!cn1cnl of huge number!> ofpeopk 10 be cll.\p!:Jccd by the construction ofthe m~$sivc Three Gorge5 fcs.crvoir i.~ onc ofthe cotic,! L,:>SUC5 In the project, and must bewell·conceived and pl,lnncd if the project is 10b<: Cl(fICO oul .~f))(),Jthly.

Under (he current.scheme of <I normal i'JS·meter·deep w,ller S[(Hage level, the reservoir\~111 <lrfcc{ \9 c()unlic.~ and cIlle5 In Sichu<l11;lnd J I \JL'>C I prO"'IIKC.\ o{ which twO cl(ic,~, II

(OUr,IIC':;, \.10 10>1,'0$, :n;; ((l\I,'nships and 1':'51

\'l1\;i~l'S \\111 lx: entlrel)' or p,l[\l)' 1I1und:ltcd.

t\(;:,)((]I!)1', to;j \ 9HS survt:y, [he rx)PUI3110{) ofIhe Mca W;lS "I?_'),500, W\(ll ~92,<)()() urban and_1.12,60G rur;1[ residents_ An estimated.1)(,,iXX) I1HJ (2J,I"JXJ hcct;lrcs) of clllllv;Hrd1;lnd ',qll be submerged. If we laKe lOW ile·

(ounlthe fX)pul:llioo grO\I,-1h rille over the la.st20 .1'(,3rs, there WIll be ilS I1WO)';1S l,133,&X)p..:op:e lO I'>\.' CV(lcUJlccl and rl'scltlcd

i~('<'l'tl\ln~ rx~()plc- on .<.ueb ;\ rnas.."-Ive -",(;lie(lu:.;rncnl.<. thc dr;\wb3Ck.~ of :hc regIon's cuI·

11\':llCd tll)U scarcity, b;lC),:v.-ard e("Doomy ;l110CdL.'c;ltion .- !;lrgely due to lhe abs-cncc ofStC1\C InvCSlmenl in the P;"L\l, Tne prolonged

in,:cCl-sion in implementing the project has

Irnr~J-<,td IJ further burden. Nevertheless, the

rC~~j()fl has IL~ ()\vn ;'\OV;\l1\'I);o not shilred byott~u reserVOirs In the countr)',

Page 88: APEO Document Redacted

~

TiHE£ ~S ffiOJECI FE.ASIBIL1Tl ST1....x:rrTABt.£ 9~) - S~ (§ 10rAl. OIS{XX.><TED FleX)'] (~S i11Tlo;r n~EE ~s - 12 R.fPK..fSEX1AT1YE Fl(XX) ~s

Vl

,...,C'Lf-O­xto

>''U'U(D

906'00006

--"s'* *--_/ .

I SU).-lt.{ARYITot"j Flood Obmbg6S, yu~nxlO6

'JingJI.~ICh.~II09-1 Tot.l)R"<)ion jl Roglon i O""'.go,

5 268 ) 6881 __-10..9.5.6-2 996 ) 2'0 6 2>6Tl99 T9iB ---TTIT-I 128 122)[ 2)1

70) 79< I )27

9 0'8 II 5 I) I 20 56), 968 6 461 I I <29

\

2898 TJ56 "'"663'5I 777 2 296 I < onI 100 I '61 2 594

I175 2 7)9 I , 781 7 716I175 ) 260 , I 251 , 69017) ) 2}) 2 )12 ) 72017) o "7 2 862 6 <5<17) 2 667 I 2<0 , 08217) 2 786 I 667 , 628I)) 2 '10 -' 156 5 7' 1

I 175 2 '68 , 10< 6 7'5

I 170 ) 002 -' 252 8 09

I 17) 2 996 ) 2,0 6 'I IITot.el txpoctG-d PIer-A O<'Yl\llges.

(8'::se-D on HIgh Grv.-th Sce-nor 10)._---

0.1.4.

following table

0.)20.07

! lITO~~1 Expuetoo FlOC'{) O~'~9~s (yu.:lnxl06 )·'··'1

1 Pror~cr~ ArellS l! (lo-w 9rOw'~h 1.. 101 di$.COJf)~ rllta)

t''''e rCXJting rrodeJ Indlc¢ie O.52~ for Jlngf1¢n ond O.07~ lor J[rgl>el,The If"Odel sho'><'s thDt __ h"n the dykes Drotectir>g OAe c(ell 1~lls W'cter

compare to

10

10 ..... [<..1-1987

***

t·,.,o Cr e-:: s.

i 2. 17

the results at

DIs.counl"'>d

95

BLi,915

1 ;.&

lH:l.),:r1 Ar (l D $. i

" I at),Y\j"r.

29

O,;;r I IO'c,ar 1'----'-------1- 1

1

"00<I1ng I I !)!n9 f •.".~.. JJIOccl"ou- 00"9[109IJln9001 I JI~oon I Oon<;ri~ 8''''0.n IJI"9jl.~!Cho~lIng-1 Totll[

~~u.) on J Ic~n l"~'OO I ""0 "~'oo I """0 ',""~"91 "~'O" I)' "~'"" 0_""I i ---.L 1. 1 lchong I .

[)111~~~~-~·n~~i-r-OC)~_·~~y~~-;~r~:~_L--- I I

I' I I i I

90 1;.00 16 i 0.00 0.» 0.67 I 75 I 2 ») I ) 178 I90 I 15.00 I' i 0.00 0.00 0.67 I 75 I 2 27) < 882

i 17 I 10.00 10 1 0,00 0.0, 0." 75 0089 , 191126 liS. 00 1.5 0.00 0.00 O. ),3

9) I \.00 8 0.00 1.00 0.00I ! 2 I I ,. 00 i I O. 00 o.no. I 7, I I I ) . 00 I I O. 00 O. '5 O. Ii! IS I 7_ 00 ) 0.00 0.00 0,10

1.,0 I, 0.00 0,97 0.00I ). 00 "I 0 . 0 2 0 , 9 9 O. 00

7,00 I 0,09 0.<6 0.0)1).00 II I 0.'6 0,70 0.00

I 98

701. )0O. ::2

).':l)

'.712.060.00).:1..1,

? »)'.0'? ? 2

1o,

be I i

U'O<.;

--,-------_._--------------

Po T (l n t ! "i ,

~> ( ;';' ~'0 ,J : [ I ; I 0 50

,:<>d O"·':'>.::Jge

i y ur :> i en f,r~.);,

;J _1_

[. :f\G~: ~IQ!lg.)rl

l,,"-''''''''-'';''~. i c>cxi

3.68 .CJO G.. ..;)\.00 '.000.57 ).602. )9 O. ; 9J.03 2, )6J.,. ~ 6 '0. i 79. \.(, :.11). )6 D.OO'). 'li

