AQIM: The Devolution of al Qaeda’s North African Node

[Teaser:] AQIM remains a security threat in North Africa, but recent events show a steady decline in its operational capacity and overall strength.

Summary

In April, militants with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapped a 78-year-old French citizen in Mali. Three months later, after supporting a Mauritanian military offensive against AQIM and later learning the hostage had been killed, the French government declared war on the group. AQIM has reached violently into the Sahara-Sahel region, but more recent developments point to the group’s steady devolution since its founding in 2006. Four years hence, we thought it time to assess the current state of al Qaeda’s North African node, which has been forced to strike softer targets closer to its Algerian base as sub-commanders to the south grow competitive and autonomous.

Analysis

On July 27, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon said that France was <link nid="168069">at war with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)</link>, the al Qaeda node in North Africa. This followed a live televised broadcast the day before by French President Nicolas Sarkozy confirming that a 78-year-old French hostage captured by AQIM operatives in April in Mali had been killed by his captors. Urging French citizens to avoid travel to the Sahel region, Sarkozy condemned the act and vowed a determined effort against the group.

Fillon’s announcement came three days after the end of a four-day French-backed offensive by Mauritanian troops against AQIM militants suspected of holding the French hostage deep into the Malian portion of the Sahara desert. Despite the loss of the hostage, the offensive represented a largely unprecedented escalation of military operations by European and African security forces against militant Islamists in the North Africa and the Sahara-Sahel region, where AQIM remains a threat to security. Indeed, the events of July follow similar incidents and messages [earlier in the year?] from French and U.S. officials warning citizens to exercise extreme caution when traveling near the Burkina Faso, Mauritanian and the Mali-Niger borders.

[<INSERT Algeria map>]

These events also represent a steady devolution of AQIM’s operational capacity and overall strength. According to the U.S. National Counter-Terrorism Center’s Wordwide Incidence Tracking System (WITS) and open-source material, the frequency and lethality of AQIM’s attacks in Algeria have fallen to unprecedented lows since the group’s founding in 2006. Indeed, because of increased security efforts against the group by

Algerian and regional authorities, AQIM has been forced to strike softer, more vulnerable targets near its base east of Algiers in Bordj Bou Arreridj province and the so-called “triangle of death,” a mountainous area between Bouira, Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou Kabyile.

Moreover, while AQIM has widened its range far from its Algerian stronghold to countries of the Sahara-Sahel region, its far-reaching attacks are more indicative of the growing autonomy and competitiveness of AQIM sub-commanders in its southern zone of operations and an overall lack of uniformity[command?] and control. These attacks also show that the North African al Qaeda node is an Africa-wide phenomenon and that its parent organizations have long had a presence in the lawless Sahel.

Background

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi bilad al-Maghreb al-Islami) represents only the latest manifestation of Islamist opposition and violence in Algeria. The group traces its roots back to the late 1990s and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, also known as the <link nid="102761">Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)</link>. Primarily a Salafi-jihadi Islamist group, GSPC emerged in 1998 after it split from the Armed Islamic Group, or Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), because of the latter’s brutal attacks against Algerian civilians during the country’s civil war. Headed by former Algerian paratrooper and GIA regional commander Hassan Hattab, the GSPC offered disaffected GIA militants a fresh start in their struggle against the Algerian government.

Hattab’s leadership was short-lived, however. An ardent religious nationalist, Hattab began to dispute GSPC’s slide toward the transnational jihadist agenda espoused by al Qaeda after 2001[9/11?]. Feeling the pressure, Hattab eventually “resigned” (though he was actually forced out) as emir in 2001 and was replaced by former GIA commander Nabil Sahraoui (aka/kunya[?] Sheikh Abou Ibrahim Mustapha). In 2003, Sahraoui issued a statement to online jihadist forums expressing his group’s intention to join al Qaeda and “Osama bin Laden’s jihad against the heretic America.” He was killed the following year by Algerian security forces and replaced by the current head of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel (aka/kunya[?] Abu Musab Abd al-Wadud, a seasoned Islamist militant and explosives expert.

