archil gegeshidze tartu, 28 january 2011 georgia-russia: challenges and opportunities georgia-russia...

Archil Gegeshidze Tartu, 28 January 2011

Georgia-Russia: Challenges and opportunities

Georgia-Russia relations: Challenges and opportunities

Archil GegeshidzeGeorgian Foundation for Strategic and International StudiesTartu, 28 January 2011



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Outline of the lecture

1. Evolution of the confrontation2. Georgia’s meaning for Russia3. The August 2008 war: causes and

implications4. Limits to Russian power5. Bilateral relations: current balance sheet6. Attitudes in Georgia toward Russia7. What the future holds?



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Evolution of the confrontation

Aspects of post-Soviet relationships

History

Psychology

Geopolitics

The ‘Putin (Medvedev) factor’



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Georgia’s meaning for Russia

© 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping

Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)

BakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBaku

BatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumi

GroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGrozny

MakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkaz

Yerevan

© 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping donated by Response.Net

RUSSIA

GEORGIA

TURKEY

IRAN

AZERBAIJAN

ARMENIA

CASPIANSEA

BLACKSEA

Vladikavkaz

NagornoKarabakh

Nakichevan

Chechnya

National Boundaries

National Capital

Scale (KM)0 100 200

Administrative Boundaries

THE CAUCASUS updated by ReliefWeb: 7.6.96

AZERBAIJAN

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations or ReliefWeb.These maps may be freely distributed. If more current information is available, please update the maps and return them to ReliefWeb for posting.

Georgia serves as kind of a valve that, if under control, allows Russia to prevent penetration of Turkish influence into the North Caucasus, as well as further to the East into the Central Asia.



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© 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping

Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)Tiflis (Tbilisi)

BakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBakuBaku

BatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumiBatumi

GroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGroznyyGrozny

MakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaMakhachkalaVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkazVladikavkaz

Yerevan

© 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping © 1993 DeLorme Mapping donated by Response.Net

RUSSIA

GEORGIA

TURKEY

IRAN

AZERBAIJAN

ARMENIA

CASPIANSEA

BLACKSEA

Vladikavkaz

NagornoKarabakh

Nakichevan

Chechnya

National Boundaries

National Capital

Scale (KM)0 100 200

Administrative Boundaries

THE CAUCASUS updated by ReliefWeb: 7.6.96

AZERBAIJAN

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations or ReliefWeb.These maps may be freely distributed. If more current information is available, please update the maps and return them to ReliefWeb for posting.

Control over Georgia provides for Russia a leverage to rule out any possibility of future NATO expansion from Turkey into the Caspian.



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Control over Georgia would allow Russia to obstruct the progress of the East-West energy corridor, as well as to hinder the penetration into the Caspian of western investment.



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Control over Georgia would ease the task for Russia to prevent increasingly disobedient national republics in the North Caucasus from falling out of jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

DISINTEGRATIO

N



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Sevastopol

Batumi

?

?

475 km

2935 km of coastline under Soviet control



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220 km



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Georgia’s meaning for Russia Russia’s fears if Georgia succeeds

• Separatist movement will intensify in the North Caucasus

• A precedent of providing conditions for swift development under Western security guarantees will arise in the CIS space, including the South Caucasus, which will further shake Russia’s already shaken authority and influence

• The strengthening of Georgia-US security co-operation and Georgia’s accession to NATO will further enhance US influence in the South Caucasus which might proliferate throughout the CIS and elsewhere in Eurasia



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Georgia’s meaning for Russia Russia’s fears if Georgia succeeds

• US military bases and NATO anti-missile systems may be deployed in Georgia as it is likely to happen in some Eastern European countries

• The transit attractiveness of Georgia and the whole of the South Caucasus will be increased in regards to transportation of Caspian energy to Western markets thereby to a certain extent lessening Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.



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The August 2008 war: Causes and implications

Dimensions of conflict

• Georgian-Abkhaz / Georgian-Ossetian confrontation

• Georgian-Russian confrontation

• Russia-West standoff



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Immediate causes

• Russian trap

• Georgia’s blunders• Stubbornness of the de facto administrations in

Sukhumi and Tskhinvali• Idleness of the West



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Implications

• Territorial reunification indefinitely postponed• Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence

recognized by Russia• Rapidly increasing Russian influence in the occupied

territories• Georgian territories occupied• NATO accession tabled off



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Limits to Russian power

Decline in Russian growth

Source: Russian Analytical Digest, #88, p. 4



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Russia in international comparison:

R&D expenditure as % of GDP (2005-2007)

Source: Russian Analytical Digest, #88, 29 November 2010



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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (%GDP)and number of researchers (Thsd.) (1990-2009)

Source: Russian Analytical Digest, #88, 29 November 2010



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Russia’s demographic map



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Average monthly per capita income, Russian federal districts 2009



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Explosive North Caucasus



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Military maladies

• Ageing equipment• Declining number of conscripts• Poor health and education of potential conscripts• Corruption, crime and casualties in peacetime military• Lack of consensus on the proper military doctrine• Financial crisis



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Russia-West Reset



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U.S. assistance to Georgia 2006-2011



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Georgia-Russia: Balance sheet

Liabilities:

• Incompatibility of national projects;• Status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

New Status Quo;• Broken intergovernmental instruments/channels

of dialogue;• Absence of the willingness to restore these

mechanisms mainly on Russian side.



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Georgia-Russia: Balance sheet

Assets:

• Absence of phobia between the peoples (Georgian diaspora in Russia);

• Huge potential of mutually beneficial economic co-operation;

• Two Churches willing to contribute;• Readiness of international community to

facilitate this dialogue.



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Attitudes in Georgia toward Russia



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Attitudes in Georgia toward Russia Would you approve or disapprove marrying the following nationality?



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Respondent’s foreign language teaching preference in secondary schools



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What future holds?

Happenings for the foreseeable future

Possible:• Establishment of the dialogue on the civil society

level;• Russia realizing part of its ‘soft power’ such as visa

facilitation/lifting embargo/restoration of transport links.

• Russia meeting some of the Sarkozy-Medvedev Plan commitments;

• Georgia signing Agreement on non-resumption of hostilities;

• IDPs returned to Akhalgori and Kodori



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What future holds?


Possible / unlikely:

• Restoration of diplomatic relations

• Establishment of direct/uncontrolled talks between the GoG and the de facto administrations;



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What future holds?


Impossible:

• Reversal of New Status Quo;• Georgia recognizing independence of

Abkhazia/South Ossetia;• Georgia abandoning pro-Western orientation



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What future holds?

Impossible:

• Reversal of New Status Quo;

• Georgia recognizing independence of Abkhazia/South Ossetia;

• Georgia abandoning pro-Western orientation (the war didn’t change public attitudes)



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What future holds?

Bottomline

• National projects remain incompatible, i.e. source of confrontation will remain

• “Strategic patience”

• Search for modus vivendi

END OF THE PRESENTATION

THANK YOU

ARCHIL GEGESHIDZE

Senior fellow, GFSIS

3a, Chitadze St., Tbilisi 0108 Georgia

[email protected]

archil gegeshidze tartu, 28 january 2011 georgia-russia: challenges and opportunities georgia-russia...

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