2.0) 0_99

,( .0-< \.2<17.78 I. 15

;.20 G. ~ 8 1.1)

lJ.,;

Totlli Di sew/) t....,j F

'0 19 I

8 68))L)T-

29 )

"'VHf ~;" A.nnur, i

) 7 79502 9))W8)I

12 '7,8 1i 2

06 09120 )6'~

7 76') 0<)

1 2. 12 9. '6I 1.6, 5.97

2. I' 7.201 1.96 7. ?8I 1.91 J • 22I <.96 2. <0I o. )0 ). 1.(

I 1.02 2.0)1 ',- ,0 ? )7

I 6.0, 2.08I 1).00 O• ..{2

i 7. )0 0.5\

'.62 I '.27 '. )9

is 881

9 005''T\T) .( 1 1

21;

507 HI< 1'821 ;721 201192'1 2) !198 <20 1110'9 15,,691'120, I' <9651 6'61111660 'I, 79' 1 8') 0171 '" 102 1< f"O '67 61,2' 8) 99' I - - - .T5TT : I '5'05 I TUT I ""9 ----rrs- I -Cf 16320T 16051 ~,

SOo j blj) I 019 I 1)0 'I )'1 <19 I ) 1 ,0 0" 22 210 01 098 I, 1 I 7U I )9 I i 208 I 7) 7 '. 77 \ I ' I 25 n 2 I' 222 19 91 I

2892'--+-7-9-06-0-+-1-2-'-9-9-6-102199 I 1»<) r-~~»r-;--~-;-8-6)~'I~-----:~rl-;-~l <) 1'27' 129 II :520951 212900 i15 80.1. .() i.(,O 68 323 I~ I ,( I i ~ I J., 295 ' 2-< ~~~ 2.(~ 82 880 ~TT85' ~ )9 710 10 252 I i 5)0 I 2 '90 i 1< I 09) I ", 87 526 '800 I 67 260 ,

5 610 I) 279 2' 266 1 6 296 I 2 99' 'I' 996 I ,22 I )2' i 9 I 67) i 91 )0 8)9 I 29 29' 'I 01 I Io X) 5 9 7 10 , I) <) 6 I < 0 I' I I 90 2 , 600 I 0) 2 969 I 6 <) 0 'I 6 0 < 00) I 5 60 I, 26 0 <2 I'

1 )) ,I

8>10~

TIT,'>16>

F i C.<_,.:j

HI;, to( i c

Hi GH

5~1i' 528 II' 5<2 I E:P::~·~I TO[:~90IS':OJ:~~ DO~O!;·$;oY'lcn X,~061 i 1(~i:OO) ': :::OI,dISC::~'&lj r02:~oI1987:" I 578 I 075 I10~ 570 879, I "9 '22, 2'9 8 1 10 I 60 I 1 097 I 10<, 1<8 I' 8() 020 207 I

TIT TI3' "ITS'I' -m. TIS I 150 '5 I ·'6 I )I I ~ 51 90 TI 188 T22I <> I )25 )) 2 " 8 I 60 I 9< 0 : < 2) : ) 0 2 ) I ) 7 1 29 II 6 75

_,____ 16> I .~_~ I 216 0561 10' I 6: ,7J 7J 15 i __0_'_7_J 00 O~ 19 I 7' '8~Hie« ) 8> I 27811 0079 I ) '92 II )06 II b08' ,; II j{; I ~'2"61 '10 <52 [ 199! 792 51)

I OJ i ..!..1X2. i I 8" I ) 002 I ~_ I ~ I' 7 I .g.:.2 ) I 22!l. ~ -'.Q.'!. ' .:E ~, TIl I 88) 1 TI5IO I Ti0 i )00 I 25': 1 lJ' ~O I nl9 I)) I 1'6 6' I 250 162[ 1'5 I 5,0 i 6») I 066 I 006 I 106 1 ; : D 00 8,9 L 82 I 90 I 09 ! 15) 99

: I(;~ I )n I <15 675 I 19~__~L .~__ ' '_'1L __"'-=-. )2 I ,5 I 25 i 97 60

~WTE: I For Jlo9Jlong end Dongtlng R~9lon fl~DCh A'tles. dllrnD~_;"'" /}rl; in Ktr'? end demo-go potBntlQ]S cre In '(x\06/~_/. For InlOri1\.Ctlon only.3. ExcludIng ,j6"""Dges In r1S'$orvolr <lore".

..I, Th<; prob.::bility of floodIng elthe, Jing.'1<'ln or Jlngbol or t-0tr, 1<, O.S9~ pM yec.r. "'IfI t does itot r!'p,esent the 3ctu¢1 river ¢ccurefely ~nc"..J<j·l rD 5-('l;J,~rc".,to il"Hl cL~r7\v:JD btlt ..... ec,'

I avol" "ra (edU<&<:l llnd rho other Drtl¢ Is uSuDi iy :{"~J

i iI H...:lJor Olve;:slon Ara..:!,> 1 ) .....,:,1 j"r

--->1 Jlncr I L I"" 1"""~ln"Dl~_~c_o~__ J~'o ~:r:_'_~~t t_' un 0

\i·-'~~----------i---

19'> ) \ 1.2.\ '!):) l 8.7\ 9)'2 (12.7·19 :).( 9.2i 9 '):) 8. ?, ..

19fJ! i 0.1\ 968 1 1.0'i 9 7D 9. Q(

I'fH 7.1.1980 } 8,1982 I 8:"198;' 1 :> • .( .

S """'0 I, I; H~ -1 -'--

,Cre-lh ![}ls.countlISc~n"r·IO 1 R",tQ '

, '--L;---t e~

! 105i TLT

[ I, > II 16> I

I

Il.

----J

\.0

W

Jl

w

(1)

--

D

r.T

---i

Page 89: APEO Document Redacted

r

To to I Exp~c t &(j-F 100d OO"\'lo-gf}'S. (yu",nx 106):Lo.... gr~th t.. \01 Ols.co...;nt r~i~)

) t 098

19 91 I

22 2 I)

iJ. 222

1 ) i 0'<' 9

~)6 05)

Prol.,ct.....j Arto>o",

25 912

1..0 )i.';'

198 .0\ 20

1~. 6') 20 I

2>

"), : 9

27)

AI ~, .... ~ I

1.(! 1 102

t.. 6 ')

2; 1 92.(721

7)7

I S6i.

i I ~O

.") 171

l i 9

ioa

8.( )

) J,a2

59 I

':;"':1

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6 ~ ;

1 f,.C))

I I

5 ~) 7

.( 791.

J ......, i ) ", . ; : v ... · . ) r~ )., ( "(; <,

:.< )n>

15 19 i

8 685

""'"r~ .. l,,,nUll'

li2

i 2 J..J ')

) 7 798

~!}l..