The formation of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was <link nid="34017 ">officially announced on Sept. 11, 2006, by al Qaeda’s number two in command, Ayman al-Zawahri</link>, in an online video posted to jihadist websites via al Qaeda’s As-Sahab media wing. This “blessed union,” as Zawahri put it, vowed to “be a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders and their allies.” The announcement was followed by a statement made three days later by then-GSPC head Droukdel pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda and to “the faith, the doctrine, the method and the modes of action of [al Qaeda’s] members, as well as their leaders and religious guides.” While 2006 marked the formal merger between the two groups, al Qaeda and its nodes had been

corresponding and negotiating with AQIM’s parent organization for at least a few years before. In a New York Times interview published in July 2008, Droukdel cited religious motivations as the primary reasons for GSPC’s merger with al Qaeda. However, there is speculation among Western and North African intelligence officials that the formation was less ideological and more opportunistic. Indeed, GSPC was reeling from a long-running offensive spearheaded by the Algerian government that had almost annihilated the group and forced it to retreat to its traditional stronghold in the mountainous Kabylie region in eastern Algeria. To make matters worse, the government’s 1999 amnesty agreement with the militants convinced a number of GIA and GSPC members to lay down their arms (it is noteworthy that AQIM has since used the amnesty to its advantage, recruiting a number of former militants into its ranks). Desperate to survive, so the theory goes, the group turned to al Qaeda, facilitated by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (aka/kunya[?] Khaled Abou al-Abbas, or Lâaouar the “one-eyed”) and top members of the core group, to help it raise money, recruit fighters and enhance its status among Islamist militants both domestically and internationally.

GSPC’s merger with al Qaeda was certainly not without its difficulties. Indeed, a number of former high-ranking GSPC members turned their backs on AQIM, renouncing violence and pledging their support to the Algerian government against the newly refashioned ideology of the group. For instance, a former senior member of AQIM, Benmessaoud Abdelkader (aka/kunya[?] Abu Daoud), who defected in July 2007, told journalists that the organization was riven by heated arguments over Droukdel’s and GSPC’s <link nid="22878">decision to join al Qaeda</link>. The dispute was based on the fact that the merger effectively transformed the group’s ideological platform from primarily domestic to primarily international, extending the group’s target and operational ambit to include foreigners and unarmed civilians.

The shift, however, was not entirely adopted. Rhetorical and tactical elements of GIA and GSPC have endured to date, demonstrated by the fact that the North African al Qaeda node continues to strike a number of targets favored by its predecessors. Indeed, as time showed, AQIM’s ideological platform and target set came to represent a synthesis between a focus on the “near enemy,” when an insurgent/militant group directs its violence against symbols and representatives of oppressive Muslim regimes (police stations, ministries, etc.), and the “far enemy,” with a more global jihadist focus on a military confrontation with the United States and its allies to exact revenge for the past oppression of Muslims and to prevent future oppression. The focus on the far enemy led to a deep split in the organization, which has led to a decrease in the AQIM’s overall size and logistical capabilities; according to Abdelkader, dozens of foreign fighters deserted after becoming disillusioned with the group’s ideological shift.

Shifts in Strategies and Tactics

2006

For any militant group, target selection and the way it carries out its attacks reflect the group’s ideology, operational capability and overall strategy. Accordingly, in late October 2006, the newly formed Algerian al Qaeda node was quick to demonstrate its <link nid="35348">commitment to strike both the near and far enemy</link>. Over a period of 10 days, AQIM carried out at least four coordinated attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against Algerian security and foreign oil establishments in and around Algiers. On Oct. 19, 2006, it conducted two IED attacks, one against a police station in El Harrach, an eastern suburb of Algiers, the other against a fuel-storage site belonging to the French company Razel in Lakhdaria. On Oct. 29, the group conducted <link nid="35348">near-simultaneous vehicle-borne improvised explosive-device (VBIED) attacks</link> against two Algerian police stations in Reghaia and Dergana.

