Arctic Airpower: Searching for an Air Force Strategy

by

Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Sheets United States Air Force

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Under the Direction of: Professor Brett D. Weigle

United States Army War College Class of 2018

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14. ABSTRACT

The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the Air Force.

Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has

brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversaries on the Arctic’s strategic

importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic

region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the

Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to

close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will

examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review

current U.S. national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies for the Arctic to identify the

ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic

capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes,

support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Polar, Alaska, Russia, China, Search and Rescue

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

UU

18. NUMBER OF PAGES

34

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UU b. ABSTRACT

UU c. THIS PAGE

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98), Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Deleted: The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States and the Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversaries on the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S. national and Department of Defense strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains.

Arctic Airpower: Searching for an Air Force Strategy

(5306 words)

Abstract

ries on the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are

designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many

gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets

and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain

awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic

environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S.

national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends,

ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force

Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to

regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space

domains.The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the

Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic.

Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversa

Deleted: The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States and the Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversaries on

Deleted: ries on the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S. national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains. the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S. national and Department of Defense strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains.The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversa

Arctic Airpower: Searching for an Air Force Strategy

I believe in the future he who holds Alaska will hold the world, and I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.

—Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell1

The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the

U.S. Air Force. During World War II and the Cold War, this region played a key role in

guaranteeing the defense of the American homeland and ensuring the Air Force’s ability

to support a multitude of operations in Europe and Asia. Military emphasis on the Arctic

declined post-Cold War, and so did the importance of resourcing and maintaining

appropriate Arctic infrastructure and capabilities. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for

increased maritime access to the Arctic.2 Additionally, it has brought about a renewed

Arctic focus by the American allies, and potential adversaries on the region’s strategic

importance.3 With the release of the national and defense strategies for the Arctic in

2013, the United States slowly began to refocus on its interests in the Arctic.

The Air Force plays a role in ensuring American strategic success in the Arctic.

The Air Force unwaveringly monitors American territorial airspace and defends the

homeland in the Arctic region. For example, on May 3, 2017, the Air Force identified a

Russian TU-95 bomber and two SU-35 fighter aircraft near Alaskan airspace and

intercepted them with two F-22 fighters.4 Additionally, the Air Force maintains Arctic

safety through its coordination and execution of over 1,800 search and rescue missions

in the region since 1991.5 Air Force satellites, radars, and command and control units

monitor the Arctic continually. These assets provide Arctic navigation guidance and

enhanced polar communication.6 The Air Force has relied on broad strategies at the

national and the Department of Defense (DoD) levels to develop its plans for the Arctic.

2

The increasing international interest in the Arctic raises questions about the Air Force’s

lack of a specific strategy for the Arctic.

This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests

in the region. Next, the paper will review current U.S. government and DoD strategies

for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. The paper concludes

with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an

Air Force strategy.

The Arctic Environment

The national territories, seas, and straits north of the Arctic Circle, which is the

line that circles the globe at 66° 34' N latitude, defines the Arctic region. Additionally, the

Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 added to the definition “all United States territory

north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim

Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and

Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain” (see Figure 1).7 Canada, Denmark, Iceland,

Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States are Arctic nations because they

possess sovereign territory north of this line. This mix of allies and adversaries, along

with increased access to the region, creates a complex geopolitical environment.

3

Figure 1. The Arctic Region8

In recent years, the climate of the Arctic region has experienced a significant

increase in annual average temperature. The increased polar temperatures have

reduced the polar ice caps by 40 percent since 1979.9 This has cleared parts of the

Arctic Sea for maritime transit for more extended periods each year (see Figure 2).10 As

the polar ice recedes, it provides increased maritime access for American and

international commercial, governmental, and military activities in the Arctic.

Figure 2. Reduction of Arctic Sea Ice11

4

The Arctic region holds a vast amount of natural resources that are crucial to the

Arctic nations. A recent U.S. Geological Survey report estimated vast deposits of

subsea oil and natural gas along with substantial traces of precious minerals, such as

nickel, copper, and cobalt.12 This region potentially holds up to 13 percent of the world’s

undiscovered oil reserves and 30 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves (see

Figure 3).13 Fisheries make up another important Arctic renewable resource. For

instance, the Bering Sea fisheries provide more than half of the annual wild-caught fish

and shellfish for the United States.14

Figure 3. Arctic Sea Routes and Potential Oil and Gas Fields15

5

Diminishing sea ice will likely increase the commercial shipping and maritime

tourism traffic throughout the region.16 The future may see the opening of three sea

lanes for full or seasonal maritime use: the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest

Passage, and the Central Arctic route (See Figure 3).17 There was a 118 percent

increase in Bering Strait commercial shipping from 2008 to 2012 due to more navigable

Arctic Oceans.18 The Arctic shipping route from Asia to Europe reduces transit time by

thirty percent as compared to the Suez Canal route.19 In August 2016, the Crystal

Serenity traveled from New York to Alaska, marking the first ever transit of the

Northwest Passage by a giant luxury cruise ship.20 More cruise lines are expected to

continue this route as the receding polar ice makes the Arctic routes more tempting for

commercial shippers. The increased activity and presence increasingly highlight the

future importance of the region and the U.S. role in providing safety and security to the

Arctic.