\ 9 2:>2

)6 G91

20 56''12 :-fi6

761.,

O~J

HonQ h U

J-l..'Jor () I v.,( '> I on Ar ">.,s

t:'4

1..:1

21>

'-1 O.l.)

: > B8:

j i ":--'9

51

1 ? ~

"1161

101

19"7,(

1930

1982

198.\

5 f),",p i '" AV"lr r:r:; I'l

HiS:o,ic flo-Od

n--i{f£ (.;cA(;f.S PX-.:.lJECT rf.ASiSIL1Ti ST\..Crr

TJ..8(.£ 9.5 ~ ~ Cff TOIN. DJ$.CI:.X.>(TE.D FLCXX) ~S wiTH TtREE ~S R:E:~)o:(":('D ~v.JECT - 12 R:£PRfS..t)<TAi;VE flOJO ~S

0"'0' !Rowvol,j I iJi:'lq- \ 111""9- jn- SDflZr>OU- Oor-gting J]r)<;~1 JIl"'><jno"" 1)r-<:j !Por:",.,tc;!Jlr.gJiorx; Ch0~11"'9-1 Tot,,1 1

fDongllng ,v2 d"yu".' 'Ic n R~]IO" Plcl.' P~lon P~lo.n !" VAI09 i R~lon JI R~lon I °""°9°' I'ifjrC"Jr.:-:;!\ SM"o'('lS [~) i I

':-'-'---'-------~+_-.-~-,----.,___---_c:__----___;------._ ..---------.,___-----;----------.----------,------;-----~------I----.,_---_i , , I I i1931 00 i.25 e.!31 7.:'>0 )2 \;.Ot) i6 C.C{) 0.00 0.59 '\ SO \ 1..58 II .( 556 1 501...0\ I\9;') (~.OO I.).() 8.Q7 7. ~C I.. i \ 5.00 :i. 0.00 0.00 0.62 I )/ I 591 I.. 769 1 5 )97 II

',952 '2. 0.°') ~,.61 7.)0 S7 IS.C~) ;2 O.C·J 0.00 0.20 'I 207 I 861 I ) 5./,) \ .( 615

19>' 0,91 1>,00 0,00 69 1>,00 Il 0,00 0,00 0,19 ( )8 I 991 I "0) I 5 <)) \'

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Page 90: APEO Document Redacted

AFpendix B.6

THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT

TABLE 2.2 - IMPACT OF JULY 1981 FLOOD AT CHONGQING

Peak Discharge: 82 600 mJ/sPeak Stage: El 193.38Peak StaSJe exceeded EI 1:30 fo(' i) days

POPULATION AFFECTED

HouseholdsPeople

AGRICULTURAL LOSSES

Gr a i n I, anclVe(j(~tab I esot e [' Cr 0 p S

Urban

26 95208 132

61 2 I) p'I, J1 ] 99 'Inl

il., ,r- ~) 270):Ll

u ra 1

528915

Total

33 480137 (jil/

Pro elu c t ion'-T:-~-'-~-

\.1000 kg)

628

rota 1

Total Loss,IJ, 'I C [' (1 9 (: 1_ 0 S s

:3 U1L[) l ii (;

} ..-- ,.,.. . --, --, .._---" .. - , .. -...,- - ..,

/9 if 5 322/ ]:-:8 000 yuan in 19i311 377 yuan/ha In 1981

Tot a 1 :

!I v c (' a CJ e

190 x 10 6 yuan (IlC) cictJ) 1 s)

190 000 00O;ill d n :: lW6 y L1 an/ pe [' son137 Oi)l peopl(~ in 1981

SOUf\CE: F~eport on "July 1981 Extra-orcJina Big F'lood in Cilongqing" byChonCJqing Floocl ConUo] Office, i'1aJch 19136.

7F _ J ....

Page 91: APEO Document Redacted

I

4

I

Appendix C.l

THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT

TABLE 9.1

SUKKARY OF CYJV RESETTLEKENT COST ESTIKATES

(mi It i on yuan)

i i

I iI

I I10 I I

I I

I I3/, I iI

I II I

NPL 180 IIIIII

3 867 III!

3 765 I III

1 3% IIII

1 630 I III

695 IIII

171 II! I

5{, I I

II

',6 I I

23

NPL 170 I

25

NPL 160 I

23

1 ~62 2 112 2 97~

1 951l 2 1,18 3 31,1l

605 797 1 067

71,2 790 1 20 1,

283 IIl3 506

91 11 " 15"

19 )() 1.6

20 26 1,2

~~ 5 29 I 3\

NPL 150 I

FACTORIES RELOCATION

RURAL RESETTLEMENT

ROADS AND BRIDGES

RELOCATION Of TWNS

RELOCATION OF CruNTY SEATS

7. TRANSKISSION LINES & SUBSTATIONS

6. PO',!ER PLANTS

i', I

IIII""" . .

IIII 1.

II 2.

II 3

II I,.

II 5.

I I 5. RURAL ENTERPRISES

IIIi q TEL[CL)KK~;'''iC/\i:O~{ Lj,H:S

IIII 10. RAILWAYS

II1111. CULTURAl. <~ITAGE

IiIi 12. PESERVO[:~ :~L[JRAI<CE I: f)UBLl!: HEALTHI 75 ql, ! 1')2 i 19B II

Ii I II

I i). U'~IISPt:CIF;::::' liE,U,S 5~)O q~)5 119/11

I III 11,. KAfiAGEKENT ~08 525 7:\6 922 III II

I 1'). TOTAL I,ESLRVOIR COSTS 621.1 8030 1121.6 11,095 IIII I!II 16. DAHSITE RESETTLEHENT 63 63 63 ()3 IiII II! I 17. TarAL COST Of RESETTLEKENT 6 30~ 8 093 11 :108 1~ 157 IIII IIII 18. TOUI! cos~ / affected person (YUiln)I 116B6 11263 11609 11959 IIII IIII 19. Totill cos~ / affected pel'son ($) 3 158 3 O~I. 3 137 3 232 IIII I I I I III1====================================================================================1 I

Volume 9 -~ 9-3 .- Table 9.1

Page 92: APEO Document Redacted

Appendix C.2

THREE GORGES· PROJECT· FEASIBILITY REPORT

100000

jJ CZ1,cooou}}­

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o1980 1990 1992 1994 1998 1990 2000 2002 2004

\ 200

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, ..

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>- '":JVl >.0u

,100

200

o1988 1990 1992 1994 1998 1998 2000 2002 2004

YEAR

RESETTLEMENT SCHEDULE AND CASHFLOW

NPL160, FCL 140 SCHEME

Volume 3

FIGURE 4.4

Page 93: APEO Document Redacted

3.