In total, from September to December 2006, AQIM carried out 19 attacks [in Algeria?] -- seven involving the use of IEDs -- that resulted in 39 deaths and 51 injuries to civilian and military personnel. (Measuring lethality by the number of killed and injured per strike, the group managed to kill an average of just over two people and injure roughly four people per attack.) The group also managed to carry out an assault outside the borders of its Algerian stronghold[of Algeria?] when its operatives killed nine civilians in an armed attack in Araouane, Tombouctou, Mali.[when?] It soon became readily apparent that Droukdel was successfully blending GSPC’s traditional guerilla-style ambush tactics that it had used for years in northeastern Algeria -- representing a balanced use of firearms and explosives -- with <link nid="30263">more sensationalist, al Qaeda-style bombings in urban areas</link>. Indeed, a number of these AQIM attacks went well beyond the relatively more moderate tactics employed by its predecessor.

2007

In July 2007, AQIM released an online statement to the jihadist forums claiming that it had successfully restructured and reformed the militant Islamist resistance in Algeria and that this would lead to the targeting of foreigners and the employment of suicide bombers. Proof of the shift came in April, when the group dispatched <link nid="28691">suicide bombers to deploy two VBIEDs</link> against the prime minister’s office and a police headquarters in Algiers, the first known suicide attacks in Algeria associated with AQIM (there had been one incident in January 1995)[associated with whom?]. The VBIED attack against the coast guard barracks in Delly, Boumerdes, east of Algiers, in September was also particularly bloody, with 27 sailors and three civilians killed and approximately 60 people injured. The <link nid="106612">surge in attacks continued well into the year</link>, with a spectacular strike against Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s convoy in the eastern town of Batna [when?] and <link nid="106552">two simultaneous suicide bombings</link> against the Constitutional Court and the U.N. offices [in Algiers?] in December.

In its campaign to target the far enemy, the newly formed AQIM also began <link nid="24975">striking foreign energy instillations</link> in Algeria in line with al Qaeda’s tactic of <link nid="154910">“economic jihad”</link>. However, despite the expanding target set, AQIM was unable to carry out any significant or truly disruptive attacks against the Algerian energy sector. This was likely because the group lacked the operational strength to target the bulk of possible targets in the energy sector, which are located far into the southern desert and are well guarded, even though it had the intention.

In all, there were 33 documented AQIM-related attacks inside Algeria in 2007, 14 (42 percent) of which were conducted using at least an IED and three using a VBIED (some studies put the VBIED figure as high as eight). Combined, they indicate that the use of explosives in AQIM attacks in 2007 went up by more than 50 percent, while the use of firearms dropped considerably. This likely contributed to the alarmingly high casualty rates -- 88 killed and 208 injured -- for total assaults during the year both inside and outside Algeria. In terms of the lethality of the attacks, this translates to roughly 2.5 people killed and six people injured per attack. Outside the group’s Algerian base, AQIM also managed to carry out two armed assaults in Mauritania in December that resulted in seven deaths and one injury. This contributed to the decision by the governing body of the Dakar Rally to cancel the <link nid="108091">annual off-road car race in 2008</link>.

The frequency and lethality of AQIM attacks in 2007 eventually forced the Algerian government’s hand. In mid-2007, security forces launched a <link nid="22878">massive operation against the group</link> that resulted in significant losses of AQIM operatives and materiel. According to the U.S. State Department, the Algerian government killed or captured approximately 1,100 Islamist militants -- nearly double the figure for 2006 -- during the 2007 operation.

[<INSERT MAP OF MAGHREB>]

Operations in the Maghreb

AQIM also began plotting and carrying out attacks in countries contiguous to Algeria as well as more distant parts of the Maghreb, an Arabic word meaning “place of sunset” or “the west” that collectively refers to an area that encompasses the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and the disputed territory of the Western Sahara. Operating from its base in the mountainous area east of Algiers, AQIM worked to extend its range across the Maghreb by establishing and loosely orchestrating cells to carry out attacks across North Africa. This effort has included <link nid="24410">cells</link> and <link nid="28449">attempted attacks</link>in Morocco. AQIM cells also were <link nid="32626">active in Tunisia</link>, with <link nid="112623">kidnappings of Westerners</link> and attempted strikes against the U.K. and U.S. embassies and other tourist sites in December 2006 and January 2007 known as the “Soilman” plot.