A recent Heritage Foundation report listed the Arctic “as an important operating

environment” for the United States, but America “is not well positioned in the region.”21

As nations such as Russia, China, and other allies focus on the Arctic, it will present

new and significant security challenges to the United States. Increased access means

increased activity and more chances for disputes, accidents, and disaster. The shortest

air route from Europe and Asia to North America is over the Arctic.22 A navigable Arctic

Ocean provides potential adversaries a shorter maritime route to America’s northern

border. The Arctic provides the northern flank for U.S. homeland defense strategy.23

The 2017 National Security Strategy highlights this interest, as it states the first and

most fundamental American responsibility is to “protect the homeland.”24

6

The Arctic plays a role in the potential future success of America's economy and

access to resources which contribute to this success. The increased access to oil,

natural gas, fisheries, and commercial maritime routes makes the Arctic a significant

region for potential economic growth. However, this access increases international

competition for these resources, as well as intensifying existing disputes over territories

and boundaries to secure these assets.25 The current National Security Strategy

promotes American prosperity as another national interest that further highlights the

importance of this region.26

The 2017 National Security Strategy also highlights the importance of

maintaining partnerships and alliances.27 Several international organizations are

shaping U.S. Arctic interests in this regard. In 1996, Canada, Denmark, Iceland,

Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States formed the Arctic Council.28 The Arctic

Council is a forum to discuss common regional issues, focusing on sustainable

development, environmental protection, cooperation, and coordination. Elements of

U.S. defense requirements for the region stem from two recent agreements made

through the Arctic Council: Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and

Rescue in the Arctic in 2011 and Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and

Response in the Arctic in 2013.29 This paper will discuss both in more detail. While such

cooperation is key to American interests in the Arctic, several U.S. near-peer

competitors are developing capabilities to compete in the region.

Russia was one of the first nations to expand its Arctic government and military

presence. This regional competitor and potential U.S. adversary is developing a new

Arctic joint military command, four Arctic brigades, ten air defense radar stations, 14

7

operational airfields, 16 deep water ports and 40 new icebreakers.30 This Russian

military development appears significant when compared to the U.S. Arctic military

infrastructure, as seen in Figure 4. The new airfields give Russia a quick strike

capability against the United States and its northern NATO allies.

These airfields are the base for Russian interceptors, fighter, and attack aircraft,

along with various electronic warfare and transport aircraft.31 Russia’s air patrols over

the Arctic have also increased since 2007.32 Strategic Russian bombers, such as the

Tu-95 and Tu-22M3, have increasingly penetrated air defense zones of the United

States, Finland, and Norway since 2014.33 Russia’s stated goal for its regional

expansion is to exercise sovereignty over its territories and waterways and to counter

the perceived NATO expansion and threat.34

Figure 4. Russian Arctic Military Presence35

8

Russia asserts that it will continue to use a cooperative strategy with the other

nations in the Arctic. In this complex geopolitical environment, it is difficult to interpret

whether Russian actions are cooperative or aggressive, similar to their operations in

Ukraine in 2014.36 Military actions in Ukraine demonstrate Russia's willingness to use

force to guarantee its interests. Russian military leaders have made statements which

contradict their stated desire for Arctic cooperation. In 2014, the Russian Land Forces

commander, Colonel General Oleg Salyukov, stated that Russian militarization of the

Arctic was to “demonstrate to other Arctic nations Russia’s military presence in the

increasingly contested region.”37 The Eleventh U.S. Air Force commander, Lieutenant

General Kenneth Wilsbach, recently commented on the development of Russian Arctic

amphibious units: “Amphibious operations are clearly for inserting troops and taking

territory.”38

China has also shown increased interest in the region. In 2013, the Arctic Council

accepted China’s request to be named a “permanent observer state.”39 While not an

Arctic nation, China is interested in the region for shipping routes, fisheries, and natural

energy resources.40 China looks to cooperate in the region but has also introduced a

military aspect to their regional engagement. In 2015, five Chinese naval vessels took

part in a joint Russian-Chinese military exercise only 12 nautical miles from U.S.

territory in the Alaskan Arctic. A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies

report stated that “the incident reflects a growing Chinese ambition to establish itself as

a player in the Arctic region.”41

In January 2018, China released its Arctic policy which solidified those

comments. Overall, China’s objective is “to understand, protect, develop, and participate

9

in the governance of the Arctic.”42 China’s rhetoric appears to support a stable Arctic,

where nations work together to enhance mutual interests. However, China has stated

similar intentions for the South China Sea but has shown disregard for regional

sovereignty and international freedom of navigation laws there.43 Russia and China are

not the only nations looking to increase national presence in the Arctic, as many of

America's allies are developing Arctic security strategies with similar priority.

Canada and Norway are advancing their respective national strategies to

safeguard their Arctic interests. Canada, in its 2017 National Defense Policy, outlined

plans to upgrade its military surveillance, communication and aircraft capabilities in the

Arctic. Additionally, it announced plans to expand its northern Air Defense Identification

Zone and forward deploy CF-18 fighter aircraft to increase patrol capabilities.44

Norway has also focused on expanding its military presence in the Arctic to

protect their national interests. Fundamental to Norway’s Arctic strategy is its

procurement of the F-35 Lightning II multi-role fighter aircraft and the development of

AEGIS frigates.45 Ensuring airspace sovereignty and providing missile defense are the

primary reasons for these acquisitions. Norway’s Defense Minister describes Norway’s

Arctic region as “more challenging and less predictable,” and these military additions

highlight their desire to improve security and defense.46 In 2017, Norway clarified its

strategy by deploying an armored battalion to deter undesired Russian actions near its

northern border.47 While these two U.S. allies believe the Arctic region will continue to

be peaceful, neither wishes to fall behind Russia in their regional presence or ability to

influence.