\=j e[IS eig nen: c:" \::; SJ:J ~": i':':S e:lI"ve rt u d0 ~_-~---------- •(

Lal sur I'acces i:J i;;-,;\.j(rr,~::i,C[\

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

l~t

tJi.:J

If

;-J

I

'1

~

i

'I SA

On the 'basis of the review and evaluation, CY JV is convinced that thenon-equilibrium approach used in the TGP model (i,e" the diffusionequation) is the proper way to model suspended sediment deposition inreservoirs ;Hld the suspended sediment loads of most rivers, For theYangtze, the suspended sediment load of generally fine sediments cornprises99,95% of the total sediment load of the river, so the gravel bed load doesnot need to be modeled for the feasibility level of study,

The theoretic31 basis for the TGP model is sound Thernodel is fairly well formulated, Some approximations used in the m'odel arenot theoretically correct, but are reasonable and are treated as parametersthat can be calibrated in the model The hydraulics arehandled adequately, The seclimerlt tra~sport function is almost identical toBagnold's equation for suspended load, has as much theoretical basis asany sediment transport furlCtion, has been used in Russia, China andEastern European countries for over 40 years, and is easy to calibrate anduse It is well suited for the problem' at hand,

The TGP model has been calibrated and verified over a very broad rarlgeof conditions It has been used extensively and with goodresults for over 15 years It was first applied to Gezhouba project in theearly 1970s and was subsequently verified after the project W;JS

constructed, Finally, and most important, the individuals who are doingthe modeling are the ones who developed the model, they have worked inthe data collection programs, they have intimate knowledge of the river,the data, the theory, and the rnodel, They have worked on the Yangtzeand other Chinese rivers for over 30 years, CY JV agrees with Dawdy andVa rlO ni (193() ) t h 3 tat the pre sen t s tat e oft hesc ienee 0 f mat hem atic aIrnocJeling of rivers I the modeler is more important than the model. TheChirlese have very competent arld experienced personnel in their modelingefforts

In c:orlclusion, CY JV believes that the results of the TGM model are asreliable as any modeling efforts that could be undertaken at this time,given the inherent uncertC1inties of these kinds of ·calculations, arld thatthe results of the TGM model computations are a suitable basis for thefeasibility study and preliminary design of the Yangtze River Three GorgesProject.

-- 3'-1 --

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Association of Professional Engineers of OntarioOffice of the Registrar

February 8, 1993

CONFIDENTIAL

Ms. Patricia AdamsExecutive DirectorProbe International225 Brunswick AvenueToronto, OntarioM5S 2M6

Dear Ms. Adams:

The Complaints Committee, at its meeting of January 21, 1993, considered your complaint againstAcres International.

The Committee's Decision and Reasons is attached in accordance with Section 25(4) of theProfessional Engineers Act 1984.

Please note that the complainant in a matter regarding the conduct or actions of a member of theAssociation or a holder of a Certificate of Authorization has the right to apply to the Complaints ReviewCouncillor under Section 27 of the Act, copy attached.

Yours very truly,

EWSjGWPjjdEnclosures

1155 Yonge Street, Toronto, Onta.rio M4T 2Y5

George W. Piper, P.Eng.Registrar

Telephone (416) 961-1100

User-1
Highlight
User-1
Highlight
Page 95: APEO Document Redacted

DUll' 10

fu"';ishinformation

HearingNOI

IYquiIYd

a member' of a commlltee uF -theAssociation; or

(c)

ENGINEERS ACT r 1984(9) In conducting an examination or Reaipl

review in resn<'ct of the ASSOCiation. the ofr'- informationComplaints Review Councillor may hear orobtain information from any person andmay make such inquiries as he thinks fit.

(10) TIle Complaints Review Councillor isnot required to hold or to afford to any per­son an opportunity for a hearing in relationto an examination. review or report inrespect of the Association.

(1 I) Every person who is.

(a) a member of the Council;

(b) an officer of the Association;

PROFESSIONAL

27.-( 1) The Complaints Review Council­lor may examine from time to time the pro­cedures for the treatment of complaints bythe Association.

(2) Where a complaint respecting a mem­ber of the Association or a holder of a cer­tificate of authori71ltion. a temporary licenceor a limited licence has not been disposed ofby the Complaints Committee within ninetydays after the complaint is filed with theRegistrar. upon application by the complain­ant or on his own initiative the ComplaintsReview Councillor may review the treatmentof the complaint by the Complaints Commit­tee.

EXdminalionhI'(omplainlJRel'irk'Council/or

Rn'j('1A'

hy ComplainlJR<,,,icH'Councillor

ApplicatioNto ComplaintsR<viewCouncillor

CcmplaintsR<vkwCcuncil/orflOI to inquiuinfo m<nrof complaint

Discretionarypower ofCcmplaintsR<viewCcuncillor

Notie<

Offiaaccommodation

Privacy

(3) A complainant who is not S<ltisfiedwith the handling by the Complaints Com­mittee of his complaint to the Committeemay apply to the Complaints Review Coun­cillor for a review of the treatment of thecomplaint after the Committee has disposedof the complaint.

(4) In an examination or review in respec:of the Association, the Complaints ReviewCouncillor shall not inquire into the meritsof any particular complaint made to theAssociation.

(5) The Complaints Review Councillor inhis discretion may decide in a particular casenot to make a review or not to continue areview in respect of the Association where,

(a) the review is or would be in respectof the treatment of a complaint thatwas disposed of by the Associationmore than twelve months before thematter came to the attention of theComplaints Review Councillor; or

(b) in the opinion of the ComplaintsReview Councillor,

(i) the application to the Com­plaints Review Councillor isfrivolous or vexatious or is notmade in good faith, or

(ii) the person who has madeapplication to the ComplaintsReview Councillor has not asufficient personal interest inthe subject-matter of the par­ticular complaint.

(6) Before commencing an examinationor review in respect of the Association, theComplaints Review Councillor shall informthe Association of his intention to com­mence the examination or review.

(7) The Council shall provide to the Com­plaints Review Councillor such accommO<la­tion and support staff in the offices of theAssociation as are necessary to the perfor­mance of the powers and duties of the C-Om­plaints Review Councillor.

(8) Every examination or review by theComplaints Review Councillor in respect ofthe Association shall be conducted in pri­vate.

(d) an employee of the Association,

shall furnish to the Complaints ReviewCouncillor such information regarding anyproceedings or procedures of the Associa­tion in respect of the treatment of com­plaints made to the Association as the Com­plaints Review Councillor from time to timerequires. and shall give the ComplaintsReview Councillor access to all records.reports, files and other papers and thingsbelonging to or under the control of theAssociation or any of such persons and thatrelate to the treatment by the Association ofcomplaints or any particular complaint.