These attempts were not surprising, since militant Islamist cells and groups were already present in a number of these North African countries. Groups such as Morocco’s Islamic Combatant Group, Libya’s Islamic Fighting Group and a number of similar organizations in Tunisia such as the Tunisian Combatant Group were all likely viewed as potential recruits in AQIM’s attempt to widen its operational scope. However, despite the fact that AQIM had <link nid="34017">ample opportunity to organize affiliate cells</link>, recruit fighters and conduct attacks in these North African countries, its attempts were, for the most part, foiled by authorities in the planning phase.2008

The year 2008 marked the most lethally successful 12 months for AQIM since its founding. Demonstrating that it was a force to be reckoned with, the group carried out six suicide bombings against police and military targets over an eight-month period, from January to August, including a <link nid="117903">deadly train bombing in June</link>. August turned out to be a particularly aggressive month for the group. AQIM launched 12 attacks across the country, including four suicide VBIED bombings that killed 80 people and injured many more. The <link nid="122357">VBIED attack against a police training academy in Issers</link> was particularly bloody, killiing 43. However, it is important to note that most of the targets struck were softer than the hardened targets the group managed to strike in Algiers in 2007, such as the prime minister’s office, the Constitutional Court and the U.N. offices.

Though the overall number of attacks was down by approximately 30 percent from the previous year, the lethality (i.e., the number of dead and wounded per attack) was up almost 100 percent. This is best explained by AQIM’s shift in assault tactics, which saw a 20 percent increase in the use of IEDs, including seven suicide VBIEDs in strikes across Algeria, more than double the year before. Indeed, some sort of explosive was used in almost three-quarters of all AQIM attacks in 2008, further indicating AQIM’s gradual tactical shift away from armed assaults and toward the use of IEDs.

All told, the marked increase in the use of IED and VBIED suicide bombings in 2008 likely accounts for the increase in the lethality of AQIM attacks, which produced an average of more than five deaths and 10 injuries per strike over the course of the year. Moreover, the group’s target set witnessed a remarkable shift from the pre-2006 days of the GSPC. According to West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, prior to GSPC’s merger with al Qaeda, 88 percent of all successful attacks were conducted against Algerian national targets. After the merger, the ratio of attacks against national to international targets reduced a substantial 88 percent [or by a ratio of seven to one] [this seems like it’s trying to make an apples-to-oranges comparison. Can we clarify by simply saying what percentage of attacks were conducted against Algerian national targets after the merger?]

The new surge in violence forced the Algerian government again to increase pressure on the group. The army launched a massive military operation against AQIM in September 2008, deploying 15,000 troops to the eastern regions of Batna, Jijel and Skikda. As part

of this aggressive counterterrorism campaign, Algerian security forces began employing air power, using helicopters with infrared equipment for reconnaissance and attacks.

In 2008, the emphasis on suicide bombers using IEDs and VBIEDs against softer, civilian targets was a relatively new phenomenon in Algeria and the larger Maghreb. Its emergence is likely attributable to two factors. First, Droukdel’s decision to take on the al Qaeda label and worldview likely influenced the veteran Algerian militant to employ methods of attack consistent with those carried out by al Qaeda and its affiliates. According to a U.S. State Department report in 2007, after the merger it became apparent that militants in Algeria “had shifted to assault tactics meant to emulate the success of suicide bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Second, according to American and European security officials, Algeria fell victim to the “blowback” phenomenon, whereby seasoned militants returning from a jihadist theater -- in this case Iraq -- joined up with the local Islamist militants, using their newly acquired battlefield skills, in some cases, to serve as <link nid="29678">significant force multipliers</link> in their home countries. According to a September 2005 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Algerians were the single largest group of foreign fighters in Iraq, making up 20 percent of total strength. Moreover, it is quite possible that Islamist militants in Algeria were increasingly successful in urging fellow militants (and potential suicide operatives) to stay home and carry out operations on Algerian soil. Both likely account for the surge of VBIED suicide attacks in 2008.

AQIM’s increasing use of suicide operatives and large-scale IED/VBIED attacks in 2008 exacerbated the schism over targeting and tactics inside the group. Despite receiving praise for the more sensational attacks from high-profile al Qaeda members such as Libyan native <link nid="34678">Abu Yahya al-Libi</link>, Wadoud and AQIM largely failed to generate local support for their violent campaign. Based on Algeria’s history of Islamist violence that had resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, AQIM’s even more indiscriminate campaign of violence turned popular sentiment against the group. Even a number of hardened former Islamist militants joined the Algerian government in asking AQIM fighters to lay down their arms, including Hassan Hattab, Benmessaoud Abdelkader, Touati Ousman (aka/kunya[?] Abu al Abbas) and <link nid="71914">Mustapha Kertali</link>.