10

Assessing U.S. Arctic Strategies and Agreements

A review of national-level, defense, and individual military service Arctic

strategies is in order. Doing so will identify strategic capabilities gaps which the Air

Force is uniquely positioned to fill, and this will drive the need for its own Arctic strategy.

The 2017 National Security Strategy asserts that protection of American borders is the

highest priority for U.S. national security. Following this interest is securing the U.S.

economy, rebuilding the American military, and developing partnerships to advance

U.S. interests and values.48 While the 2017 National Security Strategy does not

explicitly mention the Arctic region, the Arctic environment presents a challenge to U.S.

interests and objectives.

The first U.S. strategic document to direct actions in the Arctic is the 2009

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66, Homeland Security Presidential

Directive (HSPD) 25. The NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is broad in its approach, directing policy

to “meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region”

and to “strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations.”49 The

directive lays out U.S. national security interests for the region, including “missile

defense and early warning systems…strategic deterrence and ensuring freedom of

overflight.”50 The directive tasks the Secretary of Defense to “develop greater

capabilities and capacity…to protect American air, land and sea borders” and “preserve

the global mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft.”51

The NSPD 66/HSPD 25 provided the first direction for the DoD to begin focusing

resources on the Arctic, highlighting America’s interest in the region to the international

community. The document emphasized the maritime nature of the Arctic and sought to

establish an Arctic policy primarily focusing on that domain. Critics of the directive also

11

note the United States “remains a somewhat reluctant Arctic actor” and demonstrates a

lack of urgency in dealing with Arctic issues.52 The NSPD 66/HSPD 25 acknowledges

there is a lack of U.S. Arctic infrastructure and capabilities but does little to resource the

means for future development.53

In 2013, the White House released the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

The objective of this strategy is to position America “to efficiently respond to challenges

and emerging opportunities arising from significant increases in Arctic activity.”54 The

national strategy provides direction for two broad defense tasks. The first is to “advance

U.S. security interests” and the second is to “pursue responsible Arctic region

stewardship.”55

Critics of the national Arctic strategy note that it falls short in many areas of

ensuring U.S. interests in this region. They argue that it is vague and does not lay out

specific tasks or ways to meet the desired objectives. Additionally, the objectives are

unattainable until they receive funding. Finally, the National Strategy for the Arctic does

not assign any direct tasks to the military or any other federal agency.56

In 2016, the interagency Arctic Executive Steering Committee released the

Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. This

document provided more detailed, specific guidance to the DoD.57 This plan tasks the

DoD to lead the evaluation of space-based observation capabilities; conduct maritime

exercises and operations in the Arctic region; and lead international Arctic search and

rescue exercises.58 While this framework provides increased detail for ways to ensure

national interests, it does not instill a sense of urgency to support the region because it

required three years to develop.

12

The 2013 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy delivers the initial strategy for

the DoD in the Arctic. The strategy defines a DoD end-state to maintain “a secure and

stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is

protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.”59 This strategy

outlines two supporting objectives for the DoD. It directs the DoD to “ensure security,

support safety, and promote defense cooperation” and “prepare for a wide range of

challenges and contingencies.”60

In 2016, the DoD released its Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect U.S.

National Security Interests in the Arctic Region as an updated military strategy for the

Arctic. The U.S. national end-states and objectives for the Arctic remain unchanged in

this strategy while it clarifies the DoD’s Arctic interests. These interests include shaping

military activity “to avoid conflict while improving its capability to operate safely” and the

seeking to preserve “the rights and freedoms regarding navigation and overflight.”61

Specifically, this document outlines broad strategy ways which include:

enhance the capability of U.S. forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty,

strengthen deterrence at home and abroad,

strengthen alliances and partnerships,

preserve freedom of the seas,

improve domain awareness in the Arctic,

evolve DoD Arctic infrastructure and capabilities,

support civil authorities and foreign humanitarian assistance,

partner to support safety,

promote regional cooperation and rule of law.62

13

The 2016 Report to Congress identifies many of the DoD gaps in meeting the

objectives of the 2013 strategy. This report discusses the challenges of the military to

maneuver, employ and sustain capabilities due to the harsh Arctic environment. The

report briefly mentions the limited polar navigation aids, poorly mapped terrain and

waterways, and the challenges of satellite communication above 65 degrees north

latitude.63 Overall, the 2016 Report to Congress does an excellent job of defining the

objectives and the resource gaps in pursuing a national Arctic strategy.

The Report to Congress is the first document which mentions Air Force

requirements for the Arctic, though the statements are brief. Specifically, it mentions the

need to modernized existing platforms for improved air mobility to access the region.

Furthermore, it addresses the requirement for enhanced personnel recovery

capabilities, “particularly for long-range operations in or over the Arctic Ocean.”64

Colonel John Conway, a retired USAF intelligence officer and military defense

analyst, delivers a critique of the 2016 DoD Arctic strategy when he notes the current

DoD strategy reflects “no great urgency to improve its Arctic posture.”65 This criticism is

due mainly to a lack of DoD and national focus on the Arctic while American competitors

advance their capabilities and infrastructure. Conway also states that the DoD strategy

focuses solely on maritime capabilities and fails to address the need for airpower in the

Arctic.66

The Unified Command Plan establishes responsibilities among combatant

commands for organizing and coordinating military action in the Arctic (Figure 5).