(12) The Complaints Review Councillorshall make a repon following upon eachexamination or review by him in respect ofthe Association.

(13) Where the report follows upon anexamination of the procedure for the treat­ment of complaints by the Association, theComplaints Review Councillor shall transmitthe report to the Council.

(14) Where the repon follows upon areview of the treatment of a complaint bythe Association. the Complaints ReviewCouncillor shall transmit the report to theCouncil, to the complainant and to the per­son complained against.

(15) TIle Complaints Review Councillormay transmit a repon following upon anexamination or review to the Ministerwhere, in the opinion of the ComplaintsReview Councillor. the repon should bebrought to the attention of the Minister.

(16) The Complaints Review Councillormay include in a report following upon anexamination or review his recommendationsin respect of the procedures of the Associa­tion. either generally or with respect to thetreatment of a particular complaint.

(17) The Council shall consider eachreport. and any recommendations includedin the report. transmitted to it by the Com­plaints Review CounCillor and sh:.lil notifythe Complaints Review Councillor of anyaction it has taken in consequence,

Repon byComplaintsReviewCouncillor

ReportfollowinguponexamilUJlin{1

RepanfollowinguponrevieH'

Repon toMin/slu

R(("omrru'n­

dalions

Consid«atio{Jby Council

Page 96: APEO Document Redacted

DECISION AND REASONS

OF THE COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS OF ONTARIO

IN THE MATTER OF ACRES INTERNATIONAL

In accordance with the provisions of Section 24 of the Professional Engineers Act R.S.O. 1990, ameeting of the Complaints Committee was held in the offices of the Association, 1155 Yonge Street,Toronto, on Thursday, January 21, 1993 to consider a complaint from Ms. Patricia Adams of ProbeInternational which was filed with the Registrar on October 19, 1990.

Introduction

The Canadian International Development Agency ("CIDA") financed a Feasibility Report for the ThreeGorges Water Control Project ("Project") on the Yangtze River in China. A Canadian consortium knownas CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture ("CYJV") completed the study for CIDA. Acres International is one offive members of CYJV.

The Complaint and Responses

This complaint was brought to the attention of the Association by means of a September 17, 1990 letterfrom Probe International ("Probe") enclosing a copy of a book entitled :'Damrnl.o..g3he Three Gorges:What Dam Builders Don't Want You To Know" (the "Book"). The formal complaint, which was based onthis letter and the Book and dated October 18, 1990, was received on October 19, 1990.' ProbeInternational is a Toronto-based environmental advocacy group interested in the effects of Canadian aidand trade policies on the people and environment of the Third World.

A copy of the complaint and the book were forwarded to Acres International Limited ("Acres") by theAssociation in October 1990, and Acres, by letter dated December 27, 1990, provided an initialresponse. By letter dated September 3, 1991, Probe afforded to the Association a rebuttal to the Acresresponse, prompting Acres to forward to the Association a further response dated May 8, 1992enclosing a number of documents replying to the Probe position. Included in that material was theThree Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study ("Feasibility Study") in the form in which it wasprovided to Acres by CIDA. On October 19, 1992, Probe forwarded. to the Association a furtherrejoinder to the Acres response, and Acres in turn on November 16, 1992 provided the Association witha rebuttal of the Probe October 19, 1992 rejoinder.

Jurisdiction

By way of preliminary objection, Acres submitted that the Association and its Complaints Committee("Committee") do not have jurisdiction to consider and deal with the Probe complaint because theconduct in question took place outside Ontario and, in particular, in the Province of Quebec and inChina. In response, Probe took the position that the Association has inherent jurisdiction over theconduct of its members no matter where that conduct takes place. The Committee concluded that theAssociation's jurisdiction is such that it is entitled to impose discipline upon its members with respectto professional conduct inside or outside Ontario or Canada: Re: Legault and the Law Society of UpperCanada (1975), 8 O.R. (2d)585, (Ontario Court of Appeal).

Probe Position

As to the merits of the complaint, Probe's position may generally be summarized as follows:

Page 97: APEO Document Redacted

2

(a) A member of the Association involved in a project outside of Ontario must ensure that theproject meets all standards applicable in Ontario.

(b) The conduct of the CYJV engineers with respect to the Project included errors, omissions,Imprudent assumptions, biases, analytical irregularities, inconsistencies, oversights andsubstandard methodologies, demonstrating inadequacy of the review process with respect towhich the engineers were retained. In particular:

(i) With respect to dam design and safety, CYJV engineers failed to employ therecommendations of certain ICOLD (International Committee On Large Dams) Bulletinsrelating to dam safety precautions and the selection of seismicity parameters, neglectedto apply these recommendations in the dam design and the economic cost-benefitanalysis, underestimated earthquake ground accelerations and risks caused bylandslides, underestimated the risk of spillway failure, accepted dangerously high risksof cofferdam failure, did not perform adequate analyses of reservoir-induced seismicity,structural stability and flood control and failed to demonstrate the technical feasibilityof the spillways.

(ii) The flood control analysis carried out by CYJV engineers was inadequate and flawed,the purpose of the Project was misrepresented, the Project's flood control benefits wereexaggerated and misrepresented, and unrealistic operating criteria were recommendedand assumed.

(iii) CYJV engineers failed to take into account uncertainty in their risk assessments;

(Iv) CYJV engineers failed to review existing data on sedimentation as reqUired by theProject's Terms of Reference, thereby rendering their flood control, navigation andelectricity benefits, and project life-expectancy calculations unreliable and withoutscientific basis;

(v) CYJV and its clients claimed they had "reviewed and analyzed, on an integrated basis,the cost, benefits and other effects of the overall" Project, and concluded the Projectwas "feasible and financially viable", without first demonstrating the feasibility ofresettling almost one million people, as the Project's Steering Committee and Terms ofReferences required;

(vi) CYJV concluded that the Project was "environmentally feasible" without data andanalysis to prove this.

Acres' Position

As to the merits of the complaint, Acres' position may generally be summarized as follows:

(a) The Book, which is a critique of the Feasibility Study and the performance of the CYJV, containseleven chapters of which only two appear to have been written by a professional engineer.

(b) The work involved in the Feasibility Study reqUired contributions from many individuals in a widevariety of professions and specialties, including economists, environmental scientists and otherspecialists in fields other than engineering.

(c) A feasibility study necessarily involves preliminary design studies which, while sufficient toestablish the scale of development and probable project costs within acceptable levels ofconfidence, do not deal in detail with all design matters and related issues, many of which willbe resolved in subsequent stages of the project cycle.