[<INSERT map of Sahel here>]

The year 2008 also saw a noteworthy uptick of AQIM’s operations in the Sahara-Sahel region, which covers parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Over a 12-month period beginning in December [2007?], the North African al Qaeda node staged at least eight attacks in the northern reaches of Niger, Mali and Mauritania. While these certainly were not the first instances of activity by the al Qaeda node in the region, they represented an unprecedented increase. (More recently, AQIM was responsible for a suicide attack in northern Mali in March 2010.)[shouldn’t we move this to the 2010 section?]

The presence of AQIM militants in these less-populated regions is not surprising, since the loosely patrolled borders and sparsely populated states of the Sahara[-Sahel?] provide criminal gangs and militant groups like AQIM freedom to operate and grow relatively unchecked. GSPC took advantage of this with an active branch in the Sahara, which its current manifestation has built on, developing new ties with area smuggling rings. Thanks to the connections of its predecessor, AQIM cooperates with the <link nid="120295">Tuareg tribes in Niger and Mali</link>, with the latter abducting foreigners and trading or selling them to AQIM, which holds them for ransom or uses them as bargaining chips in negotiating the release of AQIM operatives. There have been rumors that AQIM is trying to link up with militant groups in Nigeria like the Boko Haram, also known as the <link nid="165105">Nigerian “Taliban,”</link> though this is unlikely, [why?]. To fortify their operations in the Sahara-Sahel, AQIM has reportedly constructed bunkers in mountainous areas in Mali and Niger and established additional bases in the desert region near the borders of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

From 2008 to 2009, AQIM focused particularly on Mauritania as a staging ground to demonstrate its intent and capability to carry out high-profile attacks against international targets. In February 2008, for instance, unknown <link nid="109940">gunmen attacked the Israeli Embassy in the capital city of Nouakchott</link>, causing no casualties to embassy personnel. The following August, Droukdel/al-Wadoud issued what turned out to be an <link nid="122012">empty a call to arms</link> in response to a coup in Mauritania a week before. In June 2009, an American teacher was murdered in the capital city in what was likely a <link nid="141000">botched kidnapping attempt</link>. That August, a <link nid="143796">suicide bomber also struck the French embassy in Nouakchott</link>, slightly damaging the outside wall of the compound and injuring two embassy security personnel.

The comparatively higher incidence of AQIM-style attacks in Mauritania is due to a couple of factors. First, the country, similar to most in the [Sahara-?]Sahel, offers a vast geography of some 400,000 square miles, combined with a small population of about 3 million people. This makes it <link nid="143774">difficult for the central government to control the countryside</link>, giving AQIM and criminal gangs ample room to maneuver. The second factor is the local AQIM emir. [Is he still considered the southern leader, even though Zayd was put in a higher position?] According to security officials, the choice to carry out these attacks in the Islamic Republic largely fell on the shoulders of the[militant attacks in Mauritania are led by Afghan veteran and AQIM southern leader?] Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The 19-year jihad veteran, dubbed “uncatchable” by French intelligence, is thought to be behind the attacks in Nouakchott. He and his 100- to 150-man el Moulathamoune (“masked”) brigade of Islamists are also thought to have been responsible for attacks outside the capital city, including a <link nid="61857">raid on a Mauritanian military outpost in 2005</link> and the murder of four French tourists near Aleg in December 2007.

While evidence suggests that Belmokhtar is indeed behind these attacks, it is unclear why he has chosen to focus on Mauritania. It is equally unclear if he carried out these attacks under the direction of top AQIM emir Droukdel or whether he was acting more or less on

his own. Before the most recent spate of attacks in Mauritania, Droukdel acknowledged in his 2008 New York Times interview that AQIM and militant operations in the region could be best described as a growing network of militants only partially controlled by his far-flung deputies.