Two geographic combatant commands share primary responsibility for military operations in the Arctic: U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) … USNORTHCOM has geographic combatant command responsibility for

14

Alaska and a subordinate unified command, Alaskan Command, which focuses on planning and execution of USNORTHCOM missions in Alaska and the USNORTHCOM portion of the Arctic …The Forces for Unified Command document assigns most Federal forces based in Alaska to U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).67

Additionally, the Commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for defining the

requirements and capabilities required for Arctic military operations and advocating for

future requirements.68

Figure 5. Combatant Command Arctic Areas of Responsibility69

The Navy developed its Arctic Roadmap in 2014 to support the DoD’s objectives

for the Arctic. Due to the region’s maritime nature, the Navy acts as the de facto lead

Service in the DoD for Arctic matters. The strategic objectives for the Navy are to

15

ensure U.S. sovereignty and provide homeland defense; provide forces to respond to

crisis and contingencies; provide access to global commons; and develop and promote

Arctic partnerships.70

The Navy’s strategy describes the environment, climate, vast distances, and

limited U.S. Arctic infrastructure as primary challenges for current and future naval

operations.71 The Navy states, “Given the vast distances and virtually no supporting

infrastructure, naval forces without specialized equipment and operational experience

face substantial impediments”; consequently, their ability to operate in the Arctic is a

“flexible, periodic presence.”72 The Navy will support and execute missions in the region

including sea control, power projection, search and rescue, disaster response, and

defense support to civil authorities.73

The Center for International Maritime Security notes the reluctance of the Navy to

prioritize the Arctic. The Navy admits its unwillingness to commit its limited resources to

develop a more significant Arctic capability. Currently, the Navy focuses its resources

on regions where they are engaged in conflict or the probability of future conflict is

higher.74 While the Navy is the de facto lead Service for the Arctic, Conway notes they

do not mention working with any of the other Services to secure national interests in the

Arctic.75

In 2013, the Coast Guard released its Arctic Strategy, which is rooted in the

NSPD 66/HSPD 25 and the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The Coast

Guard’s role in the Arctic is to provide homeland security, safety management, and

stewardship of U.S. waters, and guarantee freedom of navigation and overflight in U.S.

Arctic waters as described in their strategy.76 Like the Navy, the lack of infrastructure

16

and Arctic capability prohibits the Coast Guard from achieving an enduring presence in

the region.

A nation’s power in the Arctic is often measured by the number of icebreakers

they possess and the capabilities of those ships. The U.S. Coast Guard currently

maintains only one heavy polar icebreaker and a medium polar icebreaker.77

Icebreakers are crucial to providing yearlong access to the Arctic Ocean and the lack of

these assets limits maritime access to the ice-filled ocean. Every year the heavy

icebreaker deploys for part of the year to Antarctica, straining this limited capability.78

Additionally, the Coast Guard strategy notes limited basing in the Arctic. The nearest

Coast Guard facility to the northern Alaska Coast is its air station at Kodiak, over 900

miles south of Barrow, Alaska.79

Absent from the discussion are the Arctic strategies of the U.S. Army and the

U.S. Marine Corps. Like the Air Force, these Services have yet to develop a specific

Arctic strategy while still acknowledging the importance of the region. Both Services

recognize the unique skills and requirements for operating in the Arctic. The Army

established the Northern Warfare Training Center in Alaska, while the Marines operate

the Mountain Warfare Center in eastern California to train individual soldiers and

Marines in basic Arctic skills.80

Both Services regularly exercise in the Arctic to demonstrate capability and

develop future skills. In February 2017, the Army (with support from the Air Force)

completed exercise SPARTAN PEGASUS, which involved the airborne insertion and

ground operations of 150 soldiers.81 The Marines have enough equipment to support a

brigade prepositioned in underground mountain bunkers in Norway’s Arctic region.82

17

Since January 2017, over 300 Marines have deployed as a rotational force to Vaernes,

Norway, for training and as a deterrence to Russia.83

The DoD’s strategy to engage in the Arctic lacks urgency. Additionally, it lacks a

comprehensive DoD plan to modernize existing equipment or develop new Arctic

capabilities. The gaps in the DoD and the Coast Guard capabilities include the lack of

persistent presence; degraded navigation, and communication capability; the lack of

infrastructure to operate; and the vastness of the region. The stated national and

military objectives and ends for the Arctic are clear. The ways and means are still

lacking, which increases the risk for the strategies seeking to guarantee American Arctic

interests.

Air Force Arctic Missions and Capabilities

The National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the DoD’s Arctic Strategy do not

discuss exploitation and control of the air and space domains in sufficient detail to

ensure the success of U.S. strategies in the Arctic. The Air Force currently executes

several of its core missions in the Arctic to achieve national objectives. Air and space

superiority, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), rapid global mobility,

and command and control need modernization and enhancement as involvement in the

Arctic environment continues to develop.84

Essential to Arctic domain awareness and the homeland defense is the ability of

the Air Force to conduct its ISR mission. Early warning radars are part of America’s

defense against ballistic missiles and enemy aircraft. For missile warning and defense

and space awareness, the Air Force has radars and personnel stationed at Clear Air

Station, Alaska and Thule Air Base, Greenland.85

18

Defense of America’s homeland and deterrence of adversaries occurs in the

Arctic through the Air Force's air and space superiority mission. A squadron of F-22

Raptors, stationed at Elmendorf-Richardson, provide air dominance while Joint Base

Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska hosts a squadron of E-3 Sentry Airborne Early Warning

and Control (AWACS) aircraft.86 The fighters and the AWACS are responsible for

Russian military aircraft intercepts on American’s Arctic border.87 The Air Force plans to

base a squadron of F-35 Lightning II multi-role fighters at Eielson Air Force Base,

Alaska to ensure this capability remains in the future.88

The Air Force’s global mobility mission encompasses several national tasks for

the Arctic. It gives the nation the ability to defend the homeland and provide support to

civil authorities and foreign humanitarian assistance. Two subsets of the global mobility

mission, airlift and combat search and rescue, directly support these national

requirements.