(d) To ensure that the objectives of the Feasibility Study were met and that the standard of practicewas consistent with international practice, several levels of quality assurance and review were

Page 98: APEO Document Redacted

3

utilized, including internationally-recognized specialists who supplemented the main Projectteam, a regular review of the Study by a "Project Review Board" of the most experiencedprofessionals from CYJV's participating organizations, a review of all technical work byindependent specialists retained by CIDA, and extensive participation, including ongoing input,review of all interim and final reports and formal review meetings in Canada and in China, bya panel of international experts established by the World Bank.

(e) It is normal practice with respect to major feasibility studies to bring together a broad range ofhigh-level professional expertise and judgment to consider the often complex issues to be dealtwith. In the case of the Feasibility Study, the CYJV team possessed a very high level ofprofessional expertise, the external consultants and specialists engaged in evaluation andreview of the work were of world-class calibre, and the Feasibility Study was subjected to reviewof very substantial scope and depth.

(f) The Feasibility Study was carried out in compliance with high professional standards in alldisciplines, of which engineering was only one, and was subjected to expert review throughoutthe course of the Project. Acres does not debase those standards for any purpose.

(g) With respect to the technical criticisms of the Feasibility Study:

(i) The spill capacity is adequate in accordance with international practice, and the damand other structures are not endangered by the Probable Maximum Flood event. Thedesign of the dam was consistent with the ICOLD Bulletins to which Probe madereference and was based upon analyses considering, to a degree appropriate forfeasibility assessment, all foreseeable load scenarios with respect to reservoir-inducedseismicity, structural stability, reservoir landslide, spillway failure and cofferdam failure.

(ii) The Feasibility Study set out the Project's flood control benefits and costs; explainedthe purpose of the project and the operating criteria; and concluded that the floodrouting type flow model used was appropriate for feasibility level investigation, about90% of the flood control storage will be reserved indefinitely, the risk of loss of life tothe additional population is small and there will be little flood damage below '198m atthe critical flood stage.

(iii) CYJV Engineers recognized possible down cutting of the river bed with a potentiallocalized increase in the cost of dike maintenance and determined that the on-goingprograms of dike maintenance will ensure that repairs will be made as required.

(iv) CYJV made detailed resettlement estimates for four schemes covering a range of waterlevels, defined fOllrteen principles to guide the planning and implementation of theresettlement program and recommended that additional studies be carried out.

(v) CYJV concluded that the Project was "environmentally feasible" on the basis of the dataalready available, provided that gaps in the available database were filled and anongoing environmental monitoring and mitigation program was implemented.

The Complaint Committee's Review

In addition to reviewing carefully the Book and the submissions of Probe and Acres, the Committee wasassisted by the following input:

(a) Reports prepared by the International Panel of Experts retained by the World Bank onbehalf of the Government of China to review and comment upon the CYJV FeasibilityStudy;

(b) Statements by the World Bank and CIDA regarding their review of the Feasibility Study;

Page 99: APEO Document Redacted

4

(c) Reports with respect to international engineering projects, prepared by two Ontarioprofessional engineers with extensive international experience;

(d) Reports by an Advisory Panel of three experienced Ontario professional engineers whowere asked by the Committee to provide an independent opinion of the complaint;

(e) Information obtained from several senior geologists from Hubei and Jiangxi provincesin China;

(f) A review of the Book by Ted L. Napier of Ohio State University; and

(g) A report by Philip B. Williams P.E.

In light of the complexity of the issues and the volume of the material and information relevant to thiscomplaint, the Committee appointed five of its members to constitute a Sub-committee to review fullythe information and material provided by Probe and Acres and to report back to the full Committee.The Sub-committee met on ten occasions to consider this complaint, while the full Committeeconsidered the complaint at sixteen of its meetings.

DecisionIn considering the information and material submitted to it and in arriving at a decision, the Committeerecognized that:

(a) Experts may fairly and honestly disagree about the required standards of practice of theirprofession. However, if a professional's conduct is deemed appropriate by reputable membersof the profession, he or she cannot be properly found to be guilty of professional misconduct.

(b) A feasibility study cannot reasonably be expected to reflect the degree of certainty, finality andprecision required of a project's final design and working drawings; and

(c) While Canadian engineers are required, no matter where they are practising, to meet a standardof care, competence and diligence expected in Ontario, they are not expected to imposeCanadian social and cultural values upon foreign entities whose cultures and values may, andoften do, differ significantly from those accepted in Canada. Also, Ontario professionalengineers practising outside Canada may base their work on generally accepted internationalengineering standards.

Applying these principles to the voluminous and complex material and information relevant to thiscomplaint, the Committee has come to the conclusion that there are in this case varying opinions amongcompetent, experienced and reputable experts as to whether the Feasibility Study reflects an acceptablestandard of engineering practice on the part of the CYJV in general, and Acres in particular.

Given the scope, complexity and location of the CYJV Project, varying opinions as to some aspects ofthe Project, including assumptions, analyses and conclusions, are inevitable. In the particularcircumstances of this case, even such superficially straightforward matters as physical dimensions ofthe dam can be subject to valid and honest disagreement. This is all the more true in the many areaswhere technical decisions are inevitably influenced by social, cultural and other non-technicalconsiderations.

In the final analysis, the Committee has concluded that this is not a case in w~lich one side or opinionis "right" and the other is necessarily "wrong". As in many cases involving the exercise of professionaljudgement and expertise, there can be varying opinions as to the correctness or desirability of aproposed course of action and the work performed in determining the advisability of that course ofaction.

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After a thorough and careful review of the information and material, and considering the extent ofsupport for the Feasibility Study from reputable sources, the Committee has concluded that work of theCYJV in developing the Feasibility Study reflected a level of care, competence and diligence that meta standard reasonably to be expected of Professional Engineers in Ontario.

The Committee is, therefore, of the opinion that the evidence before it does not indicate professionalmisconduct or incompetence on the part of Acres. Accordingly, the Committee directs that theComplaint not be referred to the Discipline Committee.

Dated this _..42,--,/"I7,--t/__ day of _~----";;./=---c- 1993

~..... ,'---;::­

J.B. W' es, P.Eng. (Chairman)

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MARK O. MATTSONBARRISTER AND SOLICIlDR

P.O. BOX 552, S1N. "P"TORONlD, ONTARIOM5S2Tl(416) 463-7085(416) 469-3039 (FAX)

July 26, 1993

Complaints Review CouncillorAssociation of Professional Engineers of ontario1155 Yonge StreetToronto ontarioM4T 2Y5

Re: Probe International Complaint Regarding Acres International'sRole in the Three Gorges Water Control project Feasibility study

I am writing on behalf of Probe International ("Probe") to requestthat you undertake a review of the treatment of my client' scomplaint against Acres International for its role in the ThreeGorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, pursuant to section27 (3) of the Professional Engineers Act, 1984. The ComplaintsCommittee issued its decision and reasons in this matter onFebruary 2nd, 1993.