On top of the more sensational strikes in Mauritania, the uptick of violent AQIM attacks and kidnappings in the Sahara-Sahel region in 2008-2009 led to speculation that the group was surging in operational strength. However, the real reason behind the uptick was what security officials are referring to as a “vicious rivalry” between two AQIM sub-commanders, Belmokhtar and Hamid Essouffi (aka/kunya[?] Abdelhamid Abu Zayd). This rivalry also extends to one between Belmokhtar and Droukdel, with the former going so far as to openly criticize the latter’s leadership of AQIM and GSPC in an April 2009 an interview with the newspaper Liberté in Algiers.

Belmokhtar and his “masked” Islamist fighters constitute one of four similar yet competitive Islamist brigades operating in AQIM’s southern zone, the region in the Sahara-Sahel stretching from northeast Mauritania and[to?] the northern portions of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. His smuggling networks running drugs, weapons and illegal immigrants across the region as well as his kidnapping for ransom schemes have earned him quite a reputation, and he is known to some as “Mr. Marlboro” for his lucrative cigarette-smuggling operations, which produce large sums of money for AQIM. Though the native Algerian is a seasoned jihadist, he has been known almost as much for his opportunistic, criminal endeavors. Some time in 2007 or 2008, sensing Belmokhtar’s growing influence as a potential threat to his rule, Droukdel promoted the less-experienced Abu Zayd, who is in charge of his own Taregh Ibn Ziyad brigade of 100 to 150 militants, to a higher level than Belmokhtar in AQIM’s southern leadership hierarchy. Though this chain of command was adhered to, tensions brewed over Zayd’s promotion as well as the hostage-for-cash operation.

In September 2008, 11 Mauritanian soldiers and a civilian guide were kidnapped after their military patrol was ambushed in the town of Zouerate, in the northern Mauritanian province of Aklet Tourine. A week later, their bodies were found mutilated and beheaded. On Sept. 22, AQIM released a statement to jihadist forums claiming responsibility for the ambush, in what they called the “Battle of Zouerate.” Abu Zayd is reported to have ordered the execution. He and his Taregh Ibn Ziyad brigade were also responsible for high-profile abductions in Niger as well as the execution of a British hostage in Mali -- a known operating environment for Belmokhtar’s kidnapping-for-ransom operation -- on May 31, 2009. This deprived Belmokhtar of desperately needed ransom money and brought unwanted heat on him and his brigade. More recently, the southern commander[who is now considered the southern commander, Zayd?] has been deemed responsible for the execution of the French national in July.

According to French and Algerian security officials the above actions reflect Zayd’s desire to assert his global jihadist credentials against Belmokhtar’s already strong influence in the Sahara[-Sahel?]. Accordingly, security forces in the region were forced to step up their assault on AQIM and its affiliated brigades. This led to a number of

arrests of AQIM operatives and a violent cycle of clashes and counter-clashes pitting Abu[is this part of his last name, so it should always be included on subsequent reference?] Zayd’s and Belmokhtar’s brigades against the security forces of Mali, Mauritania and Niger. After taking a beating as a result of Abu Zayd’s more ambitious activities, Belmokhtar and his masked brigade were forced to retreat to the Algerian side of the Tanezrouft Mountains, closer to AQIM’s home base. Belmokhtar’s newfound proximity to Droukdel diminished Belmokhtar’s autonomy, although the rivalry continued to grow between him and Abu Zayd, with both brigade leaders pushing their respective network of militants to deliver more money and material to AQIM’s headquarters in Algeria.

Attacks outside of AQIM’s Algerian stronghold made it seem as though the group’s influence was increasing in the surrounding regions, especially those with large Muslim populations. However, while countries like Mauritania, Niger and Mali have majority Muslim populations, AQIM has yet to gain any momentum with local Salafi groups. Indeed, the more radical Salafi-jihadist tenets simply have not gained much traction in the region. Also, the deep influence and presence of Sufism in these countries likely stymies AQIM’s ideological appeal to the masses.[can we briefly elaborate here on why that is?] Moreover, AQIM’s appeal and foundation, like al Qaeda’s, is primarily theological. Indeed, the group justifies its attacks against the Algerian state, foreign interests and individuals in the region, including the deaths of innocent civilians, as a religious duty. However, its deep history and ongoing cooperation with criminal smugglers definitely tarnishes its appeal to potential recruits and supporters. While AQIM’s criminal dimension is absolutely crucial to its operations, it hurts its legitimacy with a number of more devout Muslim groups in the region.