Two squadrons of C-17 Globemaster III and a squadron of C-130H Hercules

mobility aircraft provide tactical and strategic airlift from Elmendorf-Richardson. 89 These

aircraft provide support to homeland defense and support contingency support for

homeland disaster response. In November 2015, a C-17 delivered four U.S. Army

Stryker vehicles and 40 soldiers north of the Arctic Circle to Deadhorse, Alaska.90 This

exercise highlights the importance of rapid mobility to overcome the vast distances

faced by the DoD in the Arctic.

While not stationed near the Arctic, the Air National Guard also operates a

squadron of ski-equipped LC-130 Hercules aircraft. These aircraft have the niche

capability to “operate from prepared and unprepared snowfields, floating ice sheets,

19

glaciers, and traditional paved runways.”91 These aircraft are based at Stratton Air

National Guard Base, Scotia, New York and can rapidly deploy to support a range of

Arctic operations.92

Air Force airlift capabilities can support Arctic intergovernmental agreements in

the region where there is limited support infrastructure and disaster response is slow. In

2013, the Arctic Council coordinated the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil

Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. This agreement works to

coordinate the response to clean up oil spills in the Arctic.93 Few nations, other than the

United States, can expeditiously bring personnel and equipment in large amounts to an

Arctic emergency area.

The Air Force also supports the DoD’s requirements for support to civil

authorities and humanitarian assistance with its Alaska-based aircraft. Joint Base

Elmendorf-Richardson provides dedicated personnel recovery capability through two

Alaska Air National Guard aircraft squadrons (HC-130J Combat King II aircraft and HH-

60G Pavehawk helicopters) that are manned by Air Force Special Operations personnel

in a Guardian Angel squadron.94 These squadrons train for Air Force combat search

and rescue missions while providing Alaska with a civilian search and rescue capability.

Both the HH-60G and the HC-130J are air refuelable assets giving them unlimited

range. This capability gives the Air Force the ability to provide search and rescue and

humanitarian assistance missions outside the range of similar Coast Guard, Navy and

Army assets.

The Air Force’s search and rescue capability is also key to supporting another

Arctic Council agreement. In 2011, members of the Arctic Council signed the

20

Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.

The agreement assigns responsibility to the United States for the coastline around

Alaska, with Russia supporting in the west and Canada to the east, north across the

Arctic Sea to the North Pole (see Figure 6).95 Under this agreement, the Coast Guard is

the authority for search and rescue coordination in the U.S. Arctic sector. Alaska’s most

northern city, Barrow, lies 1,200 miles from the North Pole, which is a significant

distance for ships to cover; airpower provides the quickest response.

Figure 6. Arctic Search and Rescue Regions96

21

Finally, the Air Force provides a critical command and control mission for both Air

Force and joint operations in the Arctic from the North American Aerospace Defense

Command’s Air Operations Center in Colorado.97 The Alaska Air National Guard’s 11th

Rescue Coordination Center coordinates interagency and joint search and rescue

operations in Alaska.98 The Air Force will launch two satellites in 2018 as part of the

Enhanced Polar System to provide secure military communications above the Arctic

Circle.99

The current national and DoD Arctic strategies adequately define the ends and

outline the ways for the Air Force to support national Arctic interests. However, they do

not effectively integrate the air and space domains because of their heavy maritime

focus.

Components of an Air Force Arctic Strategy

When asked about the development of an Arctic strategy, Lieutenant General

Mark Nowland, Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations, stated, “What do the plans

say we have to do now, what are the gaps between the changing conditions, what are

the concept of operations that fill those gaps?”100 An Air Force Arctic strategy could

ensure the Air Force means to secure national objectives for the Arctic.

A senior fellow from the American Security Project recently stated that, in regards

to the Arctic, “There is a danger that other countries may perceive U.S. inattention as

weakness.”101 Countries, such as Russia or China, may attempt to take advantage of

the United States’ lack of capabilities and presence in the Arctic to advance their own

interests.102 To enhance homeland defense and security, the U.S. Air Force’s Arctic

objectives should be: 1) provide a postured, prepared, and modernized force to defend

22

the nation and respond to wide range of contingencies, and 2) strengthen joint and

strategic partnerships.103

Developing new and modernizing existing Air Force Arctic surveillance and

communication capabilities, space-based infrastructure, and aircraft are top priorities.

Arctic maritime, air, and space domain awareness will all increase due to these

capabilities.104 The development of enhanced communication and navigation

infrastructure will increase the security, safety, and ability to command and control

future Arctic operations.105 Another priority is upgrading air assets that support disaster

response, humanitarian aid, and search and rescue missions. This requires improving

the niche capabilities of the LC-130 ski aircraft and the aging HH-60G helicopter fleet to

meet future challenges.

The Air Force will need to revitalize and expand Arctic training for airmen through

its Arctic Survival School at Eielson Air Force Base. The Air Force should reinstate

Arctic research and studies at the Air University.106 Previously, the Air Force maintained

this capability through its education and training command with a specialized center

which conducted Arctic research and published its findings in manuals and

newsletters.107 Air Force research should be coordinated with the Army’s Cold Regions

Research and Engineering Laboratory in Fairbanks, Alaska, and the National/Navy Ice

Center in Suitland, Maryland.108 Joint solutions to Arctic challenges might fill the gaps in

the various Service Arctic strategies.

