HR70-14 '

APPROVED FORRELEASE - HISTORICALCOLLECTION DIVISIONHR70-14 DATE: 07-18-201

Central Intelligence AgencyDirectorate of Intelligence

TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF WARSAW PACTGROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA

Office of Strategic Research

SR SP 72-2TS 204606October 1972

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Tactical Nuclear Capabilities of Warsaw PactGround Forces in the Reduction Area

Introduction

This report was prepared by the Central Intelli-gence Agency in partial response to the White Housememorandum of 25 September 1972 requesting additionalwork in preparation for initial MBFR discussions. Itaddresses Dr. Kissinger's questions on Warsaw Pacttactical nuclear missile capabilities in East Germany,Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary--the probable areaof reduction to be considered in the MBFR discussions.

Soviet planning for the contingency of nuclearwarfare in Europe is not limited to tactical weapons,but includes the entire nuclear force--strategic aswell as tactical. For this reason, this paper in-cludes a discussion of Soviet nuclear doctrine gov-erning the relationship between the ground campaignand the plan for the use of tactical and strategicnuclear weapons.

The paper also discusses the types of tacticalmissiles in use by the Warsaw Pact, Pact concepts fortactical missile employment, the numbers of launchersin the probable reduction area, and the forward stor-age of tactical nuclear warheads.

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Contents

Page

Warsaw Pact Nuclear Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . 3

Tactical Nuclear Rockets and Missiles . . . . . 5

Scud . . . . . . . . . . 5

FROG.... . . . . . . . 6

Tube Artillery . . . . . . 6

Shaddock and Scaleboard.. . . . . . . . . 7

Concepts for Use of Tactical NuclearRockets and Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Deployment of Tactical Missiles inthe Reduction Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Tactical Nuclear Warhead Storage andSupport . . . . . . . . . . .. ....... 12

Maps

Warsaw Pact Scud Brigades in theReduction Area . . . . . . . . . . 10

Warsaw Pact Ground Divisions in theReduction Area . . . . . . . . . . ... ... 11

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Warsaw Pact Nuclear Doctrine

The 'Soviet military planners usually begin withthe assumption that war in Europe would be started byNATO. They further assume that the Warsaw Pact hassuperior conventional forces. Consequently, theybelieve that, although a war is likely to begin with-out the use of nuclear weapons, NATO would not beable to achieve its objectives, or even hold its own,with just conventional firepower. They conclude thatafter only a limited period--a few days--NATO wouldbe forced to resort to the use of nuclear weapons tohalt a Pact incursion into Western Europe.

Rejecting NATO's concept of "flexible response,"-_the Soviets apparently do not plan to follow a seriesof controlled transitional steps from conventionalwarfare, through nuclear weapons of increasinglygreater numbers or yield, to general nuclear war.They believe that NATO does not intend to restricta European conflict to tactical nuclear weapons only,and that a limited response by them would only givethe West the opportunity to deliver the first massiveand decisive nuclear strike. The Soviets plan, there-fore, that the initial Pact nuclear strike would in-clude Soviet strategic nuclear forces based in theUSSR as well as forward-based tactical systems.L

Pact classified militarywritings emphasize the critical importance of thetiming of the changeover from conventional to nuclearwarfare. One of the main precepts

since at least 1967 has been the preemption ofNATO in the use of nuclear weapons.

nuclear weapons were to be used "in caseof a c ear, direct threat of their use by the West."There is, however, no good evidence of what theSoviets consider to be the precise criteria for de-termining that such a threat exists.

The decision to use nuclear weapons would bemade at the highest Soviet political level. Thefirst salvo by the Strategic Rocket Forces is to be

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the signal for nuclear strikes by all other forcesand weapons. The front* commanders are responsiblefor planning the strikes of the tactical nuclearweapons subordinate to them. Following the initialstrike, authority to fire remaining tactical nuclearweapons may be delegated by the front to army ordivision commanders.

documents indicate that the initialn -ea-r--str--e will employ--in addition to the stra-tegic missiles, medium bombers, and submarine-launchedmissiles--about 30 percent of the tactical nuclearmissiles and bombs available to the forces in theforward area. Analysis of several documents suggeststhat Soviet nuclear doctrine allocates 900 to 1,200tactical nuclear warheads and bombs to the groundforces and tactical air forces intended for useagainst NATO's Central Region. Of these, some 300to 400 would be used in the initial massive striketo supplement the approximately 600 strategic weaponsstrikes planned in the theater.

The nuclear forces available-to -the-Pact providea limited capability to wage nuclear warfare on ascale short of theater nuclear war. These forcesconsist of tactical-range rockets and missiles, andnuclear weapons for air delivery. However, theseforces lack nuclear tube artillery and subkilotonwarheads. For this reason, the Soviets do not nowhave the capability for graduated or flexible re-sponse to any NATO nuclear initiative at a low level-- for example, with the use of atomic demolition muni-tions or low-yield nuclear artillery projectiles.Further, Pact doctrinal emphasis on the massive useof nuclear weapons, and the absence of a demonstratedPact interest in the concept of damage limitation,seem to exclude the possibility that the Sovietswould initiate the use of nuclear weapons at lesserlevels. In recent years there have been indications

* The front is the Warsaw Pact's highest wartimefield headquarters for the joint operational controlof theater forces.