The reason for the request for review is that the ComplaintsCommittee failed to comply with the minimal procedural protectionsfound in the common law duty of fairness. Although the ComplaintsCommittee exercises a highly discretionary administrative function,it is not excused from the duty to exercise its powers in goodfai-th and to act fairly.

The law in Ontario clearly recognizes that an "investigating" bodysuch as the APEO Complaint's Committee, which does not make finaldeterminatiops, is nonetheless required to act fairly. Thecompliance!with the procedural pre-conditions to the exercise ofthe statutory power of such bodies is carefully scrutinized.

(Re Emerson and Law Society of Upper Canada (1984), 44 O.R. (2d)729 (H.C'LJ.))

Probe requests that the Complaints Review Councillor undertake toreview the following aspects of the Complaints Committee'sdecision:

The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee ­Because the Evidence Before It Did Not Indicate ProfessionalMisconduct or Incompetence on the Pa~t of Acres International

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Probe suggests that the Complaints Committee's decision, to notrefer the matter to a disciplinary hearing on the grounds that theevidence before it did not indicate professional misconduct orincompetence, is improper.

At page 4 of ·the Committee's decision it reads:

Given the scope, complexity and location of the CYJVProject, varying opinions as to some aspects of the Project,including assumptions, analysis and conclusions, areinevitable .... In the final analysis, the Committee hasconcluded that this is not a case in which one side oropinion is "right" and the other is necessarily "wrong."

Also at page 4 of the decision it reads:

.•.. the Committee has come to the conclusion that there are inthis case varying opinions among competent, experienced andreputable experts as to whether the Feasibility Study reflectsan acceptable standard of engineering practice on the part ofthe CYJV in general, and Acres in particular.

Contrary to the Committee's ruling, Probe suggests the abovefinding is ground to justify a. hearing in order to assesscredibility, examine witnesses, and interpret the standards thatshould be uniformly applied.

The jurisdiction of the Complaints Committee is not to determinethe resolution of the complaint but to determine whether or not theallegation warrants further review. In order to carry out thisrole, a recognized test has been adopted by both the courts andadministrative tribunals.

Are there reasonable grounds to believe the claim could beestablished?

If there are reasonable grounds then a hearing should be granted.

It is appropriate for the Complain·ts Committee to ascertain if thecomplaint has merit. The Complaints Commi·ttee did this and foundthat the Probe complain·t had meri"t. However, the ComplaintsCommittee then wen·t much further.

The Complaints Commi·ttee received unsworn, un·tested and undisclosedevidence. It assessed the credibility of this evidence, and on thatbasis concluded that the evidence before it did not indicateprofessional misconduct or incompetence on the part of Acres.

In Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985) 22 D.L.R.(4d) 119 (F.C.A.), the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with anappeal from a decision of the Immigration Appeal Board not to granta hearing to a person claiming refugee status. The test set out in

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the Immigration Act which must be met in order for a person toreceive a hearing, was that a hearing would only be ordered if theBoard was "of the opinion there are reasonable grounds to believea claim could be established" at a hearing. The court found thatwhile oral hearings were not always required, where serious issuesof credibility were involved, however, an oral hearing must beheld.

The Complaints Committee made decisions about the merits of theProbe complaint based on submissions of persons who were judged bythe Committee to be "reputable" members of the profession. Thesemembers were professional engineers unilaterally chosen by theCommittee to assist in its investigation, or members of anInternational Panel of Experts chosen by the proponent of theproject - the Chinese Government - and the World Bank to review theFeasibility Report. Probe had no opportunity to address the"apprehension of bias" of the reputable members. The issues ofcredibility, apprehension of bias and conflict of interest requirea hearing with cross-examination and argument.

The submission of my client then, is that the decision of theComplaints Committee to reject the need for a hearing was flawedfor two reasons. First the Complaints Committee exceeded itsjurisdiction by not limiting its role to determining whether thereare reasonable grounds to believe a claim could be established.Secondly, it is a breach of the principles of fairness to rejectthe need for a hearing when serious credibility issues are indispute.

A further reason the decision is flawed is that it can beinterpreted as a violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights.The Supreme Court of Canada, in Singh v. MEl, concluded that at aminimum, the concept of fundamental justice included the principlesof procedural fairness to act fairly, in good faith, without bias,and in a judicial temper, and must give the opportunity to personsto state their case.

The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee ­Because Acres followed Generally Accepted International EngineeringStandards

Probe suggests that the Complaints Committee failed to act fairlyand in good faith when it concluded that Acres followed "generallyaccepted international engineering standards" . Neither therespondent to the complaint nor the Complaints Committee delineatedwhat generally accepted international engineering standards consistof or how they are determined.

Only the complainant, Probe, identified and applied well known andaccepted standards to the - Feasibility Study. These standards

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included the Ontario standards set by the PEAO's Code ofProfessional Conduct and Code of Ethics, the u.s. Standards appliedto similar circumstances in the U.S., the standards of theIn'ternational Commission on Large Dams, and the standards of theU. S. Commission on Large Dams. In the complaint, Probe appliedthese standards to the work of Acres and clearly showed where therespondent's work did not meet the standards.

The standards used by Probe in its complaint are well known and arerecognized by the international engineering community and thegeneral public.

The rejection by the Complaints Committee of the standards used byProbe was never justified. The conclusion then of the Committeethat Acres followed generally accepted international engineeringstandards was unsupported. At the very least, the investigatingbody must delineate or define a standard before ruling oncompliance.

The principle of fairness demands that the standards or regulationsto be applied by the investigating body be identifiable.

The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee ­Because of the Opinions of Reputable Members of the Profession

The Complaints Committee failed to provide Probe with a fair,impartial and public hearing of its complaint.

'rhe Complaints Committee in its Decision and Reason took theposition that:

Experts may fairly and honestly disagree about the requiredstandards of practice of their profession. However, if aprofessional's conduct lS deemed appropriate by repu'tablemembers of the profession, he or she cannot be properly foundto be guilty of professional misconduct.

The Complaints Commi'ttee was assisted In its review by manyexternal parties. The Committee was assis,ted by reports prepared byan International Panel of Experts chosen by the World Bank and theGovernment of China to review and comment on the CYJV FeasibilityStudy; by reports prepared by two Ontario professional engineerswith international experience; by reports prepared by an AdvisoryPanel of three experienced Ontario professional engineers who wereasked by the Commi,ttee to provide an independent opinion of thecomplaint; and by information obtained from several seniorgeologists from Hubei and Jiangxi provinces in China.

The Complaints Cormnittee accepted these various bodies' reports andconcluded that the reports were f:com "repu'table members of the

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profession" without giving Probe an opportunity to comment on thecredibility, bias, conflict or vested interests of the members. Theerror in accepting these untested reports is compounded by anobvious apprehension of bias concerning the reports.