The second objective of the Air Force’s Arctic strategy must focus on

strengthening joint and strategic partnerships with the other Services and agencies to

ensure national and DoD objectives. The Air Force should participate in U.S. Northern

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Command’s Arctic Capabilities Advocacy Working Group to advance knowledge of

Arctic requirements, capabilities, and problems.109

The Air Force must continue to train with joint partners, allies, and strategic

competitors to be prepared for a range of Arctic contingencies. The Air Force should

continue to support and participate in homeland defense exercises such as VIGILANT

SHIELD, a combined United States and Canada air sovereignty exercise.110 The Air

Force needs to train all Arctic Council nations—not just U.S. allies. Expanding exercises

like ARCTIC CHINOOK, a search and rescue simulation exercise that Russia observed

in 2016, will bring all Arctic nations into closer cooperation for mutual benefit.111

Conclusion

Secretary of Defense James Mattis described the Arctic as “key strategic

terrain.”112 He continued by stating, “I believe that our interests and the security of the

Arctic would benefit from increasing the focus of the Department of Defense on this

region.”113 The gaps in DoD focus, capabilities, and the rapidly changing environment

put American Arctic interests at risk. Military gaps in domain awareness,

communication, and rapid response capabilities decrease U.S. ability to achieve its

strategic objectives in the Arctic. These gaps in the Arctic military capabilities could

potentially allow the United States to fall behind adversaries and limit America’s ability

to influence the region. The Air Force has the assets and mission sets to provide a joint

solution to the challenges in this theater. A dedicated Arctic strategy will allow the Air

Force to focus on developing its capabilities, adapting to regional changes, and

securing the air and space domains to safeguard American interests in the Arctic.

24

Endnotes

1 Brigadier General William Mitchell, “Statement of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell,” Congressional Record (February 12, 1935), 121, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= mdp.39015025110605;view=1up;seq=115 (accessed November 22, 2017).

2 U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2013), 7, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Strategy/ cg_arctic_strategy.pdf, (accessed October 27, 2017).

3 Dawn A. Berry, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Governance of Greenland’s Security,” in Governing the North American Arctic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 104-5, 111.

4 Barbara Starr, Ryan Brown, and Zachary Cohen, “U.S. F-22s Intercept Russian Bombers, Fighters, Near Alaska,” CNN Online (May 4, 2014): http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/04/politics/us-f-22-intercept-russian-aircraft-alaska/index.html (accessed January 12, 2018).

5 Alaska Rescue Coordination Center, “2017 SAR Mission Statistics,” email message to author, January 19, 2018.

6 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), 18-19, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf (accessed October 27, 2017).

7 Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, Public Law 98-373, amended as Public Law 101-609 (November 16, 1990), Section 112, https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/ arc_res_pol_act.jsp (accessed February 1, 2018).

8 U.S. Arctic Research Commission, “Arctic Boundary Map: Polar,” https://www.arctic.gov/ maps.html (accessed February 9, 2018).

9 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5.

10 Ibid.

11 Daily Chart, “The Decline of Arctic Sea Ice,” The Economist Online (May 1, 2017): https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/05/daily-chart (accessed March 1, 2018).

12 U.S. Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimated of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle” (Menlo Park, CA: USGS, 2008), 4, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/ (accessed November 7, 2017); U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5; Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 151-52.

13 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5.

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14 Thad W. Allen and Christine T. Whitman, Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on

America’s Fourth Coast, Independent Task Force Report No. 75 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2017), 41, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/02/TFR75_Arctic.pdf (accessed October 27, 2017).

15 CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2014), 17, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/ MAB_5-8-14.pdf, (accessed January 28, 2018).

16 David J. Hayes, Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: A Report to the President (Washington, DC: Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska, March 2013), 17, https://www.afsc.noaa.gov/ publications/misc_pdf/iamreport.pdf (accessed December 6, 2017); Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, 168.

17 CNA, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change, 17-19.

18 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5.

19 Rachael Gosnell, “The Complexities of Arctic Maritime Traffic, The Arctic Institute Online (January 30, 2018): https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/complexities-arctic-maritime-traffic/ (accessed February 18, 2018).

20 The Associated Press, “Giant Luxury Cruise Ship Crystal Serenity Makes Historic Voyage in Melting Arctic,” The Mercury News Online (September 9, 2016): https://www.mercurynews. com/2016/09/09/giant-cruise-ship-makes-historic-voyage-in-melting-arctic/ (accessed February 18, 2018).

21 Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2018), 103, 104, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength (accessed February 28, 2018).

22 Michael J. Forsyth, “Why Alaska and the Arctic are Critical to the National Security of the United States,” Military Review Online (January-February 2018): 114, http://www.armyupress. army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/ (accessed March 1, 2018).

23 North American Aerospace Defense Command, “Alaska NORAD Region,” http://www.norad.mil/About-NORAD/Alaskan-NORAD-Region/ (accessed November 7, 2017).

24 Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 7, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed January 28, 2018).

25 Sherri Goodman, “Changing Climate for Arctic Security,” The Wilson Quarterly Online (Summer 2017): https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/changing-climates-for-arctic-security/ (accessed September 23, 2017).

26 Trump, National Security Strategy, 17.

27 Ibid., 4.

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28 The Arctic Council, “The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,” September 25, 2017,

http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (accessed October 27, 2017).