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that the Soviets are taking a closer look at the con-cept of flexible response and, of course, politicalleaders have the option of authorizing only a limitedstrike on specific targets with selected weapons.There is, however, no evidence that military doctrineand planning have been modified for any contingencyother than that in which any use of nuclear weaponsin Europe will quickly become theaterwide nuclear war.

The Soviets are continuing the development oftheir tactical nuclear capabilities. Changes arebeing made which will provide tactical rocket andmissile units with greater mobility, firepower, andrange. Such changes can reasonably be interpretedas intended to support the established Soviet nu-clear doctrine which calls for the targeting oftactical weapons to supplement the initial strikesof strategic weapons. They probably also are in-tended to ensure that breakthroughs are exploited byPact armored forces and, particularly, to aid in thedestruction of NATO's air defenses and tactical nu-clear capability.

If the Soviets were to accept a --more flexible---nuclear doctrine which envisaged limiting nuclearwar to the use of tactical weapons, they might in-troduce nuclear tube artillery and subkiloton war-heads for tactical missiles. Such weapons wouldgive the Pact the flexibility to engage in nuclearwar at lower levels of violence and destruction.

Tactical Nuclear Rockets and Missiles

Scud K

All Soviet and probably all East European tacti-cal missile units are believed to be equipped withthe current version of the Scud missile--the Scud-B.The Scud-B can deliver a nuclear warhead with a yieldof from to a range of about 160 nm.Most of the Soviet Scud units have wheeled transporter-

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erector-launchers (TELs). The wheeled TEL providesgreater mobility and speed than the older trackedversion, particularly in Europe where there is awell-developed road network. Recent evidence sug-gests that the East European units also are begin-ning to replace their older tracked TELs with wheeledversions.

The normal Pact tacticai missile unit is a brigade,and one brigade is generally allocated to each fieldarmy, and at least two, possibly three brigades aresubordinate to the headquarters of the Group of SovietForces, Germany (GSFG). Most brigades have 9 launch-ers, although those subordinate to GSFG headquartershave 12.

FROG

A free-flight rocket family, designated FROG byNATO, has been a standard item in the Soviet armysince the late Fifties, and was introduced into theEast European forces of the Warsaw Pact in the earlySixties. All FROG units in the reduction area prob-ably are equipped with the newest-version-, the FROG--7-.-The FROG-7 is estimated to be able to deliver a war-head with a yield of from to arange of 37 nm. Evidence obtained within the pastyear suggests that some of the FROGs with the Sovietforces in East Germany have been modified to increasetheir range, possibly to 47 nm.

One FROG battalion is organic to each line divi-sion. The Soviet FROG battalions in the reductionarea are all believed to have four launchers each.East European FROG battalions generally have threelaunchers, although some may have been equipped withfour.

Tube Artillery

In recent years there has been a continuing con-cern that the Soviets may have issued nuclear roundsto their tube artillery. There is no persuasive evi-dence that they have done so. Pact planning documentsdiscuss in great detail the employment of nuclear

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missiles and bombs, but there has been no mention ofnuclear artillery.]

It is estimated thatsmall nuc ear weapons are wi hin the capabilities ofnuclear technology in the USSR, and the Soviets prob-ably have researched the development and production ofsuch rounds.

Shaddock and Scaleboard

Two other Soviet tactical missiles systems exist,neither of which has been observed in Eastern Europe.The Shaddock, a cruise missile with a range of 300 nm,was first observed in the USSR in 1961. Only a fewoperational Shaddock units have been seen since, how-ever, suggesting that the missile was not entirely -successful.

The Scaleboard, a mobile ballistic missile witha range of 500 nm, was first seen in 1967. It iscarried on an eight-wheeled TEL similar to the ScudTEL. The Scaleboard has been identified in increas-ing numbers in ground force installations in thewestern USSR. It probably is slated for movement -

with reinforcing units to the forward area, but theSoviets' deployment goals for the Scaleboard are un-known. It probably is under direct control of thefront commanders.

Concepts for Use of Tactical

Nuclear Rockets and Missiles

The Soviet concept does not envisage planningthe initial nuclear fires primarily for support ofthe ground maneuver plan. Conversely, the maneuverplan is designed to exploit the effects of the nu-clear strike and to ensure the occupation of keyareas of enemy territory before NATO can recoverfrom the initial blow.

NATO's means of nuclear delivery--including tac-tical missiles, nuclear artillery, airfields with

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nuclear-capable aircraft, and nuclear depots--areconsidered by the Pact to be the highest prioritytargets for the initial nuclear strike. Other tar-gets include air defense missiles, troop concentra-tions, other airfields, command posts and headquarters,and communications facilities.