The names of these "reputable members of the profession" on whichthe Committee bases its decision were never disclosed in thedecision. Probe did not have any input into the selection of themembers of this body that deemed Acres to have carried out itsThree Gorges project with care, competence and diligence. A basicdoctrine of fairness is that the evidence that the decision makerrelies on for its decision be disclosed to the parties unless itfalls under an exception to the rule. In this case, no reason wasgiven by the Complaints Committee for not disclosing the sourcesand nature of its information.

Finally, the Complaints Committee accepted the International Panelof Experts' support for the Feasibility study without addressingthe irregularity in that Panel's process, which Probe brought tothe attention of the Committee. There was no effort made to respectthe right of the complainant to have an opportunity to test theimpartialioty and reliability of this evidence before the Committeedeemed it to be worthy of basing its decision upon.

It is well established that "justice should not only be done, butshould manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." TheComplaints Committee's decision to unequivocally accept theevidence of certain members it deemed reputable over the evidenceof Probe's experts is unacceptable. The unilateral selection of themembers to assist the Committee is fraught with proceduralirregularities and causes an apprehension of bias.

The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee ­Because Acres Conduct Was Deemed Appropriate by Other Members ofthe Profession

The Complaints Committee, In its decision and reasons, stated:

"if a professional's conduct lS deemed appropriate byreputable members of the profession, he or she cannot beproperly found to be guilty of professional misconduct."

This statement is inconsistent with the statutory responsibility ofthe Complaints Committee to maintain and protect minimum testablestandards of the profession. lot is suggested that the ComplaintsCommittee failed to base its decision on the merits of thecomplaint but chose rather to base its decision on the opinions ofa select group of reputable members iot chose to consult.

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This failure is compounded by the fact that the evidence of otherprofessional members, who were deemed reputable by the ComplaintsCommittee, were ignored. The Committee chose to ignore the opinionof members who condemned the Acres study while it accepted theopinions of members who condoned the study. The basis for acceptingone reputable member over another was not given by the Committee.

The fact that there exists a fundamental disagreement over thestandards that should be applied to the Three Gorges Study betweenreputable members should have provided a basis for the ComplaintsCommittee to conclude that an oral hearing is warranted.

Probe International suggests that the Complaints Committee'sreliance on the opinion of a select group of reputable members ofthe profession for its decision, is the most serious error in thedecision.

The function of the Complaints Committee to ascertain the merits ofa complaint against a member of the Association cannot be abdicatedor delegated to some select group of members. Otherwise the lawfulregulatory function of the Complaints Committee is delegated to themembers it is meant to regulate. Such a situation calls intoquestion the integrity of the self-governing body for theengineering profession. It also impairs the ability of theComplaints Committee to regulate fairly and impartially. Mostimportantly it undermines the conclusion of· the Committee in theProbe Complaint to not order a hearing before the DisciplinaryHearing Panel.

As I am sure you are aware, there has been a great deal of mediacoverage, nationally and internationally, concerning the complaintbrought forward by Probe. As the findings of the ComplaintsCommittee are public, it is of the upmost importance that Probereceive a response to the concerns contained in this letter at theearliest date. It will certainly influence the manner in which myclient proceeds with these very important issues.

Thank you for your attention to this matter and I look forward tohearing from you in the near future.

Yours truly,

Mark Mattson

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FRJ\SER&BEAllYB~trristers and Solicitors

Nancy L. BackhouseCertified by the Law Society of UpperCanada as a Specialist in Family Law39th Floor, 1 First Canadian PlaccDircct Linc (416) 863-4378

September 14, 1993Council of the Association ofProfessional Engineers of Ontario1155 Yonge StreetToronto, OntarioNl4T 2Y5

Probe Internationalc/o Mr.Mark O. MattsonBarrister and SolicitorP.O. Box 552 Station "P"Toronto, OntarioM5S 21'1

Mr. J.M. GardinerPresidentAcres International Limited480 University AvenueToronto, OntarioM5G 1V2

Dear Sirs:

As the Complain t5 Review Councillor for the /\ssociation ofProfessional Engineers of Ontario, 1 have been asked by thecomplainant, Probe International, to review the decision by theComplaints Committee of the above-noted matter. "My role is todetermine whether th is complai at was properly anel fairly processed.Pursuant to ~)ection 26 of the Profess';on.ol Engineers Act,my roledoes not extend to inquiring into the merits of the complaint.

P.O. Box 100. 1First Canadian Place, Toron!o, Canada M5X IB~ TI~iepholw ':':(XI'ISJ!, Fax 1'11'.>: ,~().\A)')!.

Toronto )\ul'l11 York OUI\W;1 Vanu I I.! \ (;1'

In Monlrcal·-.\fiWatcd with \lc\laslcr

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I have read the decision of the Complaints Committee datedJanuary 21, 1993. I have read the letter elated July 26, 1993, fromMark O. Mattson, solicitor for the cornp1ainant requesting that areview be undertaken. I have further reviewed this extensive file. Ihave concluded that there is no basis to interfere with the decision ofthe Complaints Committee.

Yours truly,

Nancy L. BackhouseNLB:kb

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225 Brunswick AvenueToronto, Ontario

Canada tv'i5S 21'/16Phone: (416) 964-9223

Fax: (416) 964-82:39email: web:eprobe

,john Hollh>-.:'cll

Leonal·d ,johnS()i~i

January 10, 1995

J\lfs. Deborah DileoAssociation of Professional

Engineers of Ontario1155 Yonge StreetToronto, ONMAT 2Y5

Dear Ms. Dileo:

In 1990 Probe International filed a complaint against Acres International with theAssociation of Professional Engineers of Ontario regarding the Three Gorges damproject in China. That complaint was ruled on in February 1993.

We have received a number of requests for Probe International's October 19, 1992argument to the Complaints Committee in response to Acres International's May8, 1992 submission to the same committee.

As explained in our letter of February 10, 1992 to Mr. EricW. Smythe, ManagerComplaints and Discipline, we understand that the complaint and responseprocess was a public process, and that Probe International's argument is a publicdocument. However, because the Association of Professional Engineers ofOntario did not respond to that correspondence, we feel compelled to notify youbei:Cnewe release our October 1992 argument. The argument will be released withthe decision of the Complaints Committee.

If you have any concerns regarding the release of Probe International's argumentto the Complaints Committee please notify us within three business days

Yours sincerely,C:-":=~~~, ..__.. , _'') '}

\\,j" ,/. t<;:1- .-/ I ./j"

,/ 1./(./-1"......~~_.

Patricia AdamsExecutive Director

iliO!)"" 111temCliionai is a Project of [:ilerqy Prol;c F:e:;earci;CharitalJlr,1 Taxation f\Jurrtxlr 0599050-59

;dation

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