29 Ibid.

30 Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, August 2015), 73, https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-ice-curtain (accessed October 27, 2017); Robbie Gramer, “Here’s What Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like,” Foreign Policy Online (January 25, 2017): http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/ (accessed November 15, 2017).

31 Conley and Rohloff, The New Ice Curtain, 76, 79-80.

32 Ibid., 9.

33 Ibid., 81-82.

34 Alexander Serguinn, “Is Russia Going Hard or Soft in the Arctic,” The Wilson Quarterly Online (Summer 2017): https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/is-russia-going-hard-or-soft-in-the-arctic/ (accessed October 29, 2017).

35 Wood, 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength, 208.

36 Julianne Smith and Adam Twardowski, The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2017), 5, https://www.cnas.org/ publications/reports/the-future-of-u-s-russia-relations (accessed November 20, 2017).

37 “Russia to Form Arctic Military Command by 2017,” The Moscow Times Online (October 1, 2014): https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-to-form-arctic-military-command-by-2017-39975 (accessed December 16, 2017).

38 Jason Sherman, “The Arctic Heats Up: In the High North, Things are Cold No More,” Air Force Magazine 101, no. 1 (January 2018): 37.

39 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks and Mark Cancian, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships, An Independent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 183.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 186.

42 March Lanteigne and Mingming Shi, “China Stakes its Claim to the Arctic,” The Diplomat Online (January 29, 2018): https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/china-stakes-its-claim-to-the-arctic/ (accessed January 31, 2018).

43 Green, Hicks, Cancian, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025, 14.

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44 Adam Lajeunesse, “What Canada’s New Defense Policy Means for the Arctic,” Arctic

Deeply Online (June 16, 2017): https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2017/06/16/ what-canadas-new-defense-policy-means-for-the-arctic (accessed February 1, 2018).

45 Ine E. Soreide, “Security Challenges in the High North: Norwegian Perspectives,” in Advancing U.S.-Nordic-Baltic Security Cooperation: Adapting Partnerships to a New Security Environment (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014), 6.

46 Reuters Staff, “Norway Plans to Send Armored Unit Close to its Russian Border,” Reuters Online (October 13, 2017): https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-military/norway-plans-to-send-armored-unit-close-to-russian-border-idUSKBN1CI1R4 (accessed February 1, 2018).

47 Ibid.

48 Trump, National Security Strategy, 4.

49 George W. Bush, National Security Directive/NSPD-66, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-25 (Washington, DC: The White House, January 9, 2009), 2, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html (accessed November 15, 2017).

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., 3.

52 Andreas Osthagen, “The United States as an Arctic Actor,” The Arctic Institute, December 12, 2011, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/united-states-arctic-actor/ (accessed February 1, 2018).

53 Ibid.

54 Barack H. Obama, National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2013), 2, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ nat_arctic_strategy.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).

55 Ibid., 6, 7.

56 Mihaela David, “U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region: Strong Foothold or on Thin Ice?” The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies Online (May 13, 2013): https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/us-national-strategy-for-arctic-region/ (accessed February 2, 2018).

57 Barack H. Obama, Executive Order 13689 – Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic (Washington, DC: The White House, January 21, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/executive-order-enhancing-coordination-national-efforts-arctic (accessed February 14, 2018).

58 Arctic Executive Steering Committee, Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2016), 8, 10, 24. https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/national_strategy_for_the_arctic_regio_implementation_framework_2016.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).

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59 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Defense, November 2013), 4, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ Documents/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).

60 DoD, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 5-6.

61 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interest in the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2016), 3, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-for-release.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).

62 Ibid., 9-12.

63 Ibid., 13.

64 Ibid., 13-14.

65 John L. Conway III, “Toward a US Air Force Arctic Strategy,” Air and Space Power Journal Online 31, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 69, http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-31_Issue-2/V-Conway.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).

66 Ibid., 70.

67 DoD, Report to Congress, 5.

68 Ibid., 4.

69 Mia Bennet, “2011 Unified Command Plan Streamlines U.S. Military Responsibilities in the Arctic,” Cryopolitics Online (May 9, 2011): http://www.cryopolitics.com/2011/05/09/2011-unified-command-plan-streamlines-u-s-military-responsibilities-in-the-arctic/ (accessed February 12, 2018).

70 Navy Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014-2030 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, February 2014), 15, www.navy.mil/docs/USN_arctic_roadmap.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).

71 Ibid., 8.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., 17-18.

74 Andreas Kuersten, “Assessing the U.S. Navy’s Arctic Roadmap,” Center for International Maritime Security Online (June 21, 2015): http://cimsec.org/assessing-the-u-s-navys-arctic-roadmap/17117 (accessed February 7, 2018).

75 Conway, “Toward a US Air Force Arctic Strategy,” 70-71.

76 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 21.

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77 USNI News, “Report to Congress of Coast Guard Icebreaker Program, USNI News

Online (December 13, 2017): https://news.usni.org/2017/12/13/report-congress-coast-guard-icebreaker-program (accessed February 18, 2018).

78 Dan Lamothe, “In a Changing Arctic, a Lone Coast Guard Icebreaker Maneuvers Through Ice and Geopolitics, The Washington Post Online (September 4, 2017): https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-changing-arctic-a-lone-coast-guard-icebreaker-maneuvers-through-ice-and-geopolitics/2017/09/03/dfad84d4-7d12-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.0e77f951e096 (accessed March 14, 2018).

79 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 14.

80 Nathan Fry, “Survivability, Sustainability, and Maneuverability: The Need for Joint Unity of Effort in Implementing the DoD Arctic Strategy at the Tactical and Operational Levels,” Military Review Online (November-December 2014): 60, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/ military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141231_art012.pdf (accessed January 7, 2018).