Both East European and Soviet tactical missileunits are to participate in the initial strike ifready. There is no indication, however, of when theSoviets would release nuclear weapons to the EastEuropean forces, or how the Soviets would .controltheir use once they were released. The East Europeannuclear forces are not permitted access to nuclearwarheads during peacetime.

Pact documents indicate that FROG launchers wouldbe deployed between 8 and 11 nm back from the actualbattle zone, while Scud launchers would be kept be-tween 16 and 32 nm to the rear. This would permitFROGs to make strikes of up to about 30 nm into thebattle zone, while Scuds could strike as deeply as145 nm. There is no information on the operationalconcepts for use of the Scaleboard. The land-basedstrategic missiles from the USSR and medium bomberswould be responsible for nuclear -strikes beyond tac-tical missile range.

Deployment of Tactical Missiles

in the Reduction Area

The tabulation at right summarizes the numberof tactical missile launchers of each type which arecurrently estimated to be located in the reductionarea.

The ranges in the numbers of FROG launchers inthe East European forces reflect the lack of dataon the number of launchers assigned to divisionswhose FROG units have not been located.

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In East Germany:Scuds FROGs Total

Soviet 69-81 80 149-161East German 9 24 33

In Poland:

Soviet 9 8 17Polish 27 39-52 66-79

In Czechoslovakia:

Soviet 9 20 29Czechoslovak 27-36 30-40 57-76

In Hungary:

Soviet 9 16 25Hungarian 9 18-24 27-33

Totals:

Soviet 96-108 124 220-232East European 72-81 111-140 183-221

Total 168-189 235-264 403-453

The map on page 10 shows the estimated current de-ployment of Scud tactical missiles in the fourcountries considered to be the probable reductionarea. Of the four Scud brigades subordinate to theCzechoslovak forces, one (included on the map) is atraining brigade. There is evidence that in theevent of war, this brigade would be mobilized to com-bat status.

another Scud brigade, subordinate toheadquarters GSFG, may exist in the area south ofBerlin. This brigade has not been located, however,and is not shown on the map.

Although information on the deployment of Scudbrigades is fairly good, some of the FROG battalions

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organic to divisions have not been specifically lo-cated. Information from many sources indicates,however, that each division is equipped with a FROGbattalion. The map on page 11 shows the locationsof all ground force divisions in the area as anindicator of FROG deployment.

Tactical Nuclear Warhead Storage and Support

In Eastern Europe, 12 two-bunker storage sites arebelieved to be for the storage of nuclear warheadsfor tactical rockets and missiles. There are 9 inthe reduction area--2 in East Germany, 3 each inPoland and Czechoslovakia, and one in Hungary. Thelocations of the sites suggest that each is intendedto store the nuclear warheads for the Scud brigadeand the several FROG battalions in an army area. Insome army areas, however, particularly in East Ger-many, no sites have been found, although more may bediscovered as new evidence becomes-avail-able.-

There is activity at all of the sites and, wherethe nationality of site personnel has been determined,Soviet troops rather than East European troops haveconsistently been identified. The continual activityand manning, heavy security, complexity and permanenceof the construction, and the presence of nuclearwarhead vans at several of the sites imply that thesites are currently being used for the storage ofnuclear warheads, and are not merely intended to befuture staging points for warheads to be moved upin the event of hostilities.

Although there is no information on Sovietprac-tices in nuclear weapons storage, analysis

indicates thateach two-bunker site probably cou d hold about 100warheads for FROG and Scud missiles. If less spaceis devoted to nonstorage functions, such as environ-mental control equipment and maintenance shops, thanis presently estimated, the capacity could be some-what higher.

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Warsaw Pact documents suggest a re- -quirement for some 300 to 00 tactical nuclear war-heads and bombs to be allocated for the first strikeagainst NATO's Central Region. About 75 to 80 per-cent of these would be tactical rocket and missilewarheads. Thus the 9 storage sites in the reductionarea--with a capacity of at least 900 warheads--wouldbe more than sufficient to support the initial strike.

All tactical missiles are capable of carryinchemical as well as nucl_e_ar warheads

Evidence indicates, owever, thai tThe initial mas-sive strike is likely to be entirely nuclear. No _storage sites for chemical warheads have been lo-cated in Eastern Europe, and there is no evidencethat any of the nuclear storage sites are used tostore chemical warheads.

To prepare tactical missiles for firing, warheadsand missiles probably would be transported from stor-age sites to the launch units by Mobile TechnicalRepair Bases (PRTBs) which prepare warheads and matethem to the missiles. These units would move up be-hind the forces as the battle evolved. There islittle information on the procedures for transportingthe warheads, or how the problem of the increasingdistance from the storage sites to the battle zonewould be handled.

Five other nuclear storage sites, all locatednext to Soviet airfields, have been found in EasternEurope. These probably are intended solely to servethe nuclear-capable aircraft stationed at or stagedfrom these airfields. Some tactical missile warheadsmay also be stored at these sites, but there is nodirect evidence to support this proposition. However,if this were the case, the distance between certainlaunch units and the 12 other storage sites would beexplained.

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