2009

Despite a concerted propaganda and military effort against AQIM by Algerian and regional authorities, 2009 was another banner year for the group in terms of the number of attacks. A total of 40 armed assaults in which 107 people were killed and 107 wounded were attributed to the group during the 12-month period, the highest tally thus far, both in Algeria and the surrounding Sahara-Sahel countries of Mauritania and Niger. Fifty-five percent (22) of the attacks involved IEDs, mostly in roadside bombings that were part of armed assaults. However, AQIM used far less explosives in the IEDS and strayed away from the more powerful VBIEDs previously used. The most deadly of the 2009 attacks took place in June, when AQIM ambushed a security convoy escorting Chinese construction workers to a highway project in Bordj Bou Arreridj, 110 miles southeast of Algiers. It was the worst attack in six months (since the August 2008 VBIED suicide bombing [in?] Issers), with militants killing 18 gendarmes using a combination of IEDs and small arms fire.

[<INSERT map [of what?] here>]

While the number of assaults increased in 2009, their lethality significantly decreased, to just over two casualties (dead and wounded) per strike, a significant drop from the year

before. Also, the majority of strikes were carried out on softer, more vulnerable targets far outside the Algerian capital. Indeed, over the course of the year, over 95 percent of AQIM-affiliated assaults took place to the east of Algiers, mostly in Blida and Boumerdes provinces, occurring, on average, almost miles from the city’s center -- the farthest average reach for AQIM attacks since the group’s founding. Only two attacks fell outside of these parameters: a single RPG attack in Algiers and an armed assault 73 miles southwest of the capital in the city of Ibn Zayd in Ayn Defla [province?].

The number of clashes with security forces in Mali, Mauritania and Niger also increased, especially in December. Evidenced by the geographic shift in AQIM’s attacks, it is clear that the group was being forced to operate closer to its mountainous northern Kabylie stronghold because of the increasingly successful counterterrorism efforts by Algerian security forces. Among security analysts, this is referred to as a “displacement effect,” whereby a militant group is forced to act closer to its safe haven, choosing to strike in locations where state security forces are weaker. Many of these attacks also tend to be defensive in nature, striking security forces in or near militant hideouts.

2010

The lethality and quantity of AQIM attacks in the first six months of 2010 have dropped considerably. For instance, the number of deaths has decreased by more than 100 percent (from 72 in 2009 to 31 in 2010), with the number of wounded civilians and military personnel following suit (from 48 in 2009 to 16 in 2010). The frequency of attacks has also dropped significantly from January to June, with only 10 in 2010 compared to 22 in the same six-month period in 2009. AQIM is still using IEDs in approximately half of all attacks, most of which continue to occur in the east, toward the group’s stronghold. AQIM has managed to strike only one moderately hardened target, a gendarme barracks in the eastern province of Boumerdes, which it hit in June with a <link nid="164862">suicide VBIED</link>, inflicting minor damage.

Conclusion

From AQIM’s official founding in 2006 to the present, our research indicates a few discernable patterns regarding the group’s operational capacity inside Algeria. First, the majority of attacks have produced low casualty counts, from zero to three. Attacks that did achieve a higher degree of lethality (which we define as two or more casualties[people killed?]), were restricted mostly to Algiers and slightly to the east of the capital. Second, after GSPC’s September 2006 merger with al Qaeda, the number of violent attacks and threats against foreign/international targets within Algeria’s borders increased significantly. This was particular evident in the spring of 2008 and continues to date.

The attack and casualty rates were highest between mid-2008 and late 2009. Indeed, during the last six months of 2009 there was a noteworthy spike in the number of attacks. However, tracing the geographical distribution of attacks last year, we noticed that AQIM had zeroed in on softer, more vulnerable targets closer to its base in the east, strongly

suggesting that the group’s operational capacity had been crippled by Algerian counterterrorism efforts and that AQIM was likely trying to defend its base. The uptick in attacks appears to have been an effort on the part of the North African al Qaeda node to prove that it remained a security threat and relevant actor on the international jihadist stage. It was not a verifiable indicator that the group’s strength was surging. It could well have been nothing more than a last gasp that will not likely be repeated, unless AQIM is given room to rest and regroup.