81 David Vergun, “Paratroopers Leap into Arctic Tundra for Spartan Pegasus,” Army News Service Online (February 24, 2017): https://www.army.mil/article/183108/paratroopers_leap_into_arctic_tundra_for_spartan_pegasus (accessed February 19, 2018).

82 Christopher P. Cavas, “Cave-Dwellers: Inside the U.S. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway,” Defense News Online (September 20, 2015): https://www.defensenews. com/digital-show-dailies/modern-day-marine/2015/09/20/cave-dwellers-inside-the-us-marine-corps-prepositioning-program-norway/ (accessed February 19, 2018).

83 Hope H. Seck, “Marine Leaders Highlight Norway Unit’s Role as Deterrent to Russia,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/12/21/marine-leaders-highlight-norway-units-role-deterrent-russia.html (accessed February 19, 2018).

84 U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Core Missions,” Air Force News Online (August 15, 2013): http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/466868/air-force-core-missions/ (accessed December 14, 2017).

85 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2016), 5, 6, 8, https://www.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Resourcing_the_Arctic_Strategy.pdf (accessed December 14, 2017).

86 Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), “Air Force Units,” http://www.jber.jb.mil/Units/Air-Force/ (accessed December 1, 2017).

87 Starr, Brown, and Cohen, “U.S. F-22s Intercept Russian Bombers, Fighters.”

88 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 6.

89 Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, “Air Force Units”; News Release, “Air National Guard Receives First HC-130J Combat King II,” Lockheed Martin, June 1, 2017, http://news.lockheedmartin.com/2017-06-01-Air-National-Guard-Receives-First-HC-130J-Combat-King-II (accessed December 14, 2017).

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90 “Army, Air Force Deploy Strykers North of the Arctic Circle, Defense News Online,

Defense Media Activity (November 5, 2015): https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/ 627875/army-air-force-deploy-strykers-north-of-the-arctic-circle/ (accessed December 1, 2017).

91 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), 18,

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).

92 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 6.

93 Arctic Council, “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic,” May 15, 2013, 5-8, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/ 11374/529 (accessed September 23, 2017).

94 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 6; JBER Public Affairs, “Alaska Air National Guard Rescue Squadrons Conduct Precision Parachute Training at JBER,” January 30, 2018, http://www.jber.jb.mil/News/News-Articles/Article/1428261/alaska-air-national-guard-rescue-squadrons-conduct-precision-parachute-training/; Fact Sheet, “Guardian Angel,” U.S. Air Force, March 18, 2013, http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/ Article/104472/guardian-angel/ (accessed March 12, 2018).

95 Arctic Council, “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic,” May 12, 2011, 16-18, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/ 11374/531 (accessed September 23, 2017).

96 Steven Groves, “Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests,” The Heritage Foundation Online (June 26, 2014): https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/accession-convention-the-law-the-sea-unnecessary-advance-arctic-interests (accessed December 19, 2017).

97 U.S. Air National Guard, 176th Wing, “176th Air Defense Squadron,” http://www.176wg.ang.af.mil/Units/176OG/176ADS/ (accessed December 1, 2017).

98 U.S. Air National Guard, 176th Wing, “Alaska Rescue Coordination Center,” http://www.176wg.ang.af.mil/Units/11RCC/ (accessed December 1, 2017).

99 DoD, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, 18-19.

100 Sherman, “The Arctic Heats Up,” 35.

101 Andrew Holland, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats, National Security in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: How a Lack of Attention to the Arctic Is Harming America’s Interests, December 10, 2014, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20141210/102783/HHRG-113-FA14-Wstate-HollandA-20141210.pdf (accessed November 5, 2017).

102 Lamothe, “In a Changing Arctic, A Lone Coast Guard Ice Breaker Maneuvers.”

103 Navy Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, 15.

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104 Jeff Glor , “Arctic Air Base gets $40 Million Upgrade in Face of Increasing Missile

Threats,” CBS News Online (May 30, 2017): https://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-thule-air-base-arctic-jeff-glor/ (accessed February 21, 2018); “Raytheon Wins 5-Year North Warning System Contract,” CBC News Online (April 01, 2014): http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ north/raytheon-wins-5-year-north-warning-system-contract-1.2594075 (accessed February 21, 2018).

105 Leslie Wickman, “Near-Term Space Support for Arctic Operations,” Center for Space Policy and Strategy Online (March 2017, 4): http://www.aerospace.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/06/Arctic_Space_Support.pdf (accessed February 21, 2018).

106 Conway, “Toward a US Air Force Arctic Strategy,” 77.

107 Ibid., 68.

108 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 7-8.

109 General Lori J. Robinson, “Statement of General Lori J. Robinson, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command,” Congressional Record Online (April 16, 2017), 14-15, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Robinson_04-06-17.pdf (accessed November 15, 2017).

110 Mathew Strong, “Exercise VIGILANT SHIELD 17 Takes Off in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories,” NORAD News Online (October 19, 2016): http://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/ Article/979834/exercise-vigilant-shield-17-takes-off-in-yellowknife-northwest-territories/ (accessed February 21, 2018).

111 Allen and Whitman, Arctic Imperative, 16.

112 Air Force Public Affairs, “AF Senior Leaders Visit Arctic,” U.S. Air Force News Online (September 08, 2017): http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1302719/af-senior-leaders-visit-arctic/ (accessed March 13, 2018).

113 Ibid.

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