Furthermore, the more recent increase of abductions of Westerners and clashes with security forces in the Sahara-Sahel is not, as some observers believe, an indication of AQIM’s ability to effectively strike targets at a much longer range. We believe it is more likely the result of a rivalry between sub-commanders and an overall indication of the lack of uniformity[would a better word be cohesion?] within the group. It could also be the result of increased initiative on the part of countries in the Sahara-Sahel region to go on the offensive against AQIM. A <link nid="160466">joint military base</link> operated by Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger was set up on April 21, 2010, in the southern Algerian town of Tamanrasset to coordinate counterterrorism activities and clamp down on one of AQIM’s main smuggling routes. According to a report July 25 in the Algerian newspaper El Watan, Algeria will be in charge of air support, with Mali covering ground operations, Mauritania heading up communications, Niger handling logistics and Burkina Faso serving in an observation role. However, as recent events have demonstrated, the joint effort has failed to advance beyond vocal commitments and formalities.

Still, the military operations by French-backed Mauritanian troops in Mauritania and Mali in July were likely a harbinger of a more aggressive counterterrorism stance against the group by countries in the region. Paris' open declaration of war on AQIM after the death of the French hostage will certainly add energy [or perhaps just hot air] [are we not sure? we say it would certainly add impetus (or energy), then backpedal by saying it could just be hot air. seems inconsistent] to the effort. However, instead of putting French troops on the ground in Algeria, an idea that the country[Algeria?] openly rejected (probably because of the sensitive [colonial?] history between the two countries), France’s declaration will likely lead to enhanced military and intelligence efforts against the North African al Qaeda node. Joining France’s call, Niger’s military leader, whose remarks were conveyed by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, said July 28 his government is ready to “take necessary action” against terrorism and AQIM in the Sahara-Sahel.

Meanwhile, Algeria itself is continuing its assault against AQIM. On July 21, in response to a number of small attacks against army patrols in the region, Algerian security forces launched a “huge”[do you mean by these quotes that someone is calling it that but it may or may not be really huge? can we just say massive without the quotes?] operation involving heavy bombing[air strikes?] against suspected AQIM hideouts in Tizi Ouzou and Bouira provinces. The Ministry of Defense also announced in June that it is reinforcing it National Gendarmerie police force by adding 9,000 members in an effort to take the offensive against AQIM. According to official sources in the same security

body[do you mean our sources in the ministry?], Algeria has dispatched an additional 16,000 police to the southern Sahara-Sahel region of the country to confront AQIM and combat cross-border crime and smuggling, the Algerian El-Khabar daily reported on July 26[I thought we were attributing this to ministry sources]. According to official security sources, this would increase the security coverage in the south five-fold compared to the previous three years. The coverage has been further expanded by a recent doubling of the number of air patrols [conducted?] unilaterally [by the Algerian police and jointly by the police and?] the Algerian army.

As part of the overall build-up, Algerian security forces also have incorporated a new communications network known as “Ronital.” Set up in the Tizi Ouzou region of the Kabyle Mountains, where Algiers is concentrating its fight against AQIM, Ronital serves as a unified communications network operated by Algeria’s central command to ensure the [secure and reliable?] transmission of electronic messages, including sound and images.

As the offensive continues, AQIM’s future seems bleak. In all likelihood, attacks involving small arms and IEDs against military and civilian convoys and more hardened symbols of the Algerian state such as police stations will continue to be concentrated in Algeria, near AQIM’s eastern stronghold in Blida and Boumerdes provinces. It does not appear that AQIM has the operational freedom to conduct large VBIED attacks against hard targets in Algiers, as it has done in the past. The abduction of Westerners and clashes with security forces in the Sahara-Sahel region also will continue, but the frequency and lethality of these incidents will remain the same or decrease during the rest of the year. [Can say anything here about 2011, like, ‘if the regional security momentum continues at its current pace, 2011 may see al Qaeda’s North African node become a footnote in the history of Islamist militancy’?]